

THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION
OF A NEO-BURKEIAN FRAMEWORK
FOR RHETORICAL CRITICISM

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to
my father

Ralph J. Schneider

who took much interest in the progress
of this study and assisted in collecting
research materials for Chapter VI but
did not live to see the completion of
this dissertation.

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CHAPTER I

WHY A NEW THEORY IS NEEDED AND WHAT IT WILL CONTAIN

Before entering into a discussion of the flaws in the contemporary theory and practice of rhetorical criticism, several basic definitions need to be established.

In the field of public address rhetoric usually refers to discourse formulated primarily for a persuasive purpose;¹ and that is the meaning of the term as used in this dissertation. Some theorists in public address reserve the term rhetoric for spoken persuasive messages. Others include both spoken and printed persuasive messages.² In this dissertation all forms of persuasive messages -- spoken, written, and non-verbal are regarded as significant examples of rhetoric which the critic should be prepared to evaluate. Even messages formulated primarily for an informative or entertainment purpose which are concerned with persuasion as a subordinate purpose, should be of interest to the rhetorical critic. However, a given message is defined as rhetorical, informative or entertaining on the basis of the communicator's dominant concern.

¹A major exception is the definition of persuasion by Bryant which includes both suasive and informative discourse.

²Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 6.

Since rhetoric has been defined as any type of message in which persuasion is the dominant concern, it seems necessary also to define the term persuasion. Persuasion is an attempt to modify the overt behavior, or the attitudes or the beliefs of the person or persons to whom the discourse is directed.³ Rhetor or persuader refers to one who makes such an attempt.

Harold Harding, a critic of public addresses, defines criticism, whether of applied rhetoric or of other humanistic forms, in this manner:

a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world.⁴

If the critic is to promote high standards and values in public discourse he will have to judge the purposes of the rhetor as well as the rhetor's techniques. However, Edwin Black charges that generally the critic's sole consideration is whether or not the speaker accomplished his avowed purpose.⁵ The author's consideration of all the critical articles published in 1967 in five major speech journals supported Black's charge.⁶ Rhetorical critics generally fail to ask the

³Brembeck and Howell also define persuasion in terms of the attempt to influence in Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 24.

⁴Harold Harding, "The College Student as a Critic," (from an abridgement of a speech delivered at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, July 23, 1952) prepared by Prof. Melvin Miller for Speech Composition Class at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, October, 1964, p. 5.

⁵Black, pp. 76-77.

⁶The 1967 volumes surveyed were Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Monographs, Southern Speech Journal, Central States Speech

question which Black says ought to be the most important aspect of rhetorical criticism -- How well did the persuader's purpose serve the welfare of his audience?

In Rhetorical Criticism Black expands upon this ethical dimension of criticism by describing the critic as opposed to the scientist in terms of these three characteristics -- (a) He studies humanistic products, (b) He evaluates as well as perceives, and (c) He, unlike the scientist, seeks to be a social force.⁷

These same three characteristics of criticism are particularly underscored in Harding's definition of criticism. Because of the nature of criticism, the rhetorical critic is not doing his job when he makes the goals of the rhetor the ground of appraisal of the rhetor's techniques, without evaluating the rhetorical purpose. Albert J. Crofts makes a similar observation in his classic essay, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism."⁸

This failure to evaluate the purpose as well as techniques of the persuader is frequently excused on the ground that it would involve ethical judgements relative to the individual critic's value-system. Hence, the inclusion of such an evaluation would make the criticism unobjective and unscientific. (Supposedly a judgement of this nature

Journal, and Western Speech. The only critic to evaluate the rhetor's purposes was Robert W. Smith, "David Lloyd George's Limehouse Address," Central States Speech Journal, XVIII (August, 1967), 169-76..

⁷Black, pp. 15-30.

⁸Albert J. Crofts, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," in The Province of Rhetoric, ed. by Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 410-13.

could not be verified with data about the message, audience, and larger society.)

Nevertheless, explicit or implicit in almost every persuasive proposition is the contention, This solution is the best for the audience in the given circumstances, or, This attitude is the most helpful for this audience in the given circumstances, or, This belief is the truest one according to current knowledge on the subject. Since the conveying of a solution, attitude, or belief, carrying one of the above implicit propositions is the usual substance of a persuasive speech, it is not only a function of ethics but also of logic for the listener to test the truth of this implied contention. The receiver may test on the basis of whatever outside evidence relating to the contention he is aware of or is able to discover. The layman who is a critical listener tends to do this kind of testing before he votes for or against a candidate, an allocation of money, a referendum issue; or before he decides to adopt an attitude or belief or support some social reform measure. Can less be expected of the professional critic who is supposed to educate and guide the layman in doing a better job of evaluating and reacting to discourses?

Even the writer of one of the standard discussions on social movements suggests how generalized evaluations of the goals of social movements can be made and implies that it would be useful for the social scientist to make these evaluations. Hans Toch states that if the movement is mainly concerned with a practical plan, the social scientist can judge on the basis of the setting of the movement and its relation to the overall society, whether or not its practical plan is feasible

and will in the long run benefit its members without significantly harming any other area of that society. If the movement has mainly cathartic goals, one must ask a further question -- Is an obsession with this cathartic goal preventing the group from pursuing constructive goals which would be attainable? If the answer is yes, then such a purpose would be rated negatively. However, if a practical solution is so unattainable that cathartic release is the most that can be accomplished at the time, then the cathartic goal of the group would be evaluated as a good and useful one.⁹ In a similar manner the rhetorical critic can evaluate the purpose of the persuader.

It is more likely that the rhetorical critic will be encouraged to criticize on the level of purpose if he has access to a new framework for rhetorical criticism which includes new findings from the social sciences facilitating such a level of criticism. An individual critic might also make ethical assessments which cannot be defended with empirical evidence from the social sciences. This individual dimension of ethical criticism could not be provided for in any critical framework serving as a guide for critics of varying philosophical backgrounds. However, it is perfectly consistent with the framework to be developed here for the individual critic to add this dimension. The important consideration in doing this is that the critic be aware of when he is making this kind of ethical assessment in order that he may point out and distinguish it from other parts of his criticism.

⁹Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Bobbs-Merrill and Co., 1965), pp. 232-41..

As a matter of fact, the great Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal stresses that the critic, scientist, or social scientist cannot help making such judgements, but that he should write these explicitly into his work. The reader may judge how personal values may or may not affect other areas of the writer's analysis. Myrdal's argument is so interesting, so unusual, and so pertinent to our field that his argument shall be quoted here in its entirety:

Biases in research are much deeper-seated than in the formulation of avowedly practical conclusions. They are not valuations attached to research but rather they permeate research. They are the unfortunate results of concealed valuations that insinuate themselves into research in all stages, from its planning to its final presentation.

The valuations will, when driven underground, hinder observation and inference from becoming truly objective. This can be avoided only by making the valuations explicit. There is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific and sufficiently concretized value premises. If this is done, it will be possible to determine in a rational way, and openly to account for the direction of theoretical research. It will further be possible to cleanse the scientific workshop from concealed but ever resurgent, distorting valuations. Practical conclusions may thus be reached by rational inferences from the data and the value premises. Only in this way does social engineering as an advanced branch of social research become a rational discipline under full scientific control.¹⁰

Concern with an ethical dimension of criticism is not the only reason why significant social science findings should be incorporated into the framework to guide rhetorical critics. Another of these

¹⁰Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, Vol. II: The Negro Social Structure (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1964), pp. 1043-44.

reasons becomes apparent if one considers Black's definition of criticism:

Criticism is a discipline that through the investigation and appraisal of the activities and products of man, seeks as its end the understanding of man himself.¹¹

Since rhetorical discourse is a humanistic concern, significant findings regarding human sociology and psychology should aid the critic in doing the most thorough and accurate job. The addition of relevant findings from these two fields would aid the critic both in formulating appropriate criteria for judging discourses and in giving the most accurate answers to how well the discourse meets these criteria. An important established principle from the field of mass media will be given here as an example. This important principle is that of the "two-step flow of communication." The essence of this principle is that individuals are not directly influenced by messages conveyed on mass media such as radio, television, or newspapers. Persons that the individual knows and respects, at least in regard to their knowledge of the topic being considered, must state opinions similar to those the individual has heard on the mass media before the individual will be significantly influenced by the message. These influencing persons are known as "opinion leaders."¹² This principle can enable the critic to make better interpretations of persuasive events where mass media are utilized. With the principle in mind the critic can frame this critical yardstick, the answer to it being a significant part of his

¹¹Black, p. 9.

¹²David K. Berlo, The Process of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 25-35.

total critical appraisal -- Did the persuader consider and adequately provide for the factor of the intermediate "opinion leader's" influence?

Thonssen and Baird, the writers of the chief authoritative guide to rhetorical criticism, indicated the need for incorporation of social science findings in the introductory portion of their book Speech Criticism:

Speeches occur in social settings. Consequently their interpretation and criticism must stem from a knowledge of the forces and conditions operative in the social situation at the particular time.¹³

Even though Thonssen and Baird recognized such a need they did almost nothing to incorporate socio-psychological findings into their guide for critics. Basically they simplified and restated key elements of Aristotle's rhetoric, particularly those dealing with the four classical canons of style, delivery, arrangement, and invention. They also discussed the three major types of proof -- ethical, logical, and emotional. These topics provided rather set guidelines for the critical act. This type of criticism has been termed "Neo-Aristotelian" by Black. He maintains that most practicing critics follow the "Neo-Aristotelian" pattern. The author's survey of 1967 critical articles showed that "Neo-Aristotelian" criticism was the dominant mode.¹⁴

¹³ Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 9.

¹⁴ Black, pp. 35-40. The only articles which were not "Neo-Aristotelian" were James R. Andrews, "Piety and Pragmatism: Rhetorical Aspects of the Early British Peace Movement," Speech Monographs, XXXIV (November, 1967), 423-36 and James R. Andrews, "The Rhetoric of a Lobbyist: Benjamin Franklin in England, 1765-1775," Central States Speech Journal, XVIII (November, 1967), 261-67. Both articles showed a woeful ignorance of the dynamics of long range campaigns. The

The major reason, undoubtedly, is that there is no fully developed critical framework serving as an alternate to the "Neo-Aristotelian." Black is the only other critical theorist who has attempted a book-length discussion of critical methodology. Even so, his critical system is not fully developed. He has devoted over half the book to a refutation of the "Neo-Aristotelian" system and has introduced several provocative but disconnected and only briefly developed suggestions for the rhetorical critic.

Virginia Holland and Leland Griffin in published articles have also made attempts at alternate critical frames of reference, building their new formulations largely on the work of Kenneth Burke. But they too have failed to develop coherent, detailed systems. Griffin's main contribution is an analysis of stages of mass campaigns, and Holland's contribution is an analysis of verbal clues to the rhetor's persuasive strategy.¹⁵ Both contributions are analytical rather than evaluative tools.

The features which characterize the average sample of "Neo-Aristotelian" criticism might be explored further here.

characterization to follow of "Neo-Aristotelian" criticism is based partly on Black's discussion, partly on a study of Thonssen and Baird's Speech Criticism, partly on general readings of critical articles and discussions in the Rhetorical Criticism Seminar at the University of Florida, taught by Prof. Donald E. Williams, September-December, 1966.

¹⁵See Virginia Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (December, 1953), 444-50 and Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the New Left Movement," Quarterly Journal of Speech, I (April, 1964), 124-35.

The "Neo-Aristotelian" critic usually begins by determining the purpose of the rhetor who is the object of study. The critic usually judges on the basis of historic results how successful the rhetor was in working toward his purpose. In addition, specific techniques are assessed in terms of whether they added to or detracted from the desired overall effect. Generally, the ethics or inherent worth of the rhetor's purpose is not judged. The specific techniques of the rhetor are generally discussed under the headings of the four classical canons of rhetoric -- arrangement, style, delivery, and invention. The analysis and evaluation of arrangement is usually confined to deciding how many major parts the discourse contains, judging whether each part is adequately developed, and assessing the overall coherence of the discourse. Analysis and evaluation of the rhetor's style usually centers upon judging its clarity, appropriateness, and ornamental qualities. Frequently, the contributions of the speaker's style to his overall ethos are also considered. Delivery is analyzed and evaluated in terms of the speaker's overall bearing and in terms of the vigor and appropriateness of gestures and vocal qualities. In analyzing invention the "Neo-Aristotelian" critic generally determines the relative amounts of ethical, logical, and emotional proof, giving the highest rating to those discourses based mainly on logical proof.

Critics of the "Neo-Aristotelian" mode of criticism feel that its greatest weaknesses are the factors that the rhetorical critic of contemporary persuasive discourses ought to consider but which are not provided for in this traditional framework. For instance, the "Neo-Aristotelian" framework does not provide for analysis and assessment of

new communicative forms which are sometimes instruments of persuasion as significant as the persuasive speeches and essays which it does deal with.¹⁶ Examples of some of these new communicative forms of persuasion are economic boycotts, marches, sit-ins, lay-ins, and petitions. These new forms for the effecting of persuasion are featured prominently in current civil-rights, anti-war, and student protest campaigns. This shift in forms of persuasive communication utilized most extensively in contemporary mass campaigns was discussed at the 1968 S.A.A. convention by Robert Scott and Donald K. Smith, speaking on "The Rhetoric of Confrontation."

The word "confrontation" is being used currently to describe a set of behaviors that implements dissent in circumstances that once might have given rise to discourse clearly rhetorical. Whereas sit-ins, demonstrations, marches, and even physical conflict are scarcely the stuff of conventional debate, we are forced to consider the potentialities of these activities as means of persuasion.¹⁷

The "Neo-Aristotelian" framework also fails to provide guidelines for discussion of multiple channels. Frequently multiple channels convey the same message to different audiences simultaneously or at differing intervals. Lack of guidelines for analysis of multiple communication channels, non-verbal forms of persuasion, and pertinent

¹⁶Wayne E. Brockriede, "Towards a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LXIII (February, 1966), 35.

¹⁷Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation," in Abstracts (Speech Association of America 54th Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, December 27-30, 1968), p. 6.

principles of mass movement dynamics weakens the rhetorical critic's ability to evaluate the rhetoric of mass movements. The effect of this lack of guidance can be seen in specimens of contemporary criticism.

In 1967, James R. Andrews did a critical study of the Eighteenth Century British pacifist movement. He compared the first stage of this movement unfavorably with the third because more tangible goals were reached in this third and final stage.¹⁸ The scholar of mass movements realizes that the earliest stage is normally concerned with gaining attention and recruiting members;¹⁹ other concrete goals cannot be attained until a later stage. Hence, Andrews' lack of knowledge of mass movement dynamics led him to use inappropriate criteria in judging the various stages of the movement. It is interesting to note that Andrews was the sole published critic in 1967 to even attempt a comprehensive study of a mass campaign.

Many contemporary critics base their judgement of discourses mainly on the soundness of the logic of the persuader's premises without considering the soundness of the speaker's psychology in relating these points of logic to his audience. The 'Neo-Aristotelian' bias toward logical proof has probably contributed in large measure to this weakness in rhetorical theory and criticism discussed by Richard B. Gregg:

For a realistic picture of argument we need to superimpose a psychological framework over the

¹⁸James R. Andrews, "The Ethos of Pacifism: The Problem of Image in the Early British Peace Movement," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIII (February, 1967), 32.

¹⁹Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: New American Library, 1951), pp. 120-25.

logical structure of disputation. In other words, we must consider auditor or audience reaction to argument or if you will, the rhetoric of argument. We need to understand not only why arguments should or should not be accepted (the logic of argument) but why in fact they are or are not accepted (the rhetoric of argument).²⁰

An example of this problem is the 1967 study, "Presumption and Burden of Proof in Whately's Speech on the Jewish Civil Disabilities Repeal Bill," by Floyd Douglas Anderson and Merwyn Hayes, published in Speech Monographs.²¹ This article is interesting in that the critics take one of Whately's theoretical formulations from his Elements of Rhetoric and show how the rhetorical theorist actually applied the concept in one of his parliamentary speeches. The rhetorical concept illustrated was this -- Whately held that a restriction, such as disallowing Jewish participation in British political life, unless clearly necessary to the self-defense of the society, would enjoy no presumption of truth, even though it represented the status quo. This tenet from The Elements of Rhetoric was also the central proposition of Whately's speech. To bolster it, he cited evidence to show that the restriction against Jews had never been proven necessary to British self-defense. After discussing Whately's use of this rhetorical premise, the authors pose this question -- Is the hypothesis itself and, hence, the approach relied on in the

²⁰ Richard B. Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Evidence," Western Speech, XXXI (Summer, 1967), 189.

²¹ Floyd Douglas Anderson and Merwyn Hayes, "Presumption and Burden of Proof in Whately's Speech on the Jewish Civil Disabilities Repeal Bill," Speech Monographs, XXXIV (June, 1967), 133-36.

parliamentary speech, good? Their judgment is that the concept is sound and that the speech was a good one even though Whately's view didn't prevail in the vote afterward. They base their conclusion on the fact that fifteen years later in the 1848 parliamentary debates on the same issue, Whately's speech was reprinted by the forces favoring the repeal of Jewish disabilities. Moreover, they cite the fact that Robert Peel utilized Whately's line of argument. Peel's speech was considered decisive in winning enough votes for repeal.

Perhaps the authors were more concerned with analysis of Whately's theoretical concept and the ramifications of its practical application than they were with total critical assessment of the speech. Yet as they assessed the soundness of the technique in this given speech situation, they raised other issues they became obligated to answer. The most obvious question in the mind of the reader is -- Why was Peel so much more successful with a speech based on the same central argument? Had some historical happenings made the mood of Peel's audience different? If so, this should be explained. The critics might then have analyzed what else Whately could have done to counteract the more negative frame of mind of his audience. Or the critics should ask, What else did Peel do to make his central argument appealing? Perhaps he stressed the positive values of change, whereas, Whately had dwelt mainly on the negative thought that the other side had not sufficiently proved that danger would result from the removal of Jewish disabilities. The fact that both men were not successful with the same argument underscores that mere logical appeal is not enough for the success of a speech. Factors of the psychology of the audience have to be considered in a full and reliable appraisal.

The writers of three 1967 critical studies of speeches by Stokely Carmichael might have profited from specific guidelines for evaluating factors of humor and cathartic appeal as they affect the psychology of persuasion. All three critics gave interesting impressionistic reactions to the single speech each had heard.²² Each critic pointed out that Carmichael succeeded in amusing and entertaining his audience with his ironic humor. If these critics had been better acquainted with the communicative value of ironic humor in aiding the audience to consider the issue with less rigidity, they could have judged this technique on a fuller and more significant level than merely labeling it "entertaining." For instance, Dencil Taylor, dismissed Carmichael's arguments as "shallow and emotional." However emotional reactions such as amusement or cathartic release often help to reestablish communication within upset individuals or between alienated groups and, thus, prepare them eventually to see the logic of argumentative constructions.²³

A number of problems in contemporary critical theory and practice have been discussed. A most significant problem if one considers the ultimate purpose of criticism in aiding man toward greater self-understanding and toward promotion of the highest values is the general lack of an ethical dimension of criticism. The critic tends to concentrate

²² Pat Jefferson, "The Magnificent Barbarian at Nashville," Southern Speech Journal, XXXIII (Winter, 1967), 77-87; Elizabeth Flory Phifer and Dencil R. Taylor, "Carmichael in Tallahassee," Southern Speech Journal, XXXIII (Winter, 1967), 88-92.

²³ See especially Hugh Duncan, Communication and the Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 393-411; Dominick A. Barbara, "Listening with the Inner Ear," Central States Speech Journal, XI (Winter, 1960), 95-98.

on assessing the techniques of the rhetor without making value judgments of the rhetors' purposes. Also he frequently judges the techniques solely as to whether or not they are effective, regardless of social and ethical problems which might arise from the use of certain techniques.

Even the analysis and assessment of rhetorical techniques is not as complete and accurate as it ought to be. The currently available critical framework does not instruct critics regarding non-verbal aspects of persuasion such as the "direct-action" techniques. Also, the critic is not guided in considering multiple audiences receiving the persuasive message through multiple communication channels. Hence, criticism of the rhetoric of mass campaigns is relatively rare, and when such an assessment is attempted it is likely to be incomplete. In addition, many principles from sociology and psychology which relate significantly to persuasive communications have been formulated in recent years but have not been added to the framework guiding rhetorical critics. The addition of these principles would enable the critic to begin solving the problems of current research cited here. This addition would also aid the critic in formulating the best criteria to apply to rhetorical discourses and would provide him with the fullest evidence in comparing the discourse to the criteria formulated for judging it.

The author does not maintain that the new critical framework will solve all problems. On many occasions poor critical studies are done because the critic is unperceptive or is careless in his work. The author is merely making the modest claim that critics, whether poor,

average, or good, would gain helpful ideas from another fully-developed critical theory which attempts to discuss factors significant to persuasive situations which the "Neo-Aristotelian" framework does not provide for.

Consequently, the concern in this dissertation is to develop a new framework for rhetorical criticism to exist alongside or as a supplement to the "Neo-Aristotelian" framework. This framework is grounded in significant principles from sociology and psychology which add to the understanding and assessment of persuasive discourses. Moreover, attention to the non-verbal factors of persuasion, attention to significant components of mass campaigns, and attention to assessing the ethical dimension of the rhetor's purpose and tactics, in so far as these latter assessments can be supported by empirical evidence, are stressed in the new framework. In addition, several samples of applied criticism will be presented in order to aid the critic in recognizing specific critical applications that may be made of the principles discussed in the dissertation.

There is need to explain the method of selecting and synthesizing into a coherent new framework, the most significant sociological and psychological principles.

The author followed the advice of Berlo, Nichols, and Brockriede,²⁴ and the example of Griffin and Holland, by beginning the search for a

²⁴See Brockriede, p. 35 and Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Lectures on Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 106.

new critical theory with a study of Kenneth Burke. The author also relied heavily on a study of Hugh Duncan who has made a simplified restatement of Burke's key rhetorical concepts.²⁵

The author agreed with the persuasion and criticism theorists cited that Burke has provided many perceptive insights about the persuasive process which would be of aid to both the rhetor and the rhetorical critic. The author, similar to Burke, became convinced that identification is the substance of successful persuasion. However, Burke does not give a detailed explication of how the identification process operates. The author concluded after a survey of many sociological and psychological theories that an exploration of associational conditioning and related factors of learning theory were what was needed to provide a detailed anatomy of the identification process necessary to successful instances of persuasion. While this merger of identification, associational conditioning, and related learning concepts is the core of the theory, several other significant factors have been added. Linguistic symbols are the main means of activating associational conditioning; hence, this topic is explored extensively. Another addition is a discussion of psychological blocks to accurate audience perception of elements of the message. Factors of social interaction which add to or hinder perception of the persuasive message are also discussed.

²⁵Hugh Duncan, Communication and The Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962); Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962); Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962).

CHAPTER II

A DETAILED EXPLORATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION

In this chapter a detailed outline is presented of the psychology of persuasion. This may seem to be an odd topic to explore extensively in the opening theoretical chapter of a dissertation which explicates a new theory of rhetorical criticism. It would seem that the main components of a theory of rhetorical criticism would be the criteria to be applied in evaluating a rhetorical discourse to determine its overall merit. Criteria are defined as standards of excellence against which any rhetorical discourse can be tested. Consequently, these criteria are prescriptive statements indicating the best overall strategies and specific tactics which ought to be employed within given types of persuasive situations.

To derive these prescriptive statements the critic must first ascertain the crucial factors contributing to successful instances of persuasion. As these crucial factors are isolated, critical standards of rhetorical excellence can be inferred. Critical standards of excellence are ideals which few if any discourses meet fully but which provide for comparative judgement of a given discourse's worth. If critical standards were based on what is generally accomplished rather than on what are the highest possible accomplishments (which can be

inferred from intensive study of attitude formation) critics would be measuring mediocrity rather than excellence. Persuaders, moreover, would not learn to improve their art.

The remainder of this chapter contains discussion of the process factors necessary to making an attempt at persuasion a success. The author regards any conscious attempt through verbal or non-verbal means by a source to modify the overt behavior, the attitudes, or the beliefs of a person or persons as an instance of persuasion and, hence, of interest to the rhetorical critic. What are termed "necessary process factors" may not be found in every attempt at persuasion, but they would be found in every successful attempt. Since the ultimate purpose of this dissertation is the development of critical standards, the process steps necessary to any successful endeavor in attitude formation or attitude modification are what is pertinent. These process factors apply to persuasive messages in any form of publication -- speeches, printed messages, non-verbal message forms, or a combination of these. The process is discussed in terms of three major subdivisions -- perception, judgment, and action.

In a successful instance of persuasion, the audience is aided to perceive the main elements of the message in the way the rhetor intended them to be perceived. After accurate perception of the main elements, the audience is encouraged to make a judgment toward the rhetorical proposition similar to the judgment the persuader desires.

The elements of perception and judgment will occur simultaneously in certain parts of the message. For purposes of analysis, however, perception and judgment are seen as discrete parts of the persuasive

process. The perception of major message components tends to set the direction of judgment, hence, serious discrepancies between intended and actual perception may prevent persuasive success even before the judgment phase is reached.

Perception can be defined as the reception of information stimuli and the comprehension of these elements through categorization and labeling.¹ Judgment refers to connections between motivational (appeals) concepts and the rhetorical proposition, including the final inferences for overt action proceeding from these connections.

A judgment of some type generally is made by receivers, but it may be opposite to the one the rhetor desires. On other occasions, too few pertinent items of information are presented to enable structuring toward any judgment regarding the proposition. This problem is illustrated in the student speech to be discussed in Chapter III.

The final stage in the psychological process of persuasion is the acting out of the proposition by the receiver. If, however, the receiver's perceptions and/or judgments were in disagreement with the rhetor's intention, the third stage may never occur; the audience may not act in any way related to the proposition. On the other hand, they may act in a manner contrary to it. An action step congruent with the rhetor's intention is almost assured if the audience perceives and judges in the manner desired by the rhetor. If success is achieved in regard to the perception and judgment phases, the only probable reasons

¹ See discussion of perception in Ronald H. Forgas, Perception (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 2.

that the audience would fail to act would be due to the rhetor's failure to describe specific actions or his call for an action that the audience was incapable of giving. These two problems indicate poor audience analysis and are treated adequately in standard persuasion texts.²

Hence, the remainder of this discussion shall be centered upon considerations which the rhetor should make in aiding his receivers to perceive and to judge in a manner leading to the desired action. This manner of presentation may seem appropriate to the exposition of a rhetorical rather than a critical theory. Actually it is appropriate to both. In making his assessments, the rhetorical critic should simulate the process of choosing which is discussed here from the viewpoint of the rhetor. In other words, the best of the possible strategic choices open to the rhetor are equivalent to the standards of excellence for judging the persuasive message.

A number of elements presented in this theory are found in traditional discussions of rhetoric. The traditional treatment of some of these is, however, imprecise. A major contribution of this critical theory is to cite empirical support for what have been common sense notions of traditional rhetoricians. In so doing, fuller detailing and further implications of given concepts will be developed. The concepts discussed will be interrelated more carefully into an overall view of the persuasive process than has been the case previously. The discussion to follow also shifts the relative emphasis of certain

²See especially Wayne Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 32-33.

components of persuasion. For instance, traditional critics have stressed the formal logic of argument more than any other element.³ Traditionalists have related argument to audience predispositions, but generally formal logic has been scrutinized more than the audience's psychological perceptions of the logical threads of the message.

One might get the best general orientation to the theory of successful persuasion upon which this new critical theory is based by considering the following quotation from an article by O. H. Mowrer, an eminent leader in the field of stimulus-response learning psychology. Mowrer comments on a statement by Carpenter which is consistent with his own theory on the matter:

In a recent paper by Carpenter entitled "A Theoretical Orientation for Instructional Film Research," we find brief reference to the releasor-organizer hypothesis, which is that the signals, signs, and symbols of sound motion pictures function principally as releasors and organizers of meanings and responses in human subjects. The releasing function of signs is said to be both dependent (or interdependent) on the activated brain processes (engrams) of the experiencing subjects. Thus, it may be reasoned that the functions of signals, signs, and symbols do not transmit meanings; they release meaning when and only when the subjects respond. The characteristics of these responses relate closely to personal life history differences. The releasor concept of signs and symbols must be supplemented by the related organizer concept. Previously learned "engrams" may be modified by new stimulation and even new related elements may be imprinted. New relationships may be shown and old responses modified by film mediated stimulation. The results are conceived to consist principally of

³Richard B. Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Evidence," Western Speech, XXXI (Summer, 1967), 180-88.

the reorganization of previously learned neural-organic patterns which intervene between film stimulation and the subsequent actions or reactions of the individual.

The notion that signs release or arouse meanings in rather than bear them to another individual as stated by Carpender is identical with the position taken in the present analysis.⁴

The notion of rhetoric presented here is quite different from that generally entertained by the persuasion theorist. In particular the psychological processes which explain why general persuasive strategies succeed or fail are detailed.

Several of these psychological elements can be inferred from the previous quotation and explored further. Most crucial is the releasor aspect of the persuasive process. Mowrer's discussion indicates that the persuasive process is completed within the individual. Indeed the persuasive message must set forth conditions to facilitate the receiver's persuading himself. Mowrer delineates the physiological-psychological connections within the brain and central nervous system which facilitate this self-persuasive process. Due to previous experience the receiver has "activated brain patterns," engrams, which cause him to react in certain set ways in situations which trigger the given "activated brain pattern."⁵

For instance, John Smith responds with an offer to help any time one of his neighbors is in distress. A rhetor who wished to have John Smith (and perhaps others like him in a larger audience) help

⁴O. H. Mowrer, "The Psychologist Looks at Language," in Human Learning Studies: Extending Conditioning Principles to Complex Behavior, ed. by Arthur Staats (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1964), p. 181.

⁵Ibid., pp. 187-88.

some neighbors in the community would merely have to paint a clear verbal picture of the situation. Smith's "activated brain pattern" concerning the previously learned response of aid to the stimulus, distressed neighbor, would connect within his neurological system, and John Smith would either perform an overt action of giving help or at least would resolve to do so in the near future.

If the rhetor's goal were to solicit money for aid to a foreign country and his audience consisted of people like John Smith, he might stimulate a new or slightly modified response by building on one already followed as an "activated brain pattern." In this case the rhetor would show the audience that the foreign activity was concerned with giving relief to suffering international neighbors. This appeal could lead to the desired action of getting contributions. In this case a new stimulus, a problem situation in a foreign country, has been conditioned to a previously established response of aid to distressed neighbors. Both the pure "activated brain pattern" and the new pattern conditioned upon the old activations are made possible because of the engrams (traces of synapse connections of previous stimulus-response bonds left in the brain).

The preceding description of self-persuasion as it occurs in the neurological system is all that will be discussed on that subject, since little is known about the engram connection process. Though such neurological connections are crucial to the persuasive process they are a factor which cannot be analyzed directly as Ruesch and Bateson explain:

Events occurring in other persons are accessible to an observer in terms of inference alone. All he

observes is the stimuli which reach the other person and the latter's reactions; the rest is subject to conjecture.⁶

Consequently, the rhetorical theorist and the rhetorical critic should derive principles by focusing attention on those types and combinations of stimuli that will lead to mediating responses within receivers causing them to act in the desired manner. The mediating mechanisms are the engram connections and related parts of the brain and central nervous system. It is arrangements of linguistic symbols which activate these mediating mechanisms. A mediating response is the repertoire or part of a repertoire of behavior elicited by linguistic symbols which have stimulated an "activated brain pattern" or a response derivative of an "activated brain pattern."

An understanding of how linguistic symbols stimulate mediating responses might be provided by considering and commenting on this statement regarding symbol conditioning by Charles Osgood, a foremost world authority on mediational-psychology.

Words represent things because they produce some replica of the actual behavior toward those things. This is the crucial identification, the mechanism that ties signs to particular stimulus-objects and not to others. Stating the proposition formally, we may say; a pattern of stimulation which is not the object is a sign of the object if it evokes in an organism a mediating reaction this (a) being some fractional part of the total behavior elicited by the object and (b) producing distinctive self-stimulation that mediates responses which would not

⁶ Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1951), p. 26.

occur without the previous stimulation of non-object and object patterns of stimulation.⁷

Osgood's discussion is of the process by which individual words acquire meaning. The self-stimulation mediating process, however, is the same one used in connecting motivational concepts (motivational appeals) to rhetorical propositions to give the proposition a new meaning. The self-stimulation mediating responses triggered by previous associations refers to responses due directly to "activated brain reactions" or to reactions derivative of them through generalization, discrimination, or further associative conditioning. These conditions are consistent with general knowledge regarding cognition as exemplified in this remark by Doob:

When a thorough investigation reveals no actual prior contact (between stimulus and response) some process of generalization or discrimination must have occurred since all behavior has antecedents.⁸

Arthur Staats explains that language conditioned in the manner discussed by Osgood can in turn be applied in further operant conditioning procedures to generate new patterns of learning, including modifications of attitudes.⁹

These connected levels of conditioning will be traced here. The first two levels are attained by all learners of a given language; the

⁷Charles E. Osgood, "The Mediation Hypothesis," in Staats, ed., p. 173.

⁸Leonard Doob, "The Behavior of Attitudes," *ibid.*, p. 297.

⁹Arthur W. Staats, "A Case in and Stragegy for the Extension of Learning Principles to Problems of Human Behavior," *ibid.*, p. 137.

persuader has to make use of them through skillful language selection in the phrasing of his message. First one learns the meaning of separate word symbols by associating each to related clusters of action. Osgood explains that human beings think of objects and word symbols for them in terms of related actions. For instance, hammer means to an individual the striking action he can perform with the implement.¹⁰ This association of action-meaning with individual words is transferred also to phrases, clauses, and sentences. Reaching the third level, the strategy of the persuader might be phrased as an attempt to take a new subject (the rhetorical proposition) and connect it with predicates (motivational concepts) already accepted by the audience.

Mowrer has explained how the sentence can be used as this type of conditioning device. (What can be said of sentences can be applied to any other unit of complete thought as has been demonstrated by I. A. Richards.)¹¹

The sentence preeminently a conditioning device and that its chief effect is to produce new association, new learning, just as any other paired presentation of stimuli may do. This position is congruent with the traditional notion that predication is the essence of language and may indicate, perhaps more precisely than purely linguistic research has done, the basic nature of this phenomenon. Perhaps the most generally accepted criterion as to whether a sentence has or has not done its work is this: if as a result of hearing or reading a sentence, an individual's behavior on some future occasion, with respect to some person,

¹⁰ Charles E. Osgood, "The Mediation Hypothesis," *ibid.*, p. 174.

¹¹ I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 47-50.

thing or event not present when the sentence occurred is different from what it otherwise had been, then that sentence may be said to have been understood and to have functioned effectively. If, for example, John tells Charles in the absence of Tom, that Tom is a thief and if when Charles subsequently encounters Tom, he reacts toward him with distrust and apprehension, [persuasive] communication has clearly taken place.¹²

One can see how this process takes place in a lengthy message by considering an aspect of Roosevelt's First Inaugural. (This address is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.) Roosevelt's subject (proposition) was "Accept my new economic recovery program." He connected this with several predicates (motivational concepts) as his basic argumentative strategy. For instance, one line of connection was "Accept my new economic recovery program because it is consistent with 'essential democracy' and other accepted American values." Supposedly, the auditor's previously learned action-pattern toward entities democratic and American would be transferred to the recovery program. Another conditioning pattern (or line of argument) was "Accept my new economic recovery program because I am a charismatic leader." A third conditioning pattern was "Accept my new economic recovery program because it will undo the damage created by careless and unscrupulous businessmen." Within the speech symbol manipulations and supporting details were used to build up the three motivational concepts -- factors of 'essential democracy,' businessmen as scapegoats, and Roosevelt as a charismatic leader. The latter two were complicated

¹²O. H. Mowrer, "The Psychologist Looks at Language," in Staats, ed., pp. 180-82.

as charisma had to be associated with Roosevelt and scapegoating with businessmen, then the two concepts were associated with the proposition.

The essence of successful persuasion is to connect one's proposition with predicates (motivational concepts) which (1) are needs, beliefs, attitudes, or general courses of action already strongly accepted by the audience, and (2) are concepts that move the audience toward action-areas similar to the action the rhetor is trying to induce toward the proposition. In the inaugural address, the prior action-orientations toward the motivational concepts were those of strong acceptance ('essential democracy'); complete trust and obedience (charismatic leadership); and avoidance of anything connected with the scapegoat, businessmen. This last action-area was valuable because the recovery program involved a turning away from some previously revered free enterprise practices. (3) The motivational concept should be one which can be plausibly connected with the proposition.

The conditioning (or identification) of motivational concepts already accepted by the audience to the proposition might be compared with a traditional Aristotelian concept. The motivational concept(s) would be major premises believed by the audience. The connections between these motivational concepts and the proposition would be the minor premise. If the receiver truly sees the connection he is self-persuaded and will make a favorable judgment toward the proposition. When self-persuasion has occurred the argumentative strategy has functioned as an enthymeme in the sense that the receiver would comprehend for himself the conclusion of the message (proposition) proceeding from the lines of argument, even if the proposition were

left unstated. Factors of learning theory which facilitate the receiver's making of the crucial connection are discussed in detail in Chapter III.

The preceding discussion of conditioning steps has provided an outline of the organizer part of the releasor-organizer theory of persuasion as discussed by Mowrer.

Mowrer stated that the releasor aspect concerns setting forth conditions so the desired attitudinal meanings will be released within receivers. The setting forth of favorable conditions has to do with aiding the receiver toward favorable perception (especially favorable labeling) of major message elements, such as, the motivational concepts, the proposition, and the connecting link between these two entities. In particular the motivational concepts need to be labeled in a manner that will win the audience's acceptance and will orient them to an area of action similar to the one called for in the proposition. The desired action would be an acceptance or avoidance response to a definite entity. This conditioned response may be the initiation of approach to an entity previously ignored or rejected, or it may be renewal of approach to an entity. Similarly the response could be one of avoidance regarding an object previously approached, or it could be a resolve to avoid an entity previously not acted toward at all. Fotheringham refers to these four major directions of action respectively as adoption, continuation, discontinuance, and deterrence.¹³ Speeches cited in this study for the purpose of sample criticisms illustrate all

¹³Wallace C. Fotheringham, Perspectives on Persuasion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), p. 33.

four action-orientations. Adoption was called for in the proposition of Franklin Roosevelt's First Inaugural -- "Accept my new economic recovery program." Continuation was the desired response to John Glenn's proposition -- "Support this worthwhile space program." Patrick Henry sought discontinuance in the proposition of his "Give me Liberty or Give me Death Address!" He said, in effect, "Cease to negotiate with Britain." The student speaker whose proposition was "Do not depend on religion," was calling for discontinuance or deterrence, depending on the prior practices of individual audience members.

Doob speaks synonymously with Mowrer when he characterizes attitude formation as consisting of perception and associational learning.¹⁴ Staats also speaks synonymously when he explains that attitude formation is based upon categories (perceived entities) which are primed or activated through conditioning processes.¹⁵

Motivational concepts, previously learned beliefs, opinions, felt needs, or characteristic ways of acting, can be conditioned to propositions calling for various types of judgment as Doob indicates in the following observation:

Under varying conditions within the individual, a given attitude can mediate a repertoire of overt responses. A favorable attitude toward a social institution, for example, can mediate innumerable responses connected with what is considered to be the welfare of that institution.¹⁶

¹⁴ Leonard Doob, "The Behavior of Attitudes," in Staats, ed., p. 299.

¹⁵ Arthur W. Staats, "Verbal Mechanisms in Purpose and Set," in Staats, ed., p. 219.

¹⁶ Doob, p. 298.

Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin also support this line of thought in discussing the relative nature of categorization.

The objects of the environment provide the cues on which our groupings may be based, but they provide cues that could serve for many groupings other than the ones we make. We select and utilize certain cues rather than others.¹⁷

The overall releasor-organizer concept of persuasion has been defined and explicated, but a fuller understanding of the process steps, perception and judgment, need to be attained. This discussion will fill in the details of the releasor-aspect. Judgment toward the proposition is the sum total of the labelings made of motivational concepts and the resultant labeling of the proposition to which they are connected. Since perception of these major message elements consistent with the perceptions the persuader desired tends to facilitate judgment in the direction desired, the main amplificatory discussion needed is a further exploration of perception.

Although perception includes the three major elements of reception, categorization, and labeling, only reception and labeling will be discussed explicitly. A part of labeling is the categorization of message elements. Indeed many cognition theorists would state that labeling is subordinate to categorization and is chiefly an expression of how these elements were categorized. In this study the viewpoint is taken that the manner in which objects are labeled is the main determinant of their categorization. The main reason for following this interpretation is an understanding that the only way human beings

¹⁷Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: Science Editions, 1965), p. 232.

can think about features of their environment and form opinions of them is through the use of symbols to name and interrelate objects; in other words, only through labeling can objects be understood and reasoned about.

Even the cognition theorists, Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, who stress the primacy of categorization make statements which seem in reality to support the primacy of labeling:

The stimulus similarity that serves as a basis for grouping is a selected or abstracted similarity. There is an act of rendering similar by a coding operation rather than a forcing of equivalence on the organism by the nature of stimulation.

Virtually all cognitive activity involves and is dependent on the process of categorizing. More critical still, the act of categorizing derives from man's capacity to infer from sign to significance.¹⁸

Further support for the primacy of labeling is given by symbolic interactionists, such as, Duncan and Burke, who state that an individual has to name a thing before he can act toward it.¹⁹ In addition, various psychological studies report that individuals have difficulty perceiving objects for which they do not have names. The critical role of labeling in perception and cognition is especially well-stated in some of the psychiatric literature, such as in the following observation by Dollard and Miller:

The neurotic is a person who is in need of a stock of sentences that will match the events going on within and without him. The new sentences

¹⁸ ibid., p. 8 and p. 246.

¹⁹ Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and the Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 44.

make possible an immense facilitation of higher mental processes. With their aid he can discriminate and generalize more accurately; he can motivate himself for remote tasks; he can produce hope and caution within himself and aid himself in being logical, reasonable and playful. By labeling a formerly unlabeled emotional response he can represent this response in reasoning. It acquires a voice within the individual. The unknown response does not appear as a surprising element in a plan which had disregarded it. Occasions for action can be foreseen and judged in advance as to suitability.²⁰

The debate regarding labeling versus categorization as the primary cognitive operation mirrors in microcosm the debate over the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis. The linguists, Whorf and Sapir, maintained that the vocabulary and grammatical structure of a society determined its members' perceptions of reality and, consequently, the type of culture developed by them. Critics of this hypothesis have maintained that vocabulary and grammar are mainly shaped by a society's perceptions of reality and by its cultural needs. The author favors a position close to that of Whorf and Sapir. The author believes, moreover, that the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis of language shaping one's perception of objects is more applicable to the reception of persuasive messages than it might be to other situations. A formal definition of labeling and a more precise description of its role in persuasion will support the foregoing observation.

The labeling process proceeds as an inner dialogue of the self in perceiving objects, events, or other stimuli which serve as points of

²⁰ John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 281.

information in a communicative message. Labeling response refers to the giving of a name to the stimulus being perceived at the moment. Although labeling refers chiefly to the assigning of verbal names to objects, the label includes an orientation to a definite area of action which is the receiver's response to the stimulus of the labeling words and the entities (beyond the immediate object) of which the labelings are signs. Fishbein further supports and elucidates this discussion of labeling responses.

The subject tends to read, or to repeat himself, the stimulus toward which he is attending; he makes a "labeling response." Once the individual has learned the concept, however, he may learn new associations to it. Most learning occurs after the object is labeled, so attitudes are functions of the individual's belief (labeling about the attitude object).²¹

In many situations the individual is presented first with an object, event, or situation and proceeds to label it. In the persuasive setting, the receiver is presented first with the persuader's labeling of motivational concepts and of the rhetorical proposition rather than being presented with these as actual entities. The receiver does decide for himself whether to accept or reject the persuader's labelings. However, because he must begin his thought regarding these entities with labels given him by someone else he is more likely to see objects suggested by the given labels than to validate the labels by reference to related aspects not suggested by them. Especially is this likely to happen if the persuader makes his various

²¹ Martin Fishbein, Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 393-94.

labelings and the connections between them convincing (through adequate detailing, logical connections, ethical proof, and the various perception factors yet to be discussed in this chapter). The rhetor's biased labelings are apt to be most convincing in situations where the receiver knows little about the rhetorical issue. In that case the receiver may make little or no attempt to validate the rhetor's labeling through reference to outside knowledge of the objects represented by the labeling.

Such a situation was pointed out recently by Roger Egeberg, nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary of Health. He decried cliches which he felt were manipulated by representatives of the American Medical Association to frighten citizens into opposing further medical reforms without really understanding the issues involved. In particular, he attacked "socialization" as a word that electrifies everyone and "compulsory" as a word that makes everybody's "hair stand on end." His concluding remark was, "My job in Washington will be to help get people thinking in terms of facts rather than in terms of these cliches."²²

If the labeling of motivational concepts leads to a labeling of the proposition that suggests a range of action acceptable to the receiver, he will make a judgment of acceptance toward the proposition. In his validation of the rhetor's labeling of motivational concepts pointing toward a particular labeling of the proposition the receiver

²²"Egeberg Claims Medical Field is Shattered," St. Petersburg Times, July 5, 1969, sec. A, p. 9.

may derive a propositional statement suggesting an unacceptable range of response. In that case his judgment will be one of rejection. There are occasions when the rhetor presents motivational concepts in terms of sparse or confusing details. In that case the receiver normally cannot validate the labeling of either the motivational concepts or the proposition, and he will make no judgment regarding the proposition.

Since labeling is so dependent upon and intimately connected with other phases of perception, a generalized discussion follows of areas in which perception may break down. The major portion of this discussion refers to hindrances to full and accurate reception of all crucial aspects of the message. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint some of these factors as mainly a failure in reception, or in labeling (including categorization) or a combination of them. In particular it is difficult to determine whether psychological blocks within a receiver hinder mainly reception or labeling. All that is really important is to realize that these perceptual factors are a general hindrance to successful persuasion. The pervasiveness of perception as the audience comprehends points of information pertinent to the rhetorical proposition, and as they begin to judge their reaction to the proposition is illustrated in this observation:

In the accumulating experimental literature on perception and especially on judgment, there are recurrences that can be utilized in the study of attitude and attitude change. . . how we see and hear things, how we discriminate and compare things are not represented by cold carbon copies of the stimulus, regardless of the occasion. For one thing, the ways in which we perceive and judge are determined . . . within the context in which they are found concurrently and in time sequence. But this is not all . . . factors pertaining to the

individual, his background, his ego concerns, his attitude, his organic states at the time -- have to be considered as well, relative to the stimulus conditions. These considerations apply to all psychological processes, whether they involve perceiving things, judging things, learning about things, or thinking about events.²³

In the "old rhetoric" there was much concern about which side of an issue has presumption in its favor and which has the burden of proof in overcoming these presumptions. Recently Gary Cronkhite suggested a broadening of the burden of proof concept. Cronkhite stated that the rhetor bear in mind that he who asserts must prove whatever is necessary to his assertions.²⁴ Because accurate perception is so vital the rhetor should realize that the burden is on him to anticipate and to provide for any instances in which the receiver might have difficulty perceiving elements of the discourse accurately.

The concept of "noise" can be used to discuss factors responsible for a failure to transmit intended perceptions intact to auditors. The term was coined by Richards to refer to any interference with the full and accurate transmission of a message.²⁵

The most obvious interferences are physiological and technical "noises." If the audience is overly tired or overnated or the speaker's voice is not loud enough, much of the detail to be perceived

²³Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgement-Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1965), p. 223.

²⁴Gary Lynn Cronkhite, "The Locus of Presumption," Central States Speech Journal, XVII (November, 1966), 270-76.

²⁵I. A. Richards, Speculative Instruments (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 23.

will either be distorted or not communicated at all. There may also be a motivational "noise" in that the audience fails to perceive the speaker's topic as relevant to them. This frequently happens when a speech student talks to a college audience on medicare or social security. On other occasions the problem really should concern the audience in that they are capable of helping to solve it, but they have little desire to become involved. In this case the usual reaction is to physically or mentally tune out the persuader and his message. An example is the lady who mumbled that her minister had spoken again on civil rights. When asked what he had said about it, her reply was, "Oh, I don't know, I turned off my hearing aid." Other people in that audience probably tuned out by wool-gathering or by filling their minds with the thought that ministers shouldn't deal with social problems.

Discussion of the latter example leads beyond motivational "noise" to "noise" due to conflict of attitude between the persuader and his audience. In both cases receivers are likely to respond by applying selective attention or by distorting the content of messages that are attended to.

Sometimes the rhetor will induce an apathetic or hostile audience to attend to his message by initially arousing tension or fear. Martin Luther King and Arthur Waskow (prominent strategist for various peace and civil rights campaigns) conceived a tension-arousal use of "direct-action" techniques. They specified that a major purpose of demonstrations, economic boycotts, and related non-verbal protest measures is to make the previously comfortable status quo so uncomfortable that attention

of the general public toward solving social injustices becomes the path of least resistance.²⁶ This strategic approach corresponds to what Fotheringham discusses as the use of non-verbal tactics for the purpose of agitation. He also discusses the use of non-verbal techniques to convey a definite persuasive meaning, termed the "event-message."

"The event-message" is to be distinguished from agitation. The goals of the latter are to arouse feeling, to unstructure the environment of those for whom it is planned and in general to heighten motivation. Persuasion and with it the "event-message" implies the establishment of a particular view or meaning or feelings toward a particular object as a means of bringing about a definite action-goal. Agitation generally precedes persuasion and is a preparation for it.²⁷

Although such an agitation step seems needed in many situations, the nature and severity of tactics to achieve it should be chosen carefully. The famous Yale studies in persuasion indicate that extreme fear-arousal often has a "boomerang effect": The auditors develop a hatred for the communicator and are likely to do the opposite of what he advocates.²⁸

To know the direction and intensity of audience attitudes which might lend themselves to a climate of apathy or a distortion of perception, the rhetor must engage in audience analysis. Audience analysis is an important part of traditional rhetoric and most

²⁶ Martin Luther King, Why We Can't Wait (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 84-94; Raymond Murphy, ed., Problems and Prospects of the Negro Movement (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966), p. 377.

²⁷ Fotheringham, p. 71.

²⁸ Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 189.

suggestions to be offered regarding it are not novel, but new knowledge about reference groups may aid the rhetor. Most audiences that persuaders deal with are sizeable and heterogeneous. The persuader may infer major attitudinal predispositions of the audience by finding what reference groups they belong to, such as, political, social, occupational, or religious categories. Osgood makes a succinct explanation regarding the soundness of this approach:

The analogue for a cognitive element for an individual is what we may call a cultural meaning (stereotype, public image, etc.) for a group. . . . It is characteristic of cohesive groups as Newcomb has shown, for interpersonal communication to produce increased uniformity of opinion and attitude. Mass communications have this function for the larger groupings of individuals in mass society. . . . Many of the applications of the semantic differential in the study of images of political personalities and issues, of commercial institutions and products, . . . have dealt with cultural meanings based on reasonably representative groups of people. The degree of conformity on issues (of reference group members) is often striking. Ninety to 100 percent of subjects frequently choosing the same side if not the same intensity.²⁹

The occasion for the rhetorical message and/or the nature of the sponsoring group usually indicate at least one important reference group membership. Knowledge of one or two of these enables the persuader to infer other attitudes and reference groups they are likely to be associated with. Psychological studies have shown that within a given reference group, a whole constellation of attitudes

²⁹Fishbein, p. 435.

occur together.³⁰ Perhaps the best synthesis of types which might guide the rhetor or rhetorical critic is Adorno's discussion of the authoritarian versus democratic personality (including implications regarding a third in-between category).³¹ For instance, if a rhetor were to address an American Legion group which stresses patriotism and loyalty he would hypothesize that this group tends to have an authoritarian outlook. He would infer that his legion audience is politically conservative, respects established institutions, and is critical of those questioning these institutions. He would further assess that the Legionaires favor conventional morality and family life. In particular, Legionaires would react against anything associated with "hippies," leftists, or protest demonstrators including the vocabulary, clothing styles, etc., characterizing these groups.

Members of the American Legion as well as other authoritarian types are much aware of class and rank distinctions and approve of consciously stressing them. An individual addressing this group should never adopt the "chummy" manner which might be favorably received by a college audience. Even if the speaker were a social equal to the Legion audience, his function as a speaker places him momentarily at a higher rank, the expectations of which he should meet. If at the same time the speaker were much younger or of lower military rank than most of his audience, he should show the proper deference toward them in these respects. The rule of "looking

³⁰ Ibid., p. 436.

³¹ Theodore Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 31-56 and 390-467.

and acting the part," respecting one's rank whether it be that of superior, inferior, or equal applies in almost all cases. It would apply more strongly than usual with authoritarian-oriented people, but would be toned down considerably when facing a "new-left" group.

This sample audience analysis is necessarily brief and merely suggestive. It is the duty of the persuader or critic to make a thorough study of reference groups he may be dealing with rather than looking for a synopsis of reference groups in this dissertation.

Duncan discusses at length the matter of proper courtship mode between superior and inferior or between equals. Duncan's basic formula is that one petitions superiors, commands inferiors, and convinces equals.³² However, in a society or group which is basically democratic as are most American societal groups, one would also convince superiors and inferiors. Yet one's style of convincing a superior would be deferential, and requests would probably be indirect. One's style of convincing an inferior would be more authoritative and direct, and one might include indirect reminders of one's power (see discussion of 'hytification' in Chapter V). One reason student protest movements are largely unsuccessful in reaching concrete goals is that their leaders attempt to deal with university superiors in brash and commanding rather than deferential tones.³³ Such a style angers the administrator personally and makes him fear a weakening of the hierarchical

³²Duncan, p. 340.

³³J. W. Anderson; "Rebellion Follows Pattern, Usually Fails," Milwaukee Journal, July 17, 1968, sec. B., p. 1.

arrangement which upholds the university structure. The result is that the administrator refuses the student request and/or does not stay around long enough to hear it, even though he might agree that the request itself is just and reasonable.

Similar flaws which cause audiences to fail to attend at all or to form distorted perceptions can be seen in the characteristic style of extreme anti-war agitators. These people frequently proceed in a manner which offends the sense of propriety, decency, or morality of the general public. Hence, the public tunes out reception of these protest messages. For instance, pouring blood vials over draft-center records, stealing the records, burning down R.O.T.C. installations, and burning draft-cards are not attention-steps which favorably dispose the American people to listen.

The successful persuader must understand and appeal to an audience's sense of propriety and social-interaction to secure full and accurate reception of his message. In addition certain audience groups may have strong psychological tensions which must be allayed before members can properly receive and react to the rhetor's message.

An example of people likely to have extreme psychological tensions are cultural or racial minorities. Light is shed on why they might have special psychological problems in this observation made by Duncan: "We are anxious to communicate well with real audiences because their responses become our responses to ourselves."³⁴ Dominant social groups must interact favorably with an individual if he is to form an adequate

³⁴Duncan, p. 283.

self-concept. Because of the rejections minority members often experience, their self-concepts have a large component of self-hate and aggression.³⁵ These feelings are especially activated when such individuals face situations (including speeches) concerned with racial or social interactions. A persuader speaking on one of these themes to such a group should try to alleviate the probable tension of self-hate and aggression felt by his receivers. This necessity is stressed in this additional observation by Duncan:

Thus, if the dream is the guardian of sleep, art is the guardian of social order. When society supplies us with no or few benign ways to express our frustrations, we turn to crime, violence, rage, or hysteria. In these forms of communication we try to say to others something they cannot, or will not, let us say in other ways. The [psychiatric] analyst permits, indeed coaches us to every kind of hostile expression, for he knows that only when hate is expressed can it be understood. He styles himself as an audience of a certain kind, and we play out our hate before him. As the hidden and secret hate of the patient gushes forth, the physician opens wide the gates. . . .³⁶

Translating this view to rhetorical concerns, the discourse creates for the moment the society the receiver is in. If this temporary society calls forth psychological tensions, they need to be exorcized psychoanalytically before the receiver can perceive and react to the discourse. This is analogical to the inability of disturbed individuals to perceive and act effectively in the larger society until psychological problems are faced and removed, as is discussed by Bandura

³⁵ John Milton Yinger and George Eaton Simpson, Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1958).

³⁶ Duncan, pp. 282-83.

in the following remark:

Most theories of psychotherapy are based on the assumption that the patient has a repertoire of previously learned positive habits available to him, but that these adaptive patterns are inhibited or blocked by competing responses motivated by anxiety or guilt. The goal of therapy then is to reduce the severity of the internal inhibitory controls, thus, allowing the healthy patterns of behavior to emerge.³⁷

The hated elements of oneself must be purged before one under this type of tension can concentrate on constructive activity. Scape-goating is frequently used to exorcize aggression against oneself. The individual or group projects its own hated flaws on to another object and then symbolically (or in actuality) destroys it. One can also exorcize one's hated characteristics by joking about oneself or about an object on which the bad traits have been projected.³⁸ The manner in which humorous catharsis mitigates self-hatred is explained by a neo-Freudian psychologist in these terms:

In the humorous attitude the superego relates itself to the ego like a good parent to a child: lenient, understanding, forgiving, kind. Wit utilizes infantile pleasure in order to release aggressive tendencies; in humor, the saving of emotion reactivates a joyful narcissistic state during which the superego treats the ego with kindness and not with the usual sternness.³⁹

³⁷Albert Bandura, "Psychotherapy as a Learning Process," in Staats, ed., p. 478.

³⁸Duncan, pp. 125-31.

³⁹Martin Grotjahn, Beyond Laughter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 11.

Minority groups are not the only ones who may require tragic or humorous catharsis to alleviate psychological tensions which interfere with the ability to concentrate. Whenever a significant portion of the audience has intense feelings of fear, aggression, self-hate, or guilt; the rhetor should provide early in his message for an appropriate tension-release. Any group temporarily undergoing an upsetting experience may be in need of psychological exorcizing. Obscenity is widely used in comments by military men to relieve psychological tensions due to the radically different environment and value system soldiers frequently must face.⁴⁰ In Chapter IV, there will be a description of the use of symbolic scapegoating to aid members of American society during the depression. Americans during this period had to overcome feelings of fear and aggression which had prevented constructive and unified action. The tragic catharsis created by Roosevelt involved not self-hate but external hatred against the business classes. Such external hatred can also be purged through either a tragic or a humorous catharsis. Hatred features of the other group are exaggerated and then either satirized or killed symbolically. Insight into the working of satiric catharsis against an enemy is given in this observation. Note also that this method would improve an individual's self-communication because aggression would be spent without at the same time creating guilt:

Aggressive wit gives us a new way of admitting dangerous aggression to our consciousness but it has to be done in cleverly disguised form. The

⁴⁰Duncan, pp. 345-50.

first person, the one who makes the joke or perceives the idea, attacks the second person, the butt of the joke. . . . In order to test whether the work of disguising the aggressive tendency was successful, the first person has to tell his witticism to a third person. The one who has conceived the joke cannot himself laugh because he is too close to the original aggression and the feeling of guilt about it. The third person, to whom the witticism is told is only a listener and judges only the disguise of the underlying aggression. When the third person to whom the joke is told, reacts with laughter, the first person who had originally conceived the witticism, may join him in the laughter with relief: the disguise has succeeded. Hostile jokes lift repressions and open up otherwise inaccessible sources of pleasure. [but especially it opens internal and external communication].⁴¹

The foregoing discussion indicates that generally persuasion is effected during the labeling stage. The persuader's strategy is to induce the receiver to label the proposition in a manner he can respond to favorably. After labeling almost nothing short of force would change the direction of the ensuing result of the persuasive effort. The tactic of force would achieve forced compliance rather than persuasion. Persuasion has been defined in this study not merely as outward action in accordance with the proposition, but as also an inner mediational response of acceptance (self-persuasion). If enough is known about both the audience and the persuasive message, the critic can infer the probability of self-persuasion taking place.

By anticipating the factors of psychological perception discussed here and by use of word symbols carefully chosen to convey motivational

⁴¹Grotjahn, p. 35.

concepts well-selected in respect to the audience, the rhetor is likely to secure favorable labeling of propositions toward which the receivers might initially have been unfavorably disposed. This approach also supposes a gradual lead into a controversial⁴² proposition rather than blatantly announcing it early in the message. A generally loose structuring of the message and generation of strong ethos also aid favorable acceptance of a controversial proposition.⁴³

Although what has been developed here is a "labeling theory" of persuasion, it in no way implies a return to sophism. To use word choices and examples the audience can understand and show logical connections between these and the proposition should require a finding of true unities between these components. If the audience is critical, it will demand realistic connections between motivational concepts and the proposition. This means that verifiable evidence of connection as well as seeming connection through favorable symbol usage should be offered (this distinction is discussed in Chapter III in reference to an address by Robert Ingersoll).

In the next chapter the process of associational conditioning will be defined and explored in greater depth. Aspects of conditioning to be given particular attention are the nature and function of motivational concepts. Additional factors of learning theory which significantly affect persuasive conditioning will also be detailed.

⁴²Controversial is defined here as an issue on which many of the audience are likely to disagree initially with the rhetor's proposition.

⁴³Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 172 and p. 187.

Chapter IV amplifies that which is a major instrument for the development of motivational concepts and is the major instrument for conveying them. The chapter is an in-depth exploration of verbal symbols as they are used to show the linkage between motivational concepts and the proposition.

Chapter V is concerned with miscellaneous factors of social interaction which may hinder or facilitate the persuasive process. Chief of these factors is social mystification which is often used to promote privileges for certain social groups while withholding them from others. Techniques to counter these social 'mystifications' are frequently used in either individual discourses or in massive campaigns concerned with winning greater social or political power for a given group. The development of or the countering of "mystifications" constitutes a special case of developing or countering motivational concepts. Hence, Chapter V, like Chapter IV, is chiefly an expansion of a major topic developed in Chapters II and III, which contain the heart of the theory.

CHAPTER III

A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL PERSUASION WITH ASSOCIATIONAL CONDITIONING THE CHIEF STRATEGY

The previous chapter contained a generalized discussion of the overall theory of successful persuasion upon which is based the new critical theory presented in this dissertation. This chapter amplifies the associational conditioning process, which outlines the basic strategy to be employed by the rhetor. Associational conditioning is proffered as being equivalent to Burke's concept of identification, but as a more precise explication of the mechanics involved in identifying major message appeals with the persuasive proposition.

Hence, identification and related Burkeian concepts are explicated in the early part of the chapter; then, a merger of identification with associational conditioning is effected. There is also discussion of related factors of learning theory which facilitate the conditioning process. Motivational concepts are the specific elements to be conditioned to the proposition, hence, much of the discussion of conditioning centers upon these concepts. Exemplification of adequate or inadequate use of motivational concepts is explored in selected speech examples. In the latter part of the chapter there is also explication of the special types of motivational concepts utilized in mass campaigns. Miscellaneous considerations in carrying out long-range

campaigns are also discussed as these considerations have a bearing on how the total message of the campaign, especially the lines of conditioning upon which the campaign is built, are likely to be perceived.

It is common in persuasion textbooks to speak of the efficacy of establishing common ground between the persuader and his audience. For instance, the persuader is advised to demonstrate that some features of his background, or experience, or certain of his values or beliefs are similar to those of his receivers. Through these types of common ground the persuader will enhance his ethos, thus increasing audience receptivity in listening to the persuader's arguments leading to his proposition.¹ Some writers of persuasion texts explore the concept of common ground in a further direction. They suggest that the persuader can do the best job of winning acceptance for his proposition if it can be connected with felt needs or prior beliefs of the audience.² In this latter sense, common ground is closely related to the development of topoi (lines of argument) as discussed by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, although the discussion of motives providing common ground is greatly extended in modern persuasion writings.

Currently there is much interest in Kenneth Burke's concept of identification, but the author's observation has been that much of the discussion regarding Burke's concept is carried on by people who

¹Winston Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952), pp. 174-75.

²Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1942), pp. 255-87; James A. Winans, Public Speaking (New York: Century Co., 1922), pp. 260-64.

have not read his works. They try to infer the meaning of Burkeian Identification from their understanding of what the term identification signifies in general usage. These discussants generally infer that identification is equivalent to common ground in one or both of the senses just discussed. Burke's concept of identification does include both of these factors, but goes beyond them, as it is the core concept in his overall theory of persuasion.³

Since there is currently much interest in Burke, along with a lack of accurate knowledge of his thought, his basic view of identification will be discussed briefly. There is an additional reason for this discussion. Some of Burke's other persuasion concepts as stated by him or as restated by Hugh Duncan are cited elsewhere in this dissertation. These additional concepts will be clear if one understands his view of identification. The survey of rhetorical theorists' views on common ground or identification is included because the main subject of this chapter, associational conditioning, can be thought of as persuasion through a psychological identification process. This process is activated by motivational concepts conveyed through verbal symbols and is completed as engram connections are made in the brain. Associational conditioning is the core of the persuasion theory presented in this dissertation just as identification is the core of Burke's persuasion theory. Indeed Burke's discussion of the various facets of identification is consistent with the conditioning theory presented here.

³Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 521-23.

Both Burke and his chief restater, Hugh Duncan, make perceptive generalizations regarding identification, but they do not follow through by discussing the specific mechanics of identification as they facilitate persuasion within receivers. The discussion later in this chapter regarding associational conditioning provides such an understanding of the specific mechanics involved.

Before defining Burkeian identification, one needs to consider Burke's definition of rhetoric and to understand how he interrelates rhetoric and identification.

It [rhetoric] is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew, the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.⁴

The purpose of rhetoric is to induce the degree of cooperation among individuals enabling them to act together. The manner of inducing cooperation is to show the individuals concerned ways in which they already identify in common.⁵ One specifically accomplishes this by demonstrating to individuals that they share properties such as common experiences, values or attitudes. Common experiences are the sources of the most meaningful level of identification. Since values and attitudes have much to do with determining action in concrete situations, commonality in regard to either of these indicates a potential for common experiences. Hence, commonality in respect to value or attitude

⁴ ibid., p. 567.

⁵ ibid., p. 544-45.

provides for a satisfactory though weaker level of identification.⁶

Stated a bit differently, rhetoric is the inducing of oneness and cooperation by proclaiming that some level of identification already exists. Identification and its opposite, division, actually occur together.

For one need not scrutinize the concept of identification very sharply to see implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart, division.⁷

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.⁸

An excellent example of Burke's analysis is provided in the following excerpt from a sermon by William Temple, former Archbishop of Canterbury.

Let us never forget that though the purpose of our meeting is to consider the causes of our divisions, yet what makes possible our meeting is our unity. We could not seek union if we did not already possess unity. Those who have nothing in common do not deplore their estrangement. It is because we are one in allegiance to one Lord that we seek and hope for the way of manifesting that unity in our witness to Him before the world.⁹

Sometimes in a rhetorical event division against one person or group is deliberately induced in order to achieve identification among all those except the individual or group being excluded,¹⁰ (See in

⁶ Ibid., pp. 547-48.

⁷ Ibid., p. 547.

⁸ Ibid., p. 546.

⁹ William Temple, Religious Experience and other Essays (London: James Clarke, 1958), p. 157.

¹⁰ Burke, p. 569.

Chapter IV discussion of a scapegoat role for businessmen in Roosevelt's First Inaugural as exemplification of this phenomenon.)

Burke states that the "old rhetoric" utilized the concept of identification mainly in terms of lines of argument which had common appeal for audiences. The "old rhetoric" also gave some concern to stylistic phrasing which would bring these topoi most clearly in line with audience predispositions regarding the subject under question.¹¹ Burke has no quarrel with these particular uses of identification, but he feels the concept should be broadened and extended in a number of areas.

Our treatment in terms of identification is decidedly not meant as a substitute for the sound traditional approach. Rather as we try to show, it is but an accessory to the standard lore.¹²

Burke uses the term identification in three distinct though inter-related capacities.

Regarding the first capacity, identification is the generating principle of tactics to achieve persuasion. The number of specific identification tactics available to the rhetor is countless. Delineating factors of a given situation will make the choice of certain modes of identification more appropriate than others. Burke has grouped identification tactics into three general categories. The first of these is used to seek an uncritical identification. The rhetor presents a line of identification supposedly as fact, but in a manner which discourages interpretation. The example Burke gives is that of

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 580-81.

¹² Ibid., p. 522.

implying that a person with a particular uniform is a qualified representative of that occupation. The second category is concerned with analogical associations between various fields; this category allows for interpretation as well as mere statement of fact. For example, a university administrator facing students hostile to an acceptance of his authority might point out ways in which they accept the principle of authority in fraternities, sororities, and athletic teams. The third category is concerned with identifications between concepts in terms of a similar ideological principle; this third level allows for evaluation as well as presenting fact and interpretation.¹³ An example is a major argument used in the Nineteenth Century by promoters of American imperialism. They reminded their audience that the expansion of America's western frontier had been good for the nation. To this premise they added a stated interpretation that imperialist expansion in the Pacific and in the Caribbean was merely a special case of western expansion.

Within the completed process of persuasion, two additional facets of identification are operative. One of these is known to rhetoricians as a part of audience analysis. It is known to social scientists as role-taking. The successful persuader must identify with (internalize) his audience to gauge how they might react to various persuasive tactics and phrasings of them that he considers using.¹⁴ Finally

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 658-59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 560-61.

Burke discusses self-identification (self-persuasion) as it pertains to the receiver of the persuasive discourse:

To act upon himself persuasively, he must resort to images and ideas that are formative. If he does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetoricians have told him, his persuasion is not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within.¹⁵

It might be helpful to define self-identification or self-persuasion in this manner: the receiver must perceive on his own the conclusion of the chain of reasoning set forth in the speech. If the receiver cannot see for himself the conclusion which equals the rhetorical proposition preceding from the argumentative strategy, he is not persuaded.

A merger is made in the next section of this chapter of Burke's three facets of identification: generating principle of persuasive tactics, role-taking, and self-persuasion, with a model of the persuasive process developed by Gary Cronkhite. Cronkhite's persuasion model is consistent with Burke's conception of identification. In addition, Cronkhite delineates more concretely than Burke the view of persuasion as an identification process. A close study of Burke yields theoretical perceptions fitting Cronkhite's model, but which were not actually realized in it. The merger of these two viewpoints yields helpful insights to guide the analysis and evaluation of rhetorical efforts.

Cronkhite defines the persuasion process as one of identification:

A persuasive communication can on a simplified level be viewed as an attempt to induce the

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 563.

audience to perceive a relationship between two concepts in order that audience attitudes toward the one will transfer to the other.¹⁶

Cronkhite defines the two types of concepts and amplifies the process of interrelating them:

One of these concepts is one toward which the audience has not formed attitudes, or if formed, attitudes which the speaker considers capable of being altered. In deliberative speaking this concept is the plan of action proposed by the speaker; in forensic speaking it is the conviction or acquittal of the defendant; in epideictic speaking it is the person or thing praised or blamed. We shall refer to this concept, as the "object concept," in that it is the object toward which persuasion is directed.

The other of the two concepts is one toward which the audience has preformed attitudes which the speaker expects to remain relatively stable. This concept may be viewed as a goal to be achieved or avoided, and, thus, it has motivational properties which are either inherent or acquired through its relationships with concepts which do have motivational properties. We will refer to this concept as the "motivational."¹⁷

In short, the speaker induces the audience to cooperate in accepting or carrying out his proposition by associating it with beliefs, attitudes, needs, or courses of action which the audience already adheres to. These motivational concepts are entities toward which the audience has previously established emotional feelings of approach or avoidance. The perceived connections between these motivational concepts and the rhetorical proposition are the logical

¹⁶Gary Lynn Cronkhite, "Logic, Emotion, and the Paradigm of Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1 (February, 1964), 15.

¹⁷Ibid.

proofs of the discourse.¹⁸ Cronkhite underscores that there are an infinite number of possible motivational concepts (sources of identification) available to the rhetor.¹⁹

In discussing the relationship between the proposition or object concept and the motivational concepts, Cronkhite makes an additional observation, defining the persuasive process as one of associational conditioning. Following this line of thought, he holds that it is justifiable for rhetoricians to utilize principles from learning theory to supplement their notions regarding the persuasive process.

Motivational concepts are unconditioned stimuli which automatically call forth a predictable response in auditors of a rhetorical message. The rhetor seeks to connect these so strongly with his proposition that auditors will be conditioned to make a similar response to the proposition as they make to the motivational concepts. Generally the closer the identification between the two concepts the greater will be the similarity of response to the two orders of concepts—motivational and object.²⁰

Cronkhite adds that several factors which facilitate learning intervene to determine how close a connection will be made (in the mind of the receiver) between previous action toward the motivational concept and possible action toward the conditioning stimuli, the rhetorical proposition. The strength of the intervening learning factors will determine the potential strength of commitment that receivers could develop toward the rhetor's proposition.²¹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The intervening factors likely to have an effect are motivation, generalization, contiguity, reinforcement, and summation.²² Each of these terms will be defined formally. Relating these learning factors to the persuasive situation, motivation refers to the audience's interest in the rhetorical topic. Generalization refers to the degree of analogous connection between the motivational concept(s) and the rhetorical proposition. Contiguity refers to the degree of temporal relation of the motivational concept(s) to the rhetorical proposition. Reinforcement refers to the connection of rewards with the acting out of the rhetorical proposition. Sometimes it also involves the connection of punishment with behavior which is the obverse of the proposition; these are, however, more properly termed extinctions. Summation refers to repetition of the main lines of argument connecting motivational concepts to the proposition.

Operational definitions of the learning factors are presented by discussing a speech concerned with the problem of stuttering. The speaker's proposition was -- "There are things you as a listener can do to help people avoid becoming stutterers or to aid rather than hinder them, if they already have this problem." Audience motivation to attend to this message was high since the audience were portrayed as a potential cause and a potential solution to the problem.

There were two main lines of reinforcement in the speech. The one chiefly stressed was a feeling of satisfaction if one succeeds in

²²Dennis G. Day, "Learning and Communication Theory," Central States Speech Journal, XV (May, 1964), 86-87; David Berlo, The Process of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 84-92.

helping the stutterer. The reinforcement stressed secondarily was that one would not want to be responsible for helping to create a stutterer or helping to make the stutterer's problem worse. Generalization of the cause of the problem was begun by giving a detailed example of a store clerk who was very rude to two customers who were stutterers. Since listeners were urged to avoid being a cause of the problem, the causes were the major motivational concepts of the speech. Summation (repetition of the main line of argument) was provided by making this statement at the conclusion of the detailed example.

I'm sure that none of us here has or ever will treat a stutterer in such a rude and callous manner. Nevertheless through ignorance we might help to cause or worsen a condition of stuttering unless we remember as a listening relative, friend, teacher, or business associate these suggestions: (1) Don't become anxious or scolding about a child's difficulty with a few words or letters from time to time. (2) Don't try to help an adult stutterer with words. (3) Look directly at the stutterer and try to show no anxiety about his grapple for words. (4) Don't in any other way call attention to the stutterer's condition.²³

Contiguity (temporal connection) was satisfactory in that the college students in the audience either were fulfilling some of the listening roles discussed already or soon would be.

As a result of the foregoing discussion of associational conditioning, a number of suggested points for rhetorical analysis and evaluation emerge.

1. Internalizing the audience. Did the rhetor fail to internalize the audience in any respects pertinent to the situation, such

²³Dana Duncan, "You and the Stutterer," (presented in a University of Florida Speech Class), December, 1967.

as, social-economic, political, ethical, or pragmatic orientations.

II. Motivation and the Rhetorical proposition. (A) Did the rhetor speak to a felt need of the audience? (B) Did he at least succeed in making it a felt need in the course of his speech? (C) Was the specific proposition (object concept) clarified and consistently adhered to in the message? (D) Did the proposition call for a response which could be carried out by those in the audience, and/or were serious barriers to audience action minimized?

III. Factors of Habit-Strength Necessary to Successful Conditioning. (A) Reinforcement: were the rewards of following the proposition well-established and appealing? (B) If appropriate, were punishments of continuing behavior contrary to the proposition strongly stressed and logically connected with the obverse of the proposition? (C) Generalization and contiguity: was the probability of analogical connection (considering both appropriateness and time-relatedness) between the proposition and the key motivational concepts sufficiently established? (D) Were sufficient amplification and appropriate language choices used to heighten probability and strength of these analogical connections? (E) Summation: was conditioning established through several examples conveying a similar line of identification? (Particularly if each example had a better appeal than others for certain audience segments.) (F) Were summary, repetition, and parallel structures used to integrate effectively the several examples pointing to the desired association with the rhetorical proposition?

A short speech will be analyzed and evaluated in terms of the above analytical-evaluative points to enable a fuller understanding of them.

The speech to be assessed was presented by a student of public speaking at the University of Florida, in October, 1966. A verbatim copy of the speech is not available. What is reproduced here is a faithful representation of the organization, argumentative strategy, and major forms of supporting material. What is missing are a few of the amplifying details, and the accurate, complete symbolization itself.²⁴ The text reproduced here is adequate to the purpose of making a generalized analysis and evaluation in terms of the aspects of conditioning discussed in this chapter. If the concerns to be discussed in Chapter IV regarding symbol manipulations were to be added, a word for word manuscript would be required.

This particular speech was selected for several reasons. It is desirable to test and to illustrate the "new criticism" with samples given by rhetors speaking under varying circumstances to divergent persuasive purposes. The speech also illustrates certain persuasive problems which are well-diagnosed with reference to the criteria discussed in this chapter.

Finally remedies to the major strategic weaknesses can be seen by considering passages from an address by Robert Ingersoll supporting the same proposition. The student speech, dealing with the issue of dependence on religion, was delivered to a class of twenty-two beginning public speaking students. Three members of the class were Roman Catholic, about one-third were of Jewish background and the remainder were Protestant.

²⁴The researcher was the instructor for this course and heard the entire speech. Students in this class reacted with verbal comments and assessments on the day the speech was given. Two subsequent classes evaluated the speech in terms of the partial manuscript presented here as a part of their midterm exam.

Currently our society is experiencing a decline in religious values. I can cite a number of examples to show that people are less concerned with religion than they were a few years ago.

For instance, in the last ten years the total percentage of the population which are church members has declined five percent.

Also a national survey has shown that people currently read the Bible only about half as much as they did 20 years ago. Another finding of the same survey has shown that 40 percent of those interviewed could not name the authors of the four gospels.

Another instance of this religious decline is the fact that the Catholic Church is changing some of its ritual, particularly the use of Latin, and is also changing some of its views on birth control.

A final proof of the decline is the development of a radical movement in theology called the "God is dead" Theology.

In large part scientific and philosophical developments explain this decline in religious values which our society is experiencing. For instance, religious values began to decline somewhat a hundred years ago after Darwin's theory of evolution was elaborated. Herbert Spencer's "social Darwinism" also had a negative effect. Further astronomical and geological theories added their negative effect. In addition there was the pragmatist philosophy of James and Dewey, and last but not least the psychological theory of Freud.

In addition, the lack of closeness of American families and the lack of religious instruction in the public schools are causes.

I guess in the future we will have to depend on ourselves instead of on spiritual values.

The proposition of this speech is -- "In the future depend on yourselves, not on religion." The term religion was never defined, and concrete areas in which one might apply self-dependence were never discussed. The end result was that the proposition was too hazy and generalized to channel effective audience energy in any direction, yet the audience had given the appearance of strong

interest when the speaker announced his topic.²⁵

The type of personal decision and application called for in the proposition was of a nature that the audience would have been capable of producing. However, it would have been a response involving an act of will over a long period of time. This means that the rewards of depending on one's self would have to have been portrayed as appealing and highly probable results on this course of action. A stressing of punishments (negative or unpleasant effects) resulting from continued dependence on religion would also have been helpful to the most persuasive case.

But the speaker failed to develop either the punishments of depending on religion or the rewards of depending on one's self.

The speaker's main line of argument was to state in several different ways that people were already dependent on themselves rather than on religion. He did not give his listeners reasons why they ought to have accepted this condition. He gave no reinforcement for following the prescribed behavior, yet the view of persuasion as a form of learning indicates that reinforcement is a crucial phase of the persuasion process.

In addition, when the speaker summarized his proposition at the conclusion of the speech he seemed ambivalent. One wondered if he agreed with this course of action himself or had after accepting it as fact, stoically concluded that what is must be best.

The speaker's contention that a lack of dependence on religion is the current condition was not established in a convincing manner. The audience indicated that they considered only the discussion of the

²⁵In addition psychological studies of youth show that an important part of their search for identity is an exploration of what they will think and do regarding religion. See especially C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1958), pp. 58-70.

"God is dead" theology as strong proof of this contention. They felt that changes in the Catholic Church have little or no connection with the decline of dependence on religion. The item regarding a changed Catholic position on birth control was not even factually true. The statistics on the decline of church attendance and on decreased reading of the Bible were considered as partially establishing the contention. Most listeners did not feel that these institutional aspects equaled the whole of religiosity or of religious dependence. The statement regarding knowledge of the gospel writers indicated that in the speaker's mind religion was to be equated with Christianity and especially with Protestantism. This expressed line of thought and the inference stated regarding changes in the Catholic Church were tactless towards those of Jewish or Catholic background, indicating a poor internalization of these respective groups.

Many of the points covered in the analysis and evaluation of the preceding speech would have been included in a more traditionally-oriented piece of criticism. Undoubtedly, a traditional critic would have noted that the proposition was vague, that important terms were undefined, and that there were problems in establishing the probability of the contention regarding an already established lack of dependence on religion. The traditional critic would have added that the total speech was unmotivating and lacked adequate supporting material. But the traditional critic probably would have stopped short of specifying that the precise material needed was the establishment of reinforcement which would condition auditors toward acting out the rhetorical proposition. This, after all, was the critical flaw of the speech. Moreover, the use of learning theory terminology provides for a precise, and well

structured analysis, and learning concepts provide authoritative criteria for the assessments made.

The main line of argument in the foregoing speech was -- "Accept a lack of dependence on religion because this situation already is established fact." Unless the audience were driven by the desire for conformity for conformity's sake, this line of reasoning contained no motivational concept at all.

Every so often the critic will encounter a persuasive message which is really not associated with any motivational concepts. This situation is especially likely to occur in speeches concerned with upholding a tradition such as, orthodox religion, conventional sexual morality, patriotism, or the authority of institutional leaders.

For instance in May, 1968, a member of the state of Florida Board of Regents attempted to defend the proposition, "Final authority for decisions is given to the Board of Regents regarding all matters of policy referred to this body." Excerpts are cited from a written report of the address in order that its lack of motivational concepts can be discussed.

The purpose of the speech, as announced in the public notices was that of explaining how the Board of Regents worked, its administrative relationship to the University of Florida and the State Board of Education, and its role in the educational system. . . .

The students came to discuss issues, especially compulsory ROTC; several statements made by some of the students indicated that they mistrusted authority in general. One forecast a wave of student revolt if demands were not met. . . . The students seemed to have difficulty understanding (the speakers) lines of reasoning, perhaps because of their lack of acquaintance with an administrative situation.

The speaker's main point . . . might be paraphrased as follows: in the educational structure as it now stands, the Board of Regents is given the authority for final decisions on all matters of policy referred to it. It reaches its decisions only after due deliberation and consideration of all the evidence. Authority must rest somewhere (this statement which so antagonized the students must be to a lawyer an everyday working principle) -- that is someone must hold the responsibility for making a final decision, otherwise there can be no organized execution of any plan.

Parts of these arguments especially his repeated use of the word authority seemed to antagonize the attitudes of the students, and to increase the "semantic noise" resulting from the difference in background and position between the speaker and the students.

The speaker's arguments were largely ineffective in influencing the students to whom he spoke, due in a large part to their prejudice and his position of authority. He exacerbated this situation by talking in legalistic terms and by using such a term as authority which has bad connotations for some of the students.²⁶

This speech can be characterized as one in which the main supports for the proposition seemed to be restatements of the proposition and formal definitions of the term authority. The persuasion model developed in this chapter points to the conclusion that restatements of the proposition and formal definitions of its chief terms are weak proofs which cannot carry the burden of argument. Neither of these types of proof provide concrete, detailed motivational concepts which make associational conditioning and, hence, persuasion possible. Moreover, since the audience is yet to be persuaded to accept the

²⁶ Douglas Wing, "Report of a Persuasive Speech," (unpublished speech critique, May, 1968), pp. 1-4.

proposition, proofs derivative of it could not be motivational concepts already accepted by the audience.

The regent should have presented either operational definitions of authority already accepted by the audience or analogies relating to authorities acceptable to students in other situations. Then his speech would have been based on definite motivational concepts accepted by the audience, plausibly related to his proposition, and orienting the audience toward the area of action called for in the proposition.

The main arguments of religious speakers frequently lack connections with true motivational concepts. For instance, the evangelist may argue "Believe in Christianity because it is true" or "Believe in Christianity because you ought to believe it" or "Believe in Christianity because God commands you to believe." All three of these are cases of using as an argument, a definition of a key propositional term, citing an attribute of the proposition in the view of the believer. Instead the evangelist should use an idea having audience acceptance that can be related convincingly to the proposition. The even more frequent argument "Believe in Christianity because the Bible says such and such," is a similar example of circular reasoning. A non-believer in Christianity normally does not accept the Bible or any of its parts as a motivational concept. The Bible can only be used as a motivational concept for persons who believe in some critical aspects of Christianity to persuade them to accept additional beliefs or modify forms of behavior.

Several examples have been presented of messages lacking reinforcement to induce auditors to act out the persuader's proposition because

motivational concepts were absent or very weak. In a lecture titled "The Truth" Robert Ingersoll dealt with a proposition equivalent to the one advocated in the student speech discussed earlier. There are some significant flaws in Ingersoll's persuasive case, but he develops more definite motivational concepts to reinforce his proposition than the student speaker did. For that reason it should be helpful to make a brief analysis and assessment of Ingersoll's address. Only the aspects of reinforcement and extinction will be discussed in a detailed manner.

The following is the proposition of Ingersoll's speech "The Truth."

Man will find that nature is the only revelation and that he, by his own efforts, must learn to read the stories told by star and cloud, by rock and soil, by sea and stream, by rain and fire, by plant and flower, by life in all its various forms, and all the things and forces of the world. When he reads these stories, these records, he will know that man must rely on himself -- that the supernatural does not exist and that man must be the province of man.²⁷

Ingersoll conceives of the rewards of eschewing dependency on religion as broad and universal. He also states that the desired action is necessary to human progress, and equates this action with free thought, free will, and free action -- the most prized values of an Anglo-Saxon culture.

By these means man will overcome many of the obstructions of nature. He will cure or avoid many diseases. He will lessen pain. He will

²⁷C. P. Farrell, ed., *Ingersoll's Works*, (New York: Ingersoll Publishers Inc., 1900), Vol. IV, p. 79.

lengthen, enoble and enrich life. In every direction he will increase his power. He will satisfy his wants, gratify his tastes. He will put roof and raiment, food and fuel, home and happiness within the reach of all. He will destroy the serpents of fear, the monsters of superstition. He will become intelligent, and free, honest and serene . . . human beings will have each other instead of gods, men will do right not for the sake of reward in some other world, but for the sake of happiness here.²⁸

Toward the end of this passage Ingersoll has begun to list some of the punishments of the obverse of his proposition. These are further discussed by contrasting them with the rewards of self-dependency of thought and action.

It does not ask man to cringe or crawl. It does not desire the worship of the ignorant or the progress and praises of the frightened. It says to every human being, Think for yourself, enjoy the freedom of a god and have the goodness and courage to express your honest thought.²⁹

Contrast is used again in the next passage.

Superstition is the serpent that crawls and hisses in every Eden and fastens its poisonous fangs in the hearts of men. It is the deadliest foe of the human race. Superstition is a beggar -- robber, a tyrant. Science is a benefactor. Superstition sheds blood. Science sheds light.³⁰

Reward-punishment identifications of this type are developed abundantly throughout the speech. These identifications with freedom are motivational concepts which would have strong appeal with a general American audience of any time period. A close inspection reveals however, that these motivational concepts have little or no substantive content. In essence they are little more than a series of

²⁸ *Ibid.* , . . . ²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

positive and negative name-callings. A major contention in Chapter IV is that stylistic phrasings in themselves become a part of rhetorical proof. Nevertheless, while the most excellent speakers choose their words carefully to add support to their ideas, they offer objectively verifiable evidence. Ingersoll offers this level of proof less often than he could. It is clear what types of evidence he should provide in greater abundance from the few that he does produce. For instance, in one place he cites persecution, war, and suppression of scientific inquiry as bad results of the status quo.³¹ But he does not detail these or even name specific incidents in these categories. Neither does he establish that they are recent events or that they are a result of religious dependence per se rather than a narrow-minded application of it. (These are examples of failure to establish strong motivational probability with respect to the factors of contiguity and generalization.)

One passage which supports Ingersoll's line of thought quite well is a melange of specific statements from the Bible with interpretations by Ingersoll in ironic placement with the statements.

It [the church] claims to have preached peace because its founder said, "I came not to bring peace but a sword."

It claims to have preserved the family because its founder offered a hundred-fold here and life everlasting to those who would desert wife and children.

So it claims to have taught the brotherhood of man and that the gospel is for all the world because Christ said to the woman of Samaria that he came only to the lost sheep of the house of

³¹ Ibid., pp. 93-94.

Israel, and declared that it was not meet to take the bread of children and cast it unto dogs.

In the name of Christ, who threatened eternal revenge, it has preached forgiveness.³²

Further evidences of this nature might have been offered in the speech to provide summation.

Ingersoll did a much better job than the student speaker because he provided reinforcement for the desired response to the proposition at the same time inducing extinction of behavior contrary to the desired response. Ingersoll failed to do an excellent job with this proposition because in most instances reinforcement and extinction were supported with insufficient evidence. There was, moreover, insufficient detailing of the evidences that were presented. Also there was an over-dependence on name-calling of an exaggerated quality. This flaw is likely to have weakened the speaker's overall credibility with a number of his listeners.

The theoretical model of persuasion developed in Chapter 4 and expanded in this one has been discussed primarily in reference to one persuader and his face-to-face audience. The conditioning principles developed would apply also to mass campaigns. However, in the expanded setting of the mass campaign; slogans, images of leaders, associations of the group being promoted with other societal groups, as well as a generalized ideology are the usual motivational concepts. In a campaign or movement for social reform, motivational concepts of this nature are used to induce favorable acceptance of the proposition -- "Grant group x

³² Ibid., pp. 96-97.

greater equality or privilege in such and such an area." In a presidential campaign some of the major motivational concepts are features of the party platform, campaign slogans, endorsements by famous personalities, and by major interest groups, endorsements by major news media, campaign promises of the candidate, and the general personality image conveyed by the candidate and by his family and associates. These concepts are associated with the proposition -- "Vote for candidate x." Factors which could distort the total campaign message or at least obscure major lines of conditioning are considered here.

The mass campaign would be complicated with multiple communication channels and with multiple audiences which frequently do not meet the persuader face-to-face. The critic would have to consider at least a two-step persuasion channel any time that messages are conveyed through the mass media such as radio, television, or newspapers. The reason is that people are not generally influenced directly by messages conveyed through the mass media. Individuals the receiver knows personally and respects at least in regard to knowledge of the topic being considered must state opinions similar to those conveyed through a mass communication channel, before the receiver will be significantly influenced. These influencing individuals are known as "opinion leaders."³³ Frequently, the critic of mass campaigns will be concerned with the question -- Did the persuader frame his discourses adequately considering the factor of the intermediate "opinion leaders" on the mass media audience?

³³Berio, pp. 25-35.

Generally in mass campaigns the first step is to win over an audience, such as, community guardians (perhaps labor or business leaders, or politicians) so that in turn they will function as "opinion leaders" to their general publics (members). Mass media messages in that case probably should be geared to these leaders more than to the general public. Draft protests, on the other hand, are geared to winning members of the general public as "opinion leaders" so the public will pressure the community guardians for change.

If a persuasive message is conveyed through several media it is likely to become altered or distorted in the process. The alteration could work either to the rhetor's advantage or disadvantage. For instance, Richard Rovere in his biography of Senator Joseph McCarthy explains how McCarthy retained a suitable ethos with the general public. McCarthy seemed rational to the public because the synopses of his speeches reported in newspapers appeared more coherent in structure and less irrational in content than his original messages.³⁴

On the other hand, several speech critics conclude that the excerpts quoted from Stokely Carmichael's speeches have made him appear to be a fanatic; whereas, he does not convey that impression to those who have heard the complete addresses.³⁵

³⁴Richard Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 136-38.

³⁵Pat Jefferson, "The Magnificent Barbarian at Nashville," Southern Speech Journal, XXXIII (Winter, 1967), 77-87; Elizabeth Flory Phifer, "Carmichael in Tallahassee," Southern Speech Journal, XXXIII (Winter, 1967), 88-90.

In addition to looking for possible alterations in persuasive messages because of conveyance through more than one media, the critic should try to ascertain whether or not the rhetor consciously provided for or utilized such changes.

For instance, Samuel Adams, the great agitator of the American revolution, had his addresses for state occasions published as pamphlets. Knowing they would reach the greatest number of people in this form, he molded the discourses to the printed rather than the spoken medium. In addition Adams wrote a number of speeches for others and was vague about the authorship of some of his printed messages. The apparent reason for these actions was that greater persuasive impact would be achieved by making it appear that the same message was being promoted by a number of different people.³⁶

It is hoped that the discussion of motivational concepts adapted to mass campaigns, and conveyed to multiple audiences through multiple communication channels will be helpful. Several additional features of mass campaigns should be considered by the critic who is going to deal with this form of persuasive event. These features do not relate directly to the subject of this chapter, the conditioning process. However, if the critic does not understand these features, he is likely to frame inappropriate criteria in assessing both the overall goals of the campaign and in assessing the motivational concepts and lines of conditioning used to achieve these goals.

³⁶Valerie Schneider, "Samuel Adams: One Who Made a Revolution," (unpublished seminar paper, June, 1967), pp. 3-9.

The critic should take into account the fact that rhetorical campaigns which are part of a mass movement pass through several stages, generally three in number. The first stage normally is concerned with getting attention for the issue being disputed and recruiting members to the cause. During the first stage, the protest generated is quite radical as are most of the people who join the movement. Later more moderate people are recruited, and they gradually succeed in taking over leadership. In the third stage the movement frequently is transformed into an institutionalized group headed by capable administrators.³⁷

If the critic realizes the nature and cumulative effect of these movement stages, he can better gauge within each stage whether or not the best available means of persuasion were used. He can also judge whether or not the soundest persuasive goals were sought.

It would also be helpful for the critic to realize that a mass campaign has two predominant functions -- strengthening membership (group maintenance) and specific task accomplishment. For instance, the task might concern getting a referendum questioning United States involvement in Vietnam on the ballot. Or the task might be persuading citizens, political representatives, and civic leaders to use their influence to get an open housing law passed. The critic would want to judge whether or not the amount of rhetoric devoted to each of these functions (membership and task accomplishment) was proportional to how much each should have been stressed under the given circumstances.

³⁷Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: New American Library, 1951), pp. 119-25; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 148-73; Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America (New York: Borzpi Books, 1965), pp. 38-39.

Before this chapter is concluded a postscript regarding motivational concepts should be added. There has been no attempt to list specific motivational concepts and rank them hierarchically according to their persuasive efficacy, although this is the approach taken in many theoretical works on persuasion. The discussion of associational conditioning and related factors of learning psychology as well as observations on the role of perception in persuasive endeavors gives a general map of persuasive motivation. The viewpoint permeating this study is that the theorist need not, indeed cannot go further than such a general map. In a given situation the nature of the audience and the rhetorical proposition determine what possible motivational concepts can be used and the relative efficacy of each possible one. It is the job of the persuader or critic after thorough audience analysis to determine what specific motivational appeals are best. However, a few general judgments regarding types of motivational concepts have been made. It was explained that restatements of the rhetorical proposition and formal definitions of terms of the proposition are weak proofs (They really are only clarifying devices) which cannot carry the main burden of argument in a speech. In Chapter V transcendent principles will be discussed; motivational concepts derived from the transcendent principle of the group being addressed are generally the strongest ones available.

Motivational concepts based on physical force as well as those based on non-physical coercive appeal generally do not lead to persuasion as conceived in this study. Persuasion is presented here as a learning of new attitudes and new actions (derived from the attitudes) toward a given proposition. Force or coercive appeals often lead in a given

instance to outward compliance to the action called for in the proposition. The response of those forced to comply represents conditioning to the applied force or to the threat; it is not a conditioning toward the proposition itself. The test of whether true persuasion has taken place is this: If the receiver will continue over a period of time without reinforcement or interference from anyone the area of behavior called for in the proposition in a variety of applicable situations, he has truly been persuaded.

If an individual conforms to the desired action of the persuader because a gun is being held over him, his response represents conditioning to the motivational concept, preservation of life. The latter concept is not in turn conditioned to the proposition as it would be in an instance of true persuasion. For instance, if Vietnamese villagers in the pacification program are forced at gun point to aid the South Vietnamese war effort and to accept ideological statements favorable to the regime of Thieu and Khe, their response indicates conditioning to the stimuli of self-preservation. They are not also being conditioned to really believe in the actions they must perform or in the statements they must agree with. It is unlikely that most of the villagers will continue these actions after American troops leave. In the case just cited the motivational concept is connected with getting the desired action, but it is not in turn connected with the proposition. The conditions for a suitable motivational concept are not only that it possess the desired action-orientation, and be previously accepted by the audience, but also that it be capable of a logical, intrinsic connection with the proposition. This third component is what generally

is missing in the use of coercive motivational appeals. In effect, conditioning with coercive appeals leads to this labeling of the situation -- "In this instance perform the desired action or else." In a true example of persuasion the labeling would be -- "Perform the desired action now and henceforth because the action makes sense."

A hypothetical situation involving non-physical coercion is discussed to clarify further the distinction between compliance and persuasion. A group of young people who have attitudes neutral or favorable regarding the use of marijuana are presented by society with the proposition, "Do not use marijuana." The main motivational concept supporting this proposition is a law threatening severe penalties to anyone convicted of using marijuana. Most individuals in this group will comply with the law because they are conditioned to motivational concepts such as concern for social approval, fear of jail sentences, or of paying heavy fines, or even reverence for law. But these individuals are not being conditioned to an acceptance of the proposition itself. They would be persuaded in regard to the proposition itself only if a connecting link is made explaining reasons why use of marijuana is bad for the individual who experiments with it. Therefore, it is likely that many would try marijuana if the law is removed; if they feel they can break the law without detection, or if they become members of a different society where there are no penalties against marijuana consumption. Better motivational concepts to attach to the proposition would be demonstrated connections between marijuana usage and the irritation of various physical and/or mental disorders; or proof that reckless actions are performed by those under the influence of marijuana. If these motivational concepts are used, it is likely many

in the group would be persuaded to avoid the use of marijuana for the rest of their lives whether or not there were laws against its usage.

One should not conclude, however, that all negative conditioning patterns or all motivational concepts based on fear would lead to compliance rather than persuasion. For instance, an individual may disapprove of racial intermarriage; miscegenation functions for him as a motivational concept producing reactions of avoidance, fear, and disgust. Probably he has either reasoned for himself or has learned as of result of communications from others to associate his fear of miscegenation with school integration and integration in housing and public accommodations, believing integration in these areas would increase the number of racial intermarriages. There seems to him to be a plausible connection between integration in these areas and the motivational concept which conditions him to fear-avoidance responses. Hence, without further influence or reinforcement, he will react in the predictable manner of opposing integration in a variety of situations. He has been truly persuaded to believe in the proposition, "Avoid integration."

The distinction between compliance and persuasion has been made because generally a communicator needs to modify his receivers' behavior over a period of time, and compliance will not achieve this aim. There are, however, some situations in which immediate compliance is all that is necessary. In that case the critic should point out that true persuasion was not achieved, but also that it was not necessary; the communication was a success from the standpoint and need of the communicator, although the ethics of the coercive appeal

would probably receive a low rating. An example is a senator who needs to garner one more vote to have his view on a proposed bill prevail. He may coerce another senator into providing the needed vote by threatening non-support on another voting issue. The other senator complies with the desired action. But the coerced senator is not persuaded to approve of the essence of the bill he is voting for and lacking further influence would fail to support bills of a similar nature. Yet in this instance the other senator has received all he desired or needed to achieve.

The chief concern of this chapter has been the associational conditioning process. The proper selection of motivational concepts does much to determine whether or not the attempted conditioning will lead to persuasion. The three conditions for proper selection are these: (1) the motivational concept(s) should be already strongly accepted by the audience, (2) the concept(s) should orient the receivers toward the action-orientation the rhetor desires transferred to the proposition, and (3) the concept(s) should lend themselves to the making of logical, intrinsic connections with the proposition. If all three of these selection factors are properly utilized, if the concept(s) are strongly connected with the proposition, and if miscellaneous perceptual factors are provided for, it is highly likely that persuasion in the desired direction will take place. When all these conditions are met except the third because the motivational concept(s) are coercive in nature, conditioning resulting in forced compliance is likely to occur. The desired action will be performed in the immediate situation but will not be learned as a new behavioral

response to be carried out in similar situations in the future. If the motivational concept(s) are not strongly accepted by the audience, normally no type of conditioning will occur. If the motivational concept(s) orient the receivers toward an action not similar to that called for in the proposition, the audience is likely to be persuasively conditioned to an action the rhetor had not desired. A proper understanding of these conditions should make it clear in a given situation whether or not true persuasion is likely to be effected.

CHAPTER IV

THE MANIPULATION OF 'SIGNIFICANT SYMBOLS' TO CONVEY AND SHAPE MOTIVATIONAL CONCEPTS

Chapters II and III provided an overall explication of the new theory of persuasion from which new critical standards are to be derived. Motivational concepts to be conditioned to the rhetorical proposition are the most important single component of this persuasion theory. It is necessary to explore selected functioning aspects of these motivational concepts further in Chapters IV and V. Chapter IV stresses the role of effective symbol manipulation to convey as motivational concepts the exact ideas needed to condition receivers toward the action-orientation called for in the rhetorical proposition. Chapter V deals with a special category of motivational concept -- entities which aid in building or refuting social "mystification." Since social "mystification" is involved in any case of class or rank conflict this is an extremely important and complicated category of motivational concept.

Several of the more significant overall strategies for effective symbol manipulation to induce in receivers the desired action will be the main subject of this chapter. These strategies are elucidated through two speech examples, but first the types of symbols to be considered are defined, and the role of these symbols in perception and cognition is explored.

Duncan and Burke use the term, "significant symbols," to describe the signs which make communication possible and which convey and shape persuasive messages. According to these symbolic interactionists, "significant symbols" are words whose meanings are shared by members of a given social group.¹ For instance, the English vocabulary is the source of "significant symbols" for American society or subsets of it. The author contends that for the purpose of rhetorical criticism, discussion of "significant symbols" might be focused more narrowly. Rhetorical messages are concerned most frequently with political, social, or legal issues. Rhetors disputing within one of these areas generally base their strategy on an attack or defense of components which determine a given social structure. These components are characteristics of a total society or of institutions within it, and they stand out most sharply in the midst of rhetorical debates over concrete issues. Richard Hofstadter, prominent American historian, interprets the Scopes Trial as a crucial debate over whether or not American society would be dominated by the rural setting, traditionally-based values and ways of doing, or if it would be dominated by the urban setting, scientific inquiry, and a general spirit of secularism.² Words designating components such as those just discussed are the "significant

¹ Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and the Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 92-96. In rhetorical efforts as well as in other types of communication it is the patterning together of a combination of "significant symbols" which is important, but the term needs to be defined in terms of the single entity.

² Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 125-30.

symbols" manipulated to maintain or change a social structure. Additional symbols which function in affecting the social order are words which designate the character, role, and privileges (or lack of them) imputed to social groups.

For instance, in the controversy which ensued over the recalling of General Douglas MacArthur by President Harry S. Truman in 1951, some argued that "civilian control" of military affairs was a necessary part of the checks and balances system of government; no special interests or biased viewpoints could distort military and foreign policy. The pro-MacArthur forces countered that "civilian control" was in actuality a "muzzling of the military," a refusal to consider the viewpoint of those with the training and first-hand observation making them the most qualified to decide military policy.³

Various studies in social stratification indicate that these institutional-societal components and the character, role, and privileges of social groups are the basis of a society's structure, hence, they are the factors which affect both upward and downward mobility.⁴

Although Duncan uses the term "significant symbols" exclusively in reference to words, the concept can justifiably be extended to non-verbal symbols. For instance, human beings can comprise a "significant symbol." Racial integration places Negroes in social scenes where

³ John Gerber, Douglas Ehninger, and Carroll Arnold, The Speaker's Resource Book (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1966), pp. 150-55.

⁴ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipsett, eds., Class, Status, and Power (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 111-81.

previously they had not been welcome. As their organized presence in these scenes becomes more frequent and publicized, civil rights leaders hope that white people will be persuaded that it is appropriate for Negroes to be there.

One may find it difficult to see how "significant symbols" are used to maintain or change the social order, if one thinks of words as merely vehicles to convey thought and experience. Duncan, Burke, other symbolic interactionists, and the general semanticists stress that one should be more aware of how symbols affect one's view of reality and one's behavior. The general characterization of these effects which follows is also supported by leading theorists of public opinion and mass communications. The characterization is corroborated further by the general psychiatric view of human communication.⁵

It is difficult for one to know reality fully and directly. On the basis of reports by others, the individual develops conceptions of phases of reality he has not experienced directly. These reports are conveyed through symbols which stand in an analogical relationship to the objects described, so the report conveys only a part of the original objects.⁶ Nevertheless, these symbolic characterizations of

⁵David Berlo, The Process of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 288-300; Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), pp. 30-49; Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries (New York: Harper Brothers, 1946), pp. 112-72; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), pp. 20-55; Jurgen Ruesch, Disturbed Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 22-23; Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 125-55.

⁶The concept of words in analogical relationship might become clearer if one considers word meaning defined as "delegated efficacy"

given objects become for individuals their total understanding of these objects. One also converts his first-hand experiences into symbols before storing them in his memory; later one often acts in terms of his symbolic recordings rather than in terms of the first-hand reality. Thus, symbols do significantly influence one's thinking as well as one's actions and one's characterizations of these matters, whether or not the symbols are an accurate mirror of reality. In fact, the preceding discussion illustrates that symbols shape perception, thought, and resulting action rather than merely conveying what is perceived and thought about. McLuhan states that the medium conveying a message shapes it so influentially that one could say the medium is the message. One could observe specifically that the medium of words to a great extent becomes the message rather than the mere conveyer of a message outside the words.⁷ The truth of this assertion can be seen through

by I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 32 and 34.

. . . meaning is delegated efficacy, that description applies above all to the meaning of words, whose virtue is to be substitutes exerting the powers of what is not there. They do this as other signs do it, though in a more complex fashion through their contexts. In these contexts one item -- typically a word -- takes over the duties of parts which can then be omitted from the recurrence. When this abridgement happens what the sign or word -- the item with these delegated powers -- means is the missing part of the context.

⁷John H. Sloan, "Understanding McLuhan," Speech Teacher, XVIII (March, 1968), 143.

consideration of the shades of meaning of various synonyms as they orient the receiver to distinctly different actions.

For instance, a clerk wishes to express to a customer the idea that a certain dress is not expensive. One might consider several roughly equivalent words that can be used to express three similar ideas. Each word conveys a different connotation; so whichever is chosen will result in a different reaction from the customer. If the clerk says, "The dress is inexpensive," the customer will be somewhat favorably oriented toward it (provided that reasonable expenditure is a concern of the customer). If the clerk says, "The dress is a bargain," the economy-minded individual would be even more positively oriented toward it. However, if the clerk said, "The dress is cheap," this would connote low quality and would negatively orient the customer. Truly the form of the medium, in this case, words, is as well as conveys the message.

The example of the dress sale is a trivial one, but it illustrates the use of symbols with the most suitable connotation to move receivers toward the desired area of action. On a grander scale, legislators, social reformers, and moralists carefully phrase their proposals with word connotations which aid in building motivational concepts highly acceptable within the group composing the audience. This is why an American war is euphemistically termed "a great crusade," or an attempt "to make the world safe for democracy." The words designating social, professional, and ethnic groups have a number of positive and negative connotations associated with them. A rhetor seeking more rights or powers for a given group would try to emphasize the positive

connotations and minimize or refute the negative ones imputed to the group. A persuader attacking the rights or powers of a group would use the reverse process. Within one speech a persuader may simultaneously tear down an opposing group and build up his own.

This discussion is not meant to imply that only symbol manipulations are used to build up or tear down social groups, or to build other types of motivational concepts. It is a major contention of this chapter that the specific phrasing of an argument contributes significantly to the perceived meaning of that argument. The symbol manipulations in adequately developed messages, however, are supplemented with argument-content. The argument-content would be object-evidence which, though partly shaped by the symbols conveying it, could be cross-checked against real objects in the environment. (Ingersoll's address discussed later in this chapter is an example of failure to develop the object-evidence aspect.) The argument-content as well as its phrasing would be used in building "mystifications" to support groups already in power or in attacking "mystifications" to win privileges for the less favored groups. These uses of "mystification" are explored in Chapter V.

An address by Frederick Douglass is analyzed in detail in Chapter V. Douglass used a double-edged approach. He refuted negative connotations attached to the term Negro, such as the association that Negroes are not men, as other individuals are men. The desired result was that Douglass' receivers would regard the Negro on a more humanitarian level in the future. Simultaneously, Douglass attached to the names of groups opposing Negro freedom such negative

connotations as, "disloyal to the Declaration of Independence," "non-humanitarian," and "false to Christianity." Douglass hoped that as a result of this negative associational conditioning his audience would cease supporting pro-slavery individuals and groups.

Roosevelt also used a double-edged approach in his First Inaugural. Roosevelt used several strategies of symbol manipulation to accomplish three subordinate purposes to support his proposition: "Accept my new economic recovery program." These symbol strategies will be analyzed in detail. The three subordinate purposes will also be analyzed and evaluated. This attention to purpose will serve two major functions. It will enable a more structured and fully-detailed assessment; it will also permit an illustration of the ethical dimension of criticism facilitated by this new critical theory.

Black suggests that the rhetorical critic evaluate the message to be appraised in terms of all conscious purposes which can be inferred from evidence in or related to the discourse. Black also recommends that the critic evaluate both the pragmatic and ethical soundness of the speaker's purposes in regard to the situation to which the message is a response.⁸ In other words, one should judge the purposes in terms of what would seem to be their immediate effects on the situation. One should also assess how well the long-range needs of society would be met by the purposes the rhetor chose to stress, and how society might be affected in the long-run by the tactics used by the rhetor. For instance did the rhetor fail to serve a purpose pertinent to the rhetorical issue

⁸Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 77-78.

and vital to the social well being? Would any interpretations made by the rhetor be likely to cause his receivers to make inappropriate or unrealistic responses in similar future occasions? (An example of the latter would be a faulty causal analysis of the problem which might lead receivers to fail to solve a similar problem in the future.)

In the early 1930's America as well as most of the world had sunk into a terrible economic depression. The function of the inaugural was to win acceptance from the majority of the American people for proposed government regulations and programs to aid national economic recovery. This program included provisions to boost agricultural price supports and end farm mortgage foreclosures. Excessive stock speculation and other questionable business practices would be regulated. An extensive public works program was proposed as a major tactic to counter massive unemployment. Also there would be a brief bank holiday during which a variety of banking practices as well as the general soundness of the currency would be scrutinized.⁹

This proposed program would assign to government powers which it had never had before. Some of these proposals were regarded by the more conservative-minded as contrary to the "rugged individualism" Americans believed in. These proposals also seemed contrary to the Jeffersonian idea that the best government is that which governs least.¹⁰ Consequently, Roosevelt had to accomplish three subordinate

⁹Davis Newton Lott, ed., The Presidents Speak. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 232.

¹⁰Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Rise of Federal Relief," in The Thirties: A Time to Remember, ed. by Don Congdon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 152-53.

purposes before asking directly for support of his program. First, Roosevelt needed to discredit businessmen and their practices strongly enough to justify unprecedented government interference in the private enterprise system. He also needed to establish strong confidence in his leadership, and he needed to demonstrate a continuity between his program and previous American tradition.

Roosevelt discredited businessmen by charging that the negligence of the business community was the chief cause of the depression:

Yet our distress comes from no failure of substance. We are stricken by no plague of locusts. . . . Plenty is at our doorsteps, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of supply. Primarily this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed, through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted and abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men.¹¹

The following tactic served a psychological purpose as well as the expedient one of justifying exceptional government powers. Roosevelt created a scapegoat role for businessmen. He proceeded to purge the society symbolically of this undesirable element -- business. Duncan holds that in a period of extreme tension and strained communication, scapegoating is a technique that releases tension, re-establishes communication, and unifies the people.¹² Techniques of humor or irony would accomplish the same psychological purposes and would also encourage critical questioning of the situation, whereas, tragic

¹¹Lott, p. 232.

¹²Duncan, pp. 127-28 and p. 204.

scapegoating does not involve intellectualizing.¹³ Humor techniques, however, do not lend themselves to the seriousness and the formality of the inaugural situation. Therefore, Roosevelt made use of the best tension-release technique allowable in the situation.

Many people blamed the businessmen already, so the symbolic purging of them was a vent for tensions that might otherwise have been physically directed at businessmen in the form of violent riots. Nevertheless, many historians and economists would feel that Roosevelt's causal analysis was overly simplistic. He ignored factors of the world economy and the conversion from a war economy at home and abroad that were underlying causes of the depression,¹⁴ along with speculative business practices. Leaving the first two factors out of the analysis of the situation was effective regarding the major purpose of this immediate speech. This failure to make a more realistic analysis, nevertheless, could condition Americans to overlook crucial economy factors in the future when a full analysis could lead to prevention of an economic depression or recession. Whether or not the speech actually does contribute to this ill effect it had a strong potential to do so; this must be judged a major flaw on both practical and ethical grounds.

While portraying the businessman as a scapegoat, Roosevelt created an aura of charismatic leadership around himself. He seemed to compare himself with Christ in some of his Biblical allusions. Action directed

¹³Duncan, pp. 406-16.

¹⁴Irving Fisher, Booms and Depressions (New York: Adelphi Co., 1932), pp. 71-85.

toward a Christ figure would probably be transferred to Roosevelt, an aid in building a motivational concept of complete trust in Roosevelt's charismatic leadership.

The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. . . these dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men. Through this program we address ourselves to putting our own national house in order.¹⁵

Roosevelt needed to create confidence in his leadership, so that the public would accept his radical new program and his plea for emergency powers. The charismatic image was not the only way to do this, but it was an effective way, and it also matched the ceremonial mood of the inaugural. Although a display of great financial understanding and administrative skill could serve the same purpose it would not have blended in easily with the ceremonial mood of the speech. Such a display might even have made Roosevelt seem too similar to the hated businessman. He chose the most convincing approach to building confidence in his leadership within the confines of the speech atmosphere which was partially created through the rhetorical choices he had already made. Black points out in Rhetorical Criticism that earlier choices of the rhetor may cancel out certain tactics for the future and make still other tactics mandatory.¹⁶

In regard to building confidence in his leadership, one other major tactic should be discussed. Roosevelt was always careful to

¹⁵Lott, p. 232.

¹⁶Black, p. 164.

say "we" when speaking of actions to be taken, and he asked for the aid of the audience members. He even developed an analogy between the problems to be attacked and the state of war. He was a general leading the American nation as an army to attack these problems:

With this pledge taken I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems.¹⁷

An immediate result of this strategy was a justification of exceptional powers for the president, as Roosevelt himself clearly indicated in the following comment:

I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis -- broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.¹⁸

This tactic yielded psychological value as well. Duncan points out that when a society is mobilized against a limited, clear-cut object, i.e., an enemy during wartime, they feel greater unity and will work together more productively.¹⁹ By symbolically turning the depression into a battle, Roosevelt has produced a "moral equivalent of war."

There was a third subordinate purpose necessary to winning audience acceptance of Roosevelt's sweeping recovery program. This purpose was to convince the American people that the new programs would be consistent with the past values of the nation. Roosevelt maintained

¹⁷Lott, p. 234.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹Duncan, pp. 276-78 and 372.

that he was preserving the ideals of the Constitution but was shifting slightly the emphasis of some prerogatives granted to the federal government, such as assigning a prominent dimension of activity in socio-economic affairs. Roosevelt also stressed that his program and views were a part of our "modified democracy." The following passage illustrates his method:

Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary need by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. . . . We face the arduous days that lie before us in the warm courage of the national unity; with the clear consciousness of seeking old and precious moral values; . . . we do not distrust the future of essential democracy.²⁰

Roosevelt eulogized the past greatness and past values of America to demonstrate that he and his proposals should be associated with these, and that he would not propose anything inconsistent with the cherished guidelines. Throughout the speech Roosevelt associated his program with the pioneer spirit, the values of effort, efficiency, practicality, and achievement, the Puritan ethical values, the increasing of material comforts, and the respected goal of equality of opportunity. These concepts comprise most of the list of major American values compiled by Redding and Steele in an article in Western Speech.²¹ Hence,

²⁰Lott, pp. 233-34.

²¹Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding, "The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 83-91.

these items were most appropriate as parts of a line of major motivational concept development. The receivers' actions toward these items were actions Roosevelt wished transferred to his proposition.

Roosevelt's purposes were in keeping with the rhetorical demands of the situation. In general they seemed in the best long range interests of society. There was one notable exception to this -- Roosevelt's narrow causal analysis of the depression. The proposition -- "Accept my sweeping new economic recovery program" -- seemed adequately supported through the three subordinate purposes which in turn were effected with the aid of the three major motivational concepts of the speech. Careful language selection is always important in the adequate development of motivational concepts. In the First Inaugural Roosevelt skillfully manipulated significant symbols to induce attitudes facilitating a major change in the social order. Negative connotations were associated with the concept, businessmen, in a manner which encouraged the American people to label them scapegoats for the ills of the depression. Positive connotations indicating a charismatic quality were associated with Roosevelt. This two-edged connotative approach was conveyed through religious terminology and references to Biblical events which implied analogies useful to the speaker's purpose. In addition Roosevelt associated his plan with the American 'transcendent principle' of equality by referring to his plan as fulfilling "essential democracy."²² These three areas of association were used to build the three major motivational concepts upon which the

²²Lott, p. 234.

speech rests. When combined with the rhetorical proposition they form the following lines of argument with their implied areas of action: the first major line of argument was "Accept my new economic recovery program because it will undo the damage created by careless and unscrupulous businessmen." This argument prepared the audience for a turning away from some previously revered free enterprise practices. The second major line of argument was "Accept my new economic recovery program because I am a charismatic leader." This argument would encourage the audience to approach both Roosevelt and his program with complete trust. The third major line of argument was "Accept my new economic recovery program because it is consistent with 'essential democracy' and other revered American values." This last argument would encourage the audience to transfer to the recovery program previously learned action patterns of eager acceptance of entities particularly distinctive of American culture.

The contention that the critical system developed in this dissertation leads to a more precise and perceptive analysis will be supported by comparing the discussion of Roosevelt's First Inaugural in this chapter with a more traditional analysis by Braden and Brandenburg. Braden and Brandenburg's analysis of Roosevelt's speaking is carried on in a generalized manner. After citing a particular speech characteristic, they fail to show the specific functioning of the characteristic. A qualification should be stated that Braden and Brandenburg considered several speeches in addition to the First Inaugural and were seeking conclusions referring to all of these. Nevertheless, when they refer specifically to

Roosevelt's use of religious allusion in the First Inaugural this is all they conclude:

Frequently, he quoted or paraphrased some biblical expression in order to make his meaning more impressive. In his First Inaugural Address he spoke as follows: "The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization."²³

The scapegoating and the establishment of a charismatic aura developed through this and related religious allusions have escaped their critical ear.

When Braden and Brandenburg do discuss language utilization in more specific terms, it is to point out such trivia as this: "Seventy percent of his words in the First Inaugural fall within the 500 most commonly used words of the Thorndike list."²⁴

The building of an aura of charisma and the portrayal of one's self as a general leading a battle against the nation's economic ills are interesting specific examples of the force of ethos which the rhetorical critic should isolate and assess. Braden and Brandenburg characterize Roosevelt's ethical proof in this gem of generality:

The conclusion is inescapable that Franklin Roosevelt used ethical proof frequently and skillfully throughout his addresses. The occasions and the audiences he faced frequently demanded such proof. Usually the President was highly successful not only in meeting the demands of the situation, but also in furthering the acceptance of his ideas. He fulfilled the rhetorician's requirement of ethical proof for his character was made a cause of persuasion in his speeches.²⁵

²³ Ernest Brandenburg and Waldo Braden, "Franklin Roosevelt" in A History and Criticism of American Public Address, Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, ed. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), Vol. III, p. 513.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 505.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 494.

The discussion of the First Inaugural covered in depth two techniques of manipulating "significant symbols" as a major aid in building motivational concepts to convey the major lines of persuasive argument. The first technique was that of selecting words in phrasing the motivational concept which lead receivers directly to an acceptance of the desired area of action toward the proposition. Roosevelt's use of the term "essential democracy" in discussing his new program was a prime example of this tactic of symbol manipulation. The second technique illustrated was that of modifying the connotations commonly conveyed in the name for a given group, plan, value, or belief, so that audience actions toward that entity would be modified. The major illustration of this was the attaching of fear, condemnation, and avoidance connotations to the term businessman.

Both of these techniques of symbol manipulation are well-illustrated in the speeches of Robert Ingersoll. In fact both techniques were used simultaneously in Ingersoll's most frequent strategy to attack God-oriented religion while promoting a scientifically-based "religion of humanity." All the terms usually associated with religion, such as truth, goodness, light, were attributed to Ingersoll's "religion of humanity" and to its chief tool of discovering and confirming knowledge -- the empirical method. The opposites or negations, darkness, untruth, were used in referring to theological religion and the clergy.²⁶ More specifically the strategy was that of selecting

²⁶See Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), pp. 22-27. Weaver would categorize positively-valued ultimate terms such as truth, goodness, and light as "godterms" in contrast with their negatively-valued opposites, darkness, untruth,

words which conveyed motivational concepts likely to condition receivers toward avoidance of traditional religion and acceptance of Ingersoll's "religion of humanity." A further result of this strategy was that the connotations of the basic entities being compared, traditional religion and religion of humanity were modified. Another way of stating the strategy is to say receivers were encouraged to re-label these entities in order that they might act toward the entities in the manner desired by Ingersoll.

Ingersoll's method is illustrated in two excerpts from his lecture, "The Truth,"

On every hand they [orthodox clergy] sow the seeds of superstition. They paralyze the minds and pollute the imaginations of children. They fill their hearts with fear. By their teachings, thousands become insane. With them, hypocrisy is respectable and candor infamous. They enslave the minds of men.²⁷

Intelligence [scientific learning] is the only light. It enables us to keep the highway, to void the obstructions and to take advantage of the forces of nature. It is the only lever capable of raising mankind. To develop the brain is to civilize the world. Intelligence reaves the heavens of winged and frightful monsters, drives ghosts and brings fiends from the darkness and floods with light the dungeons of fear.²⁸

In "The Truth," Ingersoll used another tactic of manipulating "significant symbols." This tactic was quite complicated as it

etc., which he labels "devil terms." Either to relieve tension or to achieve a persuasive effect, a communicator might invert the usual applications of these terms as Ingersoll has done in "The Truth."

²⁷C. P. Farrell, ed., Ingersoll's Works, (New York: Ingersoll Publishers Inc., 1900), Vol. IV, pp. 99-100.

²⁸Ibid., p. 108.

involved creating or at least vivifying a motivational concept which could be used later in the address to convey the major line of argument.

The use of positive connotations in reference to science and empiricism previously discussed constituted the preparatory stage. Through this preparatory stage, Ingersoll tried to change the basis of the American transcendent principle of equality. (The nature and function of transcendent principles is detailed in Chapter V.) Religious premises and their translation into documents, such as, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, have been viewed commonly as the source of the American belief in equality.²⁹ Ingersoll maintained, on the contrary, that science was the source of the humanitarian belief in equality. It was scientific findings rather than religious-political exhortations which would translate these humanitarian views into actualities. Through this transference process, Ingersoll tried to establish science and entities related to it as the highest order of motivational concept.

Utilizing manipulations of 'god' and 'devil' terms, Ingersoll had attempted to undermine the moral value of traditional religion. Ingersoll next proceeded to attack the claim of traditional religion to hold priority on revealed truths. In achieving the latter, Ingersoll's first step was to re-name religion.

Rather than calling it traditional, conventional, theological or institutional religion to distinguish it from his "religion of

²⁹Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York: Harper Brothers, 1951), pp. 69-78 and 383-89. Curti cites French enlightenment philosophy as an additional significant influence on American political documents.

humanity" or merely calling it theology, he termed it "the science of theology."³⁰ It was helpful to Ingersoll's argumentative strategy to put religion in the category of science. In trying to change his audience's attitude toward organized religion, Ingersoll recognized this problem of logic -- lack of concrete evidence for a given theological doctrine does not necessarily prove it untrue. Consequently, Ingersoll tried to avoid a direct rebuttal of major theological doctrines. He took this indirect approach -- he reasoned that religion is not based on the approach to true knowledge, therefore, religion as a whole and its separate doctrines are untrue. More specifically, his steps in reasoning were these: (1) The sciences are acknowledged areas of certainty and truth, (2) The scientific method is that of investigation, experimentation, and reason, but religious premises are not based on any of these, and (3) Religion is based on revelation and on authority statements which are the opposite of the scientific method; therefore, religion must be false.

Another way of looking at the symbol manipulation just discussed is to say that by re-naming religion, Ingersoll shifted the burden of proof in the religion versus science debate. Ingersoll stated in effect as his major premise -- the only conclusive proofs and bits of knowledge man has garnered have related to the natural sciences, so this branch of study has set the precedent for arriving at truth. Any field which claims to have knowledge of truths shall be classified as a science, and the tests of the established sciences shall be applied

³⁰Farrell, pp. 85-95.

to it. The scientific method had been upheld in this address and in previous utterances by Ingersoll as the highest order of motivational concept. As such, and since it was presented as applicable to the topic under discussion, the scientific method, became the crucial status (turning point issue) of the debate. The creation of a new higher order motivational concept as status of the case would seem to be the strategy employed in any case where the burden of proof is shifted. If the rhetor also succeeds in strongly connecting his proposition with the status, based on a higher order motivational concept than any other motivational concepts being promoted in the debate, he achieves what Black terms "argumentative synthesis."³¹

The tactic of changing the name of a person, group, plan, or ideology will be considered in a different respect. Frequently, this tactic is used to promote the betterment of a social group. When used in this manner, name-changing generally is an example of "symbolic boasting," a topic which is discussed in detail in Chapter V. "Symbolic boasting" may be viewed not only as a persuasive tactic but also as an important clue to the specific goals to which the persuader aspires. "Symbolic boasting" is defined as an imitating of the language, dress, mannerisms, or names of those already in the class or role to which one aspires. Generally the name-change form of "symbolic boasting" involves significant persuasive address to the self as well as to external audiences which shall be illustrated shortly.

³¹Black, pp. 155-60.

An example of the name-change strategy to better a group's position is the attempt by minority groups to get derogatory terms such as, "nigger," "dago," and "kike" removed from dictionaries and literary works. The Negro is especially concerned with realizing this. Many in that group regard even the term, Negro, as derogatory because it has been in use during the time black men have been denied their civil rights. Now that Negroes are determined to realize these rights, they prefer to be called by a new name such as "black" or "Afro-American."³² They must at least be called the "new Negro" to indicate that they should be treated by white society as a group engaged in "social passage." Negroes also engage in these name-changes to persuade themselves that they are worthy of "social passage." Various studies of the American Negro show that he is burdened with feelings of self-hate and a low self-concept which must be overcome before Negroes as a group can mobilize to win a new position in the social structure.³³ In the past only individual Negroes attempted "social passage." In doing so they tried to deny their racial identity. Their "symbolic boasting" consisted of trying to whiten their skin and unkink their hair, and, in general to try "to pass for white."³⁴ Hence physical imitations of whites were their main technique of "symbolic boasting" in contrast with the linguistic "symbolic boasting" in terms of black pride currently in vogue.

³² Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 112-13.

³³ Ibid., pp. 114-22.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 100-10.

Another major technique of manipulating "significant symbols" to effect social change was cited earlier -- the use of people to comprise a significant symbol. Fotheringham refers to this tactic as the creating of an event-message. He describes and exemplifies the event-message in the following manner.

A significant type of sign-message is the event-message. Such a message involves the intentional contrivance of an event to arouse a particular meaning beyond itself in observers or on those to whom it is reported. It is a tacit message, one that is unspoken, unexpressed in any conventional code. Demonstrations, picketing, and rallies often fall in this category.

As part of the integration campaign, Negroes on Easter Sunday, 1963, sought entrance to all-white churches in Birmingham, Alabama. To the extent to which this event was created to arouse a particular meaning and affect behavior, it was a message. If it was used to arouse the meaning that white people violate the Christian principles they profess even in their churches, then it was an event-message.³⁵

Similarly, civil rights groups and organizations concerned with greater equality for women publicize members who are engaged in professions they have not formerly been in or who hold political or administrative posts. In this case the implied message is that those formerly excluded have the right and capability to fill these positions.

There is some evidence to support the efficacy of these tactics. Attitude studies show that white people involved in integrated housing or integrated education for several years significantly modified their attitudes in favor of integration in these situations.³⁶ Probably

³⁵Wallace C. Fotheringham, Perspectives on Persuasion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), p. 70.

³⁶Minority Groups; Segregation and Integration, papers presented at the National Conference of Social Work, (New York: Columbia University

several factors were at work in effecting this change. One would be that as groups who have had little contact get acquainted, their attitudes toward one another generally become more favorable. Another factor which probably contributed to the change of attitude is a principle of cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance theory states that an individual cannot bear awareness of a discrepancy between two beliefs that he holds at the same time. Nor can he bear a discrepancy between a belief versus an action contrary to it or a discrepancy between a belief and apparent contrasting reality. If one felt strong disapproval toward integrated housing yet had to participate in it or view it going on, one would experience dissonance and would seek to relieve this feeling. One might try to eliminate integrated housing or remove oneself from the situation. Another option (which frequently is the only viable one) is to convince oneself that the issue of integrated housing is unimportant or even that one positively approves of it.³⁷ Thus, one might undergo a process of self-persuasion in which the idea of Negroes in previously all-white schools or residential districts becomes an acceptable idea. This newly accepted idea becomes a new motivational concept which can later be utilized in winning acceptance for rhetorical propositions urging further gains for the Negro.

Press, 1955), pp. 102-03; J. W. Brehm and A. R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 272-81.

³⁷ Leon Festinger, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 1-31.

The discussion by Duncan, Burke, and by those in other fields supporting their conception of symbol usage in human interaction, broadens one's understanding of language use in general. It also deepens immeasurably one's understanding of language as it functions persuasively. When both of these understandings of language are developed by the rhetorical critic, he can deal thoroughly with even the most unusual symbolic manipulations as was illustrated in several examples presented in this chapter. A systematic understanding of symbol manipulation as the main vehicle for presenting motivational concepts and conditioning them to the proposition enables a coherent synthesis in which each persuasive tactic of the rhetor is related to an overall symbol strategy. Through the inclusion of the symbolic interactionist viewpoint on style, the framework for rhetorical criticism is closely related to the work of psychiatrists and general semanticists. In the future the critic has the option of borrowing from these fields concepts which will shed further light on the psychology of interaction between symbol selection as effected by the encoder and as acting on decoders.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL 'MYSTIFICATION' AND ITS COUNTERS AS THEY AFFECT THE PERSUASIVE PROCESS

In Chapter II there was brief reference to the need to consider the propriety of interactions between (social and professional) superiors, inferiors, or equals as reflected in the stylistic structuring of persuasive messages. In this chapter the content of persuasive efforts as affected by social interactions will be stressed. The attempt to persuade is frequently a response to felt unsatisfactory interactions within or between social groups. In such a situation the persuader is likely to be concerned with re-distributing rights, privileges, and functions granted to some members of society and withheld from others. At least the persuader seeks to establish pleasanter feelings and communication between the privileged versus the more restricted. Therefore, the concepts discussed in this chapter would apply to many though not to all persuasive situations.

Generally communication has broken down because the more privileged class has applied "mystification" to an excessive degree. The term, mystification, needs careful definition here in order that its usage throughout the chapter in three distinct senses will be clear. First there is "mystification" as a dynamic process to uphold social order. This general state is achieved through two major components. Chief of

these is pointed stress on social differences and the wielding of power by those at the top of the hierarchy; "over-mystification" occurs when this aspect is stressed so much that communication within the social system is noticeably strained. The second component of "mystification" which balances the power aspect is a stress on the "mystic communion" of all those in the hierarchy as they relate in common to a transcendent principle which is served through the hierarchical arrangement. The ill-effects of "over mystification" can generally be lessened by accenting more strongly this "mystic communion." A second definition of mystification is the use of specific tactics to achieve the dynamic process. These tactics are referred to as hystifications or mystification tactics. Third, these tactics relate to the construction of motivational concepts favorable to upholding or attacking a social order. Hence, there is reference to hystifications as motivational concepts to be utilized or refuted.

"Mystification" may be applied so excessively that only mechanical, ritualistic responses are carried on with no true interpersonal communication taking place. In that case the first need is to restore communication. If social reform is desired, the second concern is to use argument to refute "mystifications," restricting privileges or freedoms to certain individuals or groups. These "mystifications" are a special category of motivational concept which the persuader needs to refute in order to promote his proposition. The building and especially the refuting of "mystifications," as a special category of motivational concept is the unifying theme and chief concern of this chapter. The building of these motivational concepts is treated only tangentially

here because it was a major concern in Chapter IV, i.e., Roosevelt's creation for himself of an aura of charismatic leadership. Also one can infer from the discussion regarding refutations of motivational concepts further suggestions for the building of these concepts in furthering the "mystification" process.

Several factors of the social hierarchy and social interaction must be defined and elucidated as a basis for understanding the material to be presented regarding "mystification." This elucidation is based largely on Hugh Duncan's discussion of these factors, which are presented in a similar manner though in less detail in standard works dealing with the social psychology of human institutions. Then tactics for the countering of "mystification" are discussed. The countering of "mystification" can be used to merely establish communication or to effect changes in the rights and power of social groups.

Duncan believes it is important to note that there is always a hierarchy in society as a whole and in subsets of it, such as, clubs, organizations, or institutions.¹ The social hierarchy is based on a principle of exclusiveness -- certain tasks or beliefs are valued more highly than others within society. The highest ranks are given to the people who come closest to serving or exemplifying whatever is most highly valued in a given society. The item most highly valued can be

¹ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 1-86 and 97-190. A qualification is that Marx and a modern sociologist, Helvin Tumin, believe that at some future date hierarchical inequality can be eliminated. However, comparative studies of even the communist countries show that nowhere has this objective been achieved in even the slightest degree.

stated abstractly as the transcendent principle of that society or societal group. The ranking of people according to class or professional status is functional. In other words, the condition of hierarchy is necessary to get done the work of a given society. Since the differential ranks all serve a higher value, all are logically related. Usually a social system allows for mobility; in most situations an individual can move up or down the hierarchy.²

Duncan terms the event of moving from one rank to another "the kill" meaning, that the principle behind the old role or rank is changed to a principle fitting the new position.³

The total process of making such a change is termed "social passage." Common examples of new role taking are birth, marriage, and death. Rank changes refer to change in vocational status or change in social class membership. "Social passage" can be analyzed in terms of three stages -- isolation, transition, and incorporation.⁴ For instance, courtship preceding marriage is a period of relative isolation from others; engagement is the transition period; and the marriage ceremony incorporates the couple into a new role. Duncan's concept of changing ('killing') principles inappropriate to a new role would occur in the transition stage. During engagement an individual would psychologically condition himself toward new principles regarding family responsibilities, privacy, and management of money.

²Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 112 and pp. 315-25.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 203-06.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 257-59.

A person who has moved into a new role or is trying to do so frequently adopts a new name or title. Other members of society will tend to act toward the person in a manner which is appropriate to his new name. The technique of name changing is a form of "symbolic boasting." Other tactics of "symbolic boasting" are to imitate the language, dress, or mannerisms of those already in the role aspired to.⁵ Consideration of these tactics can aid the rhetorical critic in ascertaining the less obvious aims of groups involved in mass campaigns.

Social inequality is inherent in the hierarchical arrangement underlying all societies. Ordinarily members of a hierarchy are not disturbed by rank differential. The reason is that the members of a given society accept a transcendent principle which unites them in serving a common purpose.⁶ The transcendent principle of a club, organization, or institution can be defined as the objectification of the group's major task accomplishment. For instance, instilling patriotism is the transcendent principle of the American Legion. The transcendent principle of a nation-society is a generalized value such as equality before the law, the transcendent principle of American society.⁷ If the rhetorical critic wishes to find the transcendent

⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

⁶ Ibid., p. 279.

⁷ According to Duncan, pp. 358-68, this is the transcendent principle. According to Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), pp. 214-16, Progress along with its method, science, and its chief characteristic, modernity, is the transcendent principle of our society. My observation has been that social reformers and politicians use equality as their ultimate term. Speakers in many other areas use progress and its characteristics as the transcendent principle.

principle of a given group or society he can make a content analysis of representative speeches and documents to find the group's ultimate (most revered) terms. These ultimate terms would indicate the transcendent principle of the group. (An excellent discussion of ultimate terms is given in The Ethics of Rhetoric by Richard Weaver.)⁸

Since the transcendent principle is that which unites people who are different in many respects, connections with the transcendent principle can be the basis of the most powerful motivational concepts. Duncan delineates usage of the transcendent principle in the following two remarks:

The final power of authority is in the ability of rulers to mystify us through appeals to some great transcendent principle of social order.⁹

It is not the difference in rank between superior and inferior which disturbs a social system, but the inability (for whatever reason) to communicate in terms of a common transcendent principle of social order.¹⁰

One factor which can cause dissatisfaction with the hierarchy is lack of communication between social classes. The other factor is the feeling on the part of a class that it is excluded from the transcendent principle of its society. Usually the two conditions will occur or at least will seem to occur at the same time. If any groups are truly excluded from the transcendent principle they will lack a point of common reference from which to communicate. If communication has broken

⁸Weaver, pp. 211-32.

⁹Duncan, p. 285.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 279.

down between major groups, at least those of lower status will feel they are excluded from the transcendent principle. Campus protests are an example. The charge which college students make that they are second class citizens because they have to be in their dormitories at specified hours, and because they cannot bring guests in at all times cannot be supported by objective reality. Any groups housing a large number of people in close proximity, such as the WMCA, YWCA, and other men's and women's clubs find it necessary to make similar regulations. College students at a large university rarely communicate with those in authority. Consequently, the practical reasons for these regulations are not explained. The college student concludes that he is not being treated according to the principle of free choice regarding housing conditions as are most non-college students in his age group.

The normal state of the social order is equilibrium; social classes are relatively satisfied and interact with one another harmoniously. Yet even in the equilibrium condition "mystification" is applied, meaning that differences in rank and the power of the highest ranks are stressed. The "mystic communion" of all classes within the transcendent principle is also stressed.¹¹ (One can speak either of this general state of mystification or of specific mystification tactics to attain the general state.)

If equilibrium is threatened, the rulers of the hierarchy may make the mistake of stressing the rank consciousness aspect of "mystification" so much that communication between groups becomes difficult,

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 117-18.

and the relations between classes consist of ritual responses rather than interpersonal communication.

When communication has been thwarted due to the development of excess "mystification," three main courses of action are open -- declaration of "hierarchical psychosis," use of "play" tactics to increase interpersonal communication, or use of argument to expose "mystifications." The nature of each of these approaches and the situations in which each is likely to occur will be discussed in detail and illustrated with sample speeches.

In a situation of blocked communication, members of a group might declare that "mystification" is so complete and the stubbornness of the other side is so thorough that the state of "hierarchical psychosis" has been reached. "Hierarchical psychosis" is a state in which a lower status group believes no doubting, questioning, or restructuring of the social order is to be allowed. The low status group would add that the only course of action left to us is anti-social or violent action.¹² This strategy would most likely be found in messages advocating revolutionary social change or advocating indulgence in crime or vice. An example would be a message encouraging people to use marijuana or psychedelic drugs. Those advocating racial riots would also follow this strategy.

The discussion of "hierarchical psychosis" can be further illuminated by considering Patrick Henry's famous "Give me Liberty or Give me Death" appeal to the Virginia House of Burgesses. The argument of

¹² ibid., pp. 132-34.

Henry's speech is a declaration that the state of "hierarchical psychosis" has been reached; American representatives are unable to get a communicative response from Britain.

We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned with contempt from the foot of the throne. In vain, after these things may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation.¹³

Henry adds that the only course of action left to the colonies is "an appeal to arms and to the God of hosts,"¹⁴ He charges it is Britain rather than America that is initiating conflict, for the only communication Britain has given lately are provisions for war --

Let us not deceive ourselves sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission? Can gentlemen assign any other possible motive for it?¹⁵

Henry believes Americans are excluded from three transcendent principles pertaining to three distinct situations which converge in the speech. The discussion of communicative attempts by the colonists and the manner in which they were spurned indicates one -- the transcendent principle of courteous reception to diplomatic appeals. This terminology suggests a second exclusion -- "implements of war

¹³George Hibbitt, ed., The Dolphin Book of Speeches (New York: Dolphin Press, 1965), p. 153.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁵Ibid.

and subjugation," "bind and rivet upon us chains," "our chains are forged," and "their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston,"¹⁶ Americans are also excluded from the elementary freedoms to which British citizens are entitled. The third exclusion concerns America as a Christian nation. Henry reminds his audience that it is their highest transcendent duty to God that they remain a free people, resisting despotic rulers. (The belief that this was a high duty was a frequent theme of Puritan sermons.)¹⁷ The third exclusion is made explicit in one particular paragraph.

The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty towards the majesty of heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.¹⁸

The last sentence of the preceding quotation marks the third exclusion as the most transcendent of the three. An additional clue that this religious principle is transcendent over the others is the use of religious terminology as the dominant style of the address. Examples of this dominant style are these -- "I have but one lamp by

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-54.

¹⁷ This interpretation was discussed in the course, *Great Debates*, taught by Prof. Donald Williams at the University of Florida, October, 1966.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

which my feet are guided"; "It will prove a snare to your feet" and, "Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed by a kiss."¹⁹

Attempts to remedy "over-mystification" are better for the people involved than are attempts to proclaim a situation of "hierarchical psychosis." The latter prevents further communication and can culminate in violence. After the violence is spent, communication may be re-established but only with great difficulty.

A more constructive manner of countering 'mystification' is this: One might try to initiate more closeness of interaction across class lines so that 'mystification' would be lessened. This is the usual function of parties, parades, and holiday celebrations. These events provide a condition in which those who are normally unequal can participate in an equal manner and, as a result, can communicate more easily on an interpersonal level.²⁰ This new ease of communication carries over into "business situations." A major reason for business, office, or departmental parties is to stimulate interpersonal communications which in turn will keep the hierarchical order smoothly functioning for quite awhile after. Consequently, addresses given at functions of this type would contain techniques to proclaim greater social solidarity, unity, or similarity of all groups members in some major respect. An example of this approach is found in John Glenn's address to a joint session of Congress shortly after his

¹⁹Hibbitt, pp. 152-54.

²⁰Duncan, pp. 328-34.

orbital space flight on January 20, 1962. Ostensibly the speech was a factual report to Congress and to the American people. Since this was the first American orbital space flight, the speech celebrating it was also part of a national patriotic holiday. This second aspect is the one Glenn chose to stress in his short speech. Throughout the address Glenn referred to "our efforts," "We are now,"²¹ etc., to stress community participation in the flight and community importance of the event.

A paragraph which brought out the national identification of the speaker with all his American listeners was the following: (note that Glenn described a "mystic communion" between himself and his listeners)

This has been a great experience for all of us present and for all Americans, of course I am certainly glad to see that our pride in our country and its accomplishments is not a thing of the past. I still get a hard-to-define feeling inside when the flag goes by -- and I know that all of you do, too. Today as we rode up Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House and saw the tremendous outpouring of feeling on the part of so many thousands of our people I got this same feeling all over again. Let us hope that none of us ever loses it.²²

This paragraph underscores the contribution of the nation's workers from diverse fields to the great community project:

There are many more people, of course, involved in our flight in Friendship 7; many more things involved, as well as people. There was the vision of Congress that established this national program of space exploration. Beyond that many thousands of people were involved, civilian contractors, and many sub-contractors in many different fields; many elements -- civilian, civil service, and military, all blending their efforts toward a common goal.²³

²¹ Hibbitt, pp. 98-101.

²² Ibid., pp. 98-99.

²³ Ibid., p. 99.

Glenn seems deliberately vague and general about these contributions to the space program; this vagueness allows any listener who desires it to imagine that in some unknown way his work has contributed to the success of Friendship 7's launching.

Usually national celebrations like the one Glenn's speech exemplified serve as generalized preventatives against too much "mystification" in our society rather than as remedies for already established "over-mystification." However, one specific point of tension the speech helped to relieve was frustration and national embarrassment over Russia's earlier space successes. Russian successes had strained communication between segments of the American public and certain educational and governmental agencies.²⁴ Glenn's reference to the many contributions of common people must have given psychological satisfaction to those who felt helpless and insignificant in a large impersonal society. Glenn rose well to the nature of the speech situation. Undoubtedly he deepened his audiences' appreciation of the occasion's significance beyond what they had initially perceived; he also alleviated the dominant psychological tensions of the time particularly well.

John Glenn's address illustrates the use of ceremonial rhetoric mainly to prevent the development of "over-mystification," and also to counter excess "mystification" which may have already existed. The ceremonial occasion is one type of "play" which may be used to counter excess "mystification" to establish communication. "Play" is the condition within the social hierarchy opposite to "mystification." One

²⁴Hans W. Gatzke, The Present in Perspective (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), pp. 188-97.

might see this comparison between "mystification" and "play" by considering an analogy with a well known drama concept.

"Mystification" is a process of stressing differences in rank and ability between classes; in this respect "mystification" is the process of creating aesthetic distance between classes. The result is that the power of those in authority will cause the others in the hierarchy to follow readily their subordinate role just as aesthetic distance in the theatre is used to make the activities of the actors more real and potent with the audience through the strong differentiation of spectators versus action on the stage.

Aesthetic distance can become so extreme that its artificiality is noticeable. Then the audience feels unable to empathize with the players and their actions. When aesthetic distance has become too extreme, techniques such as staging theatre-in-the-round and providing for the movement of actors into the audience, are relied on to reverse the effect of prevailing aesthetic distance. These tactics create, in effect, an aesthetic closeness. Duncan's concept of "play" is roughly equivalent to the reversal of aesthetic distance. In "play," symbols of class-differential are weakened and the "mystic communion" of all individuals within a transcendent principle is stressed, resulting in closer communications between classes.

Certain settings lend themselves quite well to "play" techniques. Highly formal situations adapt easily to ceremonial types of "play" (ritual, ceremony, and parades). Highly informal situations adapt easily to various humorous or audience participation forms of "play." However, the in-between situations, especially settings concerned with

the harsh realities of a social problem or the clash of legislative debate do not lend themselves to the use of "play" techniques as the dominant strategy of countering "mystifications." Argument to expose "mystifications" is the main means of counter in these latter situations. Sometimes "play" techniques in the form of satire, jokes, or audience participation are used early in the argumentative address. These attenuated forms of "play" serve as a bridge in smoothing communication between alienated groups. However, social problem discussions or legislative debates are generally concerned with more than the re-establishment of communication and cooperation between alienated groups. The two situations are generally marked by a concern with making redistributions of social or political privilege.

The arguments used to expose "mystifications" hindering the social or political progress of a group may be expressed in a speech, essay, work of literature, a joke, an advertising circular, or in conversation. The strategy of argument might be that of traditional logic such as argument from tradition, definition, or similitude. A mode of argument peculiarly fitted to the circumstances might be developed. For instance, during a debate over whether or not to have gun licensing, one participant made the point that acquisition of guns cannot be controlled in view of the fact that by spending one hour one can make a rifle out of simple household materials.²⁵

Since exposure of excess "mystification" through argument is an important persuasive step toward effecting social reform, this third

²⁵Milwaukee Journal, August 2, 1968, p. 4.

method of countering excess "mystification" is the one of most interest to the critic of persuasive discourses.

A complete speech will be analyzed and evaluated here in order to show the use of various types of argument to expose "over-mystifications." The speech chosen for analysis was delivered by Frederick Douglass, a freed slave and prominent spokesman for Negro rights. In this address he was concerned with countering "mystifications" used to keep the Negro in slavery.

The speech was presented on July 5, 1852, at Corinthian Hall in Rochester, New York. The purpose of the speech was to commemorate the Fourth of July. Specific details regarding the audience and the group sponsoring the address are not available. It was reported that Douglass spoke frequently in Corinthian Hall, usually under sponsorship of the Rochester Anti-Slavery Society. It was also reported that "The lectures were well-attended and they contributed to the growth of anti-slavery sentiment in the community."²⁶ The only clue to the impact of this particular speech is this quotation from the archives of the Rochester Historical Society, Volume XLV -- "An address such as this might have resulted in the mobbing of Douglass had it been delivered in many cities. It was, of course, denounced by many Rochesterians whom it shocked."²⁷

Presumably, few of the audience members could have been members of the anti-slavery society, since Douglass addresses them as though they

²⁶ Philip S. Foner, Frederick Douglass (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), p. 127.

²⁷ Houston Peterson, A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 482.

have done nothing to advance the rights of oppressed people. Possibly the speech was sponsored by a church group. Douglass strongly chastises the churches for not doing more; also, his one concrete suggestion regarding how to begin reform is directed to agencies of the church.

The master strategy of the July Fifth Address is this -- first Douglass stresses the guarantee of liberty to all Americans stated in the Declaration of Independence, then he argues that Negroes are men. If the audience accepts his arguments they are led to the enthymematic conclusion that they must grant the Negro liberty. According to comments by Chestnut, one of Douglass' biographers, this was Douglass' strategy in most of his pre-Civil War speeches.²⁸ Benjamin Quarles, Douglass' most famous biographer, says Douglass generally spoke on the same central theme, changing one speech from another only in externals necessary to fit the occasion or setting.²⁹

A general description of Douglass' bearing and manner of presentation should be helpful to the fullest understanding of the speech situation. This description was given of Douglass in 1852, the year Douglass delivered the speech currently being considered:

Facing the audience, he showed no signs of nervousness -- he had a talent for talking fluently. For the space of a few moments, however, he said nothing, as if to satisfy those among the two thousand spectators who might wish to size him up as a physical specimen. Broad-shouldered, six feet tall and in the

²⁸ Charles Chestnut, Frederick Douglass (Boston: Small, Maynard and Co., 1899), p. 110. This would not be true of his speeches to recruit black soldiers for the Union.

²⁹ Benjamin Quarles, "Abolition's Different Drummer," in The Anti-Slavery Vanguard, ed. by Martin Duberman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 125.

prime of manhood, he could bear scrutiny. His skin was bronze-colored and his mass of black hair was nearly separated on the left. His eyes were deep-set and steady. But at the moment they were less expressive than his well-formed nose that now, as he prepared to say his first word, inhaled deeply, almost critically, as though the air might offer to nonwhites an inferior oxygen if vigilance were relaxed.

The speakers' sentences had now gained momentum. Those who were listening to him for the first time became aware of a voice that employed every degree of light and shade; a rich baritone, giving emotional vitality to every word.³⁰

A statement was made in the previous quotation that Douglass never suffered stagefright. Oddly, at the beginning of his Fifth of July Speech, Douglass speaks of nervousness. It is of a different nature -- nervousness in speaking before people separated from him, a Negro, by vast social distance.³¹ Duncan refers to social separation resulting from excess "mystification" as the major pathology of society. Duncan adds that social separation causes embarrassment and guilt to all social classes involved in it.³² Different ways of underscoring the vast social separation of Negro and White comprise the theme of Douglass' speech.

In the first one-third of the address Douglass discusses the specific purpose of this occasion -- celebration of Independence Day. This discussion bolsters Douglass' proposition regarding liberty for the Negro. He reminds his audience that the founding fathers denied the

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 123-24.

³¹ Frederick Douglass, The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, ed. by Philip S. Foner (New York: International Publishers, 1950), Vol. II, p. 102.

³² Duncan, p. 308.

infallibility of government and upheld the right to revolt against unjust laws.³³ He also declares that the equalitarian idea permeating the Declaration of Independence is the transcendent principle of American society and should be always followed, no matter how difficult:

The principles contained in that instrument are saving principles. Stand by those principles, be true to them on all occasions in all places, against all foes, and at whatever cost.³⁴

Douglas then returns to his central theme, stressing the social sin of racial separation in this major transitional comment.

I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary. Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us . . . Do you mean citizens to mock me, by asking me to speak today?³⁵

After reading descriptions of Douglass' fiery delivery and frequent use of irony and satire,³⁶ one can imagine his rendering of the word citizen to the audience to mock them for excluding his black brethren from citizenship.

As Douglass talks of viewing Independence Day from the slave's viewpoint he reveals the roots of the transcendent principle:

I shall appeal in the name of humanity outraged, liberty fettered, and in the name of the constitution and the Bible which are disregarded and trampled upon.³⁷

In the remainder of the speech humanity, liberty, the constitution, and the Bible are four of the major topics from which Douglass draws both

³³ Douglass, Life and Writings, pp. 183-85.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 185.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 189.

³⁶ Quarles, p. 128.

³⁷ Douglass, Life and Writings, p. 190.

his constructive and refutative motivational concepts. There are also a number of appeals to American self-interest. Douglass has wisely made a variety of appeals in the hope of moving individuals of the audience who may be predominantly humanitarian, or patriotic, or religious-minded, or expediency oriented. The first four topical appeals are ones that loyal Americans can hardly disagree with, especially during an Independence Day celebration. Good citizens could only attempt to disagree with Douglass' logic in connecting these motivational concepts to the Negroes' plea for liberty.

Douglass realizes that some of his auditors will try to argue in their own minds that the Negro is a special case to whom the usual democratic and religious principles do not apply. These ideas of the Negro as a special case are defense mechanisms in the form of motivational concepts which Douglass must refute. Another way of putting the matter is to say Douglass must induce his audience to label the object, Negro, in a manner more favorable to his rhetorical goal. Consequently he says, "Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man?" Douglass proceeds to show that the Negro is accountable to the law for crimes, and that he is taught to worship God—acts reserved only for man.³⁸ The fact that the speaker of this intelligent discourse is a Negro is an even stronger proof. The latter fact is not mentioned by Douglass, but it must have been uppermost in the minds of his audience. Quarles reports that consciousness of this factor was a significant part of Douglass' overall persuasive strategy. Douglass wrote an autobiography

³⁸ ibid., p. 190.

and printed a weekly newspaper primarily to expose the "mystification" that Negroes are sub-human.³⁹ Evidence of this nature would not be refuted easily even in the mind of a bigot.

The next and related argument is framed as a question -- "Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty?"⁴⁰ This argument has been answered by the Independence Day occasion itself. The two preceding arguments complete the major enthymeme discussed previously. Next follows a "pseudo-question" which is really a pathetic argument:

What am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of liberty . . . to beat them with sticks, to burn their flesh, hunt them with dogs?⁴¹

Douglas denies the need to argue and denies the fact that he is presenting arguments as he makes his next statement. The emotional response he desires from his listeners is underscored as well:

at a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument is needed. . . . The feeling of the nation must be roused. The propriety of the nation must be startled. The hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced.⁴²

Duncan argues that scorching irony is an argument; in fact, he declares it the most rational look at society men are ever exposed to:

Thus, all comedy is highly moral, but it is the morality of reason in society. It seeks to unmask vices by confronting ends or ideals with means or practice, the final transcendence in comedy is society itself, people who in love and hate try to resolve differences.⁴³

³⁹Quarles, p. 130.

⁴⁰Douglass, Life and Writings, p. 191.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 191.

⁴²Ibid., p. 192.

⁴³Duncan, p. 390.

The precise manner in which humor aids in unmasking vices becomes more apparent if one considers Bussard's definition of how humor works on the receiver, "Officially humor is the mental capacity for perceiving or expressing absurdities."⁴⁴ What better instrument could Douglass have chosen to expose the absurdity of slavery on a holiday dedicated to the liberty of all men? What better instrument could Douglass have used to cut through the major "mystifications" supporting slavery than to say this: "Do you know what is a swine-drover then I'll show you a man-drover [the slave trader]."⁴⁵ These ironic phrasings are followed by gory descriptions of the maltreatment of slaves. Douglass also cites national inconsistencies of which the following is an example:

You are all on fire at the mention of liberty for France or Ireland; but are as an iceberg at the thought of liberty for the enslaved American. . . .⁴⁶

Yet as he presents these varied arguments, Douglass three times denies either the use or the need of argument to support his cause. Could Douglass fail to realize that pathos and irony are forms of arguments? This is not the most reasonable interpretation. Other actions by Douglass show his profound awareness of persuasive tactics. The persuasive purpose Douglass fulfilled through the writing of autobiographies and the publishing of a weekly newspaper have been noted previously. Regarding the content of Douglass' first autobiography, Quarles says, "Perhaps the most striking quality of the narrative is

⁴⁴Paul Bussard, ed., The Catholic Treasury of Wit and Humor (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1960), p. 11.

⁴⁵Douglass, Life and Writings, p. 193.. ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 200.

Douglass' ability to mingle incident with argument."⁴⁷ Quarles also reports that in 1850, Douglass said he was ready "to employ the terse rhetoric of the ballot box."⁴⁸ In view of these facts it is difficult to believe that Douglas was unaware that he was arguing in this speech.

Douglass gives a clue to his behavior when he makes his third denial of argument. He says it would appear ridiculous to divide, subdivide, and partition components as though of a debatable proposition.⁴⁹ Douglass wishes to underscore that the right of the Negro to freedom is absolute and inherent, guaranteed by the transcendent principle of equality contained both in the Bible and in the Declaration of Independence. To help his audience view the question as one of absolute moral right, he needed to create verbally the proper scene. It was sound strategy to deny the use of argumentation since the traditional view of argument would be an attempt to establish probability.

Douglass denounces the American churches for doing little to eliminate slavery in contrast with the British churches which were the major agency for effecting change in that nation. His view is that if the religious press, pulpit, Sunday schools, church conferences, and Bible societies all would speak out, the institution of slavery could be toppled.⁵⁰ (This is Douglass' one appeal for concrete action.)

⁴⁷Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. xvii.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. ix.

⁴⁹Douglass, Life and Writings, p. 193.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 198.

There is a burden of proof upon a speaker to discuss any factor which might be considered a significant barrier to carrying out the rhetorical proposition. In the 1850's, many Americans felt that the Constitution guaranteed the perpetuation of slavery as an institution. Douglass maintained that there was no definite pro-slavery proposition in the Constitution, and he cited several prominent lawyers who believed this. This argument was satisfactory but thinly detailed. Douglass also said that individual citizens were entitled to make private interpretations of the Constitution and persuade others to support modified applications.⁵¹ The problem with this argument was that one would also have to conclude that the slave-holders continue to be granted their private interpretation of the Constitution.

The arguments in this address based on religious and constitutional considerations are characteristic of Douglass' speaking between 1851 and 1855, but they represent significant modifications of his earlier attitude toward church and Constitution. At first Douglass concurred with William Lloyd Garrison who denounced the church and discounted it as a possible ally. Douglass later came to view the church as more anti-slavery in its learnings than any other influential institution, and decided to court its aid.⁵²

Earlier Douglass had also concurred with Garrison in terming the Constitution, "A covenant with death and an agreement with the Devil." Douglass later hypothesized that a better tactic would be to associate the Constitution with his proposition. Douglass promoted an interpretation

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-02.

⁵² Foner, *Fredrick Douglass*, p. 148.

regarding slavery that was not evident in the document itself, but that could not be proven inconsistent with it.⁵³

Taking these modified positions regarding church and Constitution was persuasively sound. Douglass was more successful in promoting abolition than Garrison who ten years later had to adopt these positions himself.⁵⁴ Moreover, Duncan explains that continual debunking of major societal institutions has a psychologically disastrous effect. People either completely ignore the rhetor who takes such an approach, or they listen and become demoralized, often expressing their demoralization by the commission of anti-social acts.⁵⁵ The truth of this analysis of debunking seems borne out by the effect radical supporters of the anti-Vietnam cause frequently have on their receivers. While disenchantment with the war is widespread, the moderate middle class American receiver of these appeals generally turns away in disgust from anti-war marchers and draft card burners. These extreme debunkers not only oppose the war but also attack the chief leaders of the nation as liars and criminals and charge that the major institutions of society are hopelessly corrupt. Among those whom the protesters do convince, such as the "hippies," there is widespread dope addiction.

Douglass did a skillful job of arguing that the Negro must be freed. He countered well the "mystifications" of his day which were used to perpetuate the institution of slavery. Passionate both in phrasing and in presentation of his case, Douglass praised the principles behind

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-43.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁵⁵ Duncan, p. 390.

major American institutions, criticizing only the specific application of these principles to the American Negro. The discussion of debunking has shown that this was the most psychologically sound approach to take. Douglass' heavy use of ironic humor to get people to see the issue more clearly through the eye of reason instead of through unreasoning prejudice was also most appropriate. This excerpt from a study of humor aids in seeing why:

Thus, one who wishes to cultivate his sense of humor must learn that there are times at least when he must free himself from dignity, restraint and prejudice. . . . A joke is seen through the intellect as well as felt as a sensation; we see the point of a joke before we feel that it is funny.⁵⁶

Most important, Douglass' enthymeme which comprised the master strategy of his Fifth of July address is supported by the test of time. A recent newspaper article outlines this strategy as the one which has been the main tactic of the civil rights struggle. The authors describe it as quite successful in the past and certain to be more successful in the future. The authors also cite the ethical value of Douglass' efforts for the whole of American society not just for the anti-slavery cause:

But the Negro must remember before succumbing to the preachments of black racists, that the fundamental decency of Americans is, as it has been in the past, his greatest ally. Americans' commitment to democracy is his real power. The conscience-prodding ideals of the Declaration of Independence are his real weapon.

⁵⁶Max J. Herzberg and Leon Mones, Humor of America (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1945), pp. 2-3.

Growing numbers of white Americans are coming to realize that those ideals must become reality to "The last American," the Negro, or they can be no reality to America.⁵⁷

This newspaper commentary seems to be another way of saying that if one's argumentative case is strongly connected to the transcendent principle of one's society as one's main motivational concept, one will be persuasively effective in the long run.

Despite Douglass' generally skillful handling of the address, two negative criticisms have been made. First Douglass did not explain his countering of the Constitutional issue in a clear or well documented manner. Also, Douglass failed to outline concrete steps which his audience might have taken to initiate the abolition of slavery. He could have detailed specific activities to be undertaken by particular pressure groups that were represented in his audience.

The last part of this chapter was concerned with an analysis and evaluation of an oration by Frederick Douglass. The speech contained a variety of persuasive tactics. Some of these tactics were ones which a traditional critic using the 'Neo-Aristotelian' framework is aware of. Hence, referral to an enthymeme, the citing of *topoi*, and discussion of pathetic proofs all sounded quite traditional. A number of other factors pertinent to Douglass' speech are likely to be overlooked or at least not fully pursued in a traditionally-based criticism.

Duncan's discussion of humor supplemented with corroborative writings on the subject enabled a richer understanding of irony as

⁵⁷Don Oakley and John Lane, "All Men or None," Milwaukee Journal, August 2, 1968, p. 2.

it functioned in Douglass' address. These writings on humor also provided a gauge for judging the overall appropriateness of each technique of irony. Explication of the transcendent principle enabled one to understand why Douglass denied the use of argument, and to judge the efficacy of such a technique. In addition an understanding of debunking provided a yardstick to judge the appropriateness of Douglass' strategy of attacking application of the transcendent principle to Negroes while pouring lavish praise on the principle itself. Knowledge of the transcendent principle as it functions in communications between social groups indicated that the particular enthymeme Douglass used to carry the burden of his argument was the best kind a social reformer could utilize.

Earlier in the chapter several other considerations useful to the rhetorical critic were explored. The critic can use his knowledge of "symbolic boasting" to analyze the motives and goals of persuaders when these are not obvious. The critic can study appropriate documents for "ultimate terms" as part of his audience analysis, if he wishes to evaluate the appeals made by competing persuaders to a given group. The critic should find useful an understanding of social "mystification" and the three major strategies used to counter it. The critic was shown types of rhetorical situations where each of the three strategies predominates and he was shown representative tactics within each strategy. Although the stress in this chapter was on the countering of social "mystifications," the critic can make inferences from the discussion of the process used in deliberately building social "mystification." In addition, examples of building social "mystification" were illustrated

previously in Chapter IV. Roosevelt used social "mystification" when he created for himself an aura of charisma and also when he presented himself as an exemplar of concern for "essential democracy."

CHAPTER VI

A STUDY OF THE RHETORIC OF THE MILWAUKEE OPEN HOUSING ADVOCATES

In developing the last three theoretical chapters several speeches were briefly analyzed and assessed in terms of principles developed in a given chapter. The purpose of these brief instances of criticism was two-fold -- to test the applicability of the principles discussed and to illustrate to the critic their precise application. The concern of this chapter is to aid in the completion of this two-fold purpose. The previous sample criticisms were limited in that each concerned a single message conveyed through the speech medium. It was felt, therefore, that a persuasive event consisting of a whole series of messages which were sometimes spoken, sometimes written, and more frequently conveyed non-verbally would be helpful as a final test and illustration of critical principles developed in the dissertation.

Criticism to be applied here will necessarily be more extensive than previous ones since a whole chapter is being devoted to the purpose, and since the persuasive event itself -- the Milwaukee open housing campaign is more complicated than a single message event. Much of this extensive discussion is devoted to tracing the history of the campaign. More critical principles developed in the study will apply to the

campaign than were involved in each of the other sample criticisms, but all of the principles are not illustrated in the campaign or in any one single instance of persuasion. Therefore, the whole series of criticisms presented in the dissertation must be considered together to see the total pattern of criteria resulting from the new critical framework.

Since a greater number of critical principles will apply to the campaign and since they have been developed gradually through the preceding four chapters it seems necessary at this point to present a synopsis of the overall persuasion theory from which the criteria are inferred.

The most crucial component in the overall persuasion theory and the unifying element to which all other phases of the theory relate is the motivational concept. The term motivational concept conveys the same general idea as the traditional terms motivational appeal or persuasive appeal. The new term, motivational concept, borrowed from Cronkhite, is used in order to focus more attention on this component and also to indicate that the component signified by the new term is handled more precisely than in traditional theory and criticism.

In the new theory a description is offered of the precise process by which motivational concepts are used to facilitate acceptance of the proposition in question. This process description is presented as a general formula which holds true for every instance of successful persuasion whether it is a one message or campaign type of event and whether or not the form of publication of the message(s) is spoken, written, non-verbal, or a combination of these. The precise process is one of associational conditioning to the proposition of properly

selected motivational concepts. Properly selected motivational concepts consist of values, beliefs, needs, or courses of action already accepted by those to be persuaded and which orient them toward the type of action desired toward the proposition. In addition, the motivational concept must be one which can be plausibly connected with the proposition as having a true intrinsic relation to it. A brief comparison with a traditional rhetorical concept permits an underscoring of this last condition, intrinsic connection. The motivational concepts are conclusions or thought configurations existing as major premises in the minds of the audience members. The connecting link between the concept(s) used and the proposition must be a minor premise statement to indicate that the issue with which the proposition is concerned is a special case or application of the motivational concept. If these situational components are met through the selection of appropriate motivational concepts, and if they are strongly connected with the proposition through skillful use of learning factors such as contiguity and generalization, it is likely that receivers will be persuaded.

If only the first two conditions of appropriate motivational concept selection are applied, either no conditioning will take place, or there will be conditioning resulting in forced compliance rather than in persuasion. Forced compliance occurs when the third condition is violated in that the motivational concept is a coercive appeal which could be applied in various unrelated situations to achieve the same outward effects, but which has no intrinsic connection with the proposition. Those forced to comply will do so only in the immediate situation. On the contrary, those truly persuaded have learned a new behavioral

response which they will continue to act out over a period of time in a variety of similar situations. They will behave in this stable, predictable manner because they have been self-persuaded; they have followed in their own minds the minor premise linking the rhetorical issue to previously accepted major premises. Hence, the action area toward which receivers were previously oriented regarding the given motivational concept(s) is transferred or conditioned to the proposition itself.

A more precise analysis of the various facets which facilitate or prevent persuasive conditioning considers in detail three basic stages in the persuasion process -- perception, judgment, and action. Beyond choosing appropriate motivational concepts, the rhetor must word them in a manner that will allow ideological perception of exactly the desired action orientation. Miscellaneous psychological blocks to accurate perception of the overall persuasive message or of component parts, such as the motivational concepts or the links connecting these concepts to the proposition, must be anticipated and provided for. Common perceptual barriers could be lack of interest in the rhetorical issue, a general state of anxiety in receivers precluding thought processes that would occur otherwise, or a prejudicial view of the topic, causing receivers to fail to listen open-mindedly to a new viewpoint. As a subcategory of the latter problem, receivers may believe in certain motivational concepts which must be refuted before the receivers can objectively consider the subject. Many of the motivational concepts of this nature could be described specifically as stereotypes or psychological defense mechanisms.

If these perception factors are adequately provided for in conveying suitable lines of conditioning, it is likely that receivers will label the proposition in terms of thought configurations suggesting an action toward which they are strongly oriented. Hence, receivers will make a favorable judgment of the proposition and should act it out, barring significant hindrances to the carrying out of the desired action or a failure to receive specific directions as to how to initiate and carry through a course of action.

This chapter is concerned with a generalized analysis and evaluation of the persuasive efforts of the Milwaukee open housing advocates. For the purpose of a comprehensive study, this campaign is a topic which should be the focus of an entire dissertation. A briefer treatment is offered here not as a finished work of criticism but as a helpful vehicle to elucidate aspects of the critical theory not tested in earlier sample criticisms, especially the theory's application to persuasive events which are predominantly non-verbal. In this study, there is a consideration of events occurring between August 28, 1967, when formal protest marches commenced and April 30, 1968,¹ when the Milwaukee City Council passed a city ordinance slightly stronger than the federal law passed by Congress on April 11th of that year. Most Milwaukee residents regard this as the time period constituting an official, organized campaign. In actuality, it is difficult to pinpoint the beginning and closing dates of significant agitation on the subject of open housing. On May 17, 1966, Mrs. Vel Phillips, the only Negro member of the City

¹"Strong Housing Law Approved by Aldermen," Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1968, p. 1.

Council proposed to that body adoption of a city open housing ordinance. Even after the law was passed on April 30, 1968, there was unpublicized agitation at private council subcommittee meetings and, on January 21, 1969, Mrs. Phillips, with the assistance of like-minded people, won passage of an open housing law with absolutely no restrictions.² In addition, both the N.A.A.C.P. youth council and various neighborhood organizations in the ghetto are sponsoring self-help projects such as rehabilitating parolees, tutoring ghetto children, and educating white neighborhood groups about conditions in the slums.³ The Youth Council has also been demonstrating against various Milwaukee businesses which are discriminatory in hiring Negroes.⁴ These projects are a direct outgrowth of the housing campaign even though it has officially ended.

Considerable time will be spent tracing the history of the open housing campaign. Weaved into this historical tracing will be preliminary evaluations of campaign goals and tactics in terms of the critical theory developed in the last four chapters of this dissertation.

Before a full scale campaign was launched, Mrs. Vel Phillips, proposed at four different times a city open housing ordinance in the Milwaukee City Council. Mrs. Phillips, elected in 1956, is the only woman on the City Council and until April, 1968, was also the only Negro member. She has a law degree and is the wife of a Milwaukee

²"Exemptions on Housing Voted Out," Milwaukee Journal, January 22, 1969, sec. 2, p. 3.

³"Civil Rights Drive," Milwaukee Journal, July 31, 1968, p. 12.

⁴Ibid.; "Boycotts," Milwaukee Star, August 10, 1968, pp. 1-2. Borden's Dairy, Allen-Bradley, and Cutler-Hammer were three firms demonstrated against.

attorney. The four dates on which Mrs. Phillips proposed a city open housing ordinance were May 17, 1966, July 12, 1966, October 12, 1966, and March 21, 1967.⁵ On each of these occasions, eighteen councilmen voted against the ordinance, while Mrs. Phillips was its sole supporter.⁶

After the fourth unsuccessful attempt to move the City Council to action, Mrs. Phillips received organized support for the launching of the campaign which was to focus national attention on Milwaukee.

Mrs. Phillips' actions, which had been prompted by restiveness in the Negro community, generated there an even stronger clamor for passage of an open housing law. However, these inner-core residents needed leadership in channeling their feelings of restiveness and their desire to protest conditions they felt were unfair. In mid-1967, a white Roman Catholic priest, Father James Groppi, began organizing the N.A.A.C.P. Youth Council and other interested blacks and whites into protest groups to urge adoption of a city open housing law. Father Groppi had begun serving in 1965 as a priest in the predominantly Negro St. Boniface Catholic Parish. This experience apparently alerted him to the need for protest of living conditions in the ghetto. One of Father Groppi's fellow priests has also offered the explanation that Father Groppi, who is thirty-eight and of Italian background, grew up during a period when there was much discrimination against Italian-Americans.

⁵Letter from Vel Phillips, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 5, 1968.

⁶"Strong Housing Law Approved by Aldermen," Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1968, p. 1.

Hence, he has identified closely with the downtrodden Negro.⁷ In 1966 Father Groppi began leading rallies at which he made brief statements in support of open housing and other projects to end discriminatory practices; during this period there were no organized marches. Then in late July, 1967, there were several days of rioting in which the National Guard was called out and police sealed off the inner core area of Milwaukee. The entire city was also under a 9:00 P.M. curfew.⁸

Shortly after the riots, Father Groppi and the Youth Council vowed that they intended to hold nightly protest marches until the Council would pass a city housing ordinance. The first day of marching, August 28, 1967, consisted of a foray from St. Boniface Church to Milwaukee's southside ending in Kosciusko Park.⁹ This area was chosen because not one Negro family has been able to integrate into it. The area is populated mainly by Polish-Americans. In Milwaukee, as in other areas of the nation, persons of immigrant background tend to be less sympathetic to the civil rights movement than the general population.¹⁰ A number of the Southsiders replied to the marchers with insults and rocks. The following day after the havoc caused by the march to the Southside, Mayor Maier issued a proclamation forbidding further night-time marches. However, that evening, Father Groppi led a march toward city hall in order to ask the Mayor why he did not give

⁷WTMJ-TV newscast, "Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 10, 1967.

⁸"Civil Right Drive," Milwaukee Journal, July 31, 1968, p. 12.

⁹"March to Southside," Milwaukee Journal, August 29, 1968, p. 1.

¹⁰"Civil Rights Drive," Milwaukee Journal, July 31, 1968, p. 1.

the marchers police protection rather than ordering them to desist from their activities. Father Groppi was arrested for ignoring the proclamation and for resisting arrest.¹¹ He was later convicted of the second charge, fined five hundred dollars, and placed on two years' probation. A federal court ruled the Mayor's proclamation unconstitutional in that it violated the right of peaceful assembly; consequently, no one who had marched in violation of it could be convicted.¹² Although the court decision came months later, the Mayor rescinded his proclamation the next day when legal advisors informed him that his action probably was unconstitutional. The marches continued nightly for 200 consecutive days.¹³ Generally, 150 to 300 people participated in each of the demonstrations. The marchers received the police protection they had requested at a cost to the city of over \$20,000 per day beyond usual police expenditures. This added cost factor was then capitalized upon as a motivational concept by the open housing advocates.¹⁴

A consideration of certain facts shows why protests were centered on the lack of a city open housing law. Milwaukee has about 90,000 Negro residents. Seven out of eight of these, or about 79,000 are renters,¹⁵ and it was renters who suffered most from discriminatory practices as most of them fell within the 66 percent of cases not

¹¹"Groppi Arrested," Milwaukee Journal, August 30, 1968, p. 1.

¹²"Jury Decides Groppi Resisted Arrest," Milwaukee Journal, February 10, 1968, p. 1.

¹³"Marches End," Milwaukee Journal, March 17, 1968, p. 3.

¹⁴Vel Phillips, an address given to Milwaukee City Council, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September, 19, 1968, p. 3.

¹⁵"Open Housing Concern," Milwaukee Star, November 25, 1967, p. 2.

covered in the weak Wisconsin state open housing law. For instance, anti-discrimination laws did not apply to owner-occupied apartment buildings and duplexes with four or fewer units, and owner-occupied rooming houses with four or fewer renters. The law did not apply to owner-occupied dwellings on lots no larger than sixty feet by 120 feet with four or fewer family units. The law also did not apply to owner-occupied family dwellings.¹⁶ Because housing discrimination had forced Milwaukee Negroes to seek housing in a small area, landlords were not required through competition to charge a reasonable amount. The result was that most Milwaukee Negroes who have annual incomes between \$3,000 and \$5,000 a year are forced to pay as high rent as the white residents of Milwaukee's most fashionable suburbs.¹⁷ It is facts such as these which supplied the core of motive power to the open housing campaign, though the leadership of Father Groppi, the Youth Council Commandos, Mrs. Phillips, and visiting celebrities, such as Dick Gregory (who spent two months in Milwaukee) were needed to generate concrete programs of protest. The commandos were twenty youths who served as the governing body of the Youth Council.

As the housing campaign developed there was an impasse between the Mayor and those favoring his position versus the advocates of an immediate housing ordinance stronger than the state law previously discussed. There were, of course, many white people opposed to further

¹⁶"Many Homes Exempt in City Housing Law," Milwaukee Journal, December 13, 1967, p. 2.

¹⁷James Groppi, "Open Housing: The Fight in the Streets," Humanist, XXVIII (July-August, 1968), 3.

open housing concessions because of racial prejudice or perhaps more frequently because of fear that their property values would decrease. The Mayor's position, on the other hand, was a compromise between an immediate new law versus no new law. His motivation was practical and economic. The Mayor felt that the city should not enact an ordinance until half of Milwaukee's suburbs, sixteen out of thirty-two, had enacted a similar law. His contention was that otherwise many of the white people in the city would flock to the suburbs and Milwaukee's tax base would dwindle just when much more money would be needed for core projects as well as to meet other needs of the city.¹⁸ The Mayor added that this mass exodus would lead to a more segregated society than was the case previously.¹⁹

Father Groppi and Mrs. Phillips challenged both the validity of this prediction and the sincerity of the Mayor in making it. They felt he was dodging the housing issue for political reasons and was using the tax threat as an excuse.²⁰ Some political considerations may have been involved because the Mayor knew that the issue would be postponed for quite a while if the city did not take action until sixteen suburbs had passed a housing ordinance. However, it is warranted to assume that the Mayor was sincere regarding his basic line of argument because long before the housing campaign, he had become so concerned

¹⁸ Henry Maier, "Statement on Open Housing Ordinance," address to Milwaukee City Council, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 16, 1967, pp. 3-9.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁰ "Maier Likened to Pontius Pilate," Milwaukee Journal, October 8, 1967, p. 2.

about city finances that he was investigating the possibility of levying a tax on suburban residents who earn their income in the city. It seems that in the last few years, most of the Mayor's written and spoken messages, whatever their official purpose, have been dominated by the theme, "How can we raise more tax money?"²¹

The Mayor based his prediction of a mass exodus mainly upon the fact that between 1957 and 1967, 25 percent of Milwaukee residents moved to the suburbs.²² He also pointed out that he based his estimate on supporting statements by the National Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, The Milwaukee Association of Commerce, Senator Paul Douglas, Chairman of the President's Commission on Urban Problems, and Robert Weaver, first Negro member of the President's Cabinet.²³

Since the Mayor made these statements, the Kerner Report on civil disorders had predicted such a mass exodus in urban centers all over the nation unless a productive level of interracial understanding and harmony was realized.²⁴ Consequently, it does seem that Father Groppi and Mrs. Phillips were overly harsh in assessing the Mayor's motivations, and that their response was an avoidance of what could well be an unpleasant reality. At the same time the Mayor should have been less

²¹"Effects on Housing Agitation," Milwaukee Journal, October 26, 1967, p. 3.

²²Henry Maier, "Statement on Open Housing Ordinance," address to Milwaukee City Council, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 16, 1967, p. 9.

²³Ibid., pp. 6-13.

²⁴Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Otto Kerner, Chairman (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 473-82.

materialistic and more diplomatic in his approach. When he did refer to the likelihood of greater segregation as a result of an immediate housing law, it sounded like an afterthought rather than a main theme. Yet it would have been a better theme for city-wide unification than any others he used.

It seemed a general characteristic of the open housing campaign that the spoken statements of leading principals indicated failure to capitalize on useful elements that were brought up only tangentially. In other instances, the principal figures (Groppi, Phillips, the Mayor) acted in a manner positively self-destructive to their cause.

The Mayor detracted from his image when he repeatedly lost his temper during the campaign and referred to Father Groppi as "that damned liar."²⁵

Mrs. Phillips missed opportunities to develop strong themes; she only listed them in her attempts to persuade the members of the City Council. An example is the point raised earlier regarding the exorbitantly high rent Milwaukee Negroes have had to pay. This situation suggests that Milwaukee taxpayers are contributing large sums of money for welfare in order that dishonest landlords can reap a profit. Detailed exposure of items of this nature would be likely to persuade both the City Council and the general public of the desirability of action. The high rent issue as well as other problems and expenses incurred by the city as the result of discriminatory housing practices should have been detailed rather than merely listed. Motivational

²⁵"Maier on Groppi," Milwaukee Journal, July 6, 1968, p. 4.

concepts are not clearly perceived by receivers unless they are detailed through amplification and are made specific through careful symbol manipulation.

Father Groppi also tended to list rather than detail and support arguments of the nature just discussed. In addition neither he nor Mrs. Phillips gave a detailed verbal picture of unpleasant conditions in the ghetto. Father Groppi built his speeches on a direct refutative attack of prejudiced people and on brief repetitive statements of what he demanded rather than on a full constructive case of what was necessary and why it should be granted.

Perhaps one reason that Father Groppi and Mrs. Phillips gave brief, undetailed addresses and rated speaking relatively unimportant in their array of tactics is that they felt the needs for change and arguments in support of them had been sufficiently established through the civil rights movement in general. Father Groppi has said on several occasions, "Our remarks are brief, we convey our message by marching."²⁶ In a letter to the researcher, Mrs. Phillips stated that she considered marches, boycotts, and other economic pressures of primary persuasive utility in the Milwaukee campaign.²⁷

Another observation should be made here which might explain the limited repertoire of arguments by Father Groppi and by Mrs. Phillips. It seems that they regarded altruistic appeals and appeals for greater

²⁶James Groppi, address at a rally held at St. Boniface Catholic Church, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 13, 1967.

²⁷Letter from Vel Phillips, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 5, 1968.

understanding of the Black man's plight as ineffectual with their Milwaukee audience. Hence, they spoke mainly in terms of economic self-interest and in terms of threats of disorder and bad publicity to the city. Father Groppi's appeals throughout the campaign were of this nature. Mrs. Phillips stressed undetailed altruistic appeals before the official campaign commenced and also in the earlier stages of it. Later, she tended to stress economic self-interest and developing inconvenience to the city.

In addition to the \$20,000 a day expense for marcher protection, several other economic pressures were used. The housing advocates urged all of their supporters to cease buying Schlitz beer.²⁸ This tactic was successful in that brewery officials became favorable to the housing campaign and had one of their public relations men, Ben Barkin, speak with civic and business officials in the Milwaukee area to gain further support for passage of an open housing law.²⁹ In addition, when Milwaukee was being considered for another National League baseball team, Mrs. Phillips wrote officials of the ten current ball clubs informing them that until more equitable housing laws were passed in Milwaukee, Negro citizens would boycott a major league team located there.³⁰ Several convention groups which had considered having Milwaukee as their host city selected other locations.³¹

²⁸"Voice of the Citizen," Milwaukee Star, September 23, 1967, p. 4.

²⁹"Barkin Speaks Out on City," Milwaukee Star, November 25, 1967, p. 1.

³⁰"Baseball Clubs Get Warning," Milwaukee Journal, November 13, 1967, p. 2.

³¹"Hotel Letter Tells Group City is Safe," Milwaukee Journal, October 10, 1967, p. 3.

Another major economic tactic was "Black Christmas." Milwaukee Negroes were urged by Father Groppi and the Youth Council to abstain from purchasing Christmas presents and decorations or at least to buy them only from Negro merchants. Apparently most Negroes complied with the directive not to buy at all, although some complained that the Youth Council Commandos used threats and forceful measures to gain compliance.³² Undoubtedly this boycott made a noticeable dent in downtown Milwaukee Christmas business,³³ and it is a fact that eventually many Milwaukee businessmen became more favorable to passage of a housing law. However, it seems to have been Negro businessmen who suffered real disaster from the Christmas boycott;³⁴ a boycott of only white merchants would have been a far more telling tactic.

Boycotts and similar economic pressures have been standard tactics in prolonged civil rights campaigns since the success of the 1955 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama directed by Martin Luther King, Jr.³⁵ King felt that while economic pressures did get some quick results, permanent persuasive success depended upon convincing most people to approve of civil rights goals for moral and altruistic reasons. King felt this would be accomplished by associating the civil rights campaigners

³²"Black Scrooge," Milwaukee Sentinel, December 19, 1967, p. 12; "Inner Core Shrouds Glitter of Christmas," and "Arson Attempts Made at Two Decorated Homes," Milwaukee Journal, December 19, 1967, p. 24.

³³"Black Scrooge," Milwaukee Sentinel, December 19, 1967, p. 12.

³⁴"Negro Merchants Lose Plea on Yule Boycott," Milwaukee Journal, December 17, 1967, p. 3.

³⁵Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 53-71; Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 78-80.

and their goals with already accepted American cultural values such as equality before the law, humanitarian treatment, the right of peaceful assembly, and (particularly in the religious sphere) the idea of creative suffering.³⁶ In addition to the utility of these as motivational concepts, strong association of the civil rights campaigners with these concepts would mean that the campaigners must be accepted as "in-group" Americans. Those who continued to treat the campaigners as an "out-group" undeserving of basic American rights would experience strong feelings of guilt. Hopefully they would relieve these guilt feelings by acceding to the civil rights advocates' requests.

King's famous "non-violence" stress was a part of the guilt-creation strategy. He pointed out that as long as the Negro acted peacefully and with dignity he would succeed gradually in putting himself in the "in-group" category of mainstream America in the minds of his American white audience and would eventually move toward accomplishment of his goals. However, to become violent would be to undo past and projected civil rights gains. Violent Negro actions would give the resisting white an escape; it would give him a defense mechanism for ignoring Negro pleas for equality.³⁷ The resisting white could then categorize the civil rights advocates as lawless, subversive, or even as communistic. Hence, these Negroes would be unAmerican and as members of such an "out-group" not entitled to fair, equal, or humane treatment. The social-psychological study of defense mechanisms,

³⁶King, Why We Can't Wait, pp. 92-95.

³⁷King, Why We Can't Wait, pp. 36-40.

particularly in the realm of utilizing "in-group" and "out-group" classifications, supports Dr. King's analysis as being most shrewd and accurate.³⁸ There is one other major facet of King's strategy which should be considered for the purpose of comparison with the Milwaukee open housing campaign. In his addresses, King stressed the value of a full extension of equal rights not only to the Negro but to all other denied Americans, as well. In other words, he stressed that the civil rights struggle is the struggle to fulfill American ideals; therefore, it will unify and strengthen American society and enoble all who work toward its fulfillment.³⁹ Through this tactic, the resistant white audience is presented with a positive motivational concept, intrinsically connected with the proposition, providing the reinforcement of benefits to them for favoring the desired course of action. This tactic also creates a "moral equivalent of war" concept of action which should be highly satisfying and productive of a cooperative attitude. The creating of a "moral equivalent of war" was discussed in Chapter IV in regard to Roosevelt's First Inaugural.

King also felt that his guilt-creation strategy would be facilitated if he could win influential civic and religious leaders to his cause early in the campaign.⁴⁰ The discussion in Chapter III of the role of "opinion leaders" in winning the general public or a set of general publics to causes promoted by mass persuasion techniques supports the efficacy of this tactic.

³⁸Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 46-57.

³⁹King, Stride Toward Freedom, pp. 83-88. ⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 175-86.

Since King's strategy has been illuminated and supported as a sound one, it can be used as a comparative yardstick in looking at the housing advocates' approach in comparable areas.

The use of civic, business, and particularly religious figures as "opinion leaders" was realized to a considerable extent in the Milwaukee campaign. During the middle and later phases the ranks of the nightly marchers were swelled with Catholic nuns and priests and representatives of the Protestant clergy. On October 26, 1967, a statement was published in the Milwaukee Journal supporting the goal of a city open housing ordinance and critical of the Mayor's position of inaction until an ordinance should be enacted by half of Milwaukee's suburbs. The prominent Milwaukee area clergymen who signed it were: Catholic Archbishop William Cousins, Rabbi Dudley Weinberg, Episcopal Bishop Donald Hallock, Methodist Bishop Ralph J. Alton, Rev. Theodore Matson, President of the Wisconsin-Upper Michigan Synod of the Lutheran Church of America, Rev. William Longbrake, Chief Executive of the Wisconsin Presbyterian Synod, Rev. Chris Lawson, Executive Minister of the Wisconsin Baptist State Convention, Rev. Roy Albersworth, Presiding Minister of the Southeast Wisconsin Association of the United Church of Christ, and Rev. Myron Sustinson, President of Southern Wisconsin District of the American Lutheran Church.⁴¹

In addition, most of the signers of the statement of support also subscribed to a "Friend of the Court Brief," supporting the American Civil Liberties Union, which sought to have declared unconstitutional an

⁴¹"Needed Now Clerics Insist," Milwaukee Sentinel, October 26, 1967, p. 2.

attempt to provide a referendum to be held in the April, 1968, Milwaukee city election.⁴² The referendum was a counter-tactic of opponents of an open housing law. It stated that, "The Milwaukee Common Council shall not enact any ordinance which in any manner restricts the right of owners to sell, lease, or rent private property." This referendum was approved by council members as a voting issue on November 29, because by November 4, 27,473 signatures had been affixed to a petition requesting such a referendum. This was 2,612 signatures above what was required by law. However, on March 4, 1968, Federal Judge Robert Tehan ruled the referendum unconstitutional.

The group which solicited signatures was the Milwaukee Citizen's Civic Voice.⁴³ The referendum was the main means of counter-protest used by the Civic Voice Group. However, they also conducted several counter-marches in which they were joined by "Operation Crescent," a Chicago property owner's association. The Civic Voice group was headed by Father Russell Witon, Chaplain of St. Alphonsus Hospital in Port Washington, about 20 miles north of Milwaukee, and Philip Johnson, a real estate salesman.⁴⁴

The proposed referendum was not the only noticeable counter to the housing advocates. Many Catholics and Lutherans were quite incensed with the official policies of their churches in supporting the housing

⁴²"Clergymen Fight Ballot on Housing," Milwaukee Journal, January 10, 1968, p. 2.

⁴³"Petitions May Bring Housing Bias Vote," Milwaukee Journal, November 5, 1967, p. 1.

⁴⁴"Southsiders Picket Wrong Home," Milwaukee Journal, December 7, 1967, p. 3.

campaign. These two denominations compose approximately two-thirds of the church affiliated population of Milwaukee.⁴⁵ A number of priests, especially from the Polish southside and suburban areas, were adamant in their condemnations of Father Groppi. The most notable of these was Father Laurence Brey, pastor of St. Rita's Church in West Allis. In a letter to the Milwaukee Journal, Father Brey went so far as to state that Father Groppi and his followers were advocating "a questionable and pink social gospel."⁴⁶

A great number of Milwaukee Catholics exerted pressure upon Archbishop William Cousins to speak out in condemnation of Father Groppi's activities or at least to transfer him to another area. The Archbishop made several announcements refusing to condemn or remove Father Groppi. However, the Archbishop had a rhetorical problem in that his supposedly clearcut statements in support of Father Groppi sounded vague and ambivalent. Perhaps this ambivalence was due to tension rather than lack of whole-hearted endorsement for on June 27, 1968, the Archbishop made this remark:

Father Groppi was the main factor in making the people of Milwaukee realize that theirs is a conservative, prejudiced city.

Jim Groppi has done more than any combination of groups and his was a single-handed housing victory in Milwaukee. That man is doing the job that I don't have the guts to.

The Archbishop did add, however, that he felt Father Groppi was lacking in public relations finesse and that he did not always approve

⁴⁵"Religious Survey," Milwaukee Journal, June 1, 1968, p. 16.

⁴⁶"Letters to the Editor," Milwaukee Journal, October 25, 1967, p.12.

of Father Groppi's tactics. Then in his typically ambivalent phrasing, the Archbishop added, "We can see the problem that lies behind the man. Let us not apologize for what we are doing, but let us find better ways of doing it."⁴⁷

Many Catholics who were disappointed that the Archbishop did not accede to their demands decided to protest further by withholding financial contributions to the Church. A report published in the Milwaukee Journal on June 20, 1968, indicated that in 1968, Milwaukee Catholics contributed \$188,228 less than they had in 1967 to the Archbishop's Charities and Development Fund. An even more revealing statistic was that only 112,000 out of a possible total of 190,000 Catholic income receivers in the archdiocese contributed.⁴⁸

There was quite noticeable dissention over the housing issue among Lutherans also. A number of Lutheran pastors wrote a letter published in the Milwaukee Journal critical of their church's official position in support of an open housing law.⁴⁹ A group of Lutheran laymen went so far as to send letters to the City Council, the state Attorney General, and the Federal Bureau of Internal Revenue, stating that their church should lose its tax exempt status since it was engaging in political activities.⁵⁰

⁴⁷"Cousins Hails Groppi's Stand," Milwaukee Journal, July 27, 1968, p. 6.

⁴⁸"Catholic Fund Takes a Big Drop," Milwaukee Journal, June 20, 1968, p. 7.

⁴⁹"Will Perish by the Sword," Milwaukee Journal, February 17, 1968, p. 12.

⁵⁰"Urge City to Tax Churches in Politics," Milwaukee Journal, December 19, 1967, p. 7.

The various counter-protests indicate sizeable and highly vocal opposition during the campaign. Perhaps the counter-protests were also indicative of twinges of guilt as several civic, business, and religious leaders sided with the housing advocates. If the open housing advocates could have continued and nurtured more strongly this feeling, they might have broken down the defense mechanisms of their opponents. Then, in order to eliminate feelings of cognitive dissonance, defined and discussed in Chapter IV, the opponents would have been more willing to change their attitude on open housing.

However, Father Groppi, Mrs. Phillips, and their followers generally failed to capitalize on possible germinal feelings of guilt, relying instead on self-interest and threat appeals. In fact, Father Groppi's approach would actually be useful to those searching for defense mechanisms to mitigate feelings of guilt. It is true he did make some attempts at generating feelings of guilt by trying to create the image of his followers as Christ-like martyrs and indicting those opposed to the campaign as "Pharisees."⁵¹ But Father Groppi's frequent espousal of violence made the preceding images seem less convincing. The following are samples of Father Groppi's statements on violence. On November 31, 1967, speaking at the First Congregational Church in Madison, Wisconsin, Father Groppi said that he was willing to discuss the effectiveness of violence as a tactic but would refuse to condemn it on moral grounds.

⁵¹ James Groppi, address at a rally held at St. Boniface Catholic Church, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 13, 1967.

He further added, "The young black man who is frustrated and angry by [sic] the political structure -- and who picked up a brick and attacked a gyp merchant -- that man is a freedom fighter."⁵²

Father Groppi made similar remarks in an address at the University of Illinois on April 2, 1968, as these excerpts show:

"I do not see how we can avoid further violence in the nation this summer."

"Morally and ethically I have no problems whatsoever," [about justifying violence]. He added in referring to H. Rap Brown's comment that violence was as American as cherry pie, "I have no quarrel with that at all. It's the truth."

In the same address, Father Groppi charged that Milwaukee was run like a police state. He said of Mayor Maier, "The only man who can beat Mayor Maier is [former Alabama] Governor George Wallace."⁵³ These latter statements show Father Groppi's tendency to intensify "out-groupings" and polarizations of opposing attitudes instead of trying to find points of identification which would unify dissident groups.

A further comparison can be made between Martin Luther King's overall strategy and the Milwaukee campaign. Father Groppi's manner of making a rigid separation between the housing martyrs and the "Pharisees," who seemed to be everyone not actively working in support

⁵²James Groppi, address given at First Congregational Church, Madison, Wisconsin, November 31, 1967.

⁵³James Groppi, address given at University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, April 2, 1968.

of the campaign, and his condoning of violence toward the "Pharisees," was opposed to the helpful technique of portraying the demonstrators as working in actuality for the betterment of society in general. In other words, King's approach was geared to blurring "out-group" distinctions and the achieving of identification on a new level, while Father Groppi tended to create sharper "in-group," "out-group" dichotomies.

Despite the failure of the campaign leaders to use some of the best available means of persuasion, they kept the eyes of the city and even of the nation focused on the issue through the daily rallies and marches, and the various economic pressures cited. For the fifth time on September 19, 1967, Mrs. Vel Phillips proposed that a city open housing ordinance stronger than the state law be adopted. She cited the \$20,000 a day cost of extra police and the nation-wide bad publicity received by the city as major reasons for the Councilmen to act promptly.⁵⁴

The response of the Council was to deliberate for months over her proposal, until they prepared to vote on December 13, 1967. In voting, the Council had a choice of voting for Mrs. Phillips's all-inclusive housing law, the Mayor's proposal which was a copy of Mrs. Phillips', except that it would not go into effect until also ratified by sixteen suburbs, and a compromise bill by Alderman Clarence Miller which was a carbon copy of the state law. It was Alderman Miller's bill which became law by a thirteen to six vote of the council. Mrs. Phillips

⁵⁴Vel Phillips, address given to Milwaukee City Council, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 19, 1968, p. 3.

voted against the Miller proposal.⁵⁵ Commentators on both sides said that the new ordinance had really settled nothing. Its only improvement over the state law, covering only a third of all housing cases, was that the city rather than the state would enforce it, and supposedly this would bring quicker action.⁵⁶ Father Groppi and the Youth Council considered the Council action as meaning almost total defeat for their cause, and they kept up the rallies and marches as usual.⁵⁷

Months later, heartened by the passage of a federal open housing law covering close to eighty percent of all housing, Mrs. Phillips proposed another all-inclusive law for Milwaukee in a Council meeting on April 12, 1968. Though Mrs. Phillips began by asking for an all-inclusive law, she expected passage of nothing stronger than a restatement of the new federal law. Consequently, it was a surprise to her and the other campaigners when the Council voted twelve to seven in favor of a law stronger than the federal one in two respects. The city law was to take immediate effect while most passages of the federal law would not be applied until 1970. In the city law also, discrimination in housing of three or more units was prohibited; whereas, in the federal law only housing of four or more units was covered. The only other exception to both the Milwaukee and federal law related to sales of single family dwellings handled by the owners themselves.⁵⁸ Two factors of special interest in the voting were that four of Milwaukee's six

⁵⁵"Limited Housing Law Approved by Council," Milwaukee Journal, December 13, 1967, p. 1.

⁵⁶ibid.

⁵⁷"80 March on Northside," Milwaukee Journal, December 13, 1967, p. 1.

⁵⁸"Strong Housing Law Approved by Aldermen," Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1968, p. 1.

southside Aldermen voted for the ordinance and all seven of Milwaukee's new Aldermen, including an additional Negro member, Orville Pitts, voted in favor of the ordinance.⁵⁹ These new aldermen had been selected in the April election which preceded the vote on the housing ordinance by only about three weeks. This factor might seem to indicate a drastic change in the will of the people regarding open housing. Yet at the same time Mayor Maier, who was opposed to the position of the campaigners, was re-elected by the greatest margin any Milwaukee Mayor has ever received.⁶⁰ Three of the Mayor's four opponents in the primary were in favor of a strong open housing law. His fourth opponent, surprisingly, was a Negro who campaigned against open housing.⁶¹ A definite statement of the opinion of the Milwaukee audience by April, 1968, cannot be made since no referendum was held, and there are no other precise mass measures of opinion available.

Observers commented after the vote by the Council that they felt that the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. had had a significant influence on the April 30 vote.⁶² Council President James Jendusa, who had long been opposed to an open housing law, voted in favor of it because he hoped such action would "heal some of the wounds of the community."⁶³ Continued pressures on the business community and the

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ "Civil Rights Drive," Milwaukee Journal, July 31, 1968, p. 12.

⁶¹ "Elections to Center on Housing Battle," Milwaukee Journal, November 30, 1967, p. 6.

⁶² "Foes Ask Full Housing Law," Milwaukee Journal, May 21, 1968, p. 1.

⁶³ "Strong Housing Law Approved by Aldermen," Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1968, p. 1.

fact that now there was a strong federal law anyway must have been other major reasons for the changed voting pattern of the Council. There was also a great deal of personal rhetoric in the form of phone calls, letters, and visits from constituents to the Council members. Alderman Mark Ryan commented in this manner:

In my four years as an assemblyman and four years as an alderman, I've never had anywhere near as many communications on an issue as on this. To say there's quite a bit of pressure is an understatement.

Ryan added that he had received more correspondence on open housing than on all the other legislation he has voted on in the last eight years.⁶⁴ Alderman Martin Schreiber, president of the Council until April, made similar comments.⁶⁵ Alderman Rod Lanser reported a large volume of calls, many of them abusive, since becoming chairman of the council's judiciary subcommittee.⁶⁶ (Schreiber and Lanser favored a housing law and Ryan did not.)

Members of the Council who served on the judiciary subcommittee which studied different types of housing laws tended to shift their attitudes toward favor of a strong law. Miller, Schreiber, and Lanser changed from non-supporters to strong supporters after serving on the special committee. Mrs. Phillips was a member of this committee all during the campaign, so perhaps her rhetorical appeals there were more fully developed than her messages to the full Council. These Judiciary

⁶⁴"Housing Bias Struggle Opens Eyes of Citizens," Milwaukee Journal, December 20, 1967, p. 2.

⁶⁵ibid.

⁶⁶ibid.

subcommittee meetings were secret, so like the rhetoric of the jury room, what went on there will remain a mystery.

In summary of the historical and rhetorical events of the Milwaukee campaign, it appeared that a substantial victory was won by the open housing advocates on April 30, 1968. This victory was quite a surprise even to the leaders of the campaign, and it is difficult to ascertain the precise reasons for this success although some probable ones have been offered. How much rank-and-file public opinion had actually changed by April 30, is undetermined. However, the critical theory applied to the campaign is based on the assumption that outward measures of message effect are not needed to validate assessments based on the criteria contained therein. A precise measure of public opinion as the campaign began is undetermined, and that does present a problem in making definitive assessments. There are, however, several indicators that the Milwaukee audience was largely hostile to the idea of open housing. There was widespread vocal opposition to a housing law, and the formation of various groups attempting to counter the housing advocates also indicated staunch opposition. Milwaukee's southside had been totally segregated and Milwaukee's suburbs with two Negroes per 100 people were the most segregated in the world.⁶⁷ With that general understanding of the audience in mind, the new critical framework can be used in tentatively assessing to what extent the housing advocates used the best available means of persuasion. (Various individual facets

⁶⁷Gropi, Humanist, p. 3.

of the campaign have been assessed earlier in the chapter. In this concluding section the major criteria of the new theory will be applied in assessing the total campaign.)

The immediate goal of the campaigners was to win passage of a city open housing law with as few restrictions as possible. To make this goal effective over a period of time, the campaigners would need to persuade most of their audience to believe in open housing. These receivers would then support the law rather than trying to find loopholes; they would treat blacks decently when they might become neighbors in a formerly all-white area.

Generally the whole population of Milwaukee was treated as the audience in this campaign, and the foregoing discussion indicates why this was necessary. At times, however, the Milwaukee City Council was treated as a special audience within the larger one with some tactics specifically aimed at this subgroup. In addition, the general public was encouraged to send messages to the Council to try to influence them. Tactics specifically geared to the Council have been discussed and assessed previously. In this concluding section the assessment will be based on the city-wide audience as it was the one necessary to long range success of the rhetorical goal. In effect, what the critic is saying here is that considering the real goal, the probable effect of the campaign on the city-wide audience is what is significant. What a small subgroup of that audience did in the immediate context under specialized pressures is not the significant measure of the campaign's degree of success.

With the goal and audience of the Milwaukee campaign clarified, the new critical framework regarding factors necessary to successful

persuasion, especially as relating to mass campaigns, will be applied to make final assessments of the campaign. It should be pointed out that although in the Milwaukee campaign a series of messages were conveyed through a variety of communication channels; these produce a composite message consisting of the proposition and its supporting motivational concepts. After the critic has studied the campaign he can reconstruct this composite message and make it the focus of his assessments.

If there are any serious barriers to perception of the overall campaign message, these must be provided for before anything else can be accomplished. In Milwaukee as elsewhere where the issue of open housing has been raised, there was widespread fear that as open housing would become established, and neighborhoods integrated, the real estate values of many white property owners would decrease significantly. Such a fear would likely indispose a receiver from concentrating on any message favorable to open housing. Therefore, early in the campaign, the open housing advocates should have concentrated on refuting this motivational concept harmful to their cause. As it was, they did not concern themselves with it at any point in the campaign. Even those who were unafraid because they did not believe property values would decrease, or because they themselves were not property owners or because they placed acknowledged property values in a position of preference lower than other values, would not become actively concerned over the issue unless they were shown that such concern would be of value to them. For some individuals, the inducement of sympathy for ghetto dwellers who they could aid would be enough to motivate their concern.

For others, self-interest appeals such as ways the new housing pattern would actually strengthen the community or fatten their pocket books, would be necessary. The efficacious development of both self-interest and altruistic appeals would be best as it would motivate concern from people of divergent value orientations. Early in the campaign, Mrs. Phillips made attempts to connect the housing campaign intrinsically with both these major lines of argument, but soon she abandoned these lines of development in favor of threat appeals not intrinsically related to the housing issue. Even when appealing to these better sources for motivation, she did not detail them sufficiently to be effective. Other open housing advocates seemed oblivious to the need for generating audience motivation. Instead their approach seemed to be, "Listen to what we say and be concerned merely because we say so, or because we are going to revolt if you do not listen." Hence, early in the campaign, many listeners failed to attend to the message because they had not been motivated to be concerned.

Closely related to the two major perceptual flaws not adequately provided for was a third problem, which developed later as the campaign progressed. Those who did not want to listen to the housing advocate's message either due to fear or apathy, but who realized that progressively louder agitation on the issue was taking place, would probably seek defense mechanisms. These defenses would provide them an excuse for tuning out the campaigners and their ideas. Some of the campaigners actually aided these resisters in finding such defense mechanisms. Father Groppi's frequent espousal of violence made it easy to categorize the campaigners as an "out-group" of criminals and subversives, undeserving

of fair, humane treatment. Several of the twenty commandos who headed the N.A.A.C.P. Youth Council became engaged in illegal activities. Two of them were convicted of theft charges, another was arrested in a bar-room brawl, and still another shot a fifteen year old Negro boy at the Youth Council Freedom House. On another occasion, stolen goods were found in the Youth Council Freedom House.⁶⁸

Still another barrier to full and favorable perception of the campaigners overall message and/or its chief components was created because of the threat nature of the chief motivational concepts used. This barrier will be elaborated further after motivational concept selection and usage are assessed.

The three criteria for suitable motivational concept usage are these: (1) The audience should be strongly conditioned to the concept, (2) The concept should orient receivers toward the same action area which the rhetor wishes transferred to the rhetorical proposition, and (3) The concept(s) should be intrinsically connected to the proposition so that self-persuasion and, hence, true, behavioral change, will occur. The major motivational concepts developed were fear of economic loss due to consumer boycotts and cancelled conventions, fear of bad publicity to the city, concern over high cost to the city for added police protection for marchers, fear of continued tension and lack of harmony in the city due to protest agitation, and the threat that Milwaukee would lose its chance for another baseball team. In addition, endorsements had been elicited from the leaders of

⁶⁸"Civil Rights Drive," Milwaukee Journal, July 31, 1968, p. 1.

major religious groups as well as from some civic officials for the passage of an open housing law. All of these except motivational connections with religious reference group and with civic leaders are coercive appeals. These threat appeals meet the first two criteria; they do move receivers toward a previously conditioned action of conformity or acceptance. In fact when applied, they lead to an acceptance of any issue because the receiver's response is only a conditioning to the threat stimulus. This motivational concept (the threat) is not in turn conditioned to the proposition supporting open housing; these threats could not be so conditioned. There is no logical generalization of connection between threats and an acceptance of open housing. Hence, receivers would not really internalize the idea of acceptance of open housing and related reforms as acceptable forms of behavior. Previous analysis of the full implication of the proposition shows, however, that true persuasion rather than forced compliance was needed.

There were motivational appeals available that would likely have provided a true intrinsic connection for persuasive conditioning, but they were overlooked or were cited but not developed. The campaigners might have developed positive appeals to sympathetic understanding. Giving vivid, detailed descriptions of life in the ghetto and conducting tours of the ghetto as was done after the official campaign could have been aids in building motivational concepts of this nature. Symbol manipulations of a broad nature could also have aided in developing this type of motivational concept. The campaigners did attempt symbol manipulation in respect to one of the major terms used in the campaign. They made a significant first step toward the building of a motivational

concept of justice by terming their goal fair housing rather than referring to open housing as did those having a neutral or only slightly interested position for or against the issue. Vehement opponents tried to counter this symbol manipulation by complaining about the attempt to get a law passed establishing forced housing. Through detailing of ghetto conditions and the plight of its dwellers the terms ghetto and Milwaukee Negroes might have been re-labeled in a manner encouraging more definite and favorable action toward these entities. The avoidance of scandal and the early initiation of constructive projects such as tutoring and bi-racial study groups would have permitted more favorable labeling of the N.A.A.C.P. Youth Council.

Additional motivational concepts with the potential for intrinsic connection with the proposition can be cited. The campaigners might have developed a motivational concept based on the theme of identification between black and white by showing that the extension of freedom of one part of society strengthens the whole society. Intrinsic appeals to economic self-interest could have been used instead of creating artificial economic pressures such as boycotts, which can have a "boomerang effect." The advocates might have shown graphically how removal of housing discrimination and other inequalities would reduce welfare and crime costs to a degree that would be felt by each taxpaying citizen and would enable the city to provide other benefits to all its residents.

These positive lines of conditioning would also lead to a more accurate perception of the advocate's entire array of rhetorical appeals and tactics, since audience members who are angry or fearful do not perceive what is communicated in the way the persuader intended, even if they are induced to listen to the message.

If the foregoing types of motivational concepts meeting all three criteria had been selected, strongly connected to the proposition, and presented in a manner to encourage accurate perception, the audience would be likely to have undergone self-persuasion. Receivers would have made this type of labeling response, "I should support open housing as it is truly the best course of action in the long run." This labeling included a favorable judgment toward the proposition, so the receiver would act out the proposition. Without further reinforcement the receiver so self-persuaded would internalize and continue to support this proposition over a period of time. Moreover, he would support the spirit as well as the letter of it.

Because the motivational concepts selected did not lend themselves to intrinsic connections effecting self-persuasion, the most frequent receiver labelings would have approximated these, "Resist open housing as long as possible," or "When positively forced I will observe the letter of the law on open housing, otherwise I will ignore or resist it, and will certainly opposed related civil rights reforms." The following observation by psychologist, Albert Bandura, amplifies why the motivational appeals and resultant labeling induced in the Milwaukee campaign would not lead most receivers to internalize a new attitude toward open housing. Although Bandura is referring specifically to psychiatric patients, they are ones who have reached the stage of communication with the psychiatrist; hence, their reactions to reinforcement and extinction are comparable to those of "normal" people; it is merely the areas of action to be modified which are different.

Although punishment may lead to the rapid disappearance of socially disapproved behavior, its effects are far

more complex. If a person is punished for some socially disapproved habit, the impulse to perform the act becomes through its association with punishment, a stimulus for anxiety. This anxiety then motivates competing responses which, if sufficiently strong prevent the occurrence of, or inhibit the disapproved behavior. Inhibited responses may not, however, thereby lose their strength and may reappear in situations where the threat of punishment is weaker.

Several other factors point to the futility of punishment as a means of correcting many antisocial patterns. The threat of punishment is very likely to elicit conformity. Indeed the patient may obligingly do whatever he is told to do in order to avoid further difficulties. This does not mean, however, that he has acquired a set of sanctions that will be of service to him once he is outside the treatment situation. In fact, rather than leading to the development of internal controls, such methods are likely only to increase the patient's reliance on external restraints. Moreover, under these conditions, the majority of patients will develop the attitude that they will do only what they are told to do and then only half-heartedly and that they will do as they please once they are free from supervision.

In addition punishment may serve only to intensify hostility and other negative motivations and, thus, may further instigate the antisocial person to display the very behaviors that the punishment was intended to bring under control.⁶⁹

The preceding quotation sums up quite succinctly what was wrong with the motivational concepts and lines of conditioning in the campaign. On the basis of such flaws in respect to these two crucial entities in the process of successful persuasion, receivers could not have been conditioned to internalize the long range behavior called for in the proposition. This is the main reason why the critic assesses the formal campaign as a failure despite passage of three open housing laws. The

⁶⁹Albert Bandura, "Psychotherapy as a Learning Process," in Human Learning Studies Extending Conditioning Principles to Complex Behavior, ed. by Arthur Staats (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 480-81.

best utilization of varied communication channels and "opinion leaders" was also not achieved. As earlier discussion indicated, the campaign message and supporting motivational concepts were predominantly conveyed through non-verbal means of publication, chiefly varieties of "direct-action" techniques. Fotheringham has cited two distinct uses for "direct-action" in long range persuasive efforts. First, "direct-action" can be used to generate tension and create in receivers a willingness to attend to follow-up messages in the hope that the messages will indicate to them ways of ending the tension. This usage normally is applied in the early, attention-getting stage of the campaign. Second, these techniques can be used to convey definite messages, normally the proposition and supporting motivational concepts. The open housing advocates used "direct-action" primarily to create tension. At least their techniques were generally perceived as tension tactics. Perhaps more event-messages were intended than were actually received. If the non-verbal events had been interpreted more frequently and in a more expanded manner through follow-up messages conveyed through either speeches or the print media more frequent and more effective event-messages may have emerged. This over-emphasis on the non-verbal is characteristic of most contemporary campaigns and is perhaps a flaw in most of them.

A good way to follow up event-messages through another communication channel, and to reach more people on a level that might facilitate self-persuasion, would be fuller use of "opinion leaders." Various civic and religious leaders were induced to give their support to the open-housing campaign; those so induced gave sweeping endorsements in statements to

the press or in newspaper advertisements. These "opinion leaders" might also have directed study or discussion groups with members of the reference groups they represented. Through fuller discussion and debate of the issue, motivational concepts more conducive to true persuasion could have been isolated and promoted by these "opinion leaders." Also as the result of a great number of small discussion groups, many other Milwaukeeans would become self-persuaded and could in turn become new "opinion leaders" who might influence friends, neighbors, and relatives not exposed to any formal study group.

As the formal campaign ended there were some attempts to form bi-racial study groups and tours of the ghetto. It is unfortunate that these projects were not started early in the formal campaign. The attention-getting phase of marches and rallies without constructive follow-up projects and significant utilization of other communication media lasted too long. In fact this stage comprised almost the entire campaign. The second stage of developing more moderate concrete programs, which should be the chief stage of a campaign, was barely developed until the end when it merged with the third stage in which the campaigners began forming into an institutional group to carry on a variety of related projects. If the third stage continues to develop projects reaching significant numbers of people, perhaps a great many Milwaukeeans can be self-persuaded to internalize attitudes favorable to open housing and related reforms. The formal campaign, however, was not carried on in a manner suitable to this persuasive goal.

An additional factor may aid in the self-persuasion of more Milwaukeeans now that the formal campaign has ended. Because many

residents are forced to comply with a law they do not inwardly accept, they will experience cognitive dissonance. Some of these will deal with their inner tension by actively seeking information and motivational concepts facilitating self-persuasion in the direction of internalized acceptance of open housing. But the campaign itself could have facilitated this internalization directly. Moreover, people highly alienated by the campaign would resist acceptance of open housing as their strategy for dealing with cognitive dissonance.

The formal campaign must be assessed as not well-handled in respect to its full, long range goals. As it stands now, the campaign benefited Milwaukee Negroes in ways other than the major ones the campaigners had intended. Undoubtedly, the campaign participation gave Milwaukee Negroes a means of tension release and a sense of community participation. Perhaps the unusually peaceful reaction to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in contrast with the reaction in other cities of comparable size and racial unrest, show that this was a value realized by the campaign. The continued efforts of the Youth Council in promoting related projects will undoubtedly benefit the city in the long run, yet these activities may never have been attempted if there had been no campaign. Still it would have been better if the major goals of the open housing advocates could have been realized during the actual campaign through more suitable motivational concepts, better handling of perceptual blocks, more use of verbal communications, and fuller use of 'opinion leaders.'

This critic believes that the value of applying the critical theory with the added dimensions suggested here, to the Milwaukee open housing

campaign was four-fold. The overall assessment that the goal of true persuasion was not reached despite passage of three housing laws is undoubtedly different from the assessment that would be made by traditional critics who tend to judge the immediate outward attainment of major desired effects as indicative of successful persuasion.

The new theory also enabled a better structuring of the criticism with assessment of the conditioning of motivational concepts as the unifying feature of the overall evaluation. Moreover, factors peculiar to mass campaigns such as campaign stages, multi-channels, "opinion leaders," and use of non-verbal tactics were treated.

Another striking feature was the full explication of what would have been the best available means of persuasion in the situation in comparison with what means were actually used. The traditionally-oriented critic usually concentrates on what strategy and tactics actually were utilized and offers little or nothing by way of suggesting that better ones could have been employed.

Finally perceptual barriers to receiving the campaign message were thoroughly handled and use of sociological concepts such as types of defense mechanisms and utilization of "in-group" "out-group" dichotomies aided in explication of these. The traditional critic sometimes touches upon these but generally does not do a thorough job in relating these features, regarding their importance in the overall persuasive process.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to develop a framework for rhetorical criticism which can serve as a supplement or an alternate to the "Neo-Aristotelian" mode dominating critical efforts heretofore. The latter mode has served rhetors and critics well for over 2500 years, and some of the insights it offers regarding forms of logical argument and regarding reacting listeners' psychology of emotions are far superior to the treatment of these topics in modern works. The best criticism, though, in any time, will be produced by the most thorough and creative critics, quite apart from the particular critical systems they employ. Nevertheless, since Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric, a number of significant principles, particularly in the academic areas of sociology and psychology have been formulated which shed new light on what is involved in the effecting of persuasion as well as what should be considered in generating discriminating appraisal of rhetorical efforts. A revised critical system based on the more significant of these principles can further guide rhetorical critics in a material way as they analyze and evaluate attempts to persuade.

The expanded framework developed in this study posits associational conditioning as the core of the rhetorical process in every persuasive event. Neither the "Neo-Aristotelian" nor any other framework for

explicating or assessing persuasive efforts posits associational conditioning or any other such single factor as required for the success of any persuasive attempt. Components figuring prominently in this framework, such as symbol manipulations, motivational concepts, learning factors, and perceptual considerations, are components which have appeared in other theories to guide rhetors and/or critics of rhetorical efforts. The particular patterning of these components, however, and the resulting relative stress accorded some of them culminates in a rhetorical theory significantly modified in respect to its sources of derivation. Being an eclectic theory validated in terms of the most current research in attitude formation, the modified rhetorical theory provides a sharper and more authoritative guide to the core principles universal to all instances of successful persuasion than has been the case previously. Stemming from the expanded rhetorical theory is a more serviceable critical framework.

The statement that the patterning of elements has produced both a significantly modified persuasion theory and an expanded critical theory should be amplified. To accomplish the main task of this study, development of an improved critical framework, two subordinate tasks had to be undertaken. The goal of the rhetorical critic is to assess to what degree a given instance of persuasive attempt reflects the standards of rhetorical excellence. In order to make such an assessment, the critic must possess in his own mind a clear sense of what does constitute rhetorical excellence.¹ Hence, the first task subordinate

¹Rhetorical excellence is defined as the making of the best choices of purpose and of strategy and tactics for achieving the purpose, considering the possible alternatives open to the rhetor in the given

to development of an improved critical theory was the delineation of a theory featuring components necessary to the effecting of persuasion. After these factors were isolated and patterned, in order to define the process for achieving persuasion, the criteria constituting persuasive excellence could be inferred. The components of the persuasion theory were isolated after considering at length factors required for the formation or modification of attitudes; these had been hypothesized by social scientists and tested for accuracy by them in numerous carefully controlled contemporary experiments. These components, therefore, represent the thinking of knowledgeable scholars regarding attitude formation. However, to provide a further test of the relevance of these components and especially to test and illustrate the usage of the components when criteria derivative of them are applied in rhetorical criticism, several sample criticisms were presented. This testing activity, subordinate to development of the critical framework, was carried out most extensively in the analysis and evaluation of the Milwaukee open housing campaign occurring between August, 1967, and April, 1968. A whole chapter was devoted to the campaign since it was a most complex persuasive event, covering a time span of eight months and employing a variety of communication channels for conveyance of the basic campaign message. In addition to this, several speeches were assessed. These pertained to a variety of issues; they also represented

situation. If the critic understands the general process involved in all successful attempts to persuade, he can assess to what degree a given rhetor met these universal requirements and to what extent he implemented these requirements by selecting the best of the possible tactics available in the given situation.

a variety of historical periods and events dating from the "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death Address" of Patrick Henry in 1775, to the speech delivered to Congress by John Glenn after his orbital space flight in 1962.

The criteria of the expanded theory were found applicable regardless of the complexity of the persuasive event and regardless of whether the message was conveyed primarily through speech, or print, or a non-verbal mode of communication, or any combination of these. Special criteria for dealing with multiple communication channels and long range campaigns have been incorporated as part of the rhetorical and critical theories presented in this dissertation. These criteria were utilized in assessing the Milwaukee open housing campaign but were not applicable to the single speech events assessed.

The major parts of this framework relate logically to and confirm the major components of the "Neo-Aristotelian" system. Hence, this framework can be viewed as an extension of the traditional framework, especially since viewing it as an extension would be most understandable and helpful to most practicing critics who incorporate "Neo-Aristotelian" precepts significantly or wholly into their method. Major elements of this critical theory will be compared with related ones in the "Neo-Aristotelian" framework. This comparison will serve both to outline the resulting critical theory and to underscore ways in which it expands or supplements criteria comprising the "Neo-Aristotelian" system.

The concept which represents the key component of the expanded rhetorical theory from which the improved criteria are derived is that of associational conditioning of appropriately selected motivational

concepts to the rhetorical proposition, so that actions previously performed will be transferred or conditioned to the proposition. Motivational concepts include previously accepted beliefs, attitudes, needs, or areas of action typifying the audience; these are equivalent to the motivational appeals of the traditional "Neo-Aristotelian" framework. Statements linking the motivational concept with the rhetorical proposition yield thought units approximating lines of argument found in the traditional system.

In traditional theory, a limited number of lines of argument are listed and some are ranked as generally more effective than others. The theory presented here is based on the view that the number of possible motivational concepts is limitless and that the choice of the best ones varies from situation to situation -- the nature of audience members' previous experiences and the nature of the proposition itself determine which out of an infinite number of motivational concepts would be the best ones to use. Hence, the sources for lines of argument are broadened immeasurably.

In this expanded framework, other features of the message such as symbol usage, perceptual considerations, and learning factors are considered in order to gauge how successful the overall attempt to condition is likely to be or has been in a given situation. Hence, all major components relate to the conditioning process. This inter-relationship makes the modified framework more tightly structured and more process-centered than the "Neo-Aristotelian" approach in which lines of argument are considered merely as one topic of importance to persuasion and only loosely connected with other considerations relating

to the persuasive act. The more tightly organized critical framework should provide for better structured critical assessments. The firmer sense of process common to all instances of persuasion provides authoritative criteria for assessing in a given situation what possible means of persuasion could have been selected, and assessing which of these would have been best whether or not they were the means actually used. This dimension of criticism was incorporated to a considerable extent in the criticism of the Milwaukee open housing campaign. However, very little of this dimension has appeared in recent published articles based on the "Neo-Aristotelian" framework of criticism.²

A major component of the expanded framework which makes the assessment of lines of argument more precise than the traditional treatment is the development of three criteria for appropriate selection of motivational concepts. (1.) Are the chief motivational concepts used ones that are strongly adhered to by the audience? If they are not, it is unlikely that conditioning in any direction can take place. (2.) Do these motivational concepts orient the audience toward the area of action or belief which the rhetor desires transferred to the proposition? If not, the audience is likely to be conditioned to a form of behavior or thought the rhetor had not intended. (3.) Are the motivational concepts amenable to logical, intrinsic connection with the proposition? If the first two criteria are met, but the third is not, because the motivational concepts are not perceived by the audience

²The researcher surveyed all critical articles in the 1967 volumes of Speech Monographs, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Teacher, Central States Speech Journal, Southern Speech Journal, and Western Speech.

as logically related to the proposition, no conditioning will take place. However, there is one exception in which seemingly inappropriate motivational concepts do result in conditioning. These are cases in which coercive appeals are employed which are sufficiently threatening to the audience to move them to perform the action desired by the persuader? In this case, however, the receivers are conditioned to the coercive appeal, not to the proposition itself. In other words, they are forced to comply rather than being persuaded. Persuasion is a true internalization of belief in the proposition and can be termed, self-persuasion, i.e., the behavioral response called for in the proposition will be applied by the receiver over a period of time to a variety of similar stimuli without further reinforcement from other communicators. Traditional theorists do not make a precise distinction between persuasion and forced compliance; it would be difficult for these "Neo-Aristotelians" to do so because their persuasion framework does not stress the viewpoint that persuasion is essentially the learning of a new behavioral response.³

Even the meeting of the three criteria for appropriate motivational concept selection does not insure that conditioning leading to persuasion will occur. In addition to meeting the third criterion, choosing motivational concepts amenable to intrinsic, logical connection with

³Two contemporary writers of persuasion texts, Bettinghaus and Fotheringham, do make a distinction between persuasion and compliance but do not detail it extensively. Bettinghaus' distinction seems especially close to the one made in this study. He says that persuasion involves cognitive change, whereas, compliance does not. See Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Persuasive Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 14. and Wallace C. Fotheringham, Perspectives on Persuasion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), pp. 46-47.

the proposition, the connection must in fact be made. And it must be made in a manner which is perceived by the receiver as logical. Factors of learning theory and symbol manipulation must be carefully utilized in making the connection clear and plausible to the audience. Finally, overall barriers to perception of the message, especially of the motivational concepts and their connections with the proposition, must be anticipated and provided for, if persuasion is to take place.

In the traditional system there is much stress regarding the burden of argumentative proof upon a rhetor who promotes a view or course of action other than the status quo. The framework discussed herein extends the burden of proof concept beyond consideration merely of logical disputation. It stresses instead that there is a burden upon the rhetor to anticipate and provide for anything necessary to the successful presentation of his proposition. A successful conditioning process was previously discussed as a major area of consideration necessary to success. Accurate perception of message elements is the second main area of consideration. Within perception there are two subcategories, physiological and psychological blocks to perception. The traditional framework does place some stress upon physiological barriers to accurate message perception. The latter comprise an undeniably important consideration. However, the theory developed in this study details psychological barriers in a manner which adds significantly to the criteria for suitable message perception. Two major concerns within the area of psychological perception will be detailed here. Audience members may be blocked in their overall perception of the rhetorical message because of extreme emotional

tension. Those likely to be under such tension are persons facing a radical new environment or who regard themselves always marginal members of the larger society due to minority group membership. Others who have experienced severe shock or disappointment may be in a similar state of feeling intense fear, guilt, aggression, or self-hate. These receivers are especially likely to become overwhelmed by such feelings if the given rhetorical issue reminds them of their source of frustration, as a speech on racial relations delivered to a Negro audience is likely to do. Featured here is a discussion of appropriate tension-release tactics which can be used to provide catharsis (release of emotional tensions) for disturbed audience members so they can be freed to attend to the message. The rhetor provides for tension-release by employing the scapegoating of either a tragic or a humorous object (generally a human being) to purge the disturbing emotions felt by his audience. He projects the hated flaws of the receivers themselves or of the group or individual the audience hates on to the scapegoat object; then he destroys this object symbolically.

There is much concern in traditional theory with the refutation of views held by the audience which oppose the rhetor's purpose. The rhetor, however, may have difficulty in analyzing which ideas need to be refuted. Applying to refutative effort the concepts of the extended theory, one can see that among the entities which would need to be refuted would be motivational concepts strongly accepted by the audience, perceived by them as closely related to the proposition, but orienting the audience toward an action or belief other than the one the rhetor desires the receivers to accept. With this more precise guideline, it

becomes easier for the critic to assess what motivational concepts the rhetor ought to refute. The major avenues through which refutation could be accomplished also become clear -- attack the veracity of the motivational concept itself, demonstrate that the motivational concept does not really apply to the rhetorical issue, or convince the audience that a different type of action should be taken regarding the motivational concept.

In regard to making clear, convincing connections between the motivational concepts of the message and the proposition, three major areas from which criteria are derived should be reviewed. There has always been a realization in traditional rhetorical-critical theory that motivational appeals should be concrete and well-detailed. An understanding of the conditioning process explains why these traditional suggestions are sound ones. Unless receivers have a clear conception of the motivational concepts, they have no starting base from which to be conditioned to the proposition. Moreover, one can see why proofs such as formal definitions of propositional terms or repetitions of the proposition are ineffectual; as motivational concepts and therefore, should be used sparingly only as clarifying devices, they are not motivational concepts apart from the proposition, already accepted by receivers, which can be conditioned to induce acceptance of the proposition.

The word symbols selected to phrase motivational concepts and lines of argument are also crucial in determining whether the connecting link to provide conditioning comes across clearly and plausibly to receivers. There was a fairly strong realization in traditional theory of the importance of language selection, so the stylistic qualities of

clarity, appropriateness, and ornament were emphasized. However, matters of style warrant the assigning of expanded importance by recognizing that word symbols not only convey but add to the content of the motivational concepts and the links connecting them with the proposition. With this understanding, the critic can become more sensitive in analyzing and assessing complex overall linguistic strategies.

There has always been a general awareness in traditional critical theory that motivational appeals should be truly analogical in their proposed connection to the propositional issue. There was also awareness that events comprising appeals should be reasonably related in chronological time to the propositional issue, and that major connections should be repeated enough to make these connections clear and to impress them upon the receivers. Incorporation in the extended rhetorical critical framework of the learning factors, generalization, contiguity, and summation, provides precise explanation of why these criteria are sound. If the critic becomes aware of all the major learning factors applicable to analysis of persuasion and incorporates them as part of his critical methodology, he is more likely to merge all of these factors in his analyses and assessments.

Though logically connected with the "Neo-Aristotelian" system, the critical framework developed in this dissertation sharpens and expands the criteria that can be used in assessing rhetorical efforts. A theory, however, can never be regarded as totally and absolutely finished. As new knowledge emerges, additions to or modifications of the existing theory should be made. Likely sources for the modification

or expansion of the theory projected here would be additional knowledge from semanticists about symbol manipulations, from learning theorists about factors which further facilitate the learning process, of which persuasion is a specialized category, from psychologists regarding the effect of labeling or self-verbalization by individuals, insofar as this experience affects their behavior, and from sociologists regarding features of reference group behavior which could improve the quality of audience analysis.

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