

FUNCTIONAL PARADOX IN SIDNEY'S
REVISED *ARCADIA*

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is primarily an attempt to demonstrate that Sidney's revised Arcadia may be read as a unified whole and should, in the light of its unity, be included in the literature of paradox. Nearly all recent studies of Sidney's work reaffirm an interpretation established during a period of scholarship from 1907 to 1935. At the heart of this interpretation is the contention that the revised Arcadia is an heroic poem or Renaissance epic. Though justly ascribing to Sidney's book a greater seriousness in conception and design than eighteenth- or nineteenth-century critics would allow, the interpretation tends, on the one hand, to augment rather than to reduce the apparent prolixity and incoherence which formed the basis for much earlier criticism of the romance and, on the other, to deny that the romance may be read as a unified whole with some simplicity of purpose operating beneath its outward complexity. If viewed in the light of paradoxes of situation functioning conceptually in accordance with certain principles of Ramistic logic, however, the revised Arcadia will be found to have a unity that derives from an interrelationship of theme, structure, plot and style. Viewed in this manner, the revised Arcadia will also be found to have as its true foundation a ground-plan Sidney admired in Erasmus and

Agrippa, namely, an inquiry into the discrepancy between things as they seem to be and things as they really are.

For nearly fifty years after its first publication in 1590 Sir Philip Sidney's revised Arcadia enjoyed wide popularity, passing through fifteen editions and surviving an increasing dislike for far-fetched tales of knight errantry.¹ But in the latter half of the seventeenth century the popularity of the work rapidly declined, partly no doubt because the memory of its author had waned, partly because literary and public attention was then on drama, and, with the possible exception of Aphra Behn's Oroonoko in 1688, the age produced no prose fiction of any importance. When in the next century the novel began to flourish with Defoe, Richardson and Fielding, reading tastes had changed. The demand was now for "real" life, and the fantasy and prolixity of Sidney's romance could no longer be tolerated. Henceforth criticism of the revised

¹Subsequent editions in 1598, 1599, 1605, 1607, 1613, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1627, 1630, 1633, and 1638 attest to the popularity of the work. It is interesting to note also that among some twenty-five derogatory references, by such writers as Shirley, Fletcher, Butler, Shakespeare, Meres, Jonson, Burton, Shadwell, and Dekker, to the Spanish romances--e.g., the Palmerin series, Mirror of Knighthood, Honor of Chivalry--that were popular in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Sidney's revised Arcadia is not to be found. See Henry Thomas, Spanish and Portuguese Romances of Chivalry (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 265-301. The only unfavorable seventeenth-century criticism of any note is Milton's well-known jibe in Eikonoclastes that the revised Arcadia is a "vain amatorious poem."

Arcadia was, with one or two exceptions, uniformly unfavorable.

Directed mainly at the structural complexity of the work, the criticism echoed a condemnation Horace Walpole set forth in 1759. In a statement that has since become notorious, Walpole scorned the work as "a tedious, lamentable, pedantic, pastoral romance, which the patience of a young virgin in love cannot now wade through."² In 1909, however, occurred the beginnings of a decided shift in critical opinion of the revised Arcadia. For in that year the bookseller Bertram Dobell made public his discovery of five manuscripts of what scholars generally refer to as the Old Arcadia, an earlier, straightforward version in which Sidney placed the

²A Catalogue of the Royal and Noble Authors of England, 2 vols. (London, 1759), I, 183. Cf. also William Hazlitt's remark that the revised Arcadia contains "the most involved, irksome, improgressive, and heteroclitic subject that ever was chosen to exercise the pen or patience of man" (The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, 22 vols. /London, 1931/, VI, 325); J. A. Symonds' summary of a "jungle of pastoral, sentimental, and heroic adventures" (Sir Philip Sidney /London, 1902/, p. 23); or J. J. Jusserand's statement that Sidney was "no more capable of restraining.../fancies/ into logical order than a man can restrain or introduce reason into a dream" (The English Novel in the Time of Shakespeare, tr. Elizabeth Lee /London, 1908/, p. 252). See also the adverse criticism by J. W. H. Atkins in Cambridge History of English Literature, III, 353-354 and by W. J. Courthope in A History of English Poetry, 6 vols. (London, 1904), II, 220. More favorable criticism is in the following works, which emphasize the heroic in Sidney's romance and thereby anticipate Edwin Greenlaw's theory of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem (see note 5, below): Isaac Disraeli, Amenities of Literature, 3 vols. (London, 1841), II, 352-365; William Stigant, "Sir Philip Sidney," Cambridge Essays (London, 1858); and Saint-Marc Girardin, Cours de Littérature Dramatique (Paris, 1899).

pastoral element foremost.³ Scholars were now in a position to inquire into Sidney's motive for reworking an earlier version, and their corresponding shift of attention from the pastoral to the heroic element in the revision led generally to criticism more favorable than Walpole's disparaging remark. The real significance, therefore, of Lobell's discovery is that within a few years it opened up what was to be nearly a quarter of a century of Arcadian scholarship, heralded in 1913 by the appearance of Edwin Greenlaw's "Sidney's Arcadia as an Example of Elizabethan Allegory,"⁴ an article that immediately set the course for modern criticism of Sidney's romance.

Greenlaw's article introduced an interpretation of the revised Arcadia that is now widely accepted by scholars. "By Sidney and his contemporaries," writes Greenlaw, "Arcadia was

³ See "New Light upon Sir Philip Sidney's 'Arcadia,'" The Quarterly Review, CCXI (July, 1909), 74-100. The Old Arcadia, written in 1580, appears as Volume IV of The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (London, 1912-1926), hereafter referred to as Works. Two other versions of the romance exist: Sidney's revision, begun 1581-1582, left incomplete at a point near the end of Book III, frequently referred to as the New Arcadia and published in quarto by Ponsonby in 1590; a composite text issued in folio by Sidney's sister in 1593, containing the revised fragment plus slightly modified additions from the Old Arcadia. All references to Sidney's romance in the present study are, unless otherwise indicated, to the 1590 quarto edition.

⁴In Kittredge Anniversary Papers (Boston, 1913), pp. 327-337.

regarded as an heroic poem."⁵ Greenlaw's theory underlies the central point of his article: that "Sidney's book... is less truly to be described as a pastoral romance than as an 'historical fiction,' a prose counterpart of the Faerie Queene, having for its object 'to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline,' and to portray 'a good governour and a vertuous man.'"⁶ To substantiate the theory of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem, Greenlaw relies chiefly on contemporary references to the work as heroic by Abraham Fraunce, Sir John Harington, Gabriel Harvey, and Francis Meres, on the well-known passage in the Defence of Poesie where Sidney speaks favorably of Xenophon and Helicodorus as writers of heroic poems in prose, and on the testimony of Sidney's friend, Fulke Greville, as to the high seriousness and moral intent in the revised Arcadia. Rein-

⁵Ibid., p. 327. Though anticipated in some measure by the essays of Disraeli, Stigant, and Girardin cited above, Greenlaw is usually given credit for the theory. Cf. the note on this point by Marcus Goldman, Sir Philip Sidney and the Arcadia ("Illinois Studies in Language and Literature," Vol. XVII, Nos. 1-2 [Urbana, 1934]), p. 137.

⁶Op. cit., p. 337.

forced by a number of critical studies,⁷ Greenlaw's theory has met with little opposition,⁸ and its security can be felt in a recent remark by C. S. Lewis. "The first thing we need to know about the Arcadia," says Lewis, "is that it is a heroic poesy; not Arcadian idyll, not even Arcadian romance, but Arcadian epic."⁹

⁷ In particular, Friedrich Brie, Sidney's Arcadia, eine Studie zur englischen Renaissance in Quellen und Forschungen, CXXIV (1918), an interpretation of the revised Arcadia as an allegorical epic; Marcus Goldman, op. cit., pp. 144-168, 186-210, a study of the revised Arcadia as heroic romance and of Sidney's indebtedness to Malory's Morte d'Arthur for a part of the chivalric and moral content; and Kenneth O. Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney as a Literary Craftsman (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), pp. 110-295, an examination of the work especially in the light of rules for the Renaissance epic as laid down in Minturno's De Poeta. General comment on the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem may be found in C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford, 1954), pp. 318-347, and in Fritz Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England (Chicago, 1954), pp. 157-175, a study that also describes Sidney's romance as an embodiment of the humanistic ideal.

⁸ R. W. Zandvoort, Sidney's Arcadia: A Comparison Between the Two Versions (Amsterdam, 1929), pp. 121-134, has raised the strongest objection to the theory. Zandvoort finds "persuasive rather than convincing" Greenlaw's claim that Sidney looked upon his work as an heroic poem. "That Sidney may have regarded the Arcadia seriously," says Zandvoort, "does not necessarily mean that he regarded it as an attempt to illustrate the allegorical theory of epic poetry." Zandvoort interprets the revised Arcadia as "at once a romance and a treatise." For further details in his objection, see his review of Myrick's Sir Philip Sidney as a Literary Craftsman in Beiblatt zur Anglia, XLVII (1934), 242-248.

⁹ Op. cit., pp. 334-335. Cf. also the comment by Geoffrey Tillotson in his review (RES, XXIV [1937], 337-339) of Myrick's study: "...it is doubtful if counter arguments other than those Mr. Myrick has allowed for will be advanced--he is fortunate in coming at the end of a period of Sidney scholarship and makes full use of his position."

In the expansion and establishment of Greenlaw's theory, the major problem has been to account for the presence in the revised Arcadia of 1) the depreciatory preface, 2) the pastoral and love elements, and 3) the enormous complexity of Books I and II in particular. Scholars have had little difficulty in removing the first two of these obstacles. The depreciatory preface, with its statement that the romance is "but a trifle, and that triflinglie handled," is felt by all to belong almost certainly to the original version.¹⁰ And as for Sidney's use of love and the pastoral, scholars point to the Defence of Poesie. There, with regard to love, Sidney observes that "even to the Heroicall, Cupid hath ambitiously climed" and refers to the "sugred invention of that picture of love in [Heliodorus's] Theagenes & Chariclea";¹¹ and, with regard to the pastoral, he notes that "some have mingled matters Heroicall and Pastorall...if severed they be good, the conjunction cannot be hurtfull."¹² The apparent incompatibility of the intricacy of design with the simplicity of the

¹⁰The preface is usually taken to be an example of sprezzatura, "the courtly grace which conceals a sober purpose and is, indeed, the mark of consummate artistry" (Myrick, op. cit., p. 298). Moreover, in the preface Sidney speaks of the work as being done, a comment that could refer only to the Old Arcadia.

¹¹Works, III, 10.

¹²Ibid., p. 22.

classical epic cannot, however, be squared with any of Sidney's theories in the Defence of Poesie. What scholars have done, therefore, is to consider the complexity as an example of Renaissance luxuriance. Hence a reader looking into Myrick's defense of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem will find the complexity (along with the pastoral elements and the great length) treated under a separate chapter entitled "Ornament in the New Arcadia."¹³

To treat the intricate, complicated nature of the revised Arcadia as ornament or luxuriance is to treat it as something of an excrescence that is not organically functional, and is thus a satisfactory criticism only if the romance is to be thought of as meeting the requirements for a Renaissance ideal of the epic. But such a treatment denies unity in the revised Arcadia and does little to make the work any more comprehensible to modern readers than it was to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century readers. That Sidney troubled himself to revise the straightforward, unified Old Arcadia strongly suggests that he conceived the revision as organic, that is, as a romance with an interrelationship of theme, structure, plot and style. Since current interpretations of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem do not recognize this possibility, the principal aim of this study is to

¹³Op. cit., pp. 171-189.

demonstrate that, however incoherent Sidney's romance may appear on the surface, it does have a unified design.

One of the more familiar scenes in the revised Arcadia is the shipwreck near the beginning of Book I. Rescued from this disaster, Musidorus, one of the three heroes of the romance, has solicited the aid of Arcadian shepherds and is returning to the scene in hope of finding his friend Pyrocles, who has apparently perished in the same wreck.

They [the Arcadian shepherds] steared therefore as neere thetherward as they could: but when they came so neere as their eies were ful masters of the object, they saw a sight full of piteous strangenes: a ship, or rather the carkas of the shippe, or rather some few bones of the carkas, hulling there, part broken, part burned, part drowned: death having used more then one dart to that destruction. About it floted great store of very rich thinges, and many chestes which might promise no lesse. And amidst the precious things were a number of dead bodies, which likewise did not onely testifie both elemets violence, but that the chiefe violence was growen of humane inhumanitie: for their bodies were ful of grisly wounds, & their bloud had (as it were) filled the wrinkles of the seas visage: which it seemed the sea woulde not wash away, that it might witness it is not alwaies his fault, when we condemne his crueltie: in summe, a defeate, where the conquered kept both field and spoile: a shipwrack without storme or ill footing: and a wast of fire in the midst of water.¹⁴

The style of this shipwreck scene is particularly impressive.

¹⁴Works, I, 9-10.

The emphasis upon the strangeness of the sight; the contrast evident in the commingling of precious spoils with dead bodies; the summary statement of "a defeate, where the conquered kept both field and spoile: a shipwrack without storme or ill footing: and a wast of fire in the midst of water"--all these points clearly mark the importance of the passage as one of paradox of situation. Yet scholars have all but overlooked this aspect of Sidney's style.¹⁵ Their concern lies in defending the scene against the criticism of J. J. Jusserand, who was particularly disturbed by what he felt to be a jocular use of the pathetic fallacy in the sentence "their bloud had (as it were) filled the wrinckles of the seas visage: which

¹⁵The only extensive treatment of Sidney's paradoxes is by Samuel Lee Wolff, The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction (New York, 1912), pp. 357-366. Wolff's chief interest, however, is in Sidney's indebtedness to Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius. Other critics make only brief mention of paradox as a stylistic feature of the revised Arcadia. Cf., for example, Myrick, op. cit., pp. 187, 189. It is rather odd that Mona Wilson, Sir Philip Sidney (London, 1950), pp. 304-309, makes no mention of paradox in her admirable analysis of "The Arcadian Style." Nor is there any discussion of paradox in Zandvoort's chapter on "The Style of the Two Arcadias," op. cit., pp. 165-188, though he does cite (p. 171) an instance of two of oxymoron, a type of paradox that combines contradictory or incongruous words. Stanley Harkness, "The Prose Style of Sir Philip Sidney," in University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 2 (1918), pp. 57-76, likewise omits mention of paradox, though it should be stated that Harkness restricts his study to irregularities in Sidney's sentence patterns.

it seemed the sea would not wash away...."¹⁶ The paradoxical nature of the shipwreck scene sets the basic tone for the whole book and is essential to its unity.

For the shipwreck scene is but one of nearly a hundred examples of paradox in the revised Arcadia. Many of these paradoxes are, as critics observe, statements that Sidney works in for stylistic embellishment, but many more appear as situations which he plots against a larger paradox of anarchy in the midst of an Arcadian setting. It turns out that Sidney is exploring the difference between appearance and reality. Together these paradoxes of situation develop (i.e., illustrate) a central theme that demonstrates a paradoxical truth about virtue or high honor. Stated in Sidney's own words, the central theme of the revised Arcadia is that

¹⁶ Op. cit., pp. 255-259. Jusserand comments further (p. 259) that "There is indeed in French literature a dagger celebrated for having rougi le traître! but what is it in comparison; and ought it not in its turn to grow pale with envy at the thought of this sea that will not wash itself?" For a defense of Sidney's description, see Myrick, op. cit., pp. 185-188, who feels that the "most careful craftsmanship" marks the passage as a whole and thinks Sidney, "in his carefully maintained point of view, shows in his art a conspicuous intellectual quality." See also J. F. Danby, Poets on Fortune's Hill (London, 1952), p. 50, who writes: "The shipwreck description is not one of Sidney's purple passages. And as we have seen the pattern it reveals is not an arbitrary or conventional one imposed from the outside. It is the imprint of a mind mastering its objects. Sidney's style is balanced, antithetical, alliterative, calculated... Sidney saw the world in terms of division, balance, and resolution. His style is a reflection of that vision."

"the journey of high honor lies not in plaine wayes,"¹⁷ which is a reworking of a conventional theme found in Ovid and later in Bacon: "Adversity doth best discover virtue."¹⁸ Having related theme, plot and style by characterizing most of the episodes in Book II and the situations that constitute the main and sub plots in the work as a whole, paradox then intensifies an involved, labyrinthine structure that Sidney uses chiefly because a simple structure would not carry his theme. Thus, as Fulke Greville puts it, the end in the revised Arcadia is "not vanishing pleasure alone, but morall Images, and Examples, (as directing threds) to guide every man through the confused Labyrinth of his own desires, and life."¹⁹

With the combination of paradox and labyrinthine movement, the revised Arcadia becomes a riddle. Designed to teach as well as to delight, a riddle is characterized by perplexity and ingenuity. Until the riddle is solved, the perplexity remains primary; the ingenuity, secondary. The key

¹⁷ Works, I, 301.

¹⁸ See Chapter IV.

¹⁹ Sir Fulke Grevilles Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford, 1902), p. 223.

to Sidney's riddle is paradox, a study of which, though the device is one of the very elements that contribute to the form of the romance, nevertheless solves the puzzle and reveals its ingenuity. Analyzed in terms of paradox, the revised Arcadia emerges not as a ragged, incoherent jungle of thoughts and events but as a unified romance which, beneath its perplexity and in the face of its unfinished state, is carefully designed to fulfill what Sidney believed to be the purpose of poetry: to teach and delight.²⁰

The unified design briefly outlined above comes about through Sidney's application of paradox to a particular method of discourse that serves this twofold purpose of poetry. It will be seen that the new reading of the revised Arcadia follows closely the Defence of Poesie and Greville's testimony as to Sidney's aim. The reading also relies on a source hitherto slighted by critics. In view of the widespread acceptance of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem or epic, it is usually assumed that Sidney's use of the in medias res type

²⁰Works, III, 9. "Poesie therefore," says Sidney, "is an Art of Imitation: for so Aristotle termeth it in the word μιμνησκει that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically. A speaking Picture, with this end to teach and delight." It should be noted that Sidney maintained that poetry can be inclusive of prose. See Works, III, 10.

of structural pattern was due to the influence of Heliodorus's Aethiopica. This indebtedness seems all the more certain in view of the fact that Sidney is known to have borrowed other material, including paradoxes, from Heliodorus.²¹ It is quite likely, however, that Sidney's source was more immediate; that for his inverted structural plan he drew upon the description of the prudential method of discoursing outlined in the logic of the French reformer, Peter Ramus. This method is a statement of the in medias res scheme to which Ramus devotes some eight pages in his major treatise, fully explaining the plan and clearly designating it as one not only suitable for the functional use of a stylistic device like paradox but particularly adaptable for the poet whose task it is to teach and delight a popular reader. Indeed, the unified design of the revised Arcadia itself as adumbrated here is in the very spirit of Ramus's application of logic and rhetoric to literature, particularly his demonstration of how a figure such as paradox can logically function to "prove" a theme. In short, the evidence strongly suggests that the revised Arcadia is an example of Ramistic logic.

²¹See Wolff, op. cit., pp. 210 ff. Sidney's sources have been studied extensively. A convenient, annotated bibliography appears in Zandvoort, op. cit., pp. 189-197, to whose list should be added the studies by Goldman and Myrick referred to above, and the following works: Mary Patchell, The Palmerin Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction (New York, 1947), pp. 115-127, and Freda L. Townsend, "Sidney and Ariosto," PMLA, LXI (March, 1946), 97-108.

For the modern reader the term paradox is likely to be colored by modern notions and interpretations that all too often restrict its meaning to a statement expressing a verbal contradiction. The discussion of the meaning of paradox in the sixteenth century, based primarily on an examination of the most widely used grammar-books, treatises on rhetoric, and compendiums of rhetorical figures, discloses three senses of the term that were familiar to an Elizabethan writer. From its original meaning of a statement or proposition contrary to received opinion, the term came to include apparently or actually contradictory statements and then, supported by the element of surprise or wonder often implicit in the original sense, statements or situations contrary to expectation. It is mainly this latter sense, the paradox of situation, that provides the basis for unity in the revised Arcadia.

In the sixteenth century paradox appeared also in an expanded form: a literary genre with which Sidney was well acquainted and which doubtless, when considered along with the well-known paradoxical character of his life, did much to shape a personal outlook on the world in terms of sharp contrasts. The survey of the literature of paradox before 1586 places the revised Arcadia in proper context as an artful innovation of paradox in opposition to a frequent and popular employment of the device as a rhetorical exercise.

The concluding chapter of this study summarizes four important corollaries to the central thesis that the revised Arcadia may be read as a unified whole through an awareness of Sidney's application of certain principles of Ramistic investigation and method to the use of paradox. First, by employing the spirit of Ramism to validate Sidney's theory as to the end of poetry, which is to teach and delight, the revised Arcadia will be seen to take on a distinct practical character. Second, by creatively illustrating the influence of Ramus's contention that the art of logic is to reason well, the romance assumes an historical importance. Third, by achieving unity through the interrelationship of theme, structure, plot and style, the romance gains the literary distinction of contributing to the development of English prose fiction. And finally, by divulging a paradoxical truth, as Sidney saw it, about the nature of reality, the romance assumes an ontological significance.

CHAPTER II

THE MEANING OF PARADOX IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Dating from 1540, the term paradox, in the etymological sense recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary of "a statement or tenet contrary to received opinion or belief,"¹ emerged in English writing close to the outset of the Elizabethan period. This original meaning of the term, derived from Greek para (contrary to) plus doxa (opinion), was current throughout the age and received particular emphasis and popularity when it appeared in a well-established genre with a tradition dating back to the ancient Greeks. The meaning is not, however, one with which a modern reader is likely to be familiar. Nor is he likely to recognize any sense of paradox other than that in which the term is construed as a statement actually or apparently self-contradictory. Yet the term paradox was understood during Sidney's time in at least three closely related senses, two of which often obscured the original meaning. Since an understanding of the detailed analysis of the revised Arcadia that appears in a later chapter will demand a knowledge of each of these three senses, and particularly the two historical senses, and

¹The entry reads in part as follows: "Palsgrave Tr. Acclastus Prol. Bijb, We shall not wytsafe any Paradoxes in noo place, i, we shall not wytsafe...any thynges, that be abcue or beyonde the common opynyon of men."

since the chapter will insist upon rather close distinctions among them, a workable description of the meaning of paradox in the sixteenth century is here necessary.

Perhaps it is well to keep in mind that in this chapter and the next no attempt is made to trace specific sources for Sidney's paradoxes. Rather are the two chapters together to be thought of as an attempt to provide a description of paradox and to define a milieu of paradox by which Sidney, a man of wide reading and learning, might be expected to have been influenced as his inquiry into the discrepancy between appearance and reality began to take shape.

A full understanding of what the term paradox meant to an Elizabethan writer like Sidney can best be gained in the light of a brief inquiry into the nature of Renaissance rhetoric, particularly its relation to logic, and an examination of those treatises and textbooks on rhetoric which supplied definitions and illustrations of the term.

Since the subject of paradox belongs to that branch of Renaissance rhetoric known as style, a full definition of the term is not, for reasons shortly to be adduced, easy to come by. To the modern reader, sixteenth-century rhetoric is likely to appear as endless confusion. Disagreement among authorities as to what material was properly a matter for logic and what was properly a matter for rhetoric led to difference of opinion with regard to the nature of the divi-

sions within these disciplines. The two parts of rhetoric around which much of the confusion centered were invention and style. In the Middle Ages dialectic or logic occupied a place of first importance in the trivium; of its traditional (i.e., Ciceronian) five divisions of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery, rhetoric managed to retain only the latter three, the first two having been assigned to logic. In the Renaissance, however, rhetoric was elevated to a top position in the trivium. Yet invention, its first branch, was not always given treatment in school manuals. On the one hand, a few writers, e.g., Leonard Cox in The Arte or crafte of rhetorike (1524 ?)² and Thomas Wilson in The Arte of Rhetorique (1560),³ attempted to restore invention and arrangement to their traditional place in rhetoric. On the other hand, some writers, especially those who, like Abraham Fraunce in The Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), had fallen under the influence of Peter Ramus and the Rhetorica of his disciple

²Cox's treatise has the distinction of being the earliest English work on rhetoric. It deals with only one point of Ciceronian rhetoric, viz., inventio or investigation. For a discussion of Cox's departure from the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero's De inventionibus in the handling of invention, and of Cox's contention that dialectical and rhetorical invention are not entirely separate, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton, 1956), pp. 93-94.

³Cf. the reprint of the 1585 edition, collated with the edition of 1560 (the editio princeps) and that of 1567, done by G. H. Mair (London, 1909), p. 6. Wilson's rhetoric, an illustration of all five divisions of traditional or Ciceronian rhetoric, was first published in an incomplete form in 1553.

Audemarus Talaeus, took issue with traditional rhetoric and assigned invention, arrangement, and memory to logic--which left only style and delivery as the whole of rhetoric.⁴

Hence one frequently finds in an Elizabethan treatise on rhetoric much the same material, dealing with or related to invention, as that presented in a treatise on logic.⁵

Similar confusion and overlapping appeared in style, another main branch of rhetoric, and an aspect to which invention was in part related. Much of the richness and exuberance of language in Elizabethan literature was due to the schoolboy's early training in rhetoric, for not only did rhetoric hold first place in the trivium but of its five branches style was at that time considered by some writers the most important. Yet style was the least stable of these

⁴The popularity of Ramus (1515-1572) and his supposed reform of logic and rhetoric lasted in England from the latter half of the sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century. Ramistic logic was introduced at Cambridge in the early 1570's by the lectures of Laurence Chaderton, and in 1575-76 Gabriel Harvey delivered at the same institution a series of lectures on Ramus's doctrine of rhetoric. See Chapter IV. Ramistic rhetoric, which included about twenty-five tropes and figures and a discourse on delivery, was advanced by Talaeus in his Institutiones oratoriae (1567), usually referred to as the Rhetorica. Fraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorike--ed. Ethel Seaton (Oxford, 1950)--is a version of the Rhetorica and contains numerous illustrations from Sidney's Old Arcadia.

⁵Cf. William G. Crane, Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance (New York, 1937), pp. 6-7, 58-59.

branches, partly because of the association of one of its categories with logic and partly because of loose terminology among writers on rhetoric. In many Renaissance textbooks on rhetoric under the general heading of style were grouped figures of amplification designed to aid the student in the development of a theme. The most important of these figures were those of thought. Since these were derived from the process of dialectical invention, one might, however, find them under "topics" in a treatise on logic. Thus the figures of thought in Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577)⁶ do not appear in Fraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorique, because Ramus had assigned those figures to logic. In view of this overlapping, one might expect to find an example of paradox cited as a contrary or a contradictory under "topics" or "places" of invention in a treatise on rhetoric. As William G. Crane observes, "To schoolboys and literary men of the Renaissance it mattered little whether such devices as definition, distinction, division, cause, similitude, dissimilitude, example, and testimony of authorities fell under the heading of 'topics of logic' or under

⁶"The Garden of Eloquence conteyning the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorique...Set fourth in English, by Henry Peacham, Minister. Anno. 1577." STC 19497. A corrected edition of Peacham's rhetoric, showing the influence of Ramism, appeared in 1593. A facsimile reprint of this edition is available, with an Introduction by William G. Crane (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1954).

'figures of thought.'⁷

In addition to confusing one division of style with logical invention, Elizabethan writers of textbooks and compendiums created further confusion by ignoring distinctions in some of their illustrations for rhetorical figures. For instance, note the following cases wherein a contradictory (paradoxical) statement appears under different headings:

1) under contrarietie in Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique

Contrarietie, is when our talke standeth by contrary wordes or sentences together. As thus. We might dispraise some one man, he is of a strange nature as euer I saw, for to his frend he is churlish, to his foe he is gentle: giue him faire wordes and you offend him: check him sharply, and you winne him. Let him haue his will, and he will flie in thy face: keepe him short and you shall haue him at commandment.⁸

2) under enthymeme in Richard Sherry's A Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike (1555)

Enthymeme, a sentence made of contraries...to be allowed of euil, is gret reproch. Also flattry getteth frendes, trueth hatred.⁹

⁷ Op. cit., p. 63.

⁸ Cf. the edition by G.H. Mair, p. 199.

⁹ Fol. i^v. SEC 22429.

- 3) under contrary in Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Retherike (1584)

✓Contraries✓, opposites whereof one is set agaynst one and therefore they directly fight one against another. ✓Ex.✓...to be ones father and his begotten Sonne.¹⁰

- 4) under paradoxon in Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577)

It was such lucke as you neuer heard of, almost incredible, that when fyre should haue consumed him, fire saued him, and lykewyse at another tyme, when water should haue bene his death, it saued his lyfe.¹¹

- 5) under ironia in Fraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorike

Ironia, a Trepe, that by naming one contrarie intendeth another...and it is perceiued by the contrarietie of the matter it selfe, or by the manner of vtterance quite differing from the sense of the words. ✓Ex.✓ O notable affection, for the loue of the father, to kill the wife, and disinherit the children. O single minded modestie, to aspire to no lesse, than to the princie Diademe.¹²

Such confusion of rhetorical figures is perhaps understandable.

Sister Miriam Joseph notes that the "Tudor rhetoricians treat eleven figures based on contraries and contradictories."¹³

The figures are litotes, syneciosis, paradox, antithesis, antanagoge, irony, synchysis, inter se pugnancia, antiphrasis,

¹⁰Fol. B₃^r. STC 10766.

¹¹Op. cit., M11j.

¹²See the edition by Ethel Seaton, op. cit., p. 10.

¹³Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language (New York, 1947), p. 323.

paralipsis, and epitrope, the last three being forms of irony. Since contrast is the basis of each of these figures, an illustration of one might well serve to illustrate another. Shakespeare's "Towards die many times before their deaths; / The valiant never taste of death but once" (Julius Caesar, II, ii, 32) is clearly an example of paradox; but one might also use the lines, as Sister Joseph herself does, for an illustration of syncrisis, a figure "which compares contrary things in contrasting clauses."

Though understandable, confusion between certain aspects of rhetoric and logic and within rhetoric itself means, of course, that no single, generally accepted definition of paradox was in use during Sidney's time. Moreover, it has been implied that paradox was but one of a host of figures (and words) that were undergoing changes in meaning during the Renaissance. Yet in spite of the apparent difficulties such changes produced, imbedded in grammar-school textbooks and literature is sufficient information to make understandable what the term meant to the Elizabethan and to provide a workable description of paradox for the present study.

For help in writing themes the Elizabethan schoolboy made use primarily of three kinds of textbooks: a manual that supplied elementary instruction in gathering and organizing material, a textbook with a wealth of illustrations for

copiousness of matter, and a rhetoric book or compendium listing the various tropes and figures that aid in amplification and ornamentation. Of the available manuals of instruction in composition, the most widely used was the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius, particularly the Latin edition published in 1542 by Reinhard Lorich.¹⁴ Aphthonius's manual consisted of fourteen exercises with definitions and illustrations.¹⁵ To achieve copiousness of matter, the student could supplement the Progymnasmata with Erasmus's De copia (1511).¹⁶ It is interesting that both of these texts

¹⁴The title page of the edition used here reads in part as follows: "Progymnasmata Latinitate donata...H. Middleton. 1572." STC 700.

¹⁵See the Introduction by Francis R. Johnson to the facsimile reprint of Richard Rainolde's A booke called the Foundation of Rhetorique /1563/ (New York, 1945).

¹⁶"De duplici copia verborum ac rerum...J. Kyngston. 1569." STC 10472. Concrete evidence of the fusion of rhetoric and logic can be seen in the case of commentaries on Erasmus's De copia. In each of his three treatises on rhetoric, De rhetorica libri tres (1519), Institutiones rhetoricae (1521), and Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo (1531), Philip Melancthon refers his readers to the second book of the De copia for further treatment of figures of amplification; and in his commentary on Cicero's Topica--Scholia in Ciceronis Topica (1524)--he notes the close parallel between the De copia and Cicero's treatise. Moreover, in A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550) Richard Sherry lists under "Figures of sentences" material from the De copia for gaining abundance of matter. But in De duplici copia verborum ac rerum cum commentariis M. Veltkirchii (Hagenoa, 1524), John Doelsch had argued that this same material originates in the process of logical invention. Further discussion of these particular instances of confusion between rhetoric and logic can be found in Crane's Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance, pp. 71-73.

made provision for "contrarie," under which heading a paradox or paradoxical statement sometimes appeared.¹⁷ But the "contrarie" did not involve the paradox of defending a view contrary to received opinion or belief, but simply the treatment of a subject with its opposite.¹⁸ As a starting point for a description of paradox, those works concerned chiefly, though not exclusively, with style therefore provide ample illustration, e.g., Cicero's treatises and the various texts and compendiums that deal with rhetorical figures.

Popularity of the etymological meaning of paradox has already been cited as being due mainly to its expansion into a literary genre. This meaning of paradox was, of course, in use among the early Greeks. Socrates, for example, forced Thrasymachus to assert a view contrary to received opinion, namely, that the unjust are wise and good.¹⁹ From the Greeks the meaning came to England through the Romans, Cicero in

¹⁷In the Progymnasmata, p. 32; in the De copia, p. 34^r and p. 49^r.

¹⁸For example, in Richard Rainolde's A booke called the Foundation of Rhetorike, which is an English adaptation of Lorich's Latin text of the Progymnasmata, the contrary view to Solon's law "whiche suffered aduultie to bee punished with death, no judgement giuen thereupon" simply offers an "argument sufficient to confounde the lawe of Solon," namely, "no man ought in his own cause, to be his own judge or Magistrate." See the reprint by Francis R. Johnson, op. cit., fol. lx.

¹⁹Cf. Warner G. Rice, "The Paradossi of Ortensio Landò," University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, VIII (1932), 59.

particular. His well-known Paradoxa stoicorum was a series of arguments which he termed paradoxes because they "are surprising, and they run counter to universal opinion."²⁰ Aside from its appearance in a genre, which receives due attention in the next chapter, the etymological meaning of paradox was also current in works of a diversified character in the more limited form of statements and propositions.

In the 1577 edition of The Garden of Eloquence

Henry Peacham defines and illustrates paradox as follows:

Paradoxon, when we affyrme somethinge to be true, by saying we woulde not haue beleued it, nor yet once suspected it, or in good things, by saying we neuer lookte for it, thus, I woulde neuer haue beleued that he had bene suche a one, but that I heard it auouched of credible persons, and testyfyed by very good witsnesse, surely it is truth that I tell you, he is not without doubt the man you take him for. Another, it was such lucke as you neuer heard of, almost incredible, that when fyre should haue consumed him, fire saued him, and lykewyse at another tyme, when water should haue bene his death, it saued his lyfe. Act. Apost. 26. Paule being accused of the Jewes to King Agrippa, how that he beleued and taught the resurrection from death, which Doctryne they counted false, and therefore brought him to his aunswere, Paule used this figure, shewing that not long before, he was of their opynyon, and thought as they doe now, why should it be thought, quoth he, a thing incredible to you, that God should raise agayn the dead? I also verily thought in myselfe, that I oughte to doe many contrary thinges, cleane against the name of Jesus of Nazareth, which thing

²⁰ Cicero De oratore III: De fato: Paradoxa stoicorum: De partitione oratoriae, tr. H. Rackham, ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 257.

I bid also in Jerusalem, Paule to the Galatians, I maruayle that you are so soone turned.²¹

Peacham's definition has been quoted in full for purposes of comparison later in this chapter with a corrected version of The Garden of Eloquence that appeared in 1593. There it will be seen that, aside from problems in syntax, the definition just quoted is quite ambiguous; for it actually includes three senses of the term. For the present, however, it is sufficient to point out evidence of the original sense, which can be seen in the phrase "by saying we woulde not haue beleued it" and in the illustration from Acts. A similar meaning for paradox appeared in the work of Thomas Blundeville. In The Art of Logike (1599) he wrote, "Paradox, which is as much to say as an opinion contrary to all men's opinions..."; and offered as his example the following specious argument: "the Sophister will make you to grant that a rich and happy king is wretched, by force of argument thus: whosoever is subject to sin is wretched: but all rich and happy kings are subject to

²¹ Op. cit., Mij^v.

sinne, ergo all rich and happy kinges are wretched."²²

Finally, Sidney himself, in reply to the charge that poets are the greatest liars, used the term in its original sense when in the Defence of Poesie (1583) he said: "I answered Paradoxically, but truly, I think truly: that of all writers under the Sunne, the Poet is the least lyer...."²³ In the present work this etymological meaning of paradox--a tenet or proposition contrary to received opinion or belief--is referred to as paradox contrary.

Doubtless it would be futile to argue that responsibility for the first appearance of paradox contrary in English writings was attributable to any one person. A general interest among Elizabethans in the classics, including Greek, where the device was frequent, makes substantiation of the argument nearly out of the question. Yet it would not be be-

²²"The Art of Logike. Plainely taught in the English tongue, by M. Blundeville...for J. Windet. 1590." STC 3142. The quotations are on pp. 162-163. It is interesting to note that Blundeville's work, which represents a reaction against Ramism and a return to scholastic logic, gives further evidence of the shifting of terms from rhetoric to logic. In contrast to Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577), where paradox is cited as a rhetorical figure, Blundeville's treatise clearly places paradox in the realm of logic. This is comparable to Dudley Fenner's insistence (op. cit., B₃^F) that paradox belongs under "disagreeable arguments" in logic.

²³The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1912-26), III, 28--hereafter referred to as Works. Another example would be Pyrocles's defense of the contemplative life as opposed to the active life, in the familiar debate scene in Book I of the revised Arcadia.

side the mark to claim for Cicero, a master of Latin prose, a large share in the matter. For it was mainly Cicero whom the early Elizabethans studied as a model of style, then held to be the chief division of rhetoric. "The rhetorical treatises of Cicero," writes Crane, "particularly his De oratore, De inventione, and De partitione oratoriae, along with the Ad Herennium, which had long been attributed to him, received considerable attention in the schools."²⁴ Crane's point is but further testimony to a Renaissance reverence for the authority of Cicero that is now a commonplace.²⁵ Cicero's Paradoxa stoicorum has already been mentioned, and in view of the esteem in which Cicero was held, there is no reason to doubt that this work had much to do with popularization of paradox contrary as a literary genre. It seems safe, therefore, to begin with Cicero in discussing the appearance during the Elizabethan period of a second meaning of paradox.

²⁴Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance, p. 67.

²⁵"But the imitation of Cicero had its weaknesses and its abuses, as it was inculcated by the pedagogues. The tendency to imitate the merely formal characteristics of Cicero's style, to neglect thoughtful matter in favor of commonplaces, formulas, showy tropes and schemes culled from one's reading, and phrases patched together in a mosaic compiled out of 'the current aids to writers,' was all too common." See Harold S. Wilson, "Gabriel Harvey's Ciceronianus," University of Nebraska Studies, No. 4 (Nov., 1945), p. 25. Cf. also Sidney's letter to his brother Robert in 1580 (Works, III, 132): "So yow can speake and write Latine not barbarously I never require great study in Ciceronianisme the cheife abuse of Oxford, Qui dum verba sectantur, res insas negligunt."

In the De oratore Cicero declares that "the opposition of verbal contradictories is one of the chief embellishments of diction, and this same device is often witty as well...."²⁶ Not a definition of paradox, Cicero's statement nevertheless points up the main characteristic of a meaning of the term that dates, according to an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, from 1569 and, although usually present in the form of a statement or proposition, came by transferred sense to be applied to any phenomenon or action with seemingly contradictory aspects. Whereas in the original sense of the term emphasis lay on a contrary, with this second meaning came a stress on a contradiction, either actual or (more often) apparent. Sometimes the contradiction remained implicit in the phrasing of the sentence, as in the following entry again from the Oxford English Dictionary: "Your strange Paradox of Christes eating of his owne fleshe."²⁷ The more common practice, however, was to express the contradiction in a forcible manner by means of antithesis and epigram, as in Shakespeare's "No face is fair that is not full so black."²⁸ It will be observed that in the development of this second

²⁶See Rackham's translation, op. cit., p. 397.

²⁷As cited in the Dictionary, the reference reads as follows: "1569 Crowley Seph. Dr. Watson 1.187."

²⁸Love's Labour's Lost, IV, 111, 253.

meaning the etymological sense was not lost but simply subordinated by a contradiction, which, in keeping with the Elizabethan interest in style, quite often became the means for verbal dexterity.

That this second meaning of paradox found a place in textbooks and compendiums of the period was anticipated earlier in the discussion of the confusion among writers like Richard Sherry, Thomas Wilson, Abraham Fraunce, Henry Peacham, and Dudley Fenner as to the proper terminology for rhetorical figures. It should be noted, however, that because of this very confusion the type of paradox based on a contradiction rarely appeared, defined and illustrated, under the category one would expect--that is, under "paradox"; rather did it appear as an example of whatever figure or place--e.g., enthymeme, contrarietie, ironia, contrary--the author of the textbook or treatise fancied the example to fit. In other words, a contradictory statement whether actual or apparent was not always construed as a paradox. Indeed, it was sometimes cited simply as a contradictio. Such is the case with an entry in Aphthonius's Progymnasmata. As an example of "prudentia" under the general heading of "exemplum," Aphthonius records the contradictio "At senectus ipsa morbus avocatur a rebus gerendis, ac inutiles reddit (But old age itself removes pains from things that have to be done, and renders them ineffective)," which is followed in turn by a de-

tailed solutio.²⁹ Yet there is sufficient evidence to indicate that, despite its frequent appearance under classifications other than "paradox," what has been here described as a second type of paradox was understood as such by Elizabethans. In Love's Labour's Lost the King's emphatic response to Biron's "No face is fair that is not full so black" is-- "O paradox!"³⁰ Moreover, in an earlier work, Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577), this type of paradox is de-

²⁹ See the 1572 edition by H. Middleton, op. cit., p. 217v. STC 700. The solutio reads as follows: "Multo plura, quam iuvenes, efficiere possunt senes, rerum studiis assueti. Quorum arma sunt artes, & virtutum exercitationes. Nec viribus aut velocitate corporum res magnae gerentur, sed consilio, auctoritate, atque prudentia (People advanced in age are able to accomplish much more than young people, because they are accustomed to the study of things. Their weapons are the arts and the exercise of virtues. Not by physical strength nor by bodily agility are great things accomplished, but by deliberation, authority, and prudence)."

³⁰ IV, 111, 254. Cf. also Hamlet's remark to Ophelia (III, 1, 111-116): "Aye, truly, for the power of beauty will sooner transform honesty from what it is to a bawd than the force of honesty can translate beauty into his likeness. This was sometime a paradox but now the time gives it proof." Hamlet's remark demands a word of comment. When a statement or proposition contains a seemingly contradictory element that is not stressed, the difference between paradox contrary and paradox contradictory is not always easy to see. A statement that makes the contradiction emphatic by means of antithesis presents no problem; but otherwise either sense may be applicable. Hamlet's remark is a case in point. In other words, as an example of paradox contrary Hamlet's comment, once held to be contrary to received opinion or belief, has through time gained acceptance. The passage is sometimes annotated in this way (Cf. the text of Hamlet in Major British Writers, ed. G. B. Harrison, 2 vols. [New York, 1954], I, 260). It is this writer's feeling, however, that though antithesis is absent the apparent contradiction in the passage subordinates the original sense, and that the example is therefore properly one of paradox contradictory.

fined and illustrated under its proper category. "Paradoxon," writes Peacham, "when we affyrme somethinge to be true, by saying we woulde not haue beleueed it, nor yet once suspected it, or in good things, by saying we neuer loockte for it...."³¹ Peacham's definition has already been quoted in connection with paradox contrary, but the definition applies equally well to the second type of paradox. For the latter, because of its apparent contradiction, was often understood simply as a statement or proposition that appears false but that can be proven true. One of Peacham's illustrations bears out the point. "It was such lucke as you neuer heard of," he says, "almost incredible, that when fyre should haue consumed him, fire saued him, and lykewyse at another tyme, when water should haue bene his death, it saued his lyfe."³²

The authority of Cicero's treatises and the many textbooks, manuals, and compendiums of rhetoric gave popular currency to this second meaning of paradox. Along with these works should be mentioned the influence of the Greek romances, beginning in 1579 when Thomas Underdowne translated into English the Aethiopica of Heliodorus. One of the main stylistic features of these romances is the use of

³¹Milj^v.

³²Ibid.

paradox, especially paradox contradictory. In the opening pages of the Aethiopica, for example, appears a description of the remains of an unusual battle (fought on land inundated by a flood) that apparently began as a banquet. Moored nearby was a ghostly ship. "To be brief," translates Underdowne, "God shewed a wonderfull sight in so shorte time, bruuing bloude with wine, joyning battaile with banquetting, mingling indifferently slaughters with drinkings, and killing with quaffinges...the conquerors [were] no where, a manifest victorie but no spoys taken away, a shippe without mariners enely, but as concerning other things untouched, as if shee had beene kept with a garde of many men, and lay at road in a faulse harbour." ³³ Another Greek romance popular with Elizabethans, particularly Robert Greene, was Achilles Tatius's Leucippe and Clitophon. Book II of this story contains the following paradox of fire and water: "I myself have seen some of these miraculous sights: there is, for example, a spring in Sicily which has fire mixed with its waters; if you look down you can see the flame shooting up from beneath, and yet if you touch the water it is as cold as snow: the fire is not put out by the water, nor is the water heated by the fire, but a truce

³³See An Aethiopian History...Englished by Thomas Underdowne ("The Tudor Translations"; London, 1895), p. 9.

reigns in the spring between the two elements."³⁴

The influence of the Greek romances is most noticeable in the works of Elizabethan writers of prose fiction, who employed the device of paradox chiefly as ornamentation. For example, in John Lyly's Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (1579) abound sentences like the following: "I, but in the coldest flints there is hotte fire, the Bee that hath honny in hir mouth, hath a sting in hir tayle...."³⁵ Or in George Gascoigne's The Pleasant Fable of Ferdinando Jeronimi and Leonara de Valasco (1572) appear statements like "So that considering the natural climate of the country, I must say that I have found fire in frost. And yet comparing the inequality of my deserts, with the least part of your worthiness, I feel a continual frost, in my most fervent fire."³⁶ Or, finally, one has no difficulty in finding a number of examples from any one of Robert Greene's romances, for instance, this one from Menaphon (1589): "I thinke, Menaphon, that high minds are the

³⁴See Achilles Tattius, tr. S. Gaselee. ("The Loeb Classical Library"; London, 1917), p. 86. Samuel Lee Wolff, The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction (New York, 1912), pp. 211-233, has shown that in the revised Arcadia Sidney uses quite a number of these paradoxes from Heliodorus and Achilles Tattius.

³⁵See The Complete Works of John Lyly, ed. R. Warwick Bond, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1902), I, 224.

³⁶Gascoigne's work is sometimes referred to as The Adventures of Master F.J. See Elizabethan Fiction, ed. Robert Ashley and Edwin M. Moseley (New York, 1953), p. 8.

shelters of pouertie, and Kings seates are couerts for distressed persons...."³⁷ The list could readily be supplemented from the field of poetry, such as Spenser's description of Nature in The Faerie Queene: "This great Grandmother of all creatures bred,/ Great Nature, ever young, yet full of eld;/ Still mooving, yet unmoved from her sted;/ Unseene of any, yet of all beheld...."³⁸ But the foregoing examples indicate the currency of this figure.

³⁷See Life and Works of Robert Greene, ed. Alexander Grosart, 12 vols. (London, 1881-1883), II, 60.

³⁸Bk. VII, vii, 109-112. Cf. the paradox in the last couplet of the following lines from Marlowe's Hero and Leander (II, 318-322):

And from her countenance behold ye might
 A kind of twilight break, which through the hair,
 As from an orient cloud, glimps'd here and there;
 And round about the chamber this false morn
 Brought forth the day before the day was born.

Or the use of paradox in the well-known "Rich" sonnet (Works, II, 299), which has been the mainstay for those who find biographical significance in Sidney's Astrophel and Stella:

My mouth doth water, and my breast doth swell,
 My tongue doth itch, my thoughts in labour be:
 Listen then Lordings with good eare to me,
 For of my life I must a riddle tell.
 Toward Auroras Court a Nymph doth dwell,
 Rich in all beauties which mans eye can see:
 Beauties so farre from reach of words, that we
 Abuse her praise, saying she doth excell:
 Rich in the treasure of deserv'd renowne,
 Rich in the riches of a royall hart,
 Rich in those gifts which give th' eternall crowne;
 Who though most rich in these and everie part,
 Which make the patents of true worldly blisse,
 Hath no misfortune, but that Rich she is.

A later chapter will show that Sidney uses this type of paradox both in the form of statements to amplify the central theme and in the form of situations to directly develop that theme. When used in the present study this figure, where a statement or proposition or action is either apparently or actually contradictory, is called paradox contradictory.

Much of the ambiguity noted earlier in Peacham's definition of paradox disappeared in a corrected version of The Garden of Eloquence published at London in 1593.³⁹ In this revised edition Peacham defines the term as "a forme of speech by which the Orator affirmeth some thing to be true, by saying he would not haue beleued it, or that it is so strange, so great, or so wonderfull, that it may appeare to be incredible."⁴⁰ He then illustrates the definition with the account from Acts he had used in the 1577 edition of his rhetoric--of St. Paul's argument with the Jews over the Resurrection; and he adds the remark that the figure is to be used when the "thing which is to be taught is new, strange, incredible."⁴¹ Compared

³⁹"The Garden of Eloquence, containing the most excellent Ornaments, Exornations, Lightes, flowers, and formes of speech...London, R.F. for H. Jackson. 1593." STC 19498.

⁴⁰Fol. 112.

⁴¹Fol. 113.

with its original, Peacham's revised definition gains in directness and clarity. The changes themselves are noteworthy. Among these are an addition to and a tightening of the definition itself, and a removal of several illustrations. In other words, Peacham has recognized the ambiguity in the earlier definition and, though he retains in the correction traces of both paradox contrary and paradox contradictory, has attempted to restrict his definition to one meaning. Now this single meaning that Peacham has introduced into his revised epitome represents a third type of paradox that was already in use during the sixteenth century.

It will be recalled that in the Paradoxa stoicorum Cicero terms his little arguments paradoxes not only because they "run counter to universal opinion" but because they "are surprising." He here equates "paradoxa" (παρόδοξα) with "admirabilia."⁴² And elsewhere, in the De partitione oratoriae, he notes that one's style should employ brilliant touches that please the ear: "decorative details such as surprising or unexpected events or things foreshadowed by portents."⁴³ The point to be made is that quite often paradox contrary carried with it implications of the marvelous, the wonderful. Hence,

⁴²Rackham's translation, op. cit., p. 257.

⁴³Ibid., p. 365.

by transferred sense, a third meaning of paradox came into use.⁴⁴ Instead of the stress lying on a contradiction or on something contrary to opinion or belief, the stress lay on something surprising and contrary to expectation. This third type of paradox was not limited to statements or tenets; indeed, it was more often applicable to a situation in general or to any phenomenon or action running counter to what might

⁴⁴A particularly interesting entry on "paradoxographers" in the Oxford Classical Dictionary indicates that the meaning had a tradition that antedates Cicero and, indeed, existed even then as a distinct genre. "Interest in the marvellous and out-of-the-way, as such (παράδοξα, θαυμάσια), is prominent in the Odyssey, the histories of Herodotus, Theopompus, and Ephorus, and other Greek writings. Paradoxography came into existence, as a distinct literary genre, early in the Alexandrian age, and continued to be practised for many centuries. The Seven Wonders of the World (τὰ ἑπτὰ θεάματα, οἱ θαύματα), that is, the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the Colossus of Rhodes, the hanging gardens of Semiramis, the walls of Babylon, the Pyramids, the Mausoleum, and the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (or the Delian altar of Apollo), seem to have been canonized in Alexandrian times. Callimachus's contemporary, Bolus...and Callimachus himself...may perhaps be regarded as the founders of paradoxography. Archelaus composed Ἰδιόφυα (epigrams on 'peculiarities') for Ptolemy Evergetes (247-221 B.C.), and Antigonus...of Carystus wrote on similar themes at about the same time. Callimachus' pupil, Philostephanus of Cyrene, wrote, like Archelaus in verse, on Παράδοξοι ποταμοὶ and κρήναι. Prominent among the paradoxographers of the Roman period are Isignus and Phlegon....After Phlegon paradoxography seems to have declined in popularity. But as late as the sixth century A.D. Philo of Byzantium wrote Περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ θαυμάτων. The paradoxographers often took some particular country as their field, Sicily, Scythia, etc. Natural phenomena, especially rivers, attracted them greatly. But zoology, history, and social customs also came within their purview."

naturally be expected.⁴⁵ It is the sense Peacham attempts to capture in the 1593 version of The Garden of Eloquence, and is the only sense recognized a few years earlier by George Putterham in The Arte of English Poesie (1589): "Many times our Poet is carried by some occasion to report of a thing that is marvelous, and then he will seeme not to speake it simply but with some sign of admiration."⁴⁶ In the present study

⁴⁵In the Oxford English Dictionary this meaning of paradox is included under sense 1 and also under sense 4, which reads in part as follows: "transf. A phenomenon that exhibits some contradiction or conflict with preconceived notions of what is reasonable or possible." Cf. also the emphasis upon the unexpected in another entry included under sense 1, that is, under paradox contrary: "Rhet. A conclusion or apodosis contrary to what the audience has been led up to expect. Obs. 1678 Phillips (ed. 4), Paradox...In Rhetorick, it is something which is cast in by the by, contrary to the opinion or expectation of the Auditor, and is otherwise called Hypomene." Quintilian's remarks on this type of paradox are of interest. Cf. his Institutio oratoriae, tr. H. E. Butler (New York, 1921), IX, ii, 23: "This figure is termed suspension by Celsus. It has two forms. For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise. I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the speaker himself...."

⁴⁶See Arber reprint, p. 223. A paradox contradictory, as well as a paradox contrary, could sometimes carry implications of the marvelous or the incredible, e.g., Peacham's definition noted above. Cf. also Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric, tr. John Henry Freese ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), pp. 317-319: "Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but

this third type of paradox, which emphasizes a situation contrary to what the reader might naturally expect, is considered as paradox of situation or paradox unexpected.⁴⁷

are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true. Thus, Androcles of Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said 'the laws need a law to correct them,' went on, '...pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil.'" For Aristotle on the unexpected, see below, p. 48.

⁴⁷Sister Joseph, op. cit., p. 323, distinguished only two meanings for paradox in the sixteenth century. "Paradox in the sixteenth century," she writes, "had two meanings: (1) a statement contrary to received opinion, evoking wonder because it is marvelous, strange, incredible; (2) a statement apparently self-contradictory." Several reasons can be offered, however, for distinguishing the third meaning. In the first place, paradox contrary did not necessarily evoke the wonderful or the marvelous (cf. Sidney's answer to the charge that the poets are the greatest liars). Secondly, the extension of paradox contrary was not limited to statements that evoke wonder, but to situations as well. Finally, as the above note on paradoxography indicates, the third meaning argued for here existed earlier as a distinct literary genre. Warren Taylor, Tudor Figures of Rhetoric (Chicago, 1937), p. 43, also cites only two meanings. His definition reads as follows: "Showing wonder when affirming a thing that appears incredible; affirming as true a statement which seems self-contradictory." Taylor omits the etymological meaning, which was clearly in use during the period. Cf., for example, Blundeville's explanation in The Art of Logike.

Since paradox unexpected at times overlaps the second meaning of paradox, turns on the element of surprise, and bears a close resemblance to irony of situation, further comment on it here is necessary. First of all, whether a situation or proposition or statement is to be considered as paradox contradictory or as paradox unexpected depends upon the emphasis in evidence, and often upon an arbitrary judgment. Ordinarily a statement gives no trouble because it is couched in antithesis, which throws the contradictory element into strong relief. For instance, the example cited earlier from the 1577 edition of The Garden of Eloquence--"when fyre should haue consumed him, fire saued him, and lykewyse at another tyme, when water should haue bene his death, it saued his lyfe"--could be classified as paradox unexpected were it not for the fact that the element of contradiction is stressed, mainly by antithesis. But a situation in Spenser's Faerie Queene (Bk. I, iii, 10-18) is not so easily classified. Consider the scene where Una has been cast into despair because the Redcrosse Knight has abandoned her. Spenser thus marvels at her plight:

And now it [Spenser's heart] is empassioned so
 deepe,
 For fairest Unaes sake, of whom I sing,
 That my frayle eyes these lines with teares do
 steepe,
 To thinke how she through guyleful handling,
 Though true as touch, though daughter of a king,
 Though faire as ever living wight was fayre,
 Though nor in word nor deede ill meriting,

Is from her knight divorced in despayre,
 And her dew loves deryv'd to that vile witches
 shayre....

Either paradox contradictory or paradox unexpected could describe this stanza. In the writer's opinion, however, the element of contradiction is subordinate to the element of the unexpected. In other instances the surprise is so strongly pronounced that no problem arises, as will be seen below in the case of a situation from Sidney's revised Arcadia.

In the second place, it should be observed that paradox unexpected is not to be equated with any surprising development, that is, surprise for the sake of surprise. Paradox unexpected is to be applied to a situation or action that is contrary to what the reader expects and, in order to rule out mere surprise for the sake of surprise and stress instead the wonderful, the incredible, the marvelous, retains at least a semblance of paradox contradictory. Two illustrations will make the point clear. In the medieval romance Guy of Warwick Harrawde, Guy's companion, is apparently slain in battle. Guy takes Harrawde's body to an abbey, leaves the body with the abbot to be buried, and then goes forth to seek further adventure. Presently the reader learns, however, that Harrawde is not dead because the abbot is able to revive him and heal his wounds.⁴⁸ Now this is a surprising development that is

⁴⁸The Romance of Guy of Warwick, ed. Julius Zupitza, EETS ES. 25-26 2nd version (London, 1875-76), pp. 30-36.

counter to the reader's expectation. But since the situation bears no semblance of an inner contradiction, it is not to be considered as paradox unexpected. In contrast, consider a situation in Sidney's revised Arcadia. Early in the romance the princely Musidorus participates in an expedition against an unruly band of rebels called the Helots. After several skirmishes between the two forces, Musidorus engaged in single combat with the captain of the Helots. The rebel leader proves himself invincible, and to Musidorus's (and the reader's) surprise reveals that he is Musidorus's inseparable friend Pyrocles.⁴⁹ Like the scene in Guy of Warwick this scene is a result contrary to what the reader expects. But implicit in the action, and therefore qualifying it as an example of paradox unexpected, is an apparent contradiction, namely, that Pyrocles, himself a prince, has gravitated to the humble leader of an unruly mob of rebels.

In the third place, a modern reader might feel that a situation described in this study as paradox unexpected is more accurately described in terms of being ironic or of being the result of the irony of fate. Consider, for example, the scene just mentioned from the revised Arcadia; or, better, consider any scene that turns on a reversal of fortune (i.e.,

⁴⁹Works, I, 38-43.

Aristotle's peripeteia). Such a scene may or may not be contrary to the reader's expectation. In Oedipus Rex the messenger's revelation is contrary to what Oedipus expects but it is not contrary to the expectation of the reader, who is aware (by dramatic irony) of what is unknown to Oedipus. But in the well-known episode of the Paphlagonian King in the revised Arcadia the reversal of fortune is a surprise to the reader as well as to the character. At any rate, a reversal of fortune is likely to bring to mind irony.

However, if the reversal of fortune, with or without a concomitant recognition or discovery, is contrary to what the reader is led naturally to expect, then it may qualify as either paradox of situation or irony of situation. The difficulty is that in both irony of situation and in paradox of situation lies a sharp contrast between what is expected to happen and what actually does happen. Irony of situation is not, however, an Elizabethan concept. Its first usage, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, does not come until the middle of the seventeenth century,⁵⁰ and even that usage is the only one before 1833 recorded by the Dictionary. Elizabethans appear to have used irony chiefly as irony of state-

⁵⁰The entry reads as follows: "1649 G. Daniel Triumph, Hen. V, cxcviii, Yet here: (and 'tis the Ironie of Warre Where Arrowes forme the Argument,) he best Acquitts himselfe, who doth a Horse praefer To his proud Rider."

ment, that is, in terms of a contrast between the meaning intended and that expressed. For example, in The Arcadian Rhetoric Abraham Fraunce defines irony as a "Trope, that by naming one contrarie intendeth another...and it is perceived by the contrarietie of the matter it selfe, or by the manner of vtterance quite differing from the sense of the wordes...."⁵¹

As his illustration of irony, Peacham, in the 1593 text of The Garden of Eloquence, offers the following statement: "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and euill: by this derision the Lord God reprocheth Adams miserie, whereinto he was fallen by ambition."⁵²

What is more, quite often an element is at work in irony of situation that is not at work in paradox of situation, namely, an apparent intervention of fate with a mockery of the appropriateness of things. In a commentary on the unexpected

⁵¹cf. the edition of Fraunce's treatise by Ethel Seaton, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵²Op. cit., pp. 35-36. Cf. also Sister Joseph's comments (op. cit., p. 325) on Tudor use of irony, which she defines as "a trope which by naming one contrary intends another. It is used in derision, mockery, jesting, dissembling." Her definition agrees with the entry on irony in Taylor's compendium of Tudor rhetorical figures cited above: "1. a. Expressing in words a meaning directly opposite that intended. b. Speaking in derision or mockery." Taylor ascribes the first occurrence of the term in a Tudor rhetoric to Sherry's A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), and cites ironia, dissimulatio, witty jesting, illuasio, close jesting, irrisio, and drie mock as other names given to the figure.

in his Poetics Aristotle notes that unexpected incidents should be so constructed that one is an inevitable consequence of the other. "For in that way," he says, "the incidents will cause more amazement than if they happened mechanically and accidentally, since the most amazing accidental occurrences are those which seem to have been providential, for instance when the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the man who caused Mitys's death by falling on him at a festival."⁵³ It will be seen that in Sidney's use of paradoxes unexpected that turn on a reversal of fortune such apparent intervention of a mocking fate is generally absent.

Therefore, in view of the fact that irony of situation is a term not current during Sidney's day, the motive behind a given situation, that is to say, the apparent intervention of fate with its mockery of the appropriateness of things (which distinguishes irony of situation from paradox of situation), is not in this study considered to be more important than the nature of the situation itself, which is basically paradoxical. Moreover, all reversals of fortune that are contrary to the reader's expectation and are attended by some element of contradiction will be construed as paradoxes of situation or paradoxes unexpected.

⁵³ Aristotle: The Poetics: "Longinus": On the Sublime, tr. W. Hamilton Frye ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 39.

Of the three meanings of paradox--paradox contrary, paradox contradictory, and paradox unexpected--outlined in this chapter, the latter two are the most important in so far as the present study is concerned. It will be seen that Sidney uses paradox of situation--either paradox contradictory or paradox unexpected--in an organic interrelationship of structure, central theme, plot and style, and amplifies this usage with many instances of paradox contradictory in the statement form. Yet, though paradox contrary is negligible in a functional sense in the revised Arcadia, it is not to be ignored; for its importance lies in its development into a literary genre, and it is likely that Sidney's acquaintance with this genre had more influence upon the whole paradoxical character of his revision than had the brief paradoxes he appears to have borrowed from the Greek romances.

CHAPTER III
THE LITERATURE OF PARADOX BEFORE 1586

One of the most engaging manifestations of the humanists' revival of interest in the classics is the Renaissance paradox, which for purposes of this chapter can be defined as an expansion of the commonplace paradox contrary into a distinct literary genre. Based on a tradition that had its origin in the fifth century B. C. with the paradoxes of Zeno the Eleatic and the paradoxical discourses of Gorgias and Polycrates, the genre did not reach a peak in vogue until a few years after Sidney died. But by 1586 it was firmly established and immensely popular as well with the general public as with scholars and humanists of the first rank.

On the surface Sidney's use of paradox in the revised Arcadia appears to be a recognition of the popularity of the form. Such a view is consistent with his belief as to the central purpose of poetry, which is to teach and delight. Of these two functions, the ability of poetry to delight is for Sidney the more important. "And that mooving is of a higher degree then teaching," he says emphatically in the Defence of Poesie, "it may be thus appeare, that it is well nigh both the cause and effect of teaching. For who will be taught, if hee be not mooved with desire to be taught? And what so much good doth that teaching bring fourth, (I speake still of morall doctrine) as that it mooveth one to do that which it

doth teach."¹ Though "moving" and "delighting" are not synonymous, Sidney expects the reader to be moved by means of delight. To capitalize the wide appeal of a figure, like paradox, that serves to delight, would therefore be one of Sidney's first considerations in revising his romance.

But it will be seen that his use of paradox is also a recognition of the potentialities the form holds for illuminating inquiries into some of life's complexities and inconsistencies; and these potentialities are obviously more readily realized in the genre than in the more limited usage. Sidney's acquaintance with the literature of paradox showed him how effectively the form, particularly when it is imbued with irony, can suspend two levels of meaning and evoke the kind of antithetical and intellectual play that, even in a mere rhetorical jest piece, calls forth thought as well as laughter, and that, in the more serious piece, aims at truth by distinguishing between appearance and reality.

In the light of Cicero's influence upon Renaissance writers, it is proper for an inquiry into Sidney's acquaintance with the genre to begin with the well-known Paradoxa stoicorum, composed sometime around 46 B.C. Each of Cicero's

¹The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1912-26), III, 19-- hereafter referred to as Works.

six paradoxes is of the type generally referred to as the "defence of contraries," wherein the writer simply sustains a view contrary to received opinion.² Cicero thus argues "that only what is morally noble is good," "that the possession of virtue is sufficient for happiness," "that transgressions are equal and right actions are equal," "that every foolish man is mad," "that only the wise man is free, and that every foolish man is a slave," and "that the wise man alone is rich."³ With these arguments Cicero extended a Greek tradition that had originated in the fifth century B.C. when Zeno of Elea propounded his four paradoxes of motion and established a form of discourse that became popular among the sophists, the stoics and the skeptics. Don Cameron Allen gives an account of the adroitness with which these ancients used the defence of contraries.

²Information on the early development of this form of discourse and its transition into the Renaissance can be found in the following studies: E. N. S. Thompson, "The Seventeenth-Century English Essay," University of Iowa Humanistic Studies, III (1925-1927), 94-105; R. E. Bennett, "Four Paradoxes by Sir William Cornwallis, the Younger," Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature, XIII (1931), 219-240; Warner G. Rice, "The Paradossi of Ortensio Lando," University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, VIII (1932), 59-74; Paradoxes (1650) by John Hall, A Facsimile Reproduction with an Introduction by Don Cameron Allen (Gainesville, Florida: 1956), i-xxiii.

³The translation used here is that by H. Rackham, Cicero De oratore III: De fato: Paradoxa stoicorum: De partitione oratoriae, Vol. II, ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 255-303.

Plato describes the unhappy Cleinias snared into an admission that, is the unlearned, not the learned, who can learn; he also gives us in full the paradox of Lysias, who contends that the non-lover is to be preferred to the lover. Socrates is a master of the art; he makes Protagoras admit that holiness is unjust and Thrasymachus say that the unjust are both wise and good. The stoics took over these methods and argued that body is soul, that man is good, that pain is a good, that death is a boon. The skeptics followed the same intellectual pattern: Sextus Empiricus expands it in his Hypotyposes, demonstrating, for example, that concepts of right or wrong have no validity or reality.⁴

Cicero took this form and gave it the touch of a skilled stylist.

Although Cicero professes his little arguments to be amusing and clever attempts to popularize the principal ethical doctrines of the stoics, they are not without serious intent. For example, despite its familiar, anecdotal style, the first paradox is serious in its contempt for temporal things and for the popular notion that the chief good is pleasure. "An action rightly done, and honourably, and virtuously," says Cicero in earnest, "is truly said to be a good action, and I deniged only what is right and honourable and virtuous."⁵

⁴Op. cit., xviii-xix. Further development of the genre occurred in the tradition of Christian paradox, e.g., Tertullian's Paradoxa (third-fourth century A.D.), which also interested Renaissance writers in the form. See Henry Knight Miller, "The Paradoxical Encomium with Special Reference to Its Vogue in England, 1600-1800," MR, LIII (Feb., 1956), 167.

⁵Rackham's translation, op. cit., p. 261.

Even in the preface to Paradoxa stoicorum Cicero makes it clear that he is writing "with the greater pleasure because the doctrines styled paradoxa by the Stoics appear to me to be in the highest degree Socratic, and far and away the truest."⁶ As defences of contraries Cicero's paradoxes, like the traditional forms upon which they were drawn, are at once an attempt to be rhetorically clever and to separate truth from falsity.

Sidney's opinion of the Paradoxa stoicorum and the defences behind it can be determined only approximately. That he was familiar with the tradition is certain, in view of the scope of the classical references in the Defence of Poesie.

⁶Ibid., p. 257. Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, comments on this genre and observes that it may be the most weighty of those topics that deal in paradox. "Again," he writes, "since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavouring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements." Thus a man may express the notion that the non-lover is to be preferred to the lover, whereas he really wishes the opposite point of view. "If then his words are in accordance with his real wishes," Aristotle comments further in Sophistici Elenchi (11, 12), "he must be confronted with his public statements; if they are in accordance with the latter, he must be confronted with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions." For this reference to Aristotle, see The "Art" of Rhetoric, tr. John Henry Freese ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 313. Though the manuscript is not extant, Sidney is said by John Hoskins to have translated a part of Aristotle's Rhetoric. See Malcolm Wallace, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney (Cambridge, 1915), p. 235.

And though one of his main points in that treatise is that philosophy is less capable of divulging truth than is poetry, there is no reason to doubt that he looked approvingly on those school paradoxes that were serious in intent. As for the Paradoxa stoicorum in particular, Sidney probably looked into Cicero's two arguments on virtue, which is expounded in the Defence of Poesie as the highest and most excellent truth and the "ending end of all earthly learning." In the same work he refers to "the saying of Plato and Tully...that who could see vertue, woulde bee wonderfullie ravished with the love of her bewtie."⁷ Further, it will be seen that the Defence of Poesie itself may be viewed as a sober illustration of Cicero's form, which Sidney followed by way of the popular De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium of the German humanist, Cornelius Agrippa.

But first it should be pointed out that, as part of their inheritance of the literature of paradox from the ancients, the humanists took over an extension of the defence of contraries known as the paradoxical encomium, "a species of rhetorical jest or display piece which involves the praise of unworthy, unexpected, or trifling objects, such as the praise

⁷Works, III, 25.

of lying and envy or of the gout or of pots and pebbles."⁸ Though this form of paradox is sometimes indistinguishable from the defence of a contrary, the stress is usually on "praising" rather than on "defending" and the piece is more likely to be written with less gravity and to be indicative of the author's speciousness and humor. Outstanding among the ancients who used this form was the great ironist, Lucian of Samosata (c. A.D. 125-190), whose Muscae laudatio (the praise of a fly) holds a place alongside Cicero's Paradoxa stoicorum as having a direct influence upon Renaissance writers of paradox.

As Cicero had done before him, Lucian perfected a form already established by his predecessors. As far back as the time of Polycrates (c. 535 B.C. ff.) and Gorgias (485-380 B.C.) writers interested themselves in the "defence of the indefensible."⁹ In a recent investigation into the history of the genre, Miller finds that there is even "some evidence to indicate that paradoxical encomia were set as exercises in the

⁸Miller, op. cit., pp. 145-178. For further material on the paradoxical encomium, see Theodore C. Burgess, Epidictic Literature (Chicago, 1902), pp.157-166; R. B. McKerrow, ed. The Works of Thomas Nashe, 4 vols. (London, 1904-1910), IV, 377, 389-395; A. S. Pease, "Things Without Honor," Classical Philology, XXI, (1926), 27-42; and Alexander H. Sackson, "The Paradoxical Encomium in Elizabethan Drama," University of Texas Studies in English, XXVIII (1949), 83-104.

⁹The phrase is Pease's, op. cit., p. 31. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the genre dates even from Homer. See Erasmus's comment below, p. 62.

ancient schools of rhetoric."¹⁰ These encomia were thus extensions of the classical panegyric turned into a kind of rhetorical game. Polycrates, for instance, wrote an encomium on mice, and among the lost works of Gorgias's pupil Alcimadas, are a praise of death and a praise of Nais (a river-nymph).¹¹

The form was not everywhere popular at this time. Isocrates, who wrote an Encomium on Helen in objection to Gorgias' paradoxical discourse on the same subject and Buziris, a panegyric in refutation of Polycrates' defence of the mythical king, is said to have scorned those who wrote praises of bumblebees and salt.¹² But though the form appears to have been neglected for several centuries, it was taken up again in later ages with renewed interest by both Greek and Roman writers.

Sometime during the first century B.C. the Roman poet Catullus, for example, found occasion to use the paradoxical encomium to express some sentiments on love. His half-serious, half-jesting lines to his mistress' sparrow are characteristic of the genre. "Sparrow, my lady's pet," sighs Catullus, "with

¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 147.

¹¹ The Oxford Classical Dictionary, g.v., "encomium."

¹² Ibid. Isocrates' two paradoxical discourses are in Isocrates, tr. Larue van Hook, 3 vols., ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1954), III, 54, 61-87.

whom she often plays whilst she holds you in her lap, or gives you her finger-tip to peck and provokes you to bite sharply; whenever she, the bright-shining lady of my love, has a mind for some sweet pretty play, in hope, as I think, that when the sharper smart of love abates, she may find some small relief from her pain--ah, might I play with you as she does, and lighten the gloomy cares of my heart!"¹³ Later writers of less literary renown kept the tradition alive. Miller records several interesting examples of paradoxical encomia among Greek and Roman authors up to and through Lucian's time: praises of the gnat, the parrot and hair by the sophist Dio Chrysostom (A.D. 40-112); a praise of Thersites and the quartan fever by Favorinus (A.D. 80-150); a praise (with serious intent) of the Greek pallium by Tertullian (A.D. 160-225); a praise of hair by Philostratus (A.D. 170-245); a praise of baldness, Encomium calvitii, by the neo-Platonist Synesius (c. A.D. 300); and finally a praise of figs by Julian the Apostate (A.D. 331-363).¹⁴

¹³ Catullus Tibullus and Pervigilium Veneris, tr. F.W. Cornish ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 2-5.

¹⁴ Op. cit., p. 149. Synesius' discourse on baldness was a favorite with Renaissance writers. The work was translated into English in 1579: "A paradoxe proving that baldnesse is much better than bushie haire. Englished by A. Fleming. 1579." STC 23603.

In his discourse on a fly Lucian surpasses all these classical writers of the paradoxical encomium, not only in giving play to cleverness but in giving substance and meaning to the form. Aside from the mere sport of demonstrating that in comparison with other winged creatures the fly is superior in such matters as intelligence, strength and courage, and in pointing out the praise that comic and tragic writers have bestowed upon the creature in the past, Lucian adds deft touches of irony to the whole piece. The skill with which he ironically exposes the vanity of human actions in the Dialogues of the Dead Lucian transfers to the Muscae laudatio. His praise of the fly implies that man for all his worldly attainments is no better off. Indeed, hatched "as a maggot from the dead bodies of men," the fly lives in the society of men--"on the same food and at the same table"--and "takes precedence even of kings in eating." Further, in a passage that bristles with ironic humor, Lucian demonstrates the fly's immortality of soul. "You may be sure," he says, "I propose to mention the most important point in the nature of the fly. It is, I think, the only point that Plato overlooks in his discussion of the soul and its immortality. When ashes are sprinkled on a dead fly, she revives and has a second birth and a new life from the beginning. This should absolutely convince everyone that the fly's soul is immortal like ours, since after leaving the body it comes back again, recognises and reanimates it, and makes the fly take

wing."¹⁵ Not until the sixteenth century did another writer of the form come along to match Lucian's skill of cleverness.

Sidney's opinion of paradoxical encomia, of which Lucian's discourse on the fly is the superb example among the ancients, is quite clear from a passage in the Defence of Poesie that shows equally well his familiarity with the defence of contraries. "We know," says Sidney, "a playing wit can praise the discretion of an Asse, the comfortable-ness of being in debt, and the jolly commodities of being sicke of the plague. So of the contrary side, if we will turne Qvids verse, Ut lateat virtus, proximitate mali, that good lye hid, in nearnesse of the evill. Agrippa will be as mery in shewing the vanitie of Science, as Erasmus was in the commending of folly. And neither shal any man or matter, escape some touch of these smiling Raylers."¹⁶ The context of the passage indicates that Sidney is here thinking specifically of those writers who use the form to carp at poetry. But even so, as with poetry, Sidney liked the good and disapproved of the bad; so also with paradoxical encomia, many of which were little more than superficial display pieces of wit.

¹⁵Lucian, tr. A. M. Harmon, 8 vols. ("The Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge, Mass., 1953), I, 81-97.

¹⁶Works, III, 26-27.

Those encomia like Lucian's Muscae laudatio that serve a higher end, however, Sidney would certainly have approved of. Lucianic irony later influenced the paradoxes of Agrippa and Erasmus, and Sidney hastens to tell his readers in the passage just quoted from the Defence of Poesie the respect he holds for the works of these two writers. "But for Erasmus and Agrippa," he says, "they had an other foundation then the superficial part would promise." In short, Sidney would hold that a paradox of the genre type is good only in so far as it serves the same end as poetry: that it teaches as well as delights.

In alluding to Erasmus's The Praise of Folly and Agrippa's De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium Sidney is singling out the two outstanding examples of the genre among early Renaissance writers.¹⁷ Although Elizabethans frequently regarded these two works as counterparts equal in merit--if one is to judge from several references similar to Sidney's--later ages have justly given greater recognition to Erasmus's piece.

¹⁷In the medieval period the genre seems to have been developed but slightly. Pease records (*op. cit.*, p. 41) a praise of baldness, Ecloga de Calvis, by Hucbald of St. Amand in the ninth century and praises of various animals by Michael Psellus the younger in the eleventh century. Aside from the encomia, the use of paradox was limited to serious puns in the non-genre type, as in the Latin liturgical poetry of Adam of St. Victor and St. Thomas Aquinas. See Walter J. Ong, "Wit and Mystery," Speculum, XXII (1947), 310-341.

His satirical monologue first appeared in a Latin version in 1511 and later, in 1549, Sir Thomas Chaloner gave it an English translation. Behind the work lies the tradition of the so-called "fool literature," of which Sebastian Brant's Ship of Fools (1494) is the most noted example. But as regards form, The Praise of Folly owes more to the classical paradoxical encomia, a fact which Erasmus calls attention to in his preface.

Let any...who are offended by the lightness and foolery of my argument remember, I beg, that mine is not the first example, but that the same thing was often practised by great authors. Homer, all those ages ago, made sport with a battle of frogs and mice; Virgil with a gnat, and a salad; Ovid with a nut. Polycrates eulogized Busiris; and Isocrates, though a castigatour of Polycrates, did the same; Glaucon argued in praise of injustice; Favorinus, of Thersites and of the quartan fever; Synesius, of baldness; Lucian, of the fly and of the parasite. Seneca sported with an Apotheosis of the Emperor Claudius; Plutarch, in a dialogue between Gryllus and Ulysses; Lucian and Apuleius, with an ass, and someone whom I do not know, with the last will and testament of Grunius Corocotta, a hog.¹⁸

¹⁸ The Praise of Folly, tr. Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton, 1941), p. 2. Similar lists of paradoxical encomia appear in Castiglione's The Courtier (1528), Thomas Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique (1560), Harvey's Pierces Supererogation (1593), and Harington's The Metamorphosis of Ajax (1596). The first two works were familiar to Sidney.

Two points are worth noting in connection with Erasmus's list. In the first place, as the foremost humanist, Erasmus was, by reviewing the genre and adding to it a brilliant example of his own, lending considerable authority to the merits of the form and thus assuring it a place among the writings of later humanists. In the second place, of the authors that appear in Erasmus's list, Lucian calls for a special word of comment. "Some years after he had published The Praise of Folly," says Hoyt Hudson in a commentary on Erasmus as a Lucianist, "he wrote to a friend that it was Thomas More's fondness for wit and fun, 'and especially for Lucian,' that prompted him to write this book"¹⁹ The most important of the many Lucianic elements in Erasmus's encomium is irony; and as Hudson aptly observes in the paragraph just quoted, this irony is "less obviously benevolent than Socratic irony. It is likely to hold itself, as well as other things, lightly. It cuts more than one way." It is the combination, then, of two equally effective figures of contrast, irony and paradox, that gives The Praise of Folly its special character; for with this combination Erasmus achieves a perfect blend of manner and matter.

Under a closer examination, The Praise of Folly is seen first of all to represent fully paradox as a literary

¹⁹ Ibid., xix.

genre, for despite its outward appearance as a paradoxical encomium only, the work actually makes use of both this form and the defence of contraries. Erasmus even varies slightly the traditional pattern of the encomium. Thus instead of praising Folly, he allows Folly to praise herself. He then shows her in self-praise exalting corruption, debauchery and wantonness of every sort, and defending at the same time a number of tenets contrary to received opinion, e.g., "prudence in judgment is not what it is ordinarily thought to be," "it is not true that madness is a form of wretchedness," "to be foolish is the natural state of man," and "the Christian religion is akin to folly."

Even thus far The Praise of Folly is written in earnest. Erasmus's tone is more than playful; his purpose in placing traditional views in a different light is more than a test of wit. He is looking behind the curtain, and what he sees is that life is paradoxical and that things are not as they seem. All human affairs, says Folly,

like the Sileni of Alcibiades, have two aspects, each quite different from the other; even to the point that what at first blush (as the phrase goes) seems to be death may prove, if you look further into it, to be life. What at first sight is beautiful may really be ugly; the apparently wealthy may be poorest of all; the disgraceful, glorious; the learned, ignorant; the robust, feeble; the noble, base; the joyous, sad; the favorable, adverse; what is friendly, an enemy; and what is wholesome, poisonous. In brief, you

find all things suddenly reversed, when you open up the Silenus.²⁰

What Erasmus has in mind, then, is to show that what is commonly held to be true is anything but true. To maintain his paradoxes, however, Erasmus works by implication as well as by direct statement. That is to say, he makes use of irony. Two examples will serve to show his skill in moving from the explicit to the implicit in the handling of a paradox.

Consider, on the one hand, Folly's argument that the wise are maladjusted to public affairs. To support this illuminating comment on a neglected side of life, Folly simply adduces the evidence.

Take your sage to a feast and he will mar the good cheer either by a morose silence or by conducting a quiz. Invite him to a ball, and you learn how a camel dances. If you carry him to a play, he will dampen the mirth of the audience, and, a modern Cato, he will be forced to walk out of the theatre because he cannot put off his gravity. If he engages in conversation, on a sudden it is a case of the wolf in the story. If something is to be bought, or a contract made, if, in short, any of those things without which our daily life could not be carried on must be done, you will say that this wiseacre is no man, but dead wood. Thus he can be of little use to himself, his country, or his family, and all because he is inexpert in everyday matters, and far out of step with general

²⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

ways of thinking and modes of life among the folk....²¹

It will be observed that in this example Erasmus uses paradox explicitly for purposes of satire. With all his learning, the wise man is ill equipped for real life. The true humanist, Erasmus would say, is not out of touch with social reality. Or consider, on the other hand, how Folly maintains ironically the paradox that even wisdom is arrived at by way of folly. To inquire into life's paradoxes, says Folly, is considered imprudent. "The part of a truly prudent man, on the contrary," she goes on, "is (since we are mortal) not to aspire to wisdom beyond his station, and either, along with the rest of the crowd, pretend not to notice anything, or affably and companionably be deceived." Yet men will argue that to do so is folly. "Indeed, I shall not deny it," says Folly, "only let them, on their side, allow that it is also to play out the comedy of life."²² Much of The Praise of Folly is written in this vein, that is, an ironical suggestion of the truth, paradoxically stated, of a wisdom higher than worldly wisdom. In attacking churchmen, for instance, and

²¹Ibid., p. 38.

²²Ibid., p. 38.

arguing the paradox that Christianity is folly, Erasmus's *Folly*, says Hudson, "does not stand at the level of worldly wisdom, which in general approves those whom she attacks. Neither, except in moments by the way, is she speaking nonsense. Every attack is precisely against following in the spiritual kingdom the standards and practices that prevail in worldly, carnal affairs."²³ Seen from an over-all viewpoint, then, irony and paradox work together: in her very praise of wickedness and worldly wisdom, *Folly* ironically implies the humanistic ideal that rejects such activities and seeks a truer wisdom.

In the preface to The Praise of Folly Erasmus observes that nothing "is more puerile, certainly, than to treat serious matters triflingly; but nothing is more graceful than to handle light subjects in such a way that you seem to have been anything but trifling."²⁴ Little wonder that Sidney agreed and that he saw in the work, and in Agrippa's De vanitate, "an other foundation then the superficial part would promise." Exactly what Sidney meant by foundation is not clear from the Defence of Poesie, but it is most probable that he had in mind the striking paradoxical character of these two works. Sidney not only thought highly of this foundation; he was influenced by it. Though the point cannot be pursued here, later it will be shown that the foundation of

²³Ibid., xxxvii.

²⁴Ibid., p. 3.

The Praise of Folly and the De vanitate--the attempt to divulge a paradoxical truth by inquiring into the difference between appearance and reality--is the foundation of the revised Arcadia.

Apart from Erasmus's superiority in subtlety of style, it would be difficult to single out anything of real importance for present purposes that is in The Praise of Folly and not in the De vanitate. Like its counterpart, the De vanitate uses both the defence of a contrary and the paradoxical encomium to strike out against the pride of worldly wisdom and the vanity of human actions. And the irony and ambiguity of meaning that characterize The Praise of Folly are found also in the De vanitate. When the two works differ materially, they do so in terms of structure. Instead of following Erasmus's practice of fusing both genre types of paradox with ironic overtones, Agrippa keeps the two types separate. That is to say, he first presents an extended defence of a contrary opinion in which he ironically makes a mockery of knowledge, and then at the end of his work he asserts his theme in a new light, i.e., in a short eulogy of an ass.

Agrippa's theme, which is mainly spiritual, is a reworking of Socrates' familiar dictum that the truly knowledgeable man is one who makes an admission of ignorance. Like Erasmus, Agrippa attacks the shortcomings of his age in spiritual and intellectual matters, and calls especially for

a life patterned after what the humanists considered to be the true principles of Christianity uncorrupted by scholastic learning. As he discloses the uncertainty and vanity of the arts and sciences, which fall short of truth and blind the individual to faith, Agrippa argues the paradox that it is better to know nothing and believe in faith and God alone, wherein lie truth and certainty. "Nothing," he writes, "can chaunce unto man more pestilente then knowledge."²⁵ And again: "Yet he knoweth nothings, except he know the will of Gods worde, and execute the same: he that hath learned all things, & hath not learned this, he hath learned in vaine, and knoweth all things in vaine."²⁶

In his final comment on the vanity of earthly knowledge, as he turns from the defence proper to a brief discourse in praise of the ass, Agrippa exercises wit and burlesque, but his intent is no less serious than it is in the major section of the work. To be like the ass and know nothing, says Agrippa, is better than to be learned and know too much of the subtleties, for "if the unprofitable burdens of humane

²⁵The title-page of the version used here reads as follows: "Henric Cornelius Agrippa, of the Vanitie and Yncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, Englished by Ja/mes/ San/ford/. 1569." STC 204. The quotation is from fol. 4^r.

²⁶Fol. 181^v.

knowledge be not set aparte...[and] yee be not toured againe into bare and mere Asses,...[then] ye be utterly and altogether unprofitable to carrie the mysteries of diuine wisdom."27

Agrippa's influence upon later humanists and scholars as a model for clever writing was profound. Barnaby Riche indicated in his Allarme to England (1578) that the young courtly gentlemen of his day were studying the De vanitate with a desire "to be curious in caulling, propounding captious questions, thereby to shewe a singularitie of their wisdomes."28 Sidney himself appears to have drawn upon the De vanitate in writing his famous treatise on poetry.29 A. C. Hamilton has recently shown that Agrippa's use of paradox gave Sidney a rhetorical method for defending the art of

27 Fol. 185^v.

28 Sir Egerton Brydges, The British Bibliographer (London, 1810), 1, 510. Quoted by Hamilton, op. cit., p. 163.

29 In elevating poetry over all other arts and sciences Sidney consciously makes a defence of a contrary. As was noted earlier, he answers the charge that the poets are the greatest liars with the following statement. "I answere Paradoxically," he says, "but truly, I think truly: that of all writers under the Sunne, the Poet is the least lyer." Sidney's point is that the poet is not concerned with what is but with what should be, and "therefore though he reccunt things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true, he lieth not... Works, III, 28-29/." Sidney's use of the word paradoxically (the first recorded literary usage in English) suggests that he is aware, not only in this particular passage but in his whole treatise, of defending a view contrary to received opinion.

poetry. Specifically, Hamilton's thesis is that "Sidney exploits Agrippa's argument in the De vanitate in order to attack all the other arts and sciences, and to establish thereby the central argument for his defence of poetry."³⁰ Sidney's central argument, according to Hamilton, is that poetry alone can achieve truth, all other sciences and arts being limited by Nature.

Along with Sidney's high opinion of the De vanitate and Barnaby Riche's testimony as to the popularity of the work, is a favorable comment from Sidney's friend, Gabriel Harvey, who considered the De vanitate a flawless example of the genre. "They are rare, and dainty wittes," Harvey wrote in Pierces Supererogation, "that can roundly call a man Asse at every third word; and make not nice, to befoole him in good sullen earnest, that can strangle the proudest breath of their pennes, and meaneth to borrow a sight of their giddiest braines, for a perfect Anatomie of Vanitie, and Folly."³¹

Harvey appears to have been particularly impressed by an aspect of Agrippa's humor that points to still another level of meaning at which the literature of paradox can function.

³⁰"Sidney and Agrippa," RES, New Series, VII (April 1956), 151.

³¹The Works of Gabriel Harvey, ed. Alexander Grosart, 3 vols. (London, 1884), II, 245.

Both Agrippa and Erasmus were master entertainers at what is often called learned parody, wherein a writer in command of considerable learning produces fun "out of the very modes and techniques of learning itself."³² This rhetorical device can be found, for example, in the Epistolae obscurorum virorum, a series of letters compiled in 1515 by Crotius Rubianus and Ulrich von Hutton. Among the letters is one, for instance, from a churchman who puts to the test of logic the paradox that lechery is no sin. After all, says the churchman in defence of having a mistress, Samson and Solomon both had their affairs and still received God's favor. "So he addresses to her some of the passionate songs of the Canticles, and clinches it all with the erroneous syllogism, that, if Amor is love and God is love, then Amor cannot be a sin."³³ Agrippa's burlesque is, of course, on a grander scale and is much more sharply defined. In his study of Agrippa's influence upon Sidney, Hamilton has remarked on this ambiguity in the De vanitate. He finds that the work may be read "as a sceptical discourse... but equally it may be read as an elaborate joke whose whole point is that 'a demi-god in omnisufficiency of knowledge, a diuel in the practise of horrible Artes' (as Gabriel Harvey

³²Hudson, op. cit., xx.

³³Thompson, op. cit., p. 97.

calls him), can use immense knowledge to denounce the use of knowledge."³⁴

In the work of Erasmus and Agrippa the literature of paradox before 1586 is seen at its best. A whole host of sixteenth-century humanist scholars felt the influence of these two writers. The influence is especially noticeable in the development of the paradoxical encomium, which before 1586 was exploited to a far greater extent than was the defence of contraries. As Don Cameron Allen observes, the humanists who followed Erasmus filled the century "with praises of gout, pox, drunkenness, gallstones, dirt, bagatelles, nothing, fever, etc."³⁵ Though most of these encomia were jest pieces, a few took on a serious note.

Erasmus's friend Sir Thomas More, for instance, made a modest use of the form in his Utopia (1516), Book II of which is a praise of nowhere. As Erasmus had done before him and Agrippa was to do a few years later, More found paradox conven-

³⁴Op. cit., p. 152. Cf. also Sanford's preface to his translation of Agrippa's De vanitate: "And although this authore sharply inueigeth against them (which to the rude multitude for that cause, maye seme naught and noysome) yet his intent is, not to deface the worthinesse of Artes and Sciences, but to reprove and detecte their euil vses, and declare the excellencie of his wit in disprouinge them,--for a shewe of Learning: which euil vses, doubtles haue crept in, through the peruerse doings of men."

³⁵Op. cit., xx.

ient for purposes of satire. Hythloday's account of the virtues of the Utopian society forms an ironic comment on the shortcomings of More's own society. Though Sidney had slight reservations, he thought enough of the Utopia to cite it in his Defence of Poesie as an example of "the speaking picture of Poesie." What philosopher's counsel can so readily direct an entire commonwealth, says Sidney, "as the Way of Sir Thomas Moores Eutopia /?/ I say the Way, because where Sir Thomas Moore erred, it was the fault of the man and not of the Poets: for that Way of patterning a Common-wealth, was most absolute though he perchance hath not so absolutely performed it."³⁶

Erasmus's and Agrippa's use of the paradoxical encomium to ridicule pretentious knowledge and set a praise upon ignorance attracted other humanist writers. Montaigne, for example, gave the theme brief treatment at one point in the Apology for Raimond Sebond (1580). After reducing man to the level of animals, Montaigne ironically praises ignorance over learning and intellect. "It is by the meditation of our ignorance, more than our learning," he writes, "that we know anything of this divine wisdom."³⁷ A few years later, in

³⁶ Works, III, 15.

³⁷ The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, tr. Jacob Zeitlin, 3 vols. (New York, 1935), II, 160. For the influence of Erasmus and Agrippa upon the Apology for Raimond Sebond, see Zeitlin's notes, pp. 499-503. An important critical approach to the Renaissance paradox, particularly the paradoxes in

1535, a minor writer named Edward Daunce took up this same theme and gave it a fuller treatment in a pious discourse

Erasmus, More, Agrippa, and Montaigne, can be found in an article by A. E. Malloch, "The Techniques and Function of the Renaissance Paradox," SP, LIII (April, 1956), 191-203. After examining one of Donne's letters, in which paradoxes are explained as nothings that have existence only within an antithetical action of the reader, Malloch remarks (p. 195) that "Donne's statement that his paradoxes are nothings has this much truth, that they only seem to represent a conceptual argument, but in fact, do not. They achieve and sustain this appearance by means of a fabricated argument which consists of discrete statements equivocally united... Thus the paradox may be said to present one part in a verbal drama (truly a word play); the other part is not written out, but is supplied by the reader as he tries 'to find better reasons.'" The paradox is thus closely related, says Malloch, to the scholastic quaestio disputata, which, like the paradox, "perfects the deliberately fallacious argument for the purpose of revealing truth, though it differs from the paradox in containing a written refutation: the reader of the disputed question participates as audience, the reader of the paradox as actor.... (p. 193)." By the sixteenth century the disputed question was losing its life, and the paradox, in the hands particularly of the skeptics, was re-introduced to express a relative philosophy (i.e., that knowledge is right only for a given moment) as opposed to school philosophy (i.e., that knowledge is eternal and right for all time). Therefore, Malloch concludes (p. 202), "If we bear in mind Donne's words about the purposes of his paradoxes ('if they make yo to find better reasons against them they do their office'), if we bear in mind the suggestion that paradoxes are one half of a dialogue, then such works as Erasmus' The Praise of Folly, Agrippa's The Vanity of Arts and Sciences, and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond Sebond become methods of forcing the reader to assert (with More) that knowledge is dramatic, i.e., that it is proportional to each historical scene. And not only do these works lead to a conclusion that knowledge is dramatic; their very way of leading is itself dramatic."

entitled The Prayse of Nothing. This little tract, though partly whimsical and clever in its puns on the word nothing, is mainly serious in its attack on mere temporals. In the preface Daunce claims to have "endeavored to shun Agrippas vanities, and Erasmus follyes, as one that might haue bene a paterne of either," but echoes of Agrippa are everywhere evident. Take, for example, the following bit of piety: "Christ's louing imbracements of the little children (who cared for nothing), are not of least importance: for their simplicitie being the shadow of our fyrst innocency, is to be reentered, as the posterne of true godlynes: which lieth not open to them that haue the world in admiration, and be not resolute followers of the childrens ignorance."³⁸

Most humanist writers, however, used the paradoxical encomium to give play to their cleverness and wit. Rabelais' familiar praise of debt and debtors, of the codpiece, and of "Messere Gaster" in Books III and IV of Gargantua and Pantagruel offers a familiar example. Another interesting example

³⁸The title-page of Daunce's piece reads as follows: "The Prayse of Nothing. By E. D. 1585." STC 7383. The quote is at Fol. F₂^v. In 1837 J. P. Collier ascribed Daunce's work to Sidney's close friend, Sir Edward Dyer. Recently, however, Dyer's authorship has been discredited, mainly on the strength of internal evidence of style. See Ralph M. Sargent, "The Authorship of The Prayse of Nothing," The Library, 4th ser., XII (1931), 322-331.

is the La nobilitie dell' asino of the Italian musician and composer, Adriano Banchieri. Although this work did not attain an English translation until 1595,³⁹ Sidney could have known it in the Italian version and may be referring to it in the Defence of Poesie when he says, "We know a playing wit can praise the discretion of an Asse...." Composed in two parts, La nobilitie is a dull, copious work that shows only spots of humor. Banchieri first cites the praises bestowed on other animals, and then claims the worthiness of the ass over them all, concluding the section with the statement that "the nature of the Asse is good, pleasing, humble and courteous: which foure rare qualities, are farre contrary to the theft, pride, unrulinesse and villainy of other beasts."⁴⁰ The second part, after marshalling an extensive number of classical and contemporary sources in praise of the ass, ends with the reminder that for his ride into Jerusalem Christ himself chose the ass.

In his study of the genre Miller records a long list of similar paradoxical encomia that were inspired by Erasmus's satire and written by important scholars of the sixteenth century. He cites Latin encomia by

³⁹The title-page of this translation reads as follows: "The Noblennesse of the Asse. A worke rare, learned, and excellent. By A. B. 1595." STC 1348.

⁴⁰Fol. E₂^v.

Daniel Heinsius on the louse (Laus pediculi), Philip Melanchthon on the ant (Laus formicae), Elibaldi Pirckheimer on the gout (Laus or Apologia podagrae), Caelio Calcagnino on the flea (Pulicis encomium), M. Antonius Majoragio on mud (Luti encomium), Joannes Passerati on the ass (Encomium asini), Janus Douza on shade (In laudem umbrae), Justus Lipsius on the elephant (Laus elephantis), Franciscus Scribanius on the fly (Muscae ex continuo comparatione cum principe encomium),⁴¹ and Erycius Puteanus on the egg (Ovi encomium):⁴¹

To this list should be added a praise of the goose by the French scholar J. J. Scaliger.⁴² "All these authors--German, Dutch, Italian, French--were....," as Miller observes, "humanists and scholars of some importance." And it should also be pointed out that many were acquaintances Sidney had made during his travels on the Continent.

In contrast to the wide popularity enjoyed by the paradoxical encomia, defences of contraries received scant attention before 1586. Except for Sidney's Defence of Poesie, most of those that were published are of little worth. The most interesting perhaps is the Mirroure of Madnes published by James Sanford in 1576.⁴³ Sanford, it will be recalled, made an Eng-

⁴¹Op. cit., p. 152.

⁴²Cited by Pease, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴³"The Mirroure of Madnes, or a Paradoxe maintayning Madnes to be most excellent: done out of French into English by Ja/mes/ San/ford/. 1576." STC 17980.

lish translation of Agrippa's De vanitate in 1569. A work of much less literary merit, the Mirroure of Madnes is interesting only in being amusingly specious. Note the following excerpt that recalls the Epistolae obscurorum virorum in its use of fallacious logic.

As pleasure is of necessity Madnes, yet honest, profitable, and necessarye, as before is proued, Ergo, Madnes is both honest, profitable, and necessarye. But what if I make for Epicure, and proue, that all pleasures are good, excellent, then I trust, I shall enforce the like consequence of Madnes, my chiefe reason shall be a subjecte, for euery accidente, hath his excellence of his subject: now, if pleasure be in the most excellent subjecte; and the same Madnes; then Madnes for the excellencie of the subject, must nedes be most excellent.⁴⁴

Of the same tenor as Sanford's defence of madness are two minor pieces, The Defence of Pouertie againste the Desire of worldlie riches and The Payne of Pleasure, brought out by Anthony Munday in 1577 and 1578, respectively.⁴⁵ Concerning

⁴⁴See Fol. B₅.

⁴⁵Celeste Turner, Anthony Mundy: An Elizabethan Man of Letters, in University of California Publications in English, Vol. II, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), p. 9. Two other examples, which this writer has not seen, have been recorded. The title-page of the first example reads as follows: "A Defence of Death. Contayning a most excellent discourse of life and death, written in Frenche by Philip de Mornaye, Gentleman. And doone into Englishe by E. A. 1576/7." STC 18136. The other example is a Paradoxe centre l'Ameur (1581), cited by Thompson, op. cit., p. 97. Apparently the author is unknown.

The Defence of Fouertie, of which no copies are extant, Celeste Turner says that it is "no doubt similar to the classical arguments for poverty in The Defence of Contraries"; and of The Payne of Pleasure she writes, "The work itself, a series of moral poems, depicts the incredibly bad consequences of every sort of pleasure."⁴⁶

Turner's reference to The Defence of Contraries calls for a word of comment. In writing The Defence of Fouertie and The Payne of Pleasure Munday was less indebted to Agrippa's famous work than to an Italian collection of paradoxes published by Ortensio Lando in 1543.⁴⁷ The most direct influence upon the English paradox occurred in 1593 when Munday rendered these paradoxes into English under the title of The Defence of Contraries. On the heels of this translation followed the well-known ventures into the form by Donne, Cornwallis, and Hall. Unfortunately Munday's translation comes too late for present purposes, but Sidney could have known Lando's paradoxes either in the Italian or in a French translation published by Charles Estienne in 1553. Lando's work is composed of twelve clever defences, similar to Cicero's, on such topics as "poverty is better than wealth," "blindness is better than sight,"

⁴⁶Op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁷See Warner G. Rice, op. cit., pp. 59-74.

and "imprisonment is better than liberty," Sidney's reference in the Defence of Poesie to a praise of "the comfortablenes of being in debt, and the jolly commodities of being sicke of the plague" suggests a familiarity with Lando's work either in the original or in the French text.

The present inquiry has shown Sidney's acquaintance with a well-defined body of paradoxical literature that was in vogue during the sixteenth century. The wide popularity of the genre left room, of course, for a good deal of superficiality and the mere development of rhetorical skill in adapting what Don Cameron Allen calls an "un-English thinking to the English prose genius."⁴³ Sidney's remark on such abuse of the genre by so many "smiling Raylers" has already been cited, and Gabriel Harvey had words to the same effect. "They were silly country fellowes," he said, "that commended the Bald pate, the Feauer quartane; the fly, the flea, the gnat, the sparrow, bawdery, leachery, buggery, madnesse itselfe. What Dunse, or Scribnist cannot maintaine a Paradoxe?"⁴⁹ But such criticism did little to damage the genre. What it did do was to indicate clearly the facility with which a paradox can be contrived, and hence a cause for its continued popular-

⁴³Op. cit., xxi.

⁴⁹Harvey's Works, ed. Grosart, Vol II, pp. 244-245.

ity. Furthermore, and paradoxically enough, there appeared a paradox as meaningful as The Praise of Folly or the De vanitate. Certainly Sidney liked not only a good poet but a good paradox. As will be seen later, though he had to depart from the form and employ a method for paradox that was more suitable for his purposes, in the revised Arcadia he shows the influence of the genre at its best.

CHAPTER IV

SIDNEY'S CONCEPTION OF THE REVISED ARCADIA: A METHOD FOR PARADOX

Nothing perhaps is more characteristic of the humanists in the revolt against the alleged intellectual and spiritual tyranny of the medieval period than their insistence that education have a practical character. Concomitant with opening up vast areas of discovery, popularizing travel and exploration, stimulating religious and scientific inquiry, and emphasizing man's place in this world, the humanists generally held a contempt for the subtleties and fruitless metaphysics of scotist philosophy, for the other-worldliness of monasticism, and demanded instead knowledge that they considered to be more useful.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, for example, appeared a movement aimed broadly at making all knowledge useful and more particularly at putting education in closer touch with social reality. It was in the spirit of this movement, which produced a number of literary works concerned with an education suitable for the man of affairs,¹ that Sidney conceived the revised Arcadia.

¹In Italy and France the movement found literary expression in such works as Castiglione's The Courtier (1528), Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532-1564), and Montaigne's

Sidney himself was a practical man. In the light of a court preferment that led to extensive travel and service to the Queen and a matchless example of social accomplishments, he could scarcely have been anything else. Further, a Renaissance man of the world whose thoughts, like those of the noble Pyrocles in the revised Arcadia, lay more "in deeds to performe, then in wordes to defende," Sidney lived the philosophy of education he sets forth in the Defence of Poesie. "So that the ending end of all earthly learning," he there writes, "being verteous action, those skills that most serve to

Essays (1580-1588), particularly his discourses "On the Up-bringing of Children" and "Of Pedantry." Counterparts in England were Elyot's The Boke named the Gouernor (1531), Ascham's The Scholemaster (1570), Lyly's Euphues (1579) and Spenser's The Faerie Queene (1589-96), the latter undertaking "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline." Allied with the aims of the literary movement were the educational ideals behind the proposal by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, navigator and soldier under Sidney's father in Ireland, for "The Erection of an Achademy in London for Education of her Majesties Wardes and others the youths of nobility and gentlemen" (1572) and the establishment around 1575 of Gresham College by Sir Thomas Gresham. Founder of the Royal Exchange, Gresham proposed to have lectures "on the sciences of divinity, astronomy, geometry, music, law, medicine, and rhetoric." Cf. the DNE, s.v., "Gilbert, Sir Humphrey" and "Gresham, Sir Thomas." William Boyd, The History of Western Education (London, 1964), p. 209. Boyd has an excellent chapter on the broadening of humanism and the educational milieu of the sixteenth century.

bring forth that, have a most just title to be Princes over all the rest."² Such a practical view toward learning went hand in hand, of course, with a contempt for the alleged sophistry of the medieval schoolmen, and the theme is a recurrent one in Sidney's writings.

"So yow can speake and write Latine not barbarously," he writes in a letter to his brother Robert in 1580, "I never require great study in Ciceronianisme the chiefe abuse of Oxford, Qui dum verba sectantur, res ipsas negligunt."³ Oft quoted, this sentence suggests Sidney's dislike not only for the purely formal training in style--with Cicero as the model and with little or no attention to content--but also for the sophistical wrangling and word-splitting that was characteristic of traditional logic and school debates. As the philosopher Windelband observes of the Renaissance humanists, "instead of conceptions they demanded things; instead of artificially constructed words, the language of the cultivated world; instead of subtle proofs and distinctions, a tasteful exposition that should speak to the imagination and heart of the living

²The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1912-1926), III, 12--hereafter referred to as Works.

³Works, III, 132.

man."⁴ Aside from its scorn for scholasticism, Sidney's letter to his brother is notable for the stress it places on carrying out studies in a practical manner. Sidney's advice in the reading of history is to pay particular attention to worthy examples touching on all manners of fortifications, laws, politics, customs; and, since the historian is also a discoursesman who often plays the part of a divine or a philosopher and "speakes non simpliciter de facto, sed de qualitatibus et circumstantiis facti," to trust not to memory but to construct a useful table of remembrance: "that when yow reade any such thing, yow straitly bring it to its heade, not only of what art, but by your logicall subdivisions, to the next number and parcell of the art." (In this description of the table of remembrance is an unmistakable hint of the utilitarian logic of Peter Ramus, which will receive due attention later.) Sidney further advises his brother to excel in arithmetic, geometry, music, and the manly art of horsemanship.

A similar tendency to hold school philosophy up to scorn while stressing the practical value of learning appears in the Defence of Poesie. Consider, for example, Sidney's

⁴A History of Philosophy, tr. James H. Tufts (New York, 1901), p. 360. An earlier instance of Sidney's scorn for the schoolmen occurs in his first literary effort, The Lady of May, a masque presented for Elizabeth's entertainment at Wanstead in 1578. In this brief piece the pedant schoolmaster Rhombus and his verbal quiddities are verily laughed off the pastoral scene.

celebrated definition of the poet. Unlike the school philosopher with his abstract sophistry, the poet, according to Sidney, is one who "beginneth not with obscure definitions, which must blurre the margent with interpretations, and leade the memorie with doubtfulnessse: but hee cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for the well enchanting skill of Musicke, and with a tale forsooth he commeth unto you, with a tale, which holdeth children from play, and olde men from the chimney corner." In respect to poetry he is even more specific: unlike philosophy, which is tied to the precept and gives only a wordish description, or history, which is tied to the fact and wants the precept, poetry can bring learning into closer relation to the actualities of life. "Let us but heare old Archises," says Sidney, "speaking in the midst of Troies flames, or see Ulissee in the fulnesse of all Calipsoes delightes, bewaile his absence from barraine and beggerly Ithecae. Anger the Stoikes said, was a short madnesse: let but Sophocles bring you Ajax on a stage, killing and whipping sheepe and oxen, thinking them the Army of Greekes, with their Chieftaines Agamemnon, and Menelaus: and tell me if you have not a more familiar insight into Anger, then finding in the schoolmen his Genus and Difference." Considered along with Sidney's letter to his brother and his dictum that virtuous action is "the ending end of all earthly learning," these examples from the Defence of Poesie make clear Sidney's interest in the practical.

It was this interest in part that motivated Sidney to write the revised Arcadia. In the absence of a definite statement of his intention, scholars have had recourse to an account by Fulke Greville, poet, courtier, and one of Sidney's closest friends. To Greville, Sidney entrusted the only manuscript of the revision. According to Greville's account, it is Sidney's purpose to delineate in the frame of his own commonwealth all the vicissitudes of good and ill fortune in both public and private affairs; and, by turning "the barren Philosophy precepts into pregnant Images of life," to "limn out such exact pictures, of every posture in the minde, that any man being forced, in the straines of this life, to pass through any straight, or latitudes of good, or ill fortune, might (as in a glasse) see how to set a good countenance upon all the discountenances of adversitie, and a stay upon the exorbitant smilings of chance."⁵ Thus to offer, through exact pictures, a guide to the exercise of virtuous action in the very teeth of adversity--this is the purpose of the revised Arcadia. Further, Greville explains that Sidney's teaching is intended to give delight as well as instruction: "And though my Noble Friend had that dexterity, even with the dashes of his pen to make the Arcadian Antiques beautifie the Margents of his works;

⁵Sir Fulke Grevilles Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford, 1902), pp. 15-16.

yet...his end in them was not vanishing pleasure alone, but morall Images, and Examples, (as directing threads) to guide every man through the confused Labyrinth of his own desires, and life."⁶

Though Greville's account is sometimes dismissed as exaggeration because of its insistence on the finer moralities,⁷ it has much to recommend it as a reliable statement of Sidney's purpose. Not only does it strike the familiar keynote of scorning scholasticism ("the barren Philosophy precepts") in favor of matter that can be put to use, but it is consistent with Sidney's theory of the purpose of poetry in the Defence of Poesie. There Sidney defines poetry as "an Art of Imitation: for so Aristotle termeth it in the word μιμνησις, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically. A speaking Picture,

⁶Ibid., p. 223.

⁷The strongest objection to Greville's account is that by R. W. Zandvoort in Sidney's Arcadia: A Comparison Between the Two Versions (Amsterdam, 1929), pp. 121-122. Zandvoort finds that Greville's testimony as to the inculcation of moral lessons in the revised Arcadia is "somewhat surprising, in view of the composite texture of the romance, which is by no means woven of one single thread...." Defences of Greville's account are numerous. Cf., for example, Marcus Goldman, Sir Philip Sidney and the Arcadia ("Illinois Studies in Language and Literature," Vol. XVII, Nos. 1-2 (Urbana, 1934)), p. 123. Greville's editor--Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville, ed. Geoffrey Bulough, 2 vols. (London, 1945), I, 5--writes: "His interpretation with its insistence on the moral gravity of his friend's message may err by exaggeration, but it cannot be dismissed as a mere attempt to find virtue in a tale of which Greville's sober age must otherwise disapprove."

with this end to teach and delight." The subject most fit for poetry to teach delightfully is virtuous action.

Just as Sidney's central purpose in the revised Arcadia is marked by the notion of practicality, so his plan of composition bears a similar stamp as it develops out of an interest in the most remarkable manifestation of the humanistic attempt to bring learning into touch with reality. Aside from the sheer complexity of the work, the most striking feature of the revised Arcadia is an inverted or in medias res type of structural pattern. Conventional in epic poetry and prose, the in medias res technique was employed by Heliodorus, whose Aethiopica provided Sidney with a primary source.⁸ But it is quite likely, too, that an intermediary influence lay between Sidney and Heliodorus. In The Lawiers Logike (1588) Sidney's protégé, Abraham Fraunce, writes: "Reade Homer, reade Demosthenes, reade Virgill, read Cicero, reade Bartas, reade Torquato Tasso, reade that most worthe ornament of our English tongue, the Countesse of Pembrookes Arcadia, and therein see the

⁸"For the web (as it were) of his story," writes John Hoskins in his Directions for Speech and Style (1599), "he followed three--Heliodorus in Greek, Sanzarus' Arcadia in Italian and Diana de Montemaioir in Spanish." See Malcolm Wallace, The Life of Sir Philip Sidney (Cambridge, 1915), p. 235. The standard study of Sidney's debt to Heliodorus is by Samuel Lee Wolf, The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction (New York, 1912), pp. 312-313, 343.

true effectes of natural Logike which is the ground of artificiall."⁹ The reference in Fraunce's statement is to the practical logic of Peter Ramus. Critics have given but passing notice to Fraunce's statement, but evidence makes it applicable to Sidney and suggests that the revised Arcadia illustrates Ramistic logic, particularly in its use of a heteroclitite structure and paradoxes of situation that "prove" a central theme.

When Sidney began to work on the revised Arcadia in 1581-1582 perhaps no other subject was more hotly debated throughout learned circles in Europe than Ramus's proposed reform of logic and rhetoric.¹⁰ Ramus had sturned the academic world by asserting in his master's thesis at Paris in 1536 that Quaecumque ab Aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse. This thesis was less an attack on Aristotle than on

⁹"The Lawiers Logike by Abraham Fraunce. Imprinted by William How for Thomas Gubbin and T. Newman. 1588." STC 11344. The quote is on fol. 4^v.

¹⁰The most recent study of Ramus is by Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton, 1956), pp. 146-281, to which is appended (p. 146) an adequate bibliography of critical materials. Earlier studies on Ramus that have been of help in the preparation of this chapter are those by Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947), pp. 331-353; by Harold Craig, The Enchanted Glass (Oxford, 1952), pp. 142-169; and by Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 111-153, 305-330, and Appendix A.

the followers of Aristotle. As Abraham Fraunce was to write in a commentary on Ramus, "ther be no greater enemyes in deed to Aristotle, then they that in words be Aristotelians: no better frends to him indeed, then they y^t least professe in words."¹¹ Following in the path of Laurentius Valla's Dialecticæ Disputationes contra Aristoteleos (1499), Ludovico Vive's De Disciplinis (1531), and Marius Nazolius' De veriis principiis et vera ratione philosophandi (1563), Ramus objected to the alleged lack of any utility in the logomachy of scholasticism. His proposed reform in the interest of utility simplified traditional logic by separating that discipline from rhetoric, reducing the number of categories, subordinating the syllogism, and considering logic first of all as an art of disputing well, with the truth or falsity of ideas determined by an orderly arrangement based on man's use of his natural intelligence.¹²

¹¹"A bryef and general comparison of Ramus his Logike with that of Aristotle," an unpublished treatise written around 1581-82 and dedicated to Sidney. A discussion of this important manuscript appears below.

¹²The Dialectique de Pierre de la Ramée (1555) and the Dialecticæ Libri Duo (1556). Ramus's theories on rhetoric, stripped of invention and judgment and reduced to some twenty-five tropes and figures and a discourse on delivery, were advanced in 1567 by Omer Talon in his Institutiones oratoriae, usually referred to as the Rhetorica. Ramus's logic was first translated into English in 1574 by Roland Macilmainet: "The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr. Per M. Roll. Makymenaecum Scotum, for Thomas Vautrolier." STC 15246. For a thorough account of the literature of Ramus's logic in Europe, see Perry Miller, op. cit., pp. 492-501.

In England the controversy over Ramus centered at Cambridge. Introduced there in the early 1570's by way of Laurence Chaderton's lectures on logic and Gabriel Harvey's on rhetoric, Ramism gained acceptance in the next decade mainly through the efforts of three men: William Temple of King's College, George Downham of Christ's, and Alexander Richardson of Queen's. Of these commentators, Temple is the most important. Active in the early 1580's, he engaged in a series of controversies over Ramus with Everard Digby of St. John's College and with Johannes Piscator, the German philologist, and published in 1584 an edition of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo with a dedication to Sidney.

Though Sidney studied at Oxford, where opposition to the Cambridge position on Ramus was strong, it has long been known that toward the end of his brief career he accepted Ramus's system of logic. Aside from France's testimony in The Lewiers Logike and Temple's dedication to Sidney of the Dialecticae Libri Duo, evidence is not lacking that Sidney knew Ramus intimately. Malcolm Wallace, Sidney's biographer, makes this claim on the strength of a passage in the preface to Theophilus Banosius's Petri Rami Commentariorum de Religione Christiana (1577), one of the sources for the life of Ramus. Banosius dedicated this work to Sidney with the comment: "You not only entertained the tenderest love for Ramus when alive, but now that he is

dead, esteem and reverence him."¹³ To Bancsius's statement may be added Milton's remark in the preface to his recension of Ramus's logic: "I hold with our countrymen Sidney... Peter Ramus is believed the best writer on this art."¹⁴

Temple's edition of the Dialecticæ Libri Duo carried a dedicatory epistle that fixes the date for Sidney's first acquaintance with Ramus's logic as 1584, the date of publication. "So that you may begin to love this discipline," Temple tells Sidney, "which was saved as from ruin by the genius of P. Ramus and quite splendidly elucidated by him."¹⁵ Other evidence, however, points to an earlier date--one that coincides with the period commonly assigned

¹³ Quoted by Wallace, op. cit., p. 118.

¹⁴ A Fuller Institution of the Art of Logic, Arranged after the Method of Peter Ramus, tr. Allan H. Gilbert, in Works, 17 vols., The Columbia Edition (New York, 1935), XI, 3. It should also be noted that Sidney (and his brother Robert) knew André Wechel, the famous printer and publisher of Ramus's works. See Wallace, op. cit., p. 124 and Works, III.

¹⁵ For pertinent passages from the dedicatory epistle, see Howell, op. cit., p. 204. Sidney's reply to Temple is cited in Works, III, 146, and indicates Temple's contribution to the vogue of Ramism. "I have received both your book and letter," Sidney wrote Temple, "and think my self greatly beholding unto you for them. I greatly desyre to know you better, I mean by sight, for els your wrytings make you as well known as my knowledg ever reach unto, and this assure yourself Mr. Temple that whyle I live you shall have me reddey to make known by my best power that I bear you good will, and greatly esteem those thinges I conceave in you."

to the composition of the revised Arcadia.

In the preface to The Lawiers Logike Fraunce calls attention to an earlier venture into Ramistic logic in the form of three treatises composed sometime between 1580 and 1585. Fraunce never published these works, but a copy of all three is in British Museum MS/Add. 34,691.¹⁶ The title-page of the manuscript reads as follows: "The Shepheardes Logike: conteyning the praecipits of that art put downe by Ramus; examples set owt of Beurhusius, Piscator, Mr. Chat-terton and diuers others. Together with twooe general discourses, the one touchinge the prayse and ryghte vse of Logike, the other concernynge the comparison of Ramus his Logike with that of Aristotle." The longest of the treatises, The Shepheardes Logike, is dedicated to Sidney's intimate friend, Sir Edward Dyer and, with its copious illustrations from Spenser's The Shepherd's Calendar (1579), represents an early draft of The Lawiers Logike. Although the treatise on the nature and use of logic bears no dedication, it will be seen that Fraunce wrote it at Sidney's

¹⁶A bibliographical description of the complete manuscript, 36 folio pages long, is in Catalogus of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum in the years MDCCCLXXXVIII-MDCCXCIII (London, 1894), pp. 321-322. The two shorter treatises in the manuscript, "Of the nature and use of Logike" and "A bryef and general comparison of Ramus his Logike with that of Aristotle," are transcribed in Appendix A of the present study.

request. The third treatise is dedicated to Sidney: "A bryef and general comparison of Ramus his Logike with that of Aristotle, to ye ryghte worshypful his verye good Master and Patron Master P: Sydney."

Aside from its historical interest, Fraunce's manuscript is important because it strongly suggests the influence of Ramism on the writing of the revised Arcadia. In the first place, the two shorter treatises were composed, according to Fraunce in the preface to The Lawiers Logike, "when I first came in presence of that right noble and most renowned knight sir Philip Sydney" and "drew both him to a greater liking of, and my selfe to a further traauyling in, the easie explication of Ramus his logike."¹⁷ Secondly, that Sidney asked Fraunce to write the treatises is clear from the opening passage in the discourse on the nature and use of logic. Fearing that he is not equal to the task of writing on the broad subject of logic, Fraunce says: "But bee it as bee maye, seeinge he desireth to heare, w^{ch} deserueth to haue, and willeth me nowe, who may commaunde me euer, I had rather be thought ouer rashe by writtinge, then not so thankfull by concealinge."¹⁸ Finally, Sidney appears

¹⁷The preface to the copy of Fraunce's treatise used here is wanting; the relevant information is quoted by Howell, op. cit., p. 223.

¹⁸Pol. 29^r.

to have made this request to Fraunce at the time usually assigned to the composition of the revised Arcadia, that is, in 1581-1582.¹⁹ Fraunce left Cambridge in 1583 to enter law, and a passage at the end of the treatise dedicated to Sidney--"pardon, I praye yow, the stammeringe messinge for the tyme was shorte, the place vnquiet, my bodye crased, my mynde molested, my bookes in Cambridge..."²⁰--suggests that Fraunce was still at the University. Moreover, Fraunce

¹⁹ Scholars generally agree that Sidney completed the Old Arcadia in 1580; the title of the Philips MS. states that the work was "made in the year 1580" (Cf. Zandvoort, op. cit., p. 5). On the date of composition for the revised version, however, scholars are at odds. Unfortunately, in a letter that could otherwise have settled the matter once and for all, Fulke Greville has puzzled scholars with an ambiguous reference. Writing to Francis Walsingham in 1586, he said of the revised Arcadia: "I have sent my lady, your daughter, at her request, a correction of that old one, done four or five years since, which he left in trust with me...." (Quoted in full in Wallace, op. cit., p. 232). Whether "done" refers to "correction" or to "that old one," has been a matter for debate. Some (e.g., Wallace, p. 233) assume it to refer to "that old one" and hence set the date for the revision after 1582; others (e.g., Zandvoort, p. 7) take it to refer to "correction" and settle on a date between 1581 and 1582. Some support for the latter date is offered by Mona Wilson, Sir Philip Sidney (London, 1950), p. 135: "Some time during 1581 his friend, the exiled Earl of Angus, saw '(though not polished and refined as now it is) his so beautiful and universally accepted birth, his Arcadia.'" This statement could refer to the revised version in an early stage; or it could refer just as well to the Old Arcadia. An attempt to establish a date for at least part, if not the whole, of the revision in 1584 has been made by Denver Ewing Baughan, "Sidney's Defence of the Earl of Leicester and the Revised Arcadia," JEGP, LI (Jan., 1952), 35-41.

²⁰ Fol. 36^r.

frames his treatise in the form of a controversial dialogue between two Cambridge logicians, one a Ramist and the other an Aristotelian. There can be little doubt that the treatise is thus alluding to the well-known controversy between William Temple and Everard Digby. This controversy ended sometime in 1581, and it will be seen that Fraunce's treatise implies that the whole quarrel was fresh in his mind.

That the two shorter treatises in Fraunce's manuscript drew Sidney to "a greater liking of...the easie explication of Ramus his logike" is understandable, for the central intention in each is to show the usefulness and practical applicability of Ramus's logic as compared with the unprofitable and unserviceable logic of the Aristotelians. An account of these two manuscripts in some detail will show clearly the spirit of Ramism that Fraunce imparted to Sidney. In general, the treatise dedicated to Sidney (referred to here as "treatise C") serves to point up the lack of utility in Aristotelianism, whereas the treatise on the nature and use of logic ("treatise B") shows the practical character of Ramism in a most favorable light.

In treatise C Fraunce makes his point by supplying Sidney with an amusing picture of the quarrel between Temple and Digby. Fraunce begins by announcing his intention to play the part of a reporter.

And yet because it were an odious thinge for me, to sytt as iudge and censor of Aristotle & Ramus, who as I neuer name Ramus wthout some reuerence, so I alwayes speake of Aristotle wth admiration, I haue layde asyde y^e person of a determyner, and supplied the place of a playne interpreter: exhibitinge that in writinge, to your worshipe breflye, which too Cambridge sophisters did speake more diffusedlye. The one is, as they saye, a methodical Ramyst: the other an obstinate Aristotelian: the speche was theirs, the iudgement shalbe yours, the reporte must hange vpon my credyte.²¹

Early in 1580 Digby attacked Ramus with a work entitled, in part, "De Duplici methodo libri duo, unicum P. Rami methodum refutantes...." Under the pseudonym of one Franciscus Mildapettus of Navarre, Temple answered Digby's charges; and by November of 1580 Digby had written "A response to the Admonition of F. Mildapet of Navarre concerning the preservation of the Unipartite Method of P. Ramus." Temple wrote a rejoinder in 1581, and the controversy ended at that point.²² Since Temple accompanied Sidney as secretary when Sidney went to the Low Countries in 1585, it may have been this controversy that aroused Sidney's interest in Temple. At any rate, although Fraunce indicates his position as a mere reporter, in the dialogue that follows the introduction

²¹Fol. 32^r.

²²For an outline of this controversy, see Perry Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 493.

of the two sophisters he leaves no doubt as to his sentiments. The Aristotelian is made out to be a babbling, incoherent fool whose remarks the Ramist refutes point by point.

The Aristotelian speaks first. "Good god what worlde is this?" he says.

What an age doe wee noe w liue in? I thinke on it daillye, yet can I neuer conceaue in thought, I wonder alwayes, yet can I neuer maruaile enough...A sophister in tymes past was a tytle of credit, and a worde of commendation: nowe what more odious? Aristotle then the father of philosephye, nowe who lesse fauored?...Ramus rules abroad, Ramus at home, and who but Ramus? Antiquitye is nothings but dunsicality, and sophistrye nothyng but vnfrutful Quiddities. Newfangled, youngeheaded, harebrayne boyes wyl nedes bee masters w^{ch} neuer knewe order, rayle agaynst Arystotle, as soone as they crepe out of the shelle, professe to knowe that in one yeare, which antiquitye confessed to requyre seauen.²³

In addition to lamenting the fact that logic has been made easy and common to all, the Aristotelian cries out against the irreverence shown his master: "and that which most tormenteth the harte of al wei settled Aristotelians, Aristotle himselfe is quyte despered, his Organon caled a confused Chaos, his Logike a lumpe of matter without order, more fytt

²³fol. 32^r.

to confounde y^e memory then apt to instruct the mynde...."²⁴

After delivering this harangue, the Aristotelian himself bears out the criticism leveled against the Organon when he turns to a discussion of the method and matter of that work. As for the method, "I saye, y^ta sillogisme as it is the worke and scope of Logike, so it is the matter subject when about this Organon [one] is conuersant and altogether occupied." The syllogism may be considered either as "totum vniuersale," in which case it has its specials, "a demonstratye, a topically, and a sophistical syllogisme"; or as "totum integrum," in which case it consists of "his essential parts, I meane forme and matter."²⁵ Before giving further explanation of the syllogism, the Aristotelian pauses to discuss the matter of the Organon, that is, the categories and predicables.

Now for the matter, he says, "first they begyne with the simple wordes, which they cal voces & termini, wherof some be proper some comon, some ad placitu, some a natura, and some of other sorts." Next come the predicabilia: "fiue general words, euerye one affordinge four seuerall commodities," the first of which is for "y^e better vnderstandinge of y^e predicaments, that ensue, w^{ch} be nothinge

²⁴Fol. 33^v.

²⁵Fol. 33^v.

els but a methodical ordering and placinge of praedicabilia, as of genus, species, differentia & the rest." The predicaments are next in order, but they are preceded by certain ante-predicaments, "as the distinction of words to knowe w^{ch} be doubtfull, ambiguous, equivocal and w^{ch} of one simple and playne signification, w^{ch} be priuitives w^{ch} be deriuatiues." The ten predicaments themselves carry the most weight, for "who see the not what a help it is eyther to de-fyne curiouslye, or deuyde exactlye, or dispute artificialye, to haue all words al things, all propertyes, and natures of things, so orderlye put downe, so playnlye set forthe, so easye to be vsed when occasion is affected, all bodyes, spirits, substances, accidents, qualityes, quantityes, relations, actions, passions, circũstances...." Finally, the post-predicaments: "Next these predicaments succedethe the explications of some certayne words, w^{ch} because theie be generalye dispersed through all the predicaments, and not seueralye bound to any one of them, are therfor put after thẽ al, as contraries, priuatiues, relatines, contradictions, prius, simul, and the other, very profitable for y^e more absolute explication of the praedicaments."²⁶

At this point the Aristotelian returns to the syllogism, considered as "totum integram," for a brief ac-

²⁶Fol. 33^r.

count of its form and matter. The form has to do with certain figures and "a certayne number of moodes, adioyned to euerye figure." The matter of the syllogism is the proposition.

He concludes his discussion with the statement that he has given the sum of Aristotle's logic, and if there be anything in Aristotelians that is not found in Aristotle, "it is added eyther for y^e more ample declaration of that w^{ch} is exactlye put downe of him, or for the more easye accesse and entrance to the hidden mysteries comprehended in that Organon."²⁷ The Aristotelian's discourse would have amused Sidney not only because of its interminable wordish description but because of its conclusion; like all Ramists, Sidney had no use for the "hidden mysteries" in school logic.

In answer to the Aristotelian's invective on the present state of logic, the Ramist's point is simply that the old order has changed, giving rise to new. "They thinke muche that a boye should conceaue that in a weeke," the Ramist says, "whiche they could scarce perceaue in a yeare, but more that thyr ould learninge should be corrected by newe teachinge, and theyr labour lost wth so lytle profitinge, hinc illae lachrimae." Logic is no longer to be locked

²⁷Fol. 34^v.

up in secret corners by friars and monks, but is to be made common to all who have reason. "Coblers be men, why therefore not logicians? and Carters haue reason why then not logike?" Furthermore, no longer is there to be a blind tribute to authority. Ramus rules abroad and at home, but "Ramus dothe not so rule, but y^t he can suffer reason to ouerride him."²⁸

From this point the Ramist proceeds to "answere therefore to your general contradiction by particuler confutation." By making the syllogism the heart of logic, the Aristotelians, according to the Ramist, have absurdly created three arts of disputation--apodictical (demonstrative), topical (dialectical), elenchtical (sophistical)--with nothing but confusion and tautology. "Logike is general, her parts be general, nether is ther an inuention Apodictical, an other dialectical, but y^e same inuention is in bothe." In contrast to Aristotelianism, Ramism makes logic one general art and divides it into but two main parts, invention and judgment.

As for the matter of Aristotelian logic, the voces and termini are of value, but the predicables are questionable and, like the predicaments, must be stripped of "palpable tautologies" and referred to their proper places in invention if any use is to be got out of them. "There may be

²⁸Fol. 34^r.

some vse I confesse," says the Ramist, "of voces and termini, for without words a disputation conceaued can not be vttered." Of the predicables, however, which are "idle questions propounded by Porphrye, as whether genus, and species with the rest be in deed or not; haue bodyes or not," "what Logike haue they, what vse in logike, what helpe to logike?"²⁹ With respect to the ante-predicaments, since they concern words, they properly belong to grammar and not to logic. Even the predicaments themselves lack order and pertinence. Some, like the natures of heavens, trees, and plants, are not a part of dialectical investigation at all but a part of natural philosophy. The rest must be assigned proper places in invention. For example, "in Qualitye what soeuer is logical is reduced eyther to the adiuncts, or lyke and vnylyke things." Finally, of the post-predicaments only four deserve places in logical invention: "the four first, Aduersa, Relata, Priuantia, Contradicentia, be topical, and therfor to be taught in inuention. as for these trifles of Prius, Simul, and Habere, they be rather foolishe grammatikal toyes, then Logical considerations."³⁰

The Ramist brings his speech to a close with a parting shot at the syllogism, which he considers neither of the

²⁹Fol. 35^v.

³⁰Fol. 35^r.

various kinds that Aristotelians suppose nor, since of yt selfe is cleare, & manifest," in need of reduction to confirm it. The single impression in treatise C, in the Ramist's as well as the Aristotelian's remarks, is quite clear: Fraunce has pictured for Sidney school logic at its worst--confused, tautological, divorced from nature and reason, utterly impractical. All this disappears in Ramus's logic, and the chief concern of treatise B is to show the practical and universal character of that art.

After a conventional introductory paragraph of apologies for his shortcomings, Fraunce states in true Ramist fashion the plan of his discourse: "Fyrste therfore generallye of y^e whole nature and vse of Logike, then after particularlye of some special operations in y^e parts of y^e same." Beginning with the old axiom that art ought to imitate nature, Fraunce claims true logic to be based on "y^t paterne... w^{ch} eyther god hathe drawn or nature layd downe in mans mynde, I mean the reasonable capacitye, wyt, or intelligence of man." With nature and reason as its foundation, according to Ramus, the extent of logic is great; the simple country laboring man is no less a logician than the learned man. In times past, argues Fraunce, such a scope for the art was impossible, for then logic "was soe oppressed wth sophisticall brablinge, and ouershadowed wth dunsical inuentions, that nether phisitians knewe y^t, nor philosophers had it,

nor Astronomers cared for it, being neuer in deed brought into lyght but alwayes kept & inclosed amonge those intricate labarinthes of barbarous & idle headed sophisters...." But logic outlived the abuse. A charitable and amiable discipline, she "excludeth no man," says Fraunce, "is no where excluded, is alwayes at hand, euer in readynes, & suffereth no pte of our lyfe to be destitute of her good healpe. Wth louers shee loueth...wth kings shee caunsileth in princes pallace, wth men of the countryshe shee sitts in ye sheepecots, wth senators shee grauelye derydeth controuersyes, in scholars shee directeth subtyle philosophers..as high as y^e hiest, as lowe as y^e lowest, & meane wth those of mydle meanings."³¹

As an example of the range of logic, Fraunce cites the case of a poor husbandman who is asked what hope he has of the coming harvest. Not instructed by learning but taught by nature, the husbandman answers straightforwardly, "that ther is no hope at all of any firtillitye this yeare to ensue because the weather hath bene so unseasonable." Here is logic, Fraunce cries out jubilantly. "Lee here the ij parts of Logike, the one in inuention of y^e profe, the other in disposition of ye profe inuented. This is natures worke and art must followe nature, or els no cause whie we should followe art."³² Fraunce's contemporaries shared his

³¹Fol. 29^r-30^v.

³²Fol. 30^r.

enthusiasm; the simplicity and utility that lie behind the husbandman's logic were the very characteristics that gave Ramism its irresistible appeal throughout Europe.

True logic is apparent also, of course, in the writings of the ancients and other excellent authors. As Fraunce was to say a few years later in The Lawiers Logike, "Reade Homer, reade Demosthenes, reade Virgill, read Cicero, reade Bartas, reade Torquato Tasso, reade that most worthie ornament of our English tongue, the Countesse of Pembrookes Arcadia, and therein see the true effectes of natural Logike which is the ground of artificiall."

To turn from a discussion of the general nature and use of Ramus's logic to a brief account of the particulars of the same is not an easy task. For however simplified and practical Ramistic logic may be in comparison with the Aristotelian, it still contains a wealth of explanatory and illustrative detail on such matters as places, axioms, syllogisms, and method. But in three paragraphs near the end of treatise B³³ Fraunce does an admirable job of touching on the essence of Ramus's division of logic into invention and judgment. He does this by confining his remarks to two special operations, genesis and analysis, that may occur in either of the two main parts of logic.

³³Fol. 31^r-32^v.

Genesis and analysis correspond to the double practice that separates Ramistic logic into invention, concerned with the "searchinge and findinge out of arguments," and judgment, concerned with the "framing & exactlye disposinge the same." Genesis, the first operation in either part, is simply the practice whereby one creates a piece of work. For example, one might take a word like nobility and draw it through the various places of invention: causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, comparatives, name, distribution, definition and testimony. These arguments are then disposed into a discourse either by means of axioms, syllogisms or method, according to the second part of logic, judgment. Analysis is the reverse procedure, whereby one undoes that which others have done. Like genesis, it may occur in both invention and judgment. For an example of the latter, Fraunce cites an exercise of his own in which he "tooke out of Tullie his paradoxes where he hathe thease words, quod solū honestū est, id bonum est...the order, profe, examples, confirmations, confutations, axiomes, syllogismes, enthymemes...." In addition, one might profit from an analysis of another's method, and Fraunce brings treatise B to a close by referring the reader to Ramus's chapters on the exact or natural method and the inverted or prudential method.

In view of its concluding paragraphs, treatise B

might well have served Sidney with an introduction to the main doctrine of Ramus's logic. But for a fuller account of its special uses and applications he would have had to turn to a translation such as Fraunce's The Shepheardes Logike or to Ramus's own writings on the subject. The chief importance of treatise B, along with treatise C, is rather that it expresses the guiding principle of utility that characterized Ramus's main contribution to the humanistic attack on medievalism. As this principle was congenial to Sidney's thinking, so the two treatises Fraunce wrote for him helped shaped his plans for the revised Arcadia. One could, of course, as Ramus's commentators implied, use natural logic without ever having heard of Ramus. But in 1581-1582 Sidney was a professed Ramist writing under the immediate influence of conceptions of logic that made special appeals to literature and to the poet who wishes to teach and delight.³⁴

In view of the popularity of Ramus's logic during the last part of the sixteenth century, one might expect to find in the revised Arcadia a "disposition to drag logic

³⁴No attempt is made in this chapter to examine possible evidence of Ramistic logic in the Old Arcadia. It is supposed that Sidney revised this original version because it failed to teach and delight. Ramus's method provided an adequate plan for doing so.

in by the ears," as one critic puts it,³⁵ and to find any number of instances of an argument or axiom formed from the places of invention. Unity in the revised Arcadia will be seen to come about, however, in Sidney's use of a single process of framing and arranging arguments (in the Ramist sense) that is unmistakably Ramistic because it governs the whole of a piece of literature.

Touched on in treatises B and C, Ramus's rules of logic are set forth in detail in Fraunce's The Shepheardes Logike. Whether Sidney saw this manuscript is uncertain, although it is possible that he did in view of the dedication to his close friend Dyer and the illustrations from Spenser's poem. Fraunce was on familiar terms with the literary group that included Sidney, Dyer, Spenser and Harvey. In any event, Sidney could easily have turned to Ramus's doctrine in the French Dialectique (1555) or the Latia Dialecticæ Libri Duo (1556).

³⁵Hardin Craig, op. cit., p. 164. Craig cites the scene (Works, I, 78-79) wherein Musidorus discovers Pyrocles dressed as an Amazonian. Remember, says Musidorus, "what you are, what you have bene, or what you must be; if you cōsider what it is, that moved you, or by what kinde of creature you are moved, you shall finde the cause so small, the effect so daungerous, your selfe so unworthie to runne into the one, or to be driue by the other, that I doubt not I shall quickly have occasion rather to praise you for having conquered it, then to give you further counsell, how to doo it." The next chapter will show that the debate scene, a paradox contrary, is integral to Sidney's plan for unity.

Aside from the principle of utility, the two points most likely to be singled out in a discussion of Ramistic logic are its classification of arguments by dichotomy and its emphasis upon method. Of these two points, method is by far the more important; in fact, dichotomy is but a ready illustration of method. Called by different names, such as exact, perfect or natural, the method Ramus advocates is easily recognized, he felt, as a matter of common sense or natural intelligence. In a discourse the most conspicuous and general statement is placed first, followed by the next most general statement, and so on according to the natural order of ideas in the writer's mind. In other words, the order is always from universals to particulars, or, as Ramus's translators put it, from generals to specials. Ramus's scheme of dichotomies is an illustration of this method. First there is a general statement that logic is the art of disputing well, then a division of logic into the two parts of invention and judgment, and finally a further division of these parts into many halves according to their degree of generality. The importance of the dichotomization is thus that it represents a scheme whereby parts contribute to the whole.

For Ramus this method is the end of logic. "And in brief," he says in the Dialectique, "this artificial method seems to me some long chain of gold, such as Homer imagines,

of which the links are by degrees so depending the one on the other, and all chained so rightly together, that nothing can be taken away without breaking the order and continuity of the whole."³⁶ With such a concept of orderly arrangement at hand the Ramist could look beyond logic to the nature and structure of reality. As Perry Miller says, "Method was the 'golden rule' because it was a transcription of the divine order...If we wish to understand any portion of God's creation, we must set everything in its place...."³⁷ Though he could not always employ Ramus's natural method as such, the literary artist nevertheless felt its implications. In the first place, method strengthened the assumption that underlay all Ramistic thinking on logic--and the two treatises France wrote for Sidney are clear illustrations: logic is practical and universal, and all writers are, or can be, logicians testing the truth or falsity of their ideas simply by arranging them in good order. "The Ramist's profound

³⁶"Et bref ceste methode artificielle me semble quelque longue chaine d'or, telle que feint Homer, de laquelle les anneletz soyent ces degrez ainsi dépendans l'un de l'autre, & tous enchainez si justement en semble, que rien ne s'en puisse ester sans rompre l'ordre & continuation du tout." The microfilm copy of Ramus's French text used here has been kindly furnished by the authorities of the Bibliothèque Nationale. The title page of the copy reads as follows: "Dialectique de Pierre de la Ramée. A Charles de Lorraine Cardinal...A Paris, Chez André Wechel, rue S. Jean de Beauvais a l'enseigne du cheual volant. 1555."

³⁷Op. cit., p. 140.

belief in a reasonable order in nature," writes Rosemond Tuve, "allows him to have things both ways. Dialectic is just concerned with orderly thinking--every man's province; thoughts placed in order, however, will demonstrate the truth of a matter without the use of other dialectical tools. Dialectic is not synonymous with disputatious 'proving'; dialectically sound statements do, nevertheless, 'prove.' Apply this to poetry--and that it should be so applied is at the very heart of the doctrine--and you have a poem that has but to examine and state, with due care for dialectical soundness in the reasoning, in order to argue the truth or advisability of something."³⁸ In the second place, Ramus's method implied a rationale for discovering truth that was superior to any received rationale. To the Ramist's way of thinking, the Aristotelian method was too narrow, confined and out of touch with common experience. Good logic for the Ramist was not a mere science of words, but an art of disputing well, a system of orderly thinking grounded in nature and reason that could render reality as it is. For the poet like Sidney this meant nothing less than a scientific justification for artistic truth. Here was a system that would

³⁸Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, p. 342.

enable the poet, with his "feigning of noble images"³⁹ and his figurative language working conceptually, to render reality as he saw it. In the third place, method had the effect of adding a dimension to the role of particulars or specials. It will be seen that not only do specials illustrate a theme but, because of their relation to the whole, they prove it. In the importance Ramus attached to particulars Sidney found a basis for unity in the revised Arcadia.

Although the golden rule of method permeates Ramus's art of logic, the actual application of an ordering of thoughts from universals to singulars, degree by degree, is a final step in the system and in some instances may not even be necessary or may give way to the writer's decision to use, according to reason, a special arrangement. Preceding method is the discovery and disposition of arguments, which Ramus substitutes for the traditional predicables. In the sense Ramus uses the term, an argument is "that which is affected to argue somethynge, ofwhich sort be al such things as are alone & bie them selues conceaued or understoode bie reason."⁴⁰ It is "that w^{ch} is destined and pro-

³⁹cf. Abraham Fraunce, The Shepheardes Logike, fol. 6v: "y^e doctryne of inuention is general, & not restrayned onlie to y^e findinge out of mediū, w^{ch} they /Aristotelians/ commonlie take for y^e onlie argument, but absolutlye and uniuersallye applicable to y^e inuentyng of any thinge ether true or feyned whatsoeuer."

⁴⁰Fraunce, The Shepheardes Logike, fol. 5r.

per to declare something, as in a simple and single reason considered by itself, w^{ch} is comprised and declared by some exterior word, w^{ch} is the sign and note of the reason and argument."⁴¹ In the places of invention, for example, "cause" is an argument that argues its effect; an adjunct "old" is affected to the arguing of (seeing a relation to) its subject "man." Defined in Ramus's terms, an argument is a word, concept, figure of speech, or any other location that can declare or clarify or even prove a relation between things.

The discovery and disposition of arguments may proceed diversely from the various places of invention, as in the practice of genesis where a discourse on man is formed by referring him to other arguments to show him as cause, effect, subject, adjunct, and so on. Or the discovery and disposition may proceed from only two places or from a single place of invention. Consider the statement, "Men who are tall, fat, and bald have a foreboding appearance," derived from the disposition of arguments into an axiom from the places of subject-adjunct. The arguments tall, fat, and bald referred to the argument men tend not only to argue the relation (subject-adjunct) but to declare or prove something about the subject, namely, that tall, fat, and bald men are

⁴¹See Miller, op. cit., p. 124.

foreboding in appearance. As Milton says in his recension of Ramus's logic, "An adjunct is that to which something is subjected; or that which is affected to proving the subject"; whereupon he cites as an example Cicero's mockery of Fannius Chaerea: "Do not his head and eyebrows altogether bald, seem to favor of malice and cry out of deceit..."⁴² When combined with similar axioms derived from the places of subject-adjunct, the statement that "Men who are tall, fat, and bald have a foreboding appearance" can function in a poem or discourse as a special to prove a general, such as "Most men have striking appearances." The ability of an axiom or some other particular to function in this way, as a special that proves the general, comes about mainly through the influence of the golden rule ideal in Ramus's method. "If you put downe one, more, or all the specials," says Abraham Fraunce, "you also put downe the generall, for that the nature and essence of the generall is in every of the specials."⁴³ Axioms or examples framed of arguments become arguments themselves and must be considered in relation to the whole. "This conception of an infinite progression of logical relationships," writes Rosamund Tuve, "is at the very core of the Ramist idea of all thinking as a vast orderly

⁴²Columbia Edition, Vol. XI, pp. 85, 89.

⁴³The Lawiers Logike, fol. 34^r.

arrangement into which argument was hooked into argument, lesser attached to greater, word to concept, concept to larger concept, in an unbroken reasonable pattern. The inevitability of a conception of imagery as logically functional, given this understanding of the nature of thought and hence of all discourse, is obvious."⁴⁴

The practice of framing arguments and then disposing them into axioms or examples that function conceptually in a work proceeds equally well from a single place in invention. Of particular interest to Ramists were "disagreeable arguments" discovered in the class of "contraries" or "contradictions." Ramus himself in the Dialectique devotes several paragraphs to pointing out the importance the ancients attached to the use of contradiction. "Now above all the species of contraries," he concludes, "this one has been debated at length by the philosophers: among others Antisthenes had written four books about it, which (as Aristotle also says in the fourth book of his Philosophy) he disputed that it was not possible to contradict, which was a great paradox."⁴⁵ Thus the argument "strength" affects to argue

⁴⁴Op. cit., p. 345.

⁴⁵"Or sur toutes les especes des contraires ceste cy a esté debatee grandement par les philosophes: entre autres Antisthene en avoit escript quatre livres, esquelz (comme aussi diet Aristote au quatriesme de la Philosophie) disputoit qu'il n' estoit possible de contredire, que estoit un grande paradoxe." See p. 36.

its contrary "weakness." If these two arguments are then referred to another argument, that of contradiction, they declare a relation in which the one contrary affirms while the other denies what the first affirms. Disposed by judgment into an axiom, the arguments form the paradox "The strength of a kingdom lies in its weakness." From the affec-tion of arguments at the place of contrary, or its sub-division contradiction, a writer forms any number of dif-ferent paradoxes. For instance, he may take the two argu-ments "just" and "not just" and form a true paradox con-tradictory: "He is just; he is not just." With similar arguments he may form a contradictory statement such as that in Romans 9, "I will call them my people which were not my people," in which the connection between the arguments is not denied but the parts themselves deny. Or he may take two arguments, "loss" and "gain," and dispose them into an axiom--"The loss of a mistress will prove a great gain"--that is not a paradox at all but gives the semblance of one. Again, he may find in the arguments "pleasant" and "miser-able" a relation that is contrary to opinion and form the paradox contrary: "It is pleasant to be miserable."

It will be seen that in the revised Arcadia Sidney makes functional use of paradoxes discovered in the class of contraries or contradictions. His use of paradox is diverse but centered chiefly on the paradox of situation.

The burning wreck near the beginning of the romance is a good illustration. Working from the place of contraries, Sidney takes the arguments "fire" and "water" and finds in them a relation which, when applied to a shipwreck, is contrary to expectation and apparently contradictory. He then disposes these arguments into a paradox of situation: "a shipwreck without storme or ill footing: and a wast of fire in the midst of water."⁴⁶

The analysis in the next chapter will show similarly constructed paradoxes of situation that constitute the main plot and the so-called episodes of Book II. Each of these paradoxical situations stands as a special, an argument in the Ramist sense destined to prove a general.

Now the "general" that Sidney is concerned with is inseparably linked to his personal outlook on the world. Doubtless shaped by the inconsistencies and contradictions of his own life,⁴⁷ Sidney's view of the world is in patterns of contrast--specifically contrasts of paradox. The truth that Sidney the Ramist is probing, the reality that he wishes

⁴⁶Works, I, 10.

⁴⁷The more important paradoxes of Sidney's life, like the contradictions that were a part of the age in which he lived, are generally known. Marcus Goldman, for instance, has listed (op. cit., pp. 19-20, 52) a few of these, including the strange circumstances surrounding Sidney's birth.

to render, is paradoxical. Appearances are false; things are not what they seem. What better way to demonstrate this than to put to the test of Ramistic logic a paradox on the subject of virtue, the ending end of all earthly learning. This paradox can be found at the conclusion of Bacon's essay Of Adversity: "Certainly virtue is like precious odors, most fragrant when they are incensed or crushed; for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth best discover virtue." It can also be found, along with the logical way to prove it, in most versions of Ramus's logic. In the latter part of Milton's commentary, for example, he explains Ramus's definition of an argument: "An argument is that which has a fitness for arguing something... that is for showing, explaining, or proving something. Thus we have the well-known quotation: 'Fear argues degenerate souls' (AEnid 4), and that of Ovid: 'Virtue is made manifest and argued by afflictions.'⁴⁸ Notable also is Anthony Wotton's remark on Ovid's use of examples: "Here the Poet pro- veth the generall, that Adversitie sheweth true vertue; by three specials: Hector making known his valour, Typhis shewing his skill in storms, Phoebus his art in sickness."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Columbia Edition, Vol. XI, pp. 23-25.

⁴⁹"The Art of Logick gathered out of Aristotle, and set in due forme according to his instructions, by Peter Ramus...Published for the Instruction of the Vnlearned, by Anthony Wotton...1626." STC 16248. Bk. I, Chap. XXVI — as cited by Tuve, op. cit., p. 347. The actual translation was done by Wotton's son Samuel, who followed his father's notes.

If the paradoxes of situation be substituted for adversity, the unity of the revised Arcadia is clear.

For purposes of instruction, the practicality and simplicity in Sidney's plan of using paradoxes of situation ("the discountenances of adversity") as logically inter-related examples to support a main theme are obvious. Though on a much grander scale, Sidney's plan bears the simplicity of Fraunce's commentary in The Shepheardes Logike on a passage out of Spenser. In a discussion of the distribution of the whole into its parts, Fraunce remarks: "Nether is y^e general and special onlie thus handled in forms of distribution, but also in arguinge eyther this be that, or that be this. So in Julye Moriel hauinge first prayseed Hills in general, afterward rehearsethe particulars, as St. Michaels mount, S. Brigets bowre, Mt. Olivet, Parnassus, the hil Ida, Synai, our Ladyes bowre: by y^e repeatinge of which particulars he concludethe y^e general prayse of hills."⁵⁰ That the simplicity of Sidney's plan is obscure, is due of course to the immense complexity of the revised Arcadia. And yet the source of this complexity, the inverted structural pattern and profusion of detail, together form a second instance of Sidney's use of Ramus's logic.

After discovering arguments and disposing them into

⁵⁰Fol. 18^v.

axioms, statements, propositions, and examples, the writer using Ramus's logic must decide on the most reasonable order for his thoughts. In the second part of logic, the section on judgment, Ramus discusses the whole problem of disposition. Although his discussion at this point is actually divided into two parts, "axiomaticum" and "dianoeticum," with the latter further divided into syllogism and method, the vast importance Ramus attached to method had the effect of making that section a third major part of judgment, and the most popular one. "Axiomaticum" judgment is concerned with the disposition of arguments into axioms of various kinds. "Dianoeticum" judgment is concerned with the disposition of the axioms themselves. If the writer doubts any of his conclusions, he arranges his axioms in a syllogism and deduces further axioms. Otherwise, he simply orders his axioms in the intelligent sequence demanded by the natural method. The procedure of ordering thoughts from the most general to the least general may not, however, be satisfactory according to reason. And it is at this point that Ramus draws an important distinction for literature. If the writer is aiming at a learned audience of readers who can follow ideas presented in a descending order of generality, he should use the natural method; if, however, he is aiming at a popular audience (as Sidney is), he should use what Ramus calls the prudential method, an order

widely used by orators, philosophers and poets, "in which the things preceding are not altogether and absolutely the most conspicuous, but nevertheless the most convenient for him whom we must teach, and most likely to induce and lead him where we intend."⁵¹

Essentially the prudential method is another name for what Horace in his Ars poetica calls the in medias res technique, but like everything else in Ramism the method attaches a fresh importance to an old notion. In discussing the prudential method Ramus does not just restate a plan of inversion whereby the reader is plunged into the middle of things and then given past events by flashbacks or dramatic narration. Instead Ramus focuses attention on the utility of the method: an inverted structural plan best suited to the needs of the poet whose job it is to teach in a delightful way. Poetry is a speaking picture, Sidney says in the Defence of Poesie, "with this end to teach and delight." In his Dialectique Ramus spends eight pages explaining and

⁵¹"S'ensuyt la methode de prudence, en laquelle les choses precedentes non pas du tout & absolument plus notaires, mais neantmoins plus convenables à celluy qui fault enseigner, & plus probables à l'induire & amener où nous pretendons." Dialectique, p. 128. Ramus continues: "Elle est nomée par les orateurs disposition de prudence, par ce qu' elle gist grandement en la prudence de l'homme, plus qu'en l'art & precepts de doctrine comme si la methode nature estoit judgement de science, la methode de science [prudence?] estoit judgement d'opinion."

illustrating the prudential method as "the most convenient for him whom we must teach...most likely to induce and lead him where we intend."

In contrast to the coherence and clarity of the natural method, the prudential method inverts order in the beginning, digresses from the purpose, and omits such helpful devices for the reader as definitions, divisions, and transitions. For instructing a popular audience, it is nevertheless the best method for the poet to use. "Just as the poet is excellent in all parts of logic," says Ramus, "yet he is even more admirable in this part: he proposes to teach the people, that is to say, a beast of many heads: and even though he deceives them in many ways: he begins in the middle and there often comprehends what has gone before: finally he concludes by some uncertain and unexpected circumstance."⁵²

In his proposed reforms Ramus maintained a separation of logic and rhetoric by depriving the latter discipline of its traditional divisions of invention and judgment.

⁵²"Le poëte avecques ce qu'il est souvent en toutes parties de Logique excellent, encore est il plus en ceste partie admirable: Il se propose d' enseigner le peuple, c'est à dire beste de plusieurs testes: & partant deçoit par maintes manieres: Il commence au milieu & là souvent comprend le premier: finalement il conclud le dernier par quelque cas incertain & inopiné." *Dialectique*, p. 129.

But in his discussion of the prudential method he allowed logic and rhetoric to go hand in hand. For if the poet proposes to teach and delight, it is not enough that he hide his art with a distortion of method. He must also take into account the effect of rhetorical figures on the unsophisticated reader.⁵³ "In brief," Ramus writes, "all the tropes and figures of elocution, all the graces of expression, which are the whole of Rhetoric, true and distinct from Dialectic, serve no other thing if not to lead this vexatious and stubborn auditor, who is proposed to us by this method."⁵⁴ Having captivated his readers with such stylistic flourishes and with the intricacies of an inverted structure, the poet is in a position to lead them where he wishes. It is "as if by this method the poet has them benumbed and deceived by fancy, charmed and beguiled by some mask and

⁵³Cf. Howell, op. cit., p. 165: "By his standards, invention and arrangement were the true property of logic, and must be treated only in logic, even if arrangement had to have two aspects, one for the learned auditor and the other for the people. By his standards, style and delivery were the true property of rhetoric, and must therefore be treated only in rhetoric, even if the popular audience which demanded them had to have also a special theory of method that rhetoric was not allowed to mention."

⁵⁴"Et bref tous les tropes & figures d'elocution, toutes les graces d'action, que est la Rhetorique entiere, vraye & separée de la Dialectique, ne seruent d'autre chose, sinon pour conduire ce fascheux & retif auditeur, qui nous est proposé en ceste methode." Dialectique, p. 134.

semblance of reason."⁵⁵

Though Ramus is clear on the point, his translators often lose sight of the true purpose of the prudential method. Uneasy over such an "imperfect forme of methode," they limit their treatment to a paragraph or so stressing the notion of deceit and trickery.⁵⁶ But the prudential method is not for purposes of deception alone. With the support of illustrations from the ancients such as Horace, Virgil and Terence, Ramus's eight-page discussion emphasizes the utility of the method in satisfying the twofold aim of poetry.

The next chapter will show that, as a structure for his paradoxes of situation to teach a popular audience the

⁵⁵It is "comme si par ceste methode il les eust engourdz & abusé par phautauime, charmé & trompé par quelque masque & apparence de raison." *Dialectique*, p. 129.

⁵⁶Cf. MacIlmaine's version of the *Dialecticæ Libri Duc* (1574), pp. 100-101: "But when with delectation or some other motion thy chiefe purpose is to deceave the auditor, then thou shall put some thing away which doth appertaine to thy matter, as definitions, diuisions, and transitions: and set in their places thinges appertaining nothing to the matter: as digressions from the purpose, and long tarying upon the matter: but most chiefly see that in the beginning thou inuerte thy order, and place some antecedents after their consequents. And surely this more imperfect forme of methode in respect of the exact rule obserued in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the ancients taking away of some of the matter: & redouëth by the eking to of things extraordinary: but hauing some degrees of the order inuerted, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order."

exercise of virtuous action, Sidney follows the prudential method. Instead of beginning with the history of the two princes as they leave Thessalia, he plunges into the middle of things--their arrival in Arcadia--then works in past events by dramatic narration, surprises the reader at nearly every turn with unexpected happenings, and holds back the plot motif, the paradoxical oracle, until a key moment. To instruct and delight the reader further, Sidney follows Ramus's suggestion to use all the tropes and graces of expression--the Arcadian style--at his command.

Considered in terms of its functional use of paradoxes as examples to "prove" and its use of the prudential method as the best means to persuade an unlearned audience, the revised Arcadia will be seen as an illustration of Ramistic logic: a comprehensible, unified work with a theme that renders a paradoxical truth of life. The plan of composition is apt for the purpose. To a man of Sidney's practical temper and literary talents, Ramus's logic offered a method to teach and delight according to nature. Sidney's conception of the revised Arcadia, which takes its place alongside other works, such as The Courtier and the Faerie Queene, that undertake to educate a man of parts in gentlemanly virtues, is thus in the utilitarian spirit of the humanistic attempt to bring knowledge and learning in tune with the actualities of life.

CHAPTER V

FUNCTIONAL PARADOX IN THE REVISED ARCADIA

Often a well-turned remark by an influential critic can contribute as much in assigning a work of literature to limbo as can a pronounced change in reading tastes. The decline in popularity of Sidney's revised Arcadia offers a case in point. With the development of the modern novel during the shift in taste from romance to realism in the middle 1700's, Sidney's work was on its way out, and it was simply a matter of time until it was virtually forgotten. But a notorious remark by Horace Walpole certainly had an equal share in hastening that demise. In Volume I of his Catalogue of the Royal and Noble Authors of England Walpole took an incidental glance at the esteem in which Elizabethans held Sidney. "When we at this distance of time," said Walpole, "inquire what prodigious merits excited such admiration, what do we find?--Great valour.--But it was an age of heroes.--In full of all other talents we have a tedious, lamentable, pedantic, pastoral romance, which the patience of a young virgin in love cannot now wade through."¹

Enough to damn Sidney's work during the eighteenth century, Walpole's censure was reinforced in the next century by William Hazlitt, who added an insurance comment that held

¹London, 1759, p. 183.

in check any possibility for a revival of interest. After reviewing the romance with his characteristic fervor and acrimony as a "monument of intellectual abuse," Hazlitt summed up the whole in a blistering passage: "In a word (and not to speak it profanely), the Arcadia is a riddle, a rebus, an acrostic in folio: it contains about 4000 far-fetched similes, and 6000 impracticable dilemmas, about 10,000 reasons for doing nothing at all, and as many more against it; numberless alliterations, puns, questions and commands, and other figures of rhetoric; about a score good passages, that one may turn to with pleasure, and the most involved, irksome, improgressive, and heteroclitc subject that ever was chosen to exercise the pen or patience of man."² The nineteenth century agreed.

Of these two criticisms, Hazlitt's is the more damaging and vital. Not only did it strongly influence nineteenth-century thinking on the revised Arcadia, but it carried over into the present century and shaped the course for much modern criticism.³ Hazlitt's judgment undeniably has enough plausibility to satisfy the modern reader as an apt

²The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, 22 vols. (London, 1931), VI, 325.

³Cf., for example, T. S. Eliot's conclusion that the revised Arcadia is "a monument of dulness." See The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (London, 1933), p.51.

description of all that he thinks is wrong with the revised Arcadia. It must therefore be reckoned with, if for no other reason than that it contains a half-truth.

Hazlitt saw the revised Arcadia as incomprehensible and purposeless, void of coherence and unity--in fine, a riddle. His view has readily multiplied adherents because its use of the world riddle (by which he apparently has in mind a meaningless thing incapable of solution) serves as a convenient catch-all for readers cloyed by Sidney's prolixity and vexed by his lack of direction. It is possible to dismiss such a view as either a misunderstanding of Sidney's intention or a failure to make an historical adjustment ("When we at this distance of time inquire...", says Walpole) and judge the romance in light of the audience for which it was written. Yet Hazlitt's criticism, which is

Cf. also Derek Verschoyle, ed. The English Novelists (New York, 1936), pp. 47-49 and Mario Praz, "Sidney's Original Arcadia," The London Mercury, XV (March, 1927), 507-514. Verschoyle thinks that perhaps "no writer of high literary gifts has ever done such long damage to literature and to literary taste and fashion as did Sir Philip Sidney when he wrote his Arcadia." For Praz, "when all has been said, the only thing we care to remember of Arcadia is perhaps the passage about the shepherd boys who piped as though they should never be old, and even this we probably remember because of its Keatsian flavour."

never to be taken lightly, here contains a degree of truth. Sidney's romance is a riddle, and as such it is indeed prolix and directionless. But it is not, as Hazlitt would have it, meaningless or insoluble; nor is it, indeed, a riddle because it is incapable of being understood. The enigma of the revised Arcadia arises out of Sidney's meaningful application of just those principles of Ramistic logic that were appropriate for his purpose. The analysis that follows will show 1) a basic, straightforward plan of plot construction wherein paradoxes of situation are employed in a Ramistic sense for thematic development; 2) an inversion of this plan, according to Ramus's statement of the prudential method, to satisfy fully the purposes of teaching and delighting; and 3) a combination of a paradoxically plotted theme and a labyrinthine structure that accounts for the form and resolves the riddle.

I

It will be recalled that Sidney's purpose, which can be determined from testimony in Greville's Life and supported by theories in the Defence of Poesie, is moralistic. He is to teach and delight by offering a guide, through exact pictures, to the exercise of virtue in the face of adversity. The central theme within which this purpose is contained is the conventional paradox that adversity best

discovers virtue. As his basic plan, Sidney's follows Ramus's rule for the natural method of discourse and proves his general with a series of specials. That is to say, he develops his central theme by having his heroes subjected to a series of adverse circumstances, each of which is itself a paradox of situation.

Although the revised Arcadia does not, of course, appear in the straightforward manner suggested in the basic plan just outlined, yet, for purposes of analysis and for a clear understanding of Sidney's meaning, it will be necessary to follow the plan by disentangling the story as though Sidney had presented it ab ovo. In this respect, the romance conveniently divides into three parts: the so-called episodic mass or story-within-story in Book II, the main plot narrative in Books I and II, and the captivity episode in Book III.⁴ This neat division suffers from some overlapping, particularly in Book II where Sidney interweaves the past history of the heroes into the main plot. But for the most part the division will stand. Moreover, this tripartite breakdown corresponds to a three-level complexity through which Sidney paradoxically develops his central theme.

⁴Unless otherwise indicated, the word episode is used in this chapter in the general sense of an adventure or occurrence rather than in the restricted sense of an event lying outside the main plot, though related to it.

If considered as though it were written ab ovo, then, Sidney's story begins at a point a dozen or so pages beyond the commencement of Book II, as Pyrocles and Musidorus set sail from Thessalia to seek adventure and the exercise of virtue. To be sure, the reader is often hard pressed to follow the adventures in this section, because Sidney weaves them now and again into the main plot. Though it will later be seen that the exigencies of such dramatic narration agree with Ramus's instructions for the use of the prudential method and justify Sidney's use of this apparently vexing structural device, yet, to take it into account while discussing thematic development, would only blur the simplicity of this basic plan.

From the time the princes leave Thessalia until they arrive in Arcadia their journey takes them through many adventures, some of which are so weakly defined as to contribute nothing to thematic development. But the greater part of Book II has in it nine well-defined adventures which can be analyzed as adverse paradoxes of situation, either of the paradox-contradictory or paradox-unexpected type, that directly develop the central theme. For the sake of convenience, these adventures can be blocked off in sets of three: the first set deals generally with virtue in conflict with tyranny and treachery, the second with virtue in conflict with various sins against love, and the third with virtue in

conflict with treason and treachery. The plan here will be to analyze rather carefully, both as to story and as to paradox of situation, the first two sets in order to show Sidney's method in Book II, and then to summarize just the paradoxical quality of the other set, which differs from the first two mainly in terms of the specific events used rather than in terms of structure.

Thus the first set of adventures can be labeled the Phrygia-Pontus-Paphlagonia group. In the initial adventure the circumstances, it will be remembered, are as follows. Just off the shore of the Kingdom of Phrygia the ship on which the princes travel runs afoul of bad weather and is dashed to pieces against a rock. As the two friends become separated in the mountainous waves, Pyrocles is cast upon the shore, captured, and taken to the unvirtuous King of Phrygia. Apprehensive that both princes were sent to do him harm and convinced that Musidorus has perished in the shipwreck, the King determines to have Pyrocles beheaded. Meanwhile Musidorus has been rescued by a fisherman from the adjacent land of Pontus. He soon befriends a nobleman, who is able to contrive with the King of Phrygia a plan for exchanging Musidorus for Pyrocles. No sooner is this exchange carried out than Pyrocles decides to disguise himself as a servant to Musidorus's executioner. Then, just as Musidorus is about to

be beheaded, Pyrocles places a sword into his companion's hands, and the two princes heroically rout their enemies. The King orders his guards to seize the princes and put them to death at once. But the heroes withstand this assault and, indeed, act so valiantly that shortly a mutiny breaks out among the King's soldiers. The King flees, and the people, assuming their cowardly ruler dead, crown Musidorus as their leader.

Now the triumph of the princes in this first adventure comes to the reader as no surprise, because it is a mere demonstration of their great valor and strength. The coronation of Musidorus as King of Phrygia, however, comes as a complete surprise because it is attended by an inner contradiction that constitutes a paradox unexpected or paradox of situation. The contradiction may be explained as follows. Working from the logical place of "contraries," Sidney takes two contrary arguments (in the Ramist sense of the term)—an "execution" and a "coronation"—and descriptively shows how a scaffold for the one may apparently become the scaffold for the other. In fact (at the point when Musidorus is declared king), he makes this inner contradiction unmistakably clear to the reader by stating it in an antithetical phrase: "...Fortune (I thinke) smiling at her worke therein, that a scaffold of execution should grow

a scaffold of coronation."⁵ The truth underlying the contradiction need not be sought after, of course, since it is already implicit in the construction of the situation.

Thus, when to the element of surprise attending the proclamation of Musidorus as king is added this inner contradictory element, the adversity in the land of Phrygia is seen to center about a paradox of situation. The resolution to the situation is uncomplicated. Learning that the real king is not dead but has fled to a castle near by to organize the strength of his forces, Musidorus and Pyrocles gather adequate forces of their own and repair to the castle. Musidorus slays the unvirtuous King of Phrygia and Pyrocles slays the King's son, the victory "obtained, with great, and truly undeserved honour to the two Princes...." Musidorus then hands the crown over to a deserving nobleman of that land, with the admonishment to the people that "not onely that governour, of whom they indeed looked for al good, but the nature of the government, should be no way apt to decline to Tyrāny." For virtue there is no sub-

⁵ The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols. (London, 1912-1926), I, 201, hereafter referred to as Works. Pertinent quotations from the revised Arcadia in this chapter are to this edition and are acknowledged, when necessary, by page reference in the text. As pointed out earlier, supra, p. 40, all reversals of fortune (Aristotelian peripeteia) that are contrary to the reader's expectation and are attended by some element of contradiction are here considered as examples of paradox of situation rather than irony of situation.

stitute.

Somewhat less effective intrinsically as paradox of situation but equally functional as an illustration of adversity for Sidney's thematic development is the second adventure in the Phrygia-Pontus-Paphlagonia group. After being presented at Court upon recommendation of the King's counsellor, Leucippus and Nelsus, two brothers of miserable state, soon find themselves very much in the King's favor and in time recognized as great courtiers. That the King would extend such generosity and favoritism, however, angers the counsellor to a point where through cunning he has the King turn against the brothers and imprison them as servants to his enemies. At this point Pyrocles and Musidorus, who are indebted to the brothers for having earlier saved their lives, learn of their plight and request that they be granted freedom. But instead of honoring the princes' request, the King heeds further machinations of his envious counsellor and has Leucippus and Nelsus beheaded. To revenge this malicious deed, Pyrocles and Musidorus promptly gather forces in Phrygia, hasten to Pontus, and heroically slay the King upon the tomb of the unfortunate brothers.

Out of these circumstances Sidney constructs a paradox unexpected, or at least the appearance of one, in which the reader's surprise at the brothers' reversal of fortune

is juxtaposed with the contradictory character of the King's counsellor, a man "whose eyes could not looke right upon any happie mā, nor eares beare the burthen of any bodies praise: cōtrary to the natures of al other plagues, plagued with others well being; making happines the ground of his unhappinesse, & good newes the argumēt of his sorrow: in sum, a man whose favour no man could winne, but by being miserable...[p. 2037]." That this paradox of situation is less effective than the first that confronts the princes on "the journey of high honor" may be seen by noting several points of difference in Sidney's presentation of the two scenes.

In the first place, it will be observed that, when compared with the unexpected turn of events in the first adventure, the reversal of fortune that underlies the second adventure offers less in the way of surprise. The point is that as Sidney presents (by way of dramatic narration) the scene in Pontus the reader is aware of the counsellor's contradictory character before the occurrence of the brothers' downfall. In the Phrygian episode, however, the contradiction is not removed from the unexpected outcome, being in fact inner because it is implicit in the movement toward that outcome. It would perhaps be accurate to say that in the second adventure Sidney skilfully turns the event, by his phrasing, into the semblance of a paradox

of situation.⁶

In the second place, and as a corollary to the first episode, the fact that the two princes are not directly involved in the paradoxical adversity of the Pontus episode constitutes an apparent violation of Sidney's structural unity in Book II. If the relationship between thematic development and the device of a journey is to be maintained in a consistent way, the reader expects Sidney to have Pyrocles and Musidorus more directly involved in the adversity of a paradox of situation, as they are in the episode in Phrygia. It will be seen, however, that Sidney rarely departs from his basic plan,⁷ and even when he does so his thematic development is not impaired. For in so far as satisfying the Ramistic method of proving, with a series of specials, the general that "adversity doth

⁶David Daiches—Critical Approaches to Literature (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1956), p. 235—remarks that in its most significant form the effect of suspense "is not lessened by the reader's or the audience's previous knowledge of the outcome, partly because if the play or novel is effectively handled we lose ourselves in the given moment as it comes along and respond in terms of the situation as it is being developed, and partly because true suspense is not dependent on ignorance of the eventual outcome but on waiting for the inevitable to happen."

⁷Sometimes it is to Sidney's advantage to do so, as will be seen below (p. 184) in Book III where the heroic role of Pyrocles and Musidorus is taken over by Amphialus, a more noble character.

best discover virtue," the writer need not be consistent with his characters. He need only cite examples of the exercise of virtue in the face of adversity. Remember Wotton's comment on Ovid's use of examples: "Here the Poet proveth the generall, that Adversitie sheweth true vertue; by three specialls: Hector making known his valour, Typhis shewing his skill in storms, Phoebus his art in sickness."⁸ The point to be made is that Sidney's device of a journey is, finally, but an aid to thematic development; its primary function is to serve the demands of plot.

In the third place, as a reversal of fortune the paradox unexpected in the Pontus episode is likely to call the modern reader's attention to irony rather than to paradox, though it is well to keep in mind an earlier statement that "the motive behind a situation, that is to say, the apparent intervention of fate with its mockery of the appropriateness of things (which distinguishes irony of situation from paradox of situation), is not to be considered more important than the nature of the situation itself, which is basically paradoxically." Furthermore, not only is the operation of fate absent in the Pontus episode but in true irony of situation, though the outcome

⁸The Art of Logick gathered out of Aristotle, and set in due forme according to his instructions, by Peter Ramus...by Anthony Wotton...1626." STC 15248. Bk. i, chap. xxvi.

is apparently inappropriate, the reader quite often feels (perhaps half-consciously) that the outcome is appropriate-- what might be called a delicious kind of irony. This can hardly be said of the Pontus episode nor, it will be seen, of any of Sidney's paradoxes of situation that resemble irony of situation.

Whatever its weaknesses in comparison with the princes' initial adventure, the Pontus adventure is contrary to expectation and contradictory, hence paradoxical, and hence, in terms of its total effect, functional as the second adversity on the road to high honor.

Contrary to what is sometimes heard on the matter, Book II of the revised Arcadia does not comprise a series of adventures isolated from one another in the manner of the average medieval romance. Though it is true that Pyrocles and Musidorus are on the traditional quest for adventure--"and therefore would themselves...goe privately to seeke exercises of their vertue; thinking it not so worthy, to be brought to heroycall effects by fortune, or necessitie (like Ulysses and Aeneas) as by ones owne choice, and working...[p. 208]"--Sidney is careful in all but two instances in Book II to connect their adventures in some way. To be sure, the related paradoxes of situation in Book II do not, as they do in Book I, always evolve out of each other. Yet they do have an inner connection. For

example, it will be noted that in the first adventure described above Leucippus and Nelsus apparently perish in the shipwreck in order that Pyrocles and Musidorus might live, and then in the second adventure these same two servants become the center of the adverse paradox of situation.

One of the instances where Sidney does omit the link is between the second and the third adventures. But here the reader is little disturbed by the omission, because Sidney takes the opportunity to set forth his central theme. After slaying the King of Pontus on the tomb of Leucippus and Nelsus—which tomb, incidentally, "they caused to be made for them with royall expences"—Pyrocles and Musidorus engage in a number of particular trials, only one of which Sidney describes in detail. The reader is then told that it "were the part of a verie idle Orator to set forth the numbers of wel-devised honors done unto them" and reminded that "high honor is not onely gotten and borne by paine, and daunger, but must be nurst by the like, or els vanisheth as soone as it appears to the world... [pp. 205-206]." Sidney's statement of theme, here a re-wording of the notion that virtue is made manifest through adversity, will occur again explicitly in the third set of adventures, thus giving Book II some additional overall unity to supplement the mechanical device of a

Journey.

As a paradox unexpected the Paphlagonian episode, which, as is well known, provided Shakespeare with the Gloucester plot in King Lear, is patterned somewhat like the Pontus tale, albeit much more effectively presented. For not only is the reversal of fortune more sharply defined and effective as surprise, the inner contradiction better handled to work implicitly in the central situation, and the princes more directly involved in the resolution of the paradoxical dilemma; but the story itself is uniquely potential, even in being reported rather than rendered, for purposes of meaningful irony and paradox.

The circumstances are, it will be remembered, that while seeking shelter from the fury of a tempest Pyrocles and Musidorus happen upon "an aged man, and a young, scarcely come to the age of a man, both poorly arrayed, extremely weather-beaten; the olde man blinde, the young man leading him... [p. 207]." Inquiring into the miserable state of these men, the princes learn that the old man, once King of Paphlagonia, has since been dethroned and deprived of sight by an ungrateful bastard son, and is now being led by his faithful son to execute his own death by hurling himself headlong from the top of a rock. Further inquiry leads the fallen King to relate a long, lamentable story of the particulars behind this reversal of fortune.

Briefly, the particulars are that some time ago Plexirtus, the bastard son, cunningly persuaded his father to have Leonatus, the virtuous son, slain. The executioners spared Leonatus's life, however, and in the meantime Plexirtus betrayed his father, usurped his throne, put out his eyes, and sent him away to die. The King, in his own words, has been guilty of "cruell follie to my good sonne, and foolish kindnes to my unkinde bastard...p. 2097."

As the Paphlagonian King finishes this sad tale and Pyrocles and Musidorus, moved to compassion, seek a remedy, the evil Plexirtus suddenly appears with forty horsemen, intent upon slaying Leonatus. Realizing the situation, Pyrocles and Musidorus set about to defeat him (with help from the King of Pentus), but Tydeus and Telenor, two brothers of notable prowess, arrive in time to give him aid. When the battle that follows ends in a stalemate, Plexirtus is hurried off to a place of security. Pyrocles and Musidorus then see to it that Leonatus is crowned rightful King of Paphlagonia.

On the surface, the paradox of situation in the Paphlagonian episode offers nothing substantially different in presentation from the paradox of situation in the Pentus episode. Aside from the fact that in the Paphlagonian tale the princes have a more direct role in the resolution

of the action and that there is in the tale itself a better representation of inward suffering, the two adventures appear equal in merit and similar in construction. Both situations turn on a reversal of fortune, resembling irony of situation, in combination with the contradictory actions of an antagonist. In the Paphlagonian tale, set against the contradictory nature of Flexirtus, whom nature had so "formed...& the exercise of craft conformed...to all turnings of sleights, that though no mā had lesse goodnes in his soule then he, no man could better find the places whence argumēts might grow of goodnesse to another: though no man felt lesse pitie, no man could tel better how to stir pitie.../pp. 212-213/"--set against this Machiavelism is the reader's surprise upon learning that the miserable old man wandering in a tempest is no less than a king. And, as a result of the absence of a straightforward narrative leading to an unexpected outcome, in neither the Paphlagonia nor Pontus episodes is there as pronounced an element of surprise as there is in the Phrygian episode.

A closer examination of the Paphlagonian tale shows, however, that though it may be less effective as paradox of situation than is the Phrygian episode, it is clearly more effective in that respect than is the Pontus tale. In the first place, by inverting the order of the reversal of fortune, whereby the reader is not able to anticipate the

surprising outcome, and by using suspense in connection with the identity of the dethroned King—introducing him in the first several passages only as a poor old blind man—Sidney creates a more genuine sense of the unexpected. In the second place, the contradiction in the Paphlagonian tale is less likely seated in the character of Plexirtus than is apparent. Rather does it lie in the King's actions and in the situation itself. What Sidney does is to take two arguments—call them "unkindness shown to an evil son" and "kindness shown to a good son"—and by transposing terms turn them into the following contradiction, of which the King himself admits he is guilty: "cruell follie to my good sonne, and foolish kindnes to my unkinde bastard." Stated another way—and this time the reader should keep in mind Gloucester's remark, "I stumbled when I saw"—the contradiction is as follows: "It is true that the King is blind; it is not true that the King is blind." So stated, the contradiction holds true of course only for the period prior to the King's literal blindness. Hence the contradiction, like that in the princes' first adventure, is inner because it is implicit in the action; and, when combined with an outcome contrary to what the reader expects, it gives rise to true paradox unexpected.

The second set of adventures on the princes' "jorney of high honor"—call it the Erona-Pamphilus-

Andromana group—shifts the general theme of the action from tyranny and treachery to sins against love. Although these adventures are the most complicated and difficult to follow of all those in Book II, Sidney either inserting an extension to an already long and tangled episode (as in the Pamphilus tale) or beginning an episode in one chapter and not taking it up again until several chapters later (as in Erona's siege), the outlines of the paradoxes of situation that develop the central theme are clear. What is particularly interesting about these situations is that two of them depart from the pattern in the Phrygia-Pontus-Paphlagonia group and turn on a paradox contradictory rather than on a paradox unexpected. Thus instead of a surprising outcome coupled with an inner contradiction, there is a set of circumstances leading to a paradoxical snare from which the princes must either valorously rescue a lover or likewise extricate themselves.

Queen Erona, for example, falls in love with Antiphilus, a man of mean parentage (her nurse's son, no less), and refuses the hand of the great Tiridates, King of Armenia. That Erona's love is for the base Antiphilus follows as the penalty she must pay for having irreverently destroyed all the images and pictures of Cupid, whom she believes to be superstitiously adored. As further punishment Tiridates makes a bloody war upon her, manages to have

Antiphilus captured and imprisoned, and then threatens to behead him if Erona does not yield. Brought to the point "ether of a wofull consent, or a ruinous deniall," Erona now faces the full force of Cupid's revenge. For then he "did set fourth the miserableness of his effectes: she being drawne to two contraries by one cause. For the love of him cōmaunded her to yeeld to no other: the love of him cōmaunded him to preserve his life: which knot might well be cut, but untied it could not be... [p. 285]."

Stated another way, the paradox is that Erona's love can, on the one hand, force her to yield to Tiridates and thereby secure Antiphilus's freedom; but her love can also, on the other hand, prevent her from yielding to Tiridates and thereby cause Antiphilus's death. It will be observed that Erona's paradoxical dilemma represents an interesting example of Ramistic invention and judgment, whereby Sidney frames arguments from the three places of cause, effect, and contraries and then disposes them into an apparently contradictory situation.

Though, as Sidney says, the knot cannot be untied, the virtuous action of Pyrocles and Musidorus so prevails that they are able to sever it when Erona calls on them for aid. During the war that Tiridates wages, they slay Barzanes and Euardes, two men of superior valor and strength; and then, just as Erona's siege has her at the point of

desperation and about to yield to Tiridates, they manage her deliverance. By some unexplained device of dissimulation, they contrive to slay the King and to rescue Antiphilus. Their triumph over this adversity is, however, costly; for Tiridates's sister Artaxia lays a substantial reward on their heads, which reward nearly costs Pyrocles his life in a later adventure.

Also constructed on a contradiction rather than the surprise-inner contradiction combination is the paradox of situation in the Andromana episode. That this paradox of situation is perhaps less effective than the one in the story of Erona may be true, because Sidney appears less ingenious in contriving the contradiction; that it is more effective is also true, because the victims of the quandary are clearly Pyrocles and Musidorus, thus making for a tighter relation between thematic development and the structural device of a journey.

It will be recalled that in this adventure the two princes are guests at the court of the King of Iberia, to whom they owe their lives for lately giving them aid in battle. Their stay at court is mainly for purposes of healing some wounds incurred in battle, but they soon become the object of a violent, lustful love on the part of Andromana, the King's beautiful but headstrong wife. As soon as the condition of their wounds permits, the princes plan to

leave the court. But Andromana is quick to discover the plan, and promptly causes both of them to be put in prison—"a prison, indeede injurious, because a prison, but els well testifying affection, because in all respectes as commodious, as a prison might be: and indeede so placed, as she might at all hours, (not seene by many, though she cared not much how many had seene her) come unto us...

[/p. 280]. Pyrocles and Musidorus now find themselves in the following paradoxical situation:

Then fell she to sause her desires with threatnings, so that we were in a great perplexitie, restrained to so unworthie a bondage, and yet restrained by Love, which (I cannot tell how) in noble mindes, by a certain duety, claimes an answering. And how much that love might moove us, so much, and more that faultines of her mind removed us; her beautie being balanced by her shamelesnes. But that which did (as it were) tie us in captivitie, was, that to graunt, had ben wickedly injurious to him, that saved our lives: and to assure a Ladie that loved us, of her love unto us, we esteemed almost as dishonorable...
[/p. 280].

On the surface, this situation appears less a paradox contradictory than the semblance of one. But a contradiction clearly underlies the situation, which Sidney develops through a series of contraries. Note the following point in the passage just quoted. Like the paradoxical snare that befell Erona, the situation draws the two princes to several contraries by one cause: Andromana's

love evokes such opposites as beauty and shamelessness, gratitude and ingratitude, honor and dishonor. In turn, these contraries suggest the true contradiction that "to be a prisoner of love is unworthy; to be a prisoner of love is not unworthy."

Again, the princes' virtue so prevails in the face of adversity that nothing Andromana does can make them accuse her of love, and soon they find a way out of the paradoxical situation. The remedy is not, however, of their own doing; paradoxically enough, it is love that brings forth a solution. Though the resolution to the whole episode is involved, the essential details are these. Zelmane, daughter to the bastard Plexirtus, falls in love with Pyrocles and cunningly employs the help of Palladius, her lover and son to Andromana, to secure the release of the two princes. Later on, the princes demonstrate incredible valor in overcoming Andromana's forces in a battle that finds Palladius losing his life and Andromana committing suicide.

Unlike its two companion tales, the Pamphilus episode has a paradox of situation patterned like those in the Phrygia-Pontus-Paphlagonia group. As Pyrocles passes through a certain land on his way to fight a duel, he unexpectedly comes upon a lover named Pamphilus, who is bound to a tree and tormented with the bodkins of nine of

his mistresses. After first disposing of a half dozen knights who suddenly appear on behalf of the nine women, Pyrocles intervenes for the distraught Pamphilus. Presently the angry women disappear, with the exception of Dido, who acquaints Pyrocles with the details behind Pamphilus's misfortune and the reader with the contradiction that attends the unexpected.

It turns out that Pamphilus is the most inconstant of lovers, something of an angel on the outside and a poisonous adder on the inside. Apparently he has kept at bay each of the nine suitors until "at length he concludeth all his wronges with betrothing himselfe to one...leaving... [his nine lovers] nothing but remorse for what was past, and despaire of what might followe... [p. 267]." What is particularly interesting about Pamphilus is that he is a bundle of contradictions. According to Dido, for example, he argues as a justification of his gross infidelity the paradox contradictory that it is "no inconstancie to change from one Love to an other, but a great constancie; and contrarie, that which we call constancie, to be most changeable... [p. 268]." He attempts to prove the paradox with the following bit of splendid reasoning:

For (said he) I ever loved my Delight,
& delighted alwayes in what was Lovely:
and where-soever I founde occasion to

obtaine that, I constantly folowed it. But these constant fooles you speak of, though their Mistres grow by sicknes foule, or by fortune miserable, yet still will love her, and so committe the absurdest inconstancie that may be, in changing their love from fairnes to foulnesse, and from lovelines to his contrarie...where I (whom you call inconstant) am ever constant; to Beautie, in others; and Delight in my selfe.../p. 268/.

After hearing her story, Pyrocles is able to stay Dido's revenge on Pamphilus, whose eyes she would willingly put out, and to urge her to meekness. Then a number of Pamphilus's friends arrive to kill Dido. But Pyrocles's valor is superior, and he is finally able to make peace for all sides.⁹

If compared to the paradox unexpected common to the princes' first set of adventures, the Pamphilus episode has no particular merit as to evidence of a contradiction implicit in the action toward an unexpected turn of events. But the contradictions that center about the lover Pamphilus, especially his argument on the contraries of constancy and inconstancy, are as cleverly contrived as any of those in Book II.

⁹The Pamphilus episode carries an extension (pp. 270-277) in which Pyrocles is the victim of treason committed by Dido's father. The treason is unexpected, but since the episode does not develop Sidney's theme, it is omitted here.

The Phrygia-Pentus-Paphlagonia and the Erona-Pamphilus-Andromana groups are representative of Sidney's method in Book II of employing paradoxes of situation for development of theme.¹⁰ To analyze the remaining group as closely would perhaps be tedious, since the episodes within it differ mainly in descriptive details of story and generally contain paradoxes of situation similar to those in the first group. It will suffice, then, to summarize the paradoxical content of the episodes within the group and in passing to note occasional differences in Sidney's presentation of the paradox unexpected.

From various sins against love, the general theme in this third group of adventures shifts back to that of treason and treachery. Since each of the paradoxes within the group is the result of the fallen Plexirtus's passion for vengeance, which on two occasions at least is directed toward Pyrocles and Musidorus, it might be apt to call the whole group Plexirtus's Revenge. Again, as paradoxes of situation, each of these adventures is similarly patterned:

¹⁰The adventures in the Erona-Pamphilus-Andromana group are related in two ways. Tiridates's death in the story of Erona nearly costs Pyrocles his life at the end of the Pamphilus tale (p. 277). Pyrocles receives succor from the King of Iberia, at whose court he and Musidorus are guests in the Andromana tale.

a set of circumstances contrary to the reader's expectation and attended by a contradiction either implicit or explicit in the action.

In the first adventure, for example, Pyrocles and Musidorus travel through the land of Galatia and encounter the noble brothers Tydeus and Telenor, who are finishing a duel in which each has mortally wounded the other. Behind this surprising development lies a grim paradox, for the treacherous Plexirtus, alarmed at the power Tydeus and Telenor have gained while aiding him in several conquests, has connived a vicious plan to destroy them. Under pretense that the King of Pontus was to meet him in mortal duel, Plexirtus feigned sickness and "requested...Tydeus and Telenor to go in his stead; making either of thẽ swears, to keep the matter secret, ever ech frẽ other, delivering the selfsame particularities to both, but that he told Tydeus, the King would meet him in a blew armour; & Telenor, that it was a black armour; & with wicked subiltie (as if it had bene so apointed) caused Tydeus to take a black armour, & Telenor a blew.../p. 2947." In Sidney's own words, Plexirtus has managed the apparent contradiction of turning "their owne friedship toward him to their owne destruction.../p. 2947."

The adversity of a paradoxical situation in the other two adventures in Plexirtus's Revenge follows the

same pattern, though it should be noted that these two adventures are, in the presentation of paradox unexpected, closer to the Phrygian episode than to any of the other episodes in Book II. That is to say, the surprising outcome and the contradiction are closely related; in fact, they are inseparable. Consider, for instance, the details that lead to Pyrocles's rescue of Plexirtus. For several months Plexirtus's daughter Zelmane has been serving (in disguise) as Pyrocles's page. Suddenly she is taken ill, partly as a result of her grief for her father's wickedness and partly as a result of her frustrated love for Pyrocles. Her illness increases almost to the point of death, which is then sealed when she learns from a messenger that Plexirtus is somewhere in danger of a cruel death. Her dying wish is that Pyrocles rescue him. The virtuous prince is thus brought to the point of saving a man whom he has great cause to hate.¹¹

It might also be mentioned that in rescuing Plexirtus Pyrocles's valor is particularly notable, so notable in fact that his triumph over the monstrous beast that is to devour Plexirtus is "both by sculpture and picture, celebrated in most parts of Asia." But again, for virtue

¹¹cf. Works, I, 299.

there is no substitute and virtue is made manifest by afflictions. Here Pyrocles is made to say what actually underscores Sidney's central theme: "truely, the hardnes of the enterprize, was not so much a bitte, as a spurre unto me; knowing well, that the journey of high honor lies not in plaine wayes...[p. 301]."

Of the final adventure in Plexirtus's Revenge little need be said, since the details of it as a paradox unexpected were considered at some length in the introductory chapter above. The circumstances are that when Plexirtus learns that the princes wish to sail to Greece he graciously provides a ship for their passage, but also lays a plan to have them murdered when the ship is half a day sailing. The princes' discovery of the plot leads to a most confused fight and soon an unexpected shipwreck--one not by storm, but by fire. As Sidney states the paradox, "it was a strange and cugly sight, to see so huge a fire, as it quickly grew to be, in the Sea, and in the night...[p. 306]"; in fine, "a shipwrack without storme or ill footing: and a wast of fire in the midst of water... [p. 19]."

Since part of the burning wreck episode appears in Book I, additional comment will be necessary. But first it may be worth while to review Sidney's basic plan of thematic development in Book II.

From the logical places of contraries or contradictions Sidney contrives a number of paradoxes of situation grounded on either paradox contradictory or paradox unexpected. Often these situations resemble irony of situation, but the presence of a contradiction and the absence of a strong operation of fate mark them as basically paradoxical. As Sidney works these paradoxes of situation into the framework of a journey, they stand as "specials" of adversity, which the heroes must in some way overcome, to prove the "general" that virtue is best discovered in adversity. The simplicity of this basic plan of thematic development is obvious. It is no more complicated than Fraunce's account of how Spenser follows Ramus's natural method: "So in Julye Moriel hauinge first prayesed Hills in general, afterward rehearse the particulars, as St. Michaels mount, S. Brigets bowre, Mt. Olivet, Farnassus, the hil Ida, Synai, our Ladyes bowre: by ye repeatinge of which particulars he concludethe ye general prayse of Hills."¹²

It will also be observed that Sidney's paradox of situation, whether constructed as paradox contradictory or

¹²The Shepheardes Logike, fol. 18^v.

unexpected, is a less powerful rhetorical figure than is paradox contradictory when expressed in the form of an antithetical statement. The force of the latter figure upon a reader lies in the tension between his apprehension of the apparent falsity of the proposition and his sudden perception of its inner truth. But in paradox of situation this effective discrepancy between apparent falsity and inner truth is fairly lost. The reader has little opportunity to resolve the paradox, for its resolution is already clear in the construction of the situation. This is true even in those paradoxes, such as the Phrygian episode, in which the surprise and the contradiction become fused.

Yet the paradox of situation is far more amenable to Sidney's twofold purpose of teaching and delighting than is the paradox contradictory in the form of a statement. Though it must frequently turn over power of expression and provocation of thought to paradox contradictory as statement, paradox of situation is more suitable for narrative, and as such offers greater latitude for Sidney to explore meaningfully the difference between appearance and reality while instructing his reader in the proper exercise of virtue in the teeth of adversity. Furthermore, it allows greater room for ingenuity and cleverness in presentation, and therefore better serves

to move the Elizabethan.

As the basic plan of thematic development moves the princes to Arcadia (and the reader to Books I-II), two notable changes occur in Sidney's presentation of the paradoxical adversity. In the first place, no longer are the paradoxes aligned with a series of adventures that unfold in different lands. Instead, with the exception of one episode, Sidney contains all the adventures within the single land of Arcadia. Actually, in contrast to the general situation in Book II, it can be said that Books I-II contain but one long complicated adventure in Arcadia—complicated, that is, by the adversity of paradoxes of situation. That the princes find a resting place, as it were, in Arcadia does not mean the termination of "the journey of high honor" with its attendant adversity. What it does mean is that the journey is no longer literal but figurative. In the second place, it will be seen that the paradoxes of situation in Books I-II not only elicit larger and more meaningful contrasts than did those in Book II, but they function more effectively because they frequently evolve out of each other. A situation based on paradox unexpected will, for example, spawn several situations based on paradox contradictory. The point is that Sidney now manages his thematic development on a somewhat higher

level of complexity and creates more subtle effects with his paradoxes.

In general, the subject matter of Books I-II is love and politics, with about an equal emphasis on each. Under these two topics fall four main episodes that develop Sidney's central theme. They are here designated as the Helot Rebellion, the Labyrinth of Love, the Turbulent Pastorals, and the Arcadian Insurrection. This is, of course, a simplification of material, and by no means accounts for all the episodes in Books I-II. But it is convenient for purposes of analysis. Those episodes omitted lie outside the basic plan, and discussion of them is reserved until Sidney's use of Ramus's prudential method is analyzed.

Of the two topics of love and politics, the latter topic is perhaps the more important, because Sidney's treatment of it provides the reader who approaches the romance in medias res instead of ab ovo with a clue to "an other foundation then the superficial part would promise." In Books I-II all the action, whether of love or politics, stems from King Basilius's resignation to the portents of a paradoxical oracle. Fearful of the oracle's message, Basilius retires to the country and awaits the fulfilment of the enigmatic prophecy contained in the

oracle.¹³ Meanwhile he places the control of his land in the hands of a nobleman named Philanax, "with much amazement to the people...and with some apparance of daunger in respect of the valiant Amph/i/7alus, his nephew, & much envy in the ambitious number of the Nobilitie against Philanax.../p. 297." There follows from Basilius's obedience to the oracle the discord and violence of rebellion, insurrection, and finally war—all in the midst of an otherwise peaceful Arcadian setting. What is here evident is an implicit paradox unexpected. In modern criticism it might be considered as enveloping action, that hovers over the remainder of the journey to high honor and elicits a number of adverse situations to test the exercise of virtue. Moreover, in the light of this paradox unexpected implicit in the political theme, the very title of Sidney's romance becomes ironic and hence suggestive of the book's true foundation—the Sileni of Alcibiades, the discrepancy

¹³The oracle reads as follows (p. 327):

Thy elder care shall from thy carefull face
 By princely meane be stolne, and yet not lost.
 Thy younger shall with Natures blisse embrace
 An uncouth Love, which Nature hateth most.
 Both they themselves unto such two shall wed,
 Who at thy beer, as at a barre, shall plead;
 Why thee (a living man) they had made dead.
 In thy owne seate a ferraine state shall sit.
 And ere that all these blowes thy head doo hit,
 Thou, with thy wife, adultry shall commit.

between appearance and reality.

It will be well to look first of all, then, at thematic development in Books I-II as it touches on politics. Something of a foreshadowing of the discord and violence the princes are to find in Arcadia appears in two episodes that lie within the pattern of their journey: the burning shipwreck scene described earlier and the episode here named the Helot Rebellion. The unexpected occurrence of a shipwreck by fire rather than by rock or storm, with its inner contradiction of "a wast of fire in the midst of water," is a paradox of situation resulting, it will be recalled, from the bastard Plexirtus's plan to kill Pyrocles and Musidorus "in hope thereby to have Artaxia, endowed with the great Kingdome of Armenia, to his wife...." Although the shipwreck does not occur near Arcadia but off the shore of Laconia, the latter country is situated not far from the pastoral quietude peculiar to Arcadia and is blessed with it. Thus near the very outset of the romance occurs the incongruous juxtaposition of two opposites: 1) the bizarre remains of the wreck—"...a ship, or rather the carkas of the shippe, or rather some few bones of the carkas, hulling there, part broken, part burned, part drowned....And amidst the precious things were a number of dead bodies, which likewise did not onely testifie both elemēts violence, but that the chiefe

violence was grown of humane inhumanitie.../pp. 9-10/"; and 2) the brief pastoral scene which commences Sidney's romance and which evokes, according to one critic, a "mood of reverent adoration"¹⁴ as it describes the loving remembrance two shepherds have for the beautiful Urania.

A similar foreshadowing appears in the Helot Rebellion, the action of which constitutes the princes' first paradoxical adversity after they survive the shipwreck by fire. Aside from its importance as foreshadowing the violence implicit in the larger paradox that governs the political theme, the Helot Rebellion is an impressive instance of a paradox of situation in which the element of surprise is strong and the inner contradiction firmly imbedded in the action.

During the Helot Rebellion—a rebellion of a cruel, ungentle people against the state of Lacedaemon—Musidorus, now separated from Pyrocles since the shipwreck, participates in an Arcadian expedition to the trouble spot. After contriving a daring stratagem that affords entrance to the rebel camp, Musidorus exercises his valor so that the Arcadians are hopeful of routing the Helots and accomplishing their mission. The Helots regain strength, however,

¹⁴Kenneth O. Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney as a Literary Craftsman (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), p. 115.

when their captain returns from a brief absence. Presently the captain and Musidorus engage each other in a combat of "delightful terriblenes." The captain proves himself invincible, strikes Musidorus a violent blow on the side of the head, and then, to Musidorus's (and the reader's) surprise, reveals himself as none other than Pyrocles.¹⁵ Implicit in the action of the Helot Rebellion, and therefore qualifying it as an example of paradox unexpected, is the fact that Pyrocles has gravitated from princely rank to humble leadership of an unruly mob of rebels. The virtue of Pyrocles and Musidorus so prevails--Pyrocles in particular performing "acts beyond the degree of a man"--in the face of this adversity that peace is soon established among the Helots, the Lacedaemonians, and the Arcadians.

Later on--near the end of Book I, to be exact--and after the two princes have become entangled in a dilemma shortly to be discussed under the general heading of love, the peaceful setting of Arcadia itself is interrupted by open violence and discord in the scene of the Turbulent Pastorals. The circumstances here center on King Basilius's decision one day to provide his family and guests with entertainment in the form of pastorals. Lest the sharp

¹⁵Works, I, 43.

contrast underlying this particular episode be missed, it is well to note Sidney's description of the idyllic setting in which the pastorals are to take place.

It was indeed a place of delight, for
 thorow the middest of it, there ran a sweete
 brooke, which did both hold the eye open
 with her azure streams, & yet seeke to close
 the eie with the purling noise it made upon
 the pibble stones it ran over: the field
 itself being set in some places with roses,
 & in al the rest constantly preserving a
 flourishing greene; the Roses added such a
 ruddy shew unto it, as though the field were
 bashfull at his owne beautie: about it (as
 if it had bene to inclose a Theater) grew
 such a sort of trees, as eyther excellency
 of fruit, statelines of growth, continuall
 greens, or poeticall fancies have made at
 any time famous.../pp. 118-119/.

This is poetical fancy, indeed--but deliberately so; for out of the nearby wood and into the midst of this idyllicism rush without a warning whatever a monstrous lion and a bear. The paradox unexpected that derives from this set of circumstances may be explained in the following way. Implicit in the surprising development is the same apparent contradiction that pervades the greater part of Sidney's romance, namely, violence and discord in the midst of an Arcadian setting. That is to say, it is true that Arcadia is a place of peace and calm; it is not true that Arcadia is a place of peace and calm. Thus two contradictory opposites integrated into a surprising development form another

adversity of paradox unexpected for Pyrocles and Musidorus, who, put to the test of virtue, shortly slay the two beasts.

It is interesting to note that in the Old Arcadia the scene here called the Turbulent Pastorals lacked convincing motivation, the sudden appearance of the beasts being ascribed to mere chance. But in the revised version the reader learns that the disturbance is due to the craft of one Cecropia, wife to Basilius's brother and mother to the noble Amphialus, whom she is desirous of placing on the Arcadian throne as rightful heir. It is this same Cecropia who provides a link between the Turbulent Pastorals and the Arcadian Insurrection, the last paradoxical episode that touches on politics in Book II proper. Like the Turbulent Pastorals, the insurrection of the peaceful Arcadians works implicitly from the "enveloping action" by adding to a surprising set of circumstances the paradox of violence in Arcadia.

The scene is near Basilius's lodge in the country. Out of nowhere suddenly appears a large band of unruly Arcadians—"called over the world the wise and quiet Arcadians"—who have taken up arms in protest against Basilius's decision to retire from active rule of the country.¹⁶ Against this unexpected event Sidney places the

¹⁶Works, I, 312.

princes Pyrocles and Musidorus in not one but two apparently contradictory situations, both of which are part of the larger paradox of violence in Arcadia.

It seems that the sudden uprising of the Arcadian multitude began on a non-violent note. Four or five thousand Arcadians had gathered peacefully to celebrate Basilius's birthday, but excessive drinking of wine, along with the persuasion of one of Cecropia's servants, soon turned their minds to a direct dislike of Basilius's apparent disdain for them. Growing in madness to a point where they were like enraged beasts, the celebrants gathered all sorts of instruments of death and prepared to attack Basilius's lodge. These details Sidney works into a paradox of situation by phrasing the particulars surrounding the two opposites banquet and battle into an apparent contradiction. "Thus was their banquet turned to a bataille," he says explicitly, "their wine mirthes to bloudie rages, and the happie prayers for...Basilius's life, to monstrous threatning of...his estate...p. 323." For a time the valor of Pyrocles and Musidorus prevents Basilius's lodge from being captured. But soon the many-headed multitude cannot be stayed, and in order to appease it Pyrocles decides to mount Basilius's throne and deliver a conciliatory speech. His decision leads to the second paradox of situation within the Arcadian Insurrection.

This time the situation is based on paradox contradictory-- that is, the element of surprise is negligible and the apparent contradiction is quite strong. As usual, Sidney makes the apparent contradiction explicit. Pyrocles (at this point disguised as an Amazonian) thus addresses the multitude:

An unused thing it is, & I think not
heretofore seene, o Arcadians, that a
womã should give publike counsel to mē, a
strãger to the cōuntry people, & that lastly
in such a presence by a private person, the
regall throne should be possessed.../p. 316/.

Were it not for the fact that at this point the reader is aware of the disguise as a woman, the scene could be described as turning on a paradox unexpected. But by his phrasing Sidney makes the paradox contradictory outstanding. At any rate, like the banquet-battle paradox, this one evolves out of the larger contrast of violence in Arcadia.

Though Pyrocles's rhetoric is eloquent, the mob is but partly appeased, and soon Pyrocles must depend on his valor and Musiderus's aid to mitigate the adversity. Cecropia is not, of course, finished with her malice, but further discussion of it must be reserved for a later point in connection with Sidney's thematic development in Book III.

Thus in so far as politics is concerned in Books

I-II Sidney provides three main paradoxical episodes that act as specials to prove his central theme that high honor lies not in plain ways. With respect to paradoxes of situation under the general topic of love in these two Books, Sidney's treatment is more complicated; and it is in this section that Greville's testimony as to his friend's interest in the labyrinth of man's desires and life receives its fullest support.

In partial defense of the interpretation of the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem or Renaissance epic, it has been suggested that the brief pastoral scene with which the work begins is to be thought of as "an episode which... reminds us of an epic invocation."¹⁷ So far as it advances the heroic poem theory, this interpretation cannot be ignored. The praise which the shepherds Claius and Strephon bestow upon the divine Urania is certainly "couched in just the mood of reverent adoration appropriate to the poet's prayer to his Muse." But it is also possible to construe the meaning of the scene another way. Consider for a moment a paradox contradictory (as statement and only indirectly pertaining to thematic development) that appears about half way through the scene.

¹⁷Myrick, op. cit., p. 115.

As the two shepherds lament the absence of Urania, and Strephon in particular the loss of her beauty, Claius paradoxically remarks that Urania is "a maide, who is such, that as the greatest thing the world can shewe, is her beautie, so the least thing that may be prayed in her, is her beautie.../p. 17." The truth to this paradox contradictory is that what is to be praised in Urania is her "unspeakeable vertues." Sidney's point is that the adversity of love, when the object of affection is a noble woman like Urania, can be a spur to virtue and high honor. As C. S. Lewis observes, "Sidney's conception of love is a Platonic elaboration of medieval Frauendienst—the theory, later expressed by Patmore, that erotic love can be a sensuous appetite of intelligible good."¹⁸ Hence Claius can remark that the noble Urania has "throwne reason upon our desires and, as it were, given eyes to Cupid.../p. 27." In effect, then, the brief pastoral scene may be taken as Sidney's commentary on his own treatment of the adversity of love the princes are to encounter in Arcadia. As a transparent allegory, with a paradox contradictory the key to its meaning, the scene indicates that the adversity of love does better discover virtue and high honor than do other forms of adversity.

¹⁸English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford, 1954), p. 339.

In accord with his basic plan, Sidney illustrates the adversity of love in Books I-II with paradoxes of situation. As stated earlier, thematic development in this section of the romance as it touches on the topic of love deals principally with one long adventure, the Labyrinth of Love, even though this single adventure literally spreads itself out over the whole of the two Books as it elicits one paradox after another--first a paradox contrary, then a paradox unexpected, and finally a host of paradoxes contradictory. It will be seen that although both princes become victims of love, Sidney's attention is chiefly on Pyrocles, whose adversity is clearly in the form of a labyrinth.¹⁹

Unlike the Helot Rebellion, the Turbulent Pastorals and the Arcadian Insurrection, the Labyrinth of Love evolves not out of the larger paradox unexpected of violence in Arcadia but out of a paradox contrary. Up to now it has been shown that Sidney develops his central theme through

¹⁹Since Sidney's main emphasis in Books I-II is on the Labyrinth of Love with Pyrocles as the protagonist, it has been thought best in the interest of clarifying thematic development to omit consideration of Musidorus's encounter with the adversity of love. It can be noted here, however, that his love for Pamela commences with a situation based on paradox contradictory. For to pursue his love he degrades himself from princely rank to humble shepherd. This deceit leads to other paradoxes of situation that serve as a foil to those in which Pyrocles finds himself. Cf. Works, I, 153-156.

a series of paradoxes of situation that are based on either the element of surprise or of contradiction. But it must be said that in the Labyrinth of Love Sidney makes effective use of paradox in its original meaning and presents a situation that turns on a contrary notion rather than on an unexpected or contradictory event.

The paradox contrary from which the Labyrinth of Love springs is the familiar debate scene early in Book I between Pyrocles and Musidorus. At the outset of the debate the subject is ostensibly the old question of whether it is better to lead the active or the contemplative life. Musidorus charges Pyrocles with subjecting himself "to solitarines, the sly enemie, that doth most separate a man from well doing" and with failing to pursue those knowledges which would better his mind. Pyrocles retorts that "the minde it selfe must (like other thinges) sometimes be un-bent, or else it will be either weakened, or broken...." Who knows, he says, "whether I feede not my minde with higher thoughts?"²⁰

But though the issue seems to be over the relative merits of the life of action as opposed to the life of contemplation, the heart of the debate is on the subject of love and whether it has a place in the exercise of virtue.

²⁰Works, I, 54-59, 74-84.

For, unknown to Musidorus, Pyrocles has turned to the solitary life because his affections have been violently drawn toward Philoclea, the beautiful daughter of King Basilius. When Musidorus discovers that Pyrocles is in love and has even assumed the role of an Amazonian in order to allow his passions freer play, the debate becomes sharp and heated.

As Hardin Craig has noted,²¹ much of the argument between the two princes at this point works from the Ramistic places of logic, particularly cause and effect. For instance, Musidorus argues strongly in this vein. Remember what you are, he tells Pyrocles, "what you have bene, or what you must be: if you cõsider what it is, that moved you, or by what kind of creature you are moved, you shall finde the cause so small, the effect so daangerous, your selfe so unworthie to runne into the one, or to be driuẽ by the other, that I doubt not I shall quickly have occasion rather to praise you for having conquered it, then to give you further counsell, how to doo it...[pp. 78-79]." Yet in spite of the strength of Musidorus's logic, it is clear that Pyrocles has the better argument. First, he points out that, when passion and reason conflict, passion is likely (as Musidorus is soon to learn for himself) to emerge triumphant. Second, and what is more important, he

²¹The Enchanted Glass (Oxford, 1962), pp. 154-156.

advances the notion contrary to received opinion that in the exercise of virtue love for a noble woman, however adverse the love may be, has a fitting place. Women, he says--and here he gives man's rational power its due--"(if we will argue by reason) are framed of nature with the same parts of the minde for the exercise of vertue, as we are...P. 797."

The debate ends with Pyrocles's hasty remark that "these disputations are fitter for quiet schooles, then my troubled braines, which are bent rather in deeds to performe, then in wordes to defende the noble desire which possesseth me...P. 817." Pyrocles's final statement has a twofold implication: 1) Pyrocles, like Sidney, is chiefly interested in the practical application of logic based on man's intelligence; and 2) Pyrocles, like Sidney, favors a life of action--of virtuous action--that does not, however, exclude the "higher thoughts" that come from a life of contemplation.

This statement of paradox contrary of Pyrocles is the crowning argument of the debate, harks back to the substance of the pastoral interlude with Claius and Strephon, and is indicative of Sidney's attitude that the road to high honor profitably includes the adversity of love. Out of the paradox contrary grows an impossible situation for Pyrocles: a paradox unexpected, with complications that make the title "The Labyrinth of Love" a most appropriate

one.

Midway through the debate Pyrocles despairs of his friend Musidorus and disappears, presumably for a long time. Musidorus carries on an extended search that takes him through several lands and finally returns him to Arcadia. One day he is reposing near a wood and is disturbed by the sudden appearance of an Amazonian, "who because she walked with her side toward him, he could not perfectly see her face; but so much he might see of her, that was a suretie for the rest, that all was excellent...p. 757." This excellent Amazonian turns out to be none other than Pyrocles. When Pyrocles the Amazonian appears before Basilius and his wife, Gynecia, the old King fails to see through the counterfeit. The result, in words of Pyrocles, is that at "the first sight that Basilius had of me...he was striken (taking me to be such as I professe) with great affectiō towards me, which since is growen to such a doting love, that...I was even choaked with his tediousnes...p. 927." What is more, Gynecia is able to penetrate the disguise and unhappily falls in love with Pyrocles the man: "...no this is not the worst," says Pyrocles dolefully, "for he (good man) were easy enough to be dealt with; but (as I thinke) Love and mischeefe having made a wager, which should have most power in me, have set Gynecia also in such a fire towards me, as will never (I feare) be quenched

but with my destruction...p. 937." Though the apparent contradictions that attend the unexpected metamorphosis of Pyrocles are perhaps too much in the vein of humor to deserve serious attention, it must be remembered that Sidney's central purpose is to delight as well as to teach.

Over half of the content in Books I-II is governed by this paradoxical love triangle, which allows Sidney full play to exercise the apparent double-contradiction: Pyrocles is a man; Pyrocles is not a man; he is a woman; he is not a woman. Within the triangle the notion that things are not what they seem, appearances are false, is given a ludicrous but nonetheless concrete image.

Certainly the adversity of love that Pyrocles encounters is a labyrinth. When Musidorus hears the full story of his predicament, he therein "found such intricatenes, that he could see no way to lead him out of the maze...p. 947." Note also the heading of Chapter 15 in Book II: "The Labyrinth of Zelmanes Love"; again, note the physical appearance of a passage under that heading:

Zelmane returned to the Lodge, where (inflamed by Philoclea, watched by Gynecia, and tired by Basilus) she was like a horse, desirous to runne, and miserable spurred, but so short rainde, as he cannot stirre forward; Zelmane sought occasion to speake with Philoclea; Basilus with Zelmane; and Gynecia hindered them all. If Philoclea hauned to sigh (and sigh she did often) as if that sigh were to be wayted on, Zelmane sighed

also; whereto Basilus and Gynecia soone
made up foure parts of sorrow.../pp. 95-96/.

Note, finally, the paradoxes contradictory that the love triangle spawns throughout Books I-II. There are too many of these situations to cite in full; some of them befall Basilus, some Gynecia, some Philoclea. Suffice it to consider three of those situations that befall Pyrocles. "Alas," he cries out at one point, "was there ever one, but I, that had received wrong, and could blame no body? that having more then I desire, am still in want of that I woulde?...But what wilt thou doo Pyrocles? which way canst thou finde to ridde thee of thy intricate troubles? To her whom I woulde be knowne to, I live in darkenesse: and to her am revealed, from whom I would be most secreat.../p. 151/." Or observe the dilemma he finds himself in when Basilus and Gynecia are present and his thoughts turn to Philoclea: "Alas, incomparable Philoclea, thou ever seest me, but dost never see me as I am: thou hearest willingly all that I dare say, and I dare not say that which were most fit for thee to heare. Alas who ever but I was imprisoned in libertie, and banished being still present? To whom but me have lovers bene jailours, and honour a captivitie.../p. 252/?" Or consider, finally, the situation wherein he pens a sonnet on the paradoxes of his love:

Loved I am, and yet complaine of Love:
 As loving not, accus'd, in Love I die.
 When pittie most I crave, I cruell prove:
 Still seeking Love, love found as much I flie.
 Burnt in my selfe, I muse at others fire:
 What I call wrong, I doo the same, and more:
 Bard of my will, I have beyond desire:
 I waille for want, and yet am chockte with store.
 This is thy worke, thou God for ever blinde:
 Though thousands old, a Boy entit'led still.
 Thus children doo the silly birds they finde,
 With stroking hurt, and too much cramming kill.
 Yet thus much Love, O Love, I crave of thee:
 Let me be lov'd, or els not loved be.²²

Thus the Labyrinth of Love, appearing at intervals throughout Books I-II and made up of first a paradox contrary, then a paradox unexpected, and finally many paradoxes contradictory, gives ample support to Greville's remark that Sidney's end in such scenes "was not vanishing pleasure alone, but morall Images, and Examples, (as directing threds) to guide every man through the confused Labyrinth of his own desires, and life." Furthermore, later it will be seen that the labyrinthine plot content of Books I-II is compatible with the labyrinthine structure that results from Sidney's use of Ramus's prudential method.

So long as he is ensnared in such a "confused Labyrinth," Pyrocles has little opportunity, it seems, to exercise virtue in the face of adversity; and Sidney's

²²Warks, I, 253. Cf. also pp. 148, 252, 255, 257, 309, 310.

theme, in so far as it touches on the subject of love, appears at a standstill. But it should be remembered that for purposes of analyzing Books I-II the paradoxes of situation under the heading of politics and those under love have here been kept apart; in fact, however, the Helot Rebellion, the Turbulent Pastorals, and the Arcadian Insurrection are worked (as plot) into the Labyrinth of Love, and those scenes afford Pyrocles much room to discover virtue.

By way of summary, it can be said that Sidney's presentation of his basic plan for thematic development, whereby paradoxes of situation stand as specials to prove the general that adversity best discovers virtue ("the road to high honor lies not in plaine wayes"), contrasts sharply in Book II and Books I-II. From a literal journey in Book II that takes Pyrocles and Musidorus through nine paradoxical adventures in as many lands, the plan moves in Books I-II to a figurative journey in Arcadia that takes the princes through four main paradoxical adventures. In Book II the general theme of the adventures is first politics, then love, and then politics again, with the adventures themselves fairly isolated from one another. But in Books I-II the themes of politics and love are corollary and the adventures, though fewer, are greater in length and are interdependent.

Presentation of the basic plan in Book III is generally that in Books I-II. Out of the larger, implicit paradox of violence in Arcadia (one scene Sidney labels as "that bloody Teniscourt") grows a paradox unexpected which in turn produces a number of paradoxes of situation, some based on an unexpected circumstance and some on an apparent contradiction. Two important points of difference between Book III and Books I-II should, however, be noted. In the first place and with minor exceptions, no longer is the exercise of virtuous action in the face of adversity illustrated mainly in the person of either Pyrocles or Musidorus or both. Instead, the hero of the romance, the exemplar of the central theme, is now the melancholy Amphialus. In the second place, though love and politics remain the general themes of the paradoxical adventures, the two qualities are so firmly integrated as to be scarcely distinguishable.

The scene wherein occurs the shift in hero from Pyrocles to Amphialus is perhaps a trifle disturbing for want of apparent motivation. Consider the details of the scene itself, which constitutes the initial paradox of situation in Book III and in many respects is like the Turbulent Pastorals episode described above.

Six country maids, it will be recalled, appear at Basilius's lodge and persuade Pyrocles (disguised as the

Amazonian) and the King's two fair daughters to attend a presentation of rural sports not far away. Like the setting of the Turbulent Pastorals, the location of the rural games is described in idyllic terms, being "in the midst of the thickest part of the wood, a little square place, not burdened with trees, but with a board covered, & beautified with the pleasantest fruites, that Sunburnd Autumne could deliver...[p. 3627]." Into the midst of this idyllicism "there rusht out of the woods twentie armed men, who round about invironed them, & laying hold of Zelmene before she could draw her sword, and taking it from her, put hoods over the heads of all fower, and so muffled, by force set them on horsebacke and carried them away."²³ As in the Turbulent Pastorals, to a surprising event is added the inner, apparent contradiction that Arcadia is and it is not a land of peace and calm.

Now granted that exigencies of plot in Book III demand capture of the two princesses; granted that Pyrocles clearly has little chance to defend himself--still, the paradox unexpected (and particularly Pyrocles's capture) is dispatched with such expediency as to be rendered suspect in terms of adequate motivation. After all, Pyrocles

²³The fourth person in the party is Miso, guardian to Pamela; she is soon released by Cecropia's henchmen.

has managed to work his way out of far greater trials in Book II or in Books I-II. The scene gives some appearance that Sidney has perhaps simply tired of his unqualifiedly perfect Pyrocles.

To account for the abruptness with which Sidney shifts the reader's attention to a new hero, it might be suggested that he was working within the demands of his plot and that had he finished his romance he would have later on, say in Book IV, given Pyrocles a resurrection. Further, it might be argued that Sidney was less concerned about the exemplar than about the exemplification of his central theme. Yet the answer to the question may lie deeper. Structurally, the revised Arcadia is a series of contrasts, large and small, and the shift from Pyrocles to Amphialus in Book III allows Sidney to work with a meaningful contrast in thematic development. Against the impetuous, extroverted, Hotspur-like Pyrocles, he now sets the pensive, introverted, Hamlet-like Amphialus.²⁴ The shift

²⁴A notable example of the contrast in personality between Amphialus and Pyrocles occurs earlier—Works, I, 215-225—in the bathing scene at the river Lodon. Amphialus' intrusion into the privacy of the princess's bath and his refusal to return Philoclea's glove angers Pyrocles to the point where he draws his sword and challenges Amphialus. Out of sheer courtesy, Amphialus refuses to fight a duel. But the impetuous Pyrocles will have no standing on ceremonies and, quickly placing Amphialus on the defensive, runs him through the thigh.

thus allows for an intensification of character and a more interesting, more beautiful representation of virtue in the face of adversity. Despite innumerable excellencies, neither Pyrocles nor Musidorus quite measures up to what Sidney conceives as high and noble stature. From the modern reader's point of view, Amphialus may not be a fully developed character, but he is far more credible as a human being than is, say, Pyrocles. In Amphialus's "journey of high honor" there is a nobility and a virtue that Pyrocles does not attain: the deep nobility that comes from a desperate but quiet struggle with life's paradoxes and a reflection upon them that leads inevitably to the most poignant of universal themes—tragic loneliness.

Within the larger paradox of violence and discord in Arcadia, Book III commences, then, with a paradox unexpected out of which emerges a new exemplar of virtuous action in the midst of adversity. Concomitant with the transition to Amphialus as hero are a series of paradoxes of situation in which the amorous and the political are fused. The first of these situations places Amphialus in an inextricable dilemma and dominates the action throughout Book III.

On the surface, the open violence that pervades Book III is due to Amphialus's mother, Cecropia. Angry because Easilus's marriage years ago to Gynecia cut off

all hopes of her inheriting the Arcadian throne, Cecropia has already caused a breach in the quietude of Arcadia. First she had the beasts set loose at Basilius's pastorals; then she employed her servant Clinias to stir the Arcadian multitude to revolt against their leader; and now she has lured Pyrocles and the princesses into a trap and cast them into prison. Her malice leads to the open war in which Basilius's forces successfully besiege her castle.

Yet it is not really Cecropia who sustains the warfare in Book III, nor is it really Cecropia who keeps the princesses in prison. Once she has captured Philoclea and Pamela, Cecropia fully intends to have them killed. But she spares them simply because Amphialus, the key to her political aims, is in love with Philoclea. It can be shown that the motivation for nearly all the action in Book III rests squarely with Amphialus, who in loving Philoclea finds himself in the subtlest of paradoxes.

Because of Cecropia's imprisonment of Pyrocles, Philoclea, and Pamela, Book III is often referred to as the Captivity Episode. But actually it is Amphialus who is in captivity. At the outset of Book III Amphialus is "utterly ignorant of all his mother's wicked devices; to which he would never have consented, being (like a rose out of a brier) an excellent sonne of an evill mother: and now when he heard of this [i.e., the capture of the princesses],

was as much amazed, as if he had seene the Sunne fall to the earth...[p. 363].” - Yet in spite of his disgust for his mother's tactics, Amphialus consents to her wishes. That he does so is due solely to his deep love for Philoclea, a love that places him in a paradox of situation that is actually a fusion of two apparently contradictory circumstances.

First, he is forced to keep prisoner the one person to whom he himself is a slave. Working with the two contraries, captor and captive, Sidney gives full play throughout Book III to the implications of the paradoxes contradictory that Amphialus is a jailor, he is not a jailor; he is a prisoner, he is not a prisoner. In addition, Amphialus has a respect for his mother in spite of his disgust for her tactics. Only his love for Philoclea allows him to agree to Cecropia's prolonged imprisonment of the princesses and to countenance any of her political schemes. Neither of these paradoxes contradictory is Amphialus able to resolve. And for his confusion he pays a high price: his own and his mother's destruction.

Time and again in Book III Sidney sets forth paradoxes of situation that point up the apparent contradiction that Amphialus is "himselfe indeede a prisoner to his prisoner." Note, for example, Philoclea's response to Amphialus' assurance that nothing but honor is meant to her person:

You call for pittie, and use crueltie;
 you say, you love me, and yet do the effectes
 of enmitie...You entitle your selfe my
 slave, but I am sure I am yours.../p. 368/.

Or consider the implications of the paradox contradictory
 as seen in Amphialus's answer to Philoclea's assertion
 that if he loves her nothing should stop him from setting
 her and Pamela free:

It is Love, it is love, not I, which dis-
 obey you...It is you your selfe, that im-
 prisons your selfe: it is your beautie which
 makes these castle-walles embrace you: it
 is your owne eyes, which reflect upon them
 selves this injurie.../pp. 369-370/.

Again, he is tormented by the paradox in the midst of
 preparations for war:

O sweet Philoclea /he cries out/...my mind
 misgives me, for your planets beare a contrarie
 aspect unto me. Woe, woe is me, they
 threaten my destruction: and whom doo they
 threaten this destruction? even him that
 loves them; and by what means will they
 destroy, but by loving them?...O beloved
 (though hating) Philoclea, how if thou beest
 mercifull, hath crueltie stolne into thee?
 Or how if thou beest cruell, doth crueltie
 looke more mercifull then ever Mercie did?
 Or alas, is it my destinie that makes Mercie
 cruell? Like an evill vessell which turnes
 sweets licour to sewerne; so when thy grace
 fals upon me, my wretched constitution makes
 it become fiercesesse.../p. 375/.

Or, finally, even during the war itself and in the midst of
 personal triumphs Amphialus is still in thraldom:

Trophe upon Trophe, still did but builde
 up the monumēt of his thraldome; he ever
 finding himselfe in such favour of Philoclea,
 that she was most absent, when he was present
 with her; and ever sorriest, when he had best
 successe.../p. 428/.

As Sidney works out the implications of the paradox contradictory in the person of Amphialus, he underscores the notion that virtue can be discovered in the adversity of love. However agonizing his situation may be, Amphialus reminds himself that Philoclea's "sweet vertue" is his "sweet Philosophie." Moreover, in the midst of the adversity Amphialus displays valor and courage, virtue and honor, as he triumphs in battle. A notable example of the qualities Sidney esteems in Amphialus can be seen in the description of his mortal combat with the renowned Argalus. Near the end of "the cruellest combate, that any present eye had seene" and at a point when Amphialus has gained the upperhand, Argalus's wife, Parthenia, suddenly rushes in and steps between the combatants. She begs Argalus to stop fighting, but he refuses. Amphialus, however, "not onely conjured by that which helde the Monarchie of his mind [i.e., Philoclea], but even in his noble hart melting with compassion at so passionate a sight, desired him to withhold his handes, for that he should strike one, who sought his favour, and woulde not make resistance." In Sidney's words the scene is a "notable example of the wonderfull

effectes of Vertue, where the conqueror, sought for friendship of the conquered, and the conquered woulde not pardon the conqueror...[pp. 425-426]."

But so long as Amphialus is a prisoner to his prisoner, so long must he agree to his mother's Machiavellian ways even though they disgust him; so long as he obeys his mother, so long must the warfare continue. And it is the warfare that finally brings upon Amphialus a paradox of situation with tragic consequences. Soon after he achieves wide fame for slaying the great Argalus, he accepts a challenge from a strange Knight of the Tomb. As the combat commences, the Knight misses rest, but Amphialus courteously passes up the advantage. The two then engage in a sword fight, but after quickly obtaining the advantage himself, Amphialus requests that the fight be called off. Though destined to lose to an obviously superior foe, the Knight of the Tomb denies Amphialus's request. Amphialus has no other choice but to thrust home a mortal wound. Pulling off the slain knight's head-piece, Amphialus then makes a startling and tragic discovery: before him lies Argalus's fair wife, Parthenia.²⁵

Astonished with grief and compassion at this para-

²⁵Works, I, 447.

dox unexpected, Amphialus is left with nothing but deep remorse and inward suffering. "For that courtesous harte," writes Sidney, "which would have grieved but to have heard the like adventure, was rent with remembering himselfe to be the author: so that his wisdom could not so farre temper his passion, but that he tooke his sword, counted the best in the world...and brake it into many peeces... saying, that neither it was worthie to serve the noble exercise of chivalrie, nor any other worthie to feel that sword...p. 450." From this point on Sidney encourages the reader's sympathy for Amphialus while intensifying the development of his central theme and, at the same time, realizing his conception of a truly noble and virtuous character.

Though he is a man of action, Amphialus now faces a siege of solitariness as he reflects on the paradoxes of his life, and particularly on that paradox contradictory on which thematic development in Book III is dependent.

And then melancholie (onely riche in unfortunate remembrances) brought before him all the mishappes, with which his life had wrestled...the deaths of Philoxenus and Parthenia, wherein he found himselfe hated of the ever-ruling powers, but especially (and so especially, as the rest seemed nothing when he came to that) his fatall love to Philoclea: to whom he had so governed himselfe, as one that could neither conquer, nor yeeld; being of the one side a slave, and of the other a jaylor; and with all almost

upbrayding unto his mother the little
 successe of her large hoping promises, he
 in effect finding Philoclea nothing mollified,
 and now him selfe so cast downe, as he thought
 him unworthy of better.²⁶

While in the midst of this melancholic despair, Amphialus has to entertain the abominable suggestion of his mother that rape is the only means of obtaining Philoclea and to suffer the ignominy of being defeated by a "forsaken Knight" (Masidorus in disguise) weaker but nimbler than he. But between him and the end of the journey of high honor lies only one more paradox of situation.

During the interim when Amphialus is fighting the loneliness of despair and nursing a serious wound inflicted by the forsaken knight, Basilius successfully lays a siege on the castle. In desperation Ceecropia threatens Basilius with the execution of his daughters and of Pyrocles if he

²⁶Ibid., pp. 450-451. The account of Philoxenus's death appears early in the romance (pp. 66-71). The paradoxical slaying arises out of another situation based on paradox contradictory. Philoxenus takes Amphialus, his intimate friend, to Helen's court in hopes that Amphialus can be of help in winning the great Queen's favor in love. But Helen becomes interested instead in Amphialus as a suitor. "In few werdes," says Helen of Amphialus, "while he pleaded for an other, he wanne me for himselfe." Amphialus virtuously rejects Helen's love and leaves her court. Helen then rejects Philoxenus, who in turn becomes so enraged that he pursues Amphialus, challenges him to a duel, and is slain. Though the slaying of Philoxenus lies outside thematic development, it is an important part of Sidney's adoption of Ramus's prudential method. See below, p.201.

does not lift the siege. Yet even after Basilius heeds her threats and lifts the siege, she, in no way mollified, continues her malicious practices. After having Philoclea and Pamela whipped, she contrives two trials by terror: one in which Pamela is apparently executed before the anguished Philoclea and Pyrocles and another in which Philoclea's fair head apparently floats in a basin of blood before the horrified Pyrocles. No sooner does Amphialus learn of all this cruelty than he rises from his sick bed, seizes a sword, and rushes to the top of the castle with the avowed intention of slaying himself in front of his mother. Instead, however, the very sight of him so frightens Cecropia, that she falls to her death from the castle wall.²⁷ To have thus lived to be the death of her that gave him life is to Amphialus almost—but not quite—the final paradox of situation.

As if to make it so, Amphialus seizes a knife and inflicts a number of seemingly mortal wounds on himself. Lying at the verge of death, he reflects philosophically on the paradoxes that have been the agony of his life.

O Amphialus, wretched Amphialus; thou hast
lived to be the death of thy most deere

²⁷ Works, I, 492.

cōpanion & friend Philoxenus, and of his father, thy most carefull fosterfather. Thou hast lived to kill a Ladie with thine owne handes, and so excellent, and vertuous a Lady, as the faire Parthenia was: thou hast lived to see thy faithfull Ismenus slaine in succouring thee, and thou not able to defende him: thou hast lived to shew thy selfe such a coward, as that one unknowne Knight could overcome thee in thy Ladies presence: thou hast lived to beare armes against thy rightfull Prince, thine owne unckle: thou hast lived to be accounted, and justly accounted, a traitor, by the most excellent persons, that this world holdeth: thou hast lived to be the death of her, that gave thee life. But ah wretched Amphialus, thou hast lived for thy sake, and by thy authoritie, to have Philoclea tormented: O heavens, in Amphialus castle, where Amphialus commaunded....²⁸

In loving Philoclea, both Pyrocles and Amphialus suffer inwardly from the paradoxes of situation by which Sidney illustrates the adversity of love. Yet it is clear that Sidney intends for the reader's sympathy to lie more with Amphialus. He has a dimension that Pyrocles lacks, a depth of human sensitivity and manliness that leads the reader to share his internal conflict and see it as real. In a paradoxical statement touched with more meaning perhaps than any Sidney has previously employed, he points out near the end of his romance Amphialus's struggle.

²⁸Ibid., p. 492. For the deaths of Timotheus, Philoxenus's father, and of Ismenus, see pp. 71 and 391, respectively.

When servants come to him they find him "swimming in his owne bloud, there giving a pittiful spectacle, where the conquest was the conquerors overthrow, and self-ruine the onely triumph of a battaile, fought between him, and him selfe.../p. 494/."

In so far as his basic plan for thematic development is concerned, Sidney's narrative ends with Amphialus's apparent death.²⁹ That the revised Arcadia ends abruptly a few pages later is, in many respects, not surprising. Testimony has survived of Sidney's intention to finish the romance, and in 1593 his sister published a completed version that purports to be based at least in part on Sidney's notes. Yet the fact remains that Sidney did not complete the story. In the light of the present analysis, he did not need to, for with Amphialus's apparent death the possibilities of his central theme had been exhausted. To have illustrated it further—with, say, Pyrocles—would

²⁹ Some doubt surrounds Amphialus's death. The general feeling among the Arcadians is that he has died. For example (p. 503), it is clear that Pamela and Philoclea receive news that he is dead. Yet when Queen Helen comes to take him to a famous surgeon (p. 497), some life still remains in Amphialus's body. Fulke Greville claims, moreover, that Sidney intended to have Amphialus marry Helen later on. Cf. his Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith (Oxford, 1907), p. 14. Doubtless Sidney was uncertain as to the further direction of his narrative, if he did intend to finish it.

have been anti-climactic. In the characterization of Amphialus—"a young man, of great beautie, beautified with great honour, honoured by great valure, made of inestimable valure, by the noble using of it"—lay final proof of the general that virtue is made manifest by affliction, that "the jorney of high honor lies not in plaine wayes."

Such, then, is Sidney's basic plan in the revised Arcadia: paradoxes of situation functioning conceptually to illustrate (prove) a general. The last chapter made note of a limitation of Ramus's natural method of discourse, a method for "examples" that can be found adumbrated, for instance, in Milton's recension and set forth in detail in commentaries by Abraham Fraunce and Anthony Wotton. "Here the Poet proveth the generall," says Wotton, "that Adversitie sheweth true vertue; by...specialls...." The basic plan analyzed in this chapter is precisely the Ramistic method for examples. What is more, the basic plan points up the spirit of Ramism in two other instances.

To evidence presented earlier that Sidney was a Ramist, that Fraunce supplied him with specific information on Ramus's logic in 1581-1582, and that the spirit and techniques of Ramism so suitable to Sidney's temper lay at the heart of his conception of the revised Arcadia, may be added evidence of his actual application of certain of

Ramus's principles. "Reade Homer, reade Demosthenes, reade Virgill, read Cicero, reade Bartas, reade Torquato Tasso, reade that most worthie ornament of our English tongue, the Countesse of Pembrockes Arcadia," wrote Fraunce, "and therein see the true effectes of natural Logike which is the ground of artificiall." Exactly what "effectes" Fraunce had in mind are not clear, but those that the analysis in the present chapter has turned over can now be summarized.

It has been shown that in Sidney's basic plan construction of paradoxes of situation derive (often explicitly) from Ramistic places of invention. These places--"disagreeable arguments," as the Ramists were fond of calling them--are "contraries" and "contradictions," and particularly the latter, which Ramus himself singles out in his Dialectique as a favorite among the ancients of all the species of contraries. Framing contradictory relationships out of arguments (e.g., harmony-discord, violence-calm, captor-captive) found in invention, Sidney disposes them into axioms (i.e., paradoxes of situation). Sidney is not always, of course, explicit with his use of the places in logic. The revised Arcadia is, after all, not a detailed logical treatise but a work of the imagination. Hence in many instances Sidney's presentation of a paradox of situation from the place of contraries or contradictions is done without calling attention to those places--done, that

is, artistically.

In addition to framing axioms out of disagreeable arguments, Sidney composes in the very spirit of Ramism—the spirit, that is, of practicality. Sidney's basic plan for thematic development, the literary writer's application of Ramus's natural method of discourse, is a practical way to teach a central theme. The aim of the revised Arcadia is the exemplification of virtuous action, and the particular point of that aim is to prove that virtue is best achieved in the face of the "discountenances of adversity." By having his heroes struggle through a number of paradoxically adverse circumstances, Sidney proves his central message. "If you put downe one, more, or all the specials," wrote Fraunce, "you also put downe the generall, for that the nature and essence of the generall is in every of the specials."³⁰ Sidney's basic plan is Ramus's golden rule of method, the interrelationship of parts to the whole—a method in which "the links are by degrees so depending the one on the other, and all chained so rightly together, that nothing can be taken away without breaking the order and continuity of the whole." So long as this basic plan is held in perspective, the revised Arcadia is seen to

³⁰The Lawiers Logike (1588). STC 11344, fol. 34F.

have unity.

II

Were Sidney's central purpose only to teach, the basic plan of thematic development would suffice. But his purpose is also to delight. So he carries the spirit of Ramism a step further. For the poet whose interest lies in the popular rather than the learned reader and who thus seeks to teach delightfully, Ramus advises a method of presentation widely used by philosophers, poets, and orators. Hence Sidney's final presentation of material is not the ab ovo order but the in medias res order of the prudential method.

It should also be noted that although the prudential method may appear to be a substitute for the natural method, it is rather a means for hiding it. According to Ramus, good writers always use the natural method, concealed though it may be for purposes of delightful instruction. "For as it is a pointe of art to couer art," says Fraunce in one of the treatises he wrote for Sidney, "so sometymes to proceade methodicaly, defyninge, diuidinge, etc. is very preiudicial to y^e speaker, because the circumstances maye be suche, that better it were to conueye y^e matter craftelye, then to

put it downe simplie."³¹ Thus Sidney's application of the prudential method is not to be thought of as taking the place of his basic plan but as concealing it in deference to a popular audience.

Following Ramus, Sidney begins in the middle, "often comprehends by dramatic narration what has gone before," and presents many an "uncertain and unexpected circumstance." Specifically, the inversion of order appears in the first two Books of the revised Arcadia. Consider the work as it appears in the 1590 quarto. In Book I Sidney begins in the middle of things and then advances the main plot while entertaining the reader with several digressions. In Book II he continues the main plot but also works in the past history of the princes by dramatic narration. Indeed he interweaves the past history into the main plot.

Following Ramus further, in his suggestion that the

³¹"Of the nature and use of Logike," fol. 32^v. See Appendix A below, pp. 229-230. Ramus's translators often label their chapter on the prudential method as "Crypsis Method" or "Of the craftye and secrete methode" or "Of the hiding of Method." Cf. MacIlmaine's The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus...1574. STC 15246, p. 100; Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike (London, 1584), STC 22429, fol. C3^r; or Anthony Wotton's The Art of Logick (1626), STC 15248, p. 187. Fraunce refers to it as the "inuertinge of Methode" and "methodus prudentiae." See "On the nature and use of Logike," fol. 32^v.

prudential method should also employ "all the tropes and figures of elocution, all the graces of expression...to lead this vexatious and stubborn auditour," and to charm and beguile him, Sidney cloaks his narrative with many a noble and feigning image and a host of rhetorical devices usually described under the Arcadian style. He also introduces into his romance examples of paradox unexpected that lie outside his basic plan for thematic development. For instance, Book II contains the story of Plangus, in which at one point Plangus's father sends him off to war for having had an affair with an unsavory married woman. Plangus returns from the war only to find that his father has himself married the woman.³² So also in Books I-II appears the love story of Argalus and Parthenia, a story containing a situation in which Argalus is willing to marry his sweetheart despite the fact that she has been horribly disfigured by a rejected suitor. Sidney there notes the paradox of "a strange encounter of loves affects, and effects: that he by an affection sprong from excessive beautie, should delight in horrible foulnesse; and she, of a vehement desire to have him, should kindly buyld a rescolution never to have him...[p. 357]." In addition to these paradoxes of situation, throughout the revised Arcadia appears paradox

³²Works, I, 242-245.

contradictory in the statement form to amplify thematic development and to contribute to the total effect of the discrepancy between appearance and reality.³³

As Ramus's commentators were quick to point out, examples of the prudential method, like examples of the natural method, are easy to find in the writings of the ancients and other worthies. Sidney found his example in Heliodorus's Aethiopica, then recently translated (1579) into English by Sir Thomas Underdowne. In his chapter on the prudential method Anthony Wotton sums up his remarks with the following observation: "Which the poet doth with a kind of the greater shew of Art, when he purposeth to lead or perswade the people, which is a beast with many heads: he therefore deceiveth them many wayes: he beginneth with the middle, and therein oftentimes comprehendeth the beginning; last of all, he concludes with some uncertaine and unlooked-for events. So doth Heliodorus in his AETHiopian

³³Examples not cited in the present chapter can be found on the following pages: 8, 17, 20, 26, 42, 54, 67, 75, 83, 118, 143, 148, 150, 154, 155, 182, 198, 199, 200, 207, 208, 211, 245, 252, 254, 255, 257, 283, 309, 310, 312, 322, 333, 342, 361, 380, 388, 390, 399, 410, 411, 412, 472, 513. In addition, Sidney employs for the same purpose a number of instances of oxymoron, a restricted form of paradox whereby contradictory words are set off in pairs, e.g., unhappy happiness. Cf. pp. 10, 14, 18, 42, 66, 74, 97, 129, 178, 204, 225, 226, 244, 251, 254, 265, 267, 274, 278, 281, 291, 309, 312, 352, 358, 360, 382, 389, 392, 402, 407, 413, 437, 454, 465, 480, 490.

History of Theagenes & Cariclea. So Sir Philip Sidney in his Arcadia.³⁴

III

Sidney's adoption of the prudential method gives the revised Arcadia an inverted structure in Books I-II. Furthermore, by interweaving the past history of Pyrocles and Musidorus into the narrative that continues in Book II, by breaking off a story at one point and taking it up again at another, by introducing digressions and omitting smooth transitions, Sidney gives the revised Arcadia a labyrinthine structure. Complementing this involved structure and bearing out Greville's remark that Sidney attempts "to guide every man through the confused Labyrinth of his own desires, and life," is the long episode in Books I-II called the Labyrinth of Love.

If to the labyrinthine structure and the labyrinthine plot be added the paradoxical cast of the whole romance, the riddle the revised Arcadia appears to be can be accounted for. That, as many critics maintain, the revised Arcadia has an enormous complexity, that it lacks direction, that it is in fact a riddle—all such criticism is just. Yet its outward appearance, like its title, is deliberately deceptive. Beneath the surface lies the unified, basic

³⁴See p. 133.

plan of thematic development: paradoxes of situation
functioning conceptually to illustrate (prove) a general.
Sidney knew better than Fraunce that the test of art is
to conceal art.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The principal aim of this study has been to demonstrate that, notwithstanding its involution and its unfinished state, the revised Arcadia may be read as a unified whole and that its unity may be accounted for by Sidney's application of certain principles of Ramistic investigation and method to the use of paradox. Though the study seems to have taken lightly the efforts of scholars in recent years to interpret the revised Arcadia as an heroic poem, the intention has not been to deny outright the legitimacy of such an interpretation. Certainly the study has had to recognize the heroic content in Sidney's romance. What is hoped, rather, is that the study may be thought of as a supplement to the current interpretation, a reading of the work as an heroic romance yet one with a deliberate and purposeful design.

In the light of the present study the revised Arcadia becomes meaningful at four levels: 1) it assumes a practical character by employing the spirit of Ramism to validate Sidney's theory as to the end of poetry, which is to teach and delight; 2) it assumes an historical importance by illustrating, creatively, the influence of Ramus's contention that the art of logic is to reason well; 3) it

assumes a literary distinction by making a contribution to the development of prose fiction; and 4) it assumes an ontological significance by divulging a truth, as the poet Sidney sees it, about the nature of reality.

Along with Sidney's achievement of unity in the revised Arcadia is the fulfillment of a practical purpose. The salient quality of utility that underlies Ramistic thinking manifests itself in the basic plan that enables Sidney to present a moral guide that fashions a man in the exercise of virtuous action, to show that virtue is not a gift but that its discovery and cultivation lie in the adversities of life, and to demonstrate in the development of his central point the superiority of the poet over the philosopher and the historian in matters of delightful instruction. In this sense the revised Arcadia takes a place alongside those Renaissance works, like Castiglione's Il Cortegiano and Spenser's Faerie Queene, that profess social and moral instruction.

In so far as Sidney is successful in contriving paradoxes of situation from places in logic and presenting them in his basic plan as specials to prove a general, he lends weight to the premise on which Ramus's proposed reform of logic was formulated, namely, that the art of logic is to reason well. What is more, Sidney's activity

in this regard indicates the special influence Ramistic conceptions could have upon the Elizabethan poet, who, though he could not always make explicit use of a system of logic, could nevertheless employ the notion of a reasonable ordering of thoughts in a "representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically."

Although the present revaluation of the revised Arcadia does not propose a consideration of the work as the first English novel, it does suggest that in the achievement of unity, in the interrelationship of theme, structure, plot and style, Sidney made a significant contribution to the development of English prose fiction.¹ Compared to those of his predecessors and contemporaries, Sidney's achievements generally in narrative technique and particularly in an organically functional use of paradox are notable.

As pointed out in an earlier chapter, English writers of prose fiction before and contemporary with Sidney make use of paradox. Their usage is, however, detached from any principle of organic unity such as that which this study has ascribed to Sidney. The point can be demonstrated by examining, for example, several uses of paradox unex-

¹Sidney's belief that poetry can be inclusive of prose should be kept in mind here. See Works, III, 10.

pected in representative medieval romances. In these works the episodic structural pattern precludes at once the chance for paradox of situation to function conceptually toward a larger effect. If the medieval romancer uses paradox unexpected at all, its function is to add interest to a single set of circumstances within a single episode. The paradoxes of situation thus become detached from each other. Or he may allow a surprising development to stand without at least a semblance of an inner contradiction—surprise for its own sake. Or, finally, he may introduce a scene that is unexpected for the characters in his narrative but not so for his readers.

Consider one or two scenes from Huon of Bordeaux. Early in the romance Huon arrives at the castle of Dun-oster, presumably in search of a giant. Once inside the castle, however, he discovers not a giant but a fair damsel named Sebylle.² Now from the reader's point of view this is a surprising turn of events. But it is not attended by an inner contradiction. Nor is it, for that matter, contrary to the reader's expectation. The reader is not led to expect anything in particular. Several other scenes in

²The Boke of Duke Huon of Burdeux, done into English by Sir John Bouchier, Lord Berners, ed. S. L. Lee, EETS. ES 40-41 (London, 1882-1883), p. 96.

the romance do turn on paradox unexpected, yet are isolated from each other and not made to contribute to a larger plan of contrast. Such is the case with the scene wherein a bear who has accosted Huon on his journey turns out to be a man sent by Oberon to do Huon harm.³ So also with the scene when, contrary to what the reader expects, Huon and his good friend Gerames engage each other in a combat.⁴

Similarly, in Sir Beves of Hamtoun occur several instances of paradox unexpected contrived for its own sake. At one point, for example, Sir Beves appears at a castle disguised as a palmer to seek out his sweetheart, Josian, who has married Yvor of Membraunt. At the castle gates Sir Beves quietly joins other palmers, who receive food from Josian in memory of Sir Beves himself.⁵ Detached from this episode and from a controlling design of paradox is the scene where the Emperor of Alemaine throws a knife at Sir Beves' ambassador, misses him, and strikes his own son in the chest. Though paradoxical, the scene is anticipated by the author and handled so swiftly that the element of surprise has no time to take effect upon the reader.

³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴Ibid., p. 198.

⁵The Romance of Sir Beves of Hamtoun, ed. Eugen Kölbing, RETS. ES 46-48-65 (London, 1885-1894), pp. 97-107.

Note the author's description of the scene:

Whan syr Murdour herde that worde,
 He cast his knyfe euer the borde,
 To haue hit the messangere,
 But he fayled, as ye may here,
 And smate his owne son in the brest.⁶

As in Huon of Bordeaux, so in Sir Beves of Hamtoun: the principal aim of the medieval romance is to extol the prowess of a particular hero, not to inquire into the difference between appearance and reality.

Even in such an artistically constructed narrative as Sir Gawain and the Green Knight surprise appears for its own sake. To be sure, the matter of deception is basic to this romance, but the author's purpose is to demonstrate the truth of the reputed valor attached to Arthur's court, not to show that Arthur's court is a fraud. At the outset of the romance the headless Green Knight's sudden appearance at court carries with it no real inner contradiction. One could, possibly, consider the scene as having the semblance of a contradiction: the Green Knight has a head; he does not have a head. But even so, the reader in this instance is not led to expect one event and then receive a contrary event. Later on in the narrative Gawain's surrender to the

⁶Ibid., p. 143. Cf. also scenes in Guy of Warwick, ed. Julius Zupitza, EETS. ES 25-26, 2nd version (London, 1875-76), pp. 31-36, 166-167, 204, 253, 340.

charms of his host's wife comes as no surprise, since the author steadily portrays Gawain as human and as something more than a knight of chivalry. And, of course, when Bernlak reveals himself at the end as Gawain's host, the disclosure comes as a surprise to Gawain but not to the reader.

In Lyly's Euphues (1579), the only piece of prose fiction of any note in the Elizabethan period prior to Sidney's revised Arcadia, the emphasis shifts from content to style and the demand is for the clever turn of phrase rather than the ingeniously contrived situation. Hence Lyly's paradox is common in the statement form and has no function beyond serving as part of the familiar euphuistic style of alliteration, balance, antithesis, far-fetched similes, and allusions to bestiaries. As they carry a slender plot, such passages as "I, but in the coldest flinte there is hotte fire" and "the Bee that hath honny in hir mouth, hath a sting in hir taylor"⁷ never get beyond whatever interest they may have as a stylistic device. The same is true with statements in Gascoigne's Adventures of Master F. J. (1572), e.g., "So that considering the natural climate of the country, I must say that I have found fire in frost. And yet comparing the inequality of my deserts, with the

⁷The Complete Works of John Lyly, ed. R. Warwick Bond, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1902), I, 224.

least part of your worthiness, I feel a continual frost, in my most fervent fire."⁸ Indeed, in their over-concern for antithesis, balance, and clever symmetry within a periodic sentence, the euphuists create an artificiality of style that Sidney does not impart to his paradox contradictory.

In its use of paradox of situation functioning organically Sidney's revised Arcadia represents an innovation in this area of rhetorical ingenuity. Further, it is the first piece of English prose fiction in which paradox is the ground-plan of the whole work and in which content and style are interfused to carry a central theme. Couched in Sidney's basic plan, which he necessarily obscures by superimposing Ramus's prudential method, is a conceptual treatment of paradox. Each paradox of situation stands as a part that relates to the whole. From a Ramist view, each paradox of situation is an argument destined to demonstrate the truth of a general proposition. Once again, it is well to keep in mind Fraunce's comment that if "you put downe one, more, or all the specials, you also put downe the generall, for that the nature and essence of the generall is in every of the specials." What Sidney's basic plan

⁸Elizabethan Fiction, ed. Robert Ashley and Edwin Moseley (New York, 1953), p. 8.

amounts to, then, is an organic unity that comes from a functional relationship of parts to the whole. This organic unity is strengthened by an interrelationship of theme, plot, structure and style. The paradoxes of situation make manifest the truth of the central theme; in turn the paradoxes of situation create a labyrinthine plot that consistently through two books contrasts with a labyrinthine structure. This interdependence of parts, which Sidney gains through the style of paradox, gives the romance its fundamental form—a riddle that bespeaks an impressive inquiry into the contrast between things as they are and things as they seem.

Critics have noticed the advances in narrative technique which Sidney makes in the revised Arcadia, and on occasion they have gone so far as to claim for the work the distinction of containing the germ of the modern novel. For example, in 1904 Sidney Lee noted that, although the revised Arcadia is full of defects, "it proves its author to have caught a distant glimpse of the true art of fiction."⁹ Lee's comment can be bracketed with a recent, more specific praise by A. G. D. Wiles, who thinks that it "does not seem too much to say that his [Sidney's] superior achieve-

⁹Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1904), p. 97.

ments, by comparison with his contemporaries and predecessors, in sustaining suspense, in interweaving subplots with main plots, and in dramatic presentation of incident mark him a noteworthy contributor to the development of the English novel."¹⁰ To the attainments listed by Wiles should be added Sidney's advance in the use of paradox. His ability to relate, by means of paradoxes of situation that function as specials to prove a general, a number of apparently detached episodes gives the revised Arcadia a degree of organic unity that definitely marks a contribution to the development of prose fiction.

If the question were asked at this point, "What is the sum and substance of the revised Arcadia?" the answer would lie in the fourth level (i.e., the ontological) at which the romance becomes meaningful. It has been shown that beneath the surface of prolixity and inversion and of labyrinthine tangle and wanton direction lies a unified basic plan of thematic development. There is a deeper layer than that. From the Ramist notion of all thought as a vast, reasonably ordered arrangement of descending generalities, in which "argument was hooked into argument, lesser attached to greater, word to concept, concept to larger concept" and

¹⁰"Parallel Analyses of the Two Versions of Sidney's Arcadia," SP, XXXIX (1942), 173.

in which "thoughts placed in order...will demonstrate the truth of a matter without the use of other dialectical tools,"¹¹ the literary writer inferred a rationale grounded in nature and reason which, for the poet as for the logician, can divulge the nature of reality. For Sidney, Ramism became a scientific justification for the truth of reality as the poet sees it. And the reality that Sidney saw is paradoxical. The foundation, the other part "then the superficial would promise," of the revised Arcadia is the discrepancy between deception and actuality.

The point is worth laboring and perhaps can best be seen if the romance is considered momentarily in terms of a large simplicity. The most conspicuous impression the work imparts is the contrast between appearance and reality in Arcadia itself. Sidney sets this deeper theme in motion at the outset with his description of the paradoxical shipwreck. Radiating out from this central contrast of violence in Arcadia, bifurcating, as it were, from the least to the most conspicuous, are a whole host of contrasts in paradox: the general warfare in Book VII, the Arcadian Insurrection, the Labyrinth of Love, the Turbulent Pastorals, the Helot Rebellion, the paradoxical oracle, Amphialus's captivity,

¹¹Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947), pp. 345 and 342, respectively.

the nine-adventure series in Book II, the pastoral interlude with Glaius and Strephon, the story of Argalus and Parthenia, the story of Plangus, the deaths of Philoxenus and Timotheus, the death of Cecropia, the capture of Pyrocles and the princesses, the general treatment of humble shepherds as ignorant clowns, the wealth of paradoxes contradictory, and, finally, the numerous instances of oxymora.

Though it has neither the polish and finesse of Erasmus's Praise of Folly nor the erudition and vigor of Agrippa's De vanitate, the revised Arcadia is in its own right in the tradition of literature designed to lead man away from deception and toward enlightenment. The revised Arcadia makes multiple claims for classification: it is at once an heroic romance, a practical guide to the exercise of virtuous action, an illustration of Ramistic logic, and a representation, in a unique sense, of the literature of paradox.

APPENDIX

In so far as ease of typing would allow, the following transcription of the two treatises in British Museum MS. Add. 34,691 which Fraunce wrote for Sidney retains the original spelling, punctuation, and capitalization. The text of both treatises runs in the complete manuscript from fol. 29^r to fol. 36^r.

For several reasons a transcription of The Shepheardes Logike is not included. Aside from its sheer length, this treatise is technically ponderous and has no general interest above that which can be found in any Ramistic textbook on logic. Moreover, that Sidney was even acquainted with the work is not at all certain. As an early draft of Fraunce's The Lawiers Logike (1588), the treatise may possibly have not been written before Sidney's death in 1586.

Of the nature and use of Logike

[29^r] Junius Florus by continual meditation for three dayes space could not frame a beginninge for his oration. And I, when I thinke on that whiche I haue to speake, maye rather wyshe an endinge then want a begynninge in so large a discourse and plentyfull disputation. Caius Plinius in his Panegyricall speache of ye Emperoure Traiane

first praieth before he praisethe, y^t his wordes myght bee
 worthie of Traiane his maiestye. And what then I? Seinge
 all y^t I can saye, is not enough, and to saie enough, is
 more then I can saye. Yt is a shame to bee alwaies silente,
 when euer to speake is scarce sufficient: and it is to
 smale purpose to vse a smale speache, when y^e greatest can
 not bee ouer great. So that I perceauē my selfe brought
 to a verye neare strayte, when y^t I can nether be sylent
 with out shame, nor speake to my contentation. yf I saye
 as others saye, I shalbee but simple: if I gainesaye them,
 I must bee plaine impudent. But bee it as bee maye, seinge
 he desireth to heare, w^{ch} deserueth to haue, and willeth me
 nowe, who maye commaunde me euer; I had rather be thought
 ouer rashe by writtinge, then not so thankfull by con-
 cealinge. And as I am not so well pleased wth my selfe,
 as to contemne the autoritye, or correct ye iudgment of my
 betters, (for I wryte not this to teache others, w^{ch} haue
 alwayes desyred to learne my selfe) so would I haue,
 neyther my selfe to seeme so sheepishe, as to speake for
 fashion & hange on other mens sleaues, nor them so iniur-
 ious, as to bynd my wyt to theyr will, and rule my fancye
 by theyr affection. I loue Plato, I lyke Aristotle, &
 Ramus alwaies I can not reprehende, if ther be any thinge
 eyther good in Plato, or profitable in Aristotle. I take

it by theyr leaue, I thanke them for yt I take: but yf Ramus and the rest amend that which they began; I am not eyther so vnthankfull towards these, as not to accept theyr paines well imployed, or so iniurious to nature, as to thinke her so beneficial or rather prodigal, in ouerlib-erallye lashinge out her gifts upon Aristotle onlye, as that shee should leaue nothinge to bestowe vpon others. This by y^e waye, nowe to my porpose [sic], and that in a word, rather poyntinge wth y^e finger, then payntinge wth pen y^e true vse and nature of this art, and shewinge rather what might bee said, then sainge yt I ought to shewe in this behalfe. for hauinge in latyne largely put downe my mynde, I will nowe but repeat some part of ye same: breflye contrastinge & abridginge that my former speache.

Fyrste therfore generallye of y^e whole nature and vse of Logike, then after particularlye of some special operations in y^e parts of y^e same, & so an ende of a confused meditation, patched vp I feare me, in more hast, then good speed.

It is an old axiome, and as true as ould, that Art ought to imitate nature, in so muche that nothinge should bee put downe

[30v] in artificial Logike, w^{ch} hathe not some resemblance or similitude of yt paterne & foundation of all true Logike,

w^{ch} eyther god hathe drawen or nature layed downe in mans mynde, I meane the reasonable capacitye, wyt, or intelligence of man, & those y^t excel the rest amonge men: for nature beginneth y^e worke w^{ch} art must finishe, nature I saye declarethe her goodnes in seueral particulers and art by experience, sence, obseruation, & induction, makethe of diuerse particulers, a general collection, whereof ensueth the absolute constitution of euerye art.

That therefore is true Logike, w^{ch} is agreable to reason imprinted in man, and apparant in y^e wryttings, arguments, and disputacions of y^e most excellent in euerye kynde, as Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Cicero, Homer, Virgil & suche lyke whose particuler examples collected by obseruation I haue brought this art to her perfection, and so in others. for what first taughte Astronomers y^e numbers & course of y^e planets? Sence. what first tould y^e natural philosophers, y^t a Lion feareth a cocke, an Elephant hatethe a Rhinoceros? Experience. what made y^e phisitians beleue y^t Rhubarb was good to purge, that Eupatorium cured ye infected lyuer? Daylye obseruation in diuerse particulers. Nowe if eyther a phisitian should bringe in some hearbs not formed by nature, but forged by his owne dyuise, who would not deryde him? or yf an Astronomer should make a discourse of suche stares whose

examples are not extant in y^e heauens, who would not laugh him to scorne? or yf a natural philosopher would contend y^t fier were could, or water hotte w^{ch} nature hathe forbidden, who could abyde him? The yf in phisiks etc we can not suffer this, whie should it bee wynted at in Logike? or whie should y^t be taken for a rule in Logike, w^{ch} neyther can be found in reason the mother of Logike, nor in Demosthenes, Plato, and y^e rest, the Tutors of y^e same? for what auter did euer vse, what fruits can bee perceaued, naye what Logike is theyr in thease mens Logike, that wrangle of Quiddities, & Perseities, substantialyes, & formalities, Albedinities [?] & suche lyke trumperyes? By whose dunsicalitye it came to passe y^t Logike being an art of arts, a science of sciences, an instrument of instruments, the hande of philosophye, in power mightye, in autoritye greate, in profit excellent, was soe oppressed wth sophistical brablinge, and ouershadowed wth dunsical inuentions, that nether phisitians knewe y^t, nor philosophers had it, nor Astronomers cared for it, being neuer in deed brought into lyght but alwayes kept & inclosed amonge those intricate labarinthes of barbarous & idle headed sophisters; w^{ch}oe yf they had eyther red the ancient learned wrytters, or considered the simple contry laboringe men, they might haue sene Logike in those, & Logike in thease, far different

from ther owne Logike. for to let passe y^e learned poets,
and orators, whom they neuer saw, much lesse perused: send
for a poor and sylley husbandman, ask him what hope he
hathe of his harvest to come; he will roundlye make answere,
& y^t not instructed

[30^r] by learninge, but taught by nature, that ther is no
hope at all of any firtillitye this yeare to ensue because
the weather hathe bene so unseasonable.

Loe, here is Logike not found by man, but framed of nature:
Loe here the ij parts of Logike, the one in inuention of
y^e profe, the other in disposition of ye profe inuented.
This is natures worke and art must followe nature, or els
no cause whie we should followe art. the causes of plentye
faithe the countryman be taken awaye, therefore the effect
must nedes be removed. Here is no mention made, noe ground,
no occasion wherbye to bringe in any of those monks deuises.
But this is not all: for as they haue thus pestered this
noble art with suche vnecessarye & vnprofitable sophistrye
so haue they on the other syde taken as much awaie from her
of her owne vertu and greatlye detracted from her dignytye.
for wheras Logike is of her selfe so general, as y^t shee
can in no wyse suffer her liberty to bee restrayned, yet
these vnhappy Loyterers, haue so iniuriously dealt wth her,
and handled her so hardlye, by pynninge her vp in ther

lothsome Cloysters, y^t nothing at y^t time was thoght to to bee Logike w^{ch} bare not some note & token of theire sophistrye. howe subtyl they were, in this, let them iudge them selues, but howe iniurious to Logike, and preiudicial to y^e louers of the same, let others confesse. Logike hathe her name of y^e greke worde λογος, w^{ch} signifieth eyther ratio, or oratio, reason or speache; so that y^e vertu of this art dothe so fare extend it selfe, as eyther mans reason can reach vnto, or speche discourse vppon. wheras these fellows neuer sawe or neuer would seme to haue sene any suche things, measuring y^e most excellent worthines of suche a friend, by y^e lytle capacitye of theyr owne confused braynes. wherin they followe the vn honest examples Philoxenus and Eudoxus Onidius ij famous or rather infamous gluttons and belly gods, who were not ashamed most impudentlye to conueye y^e excrement of theyr noses into y^e diches of meate, to y^e intent y^t others abstayinge by the reason of theyr beastlynes, then might haue y^e full & onlye fruition of y^e same themselues. better it were for a scholer neuer to learne, then to be taught of suche masters, whose learninge they must vnlearne, yf euer they purpose themselues to be learned. but what doe I remoue the greuous remembraunce of that tyme so miserable? seinge it is past, let it be passed wth silence, or rather

ouerpassed with forgetfullnes. learning was abused then, y^e tyme was vnhappye, thease men vnlucky but Logike most vnfortunate, wch of her selfe is so gentle, familiar, charitable, & amiable, that shee excludeth no man, is no where excluded, is alwayes at hand, euer in readynes & suffereth no pte of our lyfe to be destitute of her good healpe. wth louers shee loueth & speks lyke a wanton wth kings shee caunsileth in princes pallace, wth men of the countrie shee sitts in ye sheepcots, wth senators shee grauely derydeth controuersyes, in scholers shee directeth subtyle philosophers, at whome shee admyttethe y^e simple artificer, as high as y^e hiest, as lowe as y^e lowest, & meane wth those of mydle meanings. A preacher cometh to perswade y^e people, & exhorte y^e congregation, but who can awaye wth this persuasion, or who careth for his exhortation, vnlesse he brings a sermon rather fraught & furnished wth store of arguments, then flowinge & flourishing wth shewe of ornaments: the one being y^e effect of Logike of all men comended, the other but a tricke of rhetorike, of many cōdemned.

[31v] Let princes reade y^e orations of Cirus put downe in Xenophon, let counsaylers peruse, as I haue els where spoken, in John Cheeke his exhortation to our English rebels. Let philosophers harken to Socrates disputinge in

plato, lastlye let pollitike men & gouernors geue eare to Scipio, then shall they see bothe princes & y^e rest, the necessitie of Logike in them all. As for lawyers I let them passe; for I think there is no man so ignorant or vnthankfull, that nether can see, nor wyll confesse, the helpe of logike in lawlyke disputations. Agayne I speake nothinge of princes legats and imbassadours, whom I knowe, & they acknowledge, to haue what they haue, by the hauinge of Logike. who soe readethe Homer shall well perceauē y^t nether y^e strong Ajax nor fierce Achilles did for muche preuayle in batteringe downe y^e walles of Troye, as y^e wise Hector & prudent Vlisses. The speache of Hector was sweter then honye, the talke of Vlisses sharper then the wynter snowe, but what made eyther that of Hector so swete, or this so percinge in Vlisses, but y^t Hector was wyse and Vlisses prudent? Well therefore did Agamemnon the cheftayne of the Grecians whiche, not ten lyke to Ajax but ten suche as Hector to conquere y^e Troiane towne. for lytle can ware abroad, vnlesse witt bee at home, and lesse can wytt at home vnless wee rule headye witt wth headye wysdome, the only gyfte of dialectica.

That place of Liuias is verye notable, wherin the cration of Menenius Agrippa is rehearsed. for when as the romayne raskal people had forsaken Rome, and fled by rebellion to

ye holye hill: that which others neyther by force nor fauoure, promyses nor prowes could performe, Menenius Agrippa brought to passe by one only argument framed by Logike in comparinge togeather the members of a humayne bodye & parts of a commonwealthe. As for all other Arts it is wel knowen, that they can neyther be wel taught, trulye learned, nor orderlye put downe, but by ye helpe of Logike. Nowe yf any man should be desirous to peruse the monuments of ancient wryters, historical, poetical, or philosophical, and bee not first instructed wth this facultye, I shall not so mucche enuye his good hope, as pyte his lytle discretion, who looketh to medle wth sacred mysteries wth polluted hands, to read good autors wth out any Logike. In readinge of Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, I loue ther eloquence, I prayse ther wyt, I admyre theyr copious and ample style; but why eyther Tullie his wyse eloquence is to be loued, or Aristotles wyt to be prayed, or Plato his diuynе philosophye to bee admyred, I knowe not at all, but doe what I doe by haphazard, neyther can theyr art and style any more delight me, wch can not perceauē it, then ye precious stone could please AEsopps cocke wherof he knewe no vse.

So then Logike is general and applyable to euerye disputaciō, yet the matter to bee disputed of, is not of Logike, but ye manner howe to dispute. And although in

common meetings and assemblies, the words and terms of Logike bee not named, yet y^e force and operation is alwayes vsed and apparent. for as in grammer we name nether Nounes, pronounes, Verbe, nor any other part of speache; and as in Rhetorike, we make mention nether of Metonymia, agnominatio, nor any other rhetorical figure or trope, yet vse in our 31r speche y^e helpe of the one in speakinge orderlye, and the ayde of y^e other in talkinge eloquentlye: so although in common conference we neuer name syllogismes, Maiors, minors, & other words of arte, yet doe we secreatlye practyse them in our talke, the vertu wherof is, to make our oration seme true to ye simple, & probable to the wyse.

And thus muche generallye of y^e nature and vse of all Logike. nowe in a word of the particuler consideration of the same in euerye seueral parte. As Logike therfore it selfe is diuyded into two parts the first wherof is conuersant in searchinge and findinge out of arguments, the seconde in framinge & exactlye disposinge the same, so is ther in eyther part a duple practyse, and the least of them bothe of wonderfull excellencye. The one is called genesis, when we seake by our proper labour and meditation to make some peace of work, (for so the greke word signifyeth). The other Analysis, when as we mynde to vndoe that w^{ch} others haue done, and to resolve and dissolve y^e same into his particular parts, the better to perceauce the art of ye

autor in makinge, & his conueyance in handlinge.

The vse & commoditye of genesis in inuention wyl then be perceaued and perfectlye knowen, when for our owne exercyse in this behalfe, we take some argument and drawe the same through out all the places of inuention, shewinge what be the causes, effects, subiects, adiuncts, etc. of the same: as for example sake, in latyne I propounded this word, Nobilitye, out of Sturmius, and so deduced the same. In lyke manner for analysis in inuention, I toke that peace of Cicero, w^{ch} is entyteled Latine, wherin I examyned the causes effects, etc of Amicitia, the better to vnderstand what art Tullie had vsed in that disputation. for the second part of Logike in disposition eyther axiomatical, syllogistical, or Methodical, as Apolles was wont to saye, Nulla dies sine linea so would I wyshe him, y^t would be a Logician, to let no daye pass wthout some practyse in this part. Wherin yet I wyl not be so seuerer a censor, as to exact euerye sillogisme to the strayte formes and rigorous rules of some Duses prescribed, let sophisters beate theyr braynes about thease in scholes, y^t shalbe sufficient for a political man to followe a more easye and elegant kynde of disputation, ioyninge rhetorike wth Logike as Plato in greke, and Cicero in Latyne vsed to doe. for example sake in this behalfe, I toke for my theme, the praise of Logike, and thereon disputed logicalye, after my manner in laytne. This

for genesis: nowe for analysis in this second part of Logike and namlye in axiomes, and sillogismes, that is most necessarye, for y^e auoydinge of y^e captious & sophistical circũ- uentions of our aduersaryes. for otherwise, as a good tale maye bee mard in the tellinge, so a false furnyshed fable wyl bee taken for a truthe, for want of iudgment in this part to seuer good from bad, truthe from falsehoode, shewe from sub- stance. An example for this part, we tooke out of Tullie his paradoxes where he hathe thease words, quod solũ honestũ est, id bonum est. wherin I layed downe in a table, the order, profes, examples, confirmations, confutations, axiomes, syllogismes, enthymemes, 32 secretlye conteyned in this disputation, and as in this example I haue don so must euerye logician take paynes to doo better, yf euer he purpose to haue vse of his Logike.

The last part of Judgment remayneth yet, but not y^e leaste and that is methode, w^{ch} if yo^w take awaye, all other things in a logician although they be most exelent are of smale force & lytle estimation. for what auayleth it to searche & find out arguments, to frame & conclude them, if ther be no order kept in propoundinge them, no methode obserued for conseruation & healpe of memory? Yet y^t is lyke a confused heape of stones, & tymber, in respect of a well ordered house. for this part I referre the louer of logike, to y^e last chapter of Ramus his Logike, wher he shal haue

examples to make this playne & counsaile when to vse an exact Methode, and when to admyt of an inuerted order, as occasion of place, tyme, and other circumstances shall seme to requyre. and this inuertinge of Methode, is caled of some methodus prudentiae, because it requireth y^e wysdome & discretion of y^e speaker or wryter, in iudginge the tyme, when such a perturbation of order maye be vsed. for as it is a pointe of art to couer arte, so sometymes to proceade methodically, defyninge, diuidinge, etc is very preiudicial to y^e speaker, because the circumstances maye be suche, that better it were to conueye y^e matter craftelye, then to put downe it simplye. But this by the waye, for my meaninge is not to geue precepts of Logike, but to shewe the vse of those that be geauen.

Nowe as the vse of this art is straunge & wonderfull, so the abusinge of y^e same hathe bene intollerable, partlye in supplantinge therbye and circumuenteinge the simple: but especialye by ouercharginge it wth crude and barbarous Quid-dities, as also by detractinge from it y^e most necessarye ornaments of the same. Some what I haue alreadye spoken of this abuse, more I might, and more I would, yf eyther tyme were fauorable to my will, or other affayres not prejudicial to my natural inclynation; w^{ch} euer hathe bene, and always wilbe; as a louer of Logike, so a professed enemye to those lasye & confused moonkische heades, the onlye defacers

of this so noble a science. whiche haue brought in whole cart loades of vnusual superfluityes, better neuer named theneuer knowen.

A bryef and general comparison of Ramus his Logike wth that of Aristotle, to y^e ryghte worshypful his verye good M^r and Patron M^r P: Sydney

[32^r] Phormio by reports, Ryhte Worshypful, was stoped although hee spake wel, because he spake to Hannibal: and myght not I bee scorned, for writinge il, and wrytinge to Philippus? for as I am sure of the one, that Phormio was as wel renowned for a philosopher, as I am reiected for a philosophaster; so am I certayne of the other, that Hannibal had as muche nede to heare precepts of ware, as hathe Phillipus to reade rules of Logike. But here in is y^e difference, that Hannibal as he was hardye in fyelde to reueng him of his foes, so was he to hastye at home to reiect his frende the welmeaninge Phormio: wher as Philippus, as in Logike he goethe before manye, so for gentlenes and courtesye more maye come behynd him. And yet because it were an odious thinge for me, to sytt as iudge and censor of Aristotle & Ramus, who as I neuer name Ramus wthout some reuerence, so I alwayes speake of Aristotle wth admiration, I haue layde asyde y^e person of a determyner, and supplied the place of a playne interpreter: exhibitinge that in writinge,

to your worshipe breflye, whiche too Cambridge sophisters did speake more diffusedlye. The one is, as they saye, a methodical Ramyst: the other an obstinate Aristotelian: the speche was theirs, the iudgmente shalbe yours, the reporte must hange vpon my credyte. onlye this for my selfe I must desyre your worshipe, to reade this not as my mynde, but as theyr meaninge, and yf they seme eyther ouer boulede, or scarce wel manered, before such a iudge so to behaue themselves, attribute it rather to y^e rudenes of waylinge and wranglinge sophisters that spake it, then the disposition of him that put it downe. The Aristotelian beinge almost besydes himselfe, partlye wth anger, and partlye with admiration, burst furthe into these exclamations.

Good god what worlde is this? what an age doe wee nowe liue in? I think on it daiyle, yet can I neuer conceaue in thought, I wonder alwayes, yet can I neuer maruaile enough, and styl I speake, yet as good I were styl, as styl to speake to no purpose. A sophister in tymes past was a tytyle of credit, and a worde of commendation: nowe what more odious? Aristotle then the father of philosophye, nowe who lesse fauored? the good St. Thomas of Aquyne, that angelical and Seraphical docter, the subtyle Scot, the learned Bricot, the profounde Lolcot, wth the rest whiche then did floryshe, wher are they nowe? Ramus rules abroade, Ramus at home, and who but Ramus? Antiquitye is nothings but dunsicality, and

sophistrye nothyng but vnfrutful Quiddities. Newfangled, youngeheaded, harebrayne boyes wyl nedes bee masters w^{ch} neuer were scholers, prate of methode w^{ch} neuer knowe order, rayle agaynst Aristotle, as sone as they crepe out of the shelle, profese to knowe that in one yeare, which antiquitye confessed to require seauen. True substaunce is not apparant, superficial apparance hereth awaye y^e bel. afaire is al, and onlye a faire: a grace is al, albeit past grace.

[33v] Logike is nowe but six leaues longe, & eyght daies laboure: w^{ch} before was seuen yeares studye, and fylled the world wth volumes almost infynite. herby it comes to passe, that euerye cobler can cogge a syllogism; euerye carter cracke of propositions: herby is Logike prophaned, & lyeth prostitute; remoued out of her sanctuary, robbed of her honor, left of her disciples, rauished of strangers, and made common to all, w^{ch} before was proper to scholers, and onlye consecrated to philosophers. we flye with winges of wax, we rule the chariot of the sunne without discretion: so must we fal withe Icarus, and perishe wythe falinge: so must we burn withe Phaeton, and dye with burninge. A sound scholer is called a dunse: and dunse is taken for a foole. A Logitian of eyght yeares standinge is controwled of a boye of sixe weeks continuance: and that which most tormenteth the harte of al wel settled Aristotelians, Aristotle

himselſe is quyte deſpered, his Organon caled a confuſed Chaos, his Logike a lumpe of matter without order, more fytt to confounde y^e memory then apt to inſtruct the mynde, more worthy to ſerue in a ſylkweomans ſhoppe, then furnyſhe a ſcholars lybrarye. What a blaſpheme is this? What a madnes to put it by wth ſilence? What a meritorious deed to reuenge it wth contradiction? I gaynsaye therefore that w^{ch} they ſaye, and yet ſaye no more then I mynde to proue, that his Organon as it was alwayes caled, ſo it ſhall euer be, οργανον οργανων Η ΤΗΣ Φιλοσοφιας Χειρ, for prooffe whereof, and firſt for methode, I ſaye, y^ta ſillogiſme as it is the worke and ſcope of Logike, ſo it is the matter ſubiect when about this Organon [one] is conuerſant and altogether occupied: & may be conſidered eyther as it is a whole integral, or an vniuerſal whole, as it is totum vniuerſale, yt hathe his ſpecials to wytt, a demonſtratyue, a topicall, and a ſophiſtical ſyllogiſme: of the firſt he teacheth in his demonſtracions, of the ſecond in his topike, of the third in his elenche. whereof ariſe theſe ſeuerall arts: the one eternall, neceſſarye, and infallible, as a poſditiue: the other probable, as dialectic, the third falſe in deedes yet bearinge a ſhewe of truth, as Sophiſtic.

But as it is totum integrum, it conſiſteth of his eſſentiall parts, I meane forme and matter. The forme is put downe in his analytics prioribus: the matter is duple

eyther that whiche is nowe and ioyntlye connexed wth it, as bee propositions in his booke περὶ ἐρμενεύσεως, or some what remoued & further offe, as voces and termini, wherof at large in his catagoryes & predicables of Porphyre. what is in order if this bee not methode? or what is methode yf this bee out of order? This hath Aristotle obserued in his Organon, and this haue his scholers obserued by imitation, beginninge at the least & so by litle and litle ascendinge to y^e greatest. Nowe for the matter, I would gladly learne of these praecise logicians & methodical maysters of dialectica, what is there eyther in the Captayne Aristotle y^t is not fruitful, or in his fellow souldyers y^t is not necessarye. first they begyne with the simple wordes, w^{ch} they cal voces & termini, wherof some be proper

[33^r] some comon, some ad placitu, some a natura, and some of other sorts: w^{ch} beinge by diligence noted and carefullye obserued, we that better perceauē the nature of propositions made hereof. After these followe praedicabilia, fiue general words, euerye one affordinge four seuerall commodities. the first is for y^e better vnderstandinge of y^e predicaments, that ensue, w^{ch} be nothinge else but a methodical ordering and placinge of praedicabilia, as of genus, species, differentia & the rest. the second profit is for definitions, w^{ch} if they be perfit consist of genus & differentia, yf vnperfit of proprieties [sic] & accidents. the third is

for diuisions, whiche are, or ought to be distinct seueringes of the general into his specials by lawefull differences. the last is for demonstration, w^{ch} is a conclusion of the proper qualitie in his owne subject by a true proper & immediate cause. all w^{ch} things as they can not be performed wthout thease praedicabilia, so doe they necessariye presuppose the knoweledge of the same. The predicaments in order followe for the better, conceauinge of y^e whiche, they handle some other things caled ante predicaments, as the distinction of words to knowe w^{ch} be doubtfull, ambiguous, aequivoca and w^{ch} one simple and playne signification, w^{ch} be priuitines w^{ch} deriuatiues: for in disputation he that taketh awaye distinction confoundethe art and bringethe in confusion. other diuisions and rules I omit w^{ch} are vsualye put downe in thease ante predicaments, the vse of them is so apparant.

As for the ten predicaments themseules, who see the not what a help it is eyther to defyne curiouslye, or deuyde exactlye, or dispute artificialye, to haue all words al things, all propertyes, and natures of things, so orderlye put downe, so playnlye set forthe, so easye to be vsed when occasion is affected, all bodyes, spirits, substances, accidents, qualittyes, quantityes, relations, actions, passions, circũstances, lend vp as it were in ther seueral storehouses, so that a mā shal easilye fynde, although he differ to seeke, tyle he haue

nede to vse. Next these predicaments succedethe the explications of some certayne words, w^{ch} because theie be generalye dispersed through all the predicaments, and not seueralye bound to any one of them, are therfor put after the al, as contraries, priuatiues, relatiues, contradictions, prius, simul, and the other, very profitable for y^e more absolute explication of the praedicaments. Hetherto hathe bene spoken of the remoued mother of sillogismes: nowe the matter w^{ch} is more newe, is a proposition: w^{ch} because it consistethe of a noune, & a verbe, good reason the nature of them bothe should be put downe, and because in a proposition the words maye be diuerselye taken, and in sundrye senses: supposition followethe, shewinge the force & diuerse acceptation of euerye terving, when it is to be vnderstood generalye, when particularlye, when distinctyle, when confusedlye: againe some propositions be contrarye to some others: some lyke & equal, & therefore as the one affection is taught in y^e tractate of opposition, so the other is declared in y^e discourse of aquipolentia. some propositions also be prime, some modifficake, w^{ch} as they be diuerse from the other & more difficult then they bee, so they haue 347 a seueral discourse and somewhat intricate nec iniuria: Nam de modaliby non gustabit asinus. Lastlie because the nature of propositions is suche, that bie changing y^e termini, a certayne inuersion, or rather conuersion is commonlye

made, ther is a special place appoynted for this purpose, and rules set downe to auoyde error in this behalfe. And this muche for y^e matter of sillogismes: Nowe for the forme w^{ch} consistethe in a diuerse disposition of mediũ, ther be the figures, and a certayne number of moddes, adioyned to euerye figure. But because the first is onlye perfit and absolute, ther be ordayned letters as notes to reduce the vnperfit to ye perfit, and this is caled reduction.

Nowe if we leaue of this consideration of a sillogisme as it is totũ integrum, consistinge of his natural & essential parts: & so speake of it, as of an vniuersal whole conteyninge certayne specials; so shall we fynde thre seuerall sillogismes, the first Apodictical, as I sayd in the demonstrations, the second Logical in the Topiks, the third Sophistical in y^e Elenches, not to the intent any man should vse them to abuse the simplicity of others, but y^t knowinge the vice he myght eschewe it, and detectinge the fraude auoyde the same.

This is the somme of that w^{ch} is put downe in Aristotle, and this is almost al that can bee found in Aristotelians. yf ther be any thinge in them expressed, w^{ch} is not in him conteyned, it is added eyther for y^e more ample declaration of that w^{ch} is exactlye put downe of him; or for the more easye accesse and entrance to the hidden mysteries comprehended in that Organon. And therefore he that lykethe not

this, I knowe not what he louethe: vnlesse he loue himselve so wel, that he can lyke no Logike but his owne, & so by affectation of some vayne singularitye in opinion, wyl in any case vndoe that in one daye wilfullye, w^{ch} wyse men haue done in longe tyme paynefullye. But here an ende: for yf I perswade them, I haue said yenough: yf I preuaile not, I haue spoken to muche.

Thus ended his melancholical meditation the earnest Aristotelian, whose words the Ramist perceauinge more bitter then wel he could digest; thought rather to put them backe wth lytle payne in the beginninge, then to surfett therbye wth lese pleasure in the endinge, and thus began.

Yf yo^w had bene as diligent in meditation of the cause, as you haue bene ouer earnest in admiration of y^e effect, the knoweledge of the one would haue remoued the straingnes of the other. for if the wysdome of the ancient σοφολ be nowe degenerate into the sylines of newefounde sophistae, what merualyle is it, if, when the thinge is not answeringe to y^e name, the name become odious? Suche a world this is, and suche an age we lyue in nowe, that neyther the barbarous scholemen can further deceaue vs, nor rude dunsicalitye blynde our eyes. and therfor indeede as good bee styl at once, as stil to prate to no good purpose.

[34^r] More cause had I to meruayle, if men were nowe so madd as to eate acornes with swyne when bread is inuented: to returne

wth the dog to his vomyte: wth dunses to theyr Animalities. As for Aristotle, he was a father then, he is in fauore nowe: they gaue him to muche, in geuinge others nothinge; we geaue him yenough, in leauinge others somthinge. And for Aquinas, I wyl neuer honor him for a sayntt, yet I alwayes reuerence him as a philosopher: but so that by reason of the blyndnes of the tyme I thinke he sawe not euerye thinge; and seinge it not, could neuer teache it. Bricot, Burleye, and Bonaventure: Duns, Durand, and Sorbella, are as men nowe take them to bee. Ramus dothe not so rule, but y^t he can suffer reason to ouer-rule him. Antiquitye ioyned with philosophie neuer more loued; but sophistrye lynked wth false antiquitye neuer less lyked. Owld dotinge graye beardes talke much of Baralipton, whiles youngheaded boyes beare awaye Logike. They thinke muche that a boye should conceaue that in a weeke, whiche they could scarce perceaue in a yeare, but more that theyr ould learninge should be corrected by newe teachinge, and theyr labour lost wth so lytle profitinge, hinc illae lachrimae. A superficial shewe is lytle worthe: and an outworne headpeace is lesse estemed. a meane is in the mydle. A face is commended but wth his grace. seuen yeares to muche, eyght dayes to litle, a meane is had betweene them bothe. Coblers be men, why therfore not logicians? and Carters haue reason why then not logike? Bonum quo communius, eo melius: the best thinge in logike yo^w make to be worst, in thinkinge yt

lesse commendable, because it is more common. A spitefull speeche, if I durst so saye: a malicious meaninge, if you geue me leaue: to locke vp Logike in secreat corners, neuer sufferinge her to see the lyghte, who of her selfe, as she is generally good to all, so will she particularlye be bounde to none. The wings of wax be made by fryers, the feathers set from monkishe trumperies; Phaeton is the scholemens inuention. but as fier of true logike consumed the one, so the water of wysdome ouerwhelmed the other in this our florishing age. Touchinge the grefe yo^w conceaue for the contempt of Aristotle, I haue not muche to vtter, onlye this I saye, that ther be no greater enemyes in deed to Aristotle, then they that in words be Aristotelians: no better frends to him indeed, then they y^t least professe in words. for wheras ther cã be nothings inuented and perfited by the same man, if Aristotle did inuent Logike, as he perswadethe yo^w, then did he not perfit yt, if he did not finishe it, ther is some imperfection, if ther be any want, why then alowe yo^w al? Where Aristotle deserueth prayse, who more commendeth him then Ramus? wher he hathe to muche, Ramus cutteth of: wher to litle, addeth: wher any thinge is inuerted, he bringeth it to his owne place, and al this accordinge to those thre rules put downe by 35^v Aristotle, κατὰ παντός, καθ' αὐτο καθ' ολου πρωτον. To answeere therefore to your general contradiction by particular confutation: it were an infinyt thinge, I saye, to dis-

cusse euerye quyrke; yt shall suffice to tuche some, and refer the further examynation of the rest, to the second parte of Beurhusius.

first Ramus makethe but one general art of Logike, w^{ch} he diuideth into his integral and essential parts, inuention and iudgment. The Aristotelians, who vntrulye make a sillogisme the matter subiect of Logike, accordinge to y^e placinge of Aristotles volumes, haue made thre seueral arts, Apodictical, Topical, Elenchtical: but howe absurdlye who seethe not? for what is sophistica Logike? or is Logike sophistrye? if not, whie is it numbered as a special? nay whie is it taught at all? for seeing y^t, vertu est index fin et obliqui; if Logike bee truly taught, the false & captious fallacions maye easlye be discerned. for demonstration ther is no such thing in nature, neyther any one example, among thirtye, w^{ch} prouethe that w^{ch} they pretend. Logike is general, her parts be general, nether is ther an inuention Apodictical, an other dialectical, but y^e same inuention is in bothe: for as wel myght a grāmarie saie, ther is one Syntaxis of Ciuyl spoche, an other of coūtry talke. in deed some axiomes be necessarye, some contingent, some false; but yf yo^w therefore conclude the whole arte to be eyther Apodictical, Topical, or Elenchtical, yo^w maye in lyke wyse, because an axiome is affirmatyve or negatiue, saye y^t one kynd of Logike is affirmatiue, an other negatiue. yf I should deuyde

a mans bodye in to his heade, bellye, & clothes, were it not a ridiculous distribution? so is this. for sophistrye is nothinge but as it were y^e cloke or garment, coueringe wth an out ward shewe the in ward deformitye. But to come nerer, and to followe this confused Organon, confused I saye, for what is error if this be not blyndnes? or what is blyndnes, if this be not confusion? first to begyne wth a piece of inuention in praedicables, & praedicaments, then to intermedle a patch of Iudgment in ΠΕΡΙ ΕΦΗΜΕΡΑΣ, after this to Iumble bothe to gether in prioribus or posterioribus analytics, and then to begyne againe wth Topiks and ende withe Elenches? But let vs followe, I saye, not for imitation but for confutation sake, this vnorderlie proceadinge of theirs. Ther may be some vse I confesse of voces and termini, for wthout words a disputation conceaued can not be vttered: but therfore in Logike to talk of words is no good Logike. But of this els where. let vs come to the praedicables. Where first those idle questions propounded by Porphyre, as whether genus, and species wth the rest be in deed or not; haue bodyes or not: what Logike haue they, what vse in logike, what helpe to logike? praedicabilia be fiue: for genus, & species, theyr proper place is in distribution a place of inuention, ther are they generally taught of Ramus. for differentia it is nothinge but a forme & so it is put downe in the first place of inuention among the causes. for this word Propria, ther is no

special vse in logike of it, rather then of this word commune, but

[35^r] of Commune nothinge, nothinge therfore of propria. we maye goe through out all the causes, and saye causes be proper or cōmon, and so through effects and the rest: but the things cōprehended under this word, must be referred to the adiuncts in inuention.

This word accident, is ambiguous, signifyng by Aristotles owne confession, effects, adiuncts, and comparisons: w^{ch} being thre seueral & distinct things, must seuerally be taught as Ramus hathe done, making therof thre seueral topical places, of effects, adiuncts, and comparates. Thus muche of praedicables, w^{ch} vnless they be referred to inuention, what vse is in them, to prate, and wrangle of genus and species in scholes, wthout all sence? I omytt y^e false definitions, imperfit diuisions, the palpable tautologies, a thousand tymes apparant in the whole organon. for it were an infinyt thinge to runne ouer al; only a word of the vse of euerye seueral booke, and so an ende.

The praedicaments be next in order: but first we haue certayne forerunninge Ante praedicaments, to prepare the waye fur suche honorable geasts. and thease be aequiuoca, vniuoca, denomina tuia: rules & diuisions. for aequiuoca and his fellowes seinge they concerne words they belonge to grammer not to Logike, which onlye respectethe reason. but yf reason be vttered by words then is Logike holpen by grammer, and dothe

it not of her selfe, no more then an orator can be ethicus, physicus, or astronomus of himselfe, but by y^e helpe of Astronomy, of Meral, & natural philosophye. The rule, Quando alterum de altero etc is altogether superfluous: for he that knoweth what genus is, maye some perceave that genus conteyneth his owne parts, and y^e parts of his owne parts. The diuision w^{ch} is, Entium etc is friuolous: for Logike is Entiũ et non Entium. Nowe for y^e praedicaments themselves, in a word, it dothe no more belonge to Logike to setle & place these things in suche order, then vnto any other arte. For Substantia the greke worde, ούσία, is common and general, signifying the causes of any thinge sayethe Aristotle in his Metaphysikes, so he calethe the forme the essence of the thinge, and this onlye is the true logical acception of this worde: accordinge to y^e whiche not onlye a bodilye substance, but Qualitye, Quantitye, wth all the rest; yee non Entia, shall haue theyr cause of beinge, although they haue no being in deed. The natures of heauens, Earth, Trees, Plants, Fishes, Foules, etc. belonge not to Logike, but vnto natural philosophy. But here wyll the Dunses distinguish. they belonge to Logike in this respect, saie they, that therof be made axiomes and sillogismes. so mighte theye proue all arts to belonge to Logike, for of euerye art bee axiomes framed. In Quantitye (to omitt vntruthes, as oratio, locus, tempus belonge to Quantitye: as, that corpus is an accident, in respect of a

natural bodye) ther is nothings logical, but onlye the general comparison of the lyke, vnlyke, more, lesse, or equal. for this comparison is incident to euerye thinge, and therefore hathe his peculiar

[36^v] place in inuention assigned by Ramus. Relata must be referred to disagreeable arguments, y^t is theyr seate. In Qualitye what soeuer is logical, is reduced eyther to the adiuncts, or lyke and vnlyke things. Actio is an effect. The rest be adiuncts. Nowe come in the Post praedicaments postinge in hast, as though theyr lords the praedicaments had left some what vnsaid that should haue bene declared. Wherof the four first, Aduersa, Relata, Priuantia, Contradicentia, be topical, and therfor to be taught in inuention. as for these trifles of Prius, Simul, and Habere, they be rather foolish grammatical toyes, then Logical considerations.

The booke περι ἐρμηνείας in the beginnige is ouercharged with grammatical controuersies, of nounes, and verbes, the rest he consumed in an obscure, false, & intricate disputation de futuris contingentibus, and de modalibus, w^{ch} being in deed no different kynd from the other, deserued no diuerse doctryne. for Suppositio the litle vse therof maye be perceaued by that litle w^{ch} I haue alreadye spoken. and AEquipolentia respecteth words onlye, & for y^t respect nothing Logical. for his bookes called priora analytica, we wyll take a tast of one or ij and by these iudge of the rest

of such inconueniences. for conuersion therfore, I would gladlye see any vse or example therof in probable autors. Nay what man is so absurde as to attempt yt? for y^e very same thinge is bothe y^e conuersion, and the argument of the conuersion, so y^t yf yo^w distinctlye consider the ij extreames of the question, yo^w shall fynde noe third thinge as mediu to confirme them. for example. let this be y^e thinge to bee concluded

Noe stone is a man.

The ij extreames bee stone and man, neyther is ther any thinge els put downe in this conuersion, so y^t in steed of y^e prooffe of the question, yo^w bringe me backe the quaestion it selfe in this conuersion.

Noe man is a stone.
Therefore noe stone is a man.

But howe groslye, and absurdlye, we shall better perceauce, yf of this enthymeme wee make a full sillogisme, thus.

Noe man is a stone.
euerye stone is a stone.
therefore noe stone is a man.

Lyke this is that art of reduction in syllogismes. for seinge a syllogisme of yt selfe is cleare, & manifest, what needeth it the helpe of reduction to confirme it? neyther bee all kyndes of syllogismes conteyned in these his iij figures, as he supposeth. His Demonstrations follow, wherof as I sayd, ther is no example in nature to be founde. some topical places, and iudicial praecepts be there and then dispersed,

w^{ch} Ramus hathe collected & set in order. His topikis bee almost nothinge els, but a masse of cconfusion, vayne iterations, tedious repetitions, and sophistical tautologies.

His elenches a peruersion of Logike &

[36^r] noe true logike. This for Aristotle, for if I should but onlye and barelye name & rehearse the infinite rable of fryers inuentionis, more fit as yo^w saye, to serue a sylke-womas shoppe, then troble a philosophers librariye. Ante diem clauso componat vesper olympto. and thus did y^e Ramist cut of his discourse. I haue made a simple narration, and bare reporte. Nothinge is determynd. sub iudice lis est. Vestrũ iudiciũ, Vestra existimatio valebit. only pardon, I praye yo^w, the stammeringe messing for the tyme was shorte, the place vnquiet, my bodye crased, my mynde molested, my bookes in Cambridge, my busynes in the countrie, the reader famous, the wryter obscure, the matter yll, semed not worthe the perusinge, the thinge wel put downe, subject to sillanderinge.

AF.

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George Walter Hallam, Jr. was born in Washington, Pennsylvania on January 11, 1926. After serving in the Army for two years during World War II, he enrolled at Washington and Jefferson College and received the A.B. degree from that institution in June, 1952. In September of the same year he entered the Graduate School at the University of Florida, where he completed work for the Master's degree in English in January, 1954. While pursuing his graduate studies, he served as graduate assistant and interim instructor in English. Since September, 1957 he has been a member of the English faculty at Jacksonville University. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi.

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