

Value Orientations and Modernization
in Two Colombian Cities

by

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
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VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND MODERNIZATION
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The major proposition of this dissertation evolved from participation of the writer in a teaching/research project in Colombia and knowledge of two facts: (1) that the rate and degree of modernization are highly variable in the world; (2) that economic, biological, and geographic explanations for this variability have not been sufficient. Given this reality, it was proposed that these differences, and therefore the degree of modernization or socioeconomic development achieved by any society or group, depend, to a large extent, on the strength with which certain value orientations are held by the leaders of that society or

group. This proposition made logical and empirical sense since it is known that cultural values, implicitly or explicitly, become personal goals for most men and that effective leaders set the direction and tempo of any social group, large or small.

Drawing on Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variation in value orientations, it was hypothesized that community leaders in Medellín--Colombia's best developed city--would hold, to a greater degree than would comparable leaders in the highly traditional city of Popayán, Colombia, those value orientations associated, by Kluckhohn and others, with the North American middle-class and the "modern" personality. This was, then, a comparative study to test the degree of association between modern values in leadership groups and the level of modernization reached by the areas they control and manage.

Because some variation was expected within the Medellín leadership group, other hypotheses were formulated to predict variation in value orientations according to salient social characteristics (type of occupation, age, education, father's occupational and educational status, etc.). Since, however, the leaders as a group were too

homogeneous to be differentiated by social class, senior high school boys were drawn from various social class levels and their value orientations elicited. The comparison of their responses with those of the leaders also permitted a broader examination of generational changes.

Data were collected from leaders by means of interviews and from students by means of a questionnaire. In both cases the same instrument was used--a Spanish language translation of the urban version of Kluckhohn's value orientations schedule. In Medellín 60 leaders selected from seven sectors of leadership--commercial, industrial, banking, government, quasigovernment, the church, and the university--were interviewed and 417 male high school seniors were questioned. In Popayán 59 leaders from the same sectors were interviewed and 154 students were questioned.

Value orientations expressed by leaders and students were compared with a purely "modern" profile of value orientations. Gross results showed that leaders in both Medellín and Popayán preferred modern value orientations in two of the four areas tested and traditional or other types of value orientations in the other two.

A more detailed analysis revealed that Medellín leaders did, however, make more modern responses than did Popayán leaders, although the differences were not statistically significant in all cases. This difference was even more marked when leaders from "economic" sectors of the two cities, such as the commercial and industrial, were compared.

Variations in student value orientations followed the same mixed pattern as that of the leaders except that detailed analysis showed Popayán students with a significantly greater number of modern value choices than Medellín students.

Despite some support for the prediction that Medellín leaders would be more modern in their values than Popayán leaders, the reversal of these differences with regard to students in the two cities does not lend unambiguous support to either the hypothesized difference between the two cities or the proposition that the value orientations defined here as "modern" are clearly associated with modernization.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For many years it has been noted that certain countries and areas within countries which are deficient in natural resources nevertheless achieve superior levels of socioeconomic development. This has occurred in Colombia where the pace of socioeconomic modernization is uneven, some regions and cities advancing much faster and further than others. Strong integrating trends of accelerated horizontal and vertical social mobility are weakening this phenomenon but the differences persist. Development of the city and metropolitan area of Medellín, for example, has been so great that it is often cited as an outstanding exception to the general rule of underdevelopment. Yet this isolated region is much less well-endowed in natural resources than many slower-developing areas. Degree of development (or modernization) is, then, to some extent independent of resources and climate and, in the absence of external influences such as an influx of outside capital

(as in Venezuela), the human factor must be responsible. In fact, the businesslike attitudes and energetic behavior of the people of Medellín are legendary in Colombia and this makes that area ideal for determining why the people of one rather than another region are more prone to develop themselves and their territory.

Answers to this question are of vital importance to Colombia as well as to most of the world which is still traditional and underdeveloped. Modernization is the national goal of practically every articulate Colombian one meets. The general consciousness of the progress ideal is demonstrated by the large amounts of space which the country's newspapers devote to the efforts made and myriad problems encountered in lessening the gap between Colombia and such models of optimum development as the United States.

In the opinion of many students of social change and modernization, one important answer is to be found in the cultural values which guide a people's individual and collective way of life. Florence Kluckhohn (1961:1) and cultural anthropologists in general "regard a knowledge of the basic assumptions (or values) of a people as indispensable to the interpretation of concrete behavior."

Anthropologist Kluckhohn proposes (1961:10-20) that different combinations of values or value orientations are related to markedly different ways of life and, by implication, to different levels of socioeconomic development. She believes that a "Future" orientation towards time, a "Doing" orientation towards activity, a Mastery-over-Nature orientation, and an Individualistic orientation in man-to-man relationships are "modern" values which shape the behavior of "modern" populations like the middle classes of the United States. Other social scientists as well as many philosophers agree with her interpretation and would specify further that these value orientations are closely linked with successful entrepreneurship and the Protestant ethic. Thus, there is a belief among those who stress the importance of values that individuals or groups who live by specific "action" values of this type will develop and use more fully their own capacities as well as those of the environment in which they operate.

The vital role of "influentials" or leadership groups in promoting community development is obviously and especially vital. The values they hold should, therefore, be a key factor in determining whether and to what

degree modernization will take place. Such is the thinking of Aaron Lipman (1966:14-15) who remarks that "in general contemporary economists are in agreement that the entrepreneur is a business leader whose function in the promotion of economic development is fundamental."

Given that cultural values and modernization are connected, and that community leaders are particularly important in initiating and guiding social change directed toward such a development, then the values or value orientations of leaders should be important areas of investigation for the student of modernization. Accordingly, this dissertation is intended to do just that as part of an overall research project in which variations in value orientations among leaders and high school students in three Colombian cities were investigated.¹ The three cities, Medellín, Cali, and Popayán, represent, insofar as can be determined, different points on a continuum of socioeconomic development, Medellín being the most developed or modern and Popayán least so. Students

¹The project was financed through a Rockefeller Foundation grant to the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of Florida, as part of an agreement between the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia and the University of Florida.

were included in the study in order to provide comparisons between generations and along social class lines. The leaders by themselves were clearly too homogeneous to enable us to do these things.

Medellín is the principal focus of this dissertation so that the largest part of the data presented involves descriptions and comparisons of value orientations held by leaders and students in that city. A comparison is also made between the leaders and students of Medellín and those of Popayán in view of the fact that the two cities are considered within Colombia polar opposites of socioeconomic development. The "modern" value orientation profile which is attributed to the North American middle class and "modern" entrepreneurs is used as a baseline for all comparisons. It is expected that respondents in the relatively well-developed city of Medellín will express "modern" value orientations to a greater degree than those in Popayán and indeed will approximate "modern" entrepreneurs in this respect.

Although we have presumed that values act as precipitating factors of the modernization process, the research design employed in this project permits us to

inquire only if values are associated with modernization. In this sense our goals are exploratory rather than definitive.

Organization of the Dissertation

The development of this report begins in Chapter II with a description and a history of the city of Medellín and its people. Following this, in Chapter III is a review of the literature on modernization and an explanation of the theoretical basis for the research. Chapter IV describes the research design used, the biographical characteristics of leaders and students questioned and states the hypotheses which guided the research. Results of the research--the detailed findings from Medellín and the intercity comparisons--are reported in Chapter V. Chapter VI entails a discussion of the results, while the seventh and final chapter provides a summary of the results and offers some conclusions.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

Medellín is the capital of the department of Antioquia, which is located in the wide mountainous area where the western and central Andean ranges of Colombia come together just north of the city of Cartago. This vast, rugged region encompasses the present-day departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío, in the northwestern quarter of the Colombian territory.

This is the patria chica of the Antioqueños, a cultural and racial group whose dynamic expansion has radiated southward from some of the original settlements just east of Medellín to take in all of the valleys and slopes above 3,000 feet. Until 1905, all of this territory was included in the department of Antioquia. In that year, Caldas to the south became a separate department, while in 1966-1967 the departments of Quindío and Risaralda were created out of the southern and western portions of Caldas.

Today Antioquia, with an area of 65,595 square kilometers, is still the largest of the four departments which now make up "Antioqueño country." It is larger than Switzerland, Denmark, or Ireland, and among the Colombian departments, only Boyacá has a larger land area. It consists for the most part of rough mountainous terrain cut in half by the Cauca River, which runs north to the Caribbean. The mountains of Antioquia are not quite as high, however, as those farther south and to the east across the Magdalena River. They range from about 1,000 meters to 3,700 meters, none reaching the snow line. Most of the population lives in the highlands of central and southern Antioquia between 1,600 and 2,400 meters where the mean temperatures range from 17°C to 22°C (Controlaría General de la República, 1935:40). Northern and northwestern Antioquia are relatively empty and still unexplored, especially in the lower jungle territories.

The narrow valley basins and plateaus of lower Antioquia have become the sites of small towns and cities. As a result, much of the farming is done on the hillsides and slopes so that the hyperbole-loving Antioqueños claim that their kind of vertical agriculture requires that one "sow with a shotgun and harvest with parrots."

The city of Medellín is located in the wide part of such a narrow intermontane valley called the Aburra in the south-central part of Antioquia at an altitude of approximately 1,540 meters, or 4,600 feet, where a genuinely springlike climate prevails the year around. The Aburra valley is about six kilometers wide by 18 kilometers long and is split by the Medellín River. The city and its satellites have completely urbanized the valley and are climbing the mountains on both sides for about 15 kilometers along its length.

Medellín is Colombia's second city and one of the most important and highly developed industrial centers in Latin America. Large, modern factories line the highways leading into the city from the north and south, and one is impressed by their size and the clean, well-landscaped appearance they present. It is, as one foreigner (Davies, 1963:293) observed,

. . . a most remarkable city to find in the mountains. It could hardly be less advantageously placed, for it faces forbidding mountain barriers in all directions. Its climate alone, that of an English summer day (70°F) is in its favor. And yet Medellín is the industrial capital of Colombia, a city seething with energy. . . . Medellín, for an industrial city, is a remarkably clean, well-laid-out, and delightful town. Even its industrial plants look attractive.

Principal industries include such diversified products as textiles, ready-made clothing, plasticware, chocolate and candy of all kinds, beer, cement, cigarettes, hats, phonograph records, crockery, glassware, bottles, matches, aluminumware, paints, zip fasteners, electric irons, pressure cookers, refrigerators, stoves, rayon, hosiery, machinery, steel pipe, and tubing. There were, in 1962, 1,681 industrial establishments in Medellín employing 62,328 workers, or 24.8 percent of the nation's industrial work force (Aragon, 1963:674).

Medellín and its satellite municipios have been growing rapidly since the early nineteenth century when it became the capital of the department, but the population increase has been especially notable since large-scale industrialization began after the turn of this century. Today, almost half of Antioquia's population and most of its wealth are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Medellín, which is made up of the municipio of Medellín together with the municipios of Bello, Itagüí, and Envigado. These last named had populations of 93,207, 70,000, and 61,546 respectively in 1964, which brought the population of the four together up to 997,640 for that

year (Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, 1967). (See Table 1.)

Because of traditionally high birth rates and the Antioqueños' well-known reluctance to accept outsiders, the city has drawn its migrants from nearby farmsteads and small towns much more than other Colombian cities with large immigrations such as Bogotá or Cali. In 1946 Parsons (1949:176) reported that 65.4 percent of the city's workers had migrated from rural areas of Antioquia, 31.2 percent were from Medellín, and only 3.3 percent were from outside the department of Antioquia. A somewhat similar pattern seems to hold true today. According to birthplace information gathered from a questionnaire administered to senior boys in four Medellín high schools in 1967 in the study reported here, only 12.2 percent came from outside the department, and 51.9 percent had been born in Medellín itself.

Because Medellín has been the only large city to develop in Antioquia, this writer found that critics in other parts of the country liken it to an octopus sucking wealth and talent from the hinterland. It is for this reason, they say that Medellín presents such an impressive

Table 1

Numbers and Percentage Change of the Population,
Medellín, Bogotá, and Cali, 1918 to 1968

Year	Medellín		Bogotá		Cali	
	Number	Percentage Change	Number	Percentage Change	Number	Percentage Change
1918	79,146		143,994		45,525	
1938	168,266	112.6	330,312	129.4	101,883	123.8
1951	358,189	115.8	648,324	96.3	284,186	178.9
1964	772,887	115.8	1,697,311	161.8	637,929	124.5
1968 (est.)	1,127,140		2,000,000		850,000	

Source: Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina. Algunos Elementos Para un Diagnóstico Demográfico de Colombia, Boletín 14, 1967. Table 1, no page numbers given.

front of modernity and prosperity when compared with other cities in Colombia. The Caleños point to Buga, Palmira, Tuluá, and Cartago in the Valle and challenge the listener to find cities of comparable size and development in Antioquia outside of Medellín and its suburban municipios.

The city does in truth seem to be an island of modern industrial development perched proudly in lofty isolation, although efforts are being made to decentralize industry into small towns away from Medellín.

The People

Newcomers from Europe have not played a role in Medellín's recent growth as they have in the industrial centers of southern South America. If Colombia has received few foreign immigrants since independence, Antioquia and Medellín have received even fewer. The census of 1918 (Rodríguez, 1925:178) showed that there were 235 resident foreigners in Medellín, or 3 per 1,000 population, compared with 10 per 1,000 in Bogotá, 11 per 1,000 in Cali, and 26 per 1,000 in Barranquilla. Seventy-three of the resident foreigners in Medellín at that time were members of religious communities (Rodríguez, 1925: 149-50). The census of 1938 reports that of 1,958,555

"Antioqueños" in all of Antioquia and Caldas, only 5,081 were foreigners. Rodríguez (1942:178) says that the relatively smaller numbers of foreigners to be found in Antioquia and Medellín result from the "special aptitudes of the Antioqueño race for hard work and business which make life difficult and competition hard for the foreigner." He remarks further that even the Syrians, who are commercially active everywhere else in Colombia, are almost totally absent from Antioquia. It is the boast of many Medellín industries that they have no foreign personnel on their payroll, not even in a consulting capacity.

The racial background of the Antioqueño includes white, Negro, and, to a lesser extent, Indian elements. The white element, descended from Spanish immigrants who arrived in the eighteenth century, clearly predominates in the highland valleys and plateaus above 1,500 meters so that light hair, blue or green eyes, and fair complexions are not uncommon there. In the hot lowlands and river valleys, the Negro and mulatto are numerically superior. Parsons (1949:53) says that the upland whites and near-whites with their traditions of having large families are

outreproducing the lowland Negro and mulatto elements and the population is becoming whiter.

In Medellín a colonial census taken in 1778 (Parsons, 1949:53) reported that of 14,507 people, 18 percent were white, 27 percent mestizo, 20 percent Negro, 35 percent mulatto. According to the 1918 census, 49.7 percent were white, 11.3 percent were black, and 39 percent were mixed (Rodríguez, 1925:178). Since the respondents filled in the blanks themselves, the results are open to question; nevertheless, the population of Medellín represents a good cross-section of the department's people, for all roads and railroads lead eventually to Medellín, the pride, joy, and mecca for Antioqueños no matter where they live.¹

Physical type and skin color vary with altitude here, too, but in a socioeconomic sense. The large, prosperous upper- and middle-class neighborhoods are inhabited almost exclusively by people of fair complexion, while working-class sections abound with a variety of skin

¹T. Lynn Smith's article on "The racial composition of the population of Colombia" (Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7 [April, 1966]) details the difficulties in obtaining hard data on racial characteristics in Colombia.

tones ranging from coal black to rosy white. While the Antioqueño in general, irrespective of skin color, is thought of in Colombia as being dynamic and successful, it seems evident that the most successful of them have been white, probably the descendants of the Spanish colonists who settled the upland areas of the department.

Personality differences between the Antioqueños and other Colombians have been long noted by Colombians and resident foreigners alike. Parsons (1949:1) describes the people of Antioquia as "energetic and thrifty . . . the self-styled Yankees of South America. They are shrewd, aggressive individuals," he continues,

whose extraordinary colonizing genius and vigor have made them the dominant and most clearly defined population element of the republic. Their long and effective geographical isolation in the interior highlands of Colombia is reflected in a determined conservatism and marked cultural particularism. Being Antioqueño means more to them than being Colombian.

An American observer with long experience in Colombia (Romoli, 1941:147-149) said of the Antioqueños:

. . . Life is no fun unless (they) are doing something. When one venture prospers, they do not recline on their success in genteel repose, but go out and invest their profits in something else; if it fails they are undismayed and cast about for another scheme. Business is their sport and they

are extremely proficient at it; they establish themselves in other parts of the country and prosper exceedingly. . . . there is a vigorous, cheerful, pushing quality about them that is more northern than their latitude."

She contrasts this character with that of the Bogotano who is

reputedly tuned to muted chords, inclined to a somewhat pessimistic intellectualism, more speculative than creative. . . . The Bogotano is an intellectual. He is brilliant in conversation and frequently so in print. . . . Mention a man of prominence in business and they murmur politely, "oh yes, very able"; speak of an author and their faces light up [Romoli, 1941: 279-280].

In Colombia the man of Bogotá or Popayán stereotypically bends his energy and intelligence toward politics and literature. He flirts with the sciences and religion. He bandies about his favorite ideas and beliefs, avoiding, if possible, ignoble reality. The writer can testify from everyday personal experiences as well as those gained from conducting interviews with community leaders that the Antioqueños of Medellín do seem to be different--harder working, more dynamic, dependable, and serious. Of those numerous experiences, the following stand out.

During the interviewing in Medellín, in no case did an interviewee fail to keep an appointment, and only three arrived more than five minutes late (after the time set).

Small talk was minimal, and within a short time after the interview was completed, the interviewer was on his way. By contrast, in Cali and to an even greater extent in Popayán, appointments were frequently not kept, and no explanation provided. In Popayán, this writer had the frustrating experience of trying to interview four men consecutively who failed to show up at the appointed time. However, it must be said in all fairness that once present, the Popayán leaders were by and large friendlier and more gracious than their counterparts in Medellín and Cali. It was often difficult to take leave of many Popayanejos who became attentive "hosts" after the interview, dispensing interesting conversation and, on occasion, even libations.

Before conducting the interviews it was necessary to obtain the names of top leaders from the chambers of commerce, the branches of the National Association of Industrialists, and other such organizations in each city. In Medellín these lists of names were promised us on the afternoon of the same day requested. To our great surprise, the deadline was met and the information provided was later verified to be complete and accurate. In Cali, it was necessary to press and keep pressing for several

days until the corresponding lists were delivered. Thus, it appeared that the Antioqueños were men of action as well as words.

One cannot help but be impressed by the physical appearance of Medellín in contrast with that of Cali or Bogotá. The commercial and residential areas of Medellín are the cleanest and best maintained in Colombia. Downtown Medellín abounds with attractive skyscrapers and well-stocked shops staffed by courteous, attentive personnel eager to do business. It seemed to this writer that in Cali many sales people were unwilling to make an extra effort in getting something for the customer which was not at hand. In Medellín it was a common experience to meet clerks who would run personally to another store to obtain an item requested which was not in stock.

In Cali, the streets in working-class sections were usually unpaved and unlit unless they happened to be thoroughfares, but the writer was unable to encounter a single unpaved, unlit street in Medellín, even after an extensive tour through the worst sections. Moreover, it was interesting to observe that Medellín has been honeycombed with a well-organized net of four lane, limited-access highways,

a rarity in Cali, where the population is almost the same size. Such material progress is a reflection of the civic spirit shown by the Antioqueños, who are popularly believed elsewhere in Colombia to comply faithfully with departmental and municipal tax levies.

The fact that nine of the ten largest industries in Medellín are locally owned and operated while five of the ten largest in Cali are controlled from outside the country (two of the remaining five are sugar companies, one of which was founded by Lithuanian immigrants) is another difference for which the enterprising spirit of the Antioqueños is responsible.

It can be said in defense of Cali that nightlife there seemed much better developed. There were possibly 20 discotheques operating in Cali during 1967 (as well as other kinds of nightclubs, cabarets, etc.) most of which did a good business weekends and week nights. In Medellín, only three could be found, all of them inferior in quality and poorly patronized. The Antioqueños are generally believed to be in bed by 10:00 p.m. in order to be fresh for the next day's business, and if they entertain, do so quietly at home.

Everett Hagen (1962:71-76) attempted to delineate empirically personality differences between the Antioqueño businessman and his counterpart in Popayán. With an American psychologist and using the thematic apperception test, he tested a group of business leaders in both cities and found striking collective differences between the Medellín and Popayán groups. The Medellín sample of 20 men was selected not only for position but also for the amount of social mobility they had demonstrated in their lifetime. According to Hagen, the businessmen of Medellín saw the situations pictured as problems to be resolved by hard work (rather than by magic solutions) and showed confidence in their ability to solve them. They analyzed every situation rationally before expressing opinions, taking the point of view of each person pictured, instead of identifying a preconceived type of situation, i.e., the old against the young. The Antioqueños also showed a high need for autonomy, accomplishment, and order; they possessed a sharp sense of reality and viewed the world as manageable with good judgment and persistence.

Hagen reports that a similar group in Popayán saw the pictures differently. They associated each situation

with an historic or literary event. They often philosophized and rambled off the subject into the tendencies of modern youth or the course of history. If they did comment on specific situations, it was done in stereotypical terms ("that boy ought to listen to his father"), or they imagined triumphs gained magically without effort. The Popayán business leaders showed little need for autonomy and order, and considered the world unmanageable by man, whose place they felt was predetermined.

Hagen warns us that these are aggregate results whereas differences between specific individuals would be harder to detect. Nonetheless, Hagen feels that the collective differences are marked enough to say that the incidence of the "creative personality" among the Antioqueños is probably much greater than elsewhere in the country. He believes that this is a reason for the greater success of their endeavors. In addition, Hagen found that the Medellín group put a higher value on work--not only for self-improvement and productivity, but also for its intrinsic worth. As a corollary to this, they supposedly regard success as proof of God's grace. Hagen believes these strongly held attitudes indicate the existence of a

puritan ethic in Antioquia and, indeed, Antioqueños are well-known in Colombia for their strict observance of Catholic ritual. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Bible was widely read by those able to read, and commonly given a literal interpretation. Lopez de Mesa (1930:12) remarks that Antioqueños of that period "emptied the Bible" in order to give their children Hebrew first names.

Why did this group of people develop such markedly different behavior patterns? Or, in terms of the ideas presented here, why did they develop a value system which has made their subculture so different from that of other Colombians? The following history offers some tentative answers to these questions.

History and Background

The area of present-day Antioquia and Caldas was first explored by Spanish conquistadores between 1537 and 1545. Two streams of exploration ran through the mountainous terrain, one originating in Cartagena to the north and the other in Quito, Ecuador (via Cali) to the south. The Spaniards were following Indian tales of gold, and several significant gold deposits were actually found. This news

brought on the initial stages of colonization by gold-seeking Spaniards and hordes of Negro slaves brought in to work the mines when it was found that the Indian population was inadequate for mining.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gold mining continued to be the principal occupation of old-timers and newcomers alike. Some fairly large deposits were found, and these were mined by Spaniards using Negro slaves, while small-time operators panned for gold in the rivers. The formidable terrain and low state of agriculture required importation of food and supplies at high prices, and most of the miners' profits went for such expenditures.

In 1616 the valley of Aburra began receiving settlers. Some were migrants directly from Spain, while others were mixed breeds moving from the warm mining camps of the lowlands into cooler, malaria-free areas. By 1674 the valley's population had reached 3,000; records show a considerable white settlement as well as a church, plaza, and numerous stores (Parsons, 1949:62). Authorization from Madrid for a town charter for Medellín was requested in 1666 but was held up until 1675 by the machinations of

residents from the old established lowland capital of Santa Fé who were jealous of the precocious village's growth.

On November 17, 1675, the first Cabildo and town mayor were chosen by the governor. The Cabildo was made up of six prominent citizens, all Spaniards, and included men with names such as Restrepo, Angel, and Velez, all of which frequently occur in any listing of the contemporary industrial and commercial oligarchy of Medellín. One of the Cabildo's first acts was to establish a jail with a whipping stock for "thieves, vagabonds, and those guilty of small crimes" such as smoking in church (Betancur, 1925:20). The punishment for smoking in church was scaled as follows: for Negroes and Indians--25 lashes; for mestizos--1 day in jail; for whites--10 peso fine (Betancur, 1925:20).

During the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, a new settlement took place as immigrants from old Spain--the Basque country, Asturias, Castile, and Andalusia--filtered into Antioquia. Many came as family units and settled in the highlands above 1,400 meters near present-day Medellín and to the east, instead

of prospecting in the lowland river valleys. They established homesteads in the cool, high meadowlands and, though isolated, brought in Spanish women instead of marrying Indian or Negro women. Extensive family inbreeding occurred in subsequent years, so that a limited number of last names can be found even today.

The idea has arisen in Colombia that these colonists were Sephardic Jews looking for an isolated part of the new world to escape the Inquisition. Hence, the reasoning goes, the business acumen of the Antioqueños is to be attributed to their Jewish heritage. Research shows that this assertion is false. Lipsét (1967:27-28) says that similar stories have grown up in Mexico about the residents of Monterrey, who are noted for their success in commerce and industry. Parsons (1949:2) says the story is a myth perpetrated by jealous rivals in Bogotá to explain the Antioqueños' superior record in business and industry. Hagen (1962:79) dismisses the allegation in more or less the same way and adds that records show no Jews among early settlers.

The white colonists were at first only moderately successful in agriculture because the region remained a

poor backwash of New Granada, far inferior to the savanna of Bogotá or the Cauca Valley in development. Gold mining continued to be the chief source of income, especially as far as the Spanish crown was concerned, and many foodstuffs and supplies continued to be imported with great difficulty and at high cost.

The beginning of change which "transformed this tranquil but impoverished backwoods into a virile, literate, and relatively wealthy state" came about with the appointment of Juan Antonio Mon y Velarde, an exceptionally dynamic and reform-minded royal inspector in 1784 (Parsons, 1949:5).

Mon y Velarde's changes in the economy and political administration led to an increase in many activities. New towns and agricultural settlements were founded in the upland districts, an agrarian reform (Colombia's first) was carried out, bounties were offered for new crops, and vagrancy laws were enforced so that unemployed idlers were engaged in the construction of public works. Mining activities were deemphasized in favor of agriculture, for Mon y Velarde saw no reason why the province could not be self-sufficient. Within a short time comparative

prosperity reigned as gold profits were better distributed and new lands were more productive. Mon y Velarde's own words that "all were born to work and he who doesn't is useless" became a proverb in Antioquia.

During the same period, the aforementioned colonizing of the mountainous lands to the south began. Early marriage and large families put pressure on land and food supplies, leading to the first big movement of Antioqueños to the south around 1800.

Most of the southward-migrating colonists were the children of the Spanish immigrants who had settled in the highlands to the east of Medellín during the eighteenth century; they carved out new homesteads and towns in a cooperative fashion in the tradition of our own pioneers. Since the climate and terrain were similar to that found in "old Antioquia" around Medellín, the movement was rapid. By the middle 1800s present-day Caldas and Risaralda were almost fully occupied, and Manizales, now the capital of Caldas and a city of approximately 250,000, had been founded.

López (1927:52) remarks that the typical colonist came into Caldas with little more than "a hatchet, seed,

wife, and children; trust in God, confidence in himself, his wife. . . . " Travelers reported that 30 to 40 families would clear an area, designate the flattest part for a plaza (church, school, city hall) and then distribute farmsteads by lot (Uribe, 1942:16). Priests traveled about the colonized areas on mules like circuit riders. Notaries did the same to adjudicate landholdings and disputes. Uribe (1942:13) states that the family groups learned to master the environment and after great difficulty and frequent failures imposed their will without outside help.

This epic colonization was unusual in tropical Latin America for several reasons: first, it involved real pioneers who, of their own volition and independent of government help, were interested in establishing family farms and homesteads; second, they were mostly white; and third, the areas they left behind were not abandoned.

This phenomenon of mass migration and colonization continued on a large scale up to about 1925. The introduction of coffee as a highly profitable cash crop about 1900 spurred the colonization of empty lands remaining. As Parsons (1949:9) notes, it also reinforced the pattern of small hillside tracts in contrast to the large

plantation-type holdings to be found in the Cauca Valley and the savanna of Bogotá.

The development of Medellín as a city began after 1830 when the Colombian government opened the doors to foreign trade. Enterprising Medellín merchants suddenly exhibited the same aggressive, pioneer spirit as their rural brethren and soon cornered most of the import-export business in western Colombia.

Economic progress was such that during the late 1830s a high-fashion tailor arrived in Medellín to do business, as well as an American craftsman skilled in making fine furniture (Betancur, 1925:26-29). The same source reports that during this period leading citizens such as Juan Uribe and Gabriel Echeverri began giving elaborate dances and parties.

Through the latter half of the nineteenth century Medellín prospered as the dominant trading center of western Colombia. Foreigners visiting Colombia during this period began commenting that the city and its people were the most progressive and laborious of the nation. By 1900 Vergara y Velasco (1901:472) could refer to the Antioqueños as the "Yankees of Colombia."

At the end of the nineteenth century a number of wealthy, enterprising Antioqueño merchants saw and acted on new opportunities to invest their money in manufacturing. They also initiated and promoted coffee growing among both the small farmers of Antioquia and the colonists who had pioneered in Caldas to the south. Applying their customary vigor and determination to these tasks, they soon made Medellín the industrial capital of Colombia as well as the marketing center for coffee (which by 1910 was Colombia's leading export).

There has been some debate as to exactly why the businessmen of Medellín invested their commercial profits in industry rather than land or conspicuous consumption. This practice contrasts with that usually followed in Bogotá or Cali, where successful merchants more often chose to become gentlemen farmers and groom their sons for the professions.

The same phenomenon also occurred in Japan towards the end of the last century. Mendel (1966:15-21) states that

Pre-modern Japanese elites did not have the aversion to manual labor or commerce typical of the Chinese elite. Wealthy merchants in China bought land to become gentry. Japanese merchants could not buy

land or indulge in affluent consumption forbidden by the Tokugawa laws.

Abundant land was also scarce around Medellín, and this was probably one reason why "the capitalists of Medellín took very definitely the road of manufacturing enterprises" (Vásquez, 1955:309).

But Vásquez believes that their motives were not purely economic because manufacturing enterprises up to then had not done well and the returns were low. He remarks (1955:309-310) that

among this group of capitalists and entrepreneurs there were some who were not attracted by traditional investments (commerce, usury, mining, farming, the coffee market). In general it is difficult to suppose after computing risks and bother that the new activity of manufacturing could render more than the 24 percent earned in lending. One supposes they made overly optimistic calculations or something else moved them.

He believes that the risk factor was reduced somewhat because of their willingness to cooperate and invest together and points out that cooperative efforts were not new in Antioquia (as they were elsewhere in Colombia) because of the requirements of mining and "something peculiar in their way of life" (Vásquez, 1955:310). He also feels that they were endowed with unusual vision and could foresee long-range profit possibilities.

Large-scale industrialization actually began at Medellín in 1906 when a modern textile mill began operating with imported machinery brought down the Magdalena River by boat and then over the mountains by mule train. Due to technical difficulties and the cost of repairing the damaged machines, the venture failed. In 1908 a new company, the Compañía Colombiana de Tejidos, usually referred to as Coltejer, began with a better-equipped mill. Benefiting from the previous failure, Coltejer grew and, after a series of mergers and a surge of prosperity brought on by World War II, it became the second largest corporation in Colombia and one of the largest in Latin America (Hagen, 1962:39). Coltejer, along with other Colombian industries, expanded phenomenally during the early 50's. In 1940 Coltejer paid \$357,034 in dividends and employed 1,272 persons. In 1947 the company paid out \$8,211,223 in dividends and employed 7,194 workers (Parsons, 1949: 178). Profits were so great that management's biggest problem was in distributing them, and a class of nouveaux riches grew up (Parsons, 1949). In 1967 Coltejer employed approximately 10,000 workers and manufactured, in addition to textiles and fabrics, thread, textile machinery, valves, fittings, and food products.

The success and growth of Coltejer was rapidly duplicated by scores of other industries so that by 1925 Medellín had become the industrial center of Colombia and one of the most modern and progressive cities in Latin America. Vásquez (1955:419) says that the relative success of textile manufacturing and the experience acquired in its management, organization, financing, and technical operation led to the increase in industrialization which would have seemed impossible in 1910.

Betancur (1925:85-86) gives some insight into this process of industrialization by relating the history of Felix de Bedout, founder of a large printing and office-supply manufacturing company. He describes Bedout as the personification of thrift, work, self-help, duty, and character. In 1889 with few resources other than a high-school education, Bedout founded a printing plant at the age of 21. At first he ran a one-man operation and in his first month earned only 19.7 pesos. He began experimenting and improvising with new printing techniques which he learned from patiently studying foreign magazines and catalogues. Gradually the business grew with the city so that by 1925 he had 56 machines and 90 workers in a plant

which manufactured writing paper, envelopes, and notebooks as well as printing books, magazines, etc. Bedout, upon seeing that the city's overall growth was leading to an increase in managerial activities, had the vision and the initiative to take advantage of the situation by manufacturing and selling office supplies.

Medellín in the 1920's had evolved into a relatively modern industrial city. Besides fire protection, parks, and schools, the city government provided its citizens with such public services as paving and water, public health clinics, a bacteriological laboratory, a chlorination plant, a tuberculosis hospital, an orphanage, public housing, "peoples" savings banks, etc.

A perusal of a city-sponsored magazine published in 1925 reveals imaginative, sophisticated advertising by Medellín industries. The backward little market town scornfully described by colonial officials had become an island of modern industrial civilization in an underdeveloped country.

Although the manufacture of textiles and synthetics continues to be the largest single type of industry in Medellín, the area today produces goods ranging from

structural steel to phonograph records. The postwar development of Cali and especially Bogotá as industrial centers has lessened the absolute dominance of Medellín as the focus of Colombian industry (Bogotá ranks today as the first industrial city in Colombia, with Medellín second). Nevertheless, Antioqueños point out that much of the large-scale industry in Bogotá and Cali is foreign-owned and operated--the result of government policies--while the industry of Medellín is overwhelmingly owned and operated by native-born Antioqueños.

Why the Antioqueños

There have been any number of sociohistorical and psychological reasons offered to explain the Antioqueños' peculiar behavior, which in the context of Colombia and most of Latin America can be called deviant. Although there is reason to believe that the "entrepreneur" or innovating businessman type is no longer considered "deviant" in Colombia (the man of action as personified by the successful businessman is becoming something of a new hero or model in many parts of Latin America), this was probably not true until recently. Lipman (1966:39), for example, found a "social atmosphere" in which stimuli for

the entrepreneurial personality was undervalued. He remarks that typically the socialization of children in Colombia "has not been conducive for Colombians of a dedication to commercial activities." Money and success have not been enough to gain high status and "traditional values" are encouraged by the educational system, which discourages change and works against the creation of an efficient industrial leader. Fals-Borda (1963:36) argues, however, that since World War II a new aristocracy of money has risen in Colombia.

Lipset (1967:8), writing about Latin America in general, concurs with Lipman in that, "almost everywhere in Latin America the original upper class was composed of the owners of latifundia, and these set the model for elite behavior to which lesser classes, including the businessmen of the towns, sought to adapt." These landed gentry, like those of southern Spain, scorned pragmatism and materialism, preferring the easy life of a gentleman farmer or politician (for a contemporary description of the indolent life favored by the aristocracy of Andalusia and Extremadura in southern Spain, see James Michener's book Iberia, pp. 350-360, and especially his account of the

extremaduran Hacendado on pp. 54-56). Lipset notes, however, that the Antioqueños are a deviant case, a major exception to the rule (1967:10). He says that the model for the aspiring Antioqueño was not the landed aristocrat but the gold miner and small businessman and later the industrialist. In Medellín, Lipset reminds us, the intellectual has had little status and a man was expected to demonstrate his worth by opening a business. Yet, as he points out (1967:10), historical accounts show that many Antioqueños owned slaves, so that the latifundia social system of patron-slave relationship did exist. He concludes that the type of work done (in mining and on small farms) together with the Iberian culture, led to a mixing of pragmatic-materialistic values with such traditional ones as particularism, ascription of status, etc.

Many writers likewise note that the predominance of mining or the management of small farms and businesses in Antioquia required the master to pitch in and actually work shoulder-to-shoulder with his subordinates to make the enterprise a success. It should be noted that up until the latter nineteenth century, outsiders commented on the backwardness of the entire population, the lack of culture,

and the rough and ready "frontier" atmosphere. Such "aristocrats", as there were, were in fact small-scale traders, miners, or the more successful colonists and farmers who had migrated. This indicates that they were a relatively rude, pragmatic, unpretentious lot forced by the mountainous topography and isolation to work hard for their status. They were undoubtedly quite different in background and behavior from the aristocrats of eighteenth century Bogotá or Peru. As one source (Controlaría General de la República, 1935:122) indicates,

The topography of Colombia has had a great influence on the development of this hard-working people. Mining has been one of their principal industries, and it requires ingenuity, perseverance, and hard work. The fact that it is more difficult and that the mountains require more daily toil in getting means of subsistence have made of the Antioqueños the most practical and confident people in the country.

It is probable then, that in Antioquia willingness to work hard, confidence in one's ability to master problems, and other "deviant" qualities associated with the entrepreneurial personality have for a long time been the dominant values. The Antioqueño outside of Antioquia or Caldas has been looked upon as different, a deviant because of these qualities. Like many immigrant minorities in

Latin America, Asia, and Africa, they have usually done well in other parts of Colombia outside of their patria chica. Hagen (1962:364-365) partially confirms the "Colombian national myth" that most of the nation's industry is run by Antioqueños with an analysis of the regional origins of the men who founded the 110 largest nonfinancial enterprises in the departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca (Bogotá), and Valle del Cauca (Cali). He learned that 75 or 68 percent of those enterprises were founded by Antioqueños who, during this time period, constituted about 40 percent of the combined population of the three departments. In the Valle del Cauca, 17 of the 44 largest enterprises were initiated by Antioqueños while natives of the department had founded only eight. In Cundinamarca, Antioqueños had founded 13 of the 59 largest enterprises as compared with 17 begun by native sons. In Antioquia itself only one of the 58 largest nonfinancial companies had been founded by a Colombian from outside the region.

In seeking geographical and historical reasons for the frequent appearance of the "creative personality" among the Antioqueños, Hagen (1962:82-83) also cites the

demanding topography and the importance of mining activities. He credits early mining experiences with requiring a tradition of hard manual labor, cooperative risk-taking, and knowledge of machine technology. Families were forced to calculate risks carefully and join together in order to spread them out.

Nevertheless, Hagen (1962:85) warns against over-emphasizing these factors as causes since mining was carried out all over Colombia. He feels that the European background of the colonists might be equally significant. Rejecting the idea of a Jewish heritage, he believes that the development of an energetic, capable entrepreneurial class in Antioquia might be due in part to an extra infusion of Basque blood. This hypothesis is based on a survey of the Medellín telephone directory in which he found that 20 to 25 percent of the city's top executives had Basque surnames as compared with 15 percent of all telephone subscribers (Hagen, 1962:80). In point of fact, many prominent last names such as Uribe, Echaverría, Echeverri, and Restrepo are of Basque origin. The question remains as to whether the Basques were really more influential or numerous in Antioquia than in other parts of Colombia.

It is also possible that the unusual "Protestant ethic"-like qualities of the Antioqueño people are a response to the opportunities for homesteading and colonization that grew out of Mon y Velarde's agrarian and mining reforms. Perhaps these opportunities released a hitherto-repressed potential for creative self-improvement. Avenues of self-expression and fulfillment were suddenly available and seized upon. It may be that pioneer self-reliance and belief in one's own ability to master the situation were then developed and carried over into commerce during the nineteenth century and into industry during the twentieth. T. Lynn Smith (1967:8-24) observes that the "family-sized," middle class farm system generally requires and produces a type of personality which is self-confident and well endowed with managerial skills.

Whether because of environmental conditions, mining experiences, the structural changes of Mon y Velarde, the influx of white settlers, or the combination of these and other factors, the Antioqueños did in fact develop a predilection for hard work and an attraction for commercial and industrial vocations.

The willingness to risk, a quality or ability often said to be an essential part of the entrepreneurial

personality, also distinguishes Antioqueños from other Colombians and is considered a major reason for their greater record of achievement. They offer and accept credit as a working resource to a much greater extent than elsewhere in Colombia. They also have less fear of making long-time investments and waiting for a profit.

The cooperative "in-group" spirit of the Antioqueños is almost as frequently cited as is their willingness to take risks. The large donations made by industry to the city of Medellín in the form of cash and executive personnel (for staffing key governmental positions) are a manifestation of that spirit. Mendel (1966:15-21) remarks that the traditional unity and cohesion of Japanese society was also a factor in its economic development.

The point was made in the introduction that the values held by a group of people obviously influence their behavior and that the values of their leaders are especially important in determining the shape and progress of that group.

"Modern" and "traditional" sets of values which supposedly typify modern and traditional cultures have been delineated by social scientists interested in the problems

of socioeconomic development. These values, when internalized as beliefs and feelings, are believed to set behavioral norms and thus lead some groups to master themselves and their environments to a greater extent than others. As stated in the introduction, it is thought that the following value orientations or beliefs constitute a "modern" value profile: 1) man is capable of mastering his natural environment; 2) man should plan for his future in terms of means and goals; 3) he should act or do rather than remain passive or just speculate; 4) each individual should depend primarily on his own ability. Limited evidence shows such a profile to be strongly held by the North American middle class. It is logical to expect that these would be the dominant value orientations of the entrepreneurial personality as exemplified by the successful businessman, industrialist, or community leader. Because Antioqueños in general have been significantly more successful as entrepreneurs than other Colombians and because Medellín has been the most highly developed city in Colombia, it is also logical to predict that the leadership of Medellín will hold these value orientations to a greater extent than elsewhere in Colombia and indeed

will approximate the North American middle class in this respect. If this be true, then we have discovered another answer to the question, "Why the Antioqueños?" These particular value orientations have, of course, been implied in the concrete description presented above of the Antioqueños' "deviant" behavior (e.g., that they place a high value on work, are willing to take long-term risks, that they prefer action to speculation, etc.).

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION

Defining Modernization

There is some disagreement on the part of historians and others as to precisely when and how the "modern" age began. Some seem to think it was initiated with the discovery of America and the beginning of the Renaissance during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Others believe that the first industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began the process of modernization which marks the beginning of the modern era. The following statement by Hagen (1962:10) illustrates the latter view:

In the eighteenth or early nineteenth century . . . following a number of improvements in methods in Western Europe during the Middle Ages there began in England a series of advances in technology and a rise in per capita income rapid enough so that marked change occurred within each generation, and indeed during each decade. Change at such a pace may be termed economic growth.

Apart from the timing, there is widespread agreement about other important facets of this profound change in man's personal and social life. It is agreed: (1) that the modern age began in Western Europe and has reached its fullest development there and more recently in the rest of Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan; (2) that it had barely begun in many areas of the world by the latter half of the twentieth century; (3) that the process of modernization which initiates the modern age consists of a tremendously broad transformation in the culture or way of life of a society; (4) that this transformation is very complex, involving many causes as well as a multitude of effects which reinforce the process itself; (5) that the beginning of the modern age in non-Western European countries has been largely stimulated by the diffusion of cultural elements from Western Europe.

Obviously it is hard to define or describe in a sentence what modernization is. It usually is conceptualized as a process of social change leading to a state of being called "modern" in which a society has the following characteristics: a complex division of labor, a highly mechanized technology, a national economy of

high per capita production and consumption, a complex but relatively open class structure, a high degree of urbanization, widespread education, and widespread participation in the mass media. Wilbert Moore (1963:89) describes the dynamics of modernization as involving a series of smaller scale changes in specific areas such as values, social organization, technology, etc. All such changes taking place in a single social system, no matter how far removed in time and space from each other, are viewed as being related in a cause-and-effect hierarchy of importance (small changes causing bigger ones which in turn lead to more small changes). A society is hereby conceived of as a system or an organism transforming itself as a whole through modification of its parts, whether such modification is a consequence of external influence (foreign cultures) or internal tensions, and whether or not modification of one part keeps pace with that of other parts. Both from this point of view and empirically, modernization is a somewhat disjointed process, five-year plans notwithstanding, since one part of a society, such as its educational institutions or industrial technology, will often change faster than other parts.

Moore (1963) also insists that the specific changes which are the beginning of the process usually differ from place to place and time to time. For example, in one area at one time modernization may initially mean reducing illiteracy, providing good water, or eliminating malaria. In another place the process may be manifested by new roads, hydroelectric facilities and the subsidization of light industry. Be that as it may, when the process is more or less continuous it should eventually result in the almost

total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced" economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the Western world [Moore, 1963:89].

To reach this blessed stage is usually an arduous task for, as Moore (1963:92) says, even though modernization has been going on almost everywhere at different rates, the social order of the underdeveloped areas deviates from that of the advanced areas in so many ways that there is room for "improvement" everywhere. Since World War II improvements in nations which are in the incipient stages of modernization have been determined by political leaders who decide what the most important problems and priorities

are. In making these kinds of choices, modernization has usually been equated with economic development (primarily embodied as industrialization) and to a much lesser extent, social development. Because of this, it is often referred to as "socioeconomic development." Moore (1963:92) seems to think that while economic development is not all that is entailed in modernizing a society, it is perhaps primary in importance. This he believes because: (1) the most important consequence of the process from the viewpoint of both leaders and masses in underdeveloped countries is the raising of the average man's level of living to "modern" levels and (2) without an efficient, moderately prosperous economy, and a good civil service, social objectives cannot be sustained (though they may be temporarily met by virtue of external help). Until recently, most students of modernization accepted this emphasis on economic development in general and industrialization in particular. In line with this, Alex Inkeles (1964:33) mentions the tremendous interest of younger sociologists in the impact of industrialism in the world (following he says, the tradition of Leslie White and William F. Ogburn). Like Ogburn and

White, most expect to find the development of uniform institutions and social patterns in a variety of different cultures as a result of industrialism. Arnold Rose (1958:26) for one believes that a "world culture" has been developing among advanced societies for four centuries as a consequence of economic development in the forms of industrialization and the expansion of world trade. The principal features of his "world culture" are of course the social developments which are part and parcel of the modernization process such as urbanization, specialization, secularization, increased social mobility, universal education, and a general rise in the level of living.

In short, this economic orientation emphasizes the primary and fundamental importance of economic growth in the modernization process. Since economic growth is considered so important it might be well to explain precisely what it means. In the most general terms economic growth means the expansion of commerce, industry, and other money-producing agencies which lead to a general rise in income. Hagen (1962:11) defines it more exactly as being a two step process: (1) the discovery of new knowledge making possible an increase in the output of

goods and services per unit of labor, capital, and materials used in production; (2) the incorporation of that knowledge in productive processes. By his definition, economic growth depends on innovation--innovation which Hagen observes must happen first as discovery in pure science, then as the adaptation of discovery in engineering, and finally as the application of discovery in production. It is noteworthy that he includes not only scientific and technical discoveries as elements of economic growth but also the devising of new forms of organization and procedures to make production more efficient (Hagen, 1962:11).

According to Hagen (1962:12), if this innovative process of economic growth becomes continuous, meaning a continuing improvement in techniques, products, and income, then it should also become a permanent behavior pattern (part of the culture) and provide more than just basic necessities for a growing population. In this event the fundamental economic problem of being an underdeveloped or "traditional" society is solved.

There is currently some disagreement with this largely economic view of modernization. The disagreement

appears to be based on the generally poor results or economic development plans which have been implemented in underdeveloped countries throughout the world. There is, of course, some question as to how well many of the plans were implemented, but, even with this factor accounted for, there does exist disillusionment with an approach whose results were expected to carry traditional societies a long way on the road to modernization. As a prominent Israeli political scientist and economist puts it,

The experience of many developing countries indicates that national plans based on narrowly construed economic models of development have proved to be inadequate. The expectations of the 1950's for accelerated development according to discernible stages of economic growth have not materialized. "Century skipping" has not occurred during the United Nations' first declared "development decade" [Galnoor, 1971:8].

This line of reasoning is also espoused by Donald McGranahan (1971:67) of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development:

. . . the concept of "development," which spread with great rapidity after the Second World War, has been rather consistently defined by most economists, at least in an operational sense, as growth of the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) or similar national accounts figures. . . . Recently, as a result of the apparent failure of the developing countries to achieve, on the average, a satisfactory rate of growth per capita GNP, there has been considerable criticism

of a narrowly economic approach to development. In trying to explain what has gone wrong, a number of observers have concluded that there has been insufficient attention to social (or to social and political) factors. . . . It has also been increasingly argued that social factors are part of the very nature and process of development and should not be regarded merely as external causes or effects of it.

With this in mind McGranahan (1971:68) urges us to view economic factors and "level-of-living" factors (e.g., health, education, nutrition, etc.,--more broadly defined as social factors) as interdependent aspects of an evolving system which cause and affect each other. "Under this conception, development comprises both economic and social elements, which tend to change together as a complex" (McGranahan, 1971:68).

In order to measure and operationally define "development" or modernization McGranahan has worked out a list of eighteen quantitative "core indicators" (McGranahan, 1971:70). A single reading of these social and economic facts would hypothetically "indicate" the level of development or modernization in a society at any particular time (assuming they are valid). Readings over time would indicate the course of modernization--the direction and degree of changes which make up the modernization process.

The indicators include such variables as expectation of life at birth, per capita daily consumption of animal protein, telephones per 100,000 population, and electricity consumption per capita.

Hagen (1962:23) also decries the overemphasis on economic factors in both the study of modernization and in past attempts to stimulate it. As an economist in Burma during the years 1951 to 1953, he found the economic situation there highly favorable for the beginning of technical and organizational innovation and, supposedly, the modernization of the Burmese economy and society. When this failed to take place as expected, he concluded that, for social and cultural--rather than economic reasons, the typical Burmese was not motivated to take advantage of this opportunity to increase his own income as well as help modernize his country (see Hagen, 1962:432-470). Eventually Hagen decided that the type of technological and entrepreneurial innovation which generates economic growth must be preceded by a series of social, cultural, and psychological changes--innovations in political organization and social relationships as well as innovations in the values, beliefs, and attitudes members of a society have

about their place and purpose in the world (Hagen, 1962: 33-34). He feels that making such basic changes in a traditional people's way of thinking, feeling, and acting is exceedingly difficult--requiring a great deal of painful and creative effort as well as tension and pressure. To illustrate this thesis, he points out (1962:44) that the successful operation of a large "modern" factory in a traditional society requires radical changes of behavior in both the entrepreneur and in interpersonal relations (unless it is being run by foreigners from a developed country). More specifically, a modern economic enterprise cannot be successfully operated by members of a traditional culture who are organized in a rigid hierarchical structure of ascribed statuses, who fear innovation, refuse to face problems, etc. For Hagen, sustained economic growth is produced by a certain innovative personality type which has been formed in a modernizing culture and accommodated by a modernizing social structure. In his view, full-scale economic development is the last stage of the modernization process and a sign of its maturity. From studies of the history of modern and modernizing countries Hagen (1962:21) says that the process is at first a slow

one beginning with the necessary sociocultural changes which lead eventually to the economic growth stage. For a modern country like England this final stage of economic growth was reached in the late eighteenth century with the industrial revolution. In Colombia, a modernizing country, this stage was reached during the first two decades of this century and in effect is barely under way. In Burma it has presumably not yet been reached. In short, the "modern" age fully arrives once sustained economic growth begins but the modernizing process by means of which a nation reaches this stage and becomes "modern" must begin somewhat earlier.

Galnoor (1971:9) is in substantial agreement with Hagen's view when he quotes Leopold Faufer's definition of development:

Development means many things. It means dams and factories, roads and canals, bush-clearing, electrification, soil improvement, universities, secondary schools, primary schools, sanitation, research, and a multitude of other activities and achievements. But, above all, development means people. . . . The preparation and activation of people is the cause of economic and social development.

In essence these men are saying that a modern society is one which is created by people with modern personalities

who relate to their work and each other in a modern way. The modern social relationship is essentially a bureaucratic one of cooperation and competition within a framework of mutual respect and equal opportunity. The modern personality is one whose thinking and behavior are guided primarily by modern value orientations, and attitudes, such as curiosity about the natural world, interest in solving rather than avoiding problems, the desire to achieve and be judged by achievement. A society where this type of personality predominates is modern or is becoming so. Thus, modernization is more a process of social and cultural change than one of economic growth.

Environmental Theories of Modernization

This type of theory explains the origin of the modernization process in terms of factors which are largely external to the individual and his personality. In these explanations, modern behavior in a society is principally a consequence of the physical, social, cultural, or economic environments of that society. Exponents of this view insist that even though these environmental circumstances can be transformed by the hand of man, it is from their form and content that the possibilities of

modernization for the individual and his society are derived.

Some of these theories stress the influences of physical or biological forces. Others put emphasis on man-made social structural or cultural environments which react back on man to shape his personality and behavior. In some cases modernization is explained as basically a consequence of one environmental factor while others try to trace the combined effects of several factors on the beginning of the modernization process.

Particularistic Theories

The "one key factor" theories are usually described as particularistic or deterministic theories. LaPiere (1965:23) remarks that this type of explanation

involves an assumption that social change (or modernization) is the product of some particular variable, some single "cause," and that not only is every change attributable to that cause, but every change in that cause will produce a concomitant change in society.

However, on closer analysis many of these single factors turn out to be single themes made of many parts.

The following are examples of the single-factor approach.

1. "Diffusionism" holds that one or a few dominant cultural centers (e.g., Egypt in ancient times, the United States today) create and innovate, diffusing new ideas, techniques, etc., to others. This theory, once held by the diffusionist school of anthropology, is no longer accepted as the only explanation of change and development. Nevertheless, men such as Becker and Barnes (1961:341) stress the central importance of "culture contact" in bringing about fundamental change. They regard the culture contacts stemming from the sixteenth century period of exploration as being instrumental in breaking down the feudal order, increasing scientific curiosity, and giving rise to world commerce, modern capitalism, the middle class, and the national state. These "innovations" in their turn are said to have initiated the industrial revolution and the modern age.

Hagen (1962:15) likewise places a great deal of emphasis on the role of cultural diffusion in bringing about change--

no one can doubt that the main source of change in societies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa during modern times is intrusion by the West and the parade of economic power and prowess by the West. If there are no serious internal stresses

and no disturbing forces from the outside, cultural change in any society proceeds at a snail's pace. [Hagen, 1962:15].

Hagen is far too sophisticated however to attribute all societal change to any single variable and the question arises in his mind as to why some non-Western societies have taken advantage of imported Western ideas, technology, etc., faster and more thoroughly than others. To find out, Hagen (1962:16) feels that we must look for the specific underlying factors or conditions which dispose one group to make use of outside help more readily than another. If this can be accomplished, we will, he believes, be able to hasten as well as understand the process of modernization.

2. Geographic determinism, the most popular ... version of which hypothesizes that moderately cool or cold climates produce people who are somewhat reserved, energetic, hard working, provident and thus more disposed to develop themselves and their society. Conversely, warm climates are thought to make people lazy, easygoing, talkative, cheerful, open, etc., and, therefore, less eager to master themselves and their surroundings. LaPiere (1965:25) states that Ellsworth Huntington has been the

primary exponent of this theory. Because climate and geography do have some influence on how people behave, the geographic variable is still very much a part of some multivariate analyses of modernization. McClelland (1961:338), for example, believes that while climate obviously cannot account for all variation in levels of development (as witness the difference between climatically similar Germany and Poland) it is, he thinks, a limiting factor in the sense that extremes of heat and cold have been barriers to rapid or thoroughgoing modernization.

3. Biological determinism maintains that differences in levels of social, cultural, or economic development are a result of inherent racial differences. Thus, the countries of Western Europe are more highly developed than those of Africa because the European is physically and mentally superior to the African. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this theory gained a number of adherents because of such articulate spokesmen as Count J. A. de Gobineau in France and Houston Stewart Chamberlain in England. Adolph Hitler formulated his own version of the theory and used it to guide his policies of enslavement and extermination of minorities in Europe.

4. William F. Ogburn's theory of cultural lag (1964:86-95), in common with the theories of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen, expresses the idea that social change (and therefore modernization) is fundamentally dependent on inventions in "material technology" (or technological innovation in contemporary terms). Thus, the diffusion of modern technology into traditional or underdeveloped societies should, after varying time lags, bring about the modernization of social organization and individual behavior. This, of course, has been the basic modus operandi of many economic development planners since World War II.

Though not denying the role of technological innovations in leading or hastening the modernization process, most social and economic theorists refuse to accept the idea that they are inevitably the beginning of the process. LaPiere (1965:32) insists that recent changes in China have had their origin in ideological rather than technical innovations. Wilbert Moore (1963:87) offers proof that "nonmaterial" culture can lead while technology lags, in the fact that the ideology of economic development is now almost everywhere accepted by political leaders in underdeveloped countries at the same time that their technology

lags. Moore (1963:87) calls this desire for material well-being "a worldly doctrine (which) is the single most successful conversion movement in the history of ideological diffusion." It is, in effect, a modern secular religion.

5. The influence of elite groups in the modernization of traditional societies has been proclaimed by Edward Spicer (1952) and others who have taken their cues from earlier ideas expressed by Vilfredo Pareto in Mind and Society. For Spicer, the educated elites are the best read members of their societies and are most in contact with advanced countries and this makes them more receptive to new ideas. In a way, "they clearly see the difference between what is and what might be" (Spicer, 1952:18). What elites adopt in the way of new technology, customs, ideas, values, etc., is sooner or later adopted by the masses. According to this line of thought, the more thoroughly modern an elite group becomes, the more modern will the society it dominates eventually become. The modernization of elite thinking is nonetheless difficult to put into practice because true modernization implies equalitarian social relationships and achievement of status, changes

which would threaten the near monopoly of wealth, power, and prestige which most traditional elites presently enjoy.

6. Arnold Toynbee's "challenge of the environment" theory (1947) specifies that nations grow when some environmental challenge or problem is responded to in a positive "problem-solving" way by a creative minority. Such a challenge, whether it comes from the physical or the social environment, must not be too severe, that is, beyond the capabilities of the group challenged. According to this line of reasoning, Greenland was too severe a challenge for the Viking colonists whereas Iceland was not. In the same way tropical Africa could be said to have been too much of a challenge for its inhabitants. At the other extreme, little or no challenge will, Toynbee claims, result in the stagnation or even disintegration of a civilization. McClelland (1961:7) feels that Toynbee's theory is so general that it has little explanatory or predictive power, unless the right amount of challenge can be precisely specified. Otherwise, one can always find a background of challenges in the history of developed countries and speculate that they were "just right" for stimulating development.

There are, of course, other "one factor" explanations for social change and modernization which have not been presented. The above are intended as prominent examples of the approach rather than an exhaustive list. The belief that a certain combination of religious values or precepts are of vital importance for the development of an industrial society is perhaps the most glaring omission. For the most part, deterministic theories are out of vogue because as Hagen (1962:19) remarks, when taken singly the independent variables they postulate explain only a limited amount of the developmental differences to be found among nations.

Multivariate Theories

The obvious complexity of the modernization process has led to a preference for multivariate explanations over particularistic ones. Economist Walt Rostow (1960:4-16) has postulated a series of five stages which a modernizing society passes through on the road to development. Each stage involves a complex of changes in the economic environment which implicitly brings on a subsequent stage. In stage one, the "traditional" stage, which is considered typical of many underdeveloped countries today and of

pre-eighteenth century Europe, production and innovation are severely limited though not static. Growth is cyclical and quantitative rather than qualitative in nature.

During stage two or the pre-take-off, methods of production undergo sufficient improvement to allow for some capital formation which permits an increase in output per head. The initiation of such improvements is said to be an outgrowth of either foreign penetration or ascendancy to power of rulers who, because they are interested in economic growth, give freedom to growth-minded organizers. When this stage is fully developed, social and "other" resistances to economic development are thought to be largely overcome.

Stage three is called the "take-off" stage and is characterized by large scale increases in investment and manufacturing. A modern institutional framework also evolves and after several decades, stage four is achieved.

Maturity or stage four is a period in which the economy has become capable of financing practically any known type of public and private investment while the society has technologically achieved the capability of

materially realizing such investments. This high-investment process leads to stage five.

Stage five heralds the age of high mass-consumption as exemplified by the United States and West European countries. Here durable consumer goods are mass-produced and consumed by a population desirous of and able to have much more than the basic necessities.

Joseph Spengler (1965:262) criticizes Rostow's theory of developmental stages on six points: (1) Rostow fails to say exactly how one stage ends to give rise to another; (2) he overlooks the "fact" that external influences are ineffectual if traditional value systems do not change; (3) he ignores inner stresses which may easily confound development in any one stage; (4) he gives us no clear qualitative criteria for the stages; (5) he presumes a unilinear development for all societies; (6) the sources of changes within each stage are not clearly identified.

A summary of other multivariate economic theories of modernization is provided by Hagen (1962:36-47). He prefaces it with a list of economic characteristics typical of traditional societies which economists believed were barriers to modernization. These are, in effect,

variables in the economic environment which economists thought had to be changed in order to initiate the modernization process. They include: (1) chronic low income leading to inadequate savings for investment; (2) the "demonstration effect" of Western countries, which leads the upper strata of underdeveloped nations to spend most of their income in conspicuous consumption; (3) inadequate demand, which offers little reason for investment; (4) a lack of capital to set up the necessary "infrastructure" (roads, schools, etc.,) for development to take place; (5) an excess population which eats up most of the income produced.

Hagen observes (1962:37) that by 1960 most economists had added social and cultural variables to their economic models for development after seeing so many countries with favorable economic environments fail to begin modernizing. They began stressing, in addition to economic reforms, the need for cultural changes such as the inculcation of risk-taking and profit-making values, changes in political values, changes in the definitions of "high" status and "low" status, and the development of "national" loyalties from strictly local community

loyalties. Ironically, men like Max Weber and Schumpeter had long before emphasized the role such factors play in producing industrialization. McClelland (1961:11) states that Max Weber's theory of social and economic organization laid the main groundwork for these later efforts to understand the cultural and psychological mainsprings of modernization. Weber held that the development of modern economic institutions like capitalism was the result of a conflict between "traditionalism" and rationality which in turn arose from the changes in religious and ethical values that accompanied the Protestant reformation (Weber, 1947: 324-354). For Weber, "traditionalism" was embodied in a hierarchical, authoritarian social structure in which the individual accepted his place and relationship to peers, superiors, and inferiors unquestionably on the basis of traditional values and norms. By way of contrast, rationality was exemplified by the modern bureaucratic organization in which, ideally, the rules and one's place were subject to change on the basis of practical needs and one's merit in performing assigned duties.

Weber believed that rationality had won out over traditionalism in Western cultures such that the social

and economic systems of Western nations had in our terms become "modernized."

Weber's critics often charge that contemporary Western cultures and societies are far from being "rational" (as he defined it) in their orientations or in the typical behavior of the individuals who make them up. The critics' claim that traditionalism still dominates to a large extent the thought and action of Western man has been answered by Wilbert Moore. Moore's hypothesis is that the disparity between the real and the ideal is in itself "change-producing" and a stimulus to approximate the ideal as far as possible (Moore, 1963:80). Moore points out that even though the social order is also a moral order, "sin" or nonconformity occurs everywhere because, among other things, ideal values are often not achieved and norms governing conduct are often contradictory. Moore believes that the resulting tension between the ideal and the real is conducive to change in social organization and the ideology itself. In other words, the culture sets forth the ideal in terms of goals and behavior and most people in the culture strive to achieve these goals, however imperfectly. The goals themselves

operate as a constant challenge to their own shortcomings. Thus, when rational social and economic behavior (oriented towards materialistic goals) is the ideal of a culture, most participants, or at least those who have internalized the culture, will strive to behave rationally and achieve material goals.

Working at the micro-level in the study of a small, relatively well-developed, Colombian village, A. Eugene Havens (1966:175-176) came to believe that a particular complex of social variables was responsible for that community's unusual progress. They are: (1) colonization of the area by independent small farmers rather than adventurers seeking plantation land; (2) the acceptance of risk in exploiting opportunities by the frontiersmen-colonists; (3) the openness and equalitarianism of their social structure; (4) the colonist's use of existing sources of credit and technical information; (5) the encouragement of change by church and family structure; (6) the effectiveness of voluntary associations in problem-solving (those who took part in them developed "trust" for each other and the government). Havens believes that these were sufficient conditions for development. In this

particular community these variables operated together. From a macro-level perspective of cross-cultural research, Samuel Eisenstadt (1965:659-674) emphasizes the importance of more-or-less the same set of social-environmental conditions for national modernization. He insists that class structures as well as institutions like the family and government must become adaptable and flexible enough to take advantage of external pressures for modernization.

Sociopsychological Theories of Modernization

In this species of theory, a personality type or specific personality factors are linked with modernization. Generally, modernization is seen as the consequence of a complex psychological change--the transformation of the traditional personality type into a modern one. Such a metamorphosis is considered a necessary and direct cause of modernization though it is usually acknowledged to be the effect of broader social and cultural changes. Hagen, for example (1962:9), conceives of social change and modernization as beginning in the following way. First a change in social structure occurs (because of external or internal events) which leads to a change in the parental behavior of

a significant segment of the society. This changing childhood environment then creates a different personality type which, when fully developed, acts to complete the modernization process by promoting intensive social and economic developments.

Like Hagen, most sociopsychological theorists do not believe that the majority of a society's members must acquire "modern" personalities for the modernization process to visibly begin. Instead, it is thought sufficient if there is an important minority which does so.

Whatever proportion of "modern" personalities is necessary or however exactly one defines a modern personality, there is agreement among those with a sociopsychological point of view that "modern" personalities play a vital role in modernizing a society. Whatever their origin (they might even be ambitious foreigners as in Venezuela or Kuwait, for example), they must be present with sufficient power to both originate and implement the changes which bring on socioeconomic growth. Wilbert Moore (1963:96) indirectly supports this view when he says that the simple desire for a better life does

not automatically lead to its fulfillment. In other words motivation cannot be assumed and

although Weber's emphasis on the importance of the "Protestant Ethic" as precedent to the emergence of capitalism is clearly not a necessary precondition of industrialization in the contemporary world, some degree of "achievement orientation" of ambition for personal betterment and the acquisition of the education and skills to further that ambition, must exist in some groups and spread rather widely, if sustained growth is to be accomplished [Moore, 1963:96].

Kaspar Naegele (1961:1216) offers a similar rationale for analyzing psychological factors in modernization when he states that

Psychological facts are relevant for any attempt to account for changes in social organizations or wider corporate patterns. Changes in and of any society involve changes in the configuration of motives and dispositions characterizing the members of that society. Wide shifts in an economy-- e.g., from agricultural to industrial patterns-- cannot proceed without changes in people's organization of emotions [Naegele, 1961:1216].

More specifically Joseph Spengler (1965:243-272) insists that the modernization of a society begins with changes in the typical personality characteristics of its leaders. "It is in," he remarks, "change in the contents of men's minds and in changes associated therewith (e.g., changes in habits and institutions) that technological progress, the correspondent of mutation, has its principal

source" (Spengler, 1965:247). According to Spengler, qualitative changes in culture and personality give rise to the activities of the entrepreneur which are more important for economic development than are quantitative increases in capital and machinery. He believes that the opposite view caused David Ricardo to neglect the contributions of the "creative entrepreneur" and so underestimate the economic growth of late nineteenth century Europe (Spengler, 1965:256).

Under the heading "Types of Men in Sociology," Alex Inkeles (1964:52) reviews both early and more recent efforts to devise sociopsychological personality types in order to explain the marked differences between different societies at the same time and in the same society at different times. He begins with the personality types delineated by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America and with the foxes and the lions of Vilfredo Pareto's Mind and Society. Inkeles (1964:52) feels that Pareto's innovative "foxes" and traditional "lions" are two of the most important theoretical personality types ever conceptualized. Pareto characterized his foxes as speculative and willing to experiment or risk

while the lions were portrayed as attached to tradition and lacking in imagination. Pareto believed that a society led by foxes would be dynamic, progressive and ready to innovate for the sake of improvement. His portrait of the "fox" describes the contemporary idea of the innovative entrepreneur or creative person who is considered indispensable for the initiation and development of the modernization process. Inkeles (1964:52-53) also mentions more recently elaborated personality types such as those of David Riesman. Riesman's personality types represent different models of conformity to a given type of society at different stages of development. His "tradition-directed" man is the modal type of personality he would expect to find in a traditional, predominantly rural society. The behavior of such a man is largely guided by long-standing cultural values and norms which are accepted without question. In the event that cultural changes--resulting from foreign contacts or the machinations of deviants--bring about possibilities for social mobility, capital accumulation, or scientific and technical progress, a new personality type emerges which Riesman calls the "inner-directed" man. Such a man would be socialized to achieve

to the limit of his ability by taking advantage of new opportunities for self-advancement. This personality is a desired response to these new conditions and a more flexible tradition which encourages personal improvement--rather than demanding strict adherence to all the details of the old tradition. In other words, an ambitious man is allowed not only to step out of his father's footsteps, but, as opportunities and demand increase, he is encouraged to rise above his father's position. The stimulation of such a man would involve impressing on him early in life a desire to achieve and create in whatever direction his interests lay. It would also mean the development of self-discipline and persistence in the face of obstacles. The internalization of these values and norms would produce a prototype of the capitalistic entrepreneur, the source of whose behavior or direction, according to Riesman, comes from within. In Riesman's terms it was the "inner-directed" man who, like Pareto's fox, realized the opportunities for economic development which were available in Western Europe after the seventeenth century. It is, Riesman implies, the "inner-directed" personality which present-day traditional societies need to cultivate, encourage, and provide with opportunities.

Inkeles (1964:53) states that Riesman's complex personality types, while illuminating major social processes of adjustment and change with historical perspective, have been difficult to find empirically. He reports progress in measuring some of these qualities--including McClelland's apparently successful measurement of the need to achieve--but none in finding a completely "inner-" or "other-" directed man.

Daniel Lerner in The Passing of Traditional Society (1953) constructs a hypothetical personality type which shares certain elements of Riesman's "other-directed" personality and which he believes will at least accompany the modernization process if not actually originate it. Generally, Lerner's theory holds that modernization in the form of a modern life-style has arisen within the "European orbit," is spreading to the non-European world, and is essentially connected with a distinctive "modern" personality. The "modern life-style" involves urban living, literacy, use of the mass media, political awareness and activity, and democratic relationships (Lerner, 1958:43-75). Lerner's "modern" personality is distinguished mainly by his rational postivist outlook, participation in national

institutions, and his psychic mobility or empathy, that is, his capacity to see himself in the other fellow's situation. This sensitivity to others is of course the major component of Riesman's "other-directed" man.

Lerner operationally defined the elements of the empathic or modern personality from response to nine survey items used in the Middle Eastern research from which his theory is derived. Thus, the empathic individual is one who shows that he: (1) has the ability to analyze the value of the mass media for his own use; (2) has the ability to criticize the mass-media and his rulers; (3) can picture himself living in a foreign country; and (4) can imagine what other people would do to solve his problems (Lerner, 1958:69-70). The person who has not developed these personality traits is classified as either traditional or transitional according to his distance from said traits. The traditional personality of the Middle East is described by Lerner (1958:43) as being like the modal personality type presumed to exist in medieval Europe: immobile, a stranger to empathy, and suspicious of the new. He is, for example, unable to conceive of himself outside of Turkey or as running his

government. Not surprisingly, the transitional personality is said to be somewhere between traditionalism and modernity (Lerner, 1958:72). He is usually illiterate, may or may not be urban, exposed to mass media, etc., but somehow has become fairly empathic.

Essentially, then, Lerner assumes from his data that those who have clear opinions on issues are the least restricted and traditional and the most rational, positivist, empathic, and modern. Operationally, opinion-knowledge indicates empathy and modernity.

Does this personality type really give birth to a modern society or is it the product of a modernizing society? Lerner's data show (1958:63) that incipient urbanization and the development of the mass media lead to the beginning of personality modernization. Certain individuals respond to new influences and knowledge with personality changes and they reinforce and irreversibly set in motion the modernization process. His personality is, therefore, an effect which becomes a cause.

Critics of Lerner's theory (Dawn, 1959:660-661; Gulick, 1959:135-138) point out that his objective criteria of modernization do not, in fact, correlate well. The

correlation between urbanization and political activity, for example, is diminished by the fact that election participation in Syria and Lebanon was higher in villages than in cities. Moreover, they ask whether high mass-media participation always leads to the weakening of tradition and authority and whether one can infer the existence of empathy from the fact that a variety of opinions are held? In short, Lerner is criticized for creating a modern personality type out of superficial evidence and presuming its connection with an objective state he calls modern but which, according to his own data, is not clearly that. Lerner (1958:398) regards his conclusions as hypothetical regularities made more plausible by the results of his research.

Possibly the most prominent sociopsychological theory of modernization to appear in the great post-World War II search for the mainsprings of economic development is that of David McClelland. In his monumental work, The Achieving Society (1961), McClelland, who is a psychologist, has tried specifically to pinpoint the psychological forces behind creativity and accomplishment and demonstrate through various quantitative methods that

these factors are vital for economic development. He begins by demonstrating logically and empirically the limited or insignificant influence of such environmental factors as race, climate, and political institutions on the rate of economic development (McClelland, 1961:6-7). He then argues (1961:8-14) against traditional economic theories which in his opinion mistakenly regard the modern entrepreneur as a totally rational, self-interested man, motivated to increase productivity (and the commonwealth) for personal profit. McClelland insists that many times external conditions (demand, etc.,) are unfavorable for economic growth or investment and yet people invest. He cites as proof of this contention the building of railroads to the West Coast in the 1860's, investment in innovations or developments which had no foreseeable economic advantage (such as the automobile), and the fact that in many underdeveloped countries where there is little rational reason for investing (risks are high, markets are small, etc.,) large-scale investments have been made. With regard to this last point, it might be recalled from Chapter II that the industrialization of Medellín began when seemingly irrational investments were

made in textile mills--at a time when much better returns were available elsewhere and in a product for which there was apparently little market or transport to markets.

Beginning with Weber and Schumpeter, McClelland (1961:11) finds that some economists began to sense that there were "irrational" reasons which contributed to varying propensities to save, invest, and create. Freud, he points out (1961:38), had just discovered that motives to fill needs and take action are not always or even primarily rational. Most of these scholars talked about variables such as attitude towards work, spirit of adventure or risk, and joy of creating. Whatever the specific approach, McClelland (1961:6) believes that this point of view had led to recognition of "irrational" forces for economic development that lie within man himself, in his motives. Coupled with this has come the belief that psychology can shed light on the process of modernization by finding out what kind of man concentrates on economic (and technical) activities and why some men are so successful at them. McClelland himself feels that these psychological motivations which do spur economic growth are closely related to cultural value orientations

in the sense that an individual's psychological disposition to act as an entrepreneur or agent of modernization are manifestations of his cultural values. McClelland observes (1961:17) that empirical proof for the relationships between personality traits, cultural values, and economic development is hard to come by but he believes that his own research and that of Florence Kluckhohn represent solid efforts to find such proof.

With this justification for a psychological explanation of modernization completed, McClelland begins to build his own theory for the genesis of the "achieving society." Essentially, McClelland holds that an inner motive called "need for achievement," if held by sufficient numbers of people, is the most direct cause of economic development. This need for achievement (which McClelland expresses as "N achievement" for shorthand purposes) is a desire to excel for the sake of excellence itself. It is similar to what Max Weber described as the Calvinist's irrational need to do a job well for its own sake and to the fundamental motivation of Riesman's "inner-directed" man.

McClelland located and measured the need for achievement while analyzing fantasy responses of college

students to a variety of pictures (McClelland, 1961:38-43). He was paradoxically afraid to use the actual achievements of individuals as an index of the need for achievement because he felt that unusual ability or other motives such as desire for prestige, power, or approval could lead to extraordinary achievement. Subsequently, he began conducting cross-cultural experiments in which the experimental subjects were aroused to achieve. Analyses showed that the fantasies and free associations produced under conditions of achievement revolved around "standards of excellence, doing well, and wanting to do well" (McClelland, 1961:43). The fantasies of control-group subjects who were not "aroused to achieve" failed to show much of this content. From these results it was hypothesized that the frequency of such fantasies found in testing persons who were not artificially aroused to achieve would indicate for everyday situations the degree of their "need" for achievement. Thus, the higher the frequency indicated by an individual, the higher is his score and presumably his need to achieve.

McClelland found in all of the varied cultures where experiments were conducted that those who scored

high were usually middle class and performed better on problems where individual achievement was stressed (McClelland, 1961:45). Extrinsic rewards (money) or the value of cooperation with others did not move them to perform any better than those he classified as low in need for achievement. The ubiquitousness of this result confirmed McClelland's (1961:46) belief that high need-achievers pursue standards of excellence for themselves.

Since the manager-entrepreneur role is perhaps the most important occupational role in a society's economic development, McClelland wished to find out whether individuals in such roles who had a high need for achievement were unusually successful in carrying them out. To do this he made a series of comparative studies in four countries: the United States, Italy, Turkey, and Poland (McClelland, 1961:259-271). McClelland found that:

- (1) everywhere except in Turkey individuals sampled from middle- and high-level managerial-entrepreneurial jobs scored much higher in need for achievement than did those in professional occupations of equal importance;
- (2) in all but the United States, the more (apparently) successful a manager-entrepreneur was, the higher his need for

achievement. In the United States the latter results were ambiguous because the high-salaried executives in the group of 28 tested from large corporations had lower need-achievement scores than did those whose salaries were in the middle group. In the sample drawn from smaller business enterprises, those with high earnings scored significantly higher than did middle and low wage earners.

This rather limited evidence for a cause-and-effect relationship between high need for achievement and economic development has been supplemented with the results of several ingenious studies McClelland designed to test this relationship in the past. Since it was obviously impossible to administer psychological tests to business leaders of past societies, other measures of need-achievement were devised. First, folk tales from 45 preliterate tribes were analyzed and scored for need-achievement content (McClelland, 1961:63-70). It was learned that tribes in which folk tales stressed the need for achievement usually had a much higher percentage of "full-time" entrepreneurs in their populations than did those whose folk tales were low in need-achievement

content (McClelland, 1961:66). Next, children's stories which were written between 1925 and 1950 in thirty different countries were scored for need-achievement content. These scores were found to be positively correlated with economic development, as measured by increases in electrical power output during those years (McClelland, 1961:70-97).

Going further into the past--as far back as ancient Greece and pre-Incan Peru--McClelland (1961:107-157) analyzed "doodles" on pottery, types of literature, etc., for evidence of the need to achieve. He found his evidence in the form of large differences between cultures and time periods in the extent to which the achievement ethic was emphasized. These variations were compared with differentials in various indices of economic development such as coal imports, expansion of trade, and number of inventions, and McClelland (1961:119-120, 125, 131, 139) observed that an increase in need-for-achievement imagery was followed by economic growth.

The validity of such methods may be questionable but McClelland feels (1961:191) that he is unique in relating psychological motivations to actual economic

growth in a way that is systematic, quantitative, and comparative rather than speculative. He challenges those who disagree to prove him false. Until this occurs, he believes that his research has proven that where there exists a large concentration of people with a high need for achievement, there will occur a surge of economic progress. Past spurts of social and economic development such as the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution are therefore attributed by McClelland to the influence of large numbers of people with a high need for achievement.

In a minor test of McClelland's theory, Edward Roberts (1970:23-27) administered need-for-achievement forms to fifty young entrepreneurs who had founded highly successful business enterprises during the years 1960-1962. Roberts states that all possessed a "very high need for achievement." They expressed themselves as being interested in situations where their actions could be the "big difference," where there was "moderate" risk, and in which there were tangible measures of accomplishment.

Having established to his satisfaction the link between the need for achievement and economic growth,

McClelland then sought to find out how individuals and groups of individuals acquired the motivation to achieve. A colleague, Marian R. Winterbottom (1958:453-478), looked for the immediate origins of the achievement motive in child-rearing practices. She variously tested twenty-nine boys with high need-achievement and examined their upbringing for common patterns. From this she learned that the mothers of these boys set high standards of accomplishment and expected early self-reliance and mastery. Subsequently, it was found that mothers of sons with low need for achievement set lower standards of excellence, were more restrictive, and encouraged their sons to be dependent. Since Catholic mothers tended to fall in this group, McClelland (1961:47) relates these findings to Max Weber's hypothesis about the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. He believes that early emphasis on self-reliance and the psychological motivation to achieve are links between values of the Protestant ethic and the rise of modern capitalism. Thus, in his model the emphasis on self-discipline and reaching for perfection which came out of the Protestant reformation led to earlier training for independence and mastery in

childhood, which brought on higher levels of need for achievement in more people, which resulted in the rise of modern capitalism and the modern age. McClelland (1961:47) remarks that Weber's personality portrait of the Protestant entrepreneur is one of a man with a great need to achieve.

To further explore these new connections, McClelland (1961:51-54, 356-362) began testing Weber's hypothesis by comparing Protestant and Catholic countries for levels of economic development while holding resources and climate constant. Exceptions notwithstanding, he found that Protestant countries were, on the average, more advanced than Catholic ones. Next, McClelland attempted to verify the effect of his intervening variables. He presented results from several studies showing that:

- (1) Protestant parents in New England and Germany demanded earlier independence and self-mastery from their sons than did Catholic parents of similar socioeconomic backgrounds;
- (2) Protestant boys in both places had higher levels of need for achievement.

In this systematic way McClelland confirmed his belief that modernization in the West is a product of an

increase in the need for achievement brought on by a revolution in family training which accompanied the Protestant reformation. He does not believe Protestantism as such generated the revolution but rather that it was caused by Calvin's heavy emphasis on already existing values (McClelland, 1961:362-363). This means that ultimately conditions which lead to a high level of need-achievement are imbedded in the total culture of a society --in dominant values and ideologies. In the final analysis McClelland goes back to cultural patterns for first causes.

McClelland (1961:391-437) ends his opus magnum by asserting that socioeconomic development programs implemented in the 1950's were failing because the massive cultural changes needed to transform child-rearing practices and inculcate the vital need to achieve were impossible to make. He recommends that foreign aid be channeled through American private industry, which supposedly would send to underdeveloped countries able executives with a higher need for achievement than United States government employees and who would set concrete goals and work with achievement-oriented natives.

Next to McClelland's the best-known theory of personality and modernization to emerge since World War II is perhaps that of Everett Hagen (1962). Like McClelland, Hagen was stimulated to ask himself "why have the people of some societies entered upon technological progress sooner or more effectively than others" (Hagen, 1962:ix). As previously mentioned, Hagen had observed that some countries with favorable economic resources developed far more slowly than less-favored ones. For this reason he began hunting for noneconomic behavioral factors and after extensive research he put together a complex web of interacting sociopsychological variables which convinced him that the relation between personality type and modernization is so vital that the latter cannot occur without a change in the former. Once the empirical importance of personality factors was established, however, he did, like McClelland, come to assume that vital personality changes were in the final analysis an effect of prior changes in a society's social structure and culture. Thus, when the collective behavior patterns of men change for whatever reason, this affects the personality of the individuals involved, who then act to bring about more changes in their

society. Personality is a middle link. The "creative" personality which according to Hagen's theory directly initiates modernization is, therefore, to a large extent, a composite of new values and cognitions which express the rise of new social relationships and a new technological-commercial culture. Like McClelland, Hagen links the preliminary social and cultural changes, which are his "first" causes, to the emergence of the new personality type by way of changes in child-rearing practices and home environment, but unlike McClelland he tries to define these intervening changes as fully as possible.

In On the Theory of Social Change Hagen (1962: 55-122) begins the presentation of his theory by quickly defining "traditional" society and then developing within this definition his model of the "authoritarian" personality typically found in a traditional society. For Hagen (1962:55-56) the definitive characteristic of a traditional society is the continuation of behavior patterns from generation to generation. Supporting this relative stagnation are other characteristics such as the regulation of behavior by custom rather than law, a rigid, hierarchial social structure, ascription of social status, and low

economic productivity. Hagen remarks (1962:59) that hypothetically an industrial (modern) society might come to have these characteristics and in fact become traditional or stagnant once again, although up to the present he finds that none has "regressed" in this sense.

Emanating from and at the same time reinforcing traditional society is a model personality type which Hagen labels the "authoritarian personality." By his description it is typically manifested in both of the two principal social groups of traditional society, the "peasants" and the "elite," albeit in ways peculiar to each. In general, Hagen believes (1962:97) that a man with this personality picks up two basic impressions as a child that influence his adult behavior. First, he comes to see the world as arbitrary, disorderly, capricious, and therefore not amenable to analysis, and, second, he comes to believe that this is no accident but the play of willful powers greater than he which serve their own ends, disregarding his unless he submits to them. The authoritarian man may not be clearly aware of these feelings but because of them he lacks self-esteem and believes power to be strictly dependent on social position rather

than accomplishment. He also comes to have, in Hagen's terms, a high need to depend on and submit to traditional authority coupled with a high need for aggression against and dominance over those he considers of lesser rank. Simultaneously he has a low need for achievement, autonomy, and order and maintains a low regard for the welfare of other people as individuals. In conjunction with these needs the authoritarian personality is further described by Hagen (1962:98) as being blind to or fearful about unusual situations and details. When confronted by anything extraordinary the individual is apt to rely on traditional rules or the authority of others. As a corollary to such dependence, Hagen says (1962:98) that the typical authoritarian refuses to question either the decisions of superiors or traditional values and practices and as such poses a formidable obstacle to change.

Among peasants, this type of personality gives rise to specific beliefs and actions which are to some extent peculiar to their situation. Hagen (1962:65) points out that the authoritarian peasant with his fear of the unusual, indifference to achievement, and dependence, typically believes that he is impotent or powerless to

control many concrete things that commonly happen in his life such as drought and sickness. Coping with these problems or making nonroutine judgments on his own causes him anxiety. He simply does not look for or see new ways of solving problems or doing things. A need for achievement or the ambition which might stimulate innovation is absent. Thus, in these areas, the peasant appeals to magic.

Hagen (1962:70) notes that such a peasant is, however, "rational" insofar as rationality does him any good, that is, he has rationally observed that there is a best time for planting, a best type of soil condition and irrigation procedure, a best design for a canoe, etc.

"In all of these matters he exercises with craft, skill, and high rationality a learning accumulated throughout the generations" (Hagen, 1962:70). But with regard to many natural events he believes no action on his part can help or save him and he attributes their genesis to unseen, supernatural forces which may or may not be placated by magic.

Hagen (1962:70) maintains that the traditional peasant's feeling of powerlessness over many aspects of

his physical world also applies to the social structure of his society. Whether or not he believes it just, he fatalistically accepts it as is and barring external intervention makes no attempt to change it.

Like Lerner, Hagen (1962:71) feels that the traditional peasant simply cannot visualize himself in any position or role above the one he was born to. It is, in Hagen's opinion, partly because of such acquiescence on the part of both peasants and elite that the hierarchical structure of authority and power in most traditional societies has remained stable for so long. Moreover, he believes that the authoritarian peasant eventually comes to feel satisfaction with his role and his dependence on authorities or tradition for decisions and directions.

Hagen's portrait of the typical "elite" personality (1962:74-75) reveals that beneath exterior differences, the oligarch is remarkably similar to the peasant. Essentially the elite member of traditional society is also an authoritarian who possesses more privileges and a great deal more authority than does the peasant. He may be "Western" in some ways (e.g., clothing, entertainment), but most of his values, his view of the world, and his sense of identity

are still quite different from those of middle- and upper-class individuals in modern societies. He is, for one thing, almost all-powerful thanks to his inherited status. The traditional elitist accepts this high status as rightfully his. Nevertheless, Hagen says, he feels that life is potentially very threatening due to the felt existence of capricious natural forces beyond his control. Like the peasant, he believes that "reason and logical instrumentalities" are very limited in their uses.

To maintain his identity and separateness from the peasant he holds manual labor and hard work generally in repugnance. His occupational values are humanistic rather than commercial or scientific. In terms of Florence Kluckhohn's value orientations, Hagen (1962:118) describes the elite authoritarian as one who thinks and acts almost exclusively in the context of the past or present rather than the future, who fatalistically accepts nature's dictates rather than trying to change them, and whose favored mode of activity is spontaneous "being" or "being-in-becoming" (self-fulfillment) rather than "doing" or accomplishment.

Hagen astutely observes (1962:77) that traditional elites typically want their countries to develop or modernize but at the expense of outside agencies rather than as a result of their own efforts. As a consequence of this paradoxical wish, management positions in industry are now highly regarded by the elite but they seldom are able or willing to perform the role. They give orders, Hagen remarks (1962:80-81), to maintain status rather than solve problems, with the results that such orders are bereft of analysis and "creativity" in either technology or social organization (Hagen, 1962:80-81).

Like their peasants, the elite seldom innovate and the creative process itself is avoided. Satisfied with their social situation and the opportunities it gives them to express their aggressive desires and need to dominate, they consequently feel little need to achieve. These sentiments plus a fear of all that is unfamiliar give them a strong attachment to things as they are.

Essentially then, the elite member of traditional society is authoritarian in more or less the same way as the peasant and is differentiated from him principally by the fact that he possesses more refined tastes, more

privileges, and a great deal more authority than does the peasant. The peasant's authority usually extends no further than his wife and children, whom he can and typically does dominate in a high-handed manner.

For Hagen, the prototype personality of modern society is one which he calls "innovational." In pure form it is in many ways the very opposite of the authoritarian personality, representing a sort of modern omega to a traditional authoritarian alpha. The innovative man, for example, conceives of the natural world as an orderly system amenable to analysis and control rather than as an unpredictable threat. He has a strong need for achievement, autonomy, and order. He tends to understand himself better than the authoritarian and hence he emphathizes with others. Being innovative means, of course, that he is creative by contrast to the dependent, fearful authoritarian, who abhors change. Like McClelland's achievement-oriented person, Hagen's innovator responds affirmatively to the challenge of problems which call for original, creative solutions. Hagen (1962:88-94) lists seven qualities which he says "imprecisely" define creativity and which in a summary fashion define the innovative

personality. Following these, the typical innovator can be said to have: (1) an openness to new experience (he is unafraid of unusual situations and problems); (2) a tendency to see phenomena of interest as forming logical systems of cause and effect which can be explained with analysis and effort; (3) creative imagination; (4) independent direction and confidence in making his own judgments; (5) satisfaction in attacking and resolving problems in which the natural order underlying apparent confusion is revealed; (6) a felt duty to achieve which transcends the desire for material rewards; (7) intelligence and energy.

This, then, is the modern personality which, if present in sufficient numbers and with sufficient freedom to innovate, will, according to Hagen, transform a traditional, stagnant society into a dynamic, modern one. How does this presumably desirable development take place? Hagen offers an answer to this question with a series of propositions about the formation of the innovative and authoritarian personalities in childhood and about the circumstances which promote the large scale appearance of the innovative personality. On the socialization of the

innovative or creative personality Hagen presents material drawn from social psychology and psychoanalytic theory (Hagen, 1962:123-143). Very briefly stated, the innovative personality is the product of a type of childhood environment which permits the child to explore the world around him and at the same time provides aid in understanding it as well as giving him guidance, restraint, and nurturance. In effect, the child is trusted to be autonomous while acquiring the kind of self-control which allows him to control his surroundings and achieve goals. In this way he comes to envision the world as challenging but understandable and open to improvement or change.

By way of contrast, the authoritarian personality is shaped in a family environment where strong external controls are imposed without explanation--unquestioning obedience being demanded--and without guidance. Hagen (1962:161-180) draws on the observations of anthropologists in Burma and Java as well as from his own experiences in those two traditional societies to illustrate the type of family environment which produces the authoritarian personality. He points out that in both places infants and children are viewed as irresponsible

and incapable of managing impulses (Hagen, 1962:168). They are considered toys or robots rather than autonomous beings. In essence, children there are ruled rather than trained by their parents and the ruling is so inconsistent and arbitrary that children are neither expected to nor do develop initiative and independence. Thus, they grow up perceiving the world as a place where willful individuals and forces demand submission and where one's birth-right determines to whom one submits and from whom one can demand submission. A high need for submission to traditional authorities and rules is complemented by high needs for dominance over and aggression onto inferiors. This, in Java and Burma, is the pattern of socialization which produces the authoritarian personality. Such personalities will, of course, pass on their authoritarian needs and view of the world to their children, a fact which in part accounts for the stability of traditional societies. Hagen points out (1962:175) that the perception of the physical world as dominating human fortunes, the traditional social structure--which he believes accomodates the authoritarian personality and no other--and the authoritarian personality itself interact to reinforce each other

and create authoritarian personalities over and over. These three elements fit well together in a closed circle so that the possibility of significant social change originating from within, is, in Hagen's opinion (1962: 175-180) slight. Nevertheless, deviants always arise and no society is perfectly integrated so that there always exist seeds for change which can blossom, then disrupt the structure and/or the modal personalities of important groups to begin a series of more profound structural changes.

Granting that such a potential for real change always exists, Hagen at this point (1962:185) tries to identify some of these seeds of modernization. He begins by asking himself about the kinds of influence which can cause a group in a stable traditional society to abandon traditional ways and work for technological and economic change. "In other words what influences will cause a group to emerge with altered needs, values, and cognitions" (Hagen, 1962:185). He answers his question with the argument that the "basic cause of such change is the perception on the part of the members of some social group that their purposes and values in life are not respected

by groups in the society whom they respect and whose esteem the value" (Hagen, 1962:185). To support this proposition he maintains that an individual's contentment with his life depends to a large extent on the respect accorded his major activities by the society in general and his reference groups in particular. Thus, to be satisfying, such activities need not be highly ranked but should be thought appropriate by the person carrying them out and respected by others.

Applying this general maxim to social relations in a stable, traditional society, Hagen remarks (1962:186) that in such a situation, each group's values and activities are respected so that each individual feels he has a worthwhile place and, as a result, there is little incentive to change the structure or accept new ideas. In the event that this situation is changed by a "withdrawal of status respect" from some significant group, there will eventually show up among members of the group a strong disposition to make important structural changes in their own social relations, roles, and values. If such changes involve the adoption of "modern" relationships, roles and values, and these are generally accepted or even tolerated

by the society, then the modernization process will have begun.

How might "status respect" be withdrawn from a group? Hagen (1962:187-189) lists four ways in which this might occur: (1) displacement of a traditional elite group by another by force; (2) denigration of valued symbols--a superior group (elite) changes its attitude toward the activities of an inferior group (peasants) from one of respect to scorn; (3) inconsistency of status symbols--one group becomes high in some symbols (economic) but remains low on others (prestige); (4) nonacceptance in a new society--migrants expecting respect find that their values and activities are ridiculed as "useless." Hagen (1962:190) believes that the Antioqueños ran into this type of situation when they established themselves in Colombia and that this was the origin of the series of changes which culminated with the appearance of the innovative personality among them and which heralded the beginning of their modernizing role in Colombia.

Hagen also feels (1962:192) that withdrawal of status respect is responsible for much of the turbulence found since World War II in underdeveloped countries. He

describes the elites of these new nations as having become Westernized enough to show scorn for the beliefs, values, and purposes of low groups while the lower classes have become resentful of a society where they were expected to meet their obligations without recognition. If this be true, then, as he points out, the impact of the West has been indirect in disrupting traditional society.

Once status respect has been withdrawn, Hagen believes (1962:193) that conflict breaks out within affected individuals who want to continue their traditional activities yet want the respect of reference groups which has been withdrawn because of those activities. The added burden of rage and anxiety which results alters the home environment "in predictable ways" and affects the personalities of children present. After one or more generations, the traditional authoritarian personality is modified by the widespread appearance of a retreatist or ritualist mentality. Fathers no longer exert their authority at home with consistency and confidence. Many will, according to Hagen (1962:210), come to doubt the whole value system and structure of their society. Their sons, authoritarian yet confused and afraid, will retreat even further into

apathy. Needs for aggression and dominance will be repressed.

Retreatism is not a dead end. As retreatism deepens in successive generations, it creates circumstances of home life and social life that are conducive to the development of the innovational personality.

The historical sequence seems to be: "authoritarianism, withdrawal of status respect, retreatism, creativity" (Hagen, 1962:217). Eventually, retreatist fathers come to feel so much doubt about their own place and guilt about relinquishing their authority that they convey this sense of guilt and shame to their sons. At this stage mothers and many fathers want to correct the retreatist pattern in their sons and yet find a return to the old authoritarianism now untenable. As a result they begin setting different goals and developing a need for achievement and autonomy by evincing a heretofore unknown degree of attention to and interest in their sons (Hagen, 1962:22). As the child develops initiative instead of retreating, he is rewarded with love, praise, etc. In this way the innovative or creative personality arises from retreatism. Hagen quotes (1962:223) the biographies

of self-made, innovational personalities to show that they shared this kind of background.

If, at this point, the transition to economic growth and modernization is to begin, values conducive to technological innovation and commercial activities should be available for adoption by the newly creative personalities. Hagen believes (1962:235) that when the model of technological progress and business is available (i.e., from foreign examples), many creative men will seize it if it appears that such activities will permit them to achieve. He believes that the first generation of innovative Antioqueños chose this model because they had some experience with it (from mining) and, though it was scorned by other Colombians, it seemed to offer them the high economic status held by prestigious foreign businessmen.

If the achievement-oriented new innovators adopt commercial and technological values, then they will begin a thoroughgoing process of modernization in their society. This, then, is Hagen's causal model for modernization: a disruptive series of social attitude changes leads to regression and retreat in certain groups and the breakdown

of the authoritarian personality. This is followed by the genesis of a rebounding new innovational personality type which, if offered technical and commercial roles for self-expression, will initiate modernization. Thus, for a modernized way of life to take root, a change in personality type must occur as the final link in a complex chain of causes.

Cultural Value Theories of Modernization

Defining Values

The primal importance of values in guiding the course of individual actions is pretty well acknowledged by anyone who has paused, even in the least, to question the wellsprings of his own and others' behavior. George Homans (1961:214) states succinctly the attitude of social scientists who have studied human values and their effects when he says, "The most important of all givens in explaining or predicting the behavior of men are their values, and particularly the relation of these values to one another." Yet there is incomplete agreement about what a value objectively is and precisely what it does. Perhaps this is really not surprising in view of the importance and pervasiveness of values. Philosopher

Charles Morris (1956:9) calls the term "value" one of the "Great Words like 'science,' 'religion,' 'art,' 'morality,' and 'philosophy,' and like these others its meaning is multiple and complex."

Nevertheless, there scarcely breathes a scholar interested in values who has not attempted to say in a short statement, what a value is and what it does. One of the more prominent of these is Harold Fallding (1965: 224), who defines a value as "a generalized end (goal) that guides behavior toward uniformity in a variety of situations, with the object of reporting a particular self-sufficient satisfaction." English sociologists Bryan Green and Edward Johns interpret this definition (1966:44) as referring mostly to individual motivation and therefore criticize it as being too psychological a conception of value--e.g., it implies that familiar values such as wealth, loyalty, independence, and friendliness are offered to people as goals in a smorgasboard fashion for an individual's choice and pleasure. They define a value as a verbal symbol for a generalized end which has connotations of rightness, goodness, or inherent desirability (Green and Johns, 1966:39). They explain this conception

with the proposition that values enter into personal behavior not only as motivating or restraining factors but also into "social system interaction" as a means of legitimizing authority, mobilizing support, or reinforcing morale. For them a value is a cultural or social goal for action rather than an individual preference.

Clyde Kluckhohn (1953:59) believes that the term value should include both general cultural prescriptions and individual preferences. He defines a value as "a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action." It is thus not just a preference, a desire, but a formulation of the desirable, the "ought" and "should" standards which influence action.

Philosopher Morris talks about these two conceptions of values and adds a third usage of the word value which he says is commonly employed (Morris, 1956:10-13). Individual preference for things, persons, colors, forms of physical activity, etc., he calls operative values in that one acts or operates by them. "Reference to 'value' in such cases is simply a way of referring to the actual

direction of preferential behavior toward one kind of object rather than another" (Morris, 1956:10). Generally approved cultural values he calls conceived values in that they involve a general conception of the preferable, which are symbolically indicated objects. "The problem of the relation of conceived values to operative values is a phase of the problem of the relation of behavior controlled by symbols to behavior not so controlled" (Morris, 1956:11). The other way in which Morris finds the term used is in referring to that which is preferable or desirable regardless of whether it is so preferred or conceived of as preferable. In this sense a value is anything which is objectively preferable or "good" for one. "Stress is on the properties of the object itself and such values are called object values" (Morris, 1956:11).

Morris holds that these three usages are related through use of some form of the term prefer. In effect, all three refer to preferential behavior and this appears to be Morris' personal definition of value--an object of preferential behavior, be it commonly or individually preferred or objectively preferable. For Morris (1956:12) the three conceptions of value do not refer to different

entities or values per se but are different aspects of the value field.

The research focus of this dissertation has been on how different combinations of commonly preferred cultural values will influence the degree to which different groups are modern or traditional in their behavior. In view of this interest in the social and economic effects of cultural--rather than personal--values, the meaning attached here to the term value will be that of Morris' "conceived value." This is the same meaning used by Alex Inkeles (1964:74) in his definition of values as "the expression of the ultimate ends, goals, or purposes of social action." Inkeles adds to his definition the observation that, as ultimate ends, values also express moral imperatives in the sense of defining what is right as well as what is good.

Inkeles also supports (1964:74) Florence Kluckhohn's view of values--that there is a finite range of human values which are commonly held, but with varying degrees of strength, everywhere. He believes, like Kluckhohn, that the same range of human qualities and relationships have been recognized in most societies--

e.g., honesty and duplicity, silence and loquaciousness, stoicism and emotionality, activity and passivity all have been deeply valued in human societies--and that the main difference resides in the extent to which different cultures evaluate qualities as important or minor, good or bad.

Cultural Values and Modernization

If the values of a culture are those social goals considered to be the proper objects of action and if we assume that in any society the behavior of its influential elements is, to a large extent, determined by some set of generally approved values, then, in modern societies, influential people could logically be expected to behave in accordance with a certain combination of goals or values which is peculiarly modern. As cultural standards or goals, values can be external objects or abstract symbols but to influence effectively the behavior of individuals and thus the social life of any group, they must be not only accepted verbally but also internalized to become part of an individual's personality. A value becomes "cultural" to the degree that it is internalized

by ever increasing numbers of individuals in a society and operates as a motivating force in their actions while producing similar effects (though not exactly the same effects, since each individual will give his interpretation some unique touches). The interaction of culture and personality is not well understood but it is generally acknowledged that personality is to a large extent a cultural product and is, in fact, an individualized version of the general culture in which it has been formed. Viewed in this way, the modern personality types delineated by Hagen and McClelland are manifestations of modern values, e.g., the need for achievement representing a high evaluation of achievement. Logically, one can deduce from such a view that, if, without the action of modern personalities a society cannot become modernized from within, then it likewise cannot become so without the active influence of modern values and norms, since they are the essence of modern personality. In short, personality is impossible without culture. While making a case for the crucial significance of the modern personality in modernization, both Hagen (1962:236) and McClelland (1961:356-373) acknowledge that changes in modal personality types are derived from cultural changes.

Marxist-oriented thinkers look upon cultural phenomena as the result rather than the cause of technological and economic changes. In their view, a society first industrializes (modernizes) and then new social roles come to change the interests and values of individuals. Yet, many of these same thinkers admit the fact that "traditional, conservative" values have aborted attempts to restructure and modernize backward societies. Although there is little doubt that technical and social structural changes can lead to a transformation of values, it is held here that values, once established, become an independent force and as such can stem technological changes and economic development or stimulate them. In Japan and Russia, for example, both industrialization and the process of modernization in general were the result of changes in values--brought about by the rise to political power of men with "modern" values. As Kahl says (1968:7) values tend to become institutionalized as objective conditions and interests and in the short run at least, "values determine circumstances; most men behave the way their culture has taught them to behave, for they perceive through cultural lenses the alternatives available to them."

The Colombian sociologist, Orlando Fals-Borda (1963:48), is saying much the same thing with regard to his own countrymen when he states that the backwardness of the lower-class Colombian is not due to

an atavistic and immutable inheritance, but to cultural conditioning promoted by economic adversities, calamities, and political abuses, by certain attitudes and religious deficiencies, and by the crystallization of ignorance. If these adverse factors which have molded the personality structure of the Colombian are basically changed for others (emphasizing) positive and constructive action, you will see him change his conduct and philosophy of life. This is a phenomenon created by man and for this reason the Colombian can mold and better it, if he so desires.

Timasheff (1964:85-87) credits Franklin Giddings with being the first sociologist to clearly see the significance of social values per se in the social life of man. Giddings proposed that rational decisions were made on the basis of social values which he defined as the collective appraisal of certain satisfactions, modes of activity, and forms of social organization. Like Florence Kluckhohn, he believed these varieties of appraisal were limited as well as influenced by physical conditions and the law of natural selection. Value orientations toward activities and relationships which are not suitable for the environment of those groups which hold them will,

unless changed, cause the disintegration of such groups or societies. Functional orientations ("wise choices") are rewarded in that the society whose members act on them, flourishes. For Giddings, values were the modes and mechanisms of an evolutionary process which underlies all social change.

Concerning specific links between values and modernization, there is general agreement (see McClelland, 1961:165-166; Spengler, 1965:255; LaPiere, 1965:272-283; Moore, 1963:93) that a certain complex of modern values is a necessary if not sufficient cultural condition for modernization to begin. McClelland (1961:166), for example, finds the modernization of resource-poor, heavily populated nations like Israel, Switzerland, and the Netherlands empirical proof that the "quality of the people--their values and motives--apparently can outweigh many handicaps." Latin Americans, on the other hand, "have long wondered why their part of the world has lagged behind . . . despite abundant natural resources" (Kahl, 1968:7). Arguments among students of development revolve around how values operate, the degree of their importance, what kind of people should hold them, and to a lesser extent, which values are "modern."

Kahl (1968:7) maintains that Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism represents the first systematic attempt to define with any exactness the relationship between values and modernization. Since the second World War and the increase in concern for the relative deprivation of traditional, underdeveloped peoples, there have been fresh attempts to identify modern value systems and show how they contribute to the process of modernization. The following statement by Kahl (1968:6) summarizes current thinking about the general characteristics of traditional and modern values.

Traditional values are compulsory in their force, sacred in their tone and stable in their timelessness. They call for fatalistic acceptance of the world as it is, respect for those in authority, and submergence of the individual in the collectivity. Modern values are rational and secular, permit choice and experiment, glorify efficiency and change, and stress individual responsibility.

In talking about the requirements of economic growth, Wilbert Moore (1963:93) illustrates the above definition with specific examples of modern values such as the high evaluation of achievement, freedom to move in the social system, and placement in it according to the merits of performance. Hagen (1962:117) also discusses specific values which he calls modern, including high evaluations of

commercial and technical activities and of empirical, scientific, fact-finding. In addition, he proposes that a modern personality will expand the scope of application ("social area") for such traditional moral values as honesty, loyalty, and respect for property and human life. That is, a modern man will tend to be more honest with and expect more honesty from strangers than will a traditional man.

Economist Albert Hirschman (1958:14-19) states that a belief in cooperation and mutual trust are values which are necessary for modern, effective entrepreneurship and for economic development. Kahl (1968:6) classifies as modern, preferences for: living in a nuclear rather than extended family; equality between the sexes; youth; and having a small number of children. Other beliefs and goals which are commonly thought of as "modern" are-- belief in democratic government and political equality, a high evaluation of and concern for the general welfare, belief in progress and personal improvement, respect for human life and property in general, openness to change and innovation, and a high evaluation of formal education. Also modern, but more generalized and abstract than the

above are the following four "core" value orientations: an orientation towards the future, a preference for "doing" or acting upon other persons, situations, and things, belief in man's ability to overcome natural obstacles; and a desire for self determination in social relations ("Individualism"). These, of course, are value orientations derived from Florence Kluckhohn's set of alternative solutions to the basic problems of human existence (Kluckhohn, 1961:1-20).

Given the existence of certain values or value orientations which are part and parcel of a "modern" personality, related to the modernization process in nations, and therefore justifiably labeled "modern," the questions then arise: how can such beliefs and feelings be measured, and how are they related to other variables which contribute to the modernization process (or--how are they specifically related to the modernization process, e.g., as causal factors, as effects, etc.).

David Smith and Alex Inkeles (1966:353-377) have tried to gauge social and psychological "modernity" in individuals with an instrument measuring attitudes, values, opinions, information levels, self-reported behavior, and

verbal fluency. Items include questions such as "where is Washington, can an ambitious, hardworking but poor man succeed against fate, do you prefer to plan in advance, who is most worthy of respect--a monk or a factory manager." Answers on each item are scored as "modern" or "traditional" and a summary index score is calculated for each individual. The final score supposedly represents the degree to which a person possesses "modern" attitudes "presumably of the sort generated by or required for effective participation in a modern society." This composite score is called an OM for overall modernity. The instrument is intended to be a cross-cultural measure of modernity as well as useful for "screening modern individuals in practical employment situations." Their instrument was tested in one form or another in six "developing" countries: Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Although the authors make no direct presumptions about the link between values and the modernization process, they do state that the items were based on 30 personal qualities (such as interest in planning, readiness for new experience) which dispose one to be modern in his "institutional relations--as in being an

active citizen, valuing science, maintaining autonomy in kinship matters, and accepting birth control," and which are assumed to be "the end product of certain early and late socialization experiences such as education, urban experience, and work in modern organizations" (Smith and Inkeles, 1966:355). Thus, it appears to the writer that they consider values to be an effect of the modernization process.

Joseph Kahl (1968) has carried out by means of interviews what is perhaps one of the most ambitious studies of the relationship between values and modernism yet attempted. Regarding his instrument he writes (1968: 44) that a factor analysis of the items used demonstrates that each does in fact measure modernism and traditionalism and that collectively they measure a "syndrome of modernism or traditionalism." Kahl's value syndrome of modernism is composed of the following seven closely interrelated scales: activism, low integration with relatives, preference for urban life, individualism, perception of low community stratification, mass media participation, low stratification of life changes (Kahl, 1968:21). Other values which Kahl found to be associated with modernism

to a lesser degree are--trust in people, favorable attitude toward manual work, and (contrary to expectations) distaste for large companies. For Kahl, however, the "typical modern man" can be described by his answers to the seven core scales.

He is an activist, he believes in making plans in advance for important parts of his life, and he has a sense of security that he can usually bring those plans to fruition. Unlike the fatalistic peasant who follows the routines of life and shrugs his shoulders to indicate that much of what happens will be beyond his control, the industrial man attempts to organize the future to serve his own purposes [Kahl, 1968:133].

The modern man is further described as willing to leave the extended family, to depend on his own initiative, and as perceiving his society as open and his own opportunities as plentiful.

The traditional man is the opposite. He perceives himself as permanently stuck in a life which does not change and which cannot be controlled to any great extent. Therefore he seeks little and expects to gain little, he takes what the fates may bring; he pursues security through close personal ties, primarily with relatives but also with a few friends and with patrons in high positions who will protect him so long as he stays in his place. To this exchange he brings resignation and gains safety [Kahl, 1968:133-134].

These "typical men" are, of course, two ideal, polar types and most real men will approximate but not wholly exemplify

one or the other. Kahl himself states (1968:22) that his results showed that it is possible for some men to be modern on some values and traditional on others such that "within a given individual there may exist tensions resulting from the conflict between traditional and modern values." Thus one man, for example, simultaneously may hold values which stress an old-fashioned view of life and a modern view of technical skill and prestige.

It should be clear from the above description that Kahl's "modern man" is future-oriented, individualistic, prefers doing things, and is confident of man's ability to master nature. Kahl explicitly conceives of him as being motivated by the same value orientations that in this dissertation have been associated with the modern man. His theoretical debt to the Kluckhohns would seem to be heavy.

Kahl carried out his field research in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States. He interviewed samples of respondents in rural areas, small towns and cities, and metropolitan centers in all three countries. His most significant finding was that "a commitment to modern values about work is related positively to socioeconomic status"

(Kahl, 1968:45). The correlation between a modern value syndrome and SES was .58 in Brazil and .56 in Mexico. Urban residence was also positively correlated with modernism but much less so than SES. In Brazil, with SES held constant, urban residence showed a correlation of .14 with modern values while in Mexico the coefficient of correlation was .10 (Kahl, 1968:45). Kahl reports (1968:135) that all in all SES accounted for one third of the variation in modernism while urban residence represented less than one tenth. Thus, of all the background characteristics he recorded, social class position turned out to be his best predictor of modernity in values: the higher the position, the more modern was the response. Because the similarities between respondents at similar class levels in all three countries were so striking, Kahl also concludes (1968:21) that position in the social structure determines an individual's degree of modernism much more than nationality. The fact that rural, small town, and metropolitan respondents who shared similar SES were much more like each other in the values they espoused than like neighbor-respondents at different social class levels leads Kahl to believe (1968:46)

"that a modern perspective diffuses through society via the social class hierarchy. People of upper middle status are in intellectual contact with one another regardless of the geographical zones in which they live." He thinks that the middle or upper middle class individual in a small town has acquired a metropolitan mentality thanks to his education, travel, and the mass media. In Kahl's view such a person has developed "empathy," in Lerner's terms, for his social counterparts in the big cities. Lower class respondents, regardless of location, were found by Kahl (1968:46) to be much more traditional. From their replies, Kahl got a conception of lower class men as being less sure of themselves in the modern world, dependent on personal relationships, fatalistic, and apathetic about their chances for successful careers. "Having had less material success, they expect less" (Kahl, 1968:46).

Within the network of interrelated characteristics which determine an individual's socioeconomic status and his ability to rise Kahl found (1968:138) that educational attainment and aspirations were the most closely related to modernism. With regard to educational aspirations, modernism accounted for one eighth of the variation in

educational expectations for respondents' sons after SES and location were controlled (Kahl, 1968:139). On the other hand, Kahl found (1968:49) that men who reached high school, irrespective of location, were significantly more modern in their values than those who had not.

Kahl seems to hold two models of causation into which he fits his modern value syndrome. In the principal model, modern values are largely, though not entirely, a function of socioeconomic status. Upper and middle-class people anywhere tend to be modern because of their location in "social space" (Kahl, 1968:83). Other hard-to-measure factors such as personal life experiences account for the variation in modernism among people in those classes. Values, in this model, are viewed as functions of SES but determinants of educational aspirations and attainment while the educational factors largely determine one's occupation and behavior, which in turn tend to reinforce the values already held by the individual (e.g., a modern occupational role will demand modern values). Modern values are for Kahl an intervening variable period somewhere between SES and modern educational and occupational behavior: "It would be convenient to think of values as a

perfect intervening variable, such that SES, plus location, plus personal life experiences produce general values and they in turn produce specific attitudes toward education" (Kahl, 1968:84). That values are not perfect predictors of behavior (given a certain SES level and specific life experiences) is because of "other influences" too hard to measure now (Kahl, 1968:85). Ultimately, however, in this model socioeconomic status is the first cause of the modernization process. What circumstances create the large middle and upper classes which carry modern values? Kahl says (1968:51) that industrialization is the cause behind the first cause in his model. He states that his results (especially those showing the dependency of modern values on SES)

support the position of Alex Inkeles that social structure tends toward convergence in industrial (or industrializing) countries, creating sets of cultural values that reflect status positions and the exigencies of life that are associated with them regardless of previously different national traditions [Kahl, 1968:51].

According to this model, Kahl would not have expected to find significant value differences between the leaders of Medellín, Cali, and Popayán since by and large they all hold the same socioeconomic status.

Kahl does not explain precisely how (assuming, as this model does, that modern values are really a consequence of a modernization process already well begun) industrialization (and modernization) can begin where values and behavior are still traditional. Perhaps he would (in the case of Mexico and Brazil) attribute this to external influences.

Kahl's other model is implied from his statement that a lower-class person with middle-class (modern) values will acquire a modern education and move up in status into a modern (industrial or commercial) occupation (Kahl, 1968:84). In this model, modern values help explain the transition from traditional to modern society by their influence on educational and occupational aspirations. Here, new opportunities and experiences (industrialization) produce modern values which lead one to aspire to and often attain a higher education, which in turn brings on a new socioeconomic status (presuming one is of lower-class birth). Presumably, if enough people in a society acquired modern values in this way, new and larger middle and upper classes would be created which would hasten and consolidate the modernization process. Again the appearance of

industry and large-scale commerce seems really to initiate the modernization process. However, in the latter model, values are a prior and more important influence. Most of Kahl's evidence supports the first model, of course.

Florence Kluckhohn's Theory of Variation in Value Orientation

In spite of the multiplicity of points of views and concepts, there does appear in the above a general conviction that a certain set of values is associated in some way with socioeconomic development. This dissertation is based on the belief that certain combinations of these values will lead to certain behavior patterns which, if held by sufficient numbers of people or certain influential groups, will lead to the modernization of a society. Because Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variations in value orientations has provided the theoretical framework for this research, it seems appropriate at this point to review her theory and show how it logically offers an explanation for the existing differences between societies in their degree of modernization.

Florence Kluckhohn's analysis of core value patterns takes place within a framework of orderly and

systematic variability based on the idea that value systems are made up of dominant and variant values which from one system to another are variably ordered in preference.

Behind this idea is the proposition that individuals and groups hold to, first, a series of dominant value orientations which most influence their behavior, and secondly, variant value patterns made up of alternative value orientations which also affect behavior though to a lesser degree (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961:1-4). The variant value orientations, when not defined as "deviant," serve useful functions in providing men with alternative means of behaving or confronting problems. They also, when held as dominant value orientations by certain individuals, make possible variety and balance in a society's activities. In effect, such variant and lesser-valued activities often fulfill a variety of needs (e.g., American intellectuals and artists who prefer and act on certain values which are not held as dominant by most people in American society, nevertheless do things in their professional roles which are useful for the functioning of American society). In addition, variant values provide a common ground for understanding between men whose dominant

values are different. In the same way they are invaluable as tools for comparing different cultures whose dominant value systems differ but which share values in common either as variants or when the dominant of one is the variant of the other.

The variety in both individual and societal value patterns postulated by Kluckhohn is restricted in scope and follows a definite order, in contrast with the previous theories which, she says, were built around the idea that variation in cultural values is random and limited only by the number of cultural groups in existence (Kluckhohn, 1961:3). This reasoning is based on the following assumptions: (1) there is a systematic variation in the realm of cultural phenomena, as definite as the systematic variation in physical and biological phenomena (Kluckhohn, 1961:3); (2) "there is a limited number of common human problems for which all people at all times must find some solution"; (3) "while there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely variable within a range of possible solutions"; (4) "all the alternatives of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but are differentially preferred";

(5) every society has, in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations, numerous variant or substitute profiles; (6) "in societies which are undergoing change the ordering of preferences will not be clear-cut for some or even all the value orientations" (Kluckhohn, 1961:10).¹

Kluckhohn (1961:11) has singled out five basic problems which she feels are common and crucial to all human societies. They are stated as questions in the following way: (1) what is the character of innate human nature? (2) what is the relation of man to nature (and the supernatural)? (3) what is the temporal focus of human life? (4) what is the modality of human activity? (5) what is the modality of man's relationship to other men?

In answering these universal questions and thus resolving the dilemmas they pose for thinking, acting, and feeling, man is theoretically limited to the following solutions or value orientations upon which he may base his general behavior and way of life (see diagram below). For each question there exist three alternatives.

¹Italics are the author's.

Problem	Postulated range of variation in value orientations		
Human nature can be perceived as:	Evil (mutable or immutable)	Mixture of Good and Evil (mutable or immutable)	Good (mutable or immutable)
Man can believe and live in:	Subjugation to Nature	Harmony with Nature	Mastery over Nature
Respecting time, man can orient himself toward the:	Past	Present	Future
Regarding modal activity, man can prefer:	Being	Being-in-Becoming	Doing
Man's relationship with other men may be structured as:	Lineal	Collateral	Individualistic

With regard to each of the five problems, a person or society will theoretically give first preference to one of the above solutions or value orientations upon which to pattern attitudes and behavior. The totality of preferred value orientations becomes the dominant value profile

while the remaining value orientations, ranked as secondary or tertiary preferences, make up variant value profiles.

It is possible that the meaning of some of the value-position alternatives may not be entirely clear to the reader. The following definitions are offered with this in mind. Further clarification is available in Kluckhohn, 1961:11-20 and 1955:346-352. The "Harmony with Nature" orientation toward nature is probably somewhat unclear to many people in Western culture because it is by and large not emphasized in those cultures. Florence Kluckhohn (1955:347) defines it as one in which all natural forces and man himself are regarded as one harmonious whole. One is viewed as an extension of the other and both are needed to make the whole. In past centuries this orientation toward nature was considered the dominant one in Chinese culture.

Kluckhohn's conception of a past time orientation (1955:348) involves looking to and living by traditions of the past--either to maintain them or recapture them. There is a strong emphasis on old norms and values. Her "Present" time orientation is one in which the individual lives for the moment, giving little thought to the past

or the future (immediate or long range). Those who are oriented toward living in the present or the here and now tend, for example, to ignore definite appointments so that they would be unlikely to arrive for a two o'clock appointment at precisely or even approximately two o'clock. A future-oriented individual would, by way of contrast, tend to be carefully punctual in keeping appointments and spend a good deal of his time planning or thinking ahead. In the extreme, such a person could almost never live in or enjoy his present situation in as much as he would theoretically be constantly preoccupied with what he should be doing in a half hour, two days, or three months. Kluckhohn reemphasizes here the point that all individuals and societies must deal with all three time dimensions (or are variously oriented to all three time dimensions) but they will usually learn to show preference for one. Fayerweather (1959:73) found an example of this phenomenon in his cross-cultural study of executive behavior. He reports that although Mexican executives do have a sense of the future (in being able to follow a schedule), they ignore both future and schedule whenever something they consider more important comes up in the immediate present.

Because more things were considered "important" in Mexico than in the United States (such as personal contacts), they were often inattentive to plans or appointments.

Of the three modal types of activity postulated, "Being-in-Becoming" is perhaps the least obvious. Kluckhohn points out (1955:349) that philosophers have long distinguished between "Being" as a state of spontaneous self-indulgence and "Becoming" as a state of conscientious self-development. Being-in-becoming is essentially what the philosophers called "Becoming." The "Doing" orientation motivates one to achieve and accomplish things which can be measured by external standards. Phrases like "do something!" or "getting things done" express this value position. It is, of course, closely related to McClelland's "need for achievement."

Kluckhohn (1961:18) describes Collateral relationships between men as being brotherly. Such a relationship assumes mutual dependence and cooperation on a basis of relative equality. Lineal relationships on the other hand are hierarchical, assuming the natural superiority of some men over others and a dependence which is based on inequality of position. The typical master-slave

relationship would be the prototype of this value orientation. Individualistic relationships presume a type of cooperation in which each individual depends on his own resources and initiative as much as possible. Each person theoretically gives more to the relationship than he takes. Dependence is de emphasized and the individualistically oriented personality will presumably have a high need for autonomy. Kluckhohn (1955:351) stresses the idea that all three orientations are given some attention by all societies. Even the most extreme gemeinschaft society leaves the individual some autonomy whereas even in individualistic, equalitarian America many relationships are strictly regulated along a chain of command-and-obey positions.

To better illustrate her theoretical framework, Kluckhohn (1961:11-20) cites what she regards as the dominant value profile of middle-class North American culture and compares it to the one she found among a small isolated community of Mexican-Americans in New Mexico. In her view, North Americans: (1) think of human nature as basically evil though subject to perfection; (2) seek mastery of nature; (3) are oriented towards the future

and the realization of future goals even while working in the Present; (4) prefer Doing to Being or Being-in-Becoming; and (5) are Individualistic in their relations with others. On the other hand, the Mexican-Americans were found to prefer: Subjugation to Nature, Present Time, Being as the mode of activity, and Independence in human relations.²

Florence Kluckhohn considers the North American value profile to be internally consistent, that is, the value orientations preferred are said to be complementary with one another. In the case of the Mexican-Americans the Independence orientation is thought to conflict with the others. This is said to reflect cultural malintegration due to rapid social change. She also considers equal stress on two alternative value orientations--especially in ranking both first so that dominant and formally variant value orientations are equally preferred as solutions--as evidence of rapid social change (Kluckhohn, 1961:25-26).

²The value orientation towards human nature was not recorded for the Mexican-Americans.

Kluckhohn maintains over and over that by viewing a cultural value system as always containing all possible value orientations but in varying patterns of preference or rank order, it is possible to treat variability and change more freely. The importance of knowing the nature of the ordering of choices among alternative orientations is obvious whether individuals or groups are being studied. Such knowledge facilitates inter- and intracultural comparisons because one is comparing cultures or individuals with a universal, integrated frame of reference so that differences are of degree, not kind. If, for example, in comparing Colombian cities, it was found that some or all the dominant values prevalent in Medellín vary from those of Cali, a natural conclusion would be that the variation is related to the difference in socioeconomic development and differential stress on occupational roles (or at least the differential performance of said roles in the two cities). By taking the dominant value orientations of one city and seeing what rank or preference they are given in the other and vice versa, it is possible to pinpoint the degree of variance. Using this point of view an investigator is able to recognize important

developments and directions in cultural change as being simply a shift in preference of a limited number of general value orientations already present in a society's cultural pattern rather than the substitution of one set of dominant values for another previously unknown set. Kluckhohn insists that these changes do not occur at random but follow an ordered pattern growing out of the interaction and eventual integration of external and internal pressures.

Although Florence Kluckhohn believes (1961:30) that an individual or group may prefer any combination of value orientations or solutions to the various problems (each orientation varies in preference independently), it is commonly supposed that the dominant value profile ascribed to the North American middle class is a complementary set of modern value orientations. Except for the stress on Individualism, the dominant value profile found among Mexican-Americans is considered to be a traditional one typically held by lower-class individuals in traditional societies. A third set of values orientations made up of an emphasis on past Time, Being-in-Becoming, Harmony with Nature, and Lineal relationships is often associated

with the elites of traditional societies. The identification of these particular profiles with modernization and being modern, and traditionalism and being traditional is accepted here and used as a basis for hypotheses about the relationship between values and different degrees of modernization. There is ample evidence to justify this position. LaPiere (1965:271-272 and 113-114) states that in preindustrial, traditional societies; members are reconciled by their ideology to passive acceptance of the status quo, including "the impoverishment and hardships that are consequent upon a limited control of nature." Fatalism, he remarks, is so much of a traditional orientation that in traditional societies only deviants consider chronic hardships and natural calamities as being within man's capacity to control. LaPiere believes (1965:271-272) that the emergence in Western Europe of "a more active, self-confident orientation toward the world is one of the major ideological developments of social history, and it set under way the great burst of individual enterprise that has culminated in modern society." Kahl (1968:118) reinforces this view from his own research when he states that modernization, through an emphasis on education, increases

an individual's sense of mastery over his life and provides him with motivation for "doing" things.

Moore (1963:102-104) insists that modernization always entails an increase of individualism in social relations as well as a Future time orientation which is manifested by a stricter division between leisure and work time. McClelland (1961:325) reasons that because the modern entrepreneurial spirit involves "hustling," high need-achievers imbued with the entrepreneurial spirit should have a special attitude towards time--e.g., they would not want to waste it, would perceive it as passing swiftly, would be thinking ahead in terms of future goals, etc. He found that high need-achievers did use more anticipatory tenses indicating a "forward orientation" and he remarks that Western cultures in general have a conception of history as "going somewhere" in contrast to Eastern cultures which think of time as a "quiet motionless ocean" (McClelland, 1961:328).

Lewis Mumford (1971:55) points up the contemporary spirit of the Future time orientation with the observation that "the key machine of the modern industrial age is not the steam engine but the watch. . . ."

Most scholars trace the increasing emphasis on these particular value orientations to the Renaissance and the "scientific revolution" of the sixteenth century, which took place in the West and gave rise to a more fundamental "rational" orientation toward the environment. This rational, innovative approach to problems and life in general is often considered the basic cultural difference between East and West. If this be true, then the modern age can truly be said to have begun with the Renaissance and the growth of rationality.

One piece of negative evidence came to light with respect to the presumed association between the Mastery-over-Nature orientation and the modernization process and modern personality. McClelland (1961:176) looked for the presence of nine values commonly believed to be "modern" in children's stories published between 1925 and 1950 from countries which did or did not modernize more rapidly than expected. Among these values was the "optimistic" belief that man by and large is master of nature. Specifically, he hypothesized: (1) that references to man over nature would be more frequent in the literature of more rapidly developing countries;

(2) that "ego's" actions would be successful more often in the literature of more rapidly developing countries (McClelland, 1961:173). Neither hypothesis was confirmed.

Here is a clear case of an eminently "reasonable" psychological hypothesis not being confirmed in fact. What could be more "self-evident" than that men who have in fact advanced economically should have had confidence in their ability to advance before they started? Such confidence would seem to be a prerequisite of their working hard and effectively for progress, but we find just as much "fatalism" and belief in the dominant forces of nature as in the more backward countries which are often assumed to be backward because of such beliefs. Children's stories are not the only way of measuring such beliefs, of course, but they do serve to make one skeptical as to whether what is so "logical" and self-evident is necessarily true [McClelland, 1961:189-190].

Yet McClelland did find (1961:191-192) that nature as a source of pressure to cooperate in order to survive was more

salient in the literature of children's stories in more rapidly developing countries . . . (this) result is not surprising since practically anyone would have predicted that at the very core of modern technological society lies a concern with nature as something which requires manipulation, management, or cooperative action. What is surprising is that this concern with nature is not unambiguously a faith in one's ability to conquer or subdue it, nor is it associated with the achievement syndrome.

It would seem to this writer that the recognition of the necessity to conquer nature implies a stronger faith

in one's ability to do so. Furthermore, McClelland elsewhere in his research (1961:222) reports that that embodiment of the "modern" personality, the entrepreneur, will, in the absence of hard facts, be optimistic about his chances for success and display more than an average amount of self-confidence.

Those who would doubt the validity of his method (and in this case, the writer is one of them) and believe that many of the "disproven" values are still important adjuncts of modernization have, McClelland says (1961:189) the burden of proof shifted to their shoulders.

It is interesting to note that five of the nine "modern" values were found to be associated with modernization in McClelland's analysis of children's stories. These were: Universalism (over particularism in relationships), specificity (over diffuseness), group or collectivity (over self), belief in efficacy of hard work, and rationality (McClelland, 1961:190). The four values that were not emphasized in the stories were: achievement of status, affective neutrality, mastery over nature, and material need-satisfaction.

If the theory of variation in value orientations and the method used in this dissertation to test it prove to be valid and reliable, the results of the present study will shed some light on the relationship between values, the modernization process, and underdevelopment.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter explains the methodology used in the planning and execution of the study. Included are the general objectives of the study, the specific hypotheses which guided the research followed by description of the instrument utilized, the sample selection, field procedures, analysis of the data, and characteristics of the sample interviewed.

The general objectives of the study were the following: (1) To describe the value-orientation profiles of community leaders and sixth-year male high school students in Medellín. (2) To determine if there exists a relationship between value orientations held by a group and the level of socioeconomic development reached by that group. (3) To explore the extent of intergenerational change in value orientation rankings in Medellín by comparing leaders' value profiles with those of students. (4) To

find out whether there is variation in the expression of value orientations by social class in Medellín. The fulfillment of the second objective involves two steps which directly influence the content of the hypotheses: (a) the comparison of value-orientation profiles elicited for leaders and students in Medellín, considered here a "modern" city, with the value-orientation profile of the North American middle class, which is presumed to be a "modern" profile; (b) a comparison of value profiles found among leaders and students in Medellín with those found among comparable categories in the "traditional," less-developed city of Popayán.

Both the general goals listed above and the specific hypotheses to follow were based on five assumptions derived from Florence Kluckhohn's theory and to a lesser degree from general ideas about the dynamics of social change and modernization. These are the "givens" of the research; it is assumed that:

1. Certain combinations of value orientations are more closely related to high levels of socioeconomic development or modernization than others.

2. The value orientations of Mastery-over-Nature, Doing, Future-time, and Individualism in human relations are the dominant values of the North American middle class and are, therefore, "modern" value orientations in the sense of being closely associated with the achievement of high levels of socioeconomic development.

2. The more closely the value-orientation profile of a society or human group fits the North American model, the more highly developed its social and economic life will be.

4. Community leaders are instrumental in effecting social change within a community; therefore, the more "modern" their value-orientation profile, the more modern or better developed will be their community.

5. North American culture has had increasing influence over Colombian society, especially among leaders, the upper and middle classes in general, and younger people.

These then, are the assumptions which directly underlie the hypotheses.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1.--The value orientation profile of community leaders in Medellín will be modern; that is

it will approximate the one attributed to the North American middle class.

Hypothesis 2.--The value orientations of church and academic leaders will fit the modern (United States middle class) model less closely than those of leaders in other occupational sectors.

Hypothesis 3.--University-educated leaders in Medellín will have value orientations which fit the modern model more closely than do those of leaders without university studies.

Hypothesis 4.--Leaders in Medellín with university studies in the United States or Europe will have value orientations which are closer to the modern model than will leaders with university studies in Colombia only.

Hypothesis 5.--Medellín leaders with university-educated fathers will have value orientations which approximate the modern model more closely than will those of leaders whose fathers are without university studies.

Hypothesis 6.--The value orientations of students in Medellín will be modern, that is, will fit the modern model.

Hypothesis 7.--The value orientations of students in Medellín will fit the modern model more closely than will those of leaders.

Hypothesis 8.--The value orientations of upper-class students in Medellín as represented by those in the top-ranked private school will fit the modern model more closely than will the value orientations of lower-class students in the lowest-ranked school.

Hypothesis 9.--The student value orientations of the "high" or top-ranked private school will be closer to the modern model than will those of the "high" or top-ranked public school.

Hypothesis 10.--There will be a direct relationship between modernity of students' value orientations and their social class position.

Hypothesis 11.--The value orientations of community leaders in Medellín will be closer to the modern model than will the value orientations of leaders in Popayán.

Hypothesis 12.--The value orientations of students in Medellín will fit more closely the modern model than will value orientations of students in Popayán.

The Measuring Instrument

The instrument used in this research was created by Florence Kluckhohn and used for research conducted among different cultural groups in a rural area of New Mexico and later in Boston. Marked and consistent differences in value orientations held by five ethnic-cultural groups in New Mexico were revealed by the rural version of the instrument. The rural version has also been utilized in Japan, Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela. For our research, it was decided to revise and translate the urban schedule intended by Kluckhohn for use in Boston, because the items were considered to be more universal in content as well as more applicable to the urban populations studied.

Both versions of the instrument employ 22 items, each one of which describes a specific, real-life problem and three alternative solutions. The problems are presented as situations (such as deciding on the ideal type of work, the best way to raise children, utilize free time, etc.,) which demand a value-orientation response in the sense that each of three solutions to a particular problem represents one of three possible value orientations toward the basic issue underlying the problem. For each item

a respondent is asked to choose the solution he thinks is best and second best. Thus, he expresses his value orientations towards the basic issues of time, activity, man-nature and man-man relationships in a rank order of preference. Five items apiece measure time and human-relational orientations, and six each measure orientations toward activity and man-nature relationships. Items testing beliefs about the nature of innate human nature had not, at the time the instrument was devised, been satisfactorily developed and therefore were excluded by Kluckhohn.

Perhaps the structure and purpose of the items can be better understood from the two examples below. The first is entitled "Job Description":

Three young, unmarried men had finished their schooling and had to decide what kind of work they wished to go into.

A. One decided to go into the kind of occupation which others in his family before him had followed. He believed the best way is to hold and strengthen the traditions of the past.

B. The second sought for the kind of work opportunities which offered considerable chance for future success. He believed it best to look for new developments in the future, even though he might have to start off in a position less good than others available at the time.

C. The third decided to take the best job which came his way and which gave him the money he needed to get along in the present time. He believed it foolish to think much either of the past, which has gone by, or the future which he thought too uncertain to count on.

The basic issue expressed by the problem here involves the orientation one has towards time and the three alternatives represent three value orientation positions-- Past, Future, and Present. The second item is called "Ideal Job":

Three young, married men were talking about their notions of the ideal job. Here is what each one said:

A. The first said: The kind of job I would like best to have if I could is one which is not too demanding of my time and energy. I would like to have time to enjoy myself and don't want a job which makes me feel I must always be competing.

B. The second said: Ideally, I would like a competitive job--one which lets me show what I can accomplish in a line of work for which I am suited.

C. The third said: Ideally, I would like the kind of job which would let me develop different kinds of interests and talents. I would rather have an understanding of life and people than be successful in one particular field.

This item purports to measure value orientations toward kinds of activity, and the three solutions to the problem represent the alternative activity modes of

Being, Doing, and Being-in-Becoming, respectively. Complete copies of both the original English-language instrument and the Spanish-language version used in Colombia are reproduced in the appendix.

History and Method of the Sampling Process

Defining a Sample and Universe of Leaders

It was decided first of all to sample 60 top-echelon leaders in each community for interviewing. Such a number was thought sufficient to give us a clear value-orientation profile for the power elites while not so large as to strain limited resources of time and manpower.

Then came the problem of how to define and determine the universe from which to draw the 60, that is, who were the community leaders, what activities did they carry on, and where could they be located? Discussion with Colombian members of the team led to the general conclusion that the leadership of Colombian cities is exercised within seven major activity sectors--the industrial, commercial, banking, governmental, quasigovernmental, religious, and university. The top people in these areas in effect

constitute the power elite and, the offices they hold, the power structure.

From there we had to decide what the positions and offices of the top leaders were specifically called in each sector. According to such a delineation a sector-by-sector list of names could be made up from which to draw the sample. After some discussion the decision was reached to define the universe in terms of the following leadership posts: (1) the presidents, managers, and board members of the 10 most important industries plus local board members of the National Association of Industries (ANDI); (2) the managers and/or owners of the 20 most important commercial firms along with local board members of the National Federation of Commerce (FENALCO); (3) the presidents, managers, and board members of the five largest banks; (4) the managers and board members of the two or three leading quasi-governmental enterprises; (5) the rectors and governing-board members (trustees) of the universities; (6) the mayor, his chief advisors, and principal city council members; (7) the archbishop, chancellor, and vicars of the archdiocese and the rector of the seminary. Excluded were noncitizens of Colombia and nonresidents of the community.

In Medellín all of the above comprised a total of 207 leaders from which to draw the 60. Divided among the seven activity sectors, the numbers for the sub-universes were: industry 69, commerce 31, banking 33, government 28, quasigovernment 15, church 7, university 24. In most cases these numbers were large enough to draw the required samples from each sector as well as leave a pool of replacements which could be used in case some respondents proved to be foreigners or nonresidents or it was impossible to interview them.

The pool turned out to be rather small in some cases, however. Definition of the archbishop, his top aides, and the rector of the seminary as constituting the leadership in the church sector gave us a grand total of seven possible respondents in Medellín from which to random-sample five for interviews, leaving only two replacements. In Popayán, the fact that there is only one university left absolutely no replacements. The leading officials of that institution filled the five-man allotment for the educational sector and, therefore, all of them had to be found for interviewing or the sector would simply remain underrepresented in the total sample for that city.

The next step consisted in allotting to each sector a proportion of the 60 leaders to be sampled. The distribution by sector of the 60 respondents for the two cities was made as follows:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	
	<u>Medellín</u>	<u>Popayán</u>
Industrial	20	15
Commercial	10	10
Banking	10	10
Governmental	5	5
Quasigovernmental	5	10
University	5	5
Religious	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	60	60

The exact number of respondents or units sampled from each particular activity sector varies not only with the relative importance of the different sectors in the social and economic life of the respective communities, but with the apparent degree to which their leadership is centralized. In the case of Medellín the industrial sector was given extra weight or representation because of its importance in that city. In Popayán, however, the commercial and banking sectors outweighed the industrial. The smaller numbers of units from the governmental, quasi-governmental, educational, and religious entities do not necessarily depreciate their influence but recognize

the fact that their control is more concentrated and centralized.

Filling the Universe: I. Selection
of the Leading Industries, Commercial
Firms, Banks, and Quasigovernmental
Enterprises in Medellín

As a first step in this part of the process we went to Medellín and asked the assistant manager of ANDI,¹ the director of the Medellín stock exchange, and the head of the chamber of commerce to provide us with lists of the city's most important industries along with names of their managers and board members. They were told to use any criteria they judged fit but we put emphasis on the annual value of production. This particular datum turned out to be confidential but, nonetheless, the names of 20 industrial companies alleged to be the largest in Medellín along with their top management and board members were obtained from the three lists.

With respect to commercial firms, the manager of the regional office of FENALCO and his assistant gave us a list of the 69 businesses they considered largest in

¹ Medellín is also the national headquarters of that organization.

Medellín together with the number of their owners or managers.² The list was by category; that is, they named the two or three biggest firms in various important fields such as men's clothing, general merchandising, auto agencies, and food wholesaling.

The leading banks were much easier to determine, their number being fewer and relative position more clear-cut. The names of the 5 largest banks were provided by ANDI and their choice was corroborated by informants in the stock exchange and the chamber of commerce. The names of the presidents, managers, and board members of the banks were obtained later.

As far as the most significant quasigovernmental organizations were concerned, most informants questioned (in ANDI, FENALCO, the chamber of commerce, stock exchange, universities, and banks) agreed that only 2 were really outstanding within the city of Medellín. On the basis of these consistent opinions, we included only the managers and board members of those two in the subuniverse for that sector.

²Usually one and the same person.

There still remained the task of narrowing down from the 20 industrial companies and 69 business enterprises named the 10 and 20 most important ones. Thus, in the next step, the names of each of the industries and business firms were typed on individual index cards and, during a follow-up trip to Medellín, the cards were shown to the assistant manager of ANDI and three leading bankers. These men first went through the 20 industry cards and selected what in their judgment were the 10 most important companies in Medellín and then, following the same procedure, the 20 most important commercial enterprises from the 69 business cards.³

In addition to this method a rank-order list of Colombia's top 30 "enterprises" published by the Camara del Comercio de la Costa was consulted. Their ranking was done on the basis of data supplied by the Bogotá stock exchange and included criteria such as patrimonio (assets), net profits, production, number of employees, salaries, taxes paid, dividends, capital, and number of stockholders. Of the 30, 11 were listed as having their home offices in

³One of the four, Dr. Ivan Amaya of the ANDI, took the trouble to make his choices less subjective by checking them against some data on hand.

Medellín and of those 11, 9 were industrial companies (the other 2 were banks). This ranking afforded us a fifth list based on objective criteria.

Third and finally, a comparison was made of these independent lists and from them were selected the 10 industries and 20 business firms thought to be the most important and influential in Medellín.

The ten "most important" industries picked by consensus from the five lists are:

1. Compañia Colombiana de Tejidos, S. A.
"Coltejer"⁴
(Textiles, fabrics, thread, food products, textile machinery, valves, fittings)
2. Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos del Hato, S. A.
"Fabricato"
(Textiles, fabrics, synthetics, thread)
3. Compañia Colombiana de Tabaco, S. A.
(Cigarettes, tobacco products)
4. Cerveceria Union, S. A. "Cervunion"
(Brewery)
5. Tejidos El Condor, S. A. "Tejicondor"
(Textiles and fabrics)
6. Empresa Siderurgica, S. A.
(Iron and steel products including wire, pipe, valves, machinery)
7. Compañia de Cemento Argos, S. A.
(Cement and cement products)

⁴ Brand name.

8. Enka de Colombia, S. A.
(Boxes, crates, packaging products)
9. Compania Nacional de Chocolates, S. A.
(Chocolate and candy)
10. Industrias Alimenticias Noel, S. A.
(Food products)

With these 10 companies plus ANDI we felt that we had listed the 10 highest-level industrial entities in Medellín from which to draw the sample. The managers and board members of the 10 along with the president and board of ANDI taken together composed a subuniverse of 69 industrialists from which a random sample of 20 was drawn for interviewing.

The following 20 commercial firms were considered largest and most important by the three bankers and the ANDI assistant manager:

1. Cadenalco, S. A. "Ley"⁵
(General merchandise chain--similar to 5-and-10-cent stores in the United States)
2. Droguerías Aliadas
(Drugstore chain)
3. Mercados La Candelaria
(Supermarket chain)
4. Pedernal Corona
(Distributor of porcelain products)

⁵Brand name.

5. Peter Santamaria y Cia.⁶
6. Urbanizadora Nacional
(Construction and real estate)
7. Almacenes Valher
(Retail clothing-store chain)
8. Felix de Bedout e Hijos
(Printing, retail stationary, and book stores)
9. Agencia Auto
(Automobile agency)
10. Jesus Mora y Cia.
(Auto-truck agency)
11. Cacharrería Mundial
(Variety store chain)
12. Almacen Sin Nombre
(Variety store chain)
13. General Electric de Colombia
(Distributor of G. E. products)
14. Mora Hermanos.
15. Mario Posada y Cia.
16. Almacenes Radiales
(Appliance Store Chain)
17. Manuel Piedrahita y Cia.
18. Calzado Cauchosol de Antioquia
(Shoe store chain)
19. Caribe Motor de Medellín
(Auto agency)
20. Almacenes Primavera
(Retail clothing chain)

⁶Type of business is not known.

The ranking is according to frequency of choice by the four informants (no commercial firm appeared in the published list of Colombia's 30 largest enterprises). The owners and managers of the above 20 business firms⁷ gave us a pool of 22 commercial leaders. The director and board members of the local FENALCO provided 9 more for a total subuniverse of 31 from which to random-sample 10 for interviewing.

The five banks selected as the largest and most influential in Medellín are the following (not in rank order of importance):

1. Corporación Financiera Nacional
2. Banco Industrial Colombiano
3. Banco Comercial Antioqueño
4. Banco Cafetero
5. Banco de Bogotá

All five are national banks in the sense that their operations are carried on throughout the country. Two of them--the Banco Industrial Colombiana and the Banco Comercial Antioqueño--are headquartered in Medellín and

⁷Practically none was incorporated so they had no boards of directors.

both were named in the listing of the country's 30 biggest enterprises. The presidents and/or managers of the five banks⁸ and the board members of four⁹ composed a sub-universe of 33 respondents for the random sampling of 10 interviews in the banking sector.

With regard to the quasipublic sector we decided to use as sources of respondents only the two entities which were conceded real influence in the city of Medellín. The two are Instituto del Desarrollo de Antioquia (IDEA) and the Empresas Publicas Municipales. IDEA is an organization which finances and promotes a wide variety of social and economic development projects in Medellín and throughout the department of Antioquia. It has even fostered and financed a number of other semiautonomous organizations such as a tourist bureau (Turantioquia) and power and light

⁸ Only the Banco Comercial Antioqueño had both a "president" and a "manager" (of the Medellín branch only). The rest had either one or the other, never both. It seems that (according to what the presidents of the Corporacion Financiera Nacional and Banco Comercial Antioqueño told me) when a manager is not specifically named, the president does his job.

⁹ The Banco de Bogotá had no regional or local board for its Medellín branch, having abandoned the practice of naming such boards several years ago, so that only the departmental manager for Antioquia and the Medellín branch manager were included in the subuniverse.

companies in remote rural areas. IDEA's original financing came from the sale of the state railroad and city airport to the national government. It presently is capitalized by return of interest on loans made. It was accorded a great deal of influence by informants.

The Empresas Publicas is a semiautonomous organization analogous with the Empresas Municipales in Cali. It provides all the electric power, water, and telephone service for Medellín.

The managers and board members of IDEA and the Empresas Publicas numbered 15, from which the random sample of five allotted to the quasigovernmental sector was drawn for interviewing.

Filling the Universe: II. The Governmental, Church and University Sectors in Medellín

In these cases the task was much simpler. In the governmental sector, for example, the decision was first made to include the mayor and his chief advisors. These included the contralor municipal (or city auditor), the secretaries of education, government, housing, public works, and public health, the city treasurer, the

personero municipal (or solicitor), the chief of city planning, and the chief of valorización (who is in charge of assessing a special tax for street paving). To these 11 men were later added all principal members of the city council, making a total subuniverse of 28 from which to draw a sample of five.

Regarding the Catholic Church hierarchy, we chose (after some discussion among colleagues familiar with church affairs) the archbishop, his secretary, the chancellor of the diocese, two vicars-general, the rector of the seminary, and the chief of sindicatura (or chief trustee), for a total of seven possible respondents.

In the subuniverse of higher education were included the rectors of the city's three universities (Universidad de Antioquia, Universidad de Medellín, and Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana), members of the consejo superior (board of trustees) of the Universidad de Antioquia, the trustees of the Universidad de Medellín, and the alumni chief and president of the economic affairs board of the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.¹⁰ The

¹⁰The Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana has no higher council of trustees but simply a governing council of professors and deans.

total pool of respondents in this sector came to 24, from which five were drawn at random.

Drawing the Interview Sample

The next part of the process consisted of drawing randomly, sector by sector, the 60 community leaders to be interviewed from the total universe of 207 names we had obtained in the seven sectors.

To begin, the seven lists of names or subuniverses were numbered. This was done simply by starting with number one at the top of each list and numbering through to the last name. The longest list was the industrial with 69 names garnered from the ten companies and ANDI. The shortest, amounting to only seven names, was that for the church sector.

After this the allotted number of interviewees was drawn at random from each sector list using a table of random numbers. Thus, for instance, the sample of 20 industrial leaders to be interviewed was selected from the subuniverse list of 69 names by randomly picking numbers by chance between one and 69 until we had 20 numbers and the corresponding names of the industrialists they represented. In this particular case the chance

distribution of respondents was more or less even throughout the list so that none of the ten industrial companies (or ANDI) with which the 69 were connected was over-represented. The remaining 40 interviewees in the other sectors were picked in the same way.

However, it turned out that some individuals were drawn at random two and even three times, either from different sectors or from different organizations within the same sector. This was of course due to the fact that some people serve simultaneously on the boards of a number of industrial companies, banks, and quasigovernmental entities. Previously we had agreed to include in the sample frames all the names appearing as managers or board members of the top ten industries, five banks, etc., even though the same name might show up several times. Such cases were thought to reflect the greater importance of those individuals and gave them the commensurately better chance of being drawn that they deserved. One man, for example, was on four of the ten industrial boards and one of the two quasigovernmental boards. Another's name appeared on the boards of two industries, two of the five banks, and one of the

quasigovernmental enterprises. When the same name was drawn over again it was replaced by randomly drawing another number from the same sector.

Naturally, the repetition of names on the boards of leading organizations in the same or different sectors demonstrates a tight-knit, interlocking pattern of leadership which provides for fewer but more influential leaders.

It is interesting to note that many men sampled from the boards of the industrial companies (for example) and classified in the sample as industrial leaders exercised their major occupations as bankers, lawyers, engineers, etc. This was, of course, compensated for by the appearance of industrialists on the boards of directors of banks, semipublic organizations, or the trustee councils of the universities. Such cases of "other sector" occupations occurred in all but the commercial and church samples. Owners and managers of business firms seldom claimed they worked at any other activity.

In the event of refusals or when it became a virtual impossibility to interview the original respondent within a reasonable time limit, and in cases where non-citizens or nonresidents were drawn, replacements for them

were picked from the same sector following the same random-sample procedure. The definition of refusal included those cases where it seemed virtually certain that efforts to contact an individual for an interview were being put off by secretaries or assistants even though the respondent himself never directly refused to be interviewed.

Defining the Sample of Secondary School Students

We decided to administer the schedule as a questionnaire at four all-male secondary schools, two private and two public, in each city, each school representing a polar extreme in the social class background of its student body. The sample was defined as all 6th year high school students¹¹ enrolled in (1) the private and the public schools with the highest-status student bodies in terms of socioeconomic level and (2) the private and the public schools considered lowest in this respect.

We depended upon information from reliable people in each city as to which those schools were. The

¹¹There are five years of primary school and six of high school in Colombia.

informants included faculty members of schools of education in local universities, public education officials, leading businessmen, and the rectors of the high schools themselves.

Popayán presented no problems of selection because there were only four schools going through the sixth year at the Bachillerato level.

In Medellín, on the other hand, some inquiries had to be made because of the larger numbers of schools and the fact that it was impossible to find any objective classification of private or public schools according to the socioeconomic status (SES) of their students.¹² Luckily the informants were in substantial agreement as to which were the two or three top schools in both the private and public sectors. Opinions as to the bottom ones in the two categories were somewhat more vague and usually at least three or four schools were named.

By a process of comparing the various schools named and discussing them with the most knowledgeable

¹²One exception: The rector of the Liceo Antioqueño in Medellín had made an analysis of the socioeconomic background of his own student body and categorized it by social class.

informants, we managed to pinpoint four schools. In Medellín we judged our most reliable informants to be personnel at the Instituto de Sociologia of the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and the Rector of the Liceo Antioqueño. The Liceo Antioqueño is the teaching high school of the Universidad de Antioquia and the largest high school in Medellín. Its rector claimed to have intimate knowledge of all the secondary schools in the city derived from his past experiences as head of the faculty of education at the Universidad de Antioquia.

Mostly on their recommendations and in accordance with monthly tuition figures for the private schools under consideration, the four schools finally picked at Medellín (along with the number of students interviewed and their SES) are the following:

Private

High - Instituto Jorge Robledo
56 students--upper-class

Low - Instituto Parroquial Jesus de la Buena Esperanza
62 students--lower-class

Public

High - Liceo Antioqueño
198 students--middle-class

Low - Liceo Gilberto Alzate Avendaño
101 students--lower-middle and lower-class

Total number of students 424

Field Procedures

Before going into the field an accurate, clear translation into Spanish of Kluckhohn's urban schedule had to be prepared. This was done by a completely bilingual Colombian sociologist who was also familiar with the instrument's theoretical basis. To assure accuracy, the new Spanish version was translated back into English by another bilingual colleague who had no connection with the study. His Spanish-to-English rendering was compared with the original English-language instrument. This procedure led to some modifications in the language of the Spanish version, which was subsequently subjected to a pretest.

Pretesting the Instrument

The pretest was carried out in the city of Palmira, 18 miles from Cali. A sample of 16 leaders was selected by the same method that we planned to use in Medellín, Cali, and Popayán. In addition, the instrument was administered as a questionnaire in several Palmira high schools. Both the interviews and the school pretests illuminated defects

and oversights so that changes were made in the instrument and the interviewing procedure itself. Questions regarding the occupational status of leaders' and students' fathers were made more precise: specific positions, work definitions, and organizational affiliations were requested. A decision was made to have leaders being interviewed read the items themselves and verbally state the order of their preferences to the interviewer, who would record them. Another change involved not asking leaders, as originally planned, their perceptions of how their parents would respond to the items since during the pretest it became obvious that many of the older leaders could only hazard vague guesses. This aspect of the research, however, was continued for students questioned in the three cities, although the results obtained were, in the opinion of this writer, of doubtful validity.

Interviewing the Leaders

Community leaders were interviewed personally by three men: the writer, another North American colleague, and a Colombian collaborator. Both myself and the other North American spoke fluent Spanish. Each man conducted one third of the interviews in each sector of each city.

The data analysis later showed that there were no significant differences in the responses collected by the three interviewers, so interviewer bias is assumed to be minimal. Other efforts to assure uniformity included the use of standard introductions for both leaders and students in which the study was explained as research on everyday problem-solving, confidentiality was assured, and the study's scientific importance emphasized.

Leaders interviewed were given a copy of the schedule items to read and verbally indicated their preferences to the interviewer, who held, in addition to a copy of the items, an answer sheet and questions on the respondent's background characteristics. Interviewers were forbidden to elaborate on the content of the items and simply reread them slowly when interpretations were asked for. In order to avoid "contamination" of the sample selected, none of the interviewees was allowed to keep a copy of the items, even though many requested copies. This was all-important because the power structure of Colombian cities is fairly cohesive and copies might easily have been circulated and fallen into the hands of individuals who had been sampled but not interviewed.

Leaders sampled for interviewing were contacted by telephone and appointments requested. Although some difficulty was experienced in reaching leaders at their offices or getting through secretarial ranks, persistence was usually rewarded with an appointment. In making these requests emphasis was placed on the scientific importance of the study, the importance of knowing their responses as community leaders, and our connections with the Universidad del Valle. In Medellín, it was usually necessary to make an average of three or four calls to secure an appointment. There were several outright refusals from elderly leaders, although in one case, a glance at the items led a reluctant old gentleman not only to grant an interview but become an enthusiastic proponent of the study.

The average interview in Medellín lasted about 25 minutes, but a few took only 15 minutes, while there were several long ones lasting over an hour in which the respondent philosophically discussed or criticized the items at great length. This writer found to his surprise that Medellín leaders were by and large most "un-Latin" not only in faithfully keeping appointments once these

were set but in keeping them on time. This was much less true in Cali or Popayán. Nevertheless, another interviewer reported that he drew several men in Medellín who without explanation failed to keep appointments. In most cases, the subuniverses of leaders in each sector were large enough to permit easy replacement of refusals, no-shows, or those whom we were unable to contact. In the interview situation itself, cooperation from the respondents was excellent.

Questioning the Students

In the case of the students, the instrument was administered as a questionnaire to groups in one or more rooms. Permission to do so was secured without difficulty from the rectors of the four schools selected in Medellín. As with leaders, efforts were made to minimize administrative effects on responses by using a standard procedure for introducing the material in all four schools. We stressed the fact that the questionnaire was not an exam nor a psychological test and that there were no right or wrong answers. Both leaders and students were told that individual answers were of no interest per se since collective results were sought. Our identity with the

Universidad del Valle was stressed but in spite of this there was apparently some suspicion that we were working for the CIA.¹³ In retrospect, it would have been better to use Colombians in the schools.

Hostility and misbehavior was encountered in one room at the Liceo Antioqueño but, for the most part, the administration of the questions went smoothly. No interpretation of the items was given to students, although questions about procedures were answered.

Data Processing

Once the interviews were completed the responses of approximately 948 individuals interviewed or questioned in all three cities were coded by three members of the research team. The data from the answer sheets were transferred in the proper codes onto sheets of 80-column paper to facilitate the punching of identically organized IBM cards. In order to minimize possible effects of coding error, no more than one-third of the data from each city

¹³One student at the Avendaño school asked the writer if we were not attempting to get a psychological "fix" on the Colombian people so that they might be more easily manipulated and exploited. A group of his peers concurred in this suspicion upon hearing the question.

was coded by any one person and after the coding was completed the original responses of each leader and every tenth student were matched against their coded form.

Following this, IBM cards were punched from the coding sheets, verified and after a method of analysis had been arrived at, processed by IBM 360/50 and 360/65 computers at the University of Florida.

The Method of Analysis

Due to the complex nature of the item responses (the three alternatives to each item were ranked in order of preference by each individual, making for a large number of possible combinations) and the difficulties inherent in any comparison which is both inter- and intracultural, a great deal of time and effort was spent in working out a feasible method of analysis.

In fact, two methods were used. The first and simplest involved a frequency count of first, second, and third value-orientation choices of all leaders and students, item by item. Thus, for example, if a majority of leaders chose Future first on three, four, or five of the five time items, then the dominant value orientation for leaders with respect to time was Future. If Present was the

majority second choice on those items, then the value profile in the time area was listed as Future > Present > Past. This straightforward method of response counting met the first objective of the study by providing a description of value orientation profiles for leaders and students in Medellín.

Other objectives entailed comparisons (of Medellín leaders and students with each other, with the allegedly "modern" North American middle class, and with leaders and students in Popayán), and underlying them all were ideas about the degree to which the value orientations of these various groups were truly "modern." We wanted to know, for example, how "modern" the values of Medellín leaders were in comparison with those of Popayán leaders. Therefore, a method of analysis was required which would give us the degree to which group responses fit the "modern" model. After consulting with Dr. Harry Scarr, who was then Florence Kluckhohn's principal statistical consultant, the following method was devised. First, the number of times each respondent in each group made pure North American middle-class or "modern" choices on the items in a particular value area (e.g., the five time

items) was recorded. Purely modern choices were defined as Future > Present > Past, Doing > Being-in-Becoming > Being, Mastery-over-Nature > Harmony-with-Nature > Submission-to-Nature, and Individualism > Collateral > Lineal in that order. The number of such responses in each value area was summed for each individual in each group. A sum of sums was then taken for each group of respondents and divided by the number of respondents in the group to obtain an "average" response for that group. This average is presented in the results as the mean or average number of times a group of leaders or students chose a "modern" value profile.

The following example should clarify this procedure. The leaders were first divided into broad occupational groups such as commercial, industrial, etc. There were in the commercial group 10 respondents interviewed. The number of "modern" profile responses made in each value area by each respondent was summed.

Let us suppose that each of the letters in the left-hand column below represents a single commercial leader. We wish to know for how many of the five time items each man made a purely modern response (Future >

Present > Past). The numbers in the right-hand column represent the number of time items in which each leader chose this profile exactly as above.

<u>Commercial Leaders</u>	<u>Number of Time Items in Which a Modern Profile Was Chosen</u>
Leader A	2
Leader B	1
Leader C	0
Leader D	5
Leader E	0
Leader F	2
Leader G	2
Leader H	3
Leader I	1
Leader J	2

Thus, Commercial leader "A" chose Future > Present > Past on two of the five time items, "B" on only one of the time items, etc. When the figures in the right-hand column are added and then divided by 10, we get the average or mean number of items on which commercial leaders chose a purely "modern" profile. In this instance, $\Sigma = 18 \div 10 = 1.8$ so that on an average of 1.8 items, commercial leaders chose the modern value profile. This particular analysis was referred to as the "hard" test because responses had to take the form of a "purely modern" rank-order of preferences in order to be counted.

A second analysis was made of the responses using essentially the same method but in which only the first choice from each item was examined. Therefore, if a leader chose Future first on four of the five time items, he was given a score of four no matter what his second or third choices had been. The scores for each group of individuals were summed and an average obtained in the same way as for the complete value profile. In the time value area, commercial leaders actually had an average of 3.9. This indicates that the ten commercial leaders chose Future first on an average of 3.9 or on almost four out of five time items, while they ranked Future > Present > Past in that order only 1.8 of the same items. This second analysis of the data was called the "soft" test since item responses were adjudged modern as long as the first choice or dominant value orientation was modern, irrespective of how the other two alternatives were ranked.

Differences between the hard and soft test scores of the various groups were tested for statistical significance by means of one-way analysis of variance and t-tests..

A Statistical Portrait of Leaders
and Students Interviewed

The following description of leaders and students sampled should not only give the reader a clearer picture of the various types of individuals included within those two groups but also aid in the interpretation of results since most of the social characteristics presented below were used as independent variables in the analysis and comparison of intracity responses. It should be noted that, even in the relatively homogeneous sample of leaders, there were some significant background differences which made for variations in value orientations.

Leaders

Fifty-six of the 60 community leaders sampled in Medellin were men. Of the four women in positions of leadership, two were members of the city council and two held positions with universities. Most leaders interviewed were relatively young, although none was less than 30 years old. Twenty-one of the 60 were between 30 and 39 and 15 were between 40 and 49 so that 60 percent were less than 50 years old. Only seven leaders were over age 60. The youngest leaders were working in the governmental and

quasigovernmental sectors, while the oldest were from the church and banking.

With respect to positions held, more than half of the 60 leaders (37) were on the boards of directors of the organizations from which they were drawn in the sample. Nine were also presidents of the companies with which they were associated, and 13 held the position of manager. One man from the commercial sector classified himself as "proprietor" of his firm. The remaining respondents held posts in the city government or the archdiocese.

Professionally, 25 of the 60 leaders classified themselves as administrators or executives, seven each as lawyers and bankers, five each as engineers and businessmen, two as medical doctors, five as clergymen, and four as "other."

Table 2, comparing the educational backgrounds of the leaders interviewed and those of their fathers, indicates that whereas 44 or 73.3 percent of the leaders had been graduated from a university, only 13 or 25.0 percent of the leaders' fathers had been. Only nine leaders had terminated their studies in high school, but 28 reported that their fathers had done so. Of the 50 leaders

with some university studies, 26 had studied abroad--16 of them in the United States, eight in Europe, and two in other Latin American countries.

Table 2

Educational Level of Leaders and Their
Fathers, Medellín, 1967

Educational Level	Leaders		Fathers of Leaders	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
University graduate	44	77.3	13	25.0
Some university studies	6	10.0	2	4.0
Some high school studies	9	15.0	28	54.0
Some primary school studies	1	1.7	9	17.0
TOTAL	60	100.0	52*	100.0

*Eight of the leaders did not report their fathers' educational background.

Table 3, which provides information about the occupational backgrounds of leaders' fathers, shows that, unfortunately, 26 leaders did not provide these data. Of the 34 who did, 20 had fathers in occupations comparable to their own. None had fathers in the lowest occupational category of domestic and service laborers.

Table 3

Leaders' Fathers According to Occupational
Level, Medellín, 1967

Occupational Level	Leaders' Fathers	
	No.	Percent
Group I ¹	20	33.3
Group II ²	11	18.3
Group III ³	3	5.0
Group IV ⁴	--	
Not reported	26	43.4
TOTAL	60	100.0

¹ Professional and technical workers, owners, managers, and officials of large firms.

² Clerical workers, salesmen, owners, managers, and officials of small firms.

³ Craftsmen, foremen, skilled workers.

⁴ Domestic and service workers, laborers.

As to birthplace, it was found that 37 were born in Medellín, 16 elsewhere in Antioquia, and two in neighboring Caldas. Thus, 55 or 91.7 percent of the leaders interviewed originated in the Antioqueño region. Of the five remaining leaders, one was born in New York but was brought back to

Medellín by his Antioqueño parents a month later. These figures do nothing to disprove the idea prevalent in Colombia that outsiders who want to set up a business in Medellín are not welcomed. It is doubtful that the leadership of any other Colombian city is so largely native. It might also be noted that of the 55 leaders who specified size of birthplace, 51 or 85 percent were urban-born while only 4 or 6.7 percent reported their birthplace as being rural.

Students

The 395 students questioned were, other than being all male and all in their sixth or final year of high school, more heterogeneous as a group than were the leaders. This result was intentional because we wished to discover whether or not there were differences between lower-class and upper-class Colombians in the value orientations they reportedly held. Such a comparison was obviously impossible to make with the sample of leaders but it was fairly simple to include both lower- and upper-class individuals in the sample of high-school students. In Medellín, however, the socioeconomic classification of high-school student bodies did not turn out exactly as

intended because students at the "high status" public school (Liceo Antioqueño) proved to be predominantly from middle- rather than upper-class backgrounds. Thus, a "middle-class" dimension was added to the comparison.

Table 4 shows the type of barrio (in terms of social class) in which students from each school lived. As one might expect, the majority of the students questioned at the exclusive Instituto Jorge Robledo lived either in upper-class barrios (40.7 percent) or upper-middle-class barrios (29.6 percent). None reported themselves to be living in lower-class areas.

The largest proportion of students questioned at the Liceo Antioqueño reportedly came from middle-class barrios (40.7 percent) but with substantial minorities from both upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class barrios. In keeping with this middle-class image, few students at that school reported themselves living in either upper- or lower-class sections of the city.

At the Gilberto Alzate Avendaño school most students in the sample (60.4 percent) reported that they lived in lower-middle-class barrios. Personal observation gave this writer the impression that the majority of the

Table 4

Social Class Level of Students' Barrio of Residence,
by School, Medellín, 1967

Social Class of Barrio of Residence	School			
	Instituto Jorge Robledo		Liceo Antioqueño	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Upper-class	22	40.7	11	5.8
Upper-middle-class	16	29.6	27	14.3
Middle-class	3	5.6	77	40.7
Lower-middle-class	1	1.9	50	26.5
Lower-class	--		7	3.7
Not reported	12	22.2	17	9.0
TOTAL	54	100.0	189	100.0

Table 4--Continued

Gilberto Alzate Avendaño		Parroquial De Bello		Total	
No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
6	6.3	--		39	9.9
4	4.2	1	1.8	48	12.2
23	24.0	5	8.9	108	27.3
58	60.4	28	50.0	137	34.7
4	4.2	10	17.9	21	5.3
1	1.0	12	21.4	42	10.6
96	100.1	56	100.0	395	100.0

students were, in fact, from lower-class backgrounds, as our informants had believed.

Most of the students at the lowest-ranked school, the Parroquial de Bello, also reported that they resided in lower-middle-class barrios, although a substantial number (17.9 percent) placed their residence in lower-class barrios, the largest proportion to do so in any of the four schools.

The age distribution of the students (as a group) was fairly limited. The vast majority (292 or 74.4 percent) were between 17 and 19 years of age. Eighty-two or 20.8 percent were between 20 and 23, while four were over 23. Fifteen reported that they were 16 years old.

Examination of Table 5 shows that a good many students either did not report their father's occupation or reported it in such a way that it was not classifiable in any of the four categories used. At the Jorge Robledo the majority of those students who did report this information indicated that they had high-level occupations of the kind found in Group 1. A surprisingly large number of students at the Liceo Antioqueño gave occupations for their fathers of the type found in Group 3.

Table 5

Students' Fathers According to Occupational
Level, Medellín, 1967

Occupational Category	School			
	Instituto Jorge Robledo		Liceo Antioqueño	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Group I ¹	22	40.7	18	9.5
Group II ²	7	13.0	32	16.9
Group III ³	1	1.9	72	38.1
Group IV ⁴	--		8	4.2
Not classifiable	24	44.5	59	31.3
TOTAL	54	100.1	189	100.0

¹Professional and technical workers, managers, owners, and officials of large firms.

²Clerical workers, salesmen, managers, owners, and officials of small firms.

³Craftsmen, foremen, skilled workers.

⁴Domestic and service workers, laborers.

Table 5--Continued

Gilberto Alzate Avendaño		Parroquial De Bello		Total	
No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
1	1.0	2	3.6	43	10.9
12	12.5	4	7.1	55	13.9
50	52.1	26	46.4	149	37.7
5	5.2	6	10.7	19	4.8
28	29.2	18	32.2	129	32.7
96	100.0	56	100.0	395	100.0

Predominance of Group 2 occupations for the fathers of students at that school had been expected. Likewise, there were more students with fathers in Group 3-type occupations at the Parroquial de Bello than predicted. However, the large number of unreported or unclassifiable occupations does limit the representativeness of these results.

In Table 6 are presented the educational levels attained by the students' fathers. As might be expected, a high proportion of fathers of Jorge Robledo students reported having university degrees, while the great majority of students at the Gilberto Alzate Avendaño and the Parroquial de Bello indicated that their fathers did not go beyond primary school.

Although 77.5 percent of the students reported that they had lived in Medellín (including Bello) most of their lives, only a slight majority of 51.9 percent said they actually were born in Medellín itself. This is especially notable in the Escuela Parroquial de Bello, where only five of 56 students were born in Medellín. The upper-class Instituto Jorge Robledo had the highest percentage of Medellín-born students (74.1 percent).

Table 6

Students' Fathers According to Educational Level
Attained, Medellín, 1967

Educational Level of Father	School			
	Instituto Jorge Robledo		Liceo Antioqueño	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
University graduate	17	31.5	16	8.5
Some university studies	4	7.4	1	.5
Some high school studies	21	38.9	71	37.6
Some primary studies	6	11.1	74	39.2
No studies	--		3	1.6
Not classifiable	6	11.1	24	12.6
TOTAL	54	100.0	189	100.0

Table 6--Continued

Gilberto Alzate Avendaño		Parroquial De Bello		Total	
No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
1	1.0	--		34	8.6
--		2	3.6	7	1.8
26	27.2	7	12.5	125	31.6
61	63.5	43	76.8	184	46.5
--		--		3	.8
8	8.3	4	7.1	42	10.7
96	100.0	56	100.0	395	100.0

Of those students not born in Medellín, the majority (75.0 percent) reported Antioquia as their birthplace. They and their families were undoubtedly part of the great migration of rural and small-town Antioqueños into Medellín which has accelerated in the past 30 years. Eighty-seven percent of all the students reported that both of their parents had been born either in Antioquia or other departments of the Antioqueño region. This supports the hypothesis that migration into Medellín has been from nearby areas (unlike migration to Cali) and that "outsiders" have had very little influence in the development of Medellín.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

In the tables which follow are the analytical results of this study beginning with the value orientation choices made by leaders and students in Medellín. It is perhaps well to bear in mind that the basis for comparison here is the assumed value orientation profile of the North American middle-class. The profile is considered to be a "modern" one characteristically held by entrepreneurs and middle-class groups in modernized or economically developed societies. We believe that "modern" values in effect orient the thoughts, feelings, and actions of those who hold them in the direction of social and economic achievement. An example of a "modern" value profile with respect to time, activity, man-nature relationships, and man-to-man relationships is presented here for comparative purposes.

	<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Man-Nature Relationships</u>	<u>Man-Man Relationships</u>
Dominant orientation	Future	Doing	Mastery of Nature	Individualism
Secondary orientation	Present	Being-in-Becoming	Harmony with Nature	Collateral (cooperative)
Tertiary orientation	Past	Being	Submission to Nature	Lineal (hierarchical)

Thus, the dominant value orientations in the above (Future, Doing, Mastery of Nature, and Individualism) would be the first choice or the dominant value orientations of modern groups like the North American middle-class. The third-ranked set of value orientations, that is to say, values which would be the third choice of modern peoples, are considered to be the first choice or dominant orientations of most individuals in traditional societies. As such they are often referred to as "traditional" values.

Value Orientations in Medellín

Leaders

The value orientation profile held by the 60 community leaders interviewed in Medellín is the following one.

Table 7

Value Profile of Community Leaders*
Medellín, 1967

	Time	Activity	Man-Nature Relationships	Man-Man Relationships
Dominant orientation	Future	Being-in-Becoming	Mastery of Nature	Collateral
Secondary orientation	Present	Doing	Harmony with Nature	Lineal
Tertiary orientation	Past	Being	Submission to Nature	Individualism

*N = 60

Medellín leaders were, as a group, "modern" in two of the four areas tested: time and man's relationship to nature. In their orientations toward activity and man to man relationships the leaders showed a first preference for Being-in-Becoming or self development and Collateral relationships. These are values which are thought to be neither typically "modern" nor "traditional" but somewhere in between in their effects on thought and action. The modern orientations of "Doing"--acting on the external environment --and "Individualism" in human relationships were ranked second and third respectively. These findings refute

in part Hypothesis 1 that Medellín leaders would have a completely modern value profile (see Chapter IV, p. 154).

These results can be examined in greater detail by breaking down or cross-classifying the leaders into smaller groups according to their basic characteristics, and this should provide insight as to what type of leader did not show a first preference for modern value orientations in the activity and man-man relationship areas. Table 8 presents data on the value orientations of Medellín leaders according to the basic occupational sectors in which they worked. Here one can see how the leaders varied by the kind of work they do. The reader is reminded that this presentation of results and those for all subgroups of leaders and students is different from that made for leaders and students as a whole (see Chapter IV, pp. 186-190). The figures in the following tables of this section represent the average number of modern choices made by Medellín leaders and students (modern choices = Future > Present > Past, Doing > Being-in-Becoming > Being, Mastery > Harmony > Submission, Individualistic > Collateral > Lineal in Test 1 and Future, Doing, Mastery, or Individualistic over any combination of the remaining

Table 8

Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2) by Occupational Sector, Medellín, 1967

	All Items*		Time**		Activity†		Man-Nature†		Man-Man**	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
Total (all. leaders)	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
Sector										
(1) Commercial	7.70	12.30	1.80	3.90	2.50	2.60	2.30	3.50	1.10	2.30
(2) Industrial	7.15	11.75	1.55	3.45	2.15	2.55	2.40	3.50	1.05	2.25
(3) Banking	5.80	11.10	1.50	3.50	1.90	2.50	1.10	3.00	1.30	2.10
(4) Government	7.00	10.40	2.00	3.40	2.40	2.80	1.40	2.20	1.20	2.00
(5) Quasigovernment	9.00	12.40	1.60	3.20	2.80	3.00	3.00	4.40	1.60	1.80
(6) Church	5.20	8.20	2.20	3.80	1.00	1.00	1.40	2.20	0.60	1.20
(7) University	4.80	10.80	0.80	3.40	2.00	2.40	1.40	3.40	0.60	1.60

*Total number of scheduled items = 22. A group in which all members chose a modern ranking of value orientations on all items or, in the case of Test 2, chose a modern value orientation as first on all items would have an average of 22.0, in effect a perfectly "modern" score. Thus, the higher the score, the more "modern" it can be

said to be. T-tests performed on the differences between sector means showed the following significant differences at the .05 level: On Test 1--between sector 6 and sectors 1, 2, and 3; between sector 7 and sectors 1 and 5; between sector 3 and sector 5. On Test 2--between sector 6 and sectors 1, 2, 3, and 5.

**There were five items used in both of these areas to test value orientations. Thus a "perfect" average in either time or man-man would be 5.00 meaning that for Test 1, all respondents had chosen the modern value profile of Future > Present > Past on all five time items and Individualistic > Collateral > Lineal on the five man-man items and, for Test 2, that all respondents had chosen Future first on all five time items and Individualistic first on the five man-man items. The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 for time--between sector 6 and sector 7; on Test 1 for man-man--between sector 5 and sectors 6 and 7; on Test 2 for man-man--between sector 6 and sectors 1 and 2.

+Six items apiece were used to test value orientations in the activity and man-nature relationship areas. Therefore, a "perfect" average in either area for either test would be 6.00. The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 for activity--between sector 6 and sectors 1, 2, 4, and 5; on Test 2 for activity--between sector 6 and sectors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7; on Test 1 for man-nature--between sector 3 and sectors 1, 2, and 5; between sector 5 and sectors 3, 4, 6, and 7; on Test 2 for man-nature--between sector 1 and sectors 4 and 6; between sector 2 and sectors 4 and 6; between sector 5 and sectors 3, 4, and 6.

two alternatives in Test 2). Because Test 1 involves ranking the alternatives in a modern order or profile it is considered the "hard," or "conservative" test for the presence of a modern value system. In Table 8 for example, Test 1 results by occupational sector show that industrial leaders interviewed in Medellín ranked the three value alternatives towards time in the "modern" fashion (Future > Present > Past) on an average of 1.55 items out of the five which dealt with the way time is valued. But according to Test 2, where the second and third choices are ignored, they chose a future alternative first on an average of 3.45 items out of five.

Data from this method of analysis reveal that, on the average, leaders in the quasigovernmental sector chose "modern" value orientations on more items than leaders in any other sector (except in the time area and with regard to "Individualistic" as a first choice in the man-to-man area). They were, generally speaking, closely followed in this respect by leaders in the commercial and industrial sectors. With the notable exception of the time area, church leaders made modern choices on the smallest number of items. T-tests performed on the differences between

the sector means showed that statistically speaking church leaders were significantly less modern in their choices than were quasigovernmental, commercial, and industrial leaders in all cases outside of the time area.¹ This was most apparent regarding activity values where the scores of church leaders were especially low. Leaders in the university sector also tended to score low, especially on Test 1, where they were significantly less modern than quasigovernmental and commercial leaders over all items, as well as in the time, man-nature and man-to-man areas.

In brief, the findings in Table 8 show that quasigovernmental, commercial, and industrial leaders were most "modern" in their value orientations while church leaders (except for the time area) and to a lesser extent academic leaders, were least so. Hypothesis 2 (see p. 155) is, therefore, supported on this basis. Because church leaders were less modern than other leaders in the activity and man-to-man areas, the 60 Medellín leaders taken as a whole were unexpectedly nonmodern in these areas.

¹The significance of differences between means was interpreted at the .05 level.

Other interesting differences were found when leaders were compared on the basis of their educational experiences. In general, leaders with university studies chose "modern" value orientations more often than did those without university studies, just as Hypothesis 3 predicted (see Table 9). The only exception to this general result occurred on the activity items. Aside from this discrepancy, it appears that exposure to university studies had some influence in making leaders more modern in their value orientations. Differences between the two groups were statistically significant over all items and in the time and man-nature areas.

Hypothesis 4 proposes that Medellín leaders with university training in the United States or Western Europe would be more modern in their choice of value orientations than would those leaders who had studied in Colombia. When leaders were compared solely on this basis, few large or statistically significant differences were found, although foreign educated leaders did tend to score higher than those who attended Colombian universities. However, upon comparing foreign educated leaders in terms of numbers of years spent studying abroad, it was discovered that those

Table 9

Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2),
According to Educational Experience, Medellín, 1967

Educational Experience	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1*	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
Total (all leaders)	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
University Studies										
or No										
(1) Yes	7.02	11.56	1.74	3.70	2.08	2.42	2.12	3.36	1.08	2.08
(2) No	5.70	10.00	1.00	2.70	2.40	2.70	1.20	2.80	1.10	1.80

*Difference significant at .05 level.

with three or four years of foreign study were somewhat more modern in their value choices (except in the activity area) than were those who had studied overseas two years or less (see Table 10).

Leaders' responses were also analyzed in terms of their fathers' occupation and education. In the first case it turned out that leaders whose fathers were professionals or owners/managers of large organizations were just slightly more modern as a group than those with fathers who were clerical or sales workers. The educational background of leaders' fathers proved to have more influence than did occupation on value orientation differences.

Figures in Table 11 demonstrate that, generally, leaders whose fathers had exposure to a university education were more modern than leaders with fathers who had not gone beyond primary or secondary school. A big exception to this general result is to be seen in the time area. The "purely modern" value ranking of Future > Present > Past (Test 1) was chosen on the average only one out of six times by leaders whose fathers had gone to a university. Otherwise the results lend weak support to Hypothesis 5.

Table 10

Average Number of Times Leaders with Studies Abroad Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), According to Duration of Foreign Study, Medellín, 1967*

Duration of Foreign Study	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Less than 1 year	8.50	10.25	1.50	2.75	2.25	2.25	3.00	3.25	1.75	2.00
(2) 1-2 years	6.70	12.00	1.60	3.90	1.70	2.00	1.90	3.50	1.50	2.60
(3) 3-4 years	10.00	14.67	2.33	4.33	2.00	2.33	3.67	5.00	2.00	3.00

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 for all items--between group 2 and group 3; on Test 2 for all items--between group 3 and groups 1 and 2; on Test 2 for time--between group 1 and group 2; on Test 1 for man-nature--between group 2 and group 3; on Test 2 for man-nature--between Group 3 and groups 1 and 2.

Table 11

Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), According to Father's Education, Medellín, 1967*

Father's Education	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
Total (all leaders)	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
(1) Some university studies	7.00	12.73	1.00	3.80	2.33	2.80	2.20	3.67	1.47	2.47
(2) Some secondary studies	7.21	11.39	1.93	3.50	2.25	2.54	1.96	3.43	1.07	1.93
(3) Some primary studies	6.56	10.67	1.89	3.22	2.11	2.67	1.89	2.89	0.67	1.89

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 2 for all items--between group 1 and group 2; on Test 1 for time--between group 3 and groups 1 and 2; on Test 1 for man-man--between group 1 and group 3.

Table 12 provides an interesting comparison of Medellín leaders by different age groups. When the comparison is made over all 22 items, there is clearly an inverse relation between age and the average number of "modern" value choices--as age goes up the number of "modern" choices goes down. The difference between the youngest age group of leaders (30-39) and the oldest (60 years plus) is particularly apparent. This relationship appears in all specific value orientation areas except the activity area, where the youngest and oldest age groups are about equally "modern," and in the man-to-man area, where leaders in the 30-39 age group were slightly less modern than those in the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups.

In order to illustrate in summary fashion which social characteristics most influenced a preference for "modern" value orientations, an ideal type of "modern" leader has been constructed with those characteristics which were found to be closely associated with "modern" value orientations. Thus, the Medellín leader most likely to have a "modern" value profile was born in an urban area of Antioquia and directs a quasigovernmental agency

Table 12

Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), According to Age, Medellín, 1967*

Age	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
Total (all leaders)	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
(1) 30-39	7.62	12.24	1.81	3.62	2.57	3.00	2.23	3.67	1.00	1.95
(2) 40-49	7.00	11.40	1.80	3.93	1.93	2.07	2.07	3.07	1.20	2.33
(3) 50-59	6.00	10.71	1.47	3.53	1.47	1.82	1.94	3.24	1.12	2.12
(4) 60+	5.86	9.71	1.00	2.43	2.86	3.29	1.00	2.57	1.00	1.43

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 for all items--between group 1 and group 3; on Test 2 for all items--between group 1 and group 4; on Test 2 for time--between group 4 and groups 1, 2, and 3; on Test 1 and Test 2 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; between group 4 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 for man-nature--between group 4 and groups 1 and 2; on Test 2 for man-nature--between group 1 and group 4; on Test 2 for man-man--between group 2 and group 4.

such as Las Empresas Publicas (he is almost as likely to be manager of a commercial or industrial enterprise). He has a university degree in law or engineering and has spent three or more years studying abroad. He is married and between 30 and 39 years of age. His father also had a university education and worked in the professions or as the manager of a large enterprise.

In contrast to this, the ideal type of leader who is least likely to be "modern" in his value choices is a priest who was born in a rural area and educated in theology in Colombia. If not a priest, he is probably a man with no university studies. Priest or not, he is likely single, 60 years of age or more, and the son of a man with a primary school education who worked as the owner or manager of a small business enterprise.

Students

The value profile for the 395 senior high school boys questioned in Medellín is presented in Table 13. A comparison of this table with the value orientation profile of Medellín leaders (p. 208) shows that this sample of younger generation Antioqueños is much like the older as far as their expression of value orientations is

concerned. They too are "modern" in their orientations towards time and the natural environment but somewhat traditional regarding man-to-man relationships and and between the modern and traditional with regard to the type of activity they prefer. Hypothesis 6 (that the students would have a completely modern profile) is, like the first hypothesis, only partly substantiated by these data.

Table 13

Value Profile of Sixth Year High School
Students,* Medellín, 1967

	Time	Activity	Man-Nature Relationships	Man-Man Relationships
Dominant orientation	Future	Being-in-Becoming	Mastery of Nature	Collateral
Secondary orientation	Present	Doing	Harmony with Nature	Lineal
Tertiary orientation	Past	Being	Submission to Nature	Individualism

*N = 395 (all males)

Table 14 provides a more specific comparison of students and leaders with data representing the average of

Table 14

Average Number of Times Leaders and 6th Year High School Students Chose:
 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern"
 (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), Medellín, 1967

	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2*	Test 1*	Test 2	Test 1*	Test 2	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1	Test 2
(1) All Leaders	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
(2) All Students	6.83	10.41	2.32	3.41	1.81	2.32	1.62	2.69	1.09	1.99

*Differences significant at the .05 level.

items in which "modern" value choices were made. Again the results for the two groups are similar although some differences are brought out by this type of analysis. Over all items, for example, leaders placed modern value orientations first (Test 2) more often than did students. Leaders also show up with a greater number of purely modern profile choices in the activity area and with Mastery-over-Nature ranked first on more man-nature items. All in all, leaders proved to be slightly more modern in their value orientation choices than did students, and this general finding seemingly refutes Hypothesis 7 which predicted the opposite. This result is perhaps not so surprising as it might seem once social class differences between the two groups are considered.

Class differences between leaders and students can be controlled to some extent by comparing the scores for leaders with those of students from the Jorge Robledo Institute, a private school for boys from upper-class families and the top ranked school in our sample. Compared with students from other schools, Jorge Robledo students were, except in the man-nature area, the most modern in their responses. The figures in Table 15 show

Table 15

Average Number of Times Leaders and 6th Year Students at the Jorge Robledo Institute
 Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern"
 (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), Medellín, 1967*

	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) All Leaders	6.80	11.30	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
(2) Jorge Robledo Students	7.24	11.06	2.44	3.60	1.94	2.63	1.59	2.72	1.26	2.11

*T-tests not run on above data.

that Jorge Robledo students, on the average, made more modern choices than did leaders except in the man-nature area and with respect to Test 1 in the activity area.

Though it is almost impossible to discriminate between leaders in terms of their social class position, such a distinction can be made for the students and this possibility was in fact one of the principal reasons students were included in the study. Table 16 presents the value choices of students by socioeconomic class as represented by the school which they attended. In general, upper-class students at the Instituto Jorge Robledo were the most modern in their responses, while lower-class students from the Escuela Parroquial de Bello were least modern, and this finding largely bears out the prediction made by Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 9 (that the top private school students would be more modern than students at the top public schools) was also borne out, but to a lesser degree. It would appear that the higher the social class level, the more modern are the students' value orientations except for the fact that students at the lower-middle-class Gilberto Alzate Avendaño school were more modern in their choices than were students at

Table 16

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Socioeconomic Class of School, Medellín, 1967*

Schools	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Upper-class (Jorge Robledo)	7.24	11.06	2.44	3.60	1.94	2.63	1.59	2.72	1.26	2.11
(2) Middle-class (Liceo Antioqueño)	6.68	10.09	2.30	3.30	1.71	2.22	1.53	2.57	1.13	2.01
(3) Lower-middle- and lower-class (Gilberto Alzate Avendaño)	7.33	10.98	2.54	3.52	1.85	2.40	1.94	3.04	1.00	2.02
(4) Lower-class (Parroquial de Bello)	6.14	9.88	1.86	3.40	1.91	2.25	1.41	2.48	0.96	1.75

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 for all items--between group 2 and group 3; between group 4 and groups 1 and 3; on Test 2 for all items--between group 2 and groups 1 and 3; between group 4 and groups 1 and 3; on Test 1 for time--between group 4 and groups 1, 2, and 3; on Test 2 for time--between group 2 and groups 1 and 3; on Test 2 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2 and 4; on Test 1 and Test 2 for man-nature--between group 3 and groups 2 and 4; on Test 1 for man-man--between group 1 and groups 3 and 4; on Test 2 for man-man--between group 1 and group 4.

the middle-class Liceo Antioqueño. If we combine student responses from the two "best" schools,--the upper-class Jorge Robledo and middle-class Liceo Antioqueño--and compare them with the combined responses of the lower-middle and lower-class schools, there appears to be little difference (see Table 17). Thus, even though upper-class students at the Instituto Jorge Robledo were clearly more modern in their value choices than students from the other schools, this alone is not enough evidence to confirm Hypothesis 10 that the degree to which modern values are held varies directly with social class level.

The background data collected provide other ways of separating the students into social classes (apart from school of attendance) in order to test Hypothesis 10. Table 18 shows value choices by social class level of the neighborhood in which the students lived. These results show that students living in upper-class neighborhoods were, with the exception of the man-nature area, the most modern in their responses. Thus, when neighborhood of residence is used as an index of social class position, upper-class students are still most modern in their value orientations, although students from the other end of the social class

Table 17

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Upper- and Middle-Class Schools versus Lower-Middle- and Lower-Class Schools, Medellín, 1967

Schools	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2*	Test 1*	Test 2
(1) Upper- and middle class schools (Robledo and Liceo Antioqueño)	6.80	10.30	2.33	3.36	1.77	2.31	1.54	2.60	1.16	2.03
(2) Lower-middle- and lower-class schools (Alzate Avendaño and Bello)	6.90	10.57	2.29	3.47	1.88	2.34	1.74	2.83	0.99	1.92

*Differences significant at .05 level.

Table 18

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Socioeconomic Class Level of Residence, Medellín, 1967*

Ses of Residence	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Upper-class barrios	7.92	11.39	2.72	3.46	2.31	2.97	1.51	2.80	1.39	2.15
(2) Upper-middle-class barrios	6.83	10.10	2.25	3.44	1.81	2.21	1.65	2.58	1.13	1.88
(3) Middle-class barrios	6.55	10.33	2.32	3.37	1.65	2.31	1.53	2.70	1.06	1.95
(4) Lower-middle-class barrios	6.72	10.22	2.24	3.40	1.79	2.24	1.59	2.61	1.10	1.97
(5) Lower-class barrios	7.29	10.95	1.86	3.19	2.10	2.38	2.62	3.43	0.71	1.95

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 and Test 2 for all items--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, and 4; on Test 1 for time--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, 4, and 5; between group 3 and group 5; on Test 1 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, and 4; between group 3 and group 5; on Test 2 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, 4, and 5; on Test 1 and Test 2 for man-nature--between group 5 and groups 1, 2, 3, and 4; on Test 1 for man-man--between group 1 and groups 3, 4, and 5; between group 5 and groups 1, 2, and 4.

scale generally resemble them more in this respect than do students from the middle-classes, and Hypothesis 10 remains as unconfirmed.

When the students' responses are examined by the type of occupation they attribute to their fathers, the same curious pattern emerges (see Table 19). Students whose fathers occupy high level positions were clearly the most modern in their choice of value orientations but students whose fathers were at the bottom of the occupational classification were either close behind them or expressed the same degree of modernity as students with fathers in middle level occupations.

In a final test for class differences, the students' answers were analyzed by father's education. In this case a somewhat different pattern was found. Those whose fathers had university studies were more modern in their value choices in most areas and this particular result is generally in line with previous differences, but on the basis of the figures in the preceding two tables, one would also expect that students whose fathers had ended their studies in primary school would be more modern than those with high school educated fathers. In

Table 19

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Occupation of Father, Medellín, 1967*

Father's Occupation	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Professional, technical, owners and managers of large enterprises	7.51	11.42	2.65	3.72	2.09	2.63	1.44	2.84	1.33	2.23
(2) Clerical, sales, owners and managers of small enterprises	6.16	9.89	2.06	3.15	1.53	2.09	1.56	2.82	1.02	1.84
(3) Craftsmen, foremen, skilled operatives	6.73	10.13	2.33	3.35	1.77	2.24	1.66	2.62	0.97	1.93
(4) Domestic, service workers, laborers	6.42	10.47	2.05	3.37	1.74	2.21	1.84	2.90	0.79	2.00

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 1 and Test 2 for all items--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 for time--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, and 4; on Test 2 for time--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 and Test 2 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 for man-man--between group 1 and groups 2, 3, and 4; on Test 2 for man-man--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3.

Table 20

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Education of Father, Medellín, 1967*

Father's Education	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Some university studies	7.07	11.24	2.44	3.49	2.15	2.81	1.32	2.90	1.17	2.05
(2) Some high school studies	6.92	10.29	2.36	3.36	1.73	2.22	1.58	2.67	1.25	2.04
(3) None or some primary studies	6.80	10.42	2.24	3.42	1.80	2.32	1.77	2.73	0.99	1.95

*The following differences were statistically significant at the .05 level: On Test 2 for all items--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 and Test 2 for activity--between group 1 and groups 2 and 3; on Test 1 for man-nature--between group 1 and group 3; on Test 1 for man-man--between group 3 and groups 1 and 2.

this instance, however, the similarities between the polar class groups does not emerge.

A number of other background variables were used for the analysis of students' responses as part of the search for association and causation. Accordingly, the answers of those students who spent their early, formative years in urban places were compared with the responses of those who had spent their early years in rural areas. The figures in Table 21 demonstrate that urban bred students were, on most items, more modern in their choices than those who had been reared in the country. Extension of this line of analysis led to comparisons of students by size of birthplace and by whether reared in cities of over 100,000 population or not. There were, however, no notable differences between students when they were grouped in these ways despite the differences found in the simple urban-rural comparison.

At this point, let us summarize this presentation with a model of the "modern" Medellín student constructed from those social characteristics which were most closely associated with modern value orientations. Typically such a student would be between 16 and 17 years of age,

Table 21

Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Rural or Urban Residence in Early Childhood, Medellín, 1967

Early Childhood Residence	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1*	Test 2*
Urban	(1) 6.95	10.48	2.33	3.40	1.83	2.33	1.64	2.73	1.15	2.02
Rural	(2) 6.00	9.78	2.27	3.57	1.70	2.22	1.27	2.35	0.75	1.65

*Differences significant at .05 level.

attending either the Instituto Jorge Robledo or the Gilberto Alzate Avendaño school and would live in an upper-class barrio. He would have been born and reared in an urban area. His father should be a professional man or involved in the management of a large company and he could likely count some years of university study.

By way of contrast the student who would typically be least "modern" in his value orientations is between 20 and 23 years of age, in attendance at the Escuela Parroquial de Bello, and living in a lower-middle-class barrio. He was probably born in a municipio of between 8,000 and 25,000 population but reared in a rural environment. His father would be a clerical worker or the owner-manager of a small enterprise with a limited education of some primary or high school studies.

Medellín and Popayán: A Comparison of Values
in a Modern and a Traditional City

A major purpose, perhaps the primary one, of this investigation has been to ascertain insofar as possible the relationship between the expression of basic value orientations by leadership groups and the degree of modernization (socioeconomic development) of the environment in which they operate. This has been done with the belief that the

extent of modernization achieved by a society and its people, as measured by various indices of socioeconomic development, is a concrete indicator of the values which predominate in that society's culture and in the minds of its people. More specifically, it has been proposed that certain combinations of values such as the modern set of value orientations delineated here will, if they are of primary importance in guiding the thoughts, feelings, and actions of leadership groups in a society, lead to the achievement of a high level of socioeconomic development such as that reached in this century by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In order to test this proposition, value orientations held by leaders and students in two Colombian cities, considered to be polar opposites in terms of their development, have been compared. The results of this comparison, between the modern city of Medellín and the traditional city of Popayán, are presented in this section

A Look at Popayán²

Popayán is a city of approximately 80,000 inhabitants located 5,733 feet above sea level at the

²The author wishes to express gratitude to J. Selwyn Hollingsworth, a collaborator in the research project, for his help in providing information in this section.

southern end of the Cauca Valley in southwestern Colombia. The Andes mountains come north out of Ecuador in a solid mass and split into two chains just to the south of Popayan. The climate at that altitude is exceedingly mild in spite of the fact that Popayán is only a little more than two degrees north of the equator. The mean annual temperature is about 65 degrees Fahrenheit and a daytime high of 74 degrees is considered hot (Crist, 1950:131).

Popayán has been aptly and succinctly described as "a city which abounds in well-preserved colonial architecture, which has a sense of pride in its history, and which appears to bask in the light of past accomplishments rather than to strive for future accomplishments" (Hollingsworth, 1970:39). Popayán reminded this writer of Charleston, South Carolina, and Natchez, Mississippi, in its overall ambience. A visitor rapidly comes to feel that Popayán is not only a traditional city but fully aware of its traditions and proud of them. The slow, dignified, measured pace of life in Popayan stands in sharp contrast to the dynamic hustle and bustle of Medellín. When Medellín and Popayán were compared in terms of basic

economic indices (see Chapter IV) these contrasting impressions were verified and as a result, Popayán became for our research the traditional counterpart to modern Medellín.

Popayán was founded by Sebastian de Belalcazar, a lieutenant of Pizarro's. Belalcazar had marched northward from Peru on a gold-hunting expedition and paused long enough to found Popayán on January 13, 1537, leaving Lorenzo de Aldana there as his governor while he continued north and then east to the savannah of Bogotá. Several of the men in Belalcazar's party led expeditions of their own directly northward into what is now Antioquia during this initial exploratory period (1537-1545) and one of them, Jorge Robledo, discovered the present day site of Medellín in August of 1541 (see Chapter II, p. 23). However, there was no permanent white colonization at Medellín until 1616, so Popayán predates Medellín as a settlement by 79 years and as a city of consequence by almost 250 years, since Popayán rapidly became the political and economic center of western Colombia while Medellín remained a rude village until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Around 1600 Popayán became the preferred place of residence for those Spaniards who had been successful in exploiting the mineral and agricultural resources of southwestern Colombia. These men liked the salubrious climate to be found there as well as the urban atmosphere which developed as a consequence of its position as a political center of the Spanish crown. Sebastian (1964:13) reports that the more successful ranchers, farmers, and mine owners indulged themselves in the construction of fine homes and churches all during the colonial period. A high school was established in 1640, and Popayán became the cultural center of western Colombia, as well as the political and economic focus of that vast region. Throughout the latter years of the colonial era Popayán was looked upon as a "mother country in miniature" in which the feudal life style of southern Spain was reproduced (Crist, 1950: 132).

In the early republican years (1810-1850) Popayán, even then a venerable monument to the past, retained its influence as a leading city while Medellín was just beginning to develop. In 1827 the University of the Cauca was founded and later attended by 15 of Colombia's

presidents. After 1850 Popayán began to lose its dominant position in western Colombia to Medellín and Cali. According to the census of 1905, both of these latter cities had by that year bypassed Popayán in population--Medellín and Cali with 53,936 and 30,740 inhabitants, respectively, to Popayán's 23,448. Traditional values and norms had become so well entrenched in Popayán that the area's aristocratic, languid, leisure-loving leadership was no match for the pragmatic, commercially oriented, and aggressive leaders of Medellín. To make matters worse, in 1903 the province of which Popayán is capital was subdivided into several provinces, leaving Popayán with only 30,495 of the 537,280 square kilometers it had once controlled.

The American traveler Henry Franck hiked through the area in 1915 and was not particularly impressed with the famous old city.

Though it was barely eight in the evening, Popayán was as dead as a graveyard at midnight--and darker. If Popayán is dead by night, little more can be said for it by day. Languid shopkeeping is almost its only visible industry, and the population seems to live on what they sell one another [Franck, 1917:88].

Medellín, on the other hand, had by that year become a modern city with a well-developed commerce, burgeoning

industry, and such amenities as movie theatres, a street car system, and an electric utility company that was aggressively promoting the use of electrical appliances. Moreover, there were in 1915 three business colleges operating in Medellín to supply the growing demand for office personnel which the city's development had generated.

With the passing years these differences have become even more marked. While Popayán continued to stagnate, Medellín became the nation's first city in industrial development and second only to Bogotá in population. Cali during these same years also surged ahead as a commercial center and later in industry, to deprive Popayán of pre-eminence even in the reduced domain of the Cauca Valley.

A variety of reasons have been advanced by both foreigners and Colombians for the relative decline of Popayán in the postcolonial period. Some attribute the city's stagnation to the fact that the inland railroad from the Pacific was built to Cali rather than Popayán. Others insist that the loss of its provincial territory in 1903 brought on Popayán's decline. The American anthropologist, Andrew Whiteford, who did comparative case studies of

Popayán and Queretaro, Mexico, adds a social psychological effect to this loss of territory:

As Popayán . . . was divested of its richer lands, which became part of the wealth of new or neighboring states, its fortunes declined drastically. Its rich and fertile valleys became the state of Valle del Cauca; its mines, which once supported the aristocracy in a life of royal wealth, passed to the states of Nariño and Antioquia, and even its mountainous southerly regions of unexplored but potential riches were turned over to the state of Huila. Popayán was left to rule a decimated state, small in size, and composed principally of rolling hills and unexplored mountains. The shock of loss, the feeling of impoverishment in both cases led to a paralysis, an inactivity, which deterred and impeded the full and active exploitation and development of those resources and potentialities which did remain. The result was stagnation. Throughout the major part of the first half of the present century both cities (Popayán and Queretaro) dreamed of their past, lamented their lost wealth and prestige, and estivated. Where they had once played important parts in the commerce between the regions to the north and south of them these roles declined as new roads were built and railroads passed them by. Increasingly they became isolated from their national capitals, and traffic with the outside world dwindled at the very time when other cities were expanding their commerce and increasing their relationships with other regions and oth nations. Popayán was superseded by Cali as the principal city of southern Colombia . . . [Whiteford, 1964:14].

Whiteford (1964:246-247) believes that the leaders of Popayán reacted to this loss of provincial territory by entering first into a cataleptic-like state and then emerged from that with a backward-looking reemphasis on

tradition. He describes the city's ultimate response as one of " . . . intensifying its traditionalism, immersing itself in poetry and history and deliberately turning its back upon the noise, the dirt, the disturbance--and the wealth--associated with progress" (Whiteford, 1964:247).

Although political events undoubtedly have had some influence on Popayán's lack of development, the historical fact remains that Medellín and Cali began modernizing at an accelerated rate before the construction of the Pacific railroad and Popayán's loss of territory. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that cultural and other sociopsychological factors play an important role here. The emphasis in Popayán on the leisurely gentleman-farmer way of life, the disdain for progress as illustrated by efforts to keep out industry and retard communication with the outside world (Whiteford, 1964:13), and the pride in humanistic accomplishments of an aristocratic past lead one to suspect that the values of the people are significant reasons for the relative lack of progress. A recent mayor of Popayán refers to this indirectly in his discussion of the city's problems when he talks about "the inertia of the centuries" and "the state of immobility

of the people, their lack of civic spirit on occasions, the fact of living only in their past glories, (and) of holding to their pastoral economy . . . " (Caicedo, 1969).

Glynis Anthony (1968:167) reinforces this view when he says, "Even after independence was a well established fact, Popayán remained a stronghold of conservatism and a living monument to the more attractive aspects of Colonialism."

It goes almost without saying that an upper-class of leaders who possessed such traditional values and were so well served by the status quo would be little interested in economic development or modernization. Those who were dissatisfied or held different values would be encouraged to go elsewhere. As the reader will recall from Chapter II, p. 21, Hagen's application of the Thematic Apperception Test to leaders in Popayán revealed that they not only rejected notions of progress or striving but fatalistically disbelieved in their efficacy (Hagen, 1962:368-369).

Medellín leaders, on the other hand, expressed optimism about their abilities to solve problems, overcome obstacles, etc. Thus, it seems safe to suppose that as long as the leaders of Popayán find adherence to traditional values satisfying, Popayán will remain more or less as it is. To

this writer, however, it appeared that younger leaders in that city were both dissatisfied with the general stagnation and less interested in tradition. Middle-aged and older leaders seemed on the other hand to be content with the status quo. The traditional life style of these latter groups was made apparent to the interviewers by the casual way they showed up late or not at all for appointments. As stated in Chapter II, this practice was in sharp contrast to that in Medellín.

At any rate, from this foregoing sketch of Popayán and its people it should be logical to expect that the dominant value orientations of leaders and students there would be the kind classified here as "traditional."

Results of the Intercity Comparison

Hypothesis 11 predicts that Medellín leaders will express the modern ranking of value orientations more often (on more items) than will Popayán leaders. In Table 22 the two leadership groups are compared in this respect.

The results from Test 1 for all 22 items show that the Medellín leader typically chose the complete modern value profile on one item more than did the typical

Table 22

Average Number of Times Leaders in Medellín and Popayán Chose: 1) A "Modern"
 Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant)
 Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), 1967.

	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1*	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2*	Test 1*	Test 2	Test 1*	Test 2
(1) Medellín Leaders	6.80	11.20	1.62	3.53	2.13	2.47	1.97	3.27	1.08	2.03
(2) Popayán Leaders	5.83	11.32	1.36	3.42	2.14	2.80	1.49	3.09	0.85	2.02

*Differences significant at .05 level

Popayán leader. However, Test 2 figures reveal that on the average both groups put a "modern" value orientation in first place on an equal number of items. A similar pattern prevails in specific value areas with the exception of the activity area, where Popayán leaders were as modern as Medellín leaders on Test 1 and significantly more modern on Test 2. Since Test 1 is considered the "hard" test or the more conservative of the two tests, it can be said that overall and in three of four specific value areas, Medellín leaders were more modern in their choice of value orientations. When the two groups of leaders were compared by occupational sectors, it turned out that aside from the activity area and, in the case of commercial leaders, the time area, all occupational subgroups in Medellín except church and university leaders were more modern in their responses than their counterparts in Popayán. The church leaders of Popayán were particularly noticeable for the degree to which they made modern choices, scoring higher on Test 1 than any other sector of Popayán leaders. In Medellín, on the other hand, they were next to the bottom in this respect, scoring only slightly higher than university leaders.

With regard to students, Hypothesis 12 predicted that Medellín students would choose "modern" values and value profiles more frequently than would Popayán students. Table 23 provides the data necessary for a comparison between the two groups. The figures constitute a clear refutation of Hypothesis 12. In every case--over all items and in each value area--Popayán students were more modern than students in Medellín in their choice of value orientations. When student responses in both cities are classified by schools, it appears that in Medellín the relatively low scores from students at the big Liceo Antioqueño (189 of 395 students questioned) were the chief reason that Medellín students as a whole came across with fewer modern value choices. Responses at Popayán's "middle class" high school, which is comparable with the Liceo Antioqueño vis-a-vis the socioeconomic status of its students, were much more modern.

Table 23

Average Number of Times Students in Medellín and Popayán Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) A "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), 1967

	All Items		Time		Activity		Man-Nature		Man-Man	
	Test 1*	Test 2*	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2	Test 1	Test 2*	Test 1	Test 2
(1) Medellín Students	6.83	10.41	2.32	3.41	1.81	2.32	1.62	2.69	1.09	1.99
(2) Popayán Students	7.92	11.75	2.65	3.68	1.87	2.51	1.99	3.19	1.41	2.37

*Differences statistically significant at .05 level.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Value Orientations in Medellín

Leaders

The first hypothesis predicted that the majority of Medellín leaders would hold a "modern" value profile like the one attributed to the North American middle class.¹ Research showed that the majority of leaders in fact expressed a "modern" ranking of values in two of the four areas tested: they chose Future > Present > Past as their orientation towards time and ranked Mastery > Harmony > Submission in their orientation towards nature. But in their respective preferences for type of activity and man-to-man relationships most leaders ranked Being-in-Becoming > Doing > Being and Collateral > Lineal > Individualistic rather than in the "modern" fashion of Doing > Being-in-Becoming > Being and Individualistic > Collateral > Lineal.

¹See page 207 for an illustration of this profile.

From these findings one might say that the hypothetical prediction was "half right." Nevertheless, it was expected that the Medellín leaders would be modern in their activity and personal relationship preferences just as they were in the way they evaluate time and their relationship with nature. The review of the literature on modernization and the "modern" personality clearly indicated that "Individualism" and "Doing" (achievement) were modern values and that the modern way of life was characterized by and even demanded individualistic social relations and active manipulation of the external environment. Kahl (1968:6), for example, characterized the high evaluation of individual responsibility as a modern value and in his research found that low integration with relatives and "Individualism" were part of a "syndrome of modernism" (1968:21). Hagen (1962:88-94) describes the "creative" personality as having a high need for autonomy and independence in making decisions. By way of contrast, the traditional, authoritarian personality is said by Hagen to be almost totally dependent on traditional authority. In terms of man-to-man relationships this is like saying he has a "Lineal" value orientation. McClelland's research

demonstrated that men with a high need for achievement performed better on problems where individual effort was emphasized rather than team work (McClelland, 1961:45). In conjunction with McClelland, Winterbottom (1958:453-478) found that a group of 29 boys who showed a high need for achievement had mothers who stressed self-reliance and self-mastery while the mothers of boys with a low need for achievement encouraged dependence.

There are also results from other basic value studies to be reckoned with. These are more comparable because the same theoretical frame of reference and the same or a similar instrument were used. Among Chilean workers and students (Sanchez, 1967:25-27), Japanese students (Caudill and Scarr, 1962:67), Texan and Mormon farmers (Kluckhohn, 1961:264-268), and Italian-Americans in Boston (Scarr, 1970), the Individualistic orientation was found to predominate and the Lineal was ranked third. This is the modern profile one would expect to find among all of the above groups which, with the possible exception of the Chilean workers, live in modern subcultures and would likely be composed of individuals with modern personalities. It is especially curious that Chilean

workers were not only more modern than Medellín industrialists, etc., in the activity area, but proved to be modern all across the board, more so, in fact, than Chilean students.

On the other hand, Scarr (1970) also found that Irish-Americans in Boston (SES not specified) ranked the Collateral orientation first and the Individualistic one last. They were in fact, surprisingly nonmodern in all but the time area. Moreover, Albert Hirschman (1958:14-19) insists that mutual trust and a high evaluation of "cooperation" are also modern. Antioqueños, it will be recalled, are highly praised by other Colombians for the unusual amount of trust and cooperation they display, and this is often cited as a principal reason for their success in business. In the report on his case study of Antioqueño colonists at Tamesis, Havens (1966:175-176) states that one of the most important factors in the colonists' success was their ability to develop effective voluntary groups where cooperation and trust prevailed. Perhaps, then, the historical emphasis on mutual help among the Antioqueños would militate against predominance of an Individualistic value orientation and in favor of

the Collateral orientation which was their first preference. Yet there is also the popular notion in Colombia that the Antioqueño works for another man only until he has enough to start his own business. This would indicate an Individualistic orientation.

The possibility also exists that the emphasis on family situations in the man-to-man items caused many respondents to give last preference to the Individualistic alternative. Family bonds in Antioquia and all of Latin America are still strong enough that a Latin, who is individualistic in extrafamilial relations, may not be so within his family. An instrument defect of this nature might have obscured the results. Of course, the aforementioned Chilean results cast some doubt on this possibility since the same type of instrument was used in research there. Yet, even if this were true--that Medellín leaders are Individualistic but outside the family setting--one would still have to fit this finding in with the statement by Inkeles and Smith (1966:353-377) that "autonomy in kinship matters" is one of the key personal qualities which makes an individual modern in his institutional relations.

The preference shown for a Being-in-Becoming mode of activity might perhaps be due to the tendency of Latin cultures to idealize humanistic values and denigrate material achievement. Although the Antioqueño subculture is said by other Colombians to be materialistic and profit-oriented, there remains the possibility that in this case lip service was paid to the broader ideals. It should also be pointed out that Chilean university students (but not workers) as well as the Irish and Italian-Americans in Boston preferred the Being-in-Becoming alternative. The fact that Chilean students ranked first whereas Chilean workers did not, led this writer to wonder if perhaps this alternative, with its implications for a well-rounded life, might not appeal generally to the better educated. This line of reasoning was discarded, however, when a re-examination of the results for Medellín students revealed that lower-class students preferred Being-in-Becoming to a greater degree than did middle- and upper-class students. In any event, the Being-in-Becoming orientation is not classified here as a traditional one nor is it necessarily antimodern, in the sense of being opposed to achievement or accomplishment, as the Being orientation is considered to be.

One verifiable reason for the unexpected lack of modernity in the activity and man-to-man relational areas lies in the fact that nonmodern responses from certain kinds of leaders affected the total profile for the leaders as a whole. The more specific analysis of responses done for different categories of leaders revealed which kinds were more modern than others in their value choices. One can see in Table 8 that respondents from the religious and academic occupational sectors made value choices which were significantly less modern than those of other leaders in both the activity and man-to-man areas. It was partly because of their influence that scores for leaders as a whole were not as modern as predicted.²

The churchmen were especially effective in lowering average scores, except in the time area. With respect to activity, they gave first preference to the modern alternative on only one out of six items, whereas the number of modern activity responses made by commercial and

² Leaving out religious and university leaders had the effect of raising the leaders' scores on all 22 items from 6.80 to 7.16 (Test 1) and from 11.30 to 11.64 (Test 2). Doing the same for the activity and man-to-man items raised scores from 2.13 to 2.26 and 2.47 to 2.62 in the activity area and from 1.08 to 1.18 and 2.03 to 2.16 in the man-to-man area.

quasigovernmental leaders was notably above the group average. It was because of them that unmarried leaders as a group were so much less modern than were married leaders in activity and man-to-man preferences. They were also responsible for the low average scores of university-educated leaders (among whom the religious were included) on the activity items. When the figures for university graduates were examined by field of education, it was learned to no one's surprise that those with degrees in theology were significantly less modern than other graduates in all but the time area, where the church leaders exhibited an unusually strong Future orientation. This latter deviation was due possibly to the belief that man has a future not only in this life but in afterlife and should be planning ahead to attain for himself a proper role in the afterlife.

That church leaders were in large part responsible for the low scores of the leadership sample in the activity and man-to-man areas is perhaps not unusual if the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church is indeed as conservative and tradition-oriented as it is alleged to be. The ideology of the church certainly does not endorse

individualism and material achievement. In fact, the church's very organization seems to indicate a Lineal value orientation.

The question remains as to why academic leaders demonstrated a less-modern orientation than did other leaders. The reasons are not clear. At first glance it might seem that this result has something to do with the relatively passive life academicians tend to lead which, in conjunction with the emphasis in universities on abstract thinking and variety, would dispose them to prefer a humanistic orientation like Being-in-Becoming. Along these lines it is interesting to recall that McClelland (1961:259-271) found that leaders with entrepreneurial-manager type positions³ had a higher need to achieve than did leaders with so-called professional occupations. The relatively vague standards of excellence and less stringent competition in professional life might not require in a man an Individualistic or a Doing orientation to the same degree that commerce or industry does. But closer

³These positions are found primarily in commerce, industry, and, in our case, quasigovernmental entities which in Medellín draw their directors and managers from industry.

inspection of the respondents' background data showed that most of the academic leaders were, in this case, also businessmen so that this explanation is much less plausible. There are, no doubt, other background factors which were responsible but which the writer was unable to detect.

Another datum worth discussing is that leaders with three or more years of exposure to a foreign university education were significantly more modern than those educated exclusively in Colombia. It is likely that men in the former category received an education which, both in content and as a process, was more rational and empirical than the university education typically acquired in Colombia, where a traditional humanism has been emphasized. This fact plus the extended experience of living in an atmosphere where empiricism and rational problem-solving are stressed probably account for the larger preference they displayed for modern orientations towards time, nature, and human relationships.

The prediction that leaders whose fathers had gone to a university would be more modern than those whose fathers had not was also borne out. Differences, however, were not, for most value areas, statistically significant.

If we accept the broad assumption that these distinctions in paternal backgrounds represent a social class difference, then it can be said that the above result corroborates the direct correlation between holding modern values and socioeconomic status that Kahl (1968:45) encountered. The correlation coefficient for Kahl's two variables was .58 in Brazil and .56 in Mexico. No such degree of correlation could be expected, of course, from the data presented here, and it is perhaps wrong to assume that a generation ago there was a social class difference in Medellín between those who had a university education and those who did not.

Even though social class differences were hard to define, let alone detect, among the leaders, there did appear marked differences between age groups of leaders with respect to the value orientations they held. Generally, there was an inverse correlation between the degree of modernity in value expression and age, so that a real generation gap separated the youngest group of leaders, aged 30 to 39, from those 60 years and older. That younger leaders were significantly less traditional than older leaders is probably a function of the life

cycle since men 60 years or older most likely recognize the nearness of death and lose confidence both in the future and in their abilities to overcome natural obstacles.

Before discussing the students' value orientations, a final comparison is in order between the findings of this research on value orientations toward nature and those of David McClelland. McClelland (1961:176) did not find an association between modernization and a belief in man's ability to master natural forces. He suggests, therefore, that the commonly held assumption that a self-confident, domineering orientation towards nature is a cultural prerequisite for great socioeconomic development may be a myth. He calls for evidence proving that it is not. One of the major findings presented here is that the majority of a representative sample of men closely involved with the modernization of Colombia's best-developed city did, in fact, express a belief in man's ability to dominate nature.

Students

There was the expectation, stated in Hypothesis 6, that the students as a group would also express a "modern"

value orientation profile. The gross results showed, however, that they, like the leaders, were predominantly modern in their orientation towards time and nature but more traditional than modern in their human relational preferences and neither modern nor traditional in their first choice of the Being-in-Becoming mode of activity. Once again a major proposition proved to be "half right." There were differences, nonetheless, in the degree of attachment to the various value orientations chosen.

Over all items and especially in the activity and man-nature areas, leaders show up with a greater number of modern choices, and so the expectation of Hypothesis 7 that the younger generation would be more modern than the older was not borne out. Some of the reasons for this reverse difference become apparent when the student data are broken down by subgroups. Because the students were deliberately selected from different social class levels, they are much more varied a group than are the leaders, and herein lies a primary reason for their lack of modernity relative to the leaders. Probably the most salient difference between leaders and students is the fact that leaders, by virtue of their occupational

positions, are all upper-class or upper-middle-class while most of the students come from lower-middle or lower-class backgrounds. The data show that while upper-class students were actually more modern than the leaders (who could have been their fathers or grandfathers), students from middle-class homes were significantly less so. Curiously, many lower-class students, especially in the Avendaño school, proved to be almost as modern in their value choices as upper-class students and somewhat more modern than the middle-class boys. This phenomenon refutes Hypothesis 10 that a direct relationship would appear between the modernity of students' value orientations and their social class position. Nevertheless, the tendency of upper-class students from the Instituto Jorge Robledo to be more modern than the leaders points to a minor generation gap which indicates that upper-class boys in Medellín are more modern in their outlook on life than their parents or grandparents. Whether or not this gap exists with respect to the middle and lower classes cannot be determined here inasmuch as none of the adult leaders interviewed could honestly be placed at those class levels. If the difference is real, it can be said that Antioqueños

are, in general, becoming increasingly "modern" in their value orientations.

The question remains as to why the responses of students at nearly opposite ends of the social class structure were somewhat alike. It was of course expected that the sons of an active elite in a developing area would be at least as modern as their fathers. They are the children of parents or grandparents who have made it to the top in a modernizing society and ought to be convinced by their forefathers' success about the efficacy of a modern, self-confident orientation. But what of the circumstances in the lives of lower-class boys? Lack of a verifiable answer leads the writer to speculate that the unexpected modernity of the lower-class students from the Avendaño school may have been due to the possession, by many of those at the bottom who have yet to try, of high aspirations coupled with optimistic orientations for action. It is also possible that lower-class boys such as these, who make it through to the end of high school, are above average for their class in ambition, achievement drive and confidence.

Why then were students from the middle-classes so much less modern in their value orientations? Again it is

necessary to speculate that this may be due to the influence of parents who are or have been struggling to make a better life for themselves and their children and that such a struggle has brought inevitable setbacks and a lessening of self-confidence in one's ability to master circumstances. This particular finding certainly does not square with the prevalent idea that "middle-class" values are universally much involved with optimism, individualism, striving, and achievement. Perhaps in North America the modern-value orientation profile delineated here is the dominant value profile of the middle-class (or of middle-class adults), but it was not predominant among middle-class boys in Medellín in 1967.

The Intercity Comparison

Leaders

In the conservative or "hard" analysis of Test 1 the value orientation profiles of Medellín leaders fit the United States middle-class model more closely than those of Popayán leaders in all value areas except the activity. On the less-demanding "soft" test, where only first choices were counted, the two groups of leaders were about equal in the number of modern value orientations

chosen. By rigorous standards then, Medellín leaders were by and large more modern than their counterparts in Popayán. Nevertheless, the soft test and activity area findings do not enable us to say that Medellín leaders as a group were completely and unambiguously more modern, although the weight of evidence is in their favor. But because the weight is with the men from Medellín, the hypothesis that they would hold modern value orientations more strongly than leaders from the traditional city of Popayán is tentatively accepted. If we are right, this means that there is a relationship between leaders having the values we have defined here as "modern" and the level of modernization reached by the society which they lead.

When a sector-by-sector comparison is made between leaders in the two cities, the figures show that only the church and university leaders in Medellín scored lower than their opposites in Popayán. In the entrepreneurial-managerial sectors of industry, commerce, banking, and quasigovernment, the leadership of Medellín was clearly more modern. It was pointed out in Chapter VI that church officials in Popayán were above average in their choice of modern values while Medellín churchmen were well below.

Eliminating the church leaders from both samples would probably increase the disparity between the two groups, making the Antioqueños even more modern relative to the Payaneses.¹ There is no ready explanation this writer can offer for the curious differences between the two groups of church leaders. The Antioqueños are allegedly very traditional when it comes to their religion and this feeling was possibly reflected in its values of its keepers. On the other hand, the church leaders of Popayán may have been more affected by the spirit of reform and change which is sweeping the church in Latin America, especially since they were confronted with the obvious backwardness of Popayán and its province. In any event, they appear to be the most potent force for modernization in Popayán.

Finally the question should be considered as to why Popayán leaders were, as a group, more modern on the activity value items. It appears that once again church leaders in the two cities were largely responsible. This is a value orientational area in which Medellín church

⁴ Colombian term for residents of Popayán.

officials scored particularly low while their opposite number in Popayán came through with above-average scores. Why there should be such an extreme difference in this particular area is not clear.

Students

For the younger generation, the results were reversed. In this case, the comparison revealed a clear and unambiguous rejection of Hypothesis 12 in which Medellín students were expected to express a more modern value-orientational system than Popayán students. There were no exceptions here--Popayán students scored higher on both the rigorous and the "soft" tests in every value area. Why were the students of Popayán closer to the North American model than either the leaders of their own city or students from a much more modern city? Answers are difficult to come by. Perhaps they, like the leading priests of their city, have become somewhat disenchanted with, and, self-conscious about, the relationship between Popayán's traditionalism and its backwardness. Whatever the reason for these results in Popayán, the youth of Medellín appear, on the face of it, to be rejecting so-called middle-class values as young people supposedly

are doing in modernized, industrial countries throughout the world. Such a lack of emphasis on striving, future planning, and material achievement may in fact be "modern" as far as this generation is concerned.

There is also the possibility that in Medellín falsification of responses took place. There was at the Liceo Antioqueño, where responses were surprisingly nonmodern, a certain amount of resentment of the investigators on the part of some students. Conversation with several teachers revealed that many students believed that the researchers were CIA agents carrying out a psychological study in order to more easily manipulate and exploit Colombians. Low scores at the Liceo Antioqueño were largely the reason that Medellín students as a whole scored lower than Popayán students. At this stage, however, it would be very difficult to prove one way or another that a significantly large number of students did bias the results by falsifying responses.

In short, intercity differences were found, some expected, others unexpected. It is interesting to note that small geographic differences existed in Kahl's results in Brazil and Mexico (Kahl, 1968). Kahl found

that locational differences (between cities, regions, rural or urban areas, countries) were less important than social class differences in determining values. Therefore, he would expect only minor value differences between Medellín and Popayán. Significant differences appeared, nonetheless, along with some of the class differences that Kahl encountered. On the basis of our results one could not say as Kahl would that the industrial or "modern" man has evolved to the same degree among the upper-classes of both developed and developing societies. Like Hagen, we find that there are still elites which are largely traditional in spite of outward appearances and that some are more modern than others.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Fundamentally our study has been motivated by a desire to locate and measure certain values connected with the modernization process. This wish was prompted by curiosity and knowledge of two facts: (1) that the rate and degree of modernization has been highly uneven in the world, some societies progressing much further and faster than others; (2) explanations of these disparities which rely on economic causes or differences in climate, resources, etc., have not been satisfactory since there are nations with favorable economic circumstances and abundant resources which have failed to modernize as rapidly or extensively as nations less favored in these things. Concern and curiosity about these facts have, in the past two decades, led to a search for other (social, cultural, and social-psychological) factors which influence modernization.

It is not surprising that a complex process such as modernization is the result of a complex matrix of causes. Nevertheless, some of these interacting factors are probably more basic and more important than others. It is our belief that the cultural values men hold are basic in shaping and motivating their behavior so that certain kinds of values will result in definite behavior patterns. From this it is logical to conclude that modernization, being to a great extent a function of particular behavior patterns, is also a function of certain combinations of values. This view is now widely accepted (see Chapter III) and is succinctly stated by Ayal (1963:35) when he remarks that ". . . Changes in political and social institutions, or investments by foreigners, will not, by themselves, bring about sustained economic development, unless the fundamental human values in the society are conducive to development."

Given the truth of this belief our research has attempted to find out if certain basic value orientations, widely assumed to be behavioral guideposts for the "modern" personality, are in fact associated with modernization. The research design utilized did not permit us to investigate whether or not these value orientations are truly

causes of the modernization process but it does permit an inquiry into whether or not the two phenomena are really related somehow to one another. As such, this is an acceptable first step in any effort to determine causes.

These particular values, derived from Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variations in value orientations, are considered basic because they orient the actions, thoughts, and feelings of a man in his basic relationships with nature and other men and with regard to the time and activity dimensions of his life (see introductory paragraphs of Chapter VI). In order to test our beliefs about their importance in socioeconomic development, we have hypothesized that the key decision-makers or leaders of societies or groups which are modernizing will express a preference for "modern" value orientations to the degree that the areas they control and manage have become modern.

The regional variation of Colombia makes that country a good laboratory for testing these propositions as well as others about generational changes and social class differences in values. Accordingly, samples of community leaders and senior high school students in three

Colombian cities at different stages of development were interviewed and questioned in an effort to elicit their value orientations. It was naturally expected that leaders and students in the most modern city (Medellín) would hold "modern" value orientations to a greater degree than their counterparts in the least modern, most traditional city (Popayán). This dissertation compares leaders and students in the two polar cities on the degree to which they approach the "modern" value-orientation model.

The actual results showed that leaders in Medellín and Popayán preferred a mixture of "modern" value orientations and other types which are neither modern nor traditional. In terms of their approach to time and the natural forces most leaders in both cities clearly expressed a first preference for the modern orientations of Future and Mastery-of-Nature. Yet, with regard to activity and man-to-man relationships they usually chose Being-in-Becoming and Collateral over the modern orientations of Doing and Individualism. These results were not expected in Medellín since it was predicted that the leaders of Colombia's most modern and progressive city would be overwhelmingly modern in their value choices.

Historically speaking, the Antioqueño leadership has displayed (since the beginning of the nineteenth century) a dynamic pattern of behavior similar to that of North American entrepreneurs. In comparison with Popayán leaders, however, they did prove to be more modern except on the items which dealt with activity preferences. Specifically, Medellín leaders usually made more "modern" choices in the "hard" or conservative analysis (Test 1) even though the differences were not great enough to differentiate them from Popayán leaders in the gross profile results.

Why were the Medellín leaders less modern than expected? A more detailed analysis of their responses revealed that leaders sampled from the religious sector had demonstrated a stronger than average preference for the Being-in-Becoming orientation and due to their influence the leadership group as a whole appeared to prefer that activity orientation more strongly than many key subgroups of leaders actually did. Industrial and commercial leaders, for example, displayed the expected preference for the Doing alternative. In addition, this writer suspects that the wording of the Being-in-Becoming alternative in the several items might have made it seem

so attractive as to bias the respondents' choices. In other words, many respondents who were in fact not predominantly oriented to that activity may have chosen it first because the wording made it seem as if they should be.

Leaders in the religious and university sectors also showed an above-average preference for the collateral orientation in their man-man relationships. This result partially explains the general rejection of the Individualistic alternative in that area. Yet, none of the Medellín leaders was as modern in this area as expected. We can only speculate as to why this occurred. It may have been due to the oft-remarked but un-Latin disposition of the typical Antioqueño to cooperate and work with his fellows for a common cause. Such a propensity may have made the Individualistic alternatives seem egotistical and selfish. Moreover, many of the man-to-man relationship items used examples of personal relationships within family groups and the relatively strong familial ties of the Antioqueños are well known. This factor also would have biased respondents against the Individualistic alternatives and in favor of the Collateral ones.

Students in Medellín followed the general pattern of the older generation (predominantly modern choices in the time and man-nature areas while Being-in-Becoming and Collateral orientations were preferred in the activity and man-man relationship areas). Yet, to our surprise they were less modern than were the leaders on many items, especially in the man-nature and activity areas. To some extent this was due to responses from one particular school, which was predominantly attended by boys with middle-class backgrounds. A noticeable amount of hostility was encountered there and the possibility exists that some of the responses were deliberately falsified. Students from the upper-class high school were, as predicted, the most modern.

Students in Popayán were, to our surprise, more modern than the Medellín students in all four value areas. This unexpected situation was the reverse of that for the leaders. Why were the students of traditional Popayán more modern in their expression of value orientations? It may be the case that the Medellín students, whose city is much larger and less isolated than Popayán, and who, by and large, are the beneficiaries of a greater prosperity, had

been more directly and strongly influenced by the new youth subculture of Western countries on achievement. An industrialist in Medellín told this writer that a 1966 survey of aspirations of high school students there had revealed a surprising lack of interest in business careers, in contrast to previous surveys. If this be true, the Medellín students could still, in a sense, be considered more "modern."

As mentioned previously, this writer has speculated on the possibilities that the Being-in-Becoming orientations in the activity items are phrased too attractively and that the en famille situations of several human relational items are not truly cross-cultural; that is, they measure family relationships rather than human relations in general. If such proves to be the case, these items need to be reworked into more valid measurements.

If, however, the instrument as used is valid, there are several things which may be happening. First of all, we should remember that the leaders of Medellín did express modern value orientations to a greater extent than did Popayán leaders. We can tentatively conclude, therefore, that the more modern or better developed the

city, the more modern are the value orientations of its managerial class. Since these results were somewhat ambiguous, this particular finding and conclusion need to be tested further, in a variety of settings with clear-cut differences in levels of modernization.

It may also be that leaders in both cities have been evolving toward modern value orientations through the years and that the rate of change in some value areas is greater than others just as the rate has been faster overall in Medellín than in Popayán. For example, it may have been easier for Colombians to adopt a modern Mastery orientation towards nature than an Individualistic orientation in working relations. In this case we would conclude that the lack of congruency or "fit" in the holding of dominant value orientations reflects a process of cultural change which is preceding or accompanying the modernization process. Kahl (1968:22) found that individuals in Mexico, Brazil, and the United States could be modern on some values and remain traditional on others.

On the other hand, we might possibly have caught (especially among Medellín students) a reverse process of change: an evolution away from modern orientations in

these areas toward new ones neither traditional nor modern. Being-in-Becoming may represent a new "modern" value orientation for Western cultures.

Taking another tack, it may be that value orientations such as Individualism are not necessarily, as they are assumed to be, connected with the modernization process. Even so, our findings make it appear that Mastery of Nature, Future, and probably Doing are in reality associated with modernization to some extent--we unfortunately could not determine, as mentioned earlier, the degree of association or whether these values are truly prior and causal factors.

Finally, a higher level possibility must be considered: that values per se are not as important in determining behavior, and ergo such social processes as modernization, as we think they are. Perhaps people do work from immediate needs, external pressures, or impulses rather than being motivated by the abstract goals, ideals, or values which they express. Still, I would conclude that we have established a weak but real association

between modernization and Florence Kluckhohn's values. The foregoing doubts are perhaps a roundabout way of saying, "more research is needed."

APPENDIX I

ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE VALUE ORIENTATION INSTRUMENT

1. Help for Family relational

A man has had financial trouble of some kind and must seek help in order that he and his family can get through a difficult period. Here are three ways of getting help about which we wish your judgment.

(Collateral) Would it be best if he depended mainly on his brothers and sisters or on some close group of relatives and friends to help him out as much as each can?

(Individual) Would it be best for him to try to raise the money by himself, on his own, from an outside organization which deals with such problems?

(Lineal) Would it be best for him to go to a recognized leader--a respected person of experience and authority in the family or community--and ask him for help and advice in handling the problem?

2. Ideal Job activity

Three young married men were talking about their notions of the ideal job. Here is what each one said:

(Being) The first said: The kind of job I would like best to have if I could is one which is not too demanding of my time and

energy. I like to have time to enjoy myself and don't want a job which makes me feel I must always be competing.

(Doing) The second said: Ideally, I would like a competitive job--one which lets me show what I can accomplish in a line of work for which I am suited.

(Being-in-Becoming) The third said: Ideally, I would like the kind of job which would let me develop different kinds of interests and talents. I would rather have an understanding of life and people than be successful in one particular field.

3. Bringing up Children

time

Some people were talking one day about the ways in which young children should be brought up. Here are three different ideas which were expressed.

(Past) Some people said that young children should always be brought up according to the traditions of the past--the time-proven ways of doing things. They believe that the traditional ways are best, and that when forgotten or not followed things go wrong.

(Present) Some people say that young children should be reared in the traditional ways, but that it is wrong to follow them exclusively. These people believe that it is best when each new generation adjusts to any situation by adopting whatever new ideas and methods may help them, but keeping whatever of the old they like--that is, they think it just depends on the situation.

(Future) Some other people don't place much faith in bringing up young children in the

traditional ways--which they think are interesting only as stories about what used to be. These people think it best if their children are brought up so as to make them able to have new ideas and discover new and better ways of living.

4. Length of Life

man-nature

Three men were talking about whether people themselves can do anything to make the lives of men and women longer. Here is what each said:

(Over) One said: It is already true that people like doctors and others are finding the way to add many years to the lives of most men by discovering new medicines, studying foods and doing other things such as vaccinations. If people will pay attention to all these new things they will almost always live longer.

(Subjugation) The second said: I really do not believe that there is much human beings themselves can do to make the lives of men and women longer. It is my belief that every person has a set time to live and when that time comes it just comes.

(With) The third said: I believe that there is a plan of life which works to keep all living things moving together, and if a man will learn to live his whole life in accord with that plan he will live longer than other men.

5. Expect in Life

time

People often have very different ideas about what has gone before and what we can expect in life. Here are three ways of thinking about these things.

- (Present) Some people believe that man's greatest concern should be with the present time in which he lives. They say that the past has gone and the future is too far away and too uncertain to be of concern. It is only the present which is real.
- (Past) Some people think that the ways of the past (ways of the old people or traditional ways) were the most right and the best, and as changes come things get worse. These people think the best way to live is to keep up the old ways and try to bring them back when they are lost.
- (Future) Some people believe that it is almost always the ways of the future--the ways which are still to come--which will be best and they say that even though there are sometimes small setbacks, change brings improvements in the long run. These people think the best way to live is to look a long time ahead, work hard and give up many things now so that the future will be better.

6. Technological Change

man-nature

Three persons were talking one day about the changes which science has brought about in the way people live. They mentioned all such things as changes in farming methods, in transportation, in the field of medicine, in types of food and housing. All agreed some changes had come but each of them had quite different ideas about what the long run effects would be. Here is what each one said:

- (Subjugation) The first one said: It is good that such advances have been made, but in the long run one has to be lucky to have things go right in life. Science can help a lot with some kinds of things people come up against, but it will never be able to help much with the really big things in life.

There are many things which just come to pass and everyone, if he is smart, will learn to accept this fact.

(Over) The second one said: I don't agree with you. My view is that man can and must learn to control the forces of nature. We have already gone a very long way and it is my belief that in time there will be scientific ways to control or overcome most things.

(With) The third one said: Perhaps you both have something to say, but in my opinion what matters most is that people learn to keep the balance between themselves and the forces of nature. It is my belief that human beings and the great forces of nature are all one whole--that is, related parts of a total universe, and we can expect the most when we work to fit in with and live with nature.

7. Children's Character

activity

Three parents were talking about the kind of character they wanted their young children to have. Here are three different opinions that were expressed.

(Being-in-becoming) One parent said: I want my children to learn to be creative in a number of ways. I hope they develop an interest and ability in following the various paths which lead to understanding and wisdom.

(Being) A second parent said: I want my children to grow up able to express themselves freely, to get a kick out of life in whatever situation they find themselves.

(Doing) A third parent said: I want my children to have the drive to make something of themselves, the ambition to "get up and go."

That way they'll be successful and achieve something in their chosen path.

8. Appeal of Religion

activity

Three people were talking about what it is about religion that appeals to them. Here is what each said:

(Being-in-Becoming) Religion appeals to me because the wisdom in its teachings broadens me and helps me to understand better the manysidedness of life.

(Being) The second said: Religion appeals to me because I enjoy the beauty and drama of it, and I like the feelings which come from participating in the services.

(Doing) I think religion appeals to me because it teaches people that accomplishing things for themselves and society is the right way.

9. Job Decision

time

Three young unmarried men had finished their schooling and had to decide what kind of work they wished to go into.

(Past) One decided to go into the kind of occupation which others in his family before him had followed. He believed the best way is to hold and strengthen the traditions of the past.

(Future) The second sought for the kind of work opportunities which offered considerable chance for future success. He believed it best to look to new developments in the future, even though he might have to start off in a position less good than others available at the time.

(Present) The third decided to take the best job which came his way and which gave him the money he needed to get along in the present time. He believed it foolish to think much about either the past which has gone by, or the future which he thought too uncertain to count on.

10. Inheritance

relational

When a father or mother dies and leaves property, there are different ways in which the property can be distributed among the children and managed by them. Here are three ways:

(Lineal) In some places it is thought best that the ownership, or if not the ownership at least the management, of all the property be put into the hands of one selected person--usually the eldest son.

(Collateral) In other places the sons and daughters all share in the property but all are expected to stick together and manage things as a family group. If some one person is ever needed to make certain decisions, all the heirs will discuss the matter and come to an agreement as to the one best suited to do so.

(Individual) In still other places it is thought best that each son and daughter take his or her own share of the property and manage it on his own, independent of the other brothers or sisters.

11. Philosophy of Life

man-nature

Three people were talking about the need for having some philosophy of life--such as religion. They had different ideas on the subject:

- (With) One said: Man is part of the grand plan of nature. Having a philosophy of life helps me to understand this plan and to live in the ways to keep myself in tune with that total plan.
- (Subjugation) The second one said: As I see it, there are many natural and supernatural forces over which man will never gain control. A philosophy of life is necessary to help men accept and adjust to their fate on this earth.
- (Over) The third said: I'm afraid I don't agree with either of you. I think man can do as much or as little as he wishes to overcome these natural and supernatural forces. For me a philosophy of life is necessary to teach men how to rise above these forces and shape their own destiny.

12. Teaching Young

relational

Three mothers from different kinds of families were talking about the ways in which children should be taught. Here is what each one said:

- (Individual) The first mother said: I believe children should be taught, when still quite young, to stand on their own two feet, to make their own decisions, and to take responsibility for themselves. People get along best when they can make their own mistakes and profit from them, and when they learn how to be independent enough of their families to go off on their own--sometimes even at great distances.
- (Lineal) The second said: I believe that young children should be trained first to obey and respect their elders--their parents and grandparents. It is the elders of the family who have the greatest wisdom and

people get along best when they are trained to accept and respect this wisdom.

(Collateral) The third said: I believe that young children should be taught to respect and keep ties with their close relatives--father, mother, sisters, brothers, etc. People get along best when they have a large group of close relatives upon whom they can always depend for help and advice, and whom they, too, can help.

13. Religious Ceremonies time

Some people in a community like your own saw that the church services (religious ceremonies) were changing from what they used to be.

(Future) Some people were really pleased because of the changes in religious ceremonies. They felt that new ways are usually better than old ones, and they like to keep everything --even ceremonies--moving ahead.

(Past) Some people felt that in changing the ceremonies much of the old tradition would be lost and that the church would not have the same meaning any more.

(Present) Some people felt the old ways for religious ceremonies might be best but you just can't hang onto them. It makes life easier just to accept some changes as they come along.

14. High School Students man-nature

Some high school students were discussing which of the books they were reading and studying in their various courses they really liked most.

(Over) One said: The books I like most show me how other people have conquered their problems. I like the picture of mankind over the centuries struggling with all kinds of situations and somehow always managing to come out on top.

(With) The second said: I like best those books which tell of the ways in which men have learned to understand the great forces of nature and so adjust to them that man and nature are always seen as a whole in which each completes the other.

(Subjugation) The third said: I think the really great books are those whose characters show that they have learned to accept the fact that man is and always will be powerless to change the forces which are outside and beyond him.

15. Not Working

activity

Three men were talking one day about the ways in which they liked to spend time when they were not working. Each had a different idea:

(Being) One man said that he had no definite ideas as to what he liked best to do when not working. Sometimes he did one thing, sometimes another--it just depended upon how he felt that day.

(Being-in-Becoming) Another said that he preferred to do things which would help him become a better, broader man. Sometimes he did physical things to build his body strength, sometimes mental things so that he might learn more. This, he said, was the best way.

(Doing) The third said he liked doing things that he could see results from--playing competitive games or building things. He felt

that extra time was wasted unless one could show something for it.

16. Church Organization

relational

Some people were speaking about the way in which the churches they belonged to were organized and what this organization meant to them in leading their daily lives. Here are three opinions that were expressed:

(Collateral) The first one said: In my church all are made to feel a part of a great brotherhood which is held together by many common bonds. What it teaches us is that people must act together in unison and provide a brotherly kind of support and guidance.

(Individual) The second one said: In my church there is, of course, a minister and other officials but they do not offer guidance unless called upon. I like my kind of church because each person is made to feel that the relationship between God and man is an individual one and one must learn to take responsibility for his own acts.

(Lineal) The third one said: My church is different still. In it there is a long tradition of a clergy which has special powers and training for the guidance of people. In much of my life I do not feel myself adequate to decide alone what is best to do and I am happy to depend upon them for guidance and direction.

17. Need for Education

activity

Today there is, in almost every place in the world, talk about the need for education. But people have different ideas about the kind and amount of education

that is desirable.. Here are three ideas expressed by three different men:

(Doing) One man said: A good educational system is necessary so that people will learn well the skills and knowledge which will help them to become efficient and successful in whatever they undertake.

(Being) The second man said: I feel that going to school many years and being well-trained is fine for some people but certainly not for everyone. I for one believe it is much more important to do the things I feel like doing and to really enjoy life as I go along.

(Being-in-Becoming) The third man said: I don't agree with either of you. I think a fine and long education is important, but it should be used to make each man wiser and deeper. In this way, a person can develop more fully his knowledge of himself and mankind.

18. Natural Forces

man-nature

People often worry about such disasters as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and the like. One day several persons were discussing the power of God in relation both to man and to the natural forces which create these great events. Here is what each one said:

(With) One man said: It is my view that there should be a harmonious "oneness" or wholeness among God, the forces of nature, and living creatures. It is when men do not live in the proper ways to maintain (keep) this harmony that such disasters come.

(Over) The second man said: I do not believe that God uses his power directly to control the forces which bring earthquakes, floods,

and the like. It is up to man himself to try to find out why such things happen and develop the ways of controlling and overcoming them.

(Subjugation) The third man said: I do not think the ways in which God uses his power to control the forces of nature can be known by man, and it is useless for people to think they can really conquer such things as earthquakes, floods and hurricanes. The best way is to accept things as they come and do the best you can.

19. Disaster in Family

man-nature

Aman and his family were struck hard by disaster. There was much illness over a long period of time. Also, the father lost his job and had serious financial problems. Some people were discussing the man's problems and the reason for them.

(Subjugation) One person said: You can't really blame any man when such misfortune comes to him. Things like this just happen and there isn't much people themselves can do about it. One must learn to accept the bad along with the good.

(With) A second person said: Misfortunes of this kind happen when people do not follow the right and proper ways of living. When people live in ways to keep themselves in harmony with the great natural forces of life things almost always go well.

(Over) A third person said: It was probably the man's own fault. He should have taken steps to keep things from going so far wrong. If people use their heads they usually can find ways to overcome a great deal of their bad fortune.

20. Expectations about Change

time

(a: Students)

Three young people were talking about what they thought their families would have one day as compared with their fathers and mothers. They each said different things.

(Future) The first said: I expect my family to be better off in the future than the family of my father and mother or relatives if we work hard and plan right. Things in this country usually get better for people who really try.

(Present) The second one said: I don't know whether my family will be better off, the same, or worse off than the family of my father and mother or relatives. Things always go up and down even if people do work hard. So one can never really tell how things will be.

(Past) The third one said: I expect my family to be about the same as the family of my father and mother or relatives. The best way is to work hard and plan ways to keep up things as they have been in the past.

(b: Leaders)

Three older people were talking about what they thought their children would have when they were grown. Here is what each one said:

(Future) One said: I really expect my children to have more than I have had if they work hard and plan right. There are always good chances for people who try.

(Present) The second one said: I don't know whether my children will be better off, worse off,

or just the same. Things always go up and down even if one works hard, so we can't really tell.

(Past) The third one said: I expect my children to have just about the same as I have had or bring things back as they once were. It is their job to work hard and find ways to keep things going as they have been in the past.

21. Ways to Live activity

There were three people talking about the way they liked to live. They had different ideas:

(Being) One said: What I care most about is to be free to do whatever I wish and whatever suits the way I feel. I don't always get much done but I enjoy life as I go along--that is the best way.

(Doing) A second said: What I care most about is accomplishing things--getting them done just as well or better than other people can do them. I like to see results and think that they're worth working for.

(Being-in-Becoming) The third said: What I care most about is thinking and acting in the ways which will develop many different sides of my nature. I may fail to do as well as others in the things which many people think are important, but if I am becoming a wiser and more understanding person, that is what suits me best.

22. Team Sports relational

We all know there are different kinds of sports and ways of organizing them. These three people all liked team

sports (for example, football, baseball, hockey, basketball) but had different ideas about the type they felt was best.

- (Individual) The first said: I like the kind of team sports which are organized in such a way that the individual is allowed to prove himself as an individual and get credit for it.
- (Lineal) The second said: I like the kind of team sports where there is a definite leadership and organization and where everybody knows just where he fits in.
- (Collateral) The third said: I like the kind of team sports where there is organization enough to keep things going, but where the main thing is that I can pull together with a bunch of people like myself.

APPENDIX II

SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE VALUE ORIENTATIONS INSTRUMENT

1. Ayuda a la familia

Un hombre ha tenido varios problemas financieros y debe buscar ayuda para que él y su familia puedan atravesar este período difícil. He aquí tres maneras de conseguir dicha ayuda sobre las cuales deseamos su juicio:

- A. Sería mejor si buscara el apoyo de sus hermanos y hermanas o de un grupo cercano de familiares y amigos para que le ayuden a la medida de cada uno?
- B. Sería mejor si tratara de conseguir el dinero por sí mismo, independientemente, pidiéndolo a una organización especializada que trata de estos asuntos?
- C. Sería mejor si buscara un líder reconocido, una persona prominente y respetada con experiencia y autoridad de su familia o la comunidad y le pide ayuda y consejo para resolver su problema?

2. El trabajo ideal

Tres jóvenes casados hablaban sobre sus ideas del trabajo ideal. He aquí lo que cada uno dijo:

- A. Dijo el primero de ellos: El tipo de trabajo que más me gustaría tener si se consigue, es el que no me exija ni demasiado tiempo ni esfuerzo. Me gusta tener tiempo para divertirme y no

quisiera un trabajo en el cual siento que debo constantemente estar compitiendo con otros.

- B. Dijo el segundo de ellos: Idealmente me gustaría el trabajo en que se compite con otros, en el cual puedo demostrar lo que soy capaz de lograr, en la clase de trabajo para la cual soy apto.
- C. Dijo el tercero: Idealmente me gustaría la clase de trabajo que me permita desarrollar diferentes tipos de intereses y de talentos. Preferiría poder llegar a comprender la vida y la gente, que tener éxito en un campo específico de actividad.

3. Crianza de los niños

Varias personas conversaban un día sobre las maneras como deben criarse los niños. Se expresaron estas tres ideas distintas:

- A. Algunas personas dijeron que a los niños se les debería criar siguiendo las tradiciones del pasado, o sea la forma de hacer las cosas que ha enseñado la experiencia. Creen que las formas tradicionales son las mejores y que cuando se olvidan o no se aplican las cosas andan mal.
- B. Otras dijeron que a los niños se les debe criar siguiendo las formas tradicionales, pero que es equivocado insistir adherirse a ellas exclusivamente. Estas personas creen que es mejor cuando cada generación se adapta a cualquier situación adoptando cualesquiera nuevas ideas y métodos que les ayuden pero manteniendo aquellas tradiciones que les gustan. Es decir, piensan que depende de la situación que se presente.
- C. Otras personas no dan mucha fé en criar a los niños siguiendo las maneras tradicionales, las

cuales consideran solo como interesantes historias de como sucedían las cosas. Estas personas creen que la mejor manera es criar a sus niños para que tengan nuevas ideas y descubran maneras de vivir nuevas y mejores.

4. Duración de la vida

Tres hombres hablaban sobre si la gente puede por sí misma hacer algo para prolongar la vida del hombre. He aquí lo que dijo cada uno:

- A. Uno de ellos dijo: Ya es cierto que gente como los médicos y otras personas están encontrando maneras para aumentar muchos años en la vida de la mayoría de los hombres a través del descubrimiento de nuevas medicinas, de estudiar los alimentos y de hacer otras cosas tales como la vacunación. Si la gente pone empeño en todas estas nuevas cosas casi siempre se prolongará su vida.
- B. El segundo dijo: Realmente no creo que los seres humanos puedan hacer mucho ellos mismos para prolongar la vida del hombre. Creo que cada persona tiene un tiempo determinado de vida y cuando le llega el momento pues le llega.
- C. El tercero dijo: Creo que la vida tiene un plan que opera para mantener todas las cosas desenvolviéndose juntas, y si un hombre aprende a vivir toda su vida de acuerdo con dicho plan vivirá más tiempo que otros.

5. Qué se espera de la vida

A menudo la gente tiene muy distintas ideas sobre lo que ha sucedido antes y sobre lo que podemos esperar de la vida. He aquí tres maneras de pensar sobre estas cosas.

- A. Alguna gente cree que la principal preocupación del hombre debe ser el presente en el cual vive. Esta gente dice que el pasado ya pasó y que el futuro está demasiado lejos y es demasiado incierto para preocuparse. Solamente el presente es real.

- B. Alguna gente piensa que las maneras del pasado (las maneras de los viejos y costumbres tradicionales) eran las más apropiadas y las mejores, y que a medida que sobrevienen cambios las cosas se ponen peor. Estas personas piensan que la mejor manera de vivir es mantener las maneras antiguas y tratar de revivirlas cuando se pierden.

- C. Algunas personas creen que casi siempre las maneras del futuro--las que han de venir--serán las mejores y dicen que aunque algunas veces hay pequeños retrocesos, el cambio trae mejoras a la larga. Estas personas piensan que la mejor manera de vivir es mirar hacia muy adelante, trabajar fuerte y sacrificar muchas cosas ahora para que el futuro sea mejor.

6. Cambios tecnológicos

Tres personas hablaban un día sobre los cambios que la ciencia ha traído en la forma de vivir. Nombraron tales cosas como cambios en los métodos de labrar la tierra, en el transporte, en el campo de la medicina, en tipos de comida y vivienda. Todas estuvieron de acuerdo en que sí habían sucedido algunos cambios pero cada persona tenía ideas bastante distintas de cuales serían los efectos de ellos a la larga. He aquí lo que dijo cada una:

- A. La primera dijo: Está bien que se hayan logrado estos adelantos, pero a la larga uno tiene que tener suerte para que las cosas le marchen bien en la vida. La ciencia puede ayudar bastante en relación con algunas de las cosas con las cuales debe enfrentarse la gente, pero no podrá nunca ser de gran ayuda respecto

a los problemas realmente importantes de la vida. Hay muchas cosas que simplemente suceden y cada uno, si es sabio, aprenderá a aceptar este hecho.

- B. Dijo la segunda: No estoy de acuerdo contigo. Mi punto de vista es que el hombre puede y debe aprender a controlar las fuerzas de la naturaleza. Ya hemos avanzado muchísimo y creo que con el tiempo vendrán métodos científicos para controlar o sobreponerse a la mayoría de las cosas.
- C. Dijo la tercera: Tal vez ambos tengan algo que decir, pero en mi opinión lo más importante es que la gente aprenda a mantenerse en equilibrio con las fuerzas de la naturaleza. Creo que los seres humanos y las grandes fuerzas de la naturaleza son un todo, o sea partes relacionadas del universo total, y podemos esperar lo mejor cuando nos esforzamos en armonizar y vivir con la naturaleza.

7. Carácter de los niños

Tres padres conversaban sobre el tipo de carácter que ellos deseaban para sus niños. He aquí las tres opiniones diferentes que se expresaron:

- A. Un padre dijo: Deseo que mis hijos aprendan a ser creativos de varias maneras. Espero que desarrollen el interés y la habilidad para seguir los distintos caminos que llevan a la comprensión y a la sabiduría.
- B. El segundo dijo: Deseo que mis hijos crezcan con la capacidad de expresarse libremente, de sentir el goce de la vida en cualquier situación en que se encuentren.
- C. El tercero dijo: Deseo que mis hijos tengan el empuje hacer algo de sí mismos. La ambición.

para ser de arranque. De esta manera tendrán éxito y realizarán algo en el camino que escojan.

8. El llamado de la religión

Tres personas conversaban sobre qué les atraía de la religión. He aquí lo que dijo cada una:

- A. Dijo la primera: La religión me atrae porque la sabiduría de sus enseñanzas amplía mis horizontes y me ayuda a comprender mejor los muchos aspectos de la vida.
- B. La segunda dijo: A mí me atrae la religión porque me complace su belleza y dramatismo, y me gusta la sensación que resulta de participar en los servicios religiosos.
- C. Dijo la tercera: Creo que la religión me atrae porque enseña a las personas que realizar cosas para ellas mismas y para la sociedad es lo apropiado.

9. Decisión sobre el empleo

Tres jóvenes solteros habían terminado sus estudios y debían decidir en qué tipo de trabajo deseaban entrar.

- A. Uno decidió seguir el tipo de ocupación que personas de su familia antes que él habían seguido. El creía que lo mejor es mantener y reforzar las tradiciones del pasado.
- B. El segundo buscó aquellas oportunidades de trabajo que ofrecían posibilidades considerables para el éxito futuro. Creía que era mejor mirar hacia las posibilidades de avance en el futuro, aún si tenía que empezar en una posición menos buena que otras disponibles entonces.

- C. El tercero decidió tomar el mejor empleo que se le ofreció y el cual le daría el dinero que necesitaba para sostenerse en el presente. El creía que era tonto pensar demasiado o en el pasado que ya pasó, o en el futuro que pensaba demasiado incierto para tomar en cuenta.

10. Herencia

Cuando el padre o la madre muere y deja propiedades, hay varias maneras mediante las cuales se pueden repartir las propiedades entre los hijos y administrarlas. He aquí tres maneras:

- A. En algunas partes se piensa que la mejor forma es que las propiedades, o si no la propiedad por lo menos el manejo de todas ellas, debe quedar en manos de una persona específica, generalmente el hijo mayor.
- B. En otras partes todos los hijos comparten la propiedad pero se espera que todos se mantengan unidos y las manejen como un grupo familiar. Si alguna vez se necesita a alguien para tomar ciertas decisiones todos los herederos discuten el asunto y acuerdan quién es el más capacitado para hacerlo.
- C. En algunas otras partes se piensa que es mejor que cada hijo tome su parte de la propiedad y la maneje por sí mismo, independientemente de los otros hermanos.

11. Filosofía de la vida

Tres personas hablaban sobre la necesidad de tener cierta filosofía de la vida--como por ejemplo la religión. Tenían distintas ideas sobre el asunto:

- A. Una de ellas dijo: El hombre es parte del gran plan de la naturaleza. El tener una filosofía

de la vida me ayuda a entender este plan y a vivir en tal forma que me mantenga a tono con dicho plan.

- B. La segunda dijo: Mi manera de pensar es ésta: hay muchas fuerzas naturales y sobrenaturales sobre las cuales nunca ganará control el hombre. Es necesaria una filosofía de la vida para ayudar a que los hombres acepten y se comporten de acuerdo con su destino en la tierra.
- C. La tercera dijo: Siento decirlo pero no estoy de acuerdo con ninguno de ustedes dos. Yo creo que el hombre puede hacer mucho o poco, tanto como lo desee, para sobreponerse a estas fuerzas naturales y sobrenaturales. Para mí se requiere una filosofía de la vida que le enseñe al hombre a sobreponerse a estas fuerzas y a forjarse su propio destino.

12. Enseñando a la juventud

Tres madres de tipos de familia diferentes hablaban sobre las varias maneras como debería enseñarse a los niños. He aquí lo que dijo cada una:

- A. La primera dijo: Yo creo que desde muy jóvenes debe enseñarse a los niños a pararse sobre sus propios pies, a tomar sus propias decisiones y a hacerse responsables de sí mismos. La gente lo pasa mejor cuando aprende y se beneficia de sus propios errores y a ser suficientemente independiente de su familia para marchar por sí misma--algunas veces aún bien lejos.
- B. Dijo la segunda: Creo que lo primero que debe enseñarse a los niños pequeños es a obedecer y a respetar a sus mayores--sus padres y abuelos. La mayor sabiduría la tienen los mayores y la gente lo pasa mejor cuando se les ha enseñado a aceptar y respetar dicha sabiduría.

- C. Dijo la tercera: Creo que debe enseñarse a los niños pequeños a respetar y a estar ligados a sus familiares cercanos--padre, madre, hermanos, etc. La gente lo pasa mejor cuando tiene un grupo considerable de familiares cercanos en quienes puede apoyarse siempre para ayuda y consejo y a quienes a su vez puede también ayudar.

13. Ceremonias religiosas

Algunas personas en una ciudad cómo esta vieron como los servicios religiosos (ceremonias religiosas) estaban cambiando de lo que eran antes.

- A. Algunas se mostraban realmente satisfechas de los cambios en las ceremonias religiosas. Pensaban que las nuevas costumbres son por lo común mejores que las antiguas; y les gusta mantener todo avanzando, aún las ceremonias religiosas.
- B. Otras personas pensaban que al cambiar las ceremonias, se perdería gran parte de la vieja tradición y que ya no tendría la iglesia el mismo sentido.
- C. Algunas personas pensaban que las tradiciones viejas de las ceremonias religiosas podrían ser mejores pero que simplemente no se puede amarrar a ellas. La vida se vuelve más fácil si se aceptan algunos cambios a medida que aparecen.

14. Estudiantes de bachillerato

Algunos estudiantes de bachillerato discutían sobre cuales de los libros que leían y estudiaban en los varios cursos les gustaban más.

- A. Uno de ellos dijo: Los libros que más me gustan son aquellos que me muestran como la gente se ha sobrepuesto a sus problemas. Me gusta visualizar el género humano luchando a través de los siglos con la naturaleza y siempre en alguna forma resultando triunfante.
- B. Dijo el segundo: Me gustan más aquellos libros que narran cómo el hombre ha aprendido a entender las fuerzas de la naturaleza y a adaptarse a ellas de tal manera que tanto el hombre como la naturaleza siempre se visualizan como en un todo en el cual el uno completa al otro.
- C. Dijo el tercero: Creo que los libros realmente importantes y que más me gustan son aquellos que muestran a los personajes que han aprendido a aceptar el hecho de que el hombre es y siempre será incapaz de cambiar las fuerzas de la naturaleza que están fuera y más allá de su control.

15. Tiempo libre

Tres hombres conversaban un día sobre cómo les gustaba pasar el tiempo cuando no estaban trabajando. Cada uno tenía una idea distinta:

- A. Uno de ellos dijo que no tenía ideas definidas de cómo pasar el tiempo cuando no estaba trabajando. A veces hacía una cosa, a veces otra--simplemente dependía de cómo se sentía ese día.
- B. El otro dijo que preferiría hacer aquellas cosas que le ayudaban a convertirse en un hombre mejor con más perspectiva. En algunas ocasiones hacía ejercicios físicos para aumentar su fuerza corporal, en otras mentales para poder aprender más. Esta es, él dijo, la mejor manera de pasarlo.

- C. El tercero dijo que le gustaba más hacer aquellas cosas cuyos resultados podía ver-- juegos de competencia o construir algo. Pensaba que el tiempo extra se pierde a menos que uno pueda hacer algo con él.

16. Organización de la iglesia

Algunas personas hablaban sobre la forma como estaban organizadas las iglesias a las cuales pertenecían y sobre qué significaba esta organización en el transcurso de sus vidas cotidianas. He aquí tres opiniones que se expresaron:

- A. Dijo la primera: En mi iglesia a todos nos hacen sentir como parte de una gran hermandad que se mantiene unida por muchos vínculos en común. Lo que se nos enseña es que la gente debe actuar junta, al unísono y proveer un tipo fraternal de guía y apoyo.
- B. Dijo la segunda: En mi iglesia hay, por supuesto, sacerdotes y otros clérigos pero no ofrecen orientación a menos de que se les pida. Me gusta mi tipo de iglesia porque a cada persona se le hace sentir que la relación entre Dios y el hombre es individual y que uno debe aprender a responsabilizarse de sus propios actos.
- C. Dijo la tercera: Mi iglesia es distinta de las suyas. Hay en ella una larga tradición de clero con poderes y entrenamiento especial para guiar a la gente. En gran parte de mi vida no me considero capaz de decidir por mí mismo qué es mejor hacer y estoy contento de depender de su orientación y consejo.

17. Necesidad de la educación

Hoy en casi todos los sitios del mundo se habla de la necesidad de la educación. Sin embargo la gente tiene

ideas diferentes sobre la clase y cantidad deseable de educación. He aquí tres ideas expresadas por tres señores distintos:

- A. Dijo uno de ellos: Un buen sistema educacional es necesario para que la gente aprenda bien la técnica y el conocimiento que les ayude a ser eficientes y a tener éxito en cualquier actividad que desarrollen.
- B. Dijo el segundo: Pienso que ir al colegio por muchos años y estar bien preparado es magnífico para algunas personas, pero ciertamente no lo es para todo el mundo. Yo, por ejemplo, creo que es mucho más importante hacer lo que me provoca y gozar realmente de la vida a medida que esta pasa.
- C. Dijo el tercero: No estoy de acuerdo con ninguno de ustedes. Creo que una larga y excelente educación es importante, pero debe usarse para hacer que cada hombre sea más sabio y profundo. Así, una persona podrá desarrollar más completamente el conocimiento de sí mismo y de la humanidad.

18. Fuerzas naturales

La gente se preocupa a menudo de desastres tales como las inundaciones, los terremotos, los huracanes y similares. Un día varias personas discutían sobre el poder de Dios tanto en relación con el hombre como con las fuerzas naturales en donde se originan estos magnos acontecimientos. He aquí lo que dijo cada uno:

- A. Un señor dijo: Mi punto de vista es que debe existir una unidad armoniosa total entre Dios, las fuerzas de la naturaleza y las criaturas. Es cuando los hombres no viven el género de vida necesario para mantener esta armonía que suceden estos desastres.

- B. Dijo el segundo: No creo que Dios ejercite directamente su poder para controlar las fuerzas que se desatan en los terremotos, las inundaciones y similares. Le corresponde al hombre por sí mismo tratar de averiguar por qué suceden tales cosas y desarrollar la manera para controlarlas y sobreponerse a ellas.
- C. Dijo el tercero: No creo que el hombre pueda llegar a saber la manera como Dios usa sus poderes para controlar las fuerzas de la naturaleza, y es inútil que la gente crea que podrá llegar a conquistar realmente cosas tales como los terremotos, las inundaciones y los huracanes. Lo mejor es aceptar las cosas tal como se presentan y hacer lo más que se pueda.

19. Desastre en la familia

Un hombre y su familia fueron golpeados duramente por la desgracia. Se presentaron muchas enfermedades durante largo tiempo. Además el padre perdió el trabajo y tuvo serios problemas financieros. Algunas personas discutían los problemas de este hombre y su razón de ser.

- A. Una persona dijo: Realmente no se puede culpar a un hombre cuando le suceden tales infortunios. Cosas como estas simplemente suceden y no es mucho lo que puede la misma gente hacer al respecto. Uno debe aprender a aceptar las cosas malas lo mismo que las buenas.
- B. Otra dijo: Esta clase de infortunios suceden cuando la gente no sigue las formas justas y correctas de vivir. Cuando la gente vive de tal manera que su forma de vida esté en armonía con las grandes fuerzas naturales de la vida, las cosas casi siempre andan bien.
- C. Dijo la tercera: Probablemente fué culpa del hombre mismo. He debido dar los pasos necesarios para prevenir que las cosas llegaran

a ser tan malas. Si la gente usa su cabeza, usualmente puede encontrar maneras para sobreponerse en gran parte a su mala fortuna.

20. Esperanza

(a: Students)

Tres jóvenes estaban hablando de lo que creían que sus familias--es decir, ellos mismos y sus hijos--tendrían algún día, comparado con lo que sus padres tuvieron. Cada uno pensaba de distinto modo:

- A. Uno dijo: Yo creo que mi familia tendrá más en el futuro que la familia de mis padres o mis parientes, si trabajamos duro y hacemos nuestros planes con cuidado. La vida en este país casi siempre mejora para la gente que de veras trabaja duro.
- B. Otro dijo: Yo no sé de seguro si mi familia vivirá mejor, lo mismo, o peor, que la familia de mis padres o mis parientes, La vida sube y baja aún cuando la gente trabaja duro. Así es la vida!
- C. Todavía otro dijo: Yo creo que mi familia vivirá mas o menos como vivieron las familias de mis padres y de mis parientes. Lo mejor es trabajar duro para guardar todo lo del pasado.

(b: Leaders)

Tres personas mayores hablaban de lo que esperaban que sus hijos tuvieran cuando fueran grandes. Aquí está lo que dijo cada uno:

- A. Una persona dijo: Realmente yo espero que mis hijos tengan más de lo que yo he tenido, eso es, si trabajan duro y hacen sus planes con

cuidado. Siempre hay buenas oportunidades para los que trabajan duro.

- B. Otra dijo: Yo no sé si mis hijos vivirán mejor o peor, o lo mismo, que yo he vivido. La vida sube y baja, aún cuando la gente trabaja duro. Así es la vida!
- C. La tercera dijo: Yo espero que mis hijos vivan más o menos como yo he vivido, y que hagan volver la vida como era antes. Es la responsabilidad de los hijos mantener la manera de vivir del pasado.

21. Maneras de vivir

Había tres personas que hablaban sobre la manera como les gusta vivir. Tenían ideas diversas:

- A. Una de ellas dijo: Lo que más me importa es sentirme libre para hacer lo que me plazca y lo que más se acomode a mi estado de ánimo. No siempre realizo muchas cosas pero le saco jugo a la vida a medida que ella se presenta --ésta es la mejor manera de vivir.
- B. Una segunda dijo: Lo que más me interesa es poder realizar algo--hacer las cosas tan bien o mejor que otra gente. Me gusta ver resultados y pensar que vale la pena trabajar para lograrlos.
- C. La tercera dijo: Lo que más me interesa es pensar y actuar en forma tal que desarrolle muchas facetas variadas de mi naturaleza. Puedo fallar hacer algo tan bien como los otros en aquellas cosas que mucha gente piensa como importantes, pero si cada día me convierto en una persona más sabia y comprensiva esto es lo que más me sienta.

22. Deportes de equipo

Todos sabemos que hay diversas clases de deportes y de como organizarlos. Conversaban tres personas, a todas ellas les gustaban los deportes que se juegan en equipo (ej. fútbol, basketbol, beisbol) pero tenían ideas diversas sobre el tipo que pensaban era mejor.

- A. La primera dijo: Me gustan aquellos deportes en equipo que están organizados en forma tal que se deja al individuo probarse a sí mismo como individuo y obtener crédito por ello.
- B. Dijo la segunda: Me gusta el tipo de deportes en equipo donde hay una dirección y organización definidas y en donde cada persona sabe exactamente su puesto.
- C. Dijo la tercera: Me gusta el tipo de deportes en equipo donde hay suficiente organización para mantener el rodaje de las cosas, pero donde lo principal es que puedo coordinarme en función de equipo con los compañeros tales como yo.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David W. Coombs was born on March 19, 1939, at Indianapolis, Indiana. In June, 1957, he was graduated from Fort Lauderdale High School in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In June, 1961, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of Notre Dame, and in July of that year he entered the Peace Corps, in which he served two years as a volunteer in Chile. In September, 1963, he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida. From June, 1964, to June, 1965, he held a university fellowship. He worked as a graduate assistant in the Department of Sociology from September, 1965, until June, 1966. In September, 1966, he began work as a research and teaching assistant at the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia. In January, 1968, he returned to the University of Florida where he held the positions of research assistant and teaching assistant until July, 1969. In September of that year he began work as an Instructor in Sociology at Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama. From September,


1970, to the present he has been a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa.

He is a member of the American Sociological Association, the Southern Sociological Society, the Rural Sociological Society, the Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.


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Professor of Sociology


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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1971


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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Sugiyama Iutaka
Associate Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



R. W. Bradbury
Professor of Economics

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