

Factorial Determinants of Urban Policy

By

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of
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FACTORIAL DETERMINANTS OF URBAN POLICY

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This research focuses on three areas of urban politics:

(1) urban governmental structure, (2) socio-economic environment of cities, and (3) policy outputs of cities with populations of 25,000 or more in 1960. First, an historic background of urban government is given. Using Glendon Schubert's categories of public interest theories, descriptions are made of urban political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Factor analysis is then used to determine the dimensions of reformed city government, socio-economic environment of cities, and expenditure policies of cities. Factor scores for reformism and environment are computed and used as predictors of policy components. The results demonstrate that the most significant determinants of policy are measures of demand for services from a city population.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF CITY GOVERNMENT

Introduction: The Dimensions of Urban Politics

Three foci of research in urban politics have been (1) the structures of city government, (2) the socio-economic characteristics of cities, and (3) the policy outputs of local government. In each of these areas a considerable body of literature has developed which contains several generalizations about political behavior in cities. The overall purpose of this study is to examine the various dimensions in each of these areas and to explore their relationships. In an effort to deal with the diverse nature of these areas of urban politics, this research will employ factor analysis to examine the dimensions of reformism, socio-economic characteristics, and the policy outputs of cities.

As an historical background for this study, Chapter I gives an analysis of the various political theories that have influenced forms of city government in America. In order to conceptualize the diverse nature of these influences, the typology of public interest theories developed by Glendon Schubert are used.¹ Schubert describes three categories of thought: the idealist, the realist, and the rationalist. Idealists view administration as Edmund Burke perceived representative government; it is removed from accountability to the

public and is responsible only to the dictates of the common good. On the other hand, realists think of administration as simply an extension of the political process. Finally, rationalists think of administration as value-neutral and dependent upon the political process for direction in policy.

In different historical periods, each type of theory has affected the structure of city government. After the Revolutionary War, the idealist model, taken from the federal system, was the major influence. It was supplanted by the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian realist thought with its emphasis on elective offices. Finally, within the twentieth century, the rationalist theories contained in the reform city government movement have been most prominent. The Model City Charter of the National Municipal League is the epitome of rationalist theory.

Because of the success which the reform government forces have had, the dimensions of reformism in city government are explored in Chapter II. Seven items from the Model Charter are examined in 667 cities with populations of over 25,000. These seven items are tested by the use of two methods, Guttman scaling and factor analysis, to determine the dimensions of the complex phenomenon of reformism. Three items produce a successful Guttman scale, and scores are computed for each city. The original seven items are factored into executive and council reform dimensions.

In Chapter III, types of city reformism are described by showing the regional distribution and socio-political characteristics of reform government. Some contradictory evidence exists about the socio-economic nature of reformed cities, and this research illustrates the

differences which exist between cities that have no reformed structures and those that have adopted several features from the Model Charter.

The descriptions of reformism in the preceding chapters serve as a preface to an analysis of urban policies. Chapter IV demonstrates the correlations between an index of governmental reform and spending and taxing in cities.

Before continuing the study of policies with regression analysis, a description of the socio-economic characteristics of American cities is given in Chapter V. Thirty-seven variables are factor analyzed and eight factors extracted which measure socio-economic status, stage of family cycle, ethnicity, manufacturing expansion, housing expansion, home ownership, commercial trade, and non-white deprivation. These eight factors along with the two political variables described above and a measure of intergovernmental revenue are used as predictors of fourteen spending and taxing policies.

Policies themselves are described with principal components analysis. The common functions of cities—police, fire, sanitation, parks, sewers, and highways form two distinct policy areas. Services such as parks and fire protection which require personnel who work directly with citizens form one component, and services that are primarily custodial functions to maintain sewers and highways form another.

The three original foci: governmental structure, demographic environment, and governmental policy are all found to have underlying dimensions which are revealed through factor analysis. These dimensions are related in important ways, and regression analysis

demonstrates the relative impact which structure and environment have on policies. Both are important for understanding the level of policy outputs.

City Government and Theories of the Public Interest

Changes in the structure of local and city governments have been a part of American politics from the Revolutionary War onward. In contrast to the national government which experienced only one total revision when the Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, city governments have been noted for the frequency of their structural changes. In fact, one author describes the history of nineteenth-century city governments as being marked by "constant revision."² Likewise, the twentieth century has also seen large numbers of cities changing forms of city government. One writer estimates that approximately sixty per cent of American cities have changed their structure since 1900, and many have done it more than once within those years.³

In the twentieth century, the major impetus for change in city government has come from reform organizations, especially the National Municipal League. Although this reform group never officially endorsed the commission plan, it did praise it as a replacement for the ward-elected and sometimes machine-run mayor-council system. Essentially, the commission form provides for a combination of policy-making and administration duties in the hands of a few commissioners elected at-large. After an energetic promotion of this form of government, 151 cities adopted it between the years of 1905 and 1911.⁴ However, the

enthusiasm that reformers held for the commission structure was short-lived. Richard Childs had conceived of the manager-council plan during the early part of the century, and it quickly replaced the commission form as the most popular arrangement of city government among reformers. Adoptions of the manager-council plan were so widespread that in the thirty-year period from 1908 to 1938, 451 cities changed to this plan, adopting varying forms of the Model City Charter developed by the National Municipal League.⁵ From the 1930s to 1960, changes in city government accelerated, and almost forty per cent of American cities altered their governmental structure in those years. Nearly three-fourths of the cities that did change their governments adopted the manager-council plan.⁶ Consequently, there are over 1100 cities now that have in operation some variation of the manager-council form of government, an obvious testimony to the success of the reform movement.⁷

Such fundamental changes in so large a number of cities has generated considerable attention from writers interested in urban affairs. Unfortunately, however, most of the earlier works published on municipal politics have little scholarly merit to them. In fact, Lawrence Herson describes the textbook literature on municipal government prior to 1957 as being a "lost world."⁸ He accuses these textbooks of ignoring any standards of proof for their generalizations about government structure, and he castigates their prescriptive and dogmatic reliance upon outdated "principles" of scientific management. In essence these texts are trying to maintain the simplistic optimism of the reform era after the intellectual drives of that period

have been spent. Or, as Herson says, ". . . the city government text is still fighting the Tweed Ring of the 1870's."⁹ After Herson's jeremiad and the critique by others about the state of the literature on urban government,¹⁰ several social scientists have recently examined changes in city structure and drawn generalizations without laboring under the normative search for "good government."¹¹

There is far from unanimous agreement among these writers on the causes and effects of changes in city government. However, one of the more interesting theories of change has come from Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson. It associates a desire for reform government with a particular ethos which they call "public-regardingness."¹² Derived from a Yankee-Protestant, middle-class value structure, this ethos assumes that a general and abstract community interest exists and by replacing ward representation with at-large elections, putting non-partisanship in the place of partisan contests, and adding professional managers to city administration the general civic "good" will be attained. In other words, ". . . nonpartisanship, the council-manager plan, and at-large elections are all expressions of the reform ideal and of the middle-class political ethos."¹³ Furthermore, these authors claim that the success of the reform movement is more a reflection of the extent of the public-regarding ethos among urban citizens than the degree to which corruption existed and was overcome by reformers in municipal government. "Indeed, it was in relatively small, middle-class cities, where indeed those persons (bosses and boodlers) had never existed, that reform measures were most popular. Many such cities adopted the Model City Charter in its entirety almost at once."¹⁴

The opposite of public-regardingness is private-regardingness. This ethos is associated with the immigrants that came to the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century. This last ethos is not clearly defined, but it has been interpreted to mean that ethnic groups are inclined to favor unreformed structures of partisan, ward-elected, mayor-council governments.¹⁵ And in one particular study, ethnic populations have been associated statistically with the mayor-council plan.¹⁶

The origin of the proposition that two ethoses exist and influence attitudes toward forms of city government can be traced to an oft-quoted passage in Richard Hofstadter's Age of Reform.

Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two thoroughly different systems of political ethics. . . . One founded upon the indigenous Yankee-Protestant political traditions, and upon middle class life, assumed and demanded the constant, disinterested activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued life ought to be run, to a greater degree than it was, in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs, and expressed a common feeling that government should be in good part an effort to moralize the lives of individuals while economic life should be intimately related to the stimulation and development of individual character. The other system founded upon the European background of the immigrants, upon their unfamiliarity with independent political action, their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their migration, took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs, interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations, and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of law or morals.¹⁷

The central point which Banfield and Wilson draw from Hofstadter's description of the two ethics is the different way in which a sense of "community good" is perceived. The Anglo-Saxon Protestant

middle-class value structure urges the citizen to participate in politics and to actively "seek the good of the community 'as a whole.'" On the other hand, the immigrants' style of politics focused on the local neighborhood and "took no account of the community."¹⁸ It is this emphasis upon the concept of the common good which marks the fundamental difference in the two ethoses and consequently produces a political cleavage of contesting factions in city politics.

While Banfield and Wilson attempt to associate reform government with a public-regarding ethos and an interest in the good of the community as a whole, other authors have questioned the relationship of reform structures of government to democratic tradition and practice. Duane Lockard contends that the reliance upon the "expertise" of a city manager who is without direct accountability to an electorate is unprecedented in American democratic tradition.¹⁹ For example, in a case study of Utah city government, Garth Jones concludes that reform government is basically incompatible with the democratic and religious ethic of that state. The Jacksonian frontier democracy of Utah and the Mormon emphasis on lay leadership are antithetical to the principles of manager-council government; consequently manager-council government was accepted and then rejected by some of the cities of that state because of the incongruence in the value systems.²⁰

Other studies have noted some of the effects of reform government on political practices. Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler find that reform structures tend to reduce cleavages in city policy outcomes,²¹ and Robert Alford and Eugene Lee find that with cleavages muted,

electoral turnout is lower in cities with reformed government.²² Some studies even suggest that reform structures were originally adopted as a means by which business elites could dominate city government.²³ Since reform government has been most widely accepted in states with one-party systems,²⁴ Raymond Wolfinger and John Field suggest that, in the case of the South, reform governments are numerous because they allow whites to exclude blacks from city affairs.²⁵

These studies indicate that the tenets of reformism—non-partisanship, neutral professionalism in administration, and at-large elections—have the effect, or even the intent, of frustrating parts of the democratic tradition, a tradition that says that elections should consist of competing alternatives from which voters choose and thereby allow a majority to influence decisions.²⁶

The general lack of conflict in policy-making in reform cities and the absence of competition for offices apparently fulfills the intentions of the founder of the manager-council plan, Richard Childs. In reviewing the effect of reform government in Dayton, Ohio, in 1948, he says, "There's nothing in sight to stir anybody's emotions Political strife becomes virtually extinct as voters continue to elect 'citizen' candidates."²⁷ Childs does not view reform government as undemocratic; instead he feels that the common good of a community is served by reducing the level of conflict in decision-making through the adoption of such measures as a professional city manager and the removal of administration from "politics."

In a recent analysis of Childs' thought, this type of attitude has been described as "rationalistic." Invoking typologies developed by Glendon Schubert, John Porter East portrays Childs as a rationalist or a theorist who believes that public policy can be decided through the democratic process and then be administered, even scientifically executed, by a value-neutral corps of city bureaucrats.²⁸ The rationalists are defined as positivists who in some instances are proponents of what is called the "scientific management school." They believe that administration is fundamentally a technical process void of normative judgments and divorced from the quagmire-like business of politics. The maxims of the rationalists are vox populi vox Dei, and "the expert should be on tap, not on top."

As examples of rationalist theory, the reform movement in general, and Childs in particular, says that a small city council of no more than seven members can decide public policy and then turn their decision over to the city manager with the confidence that he will carry out the council's wishes in a technical and professional manner. Childs admittedly designed the system after the structure of a corporation, with the city council acting as the board of directors for the citizen stock-holders. And, according to Childs, if the system is operating as it should, there ought to be an absence of conflict in city politics. The system should operate so smoothly that cleavages should not disrupt this well-designed system of government. In other words, it should operate as Dayton, Ohio did when Childs wrote his article in 1948.

The central feature of this form of municipal government is, of course, the manager who is supposed to deal with the problems of administration, removed from the distractions of political pressures. His role represents the emphasis upon strong executive power, but this centralized authority is shielded from the conflicts in the body politic by the lay council which operates as a group without any single outstanding leader. However, the claim that managers are independent of the political process has increasingly come under questioning in the literature on city government. In fact, the organ for the International City Managers' Association, Public Management, went so far as to print an exchange on the matter between two writers who took diametrically opposite viewpoints, one saying that the manager is a political leader and the other saying that he is not.²⁹ And even the 1952 revision of the ICMA Code of Ethics calls the manager a "community leader" instead of completely divorcing him from public affairs as the 1938 Code did. A series of studies point out the political role which the manager plays. One in particular by Gladys Kammerer, Charles Farris, John DeGrove, and Alfred Clubok finds that in Florida there is a significant relationship between the length of time that a manager remains in a city and the style of politics that there is in that community. Competition among leadership cliques is related to whether a manager stays or leaves because long tenure is associated with a stable leadership maintaining control.³⁰ Obviously such a finding contradicts the theoretical intent of Childs who believes in a value-neutral bureaucracy; but despite the evidence

to the contrary, his original ideas remain fixed, and he is unpersuaded that another system of government would best serve the public interest.

The rationalist school, of which Childs is a part, is one of three **broad** categories described by Glendon Schubert in The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept. The other two groupings are the "realists" and the "idealists." Schubert's scheme of dividing ideas about the public interest into these three classifications is useful not only in analyzing the theories of Richard Childs and the manager-council plan but also other ideas about city government structure as well. Before applying Schubert's schema, a further elaboration of his typologies is presented.³¹

In order to discriminate among the ideas of these three, Schubert discusses the relationship of each type to three aspects of a democratic society: the public, political parties, and interest groups. The rationalists are pro-public, pro-party, but oppose special interest groups. Childs endorses national political parties but rejects their function for city politics.

The realists follow the tradition of Arthur Bentley. They are also pro-public and pro-party, but they are pro-interest groups where the rationalists are not. Essentially this type believes that the public good will best be served by the free competition among groups at all stages of the policy-making process. In other words, to them, administration is simply another party of the overall phenomenon of politics, and it cannot be accurately discussed otherwise.

The idealists are pro-public, but they oppose both parties and interest groups. Essentially, they believe that administrators should play the most important roles in policy-making, and, operating as philosopher-kings, decide policy on the basis of the dictates of conscience and a higher law. A neutral civil service of elites approaches the concept of administration which the idealists endorse.

Although rationalist theories of reform government have been predominant in the twentieth century, in the nineteenth century the competing forms of municipal government came from the idealist and the realist types as described by Schubert. It is only with the rise of the literature on scientific management that the rationalist category developed in city government; therefore it can be virtually ignored in the following discussion which deals with the political theory of city governments in early, post-Revolutionary War America.

Idealist and Realist Theories of the Nineteenth Century

America of the late 1700's was overwhelmingly rural, and the few cities that did exist were small compared with today's megalopolies. At the time of the Revolutionary War, only five cities had populations of over 8,000, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, and Newport, and these cities, added to the few others that existed, held less than three per cent of the total population of the country.³² However, the Revolutionary War marked a period of change in governmental structure for not only the national government but also for the government of cities. Prior to the war, American cities had for the most part followed some variation of the English system of boroughs. The governor

of the colony would appoint a mayor who would serve with a few other officers such as a recorder and treasurer along with an elective council. The major exception to this pattern was the New England township. The change after the war meant primarily that the power for the legal organization of cities moved from the governors to the state legislatures. This change meant that the form of city government was influenced by the same political forces that were operating in state matters and in national politics as well.

In the post-war era, the most significant political movement was the rise of the Federalist Party and the idea which they promoted of government by a propertied elite. The most important documents of Federalist ideology are, of course, The Federalist papers with their theoretical arguments for the Constitution. Glendon Schubert singles out the tenth paper by Madison as the embodiment of the idealist theory of the public interest. As Schubert says,

Madison's express opposition to the dangers of both political parties and interest groups, which he felt could be equally pernicious and enemies of good government, remains the logical (though often unarticulated) premise underlying the position of contemporary Idealist theorists of the public interest.³³

Madison rejects the vying for power that would accompany the rise of parties and interest groups, or "factions" as he calls self-interested political divisions, because he believes that such competition is inimical to the commonweal. He argues that legislative bodies that represent sufficiently diffused interests will be capable of deciding policy that is in the public interest even better than the people themselves could, or in Madison's words, ". . . the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more

consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose."³⁴ Essentially Madison's position is anti-political. He denies the legitimacy of majority rule because he says that a united majority can only act unjustly toward the minority. In the place of mass participation in policy-making, Madison substitutes accommodation among a few representatives. He believes that in a large, extensive nation, special interests and local prejudices will be diluted, allowing these men of "enlightened views and virtuous sentiments" to enact policies in the common interest of the republic.

After the Constitution was adopted, some American cities were attracted to certain features of the federal system of government, and they based their own structures on the model presented in the Constitution. The two most prominent examples were Philadelphia and Baltimore. In 1789, Philadelphia enacted a system which consisted of (1) thirty common councilors elected by free men for three-year terms, (2) fifteen aldermen elected by property holders for seven-year terms, and (3) a mayor indirectly elected for the city by the aldermen. The federal model was followed in these ways: The bicameral legislative body of the city was elected from different constituencies, freemen and property holders; the mayor was indirectly chosen; and in 1799, the mayor was given appointive power over executive officers.³⁵ Baltimore also had a bicameral council in its charter of 1796. The first chamber was elected by voters who met the city's high property qualifications, and the other body was indirectly chosen by an electoral college which also elected the mayor. The use of the electoral college, however, was an aspect of state politics and not based on the national example,

but the veto power given the mayor was a feature borrowed from the federal government.³⁶

Baltimore and Philadelphia were the most innovative cities in this period. Most of the other fifty-seven incorporated cities continued to follow their colonial or Revolutionary patterns with only slight amendments. In these patterns, city government performed few functions and was consequently a relatively insignificant level of government. However, the structural changes that did occur reflected the emerging pattern of a mayor and council system which Philadelphia and Baltimore had established. The increasing authority of the mayor included not only a veto power over acts passed by the city council but in some instances police powers and even the granting of certain licenses in New York and Albany.³⁷ Although the use of bicameral councils was confined for the most part to eastern cities--Pittsburgh, Boston, and New York, some western cities such as Detroit and St. Louis employed it.

These structural innovations in city government carried with them ideas which can in Schubert's terms be called idealistic. These structural arrangements were adopted in an attempt to emulate the federal system of checks and balances, and they reflect Madison's antipathy toward majority rule. Bicameralism and the executive veto emphasize accommodation among elected leaders in order for policies to be enacted. With special interests divided by bicameral chambers and restrained by the veto power, "factions," even majority factions, could not usurp the common interest. Policy-making became more the

direct responsibility of the representatives who were forced to bargain among themselves in order to enact measures. In general these structural arrangements reduced public participation in the policy process, and the restricted franchise at that time limited participation overall so that representatives were expected to develop policies "more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves."

While idealist theory influenced some city forms at the start of the nineteenth century, opposite ideas of local government were being proposed by Thomas Jefferson. Whether correctly or not, Francis Lieber traces the word "self-government" back to Jefferson himself,³⁸ and in several instances Jefferson expressed himself on the subject of local government. One of Jefferson's best-known ideas is his distrust of urban masses. "The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do the strength of the human body."³⁹ Jefferson felt that concentrations of people who depend upon manufacturing for their livelihood sacrifice their independence and hence are politically corruptible. At the end of his Presidential administration, Jefferson's views on manufacturing had changed, and he recognized the necessity of it for American national independence. Nevertheless, his strong rural bias was echoed numerous times later on as rural and urban interests clashed.⁴⁰

Jefferson's ideal is the agrarian life, which he depicts as the chosen labor of God. The yeoman farmer is the repository of virtue and foundation for "pure government." And Jefferson is quite explicit in describing the type of local government which he feels is best. He

desires small units which will allow for the maximum participation of individuals in government; hence each individual can receive training in the civic arts in order to increase their own self-government. Such a system is necessary to preserve freedoms from a strong, centralized government.

Jefferson looked upon local government as only one unit in his overall scheme of a hierarchy of governmental arrangements. He conceived of layers of governments each with specific functions to perform, and the power of government was to be divided accordingly. Because of Jefferson's interest in a rational organization of governmental duties, W. Hardy Wickwar says that he was really operating as a French utilitarian and was probably influenced by the ideas of Turgot and his plans for the division of French government under Louis XVI.⁴¹ However, in Jefferson's plan the system was to be a democratic one with the national government concerned with foreign and federal matters and the states dealing with citizen affairs. For this purpose, states were to be divided into counties and the counties into "wards." It was the unit of the wards that Jefferson saw as the foundation of the whole structure. Because it would be the form of government closest to the citizen, the wards would elicit the most participation by the citizens and carry on the most essential duties of government: protection, adjudication, education, roads, welfare, and voting supervision. Furthermore, Jefferson saw these governmental duties being performed by officers elected directly by the people.

Relying on such small, close-knit communities is, in Jefferson's view, not only the best way to develop an entire nation of responsible

and loyal citizens but also the most efficient means of providing the services that he thinks citizens require. As he says, the wards

. . . will relieve the county administration of nearly all its business, will have it better done, and by making every citizen an acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him will attach him by his strongest feelings to the independence of his country and its republican Constitution.⁴²

Also the wards could be called together on the same day to voice their opinions on any point for the state to act. In other words, the wards would allow for direct democracy to operate state-wide.

Jefferson is unsparing in his praise of the wards. "These wards, called townships in New England . . . have proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of man. . . ." ⁴³ Both de Tocqueville and Jefferson were deeply impressed by the townships of New England, and Jefferson was so much so that he thought that the nation should be based on them. But there is considerable debate today among contemporary historians whether the townships of colonial New England were the models of democracy that Jefferson assumes they were. ⁴⁴ A modern study of a New England town by Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman finds a moribund and monopolistically controlled system, run by an aging elite. ⁴⁵ However, even though Jefferson may have overestimated the political and social virtues of township democracy, and in general man's capacity for enlightened self-government, his ideas represent a contrasting model of local government to the one developed from the federal system. He used a government based upon participation of the citizens and purposefully kept small to encourage political activism and democratic support.

Even though Jefferson spoke of the township system as an ideal form of government, "the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of man," he did not think that it would operate without conflict.⁴⁶ In a letter to Taylor he says, ". . . an association of men who will not quarrel with one another is a thing which never yet existed, from the greatest confederacy of nations down to a town meeting or a vestry."⁴⁷ Thus, in opposition to the idealist position, Jefferson approved the clash of interests as necessary to the operation of a society that is maintaining freedom for its citizens. Therefore, when he learned in Paris of Shay's rebellion, he said "I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical."⁴⁸ While Jefferson may have urged a ward system of homogeneous yeoman farmers as the foundation of the American Arcadia, he recognized that conflicts would occur in politics and accepted them as necessary elements in the workings of its process.

Little needs to be said about Jefferson's belief in the role of parties in American politics. As founder of the Jeffersonian Republicans and successful leader in the opposition to the Federalists, his activities laid the groundwork for the party system in the United States.⁴⁹ With Jefferson's advocacy of parties, acceptance of interests in policy formation, and desire for elective local administrators, his ideas can be characterized in Schubert's terms as realist. Therefore, his views on local government constituted an alternative to the idealist theory of Madison.

The impact of Jeffersonian theories of local government came after his administration and during the time of political ferment in

state and local systems. During the 1820's some states began to alter their constitutions. Massachusetts did so in 1820, followed by New York in 1821, and then Virginia in 1829. In each of these instances conflicts arose over fundamental questions such as suffrage, the judiciary, and religious qualifications for office. It was at this time that the Federalists were forced to bare the essential elements of their political philosophy. Their failure to adapt to the changing social conditions and political demands of that time contributed to their decline and eventual disappearance.⁵⁰ The Jacksonian version of the Jeffersonian tradition brought to the forefront during this time the role of the party system and the emphasis upon citizen participation in government. Jackson's extension of the belief in popular participation consisted of the widening of the suffrage, use of the spoils system, and rotation in office. Although Jackson removed no more officeholders than Jefferson did, he provided the rationale for his actions in his inaugural address in which he justified replacing officials as an expression of democracy.

While these political changes were taking place, cities had begun to grow and add new services, such as police, sewers and water, street cleaning and lighting, sidewalks, and fire protection. Governmental reorganization occurred as a consequence of these new functions, and in New York City the council moved from a committee as overseeing the new services to the use of appointed officials in 1830. Later, in a spasm of democratic fervor, the charter of 1849 made elective eight department heads besides the mayor.⁵¹ Not all areas responded as New

York did to the new democratic ideas of local government. At the Virginia Constitutional convention in 1829, a debate arose over the office of justice of the peace. Proponents of changing the position to an elective one even quoted Jefferson as favoring the idea, but in the end the forces of Marshall and Madison prevailed.⁵² The justices of the peace remained appointive and under the domination of the landed gentry.

However, for the most part, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the impact of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian notions of local government were widespread. Examples of the use of the long ballot were the charters of San Francisco in 1850, and Chicago in 1851. Both cities provided elective officials for treasurer, marshal tax collector, and attorney. And, for the new services of the cities, San Francisco elected the street commissioner, and Chicago elected a chief and two assistant engineers. The Ohio general law of 1852 provided that Cincinnati and Cleveland elect eight officials that included a civil engineer, fire engineer, and superintendent of markets.⁵³ Clearly, the new structures of local government emphasized representation in administration, representation that included parties and special interests.

The Idealist Genteel Reformers

The democratizing efforts that were adopted in the cities became a framework in which major social and economic changes were absorbed. During the thirty years from 1860 to 1890, the urban

population increased from sixteen per cent to twenty-nine per cent of the national total. By the 1890's, cities were growing three times as fast as rural areas.⁵⁴ The political response to these changes was epitomized by the growth of the political machines.

The partisan basis of municipal politics with the widespread use of the spoils system and the multiplicity of office holders and city boards had been adopted when the United States was still a relatively homogeneous population. However, these same measures which had been established in the name of democracy were called corruptive when the tide of foreign immigrants began to come to the urban centers of America. These new citizens were unskilled in the ways of American politics, and their circumstances were easily exploited by city political machines. The growing city services created a new bureaucracy which the machines filled with persons who delivered their votes and loyalty to the political bosses. The system that resulted from this political union of the immigrants to the political machines began in New York as an electoral strategy on the party of the minority opposition, Tammany Hall. The upper-class Whig mercantile interests controlled New York, and as a means of overcoming their domination, Tammany Hall looked to the newly immigrated Irish for electoral support. "The leaders of Tammany Hall had no love for the Irish in the 1840's, but they led the way in the systematic care and handling of greenhorns, the practice of exchanging civic training for electoral 'support.'"⁵⁵ The electoral "support" which Tammany Hall received was so extensive under "Boss" Tweed that the Citizens' Association estimated that in 1871,

of the 130,000 voters, one-half were controlled by appointment to public office, letter of contracts, employment on public works, issuance of licenses, suspended sentences or nonprosecution of indictments, and other means.⁵⁶

While Tammany Hall and "Boss" Tweed became the stereotype of the political machines in the cities and the Irish immigrant voter was linked to the rise of such systems, Lincoln Steffens concludes that actually the corruption of American city government was the fault of the general population. "The misgovernment of the American people is the misgovernment by the American people."⁵⁷ He notes that the Gas Ring of James McManes operated just as corruptly in Philadelphia, the most native American city, as did the political machines in German St. Louis, Scandinavian Minneapolis, and Scotch Presbyterian Pittsburgh. Although immigrant groups formed the political base of many machines, Pendergast in Kansas City and Crump in Memphis showed that immigrants were a sufficient but not necessary cause for the existence of machines. Consequently, the description of Yankee Protestant and immigrant ethics given by Hofstadter in the passage quoted above can only be taken as a very general assessment with notable exceptions. Yankee-Protestant populations could support machines as well as immigrant populations.

Although there is disagreement on the causes of machine politics in American cities, there was a growing consensus among many observers that the American government in those cities was overwhelmingly bad. In The American Commonwealth, Lord Bryce concluded that city government in America was "the one conspicuous failure of the

United States."⁵⁸ And, in 1890, Andrew White said, "With very few exceptions, the city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom—the most expensive, the most inefficient, and the most corrupt."⁵⁹ These two oft-quoted statements represented a groundswell of dissatisfaction toward the end of the nineteenth century which sought to expose and eliminate the corruption which followed the Civil War. Journalism was an important part of this mood of change. The initial success of the New York Times, and the political cartoons of Thomas Nast combined with Samuel Tilden to expose and indict the Tweed Ring. Their success led to a whole series of publications concerned with public problems. From 1886 to 1890, magazines such as Literary Digest, Arena, and Forum appeared. Even the more general journals reflected the new interest in municipal problems, and one author estimates that one-third of Atlantic, Harper's, Scribner's, Cosmopolitan, and the Nation dealt with matters related to the cities.⁶⁰

It was the Nation, and its editor, E. L. Godkin, which reflected a distinct collection of ideas which has been called Manchester Liberalism in America. And a group which looked upon Godkin's Nation as their "bible" was the mugwumps. Concentrated primarily in the Northeast around Boston and New York, the mugwumps were a journalistic, legal elite who drew support from "people like themselves—the college-bred, Protestant, urban, middle class."⁶¹ This group was born in disillusionment with party politics. When the Republican Convention in 1834 nominated Blaine, a relatively small number of Republicans publicly defected from the party and urged the election of Cleveland. Imbued with their supposed success in electing the

Democratic candidate, the mugwumps formed loose organizations, among them the Massachusetts Reform Club. However, this club was actually the pivot organization for several satellite clubs which specialized in such reforms as civil service, lower tariffs, secret ballots and clean city government.

Ostensibly, the mugwumps urged independence in partisan politics; however, they were essentially anti-party, having never recovered from the nomination of Blaine. Because of their position on parties, they evoked considerable wrath from aspiring politicians and party leaders. One of the more colorful descriptions came from Theodore Roosevelt who called them, among other things, "those political and literary hermaphrodites the Mugwumps."⁶² Roosevelt was reacting to the fact that he had chosen to associate with politicians, and politicians were generally to be avoided by the mugwumps who thought of them only as undesirable persons and did not hesitate to condemn them as a class. There was even a note of pettiness in their attitude about politicians because they thwarted Henry Cabot Lodge's election to the Harvard Board of Overseers because he had backed Blaine in 1884.⁶³ Equally despised along with the politicians were the newly rich entrepreneurs with their favor-seeking manipulation of politicians. The special interests that these men represented were viewed as giving rise to a "Chromo-Civilization" in America that engendered the "growing tendency to believe that everybody is entitled to whatever he can buy, from the Presidency down to a street-railroad franchise."⁶⁴

Despite the fact that the mugwumps shunned associations with politicians and parties, they were interested in civic life and showed a true passion for public affairs. Their major contribution to reform

was the civil service. After the Pendleton Act of 1883, they urged merit systems for both New York and Boston, and these two cities had such systems by 1888. Civil service was their chief goal because the concept of a technical elite chosen on the basis of expertise represented the most fundamental part of their somewhat ill-defined set of beliefs. While consciously trying to import Benthamite notions of utilitarian reform, they were, in effect, drawing on the notions of representation developed by Edmund Burke. It was Burke who pressed forward the idea that leaders should be free to seek the national welfare unhampered by considerations of local interests. Similarly, the mugwumps sought a class of civil servants who would develop policies that were divorced from partisan or special interests. It is this notion of a class of government officials chosen only for their technical knowledge that makes their proposals idealistic in Schubert's terms. According to the mugwumps the way of achieving the public good did not lie in the clash of either parties or interest groups, but rather in the development of an independent body of administrators and workers chosen by neutral examinations. Coupled with their interest in the civil service were notions of a strong executive. They proposed the establishment of an executive budget and the item veto with which the President could check Congressional extravagance. In general, they supported increased authority and independence in the executive branch and limits upon the legislative branch.⁶⁵

Mugwumps as a group were never able to exercise any great influence. For the most part, their efforts at changing policies or standing for office met with defeat, and they even developed pride in

failure because they were unwilling to compromise their principles in order to succeed. As Geoffrey Blodgett says, "Mugwumpery, it turned out, was not geared to decisive political action. It was not an organization but a mood."⁶⁶ Their lack of organizational skills was also combined with a snobbish distaste for the laboring classes and an alienation from the radical reform efforts by farmers. In fact, some of the mugwumps toyed with the idea of limiting the franchise. Alan Grimes' study of the Nation's editorial policy finds that in 1880 that magazine had reversed itself and was supporting the disenfranchisement of the Negroes in the South in order to allow the educated land-owners to vote and make policy.⁶⁷ The idea of an educational test for suffrage rights was fully consonant with the idea of a civil bureaucracy. Public policy, it was argued, should be made by only the most qualified, and the most qualified were those who were educated. Despite the faith in the virtues of the educational process, the Nation's strict adherence to the principle of laissez-faire prevented it from supporting federal aid to support education for the newly emancipated Negroes. The magazine maintained the Benthamite objective of a minimum of government no matter what the governmental aim might be, even if it were attempting to educate the voters.

Like Jefferson, the mugwumps admired the town government of New England. The mugwumps looked upon the rustic past of their native area as an ideal state where the social system was racially homogeneous and education and learning were held in esteem. According to them, it had been the greedy entrepreneur and the foreign immigrant who had spoiled the virginal democracy of Massachusetts Bay. In fact, Hofstadter

states that it was the very displacement in status of the mugwumps by the rising mercantile leaders that motivated their efforts at reforming the political system around themselves and "purifying" the democracy that they believed once had operated in the northeast.⁶⁸ However, while Jefferson believed that more democracy was needed in the system to create opportunities for civic training of citizens, the mugwumps proposed limiting the franchise and strengthening the powers and independence of the bureaucracy. Jefferson lauded the virtues of the independent, common man, but the mugwumps were disillusioned with democracy and believed that an educated elite should decide policy, protected from the strife of party or special interests.

Twentieth Century Theories of City Government

The era of the mugwump or "genteel reformer" was only one part of what Hofstadter calls "the Age of Reform." Their idealist notions of administration were superseded by rationalist ideas of scientific management as reform efforts continued into the twentieth century. The mugwumps had been primarily lawyers, journalists, and moderate mercantile owners, but the founding of the National Municipal League in 1894 was led by men whose backgrounds were different. Richard Childs, who is credited as the founder of the council-manager form of government, was an executive with his father's corporation, Bon-Ami. His experience was with corporate management, and this fact obviously influenced his notions of how a city government should be operated. Other prominent leaders at that time were trained as social scientists. Woodrow Wilson, Richard Ely, and T. R. Commons were men who worked in the academic fields of political

science and political economy, and they made significant contributions to the reform era. The reform movement was no longer headed only by literary men and lawyers, but also men who were imbued with an enthusiasm for the "scientific" study of society.

Whatever the advantage of their training, the new reformers were more successful in developing new directions for municipal government. The National Municipal League presented a Model City Charter and encouraged American cities to adopt the new forms in the name of economy and efficiency and to rid city governments of the waste of corruption. The rationalistic base of the council-manager system promoted by Childs has already been discussed. The novelty of this approach lay primarily in the fact that the system depended upon the concept of "scientific management" and its reliance upon the neutral, technical expertise of the city manager. The idea of a scientific approach to management had not been suggested until the start of the twentieth century. All during the nineteenth century, the models of city government were either idealist or realist. The twentieth century had produced a new alternative model based upon a new concept.

Large numbers of cities began to change their forms of government after the commission and council-manager plans were presented. However, not all cities were successful in ridding their governments of corruption simply by changing their structure. The best-known example is Jersey City. New Jersey state law prescribed the commission form for its cities, and Frank Hague was able to gain even further control over municipal affairs after the "reform" was accomplished. Obviously, in this instance the reformers had placed too much faith in the legal machinery without exploring fully the causes of corruption in city

government. Machine politics were not wholly the consequence of ill-arranged lines of authority on an organization chart. As Robert Merton's classic analysis of the machine points out, most reformers were dealing only with the manifest functions or superficial aspects of machines and overlooked the equally important features, the latent functions. Consequently, machines will exist as long as the functions which they perform go unfulfilled by the reform structures.⁶⁹

Even during the early period of the reform movement, Herbert Croly had taken the reformers to task for the narrowness of their approach to the problems of city government and their blind reliance upon governmental mechanics.⁷⁰ However, only recently has the literature on city governments begun to take into account the political needs of a community and the limitations of the reform systems. Primarily, the absence of a strong political figure, the mayor, has been the most noted feature. The role of the manager has been altered to meet some of the changing viewpoints. Manager roles now include the "community leader." But, the absence of a visible, elective leader with authority is still the chief criticism leveled against the manager-council plan.⁷¹ Some newly proposed structures make the city manager serve under the mayor, thereby increasing the authority of the elected leader.⁷² Essentially this latest trend in the theory of government structure attempts a synthesis of rationalist and realist models by combining the technical expertise of the manager with the representativeness of the mayor.

Summary

Each of the forms of government discussed above was developed as a means of promoting the public interest. While this purpose motivated the originators of these structures, the adoption and maintenance of these structures can be based on other reasons. For example, nonpartisan elections are promoted in order to eliminate the interference of state and national forces in local matters. However, while this "reform" has accomplished its goal in some instances and minimized party activity, it has also had the latent consequences of lowering voter interest and turnout. In the absence of mobilized voters, some organized elites have been freer to operate and thereby have benefited from nonpartisanship.⁷³ In view of such circumstances, it is apparent that the causes and effects of change in urban governmental structure make up a complex phenomenon. Although the ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson has stimulated research on this subject, the results have been inconclusive. In fact, the ethos theory itself has been accused of leading investigators into contradictory findings because of the vagueness of the concepts involved.⁷⁴

One aspect of the lack of conceptual clarity is the fact that Banfield and Wilson's dichotomy of private- and public-regardingness omits the variety of theories of the public interest which lie behind the models of city government. The Anglo-Saxon, public-regarding political tradition is more diverse in America than they indicate. For example, although reformism is identified as a product of the public-regarding ethos, it operates with mixed theories of idealist

and rationalist concepts. The two main elements of reformism—civil service and the manager-council plan—came during different historical periods and represent different ideas. Civil service reflects idealist theories, and the manager-council plan is an example of rationalist thought. The logical extremes of both are mutually exclusive types. Furthermore, realist ideas of structure such as the "unreformed" notion of representation in administration include a concept of the public interest that is derived from the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition, a tradition that is definitely Anglo-Saxon. Consequently, concepts of the public interest have not been confined to reform structures exclusively; they appear in governmental forms that stress representation as well. In short, the ethos theory attempts to dichotomize a political tradition that defies such over-simplification.

The discussion of models from the nineteenth and twentieth century is given above to point out that city government structures reveal the influences of several currents of political theory. The Schubert scheme of idealist, realist, and rationalist categories demonstrates the scope of ideas about the public interest involved in many of these governmental structures.

Because of the success of the rationalists in the twentieth century, the next chapter will focus on the structure of reformed city governments. The historical and philosophical aspects of reformism have been described in this chapter, but the following analysis will turn to the empirical dimensions of reformism.

NOTES

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⁴Ernest S. Bradford, Commission Government in American Cities (New York: Macmillan, 1911), pp. 131-158.

⁵Harold Stone, Don Price, and Kathryn Stone, City Manager Government in the United States (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 30.

⁶Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form," p. 165.

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⁸Lawrence Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," American Political Science Review, LI (June, 1957), pp. 330-345.

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¹⁴Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁵Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," p. 310.

¹⁶Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form," p. 169.

¹⁷Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 9.

¹⁸Panfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 41.

¹⁹Duane Lockard, "The City Manager: Administrative Theory and Political Power," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (June, 1962), p. 236.

²⁰Garth Jones, "Integration of Political Ethos and Local Government Systems: The Utah Experience with Council-Manager Government," Human Organization, XXIII (Fall, 1964), pp. 210-223.

²¹Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 701-716.

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²⁹H. G. Pope, "Is the Manager a Political Leader? No," and Gladys Kammerer, "Is the Manager a Political Leader? Yes," Public Management, XLIV (February, 1962), pp. 26-30.

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⁴¹Wickwar, Political Theory, p. 17.

⁴²Charles Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 132.

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⁴⁵Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1958)

⁴⁶This conclusion represents a contrasting viewpoint from that expressed by Anwar Syed in Political Theory of American Local Government. (New York: Random House, 1966). Syed states that Jefferson was primarily interested in social harmony through small, homogeneous wards and that Madison believed in conflict as the means of reaching a common good.

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⁴⁹For a description of Jefferson's activities in establishing an opposition party, see Manning J. Dauer, "The Election of 1804," Gainesville: University of Florida, Department of Political Science. (Mimeographed)

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⁵²Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-30. (Richmond: Ritchie and Cook, 1830), pp. 740-741.

⁵³Reed, Municipal Government, p. 81.

⁵⁴Stewart, Municipal Reform, p. 9.

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⁶²Ibid., p. 619.

⁶³Ibid., p. 630.

⁶⁴Nation, XLII (1885), p. 419

⁶⁵Alan Grimes, American Political Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 297.

⁶⁶Blodgett, "Boston Mugwump," p. 614.

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⁶⁸Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 137-148.

⁶⁹Robert Merton, On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 125-136.

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⁷²Wallace Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," Public Administration Review, XIV (Autumn, 1954), pp. 253-258.

⁷³A case study of Dallas city politics shows the workings of an elite in a reform setting; Carol Thometz, The Decision-Makers (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963).

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CHAPTER II

DIMENSIONS OF REFORMISM

Introduction

The movement for reforming city governments in the United States has been led by one organization in particular, the National Municipal League. Founded in 1894, this association has promoted "reformism" by developing a Model City Charter which "incorporated the best in governmental organization and practice."¹ After the first Municipal Program was substantially revised in 1919, the Model Charter has contained these basic principles: (1) nonpartisan elections, (2) at-large elections for city council positions, and (3) the council-manager form of government. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the League advocated the strong mayor system. Later, it issued several papers lauding the commission plan which provided for a small body of at-large elected officials. This plan had been devised for Galveston, Texas, after a hurricane struck that city and necessitated a governmental reorganization in order to meet the crisis. However, the League never officially endorsed the commission plan because shortly thereafter Richard Childs developed the council-manager plan, and the League included Childs' scheme in the new Model Charter and has maintained support of it ever since.

The Model City Charter of the National Municipal League has gone through six different editions since its initial version in 1916.

In the latest edition, the League promotes several specific points which, in addition to the three principles given above, form the basis for a program of reform city government. Some of the more outstanding of these points are: (1) a small city council of only seven members, (2) terms of office for council members of four years, (3) the election of the mayor from the membership of the council by the council itself, and (4) the absence of any veto power for the mayor. There are other aspects of city government given in the Model Charter, but the seven items mentioned above are the most prominent structural points which are commonly associated with a "reformed" city government.²

The Model Charter is presented as an ideal example upon which cities are to base their forms of government. Although its many features are presented as a package, the adoption of the model plan of government by American municipalities has not been entirely uniform. Central to the Model Charter is the installation of a professional city manager to serve as head of the city administration. This one innovation alone is present in over 1100 cities, and among the 676 cities with populations of 25,000 or more, fifty per cent or 339 have a city manager. However, the other structural aspects have been adopted in varying degrees by the larger American cities. Nonpartisanship has been accepted by seventy-one per cent of the cities, but the election of all council members by at-large elections is found in only thirty-one per cent of the cities. Similarly, the other structural items contained in the Model Charter have differing rates of acceptance. The most popular feature is the denial of veto power to the mayor, and the least popular reform item is the limitation of

the size of the council to seven members. Table 1 summarizes the extent of reformism among American cities of 25,000 or more. Mnemonics are supplied for each item of reformism.

Indices of Reformism

As Table 1 indicates, reformism has several aspects, and not every "reformed" city will have all of the items mentioned in the Model City Charter. Nevertheless, reformism as a unitary concept has been used in several studies on politics in American cities. Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler suggest that reformism can be treated as a continuous variable, and they construct an index based upon the accumulation of reform structures in city government.³ Lineberry and Fowler limit their treatment of reformism to only three structural aspects: the form of government, the election of councilmen at-large, and the presence or absence of nonpartisan elections. In regard to the form of government, although the National Municipal League no longer advocates the commission plan, Lineberry and Fowler place the small number of cities that maintain this system in their reformed category; therefore, the form of government to which they attribute "reformism" consists of two types: the manager plan and the commission structure. Although these authors describe their index as a "crude" one, it nevertheless is used in their analysis of public policies in American cities. On the basis of this index, Lineberry and Fowler conclude that as a city becomes "more reformed" it becomes less responsible to the social cleavages in its population.

Terry Clark also develops an index of reformism.⁴ The important difference between the measure which Clark uses and the one presented

TABLE 1

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OF
25,000 OR MORE

	Number of Cities	Per Cent
<u>Form of Government = Form</u>		
Manager	339	50
Commission	77	11
Mayor	260	39
<u>Type of Election of Councilmen = Type</u>		
Nonpartisan	481	71
Partisan	195	29
<u>Number of Councilmen Elected At-Large = Elect</u>		
All	210	31
One to Eleven	285	42
None	181	27
<u>Term of Office of Councilmen = Term</u>		
One to Three Years	278	41
Four or More Years	397	59
<u>Selection of the Mayor = Mayor</u>		
Council Election	193	28
Councilman Receiving Most Votes in Election	9	1
Direct Election	474	70
<u>Number of Councilmen = Council</u>		
Three to Seven	433	63
Eight or More	243	36
<u>Veto Power of the Mayor = Veto</u>		
Mayor Has No Veto	429	63
Veto Ordinances Only	107	16
Veto All Issues	140	21

Sources: International City Managers' Association, Municipal Yearbook, 1963 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1963), Table IV, p. 168; International City Managers' Association, Municipal Yearbook, 1965 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), Table V, pp. 122-176).

by Lineberry and Fowler lies in the classification of the form of government. Clark acknowledges the work of Lineberry and Fowler, but consciously excludes the commission plan from his definition of reformism. However, the Clark index and the one by Lineberry and Fowler share the same basic notion--reformism is a trait which can be measured cumulatively. Clark makes a more sophisticated methodological use of his index than Lineberry and Fowler in that he applies it in a regression analysis. On the other hand, Lineberry and Fowler content themselves with comparing correlation coefficients while controlling for reform index types. On the whole, the work of all these writers makes the same fundamental assumptions about reformism. These assumptions are: (1) that type of governmental structure is a strategic variable in explaining policies in cities, and (2) that this variable is a unidimensional characteristic which forms a continuous variable, measurable at some level other than a nominal scale.

The first assumption which these authors make can be weighed in the light of the results which they obtain in explaining public policies in the cities. On the other hand, the assumptions about the nature of reformism as a continuous variable are made without their offering supportive evidence that the variable is unidimensional.

Dimensions of Reformism

Since World War II, social science has devoted considerable attention to the matters of concept definition, interpretation, and measurement. Paul Lazarsfeld has written extensively on concepts as "property-space" or constructs in Cartesian space. Important methodological advances in concept analysis are represented by Guttman scaling

and factor analysis. Louis Guttman has developed a method for testing the unidimensionality of concepts, and modern factor analysis has been employed in exploring concepts in n-dimensional space. However, neither Lineberry and Fowler or Clark refers to the use of any of these analytic techniques in developing an index of reformism. One of the most elemental steps in concept construction appears to have been omitted by these writers.

Raymond Wolfinger and John Field also ignore such techniques of concept refinement in their study of political ethos and city government structure. But they do report the result of cross-tabulations for checking the consistency of reformism in cities. Based upon a sample of 309 cities, these authors find that cities with the manager form of government display a high level of consistency in adopting the other reform structures of nonpartisan elections at-large election of councilmen. Eighty-five per cent of the manager cities use the nonpartisan system and eighty-one per cent follow the at-large practice of electing council members.⁵ Cities with the mayor-council form of government are less consistent in being "unreformed." For example, only forty-one per cent of the mayor cities use the ward system of election. This evidence indicates that reformism appears to be unidimensional although the concept has not been tested rigorously. Furthermore, the possibility exists that all seven of the structural items given in the Model City Charter form a continuous, unidimensional index of the variable, reformism.

In order to test the proposition that reform structures have been adopted in a pattern uniform enough to form a continuous variable,

data on the type of governmental structure for all cities over 25,000 in population were collected. These data were then subjected to a series of tests using Guttman scaling and factor analysis to examine the dimensions of reformism. Several questions developed in the course of this explanation.

The first question deals with whether or not the seven reform items from the Model City Charter constitute a unidimensional variable. In order to answer this question, a Guttman scale test was used.⁶ The most essential statistic from the Guttman scaling procedure is the coefficient of reproducibility. This statistic indicates the degree to which responses can be predicted going from the least difficult to the most difficult in terms of the direction of the scale. The coefficient is expressed as the number of errors divided by the number of responses and this fraction is subtracted from one. Guttman maintains that an "acceptable" level of reproducibility is .9; or in other words, fewer than ten per cent errors among the patterns of responses. However, when the test was run on 667 cities and seven items in the scale, the coefficient of reproducibility is only .79 and therefore falls short of the minimum level established by the originator of the test. Nevertheless, viewed from another standpoint, this coefficient reveals a remarkably high level of consistency among reform cities. The Guttman test was developed primarily for use in refining attitudinal tests, and its application to the structural characteristics of cities represents a novel use of the test, a use that finds a surprisingly consistent pattern. Such a large number of cities involves a multiplicity of forces in shaping the governmental

structures of these cities, and this level of consistency represents the degree to which reform government movements are successful in pressing for the adoption of the Model City Charter in its entirety.

Table 2 shows the intercorrelation among items of the scale based upon Yule's Q. At the bottom of the table are included the part-whole, biserial correlations to indicate the association of each item with the others. As Table 2 indicates, the four-year term of office recommended in the Model Charter is the item which shows the weakest relationship to the other six items in the scale. Evidently reform cities are more prone to limit the term of office to less than four years and thereby retain a more immediate check upon policy-makers. Because of the low correlation of this item in the scale, the logic of the procedure dictates that it be dropped, and the responses retested to check for a rise in the coefficient of reproducibility. However, rather than drop the item, a further question arose concerning the coding of the form of government.

The seven items used in the initial Guttman test were coded zero and one; one indicating a reform structure based on the Model Charter list of governmental reforms, and zero indicating the absence of the reform structure. As a result, only cities with the council-manager form of government were coded in the reform column; commission plan cities were classified as unreformed. This convention was based upon the explicitness of the Model Charter itself. However, another Guttman scale was tried using the coding originally used by Lineberry and Fowler. In this test, both the commission plan and council-manager cities were classified as reformed. The entire coding scheme for this Guttman scale is given in Table 3.

TABLE 2
INTERCORRELATIONS OF REFORM STRUCTURES

	Veto	Form	Mayor	Council	Elect	Type	Term
Veto	1.0						
Form	.58	1.0					
Mayor	.44	.52	1.0				
Council	.51	.35	.27	1.0			
Elect	.33	.22	.27	.42	1.0		
Type	.33	.38	.31	.30	.14	1.0	
Term	.10	.08	.13	.22	.17	-.04	1.0
Scale Item	.63	.57	.52	.56	.41	.37	.16

TABLE 3
CODING SCHEME FOR REFORMISM

Mnemonic	Unreformed = Code 0	Reformed = Code 1
Form	Mayor-council	Manager-council or Commission
Elect	Councilmen elected by wards	All Councilmen elected at-large
Type	Partisan elections	Nonpartisan elections
Council	More than seven members on the council	Council has seven or fewer members
Term	Less than or more than four years	Four years
Mayor	Directly elected or receives most votes among councilmen running	Elected by the council
Veto	Mayor has veto power	Mayor has no veto power

The question posed by this coding scheme is whether the commission plan is more appropriately classified as a reformed or unreformed governmental structure. The coefficient of reproducibility obtained from using this coding arrangement suggests that the commission plan is properly grouped with reformed cities. There is a slight improvement in the coefficient so that it rises from .79 .81. In neither instance, does the list of seven items form an acceptable scale, but certain aspects of reformism are brought out and clarified through the scaling procedure.

A further question remained concerning the seven items taken from the Model Charter. Although the adoption of reform structures has been widespread, one of the limitations upon acceptance of these changes by cities has been the legal restraints which state governments impose upon cities. Through constitutional and statutory control granted states in Dillon's Rule, state governments may force cities to adopt or to prevent adoption of certain structures. If the cities in states where these legal obstacles existed were removed from the list of cities, the coefficient of reproducibility might rise.

An examination of the literature revealed that Alabama, Indiana, and Pennsylvania limit the home rule power of their cities in some way so that reform structures are either imposed or prohibited. Louisville, Kentucky, and Baltimore, Maryland, also, are subject to legislative control in their forms of city government.⁷ When all of these cities are removed from the total number of cities with populations of 25,000 or more, the number is reduced to 606. However, the elimination

of these cases does not significantly affect the size of the coefficient of reproducibility. In this instance, it rises to .82. Although this last step produces a "purer" group of cities for statistical tests, the results indicate that reformism is not made substantially less error free when these particular cities are removed.

Because the seven items taken from the Model City Charter do not form a unidimensional scale, the question arose over what dimensions are involved in reformism. In order to deal with this question, Guttman scaling has to be abandoned and factor analysis put in its place.

Whereas the term Guttman scaling refers to a specific statistical procedure for dealing with dichotomized variables, factor analysis is a term applied to a variety of techniques which range from simple data reduction in principal components analysis to an intensive examination of factors in space using oblique rotation. For the purposes of this study, the more common method of factor analysis, variously called classical factor analysis or principal axes with varimax rotation, is employed.

As a first step, a principal components analysis is performed on the unaltered correlation matrix. Two components are produced with eigen values greater than one, the first component has an eigen value of 3.03, and the second component has an eigen value of 1.09. These two components account for a majority of the total variance, fifty-nine per cent. In order to examine the factors with only specific variance, the unities diagonal of the correlation matrix were replaced with square multiple correlation coefficients as initial

estimates of the communalities, and the resulting factor structure was rotated according to the varimax criterion. The matrix of rotated factor loadings is given in Table 4.

The rotated factor matrix reveals two distinctive characteristics of reformism. The first factor appears to deal with items which are related to reforming the executive authority of city governments. Executive aspects are the veto power of the mayor, the manager or commission systems, and the election method for the mayor's office; these features cluster with relatively high loadings on the first factor. Also, the non-partisan electoral system appears to be associated with these reforms in executive authority. The second factor appears to be composed of items which relate more clearly to matters of the council. The at-large election of councilmen, their terms of office, and the size of the council define the second factor.

Conclusion

Factor analysis and Guttman scaling are two very different computation techniques for examining the dimensions of concepts. Although factor analysis is helpful in revealing the underlying dimensions of data, the user of factor analysis is still faced with the task of making several decisions about the significance of his results. Criteria have been developed for making some decisions such as the level of significance for eigen values, but the relative importance of factor loadings is still an arbitrary matter. In this study, for example, four items all have loadings of greater than .50 on the first factor, executive reform, but there is no absolute method of determining how important these loadings are except in relation to the loadings of the same variables on the second factor. In other

TABLE 4
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

	Factor 1 Executive	Factor 2 Council
Veto	.73	.30
Form	.75	.37
Mayor	.54	.17
Council	.46	.54
Elect	.28	.49
Type	.51	-.00
Term	.00	.40

words, interpreting the meaning of factors is largely subjective. In view of this problem, one means of providing a check on the factor loadings is to Guttman scale the items on the first factor and apply the appropriate criterion for Guttman scaling. If the four items attain a coefficient of reproducibility of .9, the items would demonstrate their suitability for use in a unidimensional index of reformism.

In fact, the four items on the first factor do have a coefficient of reproducibility of .91; and, therefore, they constitute a conceptually "pure" index of executive reformism. The minimum marginal reproducibility is .67.

This conclusion is based on the fact that, in practice, reformism is composed of two separate elements. The first element concerns the allocation of executive power in the reform system and the second element relates to matters that concern the council exclusively. Significantly, the major impetus in the reform movement has been to change the executive branch of the cities. Reformers have sought to limit the mayor's office and his powers by placing the administrative duties of the mayor in the hands of a professional city manager or using a collective body in the commission plan. These efforts appear to form a separate dimension of reformism apart from the at-large election of council members and their terms of office.

As mentioned above, the installation of a city manager or a commission plan, the selection of the mayor from the membership of the council, the denial of the veto power to the mayor's post, and finally the installation of nonpartisan elections—all of these things have a bearing upon the way in which executive power is to be exercised in

city government. These measures are clearly designed to prevent the accumulation of administrative power in the hands of a strong mayor. From the formal restriction upon the veto power to the denial of informal power through party politics, reformism tries to replace the strong mayor's office with a position that carries only ceremonial duties. These four steps taken together make up the major thrust of reform changes that have been adopted.

As stated earlier, however, the criteria involved in interpreting the meaning of factors are somewhat arbitrary. Even though in this instance four items develop a conceptually unified notion of executive reform, the pattern of factor loadings does not invalidate the other indices of reformism that have been tried. Both the Lineberry-Fowler and Terry Clark reform indices use only three items, but they combine two items of executive reform, manager or commission government, with one item of council reform, at-large elections. Despite this apparent "mixing" of factor dimensions, the application of Guttman scaling to both the Lineberry-Fowler and Clark indices reveals that these three items of reformism are also unidimensional. The Lineberry-Fowler index which includes both commission governments and manager cities in the reform category attains a coefficient of reproducibility of .91 and a minimum marginal reproducibility of .67. On the other hand, the Clark index which classifies only manager cities as reformed produces a slightly lower coefficient of .89 and a minimum marginal reproducibility of .64. Although the differences in the two results are relatively minor, the slight discrepancy in coefficients confirms the earlier conclusion that cities which maintain

the commission plan are properly considered having "reform" government although that reformism reflects an earlier era in the movement. In any event, the evidence indicates that the Lineberry-Fowler index is more appropriate than Clark's scale although only relatively so.

Despite the blending of items from the two reform factors, executive and council reform, the Lineberry-Fowler index achieves an acceptable coefficient of reproducibility, and it includes the most "significant" elements of reform city government. The Clark index is almost equally acceptable, but because of the fact that Lineberry and Fowler study the socio-economic characteristics of reformed and unreformed cities, their index will be used in the following analyses for purposes of comparability. The next chapter will employ their index in describing the socio-political aspects of cities according to degree of reformism. In addition, the original scale tested at the beginning of Chapter 2 and based on seven items from the Model City Charter will be similarly used. In the last chapter, the Lineberry-Fowler index and factor scores derived from the factor analysis of reformism will be used in a regression analysis of urban policies.

NOTES

¹Frank Mann Stewart, A Half Century of Municipal Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 93.

²National Municipal League, Model City Charter (6th ed.; New York: National Municipal League, 1964).

³Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Association, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 713-714.

⁴Terry Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), p. 582.

⁵Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), p. 312.

⁶Computations performed at the University of Florida Computing Center with an IBM 360/65. This research was funded by a grant from the College of Arts and Sciences.

⁷Daniel Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form in American Cities, 1933-1960," American Journal of Sociology, LXXIV (September, 1968), p. 164.

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF REFORMISM

Previous Studies

The relationship between socio-economic characteristics of cities and types of city government is analyzed in several recent articles. In the largest study which involves 2,970 cities with populations of over 5,000, John Kessel finds that size of population is related to form of government. City manager cities are predominantly middle-sized communities. On the other hand, cities with populations of greater than 250,000 and those with less than 25,000 are more apt to have the mayor-council form of government.¹ Kessel also notes that manager cities exhibit high rates of growth, high percentages of native populations, and the economic bases of these cities are oriented toward local business interests.

Concerning themselves only with the cities with populations of 25,000 or more, Robert Alford and Harry Scoble identify associations between form of government and empirical indicators of community status, social heterogeneity, growth and mobility, and size.² Restricting their statistical technique to cross-tabulations, Alford and Scoble find a consistent relationship between the more professional, less politicized structure of the manager form of government and white collar employees, and persons with high school education, and mobile populations. The more politicized mayor-council plan is associated with

persons of foreign stock, children in private schools, and nonwhite populations.

The finding that high community status is associated with manager-council government has been interpreted by Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson as evidence of their "ethos theory." These authors claim that Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and high status persons hold a "public-regarding ethos" which favors, among other things, reform government structures.³ In a controversial test of this theory, Raymond Wolfinger and John Field conclude that the relationship between nativity, status, and form of government is spurious when region is controlled. As Wolfinger and Field say, "The Ethos Theory is irrelevant to the South, . . . is inapplicable to the West, . . . fares badly in the Northeast, . . . and even there (in the Midwest) the difference between 'public-regarding' and 'private-regarding' cities are small and uneven."⁴ In other words, reformism is largely a regional phenomenon.

While the conclusion reached by Wolfinger and Field appears to call into question results of other researchers, Wolfinger and Field themselves have been criticized for the methods which they employ. Timothy Hennessey notes that to control for "region" is to control for a great many things since socio-economic characteristics also have considerable regional variation.⁵ Therefore, to control for region and then to compare per cent of foreign born with some other variable is, in effect, to control for not only region but per cent foreign born as well. Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler also point out the difficulties

involved in controlling for regional differences, and these authors conclude that complicated variables like region which compound the effects of several other variables should be avoided in research.⁶

At the same time, Lineberry and Fowler probe the socio-economic bases of city governments themselves. They compare the statistical means of twelve socio-economic characteristics for cities with different governmental structures. On the basis of a sample of 200 cities with populations over 50,000, Lineberry and Fowler find little difference in the means of these variables, indicating that the association between forms of government and certain demographic aspects is not evident for cities of this size. As these authors say in explaining their findings, ". . . varying samples may produce varying conclusions," and their study fails to detect the upper class nature of manager cities? According to their study reformed cities tend to have more educated populations and larger proportions of white collar workers, but unreformed cities have high incomes; consequently, not all indicators of status are consistently related to one form of government or the other.

Indices of Reformism

One major omission marks all of the studies that have been described above. While each of these studies attempts to analyze the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and reform governmental structures, none have examined reformism on a cumulative basis. In only one instance, did any of these authors demonstrate the association between combinations of government structures and

demographic variables. Wolfinger and Field present one table which describes on a regional basis the correlation between per cent of ethnicity and various combinations of reformed and unreformed governments.⁸ On the whole, the treatment of governmental structures has been made on an item by item basis. In other words, each study takes the form of governmental structure used—whether it is the manager, mayor-council, or commission plan—and breaks down the socio-economic variables according to these categories. Then, for further illustration, these studies take the form of electoral system, partisan or nonpartisan, and the method of electing council members, ward or at-large, and perform the same operation. On this basis, the authors then draw conclusions about the relationship between "reformism" and the various socio-economic variables. However, these studies do not offer evidence that reform governmental structures are consistently adopted in cities. Again, Wolfinger and Field state that in their sample seventy per cent of manager cities use both the nonpartisan ballot and the at-large election method, but the other studies cited above do not present this type of evidence. Therefore, since according to one study not even three-fourths of manager cities are consistent in adopting reform structures, it appears that most studies are using different samples for each comparison of reform governmental structure and socio-economic environment. Nonpartisan cities are not necessarily the same cities as manager cities, and cities that have at-large elections are not necessarily nonpartisan cities.

In order to deal with this problem, scales of reformism were developed which indicate the cumulative level of reformism which a city demonstrates after adopting a certain number of reform structures. Two

scales will be presented; one index utilizes three reform items, and the other is composed of seven. The first index is a four point scale based on the most prominent reform items--manager or commission city government, nonpartisan elections, and the at-large method of electing council members. It has a Guttman coefficient of reproducibility of .91. The second scale uses the three items from the first scale and adds four more items from the Model City Charter of the National Municipal League. While this latter index is a more complete measure of reformism in city government as defined by the National Municipal League, it does not meet the criterion of unidimensionality established for a Guttman scale. For the second scale, the coefficient of reproducibility is only .81. However, the two scales have a correlation of .89. The content of both scales is given in Table V.

On the basis of Index I and II, Guttman scale scores were computed for 667 cities with populations in 1960 of 25,000 or more. Because of the low coefficient of reproducibility obtained for Index II, a large number of errors in assigning scores occurred. In order to avoid erroneous scale types, only the extreme scale types, "0" and "7" will be reported in the following tables. However, reporting for Index I will be complete.

TABLE 5
GUTTMAN SCALES OF REFORMISM^a

Index ^b	Index II ^c
0 = Absence of reform structure	0 = Absence of reform structure
1 = Nonpartisan elections	1 = Nonpartisan elections
2 = Council-manager or commission form plus item 1, nonpartisan elections	2 = Council has seven or fewer members plus item 1, nonpartisan elections
3 = Council members elected at-large, plus items 1 and 2	3 = Mayor has no veto power plus items 1 and 2
	4 = Council-manager or commission form plus items 1, 2, and 3
	5 = Council members terms of office are four years plus items 1, 2, 3, and 4
	6 = Council members are elected at-large plus items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
	7 = Mayor is elected by the council plus items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6

^aCorrelation of Index I and Index II = .89.

^bIndex I has a coefficient of reproducibility of .91, a mean of 1.6, and a standard deviation of 1.0.

^cIndex II has a coefficient of reproducibility of .81, a mean of 3.8, and a standard deviation of 2.1.

Regional Distribution of Reformism

Several studies have noted the distinctive regional distribution which reform characteristics have for American cities. The general finding has been that the western states with comparatively younger cities have been more amenable to the reform movement than any other region in the United States. For example, Wolfinger and Field find that ninety-five per cent of the cities in the west covered by their study use the nonpartisan ballot system.⁹ Also, eighty-one per cent of those cities employ the council-manager form of government. The region with the second greatest incidence of reformism is the south. Within that region, eighty-one per cent of the cities have nonpartisan city elections, and fifty-nine use the council-manager plan. On the other hand, the northeast is particularly noted for its absence of reform structures. In fact, in that region only thirty-nine per cent of the cities are nonpartisan and only eighteen per cent are manager cities.

When the cumulative indices of reformism I and II are broken down by region, the results generally confirm the conclusions reached by other researchers although there are some deviations in these patterns. Table 6 shows the distribution of scale types for Index I according to regions. The table itself presents the number of cities in each cell, the row percentage or per cent of scale types, the column percentage or per cent of regional types, and finally the cell frequency as a per cent of the total number of cities. The regions used in this descriptive table are defined on the basis of the U. S. Census grouping of states. This particular grouping is listed below the table in a footnote.

TABLE 6
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDEX 1

Scale Type	Region ^a				Row Total
	South	North-east	North-central	West	
<u>0</u>					
Count	17	48	50	3	118
Row Pct	14.4	40.7	42.4	2.5	17.7
Col Pct	9.8	30.4	24.3	2.3	
Tot Pct	2.5	7.2	7.5	.4	
<u>1</u>					
Count	25	54	64	16	159
Row Pct	15.7	34.0	40.3	10.1	23.8
Col Pct	14.4	34.2	31.1	12.4	
Tot Pct	3.7	8.1	9.6	2.4	
<u>2</u>					
Count	81	47	56	55	239
Row Pct	33.9	19.7	23.4	23.0	35.8
Col Pct	46.6	29.7	27.2	42.6	
Tot Pct	12.1	7.0	8.4	8.2	
<u>3</u>					
Count	51	9	36	55	151
Row Pct	33.8	6.0	23.8	36.4	22.6
Col Pct	29.3	5.7	17.5	42.6	
Tot Pct	7.6	1.3	5.4	8.2	
Column Total	174	158	206	129	667
	26.1	23.7	30.9	19.3	100.0

^aSouth: Delaware, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Maryland, Florida, Texas West Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and South Carolina.

^bNortheast: New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Maine, Pennsylvania.

^cNorthcentral: North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Kansas, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio and Missouri.

^dWest: Alaska, Wyoming, Nevada, California, Hawaii, Washington, Colorado, Oregon, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Idaho.

An inspection of Table 6 reveals that the western part of the United States has the greatest incidence of reformism. Eighty-five per cent of the cities in that region are either scale type two or three which indicates that western cities not only accepted city manager government but the other measures of reform government as well. Close to the west in its rate of reformism is the south. There, seventy-five per cent of the cities are either scale type two or three, but southern cities do not use the at-large elective districts to the extent that western cities do; therefore, proportionally, there are fewer southern cities in scale type three than there are western cities. The north central region has a more even distribution of scale types than any other region, however, the greatest concentration of cities in that region is scale type one. The northeast has the fewest number of cities that have adopted any of the reform structures. Conversely, it has proportionally the greatest incidence of cities that are scale type zero or one.

If curves were drawn for each region for Index I, it would indicate that the northeast and the north central parts of the United States follow very similar patterns. Both areas reflect the inroads which advocates of nonpartisan city elections have made, but this is the only feature of reform government that has won acceptance. As the curves would extend along the continuum, fewer and fewer cities from these regions would be represented. Also, southern and western cities follow similar patterns to a certain extent. Both of these regions make use of non-partisan elections and manager or commission government, but the west shows the greatest inclination toward reformism by having the largest concentration of cities that use the at-large electoral system in addition to the other two items.

As a further means of illustrating this distribution of reform government among the regions, a cross tabulation table for the extreme types of Index II is given next.

This table reveals even more clearly the extent to which regions have been willing or unwilling to adopt elements of the Model City Charter. When seven items from the Model Charter are examined, the northeast continues to demonstrate the absence of reform structures; sixteen per cent of the cities have not adopted any of them. On the other hand, western cities reflect an almost total adoption of the Model Charter. Thirty-four per cent of the cities in the western region use all seven items recommended by the Model Charter. The trend which appears in comparing the south and the west on Index I is continued and amplified by Index II. Whereas one-third of the western cities have adopted the Model Charter in almost its entirety, southern cities use a fewer number of features from the overall plan recommended by the National Municipal League. In fact, only four per cent of the southern cities are found in scale type seven.

This evidence indicates that there is a fundamental difference in the type of reformism that appears in regional analyses. Most studies show that the south and west are the leading regions in municipal reform, but some reform adoptions in the south stop short of employing at-large elections and selection of the mayor from the membership of the council. Many western cities demonstrate no such hesitancy in embracing the full range of items which the Municipal League promotes; consequently, reform government in the west is more inclusive and representative of the reform ideal than city government in the south.

TABLE 7
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDEX II

Scale Type	Region			
	South	North- east	North- central	West
<u>0</u>				
Count	4	25	16	1
Col Pct	2.3	15.8	7.8	1.0
<u>1</u>				
Count	7	7	11	44
Col Pct	4.0	4.4	5.3	34.1

Socio-Political Characteristics of Cities

In the various studies which have been made linking governmental structure to socio-economic characteristics, a consistent use has been made of certain variables collected by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. Because of this consistency, it is possible to make an easy comparison of findings among studies, and for this reason, the following analysis will be confined to a list of variables based on these studies with the addition of two new variables. A total of fourteen variables are used altogether; they are listed in Table 8. The source of these variables and all subsequent data used in this research is the County-City Data Book, 1967.¹⁰

The use of Democratic and Republican voting patterns in describing reform governmental structures has been done on only a limited basis. Phillips Cutright shows the incidence of reform structures in one-party state political systems, but for the most part, political variables of this sort have been ignored in favor of the more readily available demographic data from the Census.¹¹ Even in this study, the party voting variables are for county units and not for the cities themselves. Also, the voting statistics are for presidential elections. Voting patterns for presidential elections can be a great variance from voting patterns for offices closer to the local level. Nevertheless, the significance of these descriptions of party strength, although admittedly imprecise, is sufficient to warrant their inclusion.

A criticism often raised about environmental studies of reformism is that while these studies may have some intrinsic interest

TABLE 8
SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES

Variable	Mnemonic
1. County Democratic vote for President, 1960	DEMO
2. County Republican vote for President, 1960	GOP
3. Total city population, 1960	TOTPOP
4. Per cent population increase or decrease, 1950-60	POPCHGE
5. Per cent nonwhite	PCTNW
6. Per cent of population foreign-born	PCTFORB
7. Per cent of population with foreign-born or mixed parentage	PCTFORSK
8. Median education	MDED
9. Per cent of elementary school children in private schools	PCTPRVED
10. Per cent of population in white collar occupations	PCTWC
11. Median income	MDNINC
12. Per cent of population with incomes below \$3000	PCTPOOR
13. Per cent of population with incomes above \$10,000	PCTRICH
14. Per cent of population in owner-occupied dwelling units	PCTOWN

in describing a current phenomenon, there can be no causal link between the variables used in a particular study and the reform structures which are associated with them. Any attempt to imply causality runs afoul of time-series order because these reform measures were not necessarily adopted when the present residents of the cities were there nor were the social compositions of the cities similar. While it is true that populations of cities change, it is also true that governmental forms change. Daniel Gordon estimates that since 1930, approximately forty per cent of American cities have changed their form of government. Additionally, Gordon finds that on a longitudinal basis ethnicity is related to the mayor-council form of government.¹² The results of Gordon study tend to minimize the seriousness of this original criticism. As city populations change, it is readily apparent that some city governments change also, and the time-series order rule of causality may not be violated in these studies to a significant degree.

However, a problem more serious than the time-order one concerns inferring causality from ecological data. The majority of these studies rely upon large samples of cities, or in some cases, the universe of cities in a particular size category, and in these large studies no attempt is made to collect individual data on political actors or groups. The environment of cities is described, and then it is related to a particular form of government. Because of the reliance upon ecological data, conclusions based on these studies may be subject to the "ecological fallacy" described by W. S. Robinson.¹³

Simply noting that manager cities have significantly large concentrations of native Americans, persons with white collar occupations, and relatively high education levels does not "prove" that these same individuals favor the council-manager form of government or that they worked for its adoption. The only way to satisfactorily overcome the limits of ecological data is to resort to survey research and interview residents of cities to learn about their attitudes toward reform city government and their activities in bringing about its adoption. This technique has been employed to some extent although it has been confined for the most part to case studies.¹⁴ However, the evidence drawn from these case studies tends to validate many of the inferences based on ecological data. In this respect then, the likelihood of committing the "ecological fallacy" has been reduced although not eliminated.

If ecological studies cannot prove conclusively the effects which environment play in influencing the form of government, they can serve a useful purpose in developing hypotheses about the relationship between environment and government which can be tested later through survey research. A case in point is the ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson. These authors draw the conclusions which they do about individual voter behavior from referenda election results broken down by wards. While Banfield and Wilson cannot prove that upper-middle native American voters hold "public-regarding" values, they nevertheless have presented an hypothesis about the election outcomes that has been the focus of considerable attention, research, and controversy.¹⁵ Therefore, in the absence of a systematic body of

postulates about urban political behavior, it is useful to explore as fully as possible ecological data that is available before proceeding with survey research

Tables 6 and 7 shown above reveal the marked regional distribution which reformism has in the United States. Moreover, not only is reformism noted by its particular relationship to region, but demographic variables as well have a decidedly regional nature. For example, the per cents of city populations that are foreign-born or of foreign stock, nonwhite, or home-owning is susceptible to regional influences. Because of this fact, it is difficult to "control" for the impact of region in statistical analyses. Region represents a great many things, and it can very often represent a marked distribution of some socio-economic variable. In order to illustrate the nature of the problems associated with region, Table 9 shows the fourteen variables used in this analysis broken down by four regions.

Table 9 shows that southern cities are, on the average, smaller in population than cities in other regions, but they have more nonwhites, more poor families, but fewer persons foreign born or of foreign stock, and fewer families whose incomes are above \$10,000. Northeastern cities have the largest concentrations of persons with ethnic backgrounds, the largest average number of school children enrolled in private schools, the most populous and the most Democratic cities. Cities in the northcentral region have the highest mean per cent of homeowners in their populations while western cities have the highest

TABLE 9

MEAN VALUE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES BY REGION

Variable	Grand Mean (n=667)	South (n=174)	Northeast (n=158)	North- central (n=206)	West (n=129)
DEMO	49.8	50.2	52.7	48.6	47.9
GOP	50.1	49.7	47.2	51.3	52.0
TOTPOP	112,313	99,661	137,630	108,630	105,051
POPCHGE	71.8	66.1	9.4	103.3	105.5
PCTNW	9.6	21.1	6.0	5.7	4.9
PCTFORB	6.0	2.4	10.8	4.9	6.5
PCTFORSK	21.5	7.6	37.3	20.5	22.2
MDED	11.0	10.6	10.4	11.3	12.0
PCTPRVED	16.6	9.0	24.4	20.7	10.8
PCTWC	46.4	44.8	42.8	48.2	50.3
MDNINC	6,221	5,019	6,261	6,794	6,880
PCTPOOR	16.3	26.3	13.7	12.2	12.7
PCTRICH	17.7	12.2	17.0	20.2	21.7
PCTOWN	60.6	57.2	52.5	67.9	63.4

median income and the highest average concentration of white collar employees, and the most Republican cities.

Because of the difficulty in coping with the multiple facets of regional influence, no cross tabulations will be presented which attempt to show the relationship between socio-political variables and reformism by region. However, it is useful to compare the mean value of these same variables for different scale types of both Index I and II. Lineberry and Fowler take exception to the conclusions reached by Alford and Scoble that reform cities are "the natural habitat of the upper middle class."¹⁶ On the contrary, they find that there is a general similarity between reformed and unreformed cities on indicators of class, but that the populations of reform cities do appear to be more socially homogeneous as Alford and Scoble claim. The differences in results which these two studies obtain can be attributed to the fact that they use different methods in analyzing their data, and they have different samples of cities. More importantly perhaps is the fact that these studies deal with only one structural feature at a time. Manager and mayor cities are compared, and then nonpartisan and partisan cities are examined. The advantage of comparing the mean values on an index of reformism is that a continuum underlies this measure; therefore, any generalizations about the direction of social indicators and reformism can be checked on a cumulative scale. The breakdown of socio-political variables by Index I is given in Table 10.

TABLE 10

MEAN VALUE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES BY INDEX I

Variable	Grand Mean (n=667)	Scale Type			
		0 (n=118)	1 (n=159)	2 (n=239)	3 (n=151)
DEMO	49.8	50.3	52.0	49.7	47.4
GOP	50.1	49.6	47.9	50.2	52.5
TOTPOP	112,313	180,032	151,429	85,742	60,261
POPCHGE	71.8	19.1	117.7	62.3	79.7
PCTFORB	6.0	7.0	6.9	5.3	5.2
PCTFORSK	21.5	24.8	25.6	19.2	18.1
MDED	11.0	10.5	10.9	11.1	11.4
PCTPRVED	16.6	21.1	20.6	14.6	12.0
PCTWC	46.4	43.7	45.6	47.4	47.9
MDNINC	6,221	6,224	6,272	6,138	6,299
PCTPOOR	16.3	15.3	15.2	17.4	16.7
PCTRICH	17.7	17.2	17.5	17.4	18.6
PCTOWN	60.6	58.9	59.5	60.8	62.8
PCTNW	9.6	10.5	8.6	10.3	8.8

Although there is some unevenness in the patterns shown by Table 10, overall the tendency is for the most reformed cities to differ from cities with no reform structures in several ways. Using the grand mean as the standard of comparison, type three cities have on the average (1) fewer persons with ethnic backgrounds, (2) fewer school children in private schools, (3) fewer nonwhites, (4) less populous cities, (5) more Republican voters and fewer Democratic ones, (6) more persons with white collar occupations and family incomes of \$10,000 or more, (7) more homeowners, (8) higher median incomes and education, and (9) higher rates of population change than cities that are type zero. The inconsistencies in this overall pattern occur in the middle scale types of cities, but this fact can in large part be attributed to the inordinate number of southern cities that compose scale type two. These southern cities in some instances score lower on measures of socio-economic status than do cities in any other region, and therefore they contribute to the deviations in the general trend already noted. As a result of this fact, there is not a unidirectional pattern in the relationship between socio-economic indicators and reformism, but the extreme cases do support the contention of Alford and Scoble that upper-class, native American, growing cities are more likely to have several reform governmental structures than ethnic, lower-class cities.

The breakdown of these same socio-political variables by the extreme types on Index II again confirms the generalizations based upon Index I, and in some instances, the differences between unreformed

and reformed cities is even greater. The major differences which emerge from the comparison of extreme types on Index II center around three variables: population change, median income, and per cent of families with incomes of \$10,000 or more. In each of these instances, the average values for the polar types exceeds the differences of the extreme types of Index I. Table 11 given below shows the mean values for the scale types on Index II.

These results serve to amplify the general finding that reform cities score highly on indicators of socio-economic status while unreformed cities score more lowly. Also, reform cities have a higher growth rate than do unreformed cities. Consequently, cities that have adopted the Model City Charter almost in its entirety are highly representative of the conclusions reached by Alford and Scoble about reform cities in general.

One of the advantages of employing an index of reformism is that it can be used in correlation analysis. First, previous studies on this subject have been confined to contingency tables and measures of association such as chi square to test the statistical significance of the relationship between environmental variables and forms of city government. Although the scale of reformism developed here meets the test of unidimensionality, it does not satisfy the requirement of interval data. However, Pearsonian correlation is sufficiently "robust" to overcome many of the deficiencies encountered in the data to which the test is applied; therefore, this method will be used to test the relationship between Index I of reformism and the variables

TABLE 11

MEAN VALUE OF THREE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES BY INDEX II

Variable	Grand Mean	Scale Type	
		0 (n=46)	7 (n=69)
POPCHGE	71.8	19.6	100.5
MDNINC	6,221	6,175	6,798
PCTRICH	17.7	16.4	21.7

used in the tables above. The results of this correlation analysis are given in Table 12.

Although the signs of the coefficients do fall in the expected directions—measures of ethnicity are negatively associated with reformism, and median education and per cent white collar occupations are positively related to Index I, none of the variables chosen to describe the socio-political environment of cities correlates highly with the index of reformism. Most importantly, the measures of socio-economic status do not display the high degree of correlation which could be anticipated from earlier cross tabulation analyses. Measures of income show very little relationship at all to reformism, and education and white collar occupations demonstrate only slightly higher coefficients.

Although some studies which exhaust the universe of possible subjects employ tests of significance to determine the importance of coefficients, this study will not use them. The amount of total variation, R^2 , accounted for by the thirteen variables shown above represents less than twenty per cent of the total variance; consequently, attributing statistical significance to more than two or three of the variables tends to inflate the importance of this list of environmental variables. Rather, the point should be stressed that these measures of socio-political environment leave largely unexplained the phenomenon of reformism. The only other study which uses a comparable index of reformism for correlation analysis reports an R^2 of .51.¹⁷ The highest coefficients are .63 for median education and -.43 for a measure of Roman Catholic population. However, Terry Clark's sample was limited to only

TABLE 12

CORRELATIONS OF INDEX I WITH SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF CITIES

Variable	Simple R
DEMO	-.14
TOTPOP	-.12
POPCHGE	.02
PCTNW	-.02
PCTFORB	-.15
PCTFORSK	-.20
MDED	.22
PCTERVED	-.34
PCTWC	.15
MDNINC	.00
PCTPOOR	.08
PCTRICH	.04
PCTOWN	.09
MULTIPLE R	.42
R^2	.17

fifty-one cities, and the representativeness of this sample for American cities as a whole appears questionable in view of the above results.

Conclusion

While several studies have been able to find significant differences between the social and economic environments of reformed and unreformed cities, these differences, however, do not account for a majority of the variance in reformism when viewed as a continuous variable. This finding does not obviate the results of these studies, but it does emphasize the point that these efforts must be placed in perspective. And recognition must be made of the fact that although socio-political environment is an important element in understanding governmental structure, environment alone does not explain everything about the nature of governmental systems. It well may be that the other influences upon governmental structure are unsystematic and random forces. If this is the case, then environment is surely the crucial factor in determining forms of city government but until other variables are explored to the extent that ecological data have been, this question remains moot in political science.

NOTES

- ¹John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," American Political Science Review, LVI (September, 1962), pp. 615-620.
- ²Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of American Cities," Municipal Yearbook, 1965. (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), pp. 82-97.
- ³Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 142, 170.
- ⁴Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), pp. 325-326.
- ⁵Timothy Hennessey, "Problems in Concept Formation: The Ethos 'Theory' and the Comparative Study of Urban Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIV (November, 1970), p. 549.
- ⁶Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), p. 707.
- ⁷Ibid., p. 706.
- ⁸Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," p. 320.
- ⁹Ibid., p. 316.
- ¹⁰U. S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1967 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).
- ¹¹Phillips Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems in American Cities," Comparative Studies in Society and History, V (January, 1963), pp. 212-226.
- ¹²Daniel Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form in American Cities, 1933-1960," American Journal of Sociology, LXXIV (September, 1968), p. 169.
- ¹³W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), pp. 351-357.

¹⁴Some examples of the literature on this subject are: James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), and Lorin Peterson, The Day of the Mugwump (New York: Random House, 1961). A discussion of the attitudes and ideology of the founder of the manager-council plan is given in John Porter East, Council Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard Childs (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965).

¹⁵For example, see James Q. Wilson and Edward Banfield, "Communications," American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1966), pp. 998-999, and Hennessey, "Problems in Concept Formation," pp. 537-564.

¹⁶Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies," p. 704.

¹⁷Terry Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), p. 584.

CHAPTER IV

CORRELATES OF URBAN POLICY

Previous Studies

The number of studies which deal with explanations of governmental expenditures is approaching over seventy works. In 1968, Robert Bahl counted sixty-six such studies and several more have been added since that time.¹ In fact, studies of the studies themselves constitute a growing list of articles.² In general these research efforts take on a standard form—they use a variety of socio-economic indicators to predict through regression analysis governmental expenditures. The most important works to date are those by Solomon Fabricant, Harvey Brazer, and Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks.³ Each of these three studies attempts to explain the fiscal policies of different governmental units. Fabricant's is the most inclusive because he uses data for both state and local governmental units. The other studies are successively more narrow in their focus—Brazer examines all American cities over 25,000 in population, and Campbell and Sacks confine their study to a sample of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

While the units for analysis are varied, the approach has been similar in handling the data. Fabricant began this type of study by using census data from 1942. In his pioneering effort, he uses three

variables: income, degree of urbanization, and population density. On the basis of these variables, he is able to account for seventy-two per cent of the total variation in general expenditures. The success which Fabricant experienced led other researchers to replicate his work with later sets of data. Glenn Fisher applies the Fabricant "three" independent variables in a regression analysis of 1957 data and accounts for fifty-three per cent of the variance in total expenditures. Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris repeat the procedure for 1960 data with results identical to Fisher's.⁴ All three of these studies also extend the analysis to functional categories of expenditures such as local schools, police, fire and public welfare. For these expenditure categories, the range of coefficients of multiple determination goes from .29 to .85. The predictive variables perform most poorly in explaining highway expenditures and are most successful in accounting for fire and police expenditure levels.

Brazer, Campbell, and Sacks are concerned with urban total expenditure levels. Brazer achieves a coefficient of determination of .54, and Campbell and Sacks prove to be the most successful of all the studies by obtaining an R^2 of .948. The latter two studies use different sets of independent variables from the classic three applied by Fabricant. Brazer uses (1) population, (2) density, (3) rate of growth, (4) median family income, (5) employment in manufacturing and trade, and (6) intergovernmental revenue. Campbell and Sacks include six variables: (1) density, (2) per cent urban, (3) per capita income, (4) state aid per capita, (5) federal aid per capita, and (6) a local assignment variable.

Although these studies may employ differing numbers of variables in the regression equation, the fundamental assumption behind this type of research is that expenditure levels reflect (1) the ability of a governmental unit to pay for services and (2) the demand for those services from the population within that governmental unit. The income level of the citizens indicates their "ability to pay," and the size and density of the population reflects the "demand for services." This orientation is, in the words of Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, a "socio-economic determinism paradigm."⁵ This viewpoint emphasizes the primacy of economic and social factors to the exclusion of political variables in determining fiscal policies for state and local government. The epitome of this perspective is represented in classical economics by Adolph Wagner's "law" that an increase in urbanization is the cause of increase in governmental spending. Understandably, practically all of the literature cited above has been written by economists who have not felt it necessary to include political aspects in the fiscal policies which they study.

Only recently have political scientists begun to concentrate on the political implications of the expenditure levels of various units of government. V. O. Key despairs about the absence of a theory for allocating budgetary expenditures, but one of the most important contributions within political science on this topic has been Aaron Wildavsky's The Politics of the Budgetary Process.⁶ In his book, Wildavsky argues the point that the fiscal matters of government have long been the subject of political economy, but that this body of knowledge has been

principal domain of economics which has minimized the political implications of the subject matter. In an attempt to reclaim some of the neglected territory of political science, Wildavsky claims that budgetary matters are at the heart of politics since fiscal policies necessarily deal with "who gets what and how." Because budgets are political, Wildavsky focuses on the federal level and demonstrates that the structural elements in the decision-making process continue and reinforce an incremental approach to deciding budgetary matters. In other words, it is the arrangement of the institutions and their power relationships with one another that produces the method of handling the complex task of budgeting.

While Wildavsky's concept of "politics" is inclusive of a great variety of behavior, other researchers have taken a more prosaic definition of political phenomena in attempting to explain fiscal policies for state and local governments. Generally cited as the most important work in state government is Thomas Dye's Politics, Economics, and the Public.⁷ Dye's work defines the political influences on state taxing and spending in terms of partisan control of state legislatures, the degree of malapportionment of state bodies, interparty competition, and political participation. Using multiple and partial correlation methods, Dye concludes that these "political" factors have little or no explanatory power when state levels of economic development are controlled. The simple correlations between political measures and taxation and expenditure levels drop or vanish when partial correlation control for education, urbanization, industrialization and income.

Consequently, the field of political economy is more properly economic than political as far as state government is concerned.

On the other hand, in recent studies on urban policy, research indicates that political elements of local government structure are important factors in understanding fiscal policies. Robert Wood's 1400 Governments, a study of the local governmental units in the New York metropolitan area, stresses the effects which local zoning policies have in manipulating the size and quality of growth in communities.⁸ In turn, Wood finds that a factorially derived variable called size accounts for the greatest proportion of the variance in the taxing and spending policies of these cities.

Departing somewhat from the "socio-economic determinism paradigm," Campbell and Sacks include in their regression equation an assignment variable which measures the apportioning of services provided at the local level between states and their local governments. This variable is important both conceptually and empirically because of the diverse nature of local government responsibility in providing services. For example, New York and Chicago are two major metropolitan cities, but their total operating budgets reflect extremely different levels of per capita expenditures because of the different services which they provide. New York incorporates both education and welfare expenditures in its total budget, but Chicago does not. In Chicago, education is the responsibility of an independent school district, and welfare is a joint state-county function. This example is repeated from region to region and even from city to city where responsibilities for major social services are divided among the often multiple units of local

government. Because of this fact, an assignment variable appears especially noteworthy because of its ability to account for the diverse nature of local government expenditures. Campbell and Sacks find that the assignment variable does explain a significant proportion of the total variation in expenditure policies, and Yong Cho similarly notes that it is important in explaining interstate variation in local government taxation and expenditure policies.⁹

The assignment variable is "political" in that it reflects the structural division of services for citizens by state and local governments. However, it deals primarily with the sharing of responsibility for one function in particular—welfare. In fact, in the absence of data for the assignment variable itself the apportionment of welfare is substituted.¹⁰ Because this variable is heavily dependent upon this one function, it is difficult to analyze the actual impact which it has in determining expenditure policies in other areas. Also, a subsequent study which includes other variables in the regression analysis finds the assignment variable of little or no explanatory power.¹¹

Finally, two recent articles assess the role which types of local governmental structure have in taxation and expenditure policies. Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler develop an index of reformism which measures the degree to which city governments have adopted the major structural changes advocated by the reform movement: council-manager or commission government, nonpartisan elections, and the at-large election of councilmen.¹² Although they describe this index as an effort to treat reformism as a continuous variable, methodologically, they use the scale in a different way. Instead of examining the effect

on policy which reformism has as an independent variable, these authors apply levels of reformism as "type-concepts." These type-concepts are simply means of expressing a function of two or more variables, or, in other words, they summarize the interaction effects which take place within categories.¹³

In analyzing these "type-concepts," Lineberry and Fowler predict that the degree of reformism affects the "responsiveness" of local governments. The more reformed that a local government is, the more unresponsive it is to the socio-economic cleavages within the community. As a test of this hypothesis, Lineberry and Fowler compare the correlation coefficients between environment and fiscal policies while controlling for degree of reformism. As they predicted, the correlations between the indicators of social and economic cleavages are lower in cities with reform government than in cities that are unreformed. While this study has been criticized for the superficial way in which it operationalizes the difficult concepts of "cleavage," and governmental "responsiveness,"¹⁴ this research does mark an important use of a political variable--governmental structure--in examining urban policy. Although the interpretation given the role of governmental structure may be debatable, the fact that type of local government does have an effect on policy represents an important dimension of policy studies which has received little attention previously.

Another study which treats governmental structure as a factor in determining local fiscal policy is Terry Clark's article on community, power structure, and budget expenditures in fifty-one American cities.¹⁵

Clark also develops an index of reformism which is only slightly different from the one described above by Lineberry and Fowler. However, Clark is interested in examining the statistical impact which this index has as an independent variable upon various dependent variables such as total budget expenditures, urban renewal expenditures, and degree of decentralized decision-making structure. In two instances, total expenditures and decision-making structures, Clark finds that reformism is a significant variable in explaining these phenomena. Using path coefficients, Clark demonstrates that reformism has a negative effect, $-.586$, upon decentralization of decision-making in communities, but it has a positive effect, $.521$, upon budget expenditures. In essence, reformism contributes to an elitist model of decision-making, but it also has the effect of leading to higher outputs in the form of large total city budgets. This latter point is not altogether clear, however. Using zero-order correlations, Clark obtains a negative association of $-.015$ between reformism and budgetary expenditures, but the path coefficient rises to $.521$, and the sign changes from negative to positive. In other words, reformed city governments are not generally found in cities with high total expenditures, but after controlling for the influences of all of the other independent variables, the degree of reformed government is an important determinant of expenditures.

In any event, the Clark article emphasizes in another manner that governmental structure is a variable of importance in explaining urban policy. His statistical treatment of reformism is considerably different from that of Lineberry and Fowler, and his conclusion is somewhat at variance from the one that they reach. Lineberry and Fowler

stress the filtering and diminution of interest articulation which increased reformism has in determining levels of outputs. Clark notes that reformism influences the decision-making process as Lineberry and Fowler predict that it does; however, reformism in turn contributes to higher total expenditures.

Both of these studies attempt to explain only a limited set of dependent variables. Lineberry and Fowler use two ratio variables which summarize the tax and expenditure efforts of the cities in their sample. In their study, they divide the total taxes and the total expenditures by the aggregate incomes in the cities. These ratio variables provide a convenient way of expressing the willingness of communities to tax and spend from their own resources. On the other hand, Clark uses three policy variables in his study: total expenditures, urban renewal expenditures, and level of governmental reformism. One problem associated with using either total expenditure or total taxation is the wide diversity of items which cities include in those categories. Instead of providing a summary figure for comparative purposes, these data conceal the variety of functions which cities undertake. Some cities are responsible for education expenditures while others are not, and some cities employ sales taxes or use taxes while others do not. Consequently, both the ratio variables of Lineberry and Fowler and the total expenditure figure used by Clark are subject to the caveat that these variables are not truly comparable from city to city. Also, explanation of only two or three dependent variables has the disadvantage that the conclusions reached may not be valid for another policy area. In one of the most inclusive studies done on urban fiscal

policies, George Pidot obtains coefficients of determination that range from .004 to .834 for thirty-four per capita revenue and expenditure categories.¹⁶ Pidot achieves the greatest success with large, inclusive items like total general expenditures, but he is least successful in accounting for individual expenditure policies for highways, sewerage, parking, and corrections. Pidot's results confirm a criticism that is often leveled against the decision-making approach in community power studies. Generalizations drawn from studying only a few community decisions are not necessarily applicable to other issues being decided.

Dependent Variables Used in This Research

In view of the limitations which broad categories of data like total general expenditures have and the variation in levels of explanation of policies, this analysis will focus on a total of sixteen fiscal policy variables. These variables are drawn from the 1967 County-City Data Book and include the two ratio variables used by Lineberry and Fowler as well as fourteen per capita expenditure and taxation items. These latter data have in addition to the individual categories of police, fire, parks, highways, sewers and sanitation, a comprehensive variable which adds together all of these common city functions to form a "common function" expenditure variable. This variable has the advantage of being conceptually clearer than the gross total expenditure variable which includes different functions for different cities.

Regional Distribution of Fiscal Variables

These sixteen fiscal policy variables have a regional distribution which is important to note. Just as the socio-political variables of

cities have distinctive regional characteristics, the fiscal levels of American cities are associated with specific areas of the nation. Table 13 shows the regional distribution of the means of the sixteen fiscal variables involved in this study.

An inspection of Table 13 reveals that the significant regional differences are confined to only certain categories. In most instances the differences in means from one area of the country to another are only a matter of a few dollars, but the greatest differences occur in categories that are large and inclusive. For example, both total revenue and total expenditure categories show a wide difference from the higher mean figure for the northeast and the lower value for the northcentral region. On the other hand, mean per capita expenditures for functions such as fire, sewer, and sanitation have only slight differences from region to region. One possible reason for this pattern is the differing responsibilities which local governments assume in different sections of the nation. The historical pattern in the northeast is for municipal government to fund and tax for local public schools, but, in other parts of the country, independent school boards perform these functions. As a result, taxes and expenditures for cities appear greater in the northeast because city budgets reflect more local governmental functions than do urban budgets elsewhere. Public education is only one example that can be cited, but the size of that one function alone could contribute substantially to the regional differences which occur in gross total expenditure and taxation categories.

TABLE 13

MEAN VALUE OF FISCAL VARIABLES OF CITIES BY REGION

Variable	Mnemonic	Grand Mean (n=667)	South (n=174)	North- east (n=158)	North- central (n=206)	West (n=129)
Total taxes divided by total aggregate income	TAXINC	.035	.031	.059	.025	.026
Total expenditures divided by total aggregate income	EXPINC	.063	.068	.089	.048	.049
Per capita total revenue	TOTREV	\$119.65	102.11	173.99	100.47	107.63
Per capita intergovernmental transfers	INTERGVT	\$ 23.22	17.36	35.93	20.38	20.07
Per capita total taxes	TOTTAX	\$ 70.27	53.44	120.11	52.69	59.45
Per capita property taxes	PROPTAX	\$ 55.66	36.34	111.35	43.18	33.45
Per capita total expenditures	TOTEXP	\$125.09	115.17	179.21	100.90	110.83
Per capita total noncapital expenditures	NCAP	\$ 96.62	83.94	151.41	75.21	80.82
Per capita total highway expenditures	HIMAY	\$ 15.44	14.05	12.95	15.95	19.54
Per capita total police expenditures	POLICE	\$ 12.88	11.37	14.54	10.75	16.30
Per capita total fire expenditures	FIRE	\$ 11.08	9.19	13.89	9.50	12.72
Per capita total sewer expenditures	SEWER	\$ 9.32	10.42	7.55	10.21	8.59
Per capita total sanitation expenditures	SANI	\$ 5.62	6.75	6.14	4.52	5.23
Per capita total park and recreation expenditures	PARK	\$ 6.72	6.71	5.64	5.24	10.40
Per capita total common function expenditures	COMMON	\$ 61.06	58.50	60.70	56.16	72.78
Per capita total debt outstanding	DEBT	\$.218	.331	.188	.178	.168

Intergovernmental revenue also follows a distinctive regional distribution. In all likelihood, this variable follows the regional pattern of local government functions. When the city unit is designated by the state as responsible for education, welfare, or health, then the state funds to assist in carrying out those functions will be represented in intergovernmental transfers to the cities. In view of this regional distribution of responsibilities, it is important to note the ratio variables for taxes and expenditures used by Lineberry and Fowler. While these variables are convenient summaries for tax and expenditure efforts on the part of cities, they also reflect a marked regional nature similar to total taxes and expenditures. Consequently, it is probable that these ratio variables are also influenced by the distribution of responsibilities of cities from region to region.

Finally, the last feature that should be noted is the similarity of regions in mean per capita expenditures for various individual functional categories. Although there are some differences that do appear in these common functions of cities, overall the expenditure levels appear remarkably the same. When the six functions are added together to form one variable, common expenditures, the cumulative differences are brought out, and the west is the region which spends the most on the average for these city services. This fact represents a change from the total expenditure category when the west is ranked next to last and several dollars below the northeast region.

Distribution of Fiscal Variables by Degree
of City Reformism

Because of the pattern which emerges after examining fiscal levels on a regional basis, it is useful to take the analysis further and inspect the mean values of fiscal levels based on reform scale types. Table 14 shows the distribution of mean values according to Index I.¹⁷

The results shown in Table 14 correspond to the findings of Lineberry and Fowler in that unreformed cities tend to spend and tax more than reformed cities. The ratio variables used by Lineberry and Fowler demonstrate the difference which exists between the polar types of Index I. Cities without any of the reform structures in Index I tax and spend, on the average, at a higher level than do cities with all three reform features. However, the intermediate types contradict the notion that there is a decreasingly lower level of fiscal effort as the city becomes more reformed. In fact, fiscal effort tends to rise in cities with one reform structure, nonpartisan elections, and then decrease with successive reform measures.

Despite the consistency of this pattern in the more inclusive fiscal categories such as total revenue and total expenditures, the functional categories of common services show only marginal differences among the four scale types. In view of these conflicting results which show substantial differences in some categories and only slight differences in others, it is probably true that the diverse nature of local government responsibility is operating on these variables just as it does on a regional breakdown of these figures. In other words, for large inclusive categories, the regional distribution of local

TABLE 14

MEAN VALUE OF FISCAL VARIABLES OF CITIES BY INDEX I

Variable	Grand Mean (n=667)	Scale Type			
		0 (n=118)	1 (n=159)	2 (n=239)	3 (N=151)
TAXINC	.035	.038	.041	.033	.029
EXPINC	.063	.061	.070	.066	.053
TOTREV	\$119.65	120.60	134.73	119.92	102.60
INTERGVT	\$ 23.22	22.21	29.41	23.24	17.45
TOTTAX	\$ 70.27	78.33	82.27	65.38	59.08
PROPTAX	\$ 55.66	65.93	71.47	50.02	39.91
TOTEXP	\$125.09	123.56	138.82	128.52	106.41
NCAP	\$ 96.62	96.86	111.50	96.73	80.59
HIWAY	\$ 15.44	12.67	15.44	16.76	15.51
POLICE	\$ 12.88	12.53	13.09	12.58	13.41
FIRE	\$ 11.08	11.30	11.91	10.89	10.34
SEWER	\$ 9.32	10.23	9.56	9.37	8.28
SANI	\$ 5.62	5.16	6.01	5.76	5.36
PARK	\$ 6.72	5.06	6.49	6.82	8.10
COMMON	\$ 61.06	56.95	62.49	62.17	60.99
DEBT	\$.218	.202	.203	.240	.213

responsibility for education, welfare, and public health affects the level of total spending and taxing. Therefore, areas of the northeast and northcentral United States which have larger concentrations of cities with no reform structures or only nonpartisan elections cause the average level of taxing and spending to rise in accordance with the larger number of services which cities in those regions carry out. On the other hand, the average expenditure levels for the common functions of all cities show very little difference among types of city government reformism. The differences that are present go in the opposite direction from the inclusive fiscal categories because the most reformed cities spend more on the average than do the least reformed.

When these fiscal variables are broken down by Index II, a similar pattern develops in that gross variables like total taxes and expenditures demonstrate greater differences than do the individual city functions. For one variable, average per capita expenditures on parks and recreation, the most reformed cities, type seven, spend almost twice as much as do cities without reformed structures. However, for the total common functions, type seven cities spend on the average \$63.69. In short, when cities are compared on spending for common services, there appears to be only marginal differences among them from region to region and under various governmental structures.

Correlates of Urban Policies

Among the numerous determinant studies of local government fiscal policy, there is little variation in the use of independent variables. Fabricant's initial use of density, urbanization, and

per capita income has been replicated several different times with varying degrees of success in explaining taxation and expenditure levels. Other studies have minimized the importance of these three variables by demonstrating that federal and state aid account for a greater per cent of the variance or that an assignment variable which partitions governmental responsibility for services is more significant than the Fabricant "three." However, the explanatory power of inter-governmental aid has provoked considerable controversy in the economic literature. The nature of state and federal aid has been questioned as an "independent" variable when it is used as a determinant of total revenue and expenditures.¹⁸ Intergovernmental revenue is necessarily correlated highly with these two variables because in the case of total revenue, it is one of the component parts which forms the variable, and, in the case of total expenditures, it is expected that revenues will be spent; therefore, stating that revenue causes expenditures appears trivial.

Whatever the merits of these particular variables, it has only been as other disciplines have undertaken policy studies of these kind that variables of a socio-political nature have been tested for their explanatory power. For example, in one study the religious factor is significant. Terry Clark finds that the Roman Catholic population measure is the most important determinant of total expenditures in fifty-one cities.¹⁹ Furthermore, in Clark's study, the second most important determinant is reformism. And, in another study Lineberry and Fowler use a total of twelve socio-economic variables to measure the homogeneity, status, and population size of cities, and these

variables account for fifty-two and thirty-six per cent of the variance in taxation and expenditure policies, respectively.²⁰

In view of the success which Lineberry and Fowler achieve with their list of variables, these same variables are used along with three others in a Pearsonian correlation analysis of taxation and expenditure policies of cities. Table 15 shows the zero-order coefficients between these twelve variables, another measure of ethnicity, per cent Democratic vote, Index of reformism, and the sixteen fiscal variables used in the preceding tables.

The coefficients of determination of each dependent variable indicate the mixed results which are obtained in this analysis. The highest levels of R^2 occur in taxation variables where forty-seven per cent of the variance in total taxes is accounted for by the socio-political variables. However, in only one expenditure category, per capita police expenditures, does the level of explanation rise above forty per cent. In other words, Lineberry and Fowler appear to be more successful in accounting for total variance in their study than has been done here. However, the correlations do provide a pattern of results which needs to be elaborated.

Overall, the most important point is that the scale of reformism correlates only slightly with these fiscal policies. Where the coefficients between reformism and fiscal policies do rise above the .10 level, reformism is in general negatively associated with spending and taxing. For example, for per capita property taxes, Index I has a coefficient of $-.22$. Secondly, the measure of Democratic partisanship shows only a modest association with the fiscal variables

TABLE 15

CORRELATIONS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES WITH URBAN FISCAL ITEMS

Fiscal Variables ^a	Socio-Political Variables ^b					
	INDEX J	DEMO	PCTOWN	TOTPOP	POP-CHGE	PCTNW
<u>Ratio Variables</u>						
TAXINC	-.16	.28	-.45	.17	-.03	.07
EXPINC	-.07	.23	-.40	.14	-.01	.16
<u>Per Capita Expenditure</u>						
COMMON	.04	.01	-.15	.13	.12	.04
TOTEXP	-.09	.21	-.36	.18	-.01	.03
NCAP	-.12	.23	-.41	.18	-.04	.01
POLICE	.04	.08	-.34	.29	-.02	.11
FIRE	-.09	.13	-.40	.08	-.03	-.02
SANI	.00	.06	-.30	.15	.00	.20
SEWER	-.05	-.02	.04	.00	.15	.04
HIWAY	.10	-.06	.15	.00	.11	-.10
PARK	.16	-.06	-.10	.09	.02	.05
<u>Per Capita Taxation</u>						
TOTREV	-.11	.20	-.37	.21	.00	-.01
TOTTAX	-.17	.25	-.40	.20	-.02	-.03
INTERGVT	-.10	.17	-.22	.18	.00	-.04
PROPTAX	-.22	.25	-.36	.10	-.02	-.09
DEBT	.04	.02	-.14	.20	.00	.28

^aMnemonics for fiscal variables are the same as used in Table 13, Chapter IV.

^bMnemonics for socio-political variables are the same as used in Table 8, Chapter III.

TABLE 15--Continued

PCT- FORB	PCT- FORST	MDED	PCT- PRVED	PCTWC	MDINC	PCT- POOR	PCT- RICH	MULT- IPLE R	R ²
.47	.45	-.31	.30	-.29	-.17	.04	-.19	.65	.42
.24	.22	-.30	.14	-.28	-.27	.18	-.27	.51	.26
.23	.17	.15	-.01	.10	.11	-.06	.16	.43	.18
.39	.36	-.12	.21	-.10	-.02	-.05	-.01	.52	.26
.46	.44	-.17	.26	-.13	-.01	-.06	-.02	.58	.34
.45	.35	.05	.06	.05	.20	-.13	.24	.68	.46
.43	.39	-.05	.19	-.07	.06	-.09	.06	.56	.32
.23	.14	-.04	.04	.05	-.05	.15	.06	.46	.21
-.08	.08	.05	-.08	.01	-.04	.05	-.01	.23	.05
-.03	.00	.21	-.05	.11	.16	-.14	.13	.28	.08
.20	.11	.21	-.07	.20	.08	.00	.15	.47	.22
.45	.43	-.13	.26	-.10	.01	-.09	.00	.57	.32
.58	.56	-.14	.34	-.09	.07	-.15	.06	.67	.47
.25	.28	-.16	.23	-.18	-.05	-.07	-.10	.44	.19
.56	.57	-.16	.38	-.13	.05	-.18	.02	.68	.45
-.12	-.18	-.05	-.11	.00	-.23	.28	-.15	.39	.16

although it is in general positively correlated. In regard to the socio-economic variables used by Lineberry and Fowler, the results appear similar to the coefficients which they find. Homeownership is consistently negatively related to both expenditure and taxation levels. Other measures of middle class status such as median education, median income, per cent white collar occupations, and per cent of families with incomes over \$10,000 have mixed positive and negative associations with these fiscal variables. However, in general the coefficients are only at a moderate level and they tend to be negative.

Two measures of ethnicity—per cent of foreign born and per cent of foreign stock demonstrate the highest association of any of the variables. For total taxes and for property taxes, these variables have coefficients that are close to .60. This finding can be interpreted as a contradiction of the public-regarding thesis of Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson. These authors find a negative association between city fiscal referenda and per cent of the population which belongs to certain ethnic groups such as Polish.²¹ Banfield and Wilson interpret their finding to mean that certain ethnic groups are opposed to increased public expenditures and taxes, preferring to keep their resources for private use. Although the measures of ethnicity used in Table 15 do not indicate the nation of origin, these relatively crude indicators of ethnicity are nonetheless clearly related in a positive manner to high levels of taxation.

Conclusion

However, it is not possible to invalidate Banfield and Wilson's hypothesis on the basis of this correlation analysis. Banfield and Wilson develop their explanation of voting behavior after examining the results of ecological data. Their units of analysis are voting wards in cities and not individual voters. The units of analysis for the present study are the cities themselves. Consequently, using cities only increases the distance from the phenomenon which is under scrutiny. The more accurate method is to employ survey research and question the individual participants about their attitudes and behavior. Debating from two sets of ecological data about the explanatory merits of the ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson will not resolve this matter, but contradictory ecological evidence is suggestive of the limitations of the public-regarding- private-regarding hypothesis.

Furthermore, the results in Table 15 are derived from zero-order correlations. It is entirely possible that the coefficients obtained between any two variables will diminish if a third variable were introduced and controlled for through partial correlation or beta weights in a regression analysis. The spurious association between variables is an ever-present problem in social science; it is a matter that can never be resolved completely since it is impossible to know all the relevant variables which might have an intervening influence.²² However, there is a major reason for not proceeding further with the socio-political variables that are used in Table 15. In order to regress the fiscal variables on the social environment indicators, it is important that these latter variables have as little

correlation among themselves as possible. Whenever there is a significant intercorrelation among the independent variables, the regression betas become unreliable and the standard error increases. In the case of the independent variables in Table 15, several have high correlations among themselves. For example, median income and per cent of families with incomes over \$10,000 have a correlation coefficient of .93, and median income and per cent of families with incomes under \$3,000 have a correlation of -.83. Similarly, white collar occupations and median education are highly correlated, and the two measures of ethnicity have a correlation of .94. Problems of multicollinearity are not confined to only this group of independent variables. In fact, a major criticism of many determinant studies is that the subject of multicollinearity has been ignored altogether, and consequently the regression results are suspect.²³

An alternative to proceeding with a regression analysis that would be prone to multicollinearity error is to factor analyze the variables in the soci-economic environment and derive factor scores based on orthogonally rotated factors. These factor scores would necessarily be uncorrelated. In Chapter V, this alternative is explored in finding factorial determinants of the fiscal policies of cities.

NOTES

¹R. W. Bahl, "Studies of Determinants of Expenditures: A Review," in Functional Federalism: Grants in Aid and PPB Systems, edited by S. Mushkin and J. Cotten (Washington, D.C.: George Washington Press, 1968), pp. 145-162.

²In addition to Bahl's article cited above, there are two others: Elliott Meress, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and Local Expenditures," National Tax Journal, XIX (March, 1966), pp. 95-103, and Gail Wilensky, "Determinants of Local Government Expenditures," in Financing the Metropolis, edited by John Crecine (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970).

³Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Governmental Activity Since 1900 (New York: Bureau of National Economic Research, 1952), Harvey Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959), and Alan Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

⁴Glenn Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditure: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal, XIV (December, 1961), p. 353, and Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1964), p. 76.

⁵Edmund Fowler and Robert Lineberry, "Canadian City Politics: Public Policy Analysis and the Problem of Reciprocal Causation," Paper presented at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., September 2 - 6, 1969, 1 - 2.

⁶Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964).

⁷Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966).

⁸Robert Wood, 1400 Governments (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).

⁹Yong Cho, "The Effect of Local Governmental Systems on Local Policy Outcomes in the United States," Public Administration Review, XXVII (March, 1967), pp. 31-38.

¹⁰Campbell and Sacks, Metropolitan America, p. 45.

¹¹Fowler and Lineberry, "Canadian City Politics," p. 17.

¹²Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), p. 713.

¹³The description of "type-concepts" and their use by Lineberry and Fowler is given by Timothy Hennessey, "Problems in Concept Formation: The Ethos 'Theory' and the Comparative Study of Urban Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIV (November, 1970), p. 555.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 558.

¹⁵Terry Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), pp. 576-593.

¹⁶George Pidot, "A Principal Components Analysis of the Determinants of Local Government Fiscal Patterns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, LI (May, 1968), pp. 176-188.

¹⁷See Chapter III for descriptions of Index I and II.

¹⁸Morss, "Thoughts on Determinants," pp. 95-103.

¹⁹Clark, "Community Structure," p. 589.

²⁰Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism," p. 709.

²¹Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 235.

²²For a discussion of the problems of causality, see Hubert Blalock, Causal Inference in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).

²³Wilensky, "Determinants," p. 205.

CHAPTER V

FACTORAL DETERMINANTS OF URBAN POLICY

Factor Analytic Studies

The number of studies using factor analysis has increased significantly in social science within the past decade. This technique has been applied to a variety of data in political science that has ranged from socio-political measures of nation-states to personality characteristics of academicians. And, to a large extent in urban studies has factor analysis been utilized as a research tool. With the increased information available from such sources as the Bureau of the Census, students of urban areas have employed factor analysis in order to reduce large bodies of data to a parsimonious set of variables for description and classification. An example of the evolution of the use of factor analysis for descriptive purposes is the work of E. L. Thorndike and Peter Hofstaetter.

In a largely neglected study of American cities in 1939, E. L. Thorndike made a pioneering examination of the social well-being of communities.¹ Thorndike systematically collected a large amount of information about health, education, and social and economic aspects of cities. He used this data to construct an index of the "goodness" of communities, basing his scale on thirty-seven variables that ranged from fiscal policy items like per capita teachers' salaries to circulation rates for various magazines. Thorndike assumed that each of these

variables provided some measurement of the general characteristic, city goodness.

However, in one of the early applications of factor analysis, Peter Hofstaetter used most of the variables in Thorndike's goodness index and extracted four factorial dimensions from the data.² Hofstaetter called these factors (1) prevalence of slum conditions, (2) enlightened affluence, (3) industrialization, and (4) organized public welfare. In other words, Hofstaetter found that these original variables did not form a unidimensional scale of the concept labeled "goodness." In fact, Thorndike's index was composed of variables which tapped at least four separate attributes of these cities. Thorndike's work anticipated the need for a factor analytic study which Hofstaetter filled by revealing the underlying dimensions of certain characteristics of cities.

Since Hofstaetter's study has been made, several other factor analytic studies of urban data have followed. The most prominent of these is Jeffrey Hadden and Edgar Borgatta's American Cities.³ Using the universe of United States cities over 25,000, Hadden and Borgatta extract thirteen factors from their list of sixty-five variables. Their results show a marked similarity to an even larger study of American cities conducted by Brian Berry. Certain factors appear to be constant even when the number of cities varies.⁴ For instance, both the Hadden-Borgatta and the Berry studies find that socio-economic status, age and ethnicity, economic base, and racial composition are important factors in describing American cities. Because of the fundamental similarities of these studies, they form a basis for comparison with the factors extracted in the research being reported.

Eight Factors Describing American Cities

A factor analysis was performed using thirty-seven variables collected from 667 cities with populations over 25,000 in 1960. A total of eleven cities were removed from the original universe which left a population of 667 cities.⁵ These eleven cities were dropped from the analysis because of missing data on an excessive number of variables. Where missing data was encountered for the rest of the cities, estimates were made based on a technique used by Hadden and Borgatta. These authors replaced missing city data with information from the county as a whole in which the city is located. The principal source of data for this study is the County and City Data Book, 1967. A complete list of the variables used in this study is given in table sixteen. Of the thirty-seven original variables selected, a total of twenty-eight are taken from the list of characteristics used by Hadden and Borgatta in their American Cities. The purpose in duplicating to a large extent the work of Hadden and Borgatta is to insure some level of comparability between the two studies. However, this analysis is not a replicate study for two reasons. First, Hadden and Borgatta use as their primary source of information the 1962 edition of the County and City Data Book. In an effort to obtain the most recent data available, this study used the 1967 edition of this census publication. To an extent, the two editions present overlapping sets of information, but in some instances, the later version presents new variables or, in any event, the most current information about the same variables. In view of these similarities and distinctions, the decision was made to use the more recent source of data. Second, Hadden and Borgatta attempt to exhaust the number of socio-economic

TABLE 16

LIST OF VARIABLES FOR FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY OF AMERICAN CITIES

Variable	Mnemonic
1. Value added by manufacture per capita ^a	PVALADD
2. Retail trade sales per capita, 1963	RTRDSALE
3. Total population, 1960	TOTPOP* ^b
4. Density	DENSITY*
5. Population change, 1950-1960	POPCHGE*
6. Per cent nonwhite, 1960	PCTNW*
7. Per cent foreign born	PCTFORB*
8. Per cent total foreign stock	PCTFORSK*
9. Median age	MEDAGE*
10. Per cent under 18 years old	P18
11. Per cent 65 years and over	P65*
12. Population per household	PPERHSLD
13. Persons residing in same house as in 1955	NMOBILE*
14. Fertility ratio, 1960	FERTILE
15. Median school years completed, persons over 25	MDED*
16. Completed less than 5 years of school, persons over 25	LOWED*
17. Completed high school or more	HIED*
18. Per cent enrolled private schools through secondary level	PCTPRVED
19. Per cent employment in manufacturing	MANUF*
20. Per cent employment in wholesale and retail trade	TRADE*
21. Per cent in white collar occupations	PCTWC*
22. Median income of families	MNDINC*
23. Per cent of families with incomes under \$3,000	PCTPOOR*
24. Per cent of families with incomes over \$10,000	PCTRICH*
25. Per cent of one-unit housing structures	SNGUNT*
26. Per cent of sound housing units	SOUNDNT*
27. Per cent of units owner occupied	PCTOWN*
28. Median value of owner occupied housing	MEDOWN*
29. Median gross monthly rent	MEDRENT*
30. New housing units authorized per capita, 1964	PNHOUSE
31. New housing units for five or more families per capita	PNE/MULT
32. Total manufacturing establishments per capita, 1963	PMANUEST*
33. Ratio of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees to all manufacturing establishments	PBIGMANU*
34. New capital expenditures per capita, 1963	PNENCAP
35. Total retail trade establishments per capita	PRTRDEST*
36. Total wholesale trade establishments per capita	PWTRDEST*
37. Wholesale sales per capita	PWTRDSAL*

^aAll per capita statistics are computed from: U. S. 'Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 464-573.

^bAsterisk indicates that a similar variable is used by Jeffrey Hadden and Edgar Borgatta in American Cities: Their Social Characteristics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965).

characteristics available about cities of over 25,000 population. In the process, these two authors use variables which make relatively fine distinctions in describing cities. For example, Hadden and Borgatta use three measures of manufacturing employment in cities: (1) per capita manufacturing employees, (2) per capita manufacturing employees of durable goods, and (3) per capita manufacturing employees of nondurable goods.⁶ While each variable is unique, the first one is derived from the addition of the other two and is a duplication in measurement. This study uses only the per cent employed in manufacturing, and is, consequently, a more economical representation of city attributes which tries at the same time to remain as comprehensive as possible.

This set of data was then factor analyzed. Eight factors were extracted and rotated according to the varimax criterion. Before rotation the eight factors had eigen values that ranged from 8.53 to 1.00; these eight factors account for seventy-three per cent of the total variance. A complete list of the variables with their respective loadings on each factor is given in table seventeen. An inspection of the table shows which variables have the highest relationship to which factor. On the basis of these loadings and their relative levels, it is possible to label each factor. Although this labeling procedure has no precise rules, giving each factor a name is a helpful mnemonic aid and it clarifies the patterns which emerge from the factor analysis. The labels attached to the eight rotated factors are: (I) socio-economic status, (II) family stage, (III) ethnicity, (IV) manufacturing expansion (reflected), (V) housing growth, (VI) commercial trade, (VII) home ownership, and (VIII) nonwhite deprivation (reflected). Of the thirteen factors extracted by

Hadden and Borgatta, eight are related to the ones generated by this smaller list of variables. Consequently, the results of the two studies appear to have basic similarities despite the use of different variables or in some instances more recent data collection. Furthermore, Brian Berry's study of all cities with populations over 10,000 finds six factors similar to ones in this analysis. In other words, American cities appear to have some fundamental properties which are consistently identifiable in factor analytic studies.

Factor one has high loadings with variables which are generally chosen as indicators of socio-economic status. Some of the highest loading variables are: (1) per cent of families with incomes greater than \$10,000 (.97), (2) median income of families (.94), (3) per cent in white collar occupations (.77), (4) per cent with high school education or more (.75), and (5) median education (.70). Income and education are the components of occupational status in Peter Blau and Otis Duncan's the American Occupational Structure, and these variables are associated with communities just as they are elements of status of individuals.⁷ Housing also appears to be another part of community status because median value of owner housing (.86) and median rent (.87) are also strongly related to factor one.

The second factor is derived from the high positive and negative loadings of variables associated with age and fertility. Median age (.80) and per cent of population over sixty-five years old (.83) are positively related to factor two. On the other hand, per cent of population under eighteen years old (-.91), population per household (-.89), and the fertility ratio (-.84) are negatively associated with factor two.

TABLE 17

EIGHT FACTORS^a OF THIRTY-SEVEN MEASUREMENTS OF 667 CITIES HAVING POPULATIONS OF AT LEAST 25,000

Variable	Variable Loadings							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
PVALADD	-.04	.04	.08	.86	.01	.06	-.02	-.05
RTRDSALE	.14	.30	-.09	-.10	.31	.58	.19	.06
TOTPOP	.00	-.01	.05	-.01	-.05	.12	-.36	.03
DENSITY	.03	.18	.33	-.03	-.07	.00	-.57	-.02
POPCHGE	.04	-.19	.05	.07	.24	.02	.06	-.07
PCTNW	-.31	-.02	-.35	-.01	-.03	.11	-.20	.64
PCTFORB	.17	.23	.86	.08	.07	-.03	-.28	.03
PCTFORSK	.24	.16	.90	.09	-.05	-.07	-.18	-.09
MEDAGE	.13	.80	.36	.04	-.20	.14	.05	-.01
P18	.02	-.91	-.12	-.02	.01	-.03	.28	.02
P65	-.19	.83	.25	-.02	-.17	-.11	.06	-.11
PPERHSLD	.09	-.89	.05	-.02	-.08	-.16	.19	.16
NMOBILE	-.10	.22	.43	.19	-.62	-.01	.06	.05
FERTILE	-.16	-.84	-.05	-.03	.03	-.09	.13	-.16
MDED	.70	-.03	-.28	.19	.27	.02	.09	-.33
LOWED	-.57	-.11	.16	.01	-.07	.34	-.05	.71
HIED	.76	-.05	-.26	-.20	.25	.00	.11	-.20
PCTPRVED	.09	.13	.50	.08	-.33	-.09	-.20	-.18
MANUF	.00	-.09	.30	.54	-.20	-.23	.01	-.19
TRADE	-.07	-.08	-.05	-.45	-.05	.40	.24	-.01
PCTWC	.77	.11	-.13	-.29	.08	.07	.08	-.05
MNDINC	.94	-.07	.14	.05	-.01	-.02	.06	-.15
PCTPOOR	-.70	.13	-.23	-.17	.01	.11	.04	.54
PCTRICH	.97	.02	.08	-.03	.02	.04	.06	.09
SNGUNT	.11	-.45	-.43	-.11	.08	.04	.66	-.02
SOUNDNT	.74	-.07	.21	-.03	.21	-.08	.10	-.38
PCTOWN	.39	-.44	-.08	-.03	-.05	-.04	.66	-.29
MEDOWN	.86	.10	.26	-.03	.16	.00	-.11	.10
MEDRENT	.87	-.14	.19	-.04	.12	-.05	-.01	-.14
PNHOUSE	.16	-.07	-.07	-.04	.84	.02	.13	-.01
PNEWMULT	.19	.08	.02	-.03	.77	-.05	-.03	.00
PMAUEST	-.09	.21	.28	.26	.13	.35	-.22	-.15
PBIGMANU	-.29	.04	-.01	.51	-.25	.03	-.05	.03
PNEWCAP	-.02	-.04	.05	.77	.05	-.03	.06	.03
PRTRDEST	-.44	.50	.02	-.08	.18	.43	.18	.15
PWTRDEST	-.20	.24	-.11	-.06	-.07	.82	-.15	.06
PWTRDSAL	.11	.03	-.02	.09	-.11	.68	-.27	.04

^aFactors and their mnemonics.

	Factor	Mnemonic	Factor	Mnemonic
I	Socio-economic status	SES	V	Housing growth
II	Stage of family cycle	FAMILY	VI	Commerical trade
III	Ethnicity	ETHNIC	VII	Home ownership
IV	Manufacturing expansion	MANUF	VIII	Nonwhite deprivation
				HOUSE
				TRADE
				HOME
				NWPOOR

This factor appears to indicate the stage of the family cycle in which a community is.

Factor three is a measure of ethnicity. Both variables which measure per cent of foreign born (.86) and foreign stock (.90) load highly on this factor. Also, the per cent of students in private schools (.50) is related to this factor although less strongly than the other two variables. This last variable is sometimes used as an indicator of Roman Catholic religious affiliation, but it is also linked to the degree of ethnicity of a city.

Manufacturing expansion is apparent in factor four. The loadings of the variables are reflected to make the meaning of the factor more comprehensible, but the value added in manufacturing (.86) and the per capita expenditure for new capital (.77) have the highest level of association with this factor.

Housing growth is measured by factor five. Both new housing units authorized (.84) and new multi-unit housing (.77) variables have high loadings on this factor. Conversely, the per cent of persons non-mobile (-.62) is negatively related to this factor.

Factor six indicates the commercial trade of a city. Measures of retail (.53) and wholesale (.68) trade sales and the number of per capita wholesale trade establishments (.82) have the highest loadings on factor six.

The obvious measures of home ownership, form factor seven. Per cent of housing units occupied by owners (.66) and per cent of single unit housing (.66) have the highest loadings on factor seven. Negatively, both density (-.57) and total population (-.36) are related to this factor.

Lastly, factor eight is composed of measures of poverty, illiteracy, and Negro population. The loadings are reflected on this factor for all variables including the following: per cent with five years or less schooling (.71), per cent nonwhite (.64), and per cent of families with incomes of \$3,000 or below (.54). These three items have the highest level of association with factor eight.

These eight factors present a composite picture of American cities that includes socio-economic status, racial and ethnic composition, family stage and housing modes, and the type of economic base which the city has--manufacturing or trading. With these basic elements of urban living summarized into eight variables, it is possible to continue the analysis and describe the determinants of urban policy.

Factor Analytic Determinant Studies

Three other studies have explored the uses of factor analysis in policy studies. The most important of these works is Robert Wood's 1400 Governments.⁸ Wood confines his study to the New York Metropolitan area. His use of factor analysis involves sixty-four New Jersey cities that range in population size from ten to eighty-five thousand. Wood extracts seven factors from a twenty variable correlation matrix, but one factor is clearly the most significant one in his analysis--community size. Wood regresses expenditure variables on the factors he derives and accounts for eighty-three to fifty-three per cent of the variance with the major variable, community size, by itself. However, Wood's analysis is made with the raw expenditure variables; he does not view it necessary to compensate for community size by computing per capita figures. While the range of population in the cities which Wood uses is

not as great as some other studies, it seems nevertheless that his results could have been predicted without using regression analysis. The larger that a community becomes, the greater the size of the service force that is required to provide fire, police, protection and sanitation service. While there may be an upper limit on this progression, in all likelihood Wood does not reach it in his group of cities, and as a result the usefulness of his analysis with its extreme emphasis on community size as the determinant of expenditures is limited.

In a study of a sample of eighteen Ohio cities, Louis Masotti and Don Bowen use factor analysis to investigate the relationship between municipal budget expenditures and the socio-economic environment of cities.⁹ Three significant factors are extracted: (1) socio-economic status of cities, (2) age of residents, and (3) population mobility. The first factor shows the highest relationship with city expenditures, however the way in which these authors conduct their study precludes knowing the degree of this relationship. Instead of obtaining factor scores for a regression analysis, Masotti and Bowen place the expenditure items in the correlation matrix itself so that the expenditure items appear in the factor matrix with loadings on all three of the factors. On the basis of these loadings, the authors conclude that the first factor has the highest association with city expenditures, but it is not possible to determine a coefficient of determination from this analysis to know the amount of variance which socio-economic status, explains. What is gained most from this work is the knowledge that per capita expenditures are related most highly to a measure of socio-economic status than to age and mobility of the population of Ohio cities.

Both the study by Wood and the one by Masotti and Bowen demonstrate two chief aspects of policy studies. Levels of public expenditure seem to be related to a "demand for services" and an "ability to pay" for these services. Wood's analysis indicates that the size of the community creates a need for services that is met by an expenditure from the municipal budget. On the other hand, Masotti and Bowen stress that it is the socio-economic characteristics of the community which account for the level of per capita expenditures for services. In other words, it is the ability of citizens to pay for services which ultimately determines the amount which cities spend. Both of these studies are confined to cities in only two states. Wood uses cities from New Jersey, and Masotti and Bowen study a sample from Ohio. But, demand for services and the ability to pay are two elements of policy studies that have been greatly emphasized in other studies as well. One such study which makes use of a larger sample than either Masotti and Bowen or Wood was conducted by George Pidot.¹⁰

Pidot examines the eighty-one largest metropolitan core areas with the use of a principal components analysis of twenty-six urban characteristics. Pidot's components are relatively hard to label. He is able to label the first three components without difficulty, but he is less certain of the identification of the last three. The first component involves characteristics of high population concentration and density and is called "metropolitanism." The second and third components are inverse measures of wealth and size, respectively. On the basis of the component loadings, Pidot describes the last three as measurements of (1) the absence of older persons and a low-income population, and the

presence of manufacturing, (2) heavy residential development, and (3) urban stagnation. Pidot develops component scores on the basis of the variable loadings on each of the six components for the cities in his sample. Pidot then regresses thirty-four fiscal policy variables on these component scores. The most important single variable in the regression analysis is the metropolitan component, and Pidot concludes that size and its concomitant demand for services is a more significant determinant than the measure of wealth or ability to pay. Another important determinant is state aid. Pidot finds that for each dollar of state aid grant to the city, the expenditures rise \$1.40. However, the use of this last variable is the subject of controversy in the literature on fiscal policy. Because aid funds are simply another source of revenue for governmental units, the use of state or federal aid as an independent variable in a regression analysis raises the question of the interpretation of the variables. Revenue is spent, but it is doubtful that simply the presence of revenue causes expenditures. The two are related and are not independent of one another. Nevertheless, aid variables are consistently used in regression in attempts to assess the effects which they have on policy. The use of these variables is made to determine whether aid is stimulating or replacing local revenue and expenditures.

Three Sets of Independent Variables Used in Regression Analysis

The study reported in this paper uses indicators of all three of the determinants of fiscal policy discussed above. First, the ability of citizens to pay for services is represented by the factors which measure socio-economic status and home ownership. Second, the demand for services

is included in more than one factor. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that specific segments of a community are linked to specific services. It is not sufficient to say that population alone creates a demand. It is necessary to go further and identify which services are sought by which part of the cities' population. Of course with ecological data, it is impossible to say definitely that specific demands arise from population groups described by the data, but inferences can be made. Consequently, the six remaining factors can be assumed to represent specialized interests in the population seeking certain services.

For example, the factor measuring commercial trade could be expected to correlate with police and fire protection because businesses require protection of property. Likewise, housing growth could be expected to correlate with residential services such as park and recreation items and sewer and sanitation expenditures because these services are directly related to housing. In the literature describing the determinants of city expenditures, there is a marked absence of any discussion about which interests actually comprise the demand for services. For the most part, there is a greater emphasis placed on achieving a high coefficient of determination than in explaining the relationships among the variables. Therefore, studies that define demand only in terms of population size or level of urbanization are of little use because they are too general. The six factors used as measures of potential demand from different parts of a city's population will test whether linkages exist between demands and outputs.

Finally, in lieu of variables for state and federal aid to cities, intergovernmental revenue is used. This variable includes all receipts

from other governmental units; therefore, it is not possible to separate the effects which federal versus state funds might have, but nevertheless the variable indicates outside funds which could stimulate or replace local fiscal effort.

Furthermore, this study assesses the impact that two "political" variables have on fiscal policies. The political variables consist of the per cent Democratic vote cast for the presidential candidate in 1960,¹¹ and Index I, a scale of local governmental reformism.¹²

Nationally, the Democratic Party is viewed as the party which favors greater expansion of social services. Consequently, it is expected that high Democratic partisanship should be associated with higher expenditure levels at the local level. On the other hand, reform city government is characterized in some studies as unresponsive to social cleavages in the local community, and the centralized administration of the city manager is pictured as successful insulation of the public purse against the demands of a heterogeneous citizenry.¹³ Consequently, on the basis of these studies, an index of governmental reformism should be a negative determinant of city spending.

In summary, the estimating equations for city expenditures and taxation consist of three sets of variables. The index of reformism and the Democratic vote constitute the first set which are political variables. The second set is composed of factor scores for each city computed from the rotated orthogonal matrix of eight factors. Within these eight factors, home ownership and socio-economic status, represent the ability of citizens to pay for services. The other six factors represent segments

of the population with demands for services. Finally, the third set consists of one variable, intergovernmental revenue. This variable is a proxy for aid from both federal and state sources.

Determinants of Urban Policies

The results of the regression equations are given in table eighteen. This table gives both the zero-order correlation coefficients and the regression beta weights obtained from regressing fifteen fiscal policy variables on the three sets of independent variables described above. The multiple correlation coefficient and the coefficient of multiple determination are included for each dependent variable.

The level of explanation among these estimating equations varies from a high of seventy-six per cent for total revenue to a low of eight per cent for sewer expenditures. However, within these varying levels of R^2 , some overall patterns emerge. The impact of intergovernmental revenue is most clearly evident in fiscal policies that are large, heterogeneous categories. For example, intergovernmental revenue is without question the most important determinant of five variables: total revenue, total taxes, total expenditures and noncapital expenditures, and the measure of total expenditures as a ratio to total aggregate income of the city population. However, these variables represent widely varying city functions and sources of revenue. For example, total expenditures for cities in the northeast region of the United States include activities that are performed by other levels of government in the south. Functions will vary from region to region and even from city to city. Consequently, it is not possible to say which particular city functions are most affected by intergovernmental revenue. But, in order to

TABLE 18

DETERMINANTS OF URBAN POLICIES

Dependent Variables ^a	Political Variables						Factors					
	Index I		DEMO		SES		FAMILY		ETHNIC		MANUF	
	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B
TOTREV	-.109	-.021	.202	.038	-.006	.964	.234	.186	.362	.176	.161	.041
TOTTAX	-.168	-.052	-.247	.055	.049	.096	.263	.232	.471	.332	.166	.080
PROPTAX	-.223	-.069	.251	.022	.014	.062	.198	.161	.488	.355	.180	.086
TOTEXP	-.092	-.024	.207	.058	-.024	.046	.197	.155	.307	.199	.153	.036
NCAP	-.115	-.005	.233	.052	-.028	.039	.247	.204	.366	.185	.148	.035
HIWAY	.101	-.005	-.063	.033	.130	.146	-.048	-.054	.006	-.043	.055	.032
POLICE	.035	.014	.083	.040	.211	.230	.271	.252	.253	.193	.101	.075
FIRE	-.134	-.029	.128	.094	.028	.063	.364	.348	.288	.173	.188	.131
SEWER	-.054	-.136	-.015	.012	-.017	.001	-.043	-.049	-.058	-.115	.085	.043
SANI	.002	-.016	.062	.017	.025	.038	.250	.238	.138	.104	-.001	-.016
PARK	.161	.057	-.059	.011	.144	.150	.247	.238	.097	.078	-.044	-.045
COMMON	.044	-.056	.007	.053	.136	.166	.196	.179	.173	.044	.133	.064
TAXINC	-.164	-.036	.279	.059	-.201	-.149	.197	.147	.432	.286	.163	.070
EXPINC	-.073	-.002	.232	.059	-.285	-.214	.100	.061	.240	.057	.127	.012
GVTDEBT	.044	-.033	.017	.034	-.159	-.130	.004	-.009	-.099	-.170	-.034	-.074

Dependent Variables ^a	Factors						Aid Variable			R ²		
	HOUSE		TRADE		HOME		NMIPOOR		INTERGVT			
	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r		B	
TOTREV	.076	.161	.109	.124	-.322	-.140	-.003	.050	.796	.715	.873	.762
TOTTAX	.055	.104	.107	.125	-.355	-.222	.032	.056	.594	.446	.790	.624
PROPTAX	-.057	-.006	.032	.048	-.345	-.214	-.032	.002	.619	.461	.777	.605
TOTEXP	.106	.158	.1095	.112	-.306	-.126	.037	.084	.757	.695	.826	.683
NCAP	.027	.072	.073	.088	-.341	-.166	.031	.078	.771	.678	.852	.726
HIMAY	.265	.281	.181	.188	.144	.189	-.093	-.081	.123	.192	.434	.188
POLICE	.354	.363	.277	.281	-.329	-.267	.141	.145	.268	.188	.737	.544
FIRE	.125	.160	.232	.249	-.266	-.168	-.026	-.024	.418	.290	.681	.464
SEWER	.181	.231	.038	.048	.047	.102	.042	.054	.100	.149	.292	.085
SANI	.169	.128	.233	.228	-.163	-.124	.249	.249	.132	.102	.506	.256
PARK	.371	.362	.215	.206	-.016	.014	.045	.054	.104	.125	.541	.293
COMMON	.412	.451	.289	.298	-.079	.012	.057	.071	.290	.296	.656	.431
TAXINC	.035	.083	.067	.086	-.352	-.212	.047	.071	.641	.490	.785	.616
EXPINC	.075	.122	.053	.070	-.267	-.090	.89	.134	.751	.700	.819	.672
GVTDEBT	.170	.195	.186	.191	-.067	-.003	.177	.185	.188	.248	.434	.188

^aMnemonics for dependent variables are the same as used in Tables 13, 14, and 15, Chapter IV.

understand the total level of city services, intergovernmental revenue is of prime importance.

The specific services which are affected by external revenue appear to be ones other than the common services which cities generally provide in the United States. This conclusion is based on the fact that intergovernmental revenue has little impact on spending for police, sewers, sanitation, parks, and highways. Overall, when all spending for common city services is added together, intergovernmental revenue has a moderate beta weight of .30, but the size of this figure is considerably reduced from the .72 and .70 which this variable has in predicting total revenue and total expenditures, respectively. As a result, the more important determinants of the individual common functions are found in the factors which measure the social and demographic characteristics of cities. Here segments of the population which should logically demand services are in fact the major factors in predicting expenditures. For example, for both police and fire expenditures the most important variables in the equations are the factors which measure commercial trade and family stage. In the case of police spending, housing growth is also an important variable. Consequently, the groups which could be expected to seek police and fire protection for new houses and business, appear to influence spending for these services.

In general, aggregate measures of demand appear to be more important than aggregate measures of ability to pay in determining policy outputs. In the case of police and fire expenditures, one measure of ability to pay, home ownership, actually has a negative impact on spending for these services. Other studies have noted the relationship

between home ownership and spending and taxing policies in cities.¹⁴ Generally, there appears to be a tendency on the part of home property holders to seek to depress levels of taxing and spending, or at least, this tendency is evident in aggregate measures. Even controlling for socio-economic level of residents does not diminish the impact of home ownership or change the direction of its influence. However, socio-economic status itself does have a positive impact on spending. When all city services are considered as a lump sum, housing growth and commercial trade are the most important factors. Housing growth has a beta weight of .45 and commercial trade has a beta weight of .30 in predicting spending for all common functions. Neither socio-economic status nor home ownership is important in determining the level of spending for all common services. But variables which measure demand for services are positive forces in influencing spending policies.

The role of the political variables is for all purposes inconsequential. Although the zero-order correlations between government structure, per cent Democratic, and the fiscal policy variables rises to modest levels in some instances, when controls are made for the two other sets of variables, the beta weights for the political variables drop to almost the zero level. In only one minor case does the beta coefficient for reformism rise above the .10 level, and for this city function the amount of total variance explained by all the variables combined is less than ten per cent. This finding is contrary to the results obtained by Terry Clark. Clark's study of fifty-one cities shows that reformism is an important determinant of total expenditures. His index generates a beta coefficient of .521.¹⁵ Because of the contradiction in

findings, the regression equations were tested again, but in place of an index of reformism, a dummy variable for type of city government was used. The presence of either the manager-council or commission plans was coded as one for "reformed," and the absence of these forms was coded zero. The results were almost identical with those using an index of reformism. The dummy variable consistently proved to be an insignificant determinant of any of the fiscal policies.

In view of this finding, the overall conclusion is that variables which measure potential demand for services from a city's population are the most important factors in determining the funding level of services. Measures of demand outstrip not only indicators of ability to pay for services, but also the influences of intergovernmental revenue and political variables. Demands appear to affect policy outputs irrespective of partisan or structural considerations in city government. The medium for meeting the demands of a city population whether it is outside aid, partisan dominance, or governmental structure are of little consideration in determining the common functional outputs of cities since demands for these particular services are generally met under any conditions.

Components of Public Policy

Students of public policy have attempted to categorize the functions which governments perform into theoretically meaningful types. Theodore Lowi describes three types of public policies--distributive, regulatory, and redistributive.¹⁶ These policies differ in the level of disaggregation of benefits. From a different perspective, Lewis Froman divides policies on the basis of the number of people that they affect. Areal policies affect the population as a whole, but segmental ones

involve a more limited number of persons.¹⁷ However, all of these categories represent a priori efforts at conceptualizing the public policy. Another possibility for describing policy areas is to factor analysis a set of governmental functions and determine which policies do in fact form dimensions. This approach is tested with the six common functional areas of city government.

A principal components analysis was performed on the city expenditure categories of police, fire, highways, sewers, sanitation, and parks. Two components emerge from this data reduction technique. The first component is composed primarily of police, fire, sanitation, and parks expenditures. The second component is made up of the remaining two variables--highways and sewers. The results of the unrotated principal components are given in table nineteen.

Although the range of these city functions is limited to only the common services which cities provide, there are nevertheless two distinct components which emerge from the analysis. These components in turn represent two types of policies which cities pursue. First, spending for police and fire protection, refuse collection, and parks and recreation involves services that make direct contact with the citizens themselves. These functions are highly visible services for the people that meet citizen needs for protection, sanitation, and recreation. For the most part, these services involve city personnel who deal personally with the public.

On the other hand, expenditures for highways and sewers are aimed primarily at maintaining the physical assets of cities. Highways and sewers generally require bond programs for cities to finance capital

TABLE 19
 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF COMMON FUNCTIONS

Variables	Component I Service	Component II Physical
I. Hiway	.39	.61
II. Police	.85	-.17
III. Fire	.78	-.17
IV. Sewer	.18	.78
V. Sani	.62	-.17
VI. Park	.69	.00
Eigenvalues	2.38	1.07
Cumulative Proportion of Total Variance	.40	.58

improvements of this sort, and the budget expenditures which cities allot for these functions are to a large extent for custodial operations. Once the facilities are built, the cities' responsibilities are mainly for keeping care of the physical objects themselves. As a consequence, these services are more remote from contact with citizens than the services described by the first component. In other words, the fundamental difference between the two components is that some policy areas meet the needs of persons with direct, personal service while others require long term capital outlays and serve people through the physical aspects of a city.

Determinants of Policy Components

Because principal components is, among other things, a method of data reduction, it is now possible to manipulate the original six common functions of cities, as two components. The first component is labeled "service" and the second, "physical." Using the loadings of each variable on these components, it was possible to generate component scores for each city. Consequently, city expenditures for these two policy areas are now reduced to standardized scores for the two policy components, and these component scores are used as dependent variables. The use of component scores in this manner has been neglected entirely in the literature on policy determinants; therefore, this study represents an original effort in this direction.

Rather than continuing the analysis with the same set of independent variables, one change was made for the regression equations. The index of reformism showed little or no impact upon levels of taxing and spending. Even a dummy variable for form of government did little to

indicate that type of city government influences policy. In an effort to test the importance of governmental structure one further way, seven items from the Model City Charter of the National Municipal League were coded as dummy variables and factor analyzed.¹⁸ Two factors emerged; one is related to reforming executive functions of city government, and the second is related to changes in city councils. Factor scores were computed for each city from these factors. Consequently, reformism becomes two factorially derived variables--executive and council reform. These two factors were added to the eight factors already derived and the single variable, Democratic vote. Because of the analytical problems associated with intergovernmental revenue, it is dropped from this analysis. All of these variables then were placed in a regression analysis of the two policy components. The results are given in table twenty below.

The level of explanation varies sharply between these two policy components. The service component is explained relatively well by the independent variables $R^2 = .55$, but the physical component is left largely unexplained, $R^2 = .16$. It appears, therefore, that indicators of the socio-political characteristics of cities are successful in accounting for policy levels for services that are visible and make direct contact with citizens. On the other hand, determinants of spending for the maintenance of the city streets and sewers are in all likelihood related to the size and complexity of these facilities.

Having noted the fundamental differences between the two components and the degree of explanation for both, it is necessary to go further and examine the relative importance of the variables in accounting for these policies. As noted earlier, demand factors play a greater

TABLE 20
DETERMINANTS OF POLICY COMPONENTS

Independent Variables	Component I		Component II	
	Service		Physical	
	r	B	r	B
EXECUTIVE	.030	.103	.034	-.022
COUNCIL	-.046	-.121	-.053	-.141
DEMO	.082	.065	-.071	.019
I. SES	.142	.152	.061	.072
II. FAMILY	.384	.386	-.095	-.083
III. ETHNIC	.277	.251	-.072	-.097
IV. MANUF	.083	.084	.074	.056
V. HOUSE	.311	.315	.279	.314
VI. TRADE	.314	.323	.105	.117
VII. HOME	-.282	-.251	.165	.189
VIII. NWPOOR	.125	.113	-.047	-.031
R	.739		.402	
R ²	.546		.162	

role in determining spending than do measures of ability to pay. This fact is also true for the components. Factors which measure stage of the family cycle, commercial trade, and housing growth are the most significant determinants of the service component. These segments of the population appear to be the ones which would benefit the most from the functions contained in this component; therefore, they also have the greatest impact in influencing the level of these services. Measures of ability to pay are secondary to these demand factors in determining policy. But, perhaps of more noteworthy significance is the role which the reform factors play in the regression results.

As mentioned above, other measures of reformism tested in this study have almost no importance whatsoever in affecting spending and taxing. When factor scores are used, however, these structural characteristics of city government do appear to be variables of some consequence. Although the factors of reformism are in a tertiary class of variables that account for levels of public policy, these two factors, executive and council reform, influence the service component in opposite ways. Council reform measures tend to depress expenditures and executive reform tends to increase the level of this component.

Despite the low level of these two beta coefficients, the inference can be made that these two reform dimensions contained in the Model City Charter result in contradictory pressures in city government. First, executive reform centers primarily around installing a manager or commission form of government and denying administrative power to the office of a mayor. In other words, the effect is to centralize power in the office of a city manager or in the city bureaucracy itself. When this

occurs, the result is a modest positive influence on spending for the service component. Contrary to this, reforms of the council have a negative impact. Restricting the size of the council to no more than seven members, setting their terms of office at four years, and holding elections on an at-large basis produces a negative result on spending for the service component.

The distinctions between these two dimensions of reformism in city government does make a difference in urban policies. A centralized administrative structure for a city promotes spending for services which directly affect citizens. On the other hand, insulating a city council from more direct pressures from voters by having long terms in office and at-large elections tends to reduce the level of spending for these same services. Consequently, while the impact which these two factors has in determining expenditures is not great, the direction of the sign of their coefficients is theoretically important. Lineberry and Fowler argue that cities with the most reformed city governments are the least responsive to cleavages in city populations. But, reformism has at least two dimensions, and it is the reforms which center around the city council that may produce the "unresponsiveness" which Lineberry and Fowler describe. In any event, the council factor does have a negative sign while the factor for executive reform has a positive influence on spending similar to the other factors which measure potential demands for a city population.

Summary

The attack of reformers against partisan politics in city government is in part motivated by the assumption that administration is a technical, value-neutral process. This attitude is summarized in the

reformers' belief that "there is no Democratic way to lay a sewer and no Republican way to pave a street." The results of this regression analysis tend to confirm this attitude. Even controlling for the degree of reformism in city government does not make Democratic partisanship an important variable in explaining levels of outputs. But, if a "political" variable like per cent of Democratic vote has little or no influence on city taxing and spending, also the type of city government has only a marginal impact on city outputs. Perhaps to the consternation of the city reformer, in predicting level of taxing and spending it does not matter significantly whether the city has a manager-council or a mayor-council plan of government.

This finding is somewhat similar to the conclusion reached by Thomas Dye and others about outputs from state governments. After controlling for level of state urbanization, industrialization, income and education, Dye finds that the relationship between measures of party politics and government outputs is greatly reduced. However, the most important determinants of the common city functions are not, as Dye's results indicate, the socio-economic level of the governmental unit, but rather the measures of potential demand from a city population.

Governmental structural variables are clearly secondary to indicators of socio-economic status, but socio-economic status itself is secondary to the types of demands which segments of the population may make upon city government. Although structure of government and measures of wealth and education of citizens are important for understanding the level of outputs from city government, overall it is much more significant to know the social and demographic make-up of a city. In knowing these

characteristics and the type of services which they imply for city governments, it is possible to predict with some measure of accuracy the level of expenditure for these services. Essentially, it is the various groups in a city population and their demands which influence policies.

Concluding Remarks

This study has focused on three major aspects of urban politics: (1) the structure of city government, (2) the socio-political environments of American cities, and (3) the spending and taxing policies of these cities. These three areas have been described in a number of ways and the relationships been explored.

First, an historical analysis of the political theory of American city governments was given. The Glendon Schubert tri-part scheme of public interest theories was used to describe the idealist, realist, and rationalist schools of urban political thought. At different historical periods, each school has been predominant. For example, in the post-Revolutionary War era, the idealist theory was influential. The idealist concept of city government, modeled after the national system, later gave way to the democratizing effects of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian theory. This latter ideology believed that administration is simply another part of representative government and that officials should be held responsible through the elective process to constituencies. Within the twentieth century, the realist influences on city government were replaced by the rise of the corporate model of administration and rationalist theory. According to rationalist theory, city administrators are neutral managers who execute policy in a technocratic system where decisions are essentially apolitical and are made on the basis of rational criteria.

This emphasis upon the rational city bureaucrat carries with it a host of other governmental "reforms." The National Municipal League in an effort to promote these reform notions publishes a Model City Charter. This Model Charter advocates several features of an ideal city government and provides a definitive statement about the content of urban reformism.

Through the use of Guttman scaling and factor analysis the dimensions of reformism contained in these features were explored for 667 cities with populations of 25,000 or more. Three items from the Model Charter form an acceptable Guttman scale of unidimensionality. On the other hand, seven items were factored into two dimensions--one composed of executive reform items and the other of council reform items.

In addition to city government structure, socio-economic characteristics of cities were also factor analyzed. Eight significant factors emerge which describe cities on the basis of social status, family stage, ethnicity, commercial trade, manufacturing expansion, housing expansion, home ownership, and nonwhite deprivation. These eight factors measure both the source of demands for services from local governments and the ability of citizens to pay for urban expenditures and taxes. These eight factors together with variables measuring degree of governmental reform and Democratic partisanship were used in a regression analysis to predict levels of city spending for common services and taxation. The most important determinants of expenditures for common services are the logical sources of demand for these services--commercial trade, housing growth, and stage of family cycle. Political characteristics and the measures of ability to pay are secondary to demand.

Common services were also studied for underlying dimensions. Using the principal components method, common functions were clustered into two distinct policy areas. Services that require personnel who serve the public directly--police, fire, parks, and sanitation--form one policy component. The maintenance of the physical assets of cities--sewers and highways **forms** another.

Again, measures of demand from the population who use these services are the best predictors of the level of spending for these services. However, factors of reform government also play a role. Executive reform has a slight positive effect on spending, but council reform has a negative effect. In other words, the installation of a city manager and the diminution of the mayor's powers stimulates the spending for services. But, the reforming of a council, having a small council composed of members who run at-large and serve four-year terms, tends to reduce spending for common functions. Most importantly, however, it is the measure of the demands from the population which influences policies to the greatest extent; the institutional arrangements of offices are of secondary consideration.

Factor analysis has proven to be a highly useful tool in revealing the dimensions of reformism, socio-economic environment, and policy levels of American cities. Also, the historical dimensions of theories of local government point out the conceptions of the public interest which lie behind various structures. The relationships among the dimensions of all of these areas have been explored. Regression analysis has shown the relative importance of reformism and environment in determining policy components. Theories of structure, measures of structure itself, and the

environment of cities are all important elements in providing an understanding of the level of policy outputs.

NOTES

¹E. L. Thorndike, Your City (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939).

²Peter Hofstaetter, "Your City--Revisited: A Factorial Study of Cultural Patterns," American Catholic Sociological Review, XIII (October, 1952), 159-168.

³Jeffrey Hadden and Edgar Borgatta, American Cities: Their Social Characteristics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965).

⁴Berry's work is reported in Richard Forstall, "A New Social and Economic Grouping of Cities," Municipal Yearbook, 1970 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1970), pp. 102-170.

⁵Cities omitted from study are: Pekin, Ill., Midland, Mich., Austin, Minn., Cheyenne, Wyo., Hilo, Haw., Hampton, Va., Weirton, W. Va., Ashland, Ky., Washington, D.C., Virginia Beach, Va., and Chesapeake, Va.

⁶Hadden and Borgatta, American Cities, p. 36.

⁷Peter Blau and Otis Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), Chapter 4, "Ascribed and Achieved Status."

⁸Robert Wood, 1400 Governments (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).

⁹Louis Masotti and Don Bowen, "Communities and Budgets: The Sociology of Municipal Expenditures," Urban Affairs Quarterly, I (December, 1965), 39-58.

¹⁰George Pidot, "A Principal Components Analysis of the Determinants of Local Government Fiscal Patterns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, LI (May, 1968), 176-188.

¹¹Democratic vote for the city is an estimate based upon the county election returns as a whole.

¹²See Chapter III for a discussion of Index I.

¹³Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 701-716.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 712.

¹⁵Terry Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1968), 588.

¹⁶Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, XVI (July, 1964), 677-715.

¹⁷Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February, 1967), 94-108.

¹⁸See Chapter II for a discussion of executive and council factors.

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
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
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


Manning Dauer, Chairman
Professor of Political Science


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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1971

Dean, Graduate School

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