

THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADMINISTRATIVE  
THEORY TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF  
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN STATE  
COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEMS

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE  
COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1979

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my supervisory committee for the aid they provided me as I worked on this project. Dr. James L. Wattenbarger, as chairman, contributed immensely, not only by sharing his knowledge but, perhaps more importantly, by offering his unflinching interest, concern, and encouragement. Likewise, the valuable contributions of Dr. Michael Y. Nunnery and Dr. Kevin M. McCarthy are sincerely appreciated. The former, especially, sparked my belief in the essential and unavoidable relationship between administrative theory and administrative practice, a belief that lies at the heart of this study. To the latter go my thanks both for his aid on this project and also for his major contribution to my understanding of the structure of language; many of my most rewarding moments as an instructor of English can be attributed to that foundation.

I also wish to thank the community college educators who served on the Delphi panel around which this study revolved. Obviously, without their excellent cooperation, this study would not exist.

Finally, my family deserves my deep gratitude. My wife, Mary Jo, gave me the encouragement, support, and aid, especially in the final stages, that made the completion of this project possible. And I must thank my sons, Andrew and Tyler, for their loving tolerance of the loss of many hours together. I hope that I can repay the debt I have incurred.

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate  
Council of the University of Florida in  
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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June, 1979

Chairman: James L. Wattenbarger

Major Department: Educational Administration and Supervision

The purpose of this study was to investigate the desirable allocation of governance power to state-level boards/agencies and colleges/districts in state community college systems. First, the growth of state coordination and governance and the factors impelling this growth were noted. Likewise, calls for the maintenance of traditional institutional autonomy and the evidence supporting these calls were examined. It was concluded that these sometimes conflicting ideas, coordination and autonomy, were both indeed requirements for effective and efficient state systems. Therefore, balancing these requirements constituted a real, complex, and controversial problem.

This problem was examined by first identifying the issues and nonissues in the allocation of governance power in terms of the opinions of chief executives of state-level staffs for community colleges and of college chief executives. Representing approximately equal samples from each

group, 36 Delphi panelists were asked to indicate at which of five levels, solely state to solely college, each of 55 governance activities should preferably be exercised. A majority agreed on the preferred placement levels for 34 activities; therefore, these activities were identified as nonissues. The other 21 activities were identified as issues. The panelists' opinions regarding the placement of the issues were analyzed, and it was found that panelist role level, state or college, appeared to be a factor contributing to disagreement over the preferred placement of eight issue governance activities. On the other hand, no significant difference was found among the opinions of chief executives grouped by type of state board for community colleges--governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating--in the state where each worked. Consequently, it was concluded that this factor apparently did not contribute to disagreement. Finally, the preferred placements of the nonissues were compared to placements hypothesized on the basis of the prescriptive tenets of bureaucratic and of collegial administrative theory. The nonissue placements were found to be significantly congruent with the theoretical collegial placements. Therefore, it was concluded that collegial theory appeared to underlie, whether consciously or unconsciously, the thinking of the chief executives regarding the placement of nonissue governance activities.

Next, the implications of the study's results for the desirable allocation of governance power in state systems were discussed. The nonissue placements were compared to opinions previously expressed in the

literature and to the ideas of collegial theory, and typically, general agreement was found. Accordingly, 33 of the 34 nonissue placements were recommended as guidelines for practice. Each of the 21 issues was then discussed in terms of the distribution of panelist placement opinions, opinions from the literature, and theorized collegial placements. For most activities, this evidence strongly implied that no more than two, and sometimes one, placement levels were desirable alternatives. For each issue governance activity, then, these alternatives were recommended as guidelines.

Among the more general conclusions in the study, it was suggested that professional opinion, as represented by the panelists' responses and comments in the literature, was characterized by greater agreement concerning governance-power allocation than actually exists in practice. Moreover, the panelists supported the concept of college autonomy more strongly than one might have expected from observing existing patterns. These conclusions perhaps imply that the coordination-autonomy conflict can be dealt with more adequately in practice; equally, however, they perhaps imply that professional influence on actual practice in state systems is limited. Finally, it was suggested that the theoretical consistency of the nonissue placements supported the validity and value of applying administrative theory, especially collegial theory, more extensively to research in this area.

CHAPTER ONE  
THE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The Rise of State-Level  
Coordination of Postsecondary Education

The Growth of Postsecondary Education

Until the past few years, it would not have been inappropriate to describe the development and growth of higher education in the United States as phenomenal. Rudolph (1962, p. 486), in his history of American higher education, summarized this point over a decade ago when he noted that higher education had moved from initially serving a small elite--variously economic, intellectual, or both--to a point where half of the traditionally college-aged youth were engaged in some form of postsecondary education. More recently, Gleazer (1974, p. 6) too noted that nationally about 50% of high school graduates entered postsecondary education and the rate in some states was 70%. As would be expected, the costs of postsecondary education likewise rose. Halstead (1974, p. 520) reported that, between the academic years 1962-63 and 1972-73, operating expenditures quadrupled to 30.2 billion dollars. Even with per-student expenditures increasing very little, the annual growth rate of operating expenditures averaged 14%, twice that of the gross national product.

In the early 1970's however, this growth trend slowed and turned around. The most direct cause of this slowdown was the decrease in the college-age population, resulting from declining birthrates. The size of this group has stabilized in the 1970's and may begin decreasing

this year (Glenny, 1972, p. 43). One reported projection (Glenny, 1974, p. 60) foresees a drop of 22% between 1980 and 1990, and Gleazer (1974, p. 6) thinks any increase before the year 2000 appears unlikely. Furthermore, he does not believe significant increases can be expected in the rate of attendance of high school graduates, given its current level. As a result, an increase in this rate cannot be relied upon to soften the blow of these enrollment trends on postsecondary education. In addition, just as was true in the earlier growth period, these new trends have been echoed in the area of funding. Moreover, this situation has been exacerbated by the rise in other societal demands upon the tax dollar. As a result, postsecondary education has been receiving a declining percentage of governmental revenues (Glenny, 1974, p. 62).

Some observers are more optimistic. Bowen (1974), for example, suggested that nothing in the current situation unalterably prohibits growth in postsecondary education and that appropriate decisions by leaders in higher education, especially in the realms of the basic goal of education (he recommends emphasizing the development of human capabilities over occupational training) and the avenues of access, can make the current stabilization temporary. Certainly, postsecondary education's response to the contemporary environment will affect its future; nonetheless, the consensus evident in a review by Centra (1979) is that the future promises little or no growth in this century.

#### Factors Impelling State-Level Coordination of Postsecondary Education

Ironically, both of these eras in postsecondary education, the boom years of the 1960's and the limited-growth years of the 1970's and beyond, share one effect. Both seem to call for state-wide

coordination and/or control of postsecondary education. Halstead (1974) defined coordination as "the securing of smooth concerted action through effective interrelationships and recognition of common goals" and noted that it "relates the parts of a system to the whole, interrelates parts within the system, and relates the parts and the system to external factors" (p. 3). Since colleges are corporations chartered by individual states, the ultimate responsibility for monitoring these interrelationships inherently and properly falls to the states (Henderson, A. D., 1969, p. 3).

However, the extent to and the manner in which this inherent power is implemented varies with circumstances and has thus changed over the years. When postsecondary education was an elite function, carried out by a limited number of often small institutions and affecting a small segment of the population, the necessity of a state assuming this monitoring responsibility was minimal. As the size and societal impact of postsecondary education grew, however, the necessity of assuming that responsibility also grew. Initially, as pointed out by one state legislator (Graham, 1975, p. 46), this emerging requirement could be and was carried out by legislatures dealing directly with institutions through their governing boards; thus, the legislatures were the coordinating boards. Nonetheless, the postwar growth of postsecondary education, reaching its peak in the 1960's, eventually impelled many legislatures to delegate this responsibility. The increased size and complexity of the postsecondary education establishment required the specific attention of a state-level body created especially for this purpose (Henderson, A. D., 1969, pp. 8-9). As a result, by 1969, 46 states had some type of coordinating agency for

higher education; and of the remaining four, two had a formal, although voluntary, system of interinstitutional communication. Half of these agencies were creations of the 1960's (Berdahl, 1971, pp. 20-21).

As an early proponent of coordinated state systems of higher education, McConnell (1962, p. 136) identified two major reasons underlying the need for such coordination. First, because of the increasingly complex nature of society, diverse educational programs and opportunities are necessary to meet the desires of the citizens and the needs of the society. Second, with the finite financial resources available, these objectives must be pursued efficiently by the system as a whole if each unit in the system is to have the resources needed for a quality program. In McConnell's opinion (1962, chap. 5), only active coordination could meet these concerns because, left alone, institutions tended to move toward a common "typical-college" form as a result of both external (students and parents) and internal (faculty and administrators) pressures. A laissez faire approach, therefore, often led to duplication among schools, defeating the goals of diversity and efficiency.

In general terms, other observers (Halstead, 1974, pp. 4-5, 299; Heilbron, 1973, p. 208; Henderson, A. D., 1969, pp. 8-9) have expressed these same reasons, and Weathersby (1971, pp. 74-75) and Leslie (1975, p. 28) saw these reasons as coming under a single term, accountability. In addition, Smart (1970, pp. 365-368) noted that the campus violence of the later 1960's further encouraged public, and thus state, scrutiny of higher education. Finally, the establishment of state planning as a prerequisite for Federal funding and the emergence of more

sophisticated planning methods and especially the use of computers also, according to Halstead (1974, p. 5), added impetus to the development of coordination.

Perhaps J. L. Miller (1972) stated the need for state coordination most succinctly:

Since the state is the area to be served, only an agency with statewide responsibilities can identify new needs of a statewide nature, identify geographic or programmatic gaps in the system of state service, and initiate action to fill these needs. Only a statewide agency can speak knowledgeably and nonparochially to the state legislature, governor, and budget office concerning higher education's needs--both its continuing needs and its newly emerging ones. Only this agency can determine the present and projected total demand for postsecondary education in the state and rationally allocate among the state's institutions responsibilities for meeting these several needs. (p. 242)

As Mautz (1975a, pp. 48-49) has pointed out, although the original factor impelling the rise of state boards and agencies to coordinate postsecondary education was its rapid expansion, the 1970's brought another *raison d'etre*, the curtailed growth described earlier. Glenny and Hurst (1971, p. 34) were perhaps among the first to see this new impetus for coordination, but today its recognition is widespread. Harclerod (1975, p. 34) has stated that organizations tend to centralize during periods of financial difficulty in order to promote efficiency, and both he and Glenny (1972, p. 47) have noted this trend in postsecondary education. The individual institutions themselves have perhaps added to what might be a natural trend by engaging in what Millard (1974, p. 34) called survivalism. He listed some of the factors precipitating this attitude: the decline in the college-aged population, rising costs paired with limits in government funding, public- and private-sector competition for these funds, and the growth

of the proprietary sector's appeal to students. Finally, the Federal trend to promote a so-called "free market" in postsecondary education has likely exacerbated institutional fear of the potential effects of these factors.

Other observers have reported many of these same conditions, as well as suggesting others adding to the desirability of state coordination. Boyer (1975, pp. 198-200) has noted a more critical attitude toward higher education, growing both within and without it. In addition, he has pointed out that social-policy decisions, such as those resulting in regulations affecting hiring policies, at both the state and Federal level often encourage or impel greater state-level coordination. Glenny (1972, p. 47) suggested that unionism may promote centralization of authority and that the growing move to establish alternative structures to provide postsecondary education to more of the population further increases institutional competition for students. Finally, as Mautz (1975a, p. 50) has observed, the fiscal problems of institutions are compounded by inflation.

Balderston (1975, pp. 72-76) has summed up the effect of these factors as heightened intra- and inter-institutional stress resulting in intrasystem conflict. This conflict--especially when a consequence of Millard's survivalism, the attempt of each institution to preserve and expand its own competitive position--generally does not promote McConnell's basic postsecondary-education goals of effective and efficient diversity within the system. For example, Mautz (1975a, p. 51) pointed out that the decline in the traditional student pool has caused a rush evident in all segments of the system to try to attract the so-called "new" students--the less completely tapped reservoirs of

economically disadvantaged, less qualified, or older students. In many cases, this rush may involve a school going beyond its recognized role in a state's postsecondary-education system. Mautz specifically cited lowered standards as one undesirable effect of this rush. Indeed, Scully (1979), discussing a recently issued Carnegie Council report, described the situation as a crisis in academic ethics that could well serve to erode further institutional autonomy. Equally serious if less academically questionable is the potential for inefficient program duplication that could result from institutional efforts to attract students. Thus, the factors impelling the growth of state coordination of postsecondary education seem evident. The need first appeared in an era of rapid expansion, but it continues to exist. In fact, Millard (1974, pp. 36-38) has stated that the coordinating process was easier during the growth period. A steady state in postsecondary education has not diminished the need; rather, it has merely complicated the difficulty of the task of coordinating the state system.

Although the necessity of state coordination may seem readily apparent, it should be recognized that at least one other basic method has been put forth to promote the general goals of diversity and efficiency within systems of postsecondary education. This alternative is the application of the model of the competitive market to higher education. For example, Weathersby (1971) concurred with the idea that states have a significant stake in insuring higher education's accountability (basically in terms of the goals noted above) to the public, but he pointed out that the means of doing so range from extreme centralization, with government agencies making nearly all policy and allocation decisions, to extreme decentralization, with consumers (the students) ultimately making most decisions through their attendance

patterns. He suggests that the latter is likely the more accurate and responsive method of maintaining accountability. Hoenack and Norman (1974) and Leslie and Johnson (1974) also described the market model approach. As set out by Leslie and Johnson, the mechanism most widely suggested involves government financing of postsecondary education through student grants vice the current institutional grants, i.e., funds budgeted by the state to institutions. Armed with their grants, the students then shop around among the schools, which are pricing their programs at full cost, for the programs that best meet their needs. As the students go about choosing and paying for, with their grants, particular programs from among those offered, the institutions will be rewarded for efficiency, through competitive pricing; and programmatic allocations of the state funds will be distributed in exact proportion to the population's needs. Accordingly, diversity within the system will accurately reflect and continuously respond to the society's requirements, and efficiency will be forced by competition. Thus, the same goals that McConnell cited as impelling state-mandated coordination would be met with a minimum of government intervention in the activities of individual institutions.

A number of questions can be raised regarding the effectiveness of this approach, ranging from ones about the details of applying the market model to general doubts about the actual efficacy of the market model itself. Leslie and Johnson, however, looked at its value in postsecondary education at the most basic level. Thus, ignoring the details of application and doubts of its underlying value, they pointed out that the market model theory specifically assumes, if the model is to operate as postulated, that certain conditions allowing free competition must

exist. Their analysis revealed that these conditions do not exist, and, therefore, they concluded that the actions of student consumers will not result in the hoped-for effects outlined above.

On the other hand, Hoenack and Norman (1974) express an opposing view in their analysis of the model. Certainly, the ultimate value of this approach to accountability in postsecondary education is not yet determined. Its appeal is almost magical, because of both its simplicity and its foundation in values basic to American traditions; and in light of the growing public dissatisfaction with government intervention as a solution to social problems, the model will probably continue to be considered as an alternative. Nonetheless, the majority of observers appear to believe--whether as the result of analyses based on theoretical considerations like Leslie and Johnson's, based on common-sense deductions like McConnell's, or based on nothing more than looking at the organizational trends in the states--that state coordination involving some degree of centralization of powers will continue to be the nearly universal pattern. Furthermore, they generally concur that the steady-state characteristics summarized previously can only encourage the centralization of the coordinating process in postsecondary education. Glenny's opinion (1972) is representative: "What will be needed, as it is in any time of financial restraint, is far more planning than has been done in the recent past, to utilize available resources with greatest effectiveness" (p. 48).

A look at the development of boards to coordinate postsecondary education seems to bear out this view. Before an examination of the trend toward centralization of coordinating power at the state level, it is first appropriate to classify the possible methods available, in

structural terms, to carry out this function. If one begins with the lowest degree of centralization, the initial possibility is of course no state-level coordinating board or agency whatsoever. Beyond that, Glenn and Hurst (1971, pp. 22-26) classified the possible boards into three basic types: voluntary boards, coordinating boards, and single governing boards. Representing least centralization, voluntary boards are made up of institutional representatives meeting together to promote the mutual benefits from coordination of the activities of the colleges. Glenn and Hurst noted that these associations have generally failed to satisfy the public's need for accountability.

Next are coordinating boards. These differ from voluntary boards in that they are state mandated. Furthermore, in nearly every case, such boards include lay members, not just institutional representatives; and usually the lay members are in the majority. As a result, such a board is obviously more likely to provide for public accountability than is the voluntary board. On the other hand, coordinating boards, like voluntary boards, are separated from the institutions themselves by actual governing boards, either for single institutions or for groups of colleges. Berdahl (1971, pp. 20-21; 1975, pp. 2-3) further classified coordinating boards into two types, advisory and regulatory. Advisory boards may only recommend actions, whether to the governing boards below them or the legislative or executive arms of the state government above. Regulatory boards, however, are those which have at least some decision-making powers.

Last, the most centralized form is the single board governing directly all units of a state's postsecondary-education system (with the possible exception of all or some community colleges). The lay

membership of such boards is always dominant; indeed, there is often no official institutional representation at all. Berdahl used the term consolidated governing board for this type.

As one can see from Table 1, formal state-level coordination grew considerably from 1940 to 1974. For example, the number of states with no coordinating agency decreased from 33 to 2 during that period. Moreover, the trend was also toward more centralized coordinating structures. Consolidated (single) governing boards grew slowly but steadily from 13 to 19. And, supporting Glenny's implication, noted previously, that the no-growth era would result in greater centralization of coordinating power, all changes from 1970 to 1974 were in that direction. Indeed, after ten years of a nearly equal division in the growing number of coordinating boards between advisory and regulatory types, 1974 showed a sudden shift in favor of regulatory boards.

Table 1  
Number of States by Type of State-Level  
Postsecondary-Education Coordinating Structure

Type of Coordinating Structure	Year					
	1940	1950	1960	1965	1970	1974
No Board	33	28	17	7	2	2
Voluntary Board	0	3	6	3	2	1
Advisory Coordinating Board	1	1	5	11	13	11
Regulatory Coordinating Board	1	2	6	12	14	17
Consolidated Coordinating Board	13	14	16	17	19	19
Total	48	48	50	50	50	50

Source: Berdahl, 1975, pp. 2-3

The growing centralization of the coordinating function was also illustrated in a 1973 survey by Millard of legislative activity. As Glenny (1974) reported it: "Twenty-three states changed statutes relating to the powers and duties of their statewide boards, almost invariably toward making them more representative of the general public and more powerful in their control, review, and recommending powers" (p. 66). The impact of the facts seems clear: Coordination of post-secondary education is a fact of life, and the current trend is apparently toward further centralization of that responsibility.

### The Community Colleges and Coordination

#### The Growth of Community Colleges

Developments in the community college segment have generally paralleled those of postsecondary education as a whole. Although the first continuously existing public two-year college was not founded until 1901 (Carnegie Commission, 1970, p. 10), these colleges have grown rapidly in number since. According to the Education Yearbook, 1974-75 (Randall, p. 536), 511 two-year colleges existed in 1951, enrolling about 200,000 students. (These and the following figures include two-year branches of four-year colleges and universities, which generally are not classed as community colleges in this study; see "Definition of Terms.") Of these institutions, 294 were public and enrolled over 75% of the students. Just as for postsecondary education as a whole, the 1950's and especially the 1960's represented a period of enormous expansion for two-year colleges. Enrollment from 1951 to 1971 rose almost 900% to over 1.7 million, more than twice the rate for all of higher education. Most of this growth occurred within the ten years before 1971, and during that period the number of public

two-year colleges almost doubled to 637, enrolling almost 95% of the two-year college student body. The Carnegie Commission (1970, p. 3) reported that at the end of the 1960's two-year college enrollments accounted for nearly 30% of the total for undergraduates. Thus, during its growth era, two-year colleges not only shared liberally in the expansion of postsecondary education, but also became a very significant part of the system. Furthermore, the Carnegie Commission (1970, p. 6) predicted that community college enrollments would continue to rise, both in number and percentage of undergraduate enrollment.

These predictions have proven correct; but, like that for all of postsecondary education, the growth rate for two-year colleges has slowed in the 1970's. From 1970 (Greene, 1972, p. 114) to 1975 (Standard Education Almanac, 1977, p. 266), the number of public two-year colleges grew at a slightly reduced rate to 897. Two-year college enrollments also grew to almost 4 million, at a rapid but sharply lower rate of 80%. Still, this rate was close to three times the growth rate for all of higher education; indeed, two-year-college enrollment growth represented nearly two-thirds of the total growth in higher education as a whole.

Therefore, through 1975 community colleges were continuing to expand in number and students, yet their growth too was affected by the steady-state era for postsecondary education that the 1970's ushered in. All the same factors noted earlier for higher education generally, most significantly the stabilization and projected decline in the traditional college-aged population and the increased competition for funding, are affecting community colleges as well. However, they are perhaps suffering less. In 1972, Glenny (p. 44) predicted that

community colleges would be the last to feel the effect of steady state, and the numbers above seem to support his assertion. For one thing, he (p. 46) saw a shift of students from traditional liberal education to career training, which possibly benefited the community colleges. In reviewing the likely future environment for postsecondary education, Harvey (1974, pp. 518-519) saw a similar trend in the form of an increase in short-term training. Furthermore, he felt that, in general, any growth in enrollments that would occur through the year 2000 would have to come in the form of nontraditional--in terms of age, ethnic group, or socio-economic level--students. Gleazer (1974, pp. 7-10) was responding to ideas of this sort when he recommended that community colleges, if they wanted to expand further, had to continue to reflect their name, actively discovering and then meeting the specific needs of their communities and thus serving people as they were rather than expecting them to fit into the traditional college-student mold. Perhaps such trends and such actions will soften the blow of steady state for community colleges. Of course, as noted earlier, Mautz (1975a, p. 51) pointed out that institutions from all segments of postsecondary education are attempting to draw the non-traditional student. Consequently, the success community colleges have in following Gleazer's suggestions will not be a function of their own actions alone.

Thus, during the middle of the twentieth century, community colleges shared the growth trends of higher education as a whole. They shared very liberally in the era of expansion leading up to the 1970's. To their relief, they have shared somewhat less liberally in the downturn in expansion since that time. During both periods,

however, they have shared equally, and maybe more than equally, in one of the results of these times, the rise in state-level coordination and control of their activities.

#### Factors Impelling State-Level Coordination of Community Colleges

Up through the 1950's, the state-level coordination of community colleges was most often carried out by a state's department of education (Martorana, 1968, p. 25); and in many cases, as in California (Lombardi, 1968, p. 28), the coordination was minimal, with the state department preoccupied with its K-12 responsibilities. But the 1960's brought a greater degree of coordination and the beginning of a trend to boards and/or agencies specifically concerned with community colleges (Martorana, 1968, p. 25).

Erickson (1968, p. 23) saw a number of causes for this trend. As was true for postsecondary education as a whole, growth, of course, was a dominant factor. Thus, the rapid expansion of community colleges and their sudden emergence as a significant part of higher education dictated a need for considerably greater planning in this sector. Moreover, as a major partner in higher education, community colleges were affected by the rise in the interdependence of planning for higher education and public policy at the state level in general. Fiscal considerations generating a necessity for coordination included the increase in Federal grants to community colleges, grants often requiring administration or matching by the state, and the trend to a greater state role in community college funding. Finally, Erickson suggested that the successful experience of states engaged in state-level master planning for community colleges reinforced the movement to stronger coordination elsewhere. Wattenbarger (1968, p. 10), saw similar causes,

along with pointing out others. He too noted the rapid expansion of community colleges resulting from an escalating societal desire for postsecondary education and the rise in state and Federal funding for these colleges. However, he also identified other basic factors. One was the growing mobility of the population; this resulted in a public demand for equal educational opportunity statewide, not limited in quality of accessibility by geography. This demand forced states to reassert their leadership role in education, especially in the community college arena where a high degree of local control had been typical. Further, these causes were buttressed by a general "recognition of the value of planning and coordination" in many segments of society and a corresponding trend to centralization.

Other observers noted additional concerns requiring or encouraging state coordination of community colleges. Some of these were outgrowths of expansion. For example, Wattenbarger and Christofoli (1971, p. 1) suggested that the rapid increase of courses and programs at community colleges, a corollary of growth, was a factor impelling coordination. Likewise, the rise of community colleges to a major role in higher education resulted in the need for state leadership in the area of articulation between community colleges and the other segments of a state's education system, so as to ease student transfer (Cohen & Evans, 1968, p. 32).

The increasing complexity of the relationships among community colleges and between them and their environment was another broad area of concern. Much of the growing complexity among the college relationships was also, of course, a function of expansion, and Stuckman and Wattenbarger (1971, p. 43) suggested that legislatures often created

stronger coordinating agencies out of a feeling that experts were needed to meet more difficult problems with more sophisticated solutions. The difficulty of finding solutions was further exacerbated by the swelling number of factors impinging upon system decisions. Wattenbarger (1973) catalogued many of these: student and faculty demands for decision input; Federal legislation; increased activity by accrediting agencies, foundations, and national professional and institutional associations; and, not least, greater regulation by state executive-branch agencies and the legislature itself. Gleazer (1973, pp. 129-135) emphasized this last influence, state government, suggesting that it had been in part promoted by public awareness, resulting to a degree from campus unrest, and by the growing technical ability of government, and especially the legislature, to obtain and digest relevant data more easily. State involvement had also been encouraged by Federal actions, especially the creation of 1202 commissions (Brossman, 1974, p. 95). The result of this plethora of pressures on community college decisions was an obvious need for a greater central authority which could assimilate the burgeoning input and plan with rational regard for it. The complexity of the situation was such that, in California at least (Lombardi, 1968, pp. 27-28), the community colleges themselves supported a state agency solely for these colleges as necessary to provide an effective state-level voice for them.

A final area of concern was, as in postsecondary education as a whole, efficiency in the use of resources. This concern took two primary forms. One was the avoidance of unnecessary overlap in programs offered in a state system (Cohen & Evans, 1968, p. 32), the importance of which was largely an outgrowth of expansion. The second form that

efficiency took was the desire for a general economy in the provision of all services by community colleges (Richardson, Blocker, & Bender, 1972, p. 23). As Gleazer (1973, pp. 129-131) noted, this desire often manifested itself in close observation and possible regulation of some of the detailed factors of cost. He specifically reported increasing legislative concern with items like contact hours, salaries, and facilities; and he used the term accountability to describe these and broader concerns in the area of efficiency. An obvious impetus for this emergence of state-level concern with efficiency, as well as in large measure for all aspects of state coordination of community colleges, was the rise in the percentage of their funding from state-level sources, as specifically pointed out by Cohen and Evans (1968, p. 32) and Richardson et al. (1972, p. 25).

Thus, when all these factors and concerns are taken into account, the strength of the forces compelling the emergence of state-level coordination for community colleges becomes readily evident. Stuckman (1969b) summarized this viewpoint, emphasizing the growth aspect especially, when he concluded:

If the state's educational and occupational needs are to be met, if each citizen of the state is to be provided an equal educational opportunity beyond the high school no matter where he resides, and if the junior colleges are to develop in an orderly, planned manner, a statewide coordinating agency for junior colleges appears to be a necessity. (p. 7)

And Gleazer (1973), reflecting more directly concerns in the area of efficiency noted:

An agency is needed at the state level...to address itself to statewide interests in the light of statewide resources to meet statewide needs. This "quality control" agency can take a dispassionate view of the capacity of institutions to fulfill their state goals with reasonable cost and effectiveness. (p. 194)

These statements were representative of a consensus and were reflected in, or perhaps themselves reflected, the actual state of affairs. In 1970, as reported by Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971), 45 states had some form of state-level board exercising a degree of control, whether governing or coordinating, over the community colleges in their states. They saw the legal form of these boards as divided into four classes. A state board serving only community colleges existed in 13 states. In 12 states, a board of higher education included the community colleges within its field of responsibility. In 5 states a state-university-system board had jurisdiction over the community colleges. Finally, 15 states placed these colleges under the responsibility of a state board of education, which also exercised K-12 responsibility. This form was the most common, but, as noted earlier (Martorana, 1968, p. 25), even this number had declined substantially from earlier years. Singer and Grande (1971, p. 39) suggested the trend in board form was to the first class above, state boards solely serving community colleges, and reported that, from 1965 to 1969, 7 of the 10 states enacting legislation dealing with state-level coordination for community colleges created boards of that type. Further, they pointed out that about 50% of all community colleges nationwide came under the jurisdiction of such boards. Singer and Grande (1971, p. 42) concluded that the emergence of this particular kind of board signaled a growth in state-level power relative to community colleges. However, it seems fair to say that, regardless of specific board form, state-level influence in the affairs of this segment of postsecondary education had risen; at the very least, it was fact that, as the period of expansion for higher education began

to draw to a close, virtually every state with community colleges had a state-level board assuming some degree of control over them.

It was pointed out earlier that in the early 1970's postsecondary education entered an era of slow- or no-growth and that community colleges, though feeling the effects later and less severely, also saw their growth rate decline and their funding become more dear. During this steady-state period the factors impelling state-level coordination or higher education as a whole have been perceived as even more pressing, and the trend toward further centralization of coordinating responsibilities has continued. Again, as they had in the past, developments in the community college arena paralleled those in the general postsecondary-education field.

Consequently, concern over the need for strong coordination of community college systems has, if anything, become greater during the last few years. Various factors enter into this concern. First of all, Glenny (1974, p. 54) pointed out that the community colleges have become more subject to sharing with all of postsecondary education the effects of trends in the general environment. This condition has been an outgrowth of the colleges becoming and being perceived as a full and significant partner in the overall postsecondary-education system, resulting initially from their enormous growth in the 1960's and now being added to by their continued growth, relative to the entire system, in the 1970's. From this viewpoint, Glenny saw four specific conditions that would further strengthen the perceived necessity of state-level community college coordination: "(1) new program developments, (2) shifts in student distribution among postsecondary schools and among the colleges themselves, (3) leveling of state funding for

higher institutions, and (4) the commitment of states to stronger coordination encompassing all of postsecondary education" (p. 54).

Thus, Glenny saw the apparent need for state-level coordination of community colleges as increasing because of their fuller identification as a part of higher education; however, the opinions of Wattenbarger and Hansen (1975, p. 11) suggest the relationship between the colleges and other segments of education may be even more complex. They noted that the colleges' activities overlap and interrelate not only with those of traditional institutions of higher education but also with those of schools, at the secondary or postsecondary level, who offer programs in adult, continuing, or vocational-technical education. In the past, however, coordinated planning of these overlapping activities had not existed, yet concern from state and federal sources over duplication and fiscal efficiency has begun demanding it. Therefore, a new reason for greater coordination has arisen. Overall, then, the community colleges' expanding interrelationships with other educational institutions are, indirectly and directly, resulting in a greater requirement for coordination of their activities by the state.

One of the most significant of the indirect effects, trends that community colleges are sharing with all or postsecondary education, is the stabilization of funding noted by Glenny above. Matorana and Kuhns (1977, p. 50) reported that after increases throughout the 1960's and up through 1971, the percentage of state revenues allotted to higher education began to drop, and the 1977 funding level represented an absolute drop in dollars from the previous year. Certainly, therefore, community colleges have found themselves in a situation where competition for support is tightened. Moreover, a 1976 survey of actions by

state legislatures (Martorana & Nespoli, 1977, pp. 15-17) revealed that the legislatures were becoming more concerned with both the method and level of budget allocations for community colleges. Their conclusion was that nothing particularly indicated any end to the financial problems of the colleges. The effect of this fiscal situation seems familiarly apparent: strong coordination of the community colleges as the state attempts to maintain the demanded diversity and quality of services despite more stringent limitations on resources.

Another factor, related to resource limits, has also affected the trend in coordination. As pointed out earlier, community college enrollments have continued to rise in the 1970's at a strong, if reduced, rate; nonetheless, from their legislative survey, Martorana and Nespoli (1977) concluded, "Institutional growth and expansion is no longer a priority in state legislatures" (p. 16). Martorana and McGuire (1976, p. 9) stated the effect of this attitude more concretely, noting that significantly expanding programs, especially when the expansion dictated additional facilities, and starting new colleges had become more difficult. Obviously, the implementation of this legislative concern again involves shifting responsibility to a state-level coordinating agency or board.

A final factor providing impetus for coordination is the decline in the traditional college-aged population. Once more, though community college enrollments have not proportionately reflected this decline for reasons suggested previously (Glenny, 1972, p. 46; Harvey, 1974, pp. 518-519), its effects do exist, directly in the form of a reduced growth rate and indirectly through its impact on postsecondary education as a whole. It has resulted in greater competition for

students by institutions from all segments of postsecondary education and, consequently, at times has led to the condition described earlier (Millard, 1974, p. 34) as survivalism. The state response to survivalism has necessarily been increased coordination of higher education; and following from Glenny's postulated effect-sharing, the result is again a strengthening of community college coordination.

Accordingly, it seems clear that the dampening of the community college boom has merely enhanced the need perceived by the states for coordinating this segment of postsecondary education. Indeed, a 1974 survey of 100 university professors specializing in community college operations revealed that they believed planning--the soul of effective coordination and the watchword of the expansion era--continued to be the most critical issue facing these colleges (Martorana & Kuhns, 1977, p. 44). As Glenny (1974) stated, "The immediate future points to a greater and fuller involvement [on the part of community colleges] in the planning and financial control imposed by the state" (p. 53).

Paralleling the situation for higher education as a whole (Table 1), the forms that have evolved in state-level coordination of community colleges in the 1970's reflect the increasingly compelling reasons for coordination identified above and support the contention that the power of the state-level agencies has grown. Table 2 first indicates, for selected years, the distribution of state-level boards most directly coordinating community colleges within each state by the structure classification of Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971). Next these boards are distributed by their functional power, governing or coordinating. (When a source did not explicitly place a board within either category, the board was designated governing or coordinating on

the basis of the existence of institutional governing boards. In other words, if no governing board stood between a state board and that state's colleges, the state board was designated governing; the existence of intervening governing boards classed the state board as coordinating.)

The variations between the 1974 and 1978 distributions do not appear to be sufficient to warrant any conclusions, but two major shifts between the distribution pattern for 1970 and the general pattern exhibited in 1974 and 1978 seem definitely noteworthy. First, when one examines the distributions of state-level boards by structure, a clear drop in the number of systems under the jurisdiction of no board or a state board of education can be seen, offset, of course, by a corresponding rise in the number of states having boards in the other three categories. Obviously, the decline of no-board states represents a shift to a more powerful state-level structure. On the other hand, the shift of state-level coordinating responsibility from a state board of education to some other structure does not inherently and invariably represent a move to greater state-level power; but it is suggested that, as a general rule, this is indeed the intent. Typically, under a state board of education, coordination of the community colleges is overshadowed by K-12 concerns; moreover, the colleges are isolated somewhat from the rest of a state's higher education system. Thus, on the whole, shifting coordinating responsibility for community colleges to a separate board or a board dealing specifically with higher education would appear to represent, in nearly every case, an attempt to provide for closer inspection of community college operations and greater ability to coordinate their

Table 2  
 Number of States by Type and Functional Role  
 of State-Level Community College Coordinating Board

Type of Board	Year		
	1970	1974	1978
No Board	5	2	1
State Board of Education	15	10	11
University System Board	5	10	8
Board of Higher Education	12	14	15
Community College System Board	13	14	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>
Functional Role			
No Board	5	2	1
Coordinating	28	18	20
Governing	17	30	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>

Sources: 1970--Wattenbarger &  
 Sakaguchi, 1971;  
 1974--Berve, 1975;  
 1976--"Fact-File," 1978

activities with those of other segments of higher education. As a result, then, the change in the distribution of state-board structures clearly seems to point up an increase in coordinating power over community colleges at the state level.

A second obvious shift came in the distribution of boards identified as coordinating versus governing. In 1970 a clear majority were

coordinating; in 1974 and 1978, the reverse was true. Saying that this shift represented an increase in state-board power needs no explanation.

Overall, then, the current trend in coordination of community colleges is readily apparent--expanding responsibility increasingly centralized at the state level. The consensus of a number of observers is that this is the case, and they have revealed the factors which have led up to and continue to support this trend. Moreover, their contention has been unequivocally supported by the actual trend in state-level board structures and powers. Of course, the general rule does not apply in the case of every state. The community colleges of Nebraska, for example, successfully fought in the legislature in 1975 and then in the state courts in 1976 to be returned to nearly full local-board control (Paradise, 1976). Even in that case, the legislature has continued to discuss means of reinstating state-level coordination (Jacobson, 1978; Paradise, 1978). Thus, the evidence nationwide compels one to conclude that the significant rise of state-level boards exercising a good deal of power over community colleges is not likely to subside.

### The Concern over Institutional Autonomy

#### Introduction

In the previous sections, the course of higher education and state-level coordination of it has been charted. The phenomenal growth of institutions since World War II, peaking in the 1960's, resulted in a rise of concern at the state level for insuring that this expansion served state interests, effectively through appropriate diversity of opportunity and efficiently through avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort. This concern found expression in the establishment, in nearly every state, of some board or agency to

oversee and coordinate the activities of higher education institutions. When the era of expansion ended in the early 1970's, the perceived need by the states for coordination of higher education did not; instead, concern for continued system effectiveness, coupled with an even more pronounced desire for efficiency in resource utilization, resulted in a continuance, and often an increase, in the coordination function at the state level.

Developments in the community college field generally paralleled those in higher education as a whole, as also explained previously. Through the early 1970's, these colleges grew at an even more rapid pace than their partners in higher education; consequently, they too saw state-level oversight over their operations grow. Since the end of the boom in higher education, the community colleges have continued to grow at a healthy if reduced rate; however, they have avoided the full brunt of the slow-growth era to a lesser degree in other areas. Like the other segments of higher education, they have seen their funding become more dear, and they too have been subject to an increasing level of state-board control in the name of accountability.

#### Autonomy and Coordination in Postsecondary Education Generally

As one would expect, this movement toward greater control at the state level has caused some consternation at the institutional level within all segments of higher education. Perhaps a statement by a proponent of voluntary consortia (Quehl, 1972) revealed the depth of feeling that the issue can evoke:

Originally established because they made good social, educational, and fiscal sense, many [centralized state systems of higher learning] have grown to deny basic autonomy to individual campuses and erode public confidence, often leaving individual colleges and state agencies in

adversary positions. Too often the result has been a monolithic system that has routinized and dehumanized education, has stimulated the rise of unionism among faculty members, and has helped to push many states to the brink of bankruptcy. (p. 257)

Quehl failed to support his evaluation with specific examples, and it seems likely to be undeservably harsh; nonetheless, it indicates the degree of the concern that has arisen.

Leslie (1975) suggested that the root of the institution/state-board conflict is the clash of similar claims to power that, indeed, are often legitimate and sometimes actually delegated, implicitly or even explicitly, to both sides by state government. He stated:

On the one hand, statewide coordinating bodies demand--legitimately--that institutions be more responsive or accountable to the needs of society. On the other hand--and equally legitimately--the institutions insist that they must be left alone if they are to satisfy such purposes as the critical evaluation of society and the transmission and advancement of learning and wisdom. (p. 39)

Thus, Leslie and even, if one looks closely, Quehl identified the inherent dilemma behind the conflict--the fact that state coordination is a two-edged sword, fully capable of slaying dragons but also capable, if it is not wielded carefully, of inadvertently beheading the damsel in distress on the backswing. Corson (1971) described the dilemma in more specific terms:

The surveillance [by state governments] has done much to avoid duplication of facilities and to husband scarce resources; but it also has curtailed the administrative autonomy of the individual institution. It has markedly limited the freedom with which institutional administrators and faculties can hire personnel, build buildings, revise curricula, and even define their own purposes. (p. 435)

Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) defined the problem from the perspective of those who must attempt to solve it: "The danger of creating a board with insufficient power is that the public interest

will not be adequately protected; in creating a board with too much power, that the necessary autonomy and initiative of the institutions will be threatened" (p. 6). Overall, it is apparent that the issue of autonomy versus coordination is real and valid.

The fact that institutions of higher education require some degree of autonomy if they are to thrive is widely agreed upon. One of the earliest studies on the issue of institutional autonomy versus state control (Moos & Rourke, 1959) generally endorsed the efficacy of broad institutional autonomy. In 1963 Brumbaugh, in an early effort to provide guidelines for the state planning and coordination process, stated that, within the limits necessary for effective coordination, colleges must be granted as much autonomy as possible. This basic maxim has since often recurred in the literature. For example, an Education Commission of the States Task Force (The Task Force on Coordination, 1973) repeated the recommendation, noting that some college autonomy is necessary if the colleges are to have the flexibility to adapt to a shifting environment. Halstead (1974) stated that extensive institutional autonomy is necessary to maintain academic freedom, "preserve self-initiative," "encourage healthy competition," and "permit a responsible balance between" college and societal interests (p. 13). He later supported this opinion by suggesting that a college must be recognized "as an entity with a character that must be achieved through the pursuit of goals." Thus, like humans, colleges have "hopes and ambitions" to fulfill and will "become nonproductive" if these desires are not fulfilled (p. 224). Finally, Harclerod (1975, p. 34) concurred in these assessments of the value of autonomy and recommended that higher education could profit from the recent experience of large

businesses, especially conglomerates, who have learned that a good dose of operating autonomy for system elements generally results in maximum efficiency in resource utilization.

A number of observers have identified some of the deleterious effects of overly zealous state coordination, though these comments have typically been rather broad. One common complaint, reported by McConnell (1962, pp. 141-142), is that state coordination can result in a leveling of quality among a state's colleges. McConnell himself felt this result was indeed a possibility but far from inevitable, and the intervening years do not seem to have produced much evidence to justify the fear. However, some of the suggested effects may be more real. Chambers (1977), for example, expressed the opinion that excessively detailed external control of institutional budgets could "stifle instructional programs, confuse the faculty and students, lower their self-esteem and add to their anxieties, and largely destroy the morale of the whole enterprise" (p. 25). This assessment may be overstated, but it does reflect some of the thinking of the proponents of autonomy above. Also echoing their concerns, Balderston (1971, p. 109) stated that state coordination can rob the campus leadership of the flexibility to respond to the concerns of internal constituencies, perhaps lessening efficiency. Martin (1974) extended this viewpoint to suggest that institutional administrators and faculty in a strongly coordinated system can, perceiving themselves as relegated to implementing the wishes of others, experience "feelings of powerlessness" (p. 32). The ultimate irony and danger inherent in this situation was noted by Perkins (1975, p. 193) when he pointed out that, if reduced autonomy does impair the ability of the campus administration to operate its

institution efficiently, the likely result is increased external control--exacerbating the original unsatisfactory situation and thus initiating, perhaps, a spiraling deterioration. Overall, then, it seems a reasonable foundation does exist for concern regarding the maintenance of college autonomy in the face of state coordination.

At the same time, however, the necessity--or, at the very least, the inevitability--of state coordination has been established previously here; and furthermore, a number of experts have argued convincingly that, in some ways, state coordination may be essential in preserving institutional autonomy. For example, Mautz (1975b, p. 173) expressed this view, noting that some centralization of power in a state board can insure, to some extent, institutional autonomy from undue interference by the legislature or governor. This concern over state-government intervention was repeated by Millard (1975), saying, "The real danger [for autonomy] is that responsibility for planning and coordination of postsecondary education will pass out of the hands of state agencies created for this purpose and move into the hands of general state planning agencies, for whom education does not constitute the first priority, or directly into executive or legislative control" (p. 206).

Especially in his reference to the executive, Millard was reflecting a worry stated earlier by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1971). They noted that, in light of increased public attention to and growing public expenditures for higher education, governors could and, in some cases, had become controlling forces. Though they admitted the effect was not uniformly bad, they generally felt "that governors should not be the dominant forces in higher education" (p. 2).

That the governors have been concerned and that their concern has grown during the steady-state period of the last few years seems readily apparent from previous sections on the rise of state coordination. Their attitude is forcefully illustrated by comments reported by Magarell (1976). He quoted Gov. Sherman W. Tribbit of Delaware as saying, "Even the most cursory glance shows that some of the funds for higher education are ill-spent. For example, in a state as compact as Delaware, we have six nursing programs in the institutions of higher learning. That strikes me as extremely wasteful of our limited resources" (p. 11). Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr. of California stated (well before Proposition 13), "We are entering an era of limits. It's now a question of reordering priorities and choosing one program over another, based on a rigorous standard of equity and common sense" (p. 1). Obviously, the question Mautz and others have spotlighted is who will get to define what represents "equity and common sense." Only a partial answer is certain: It will not be defined unilaterally by the institutions. Consequently, higher education has been left with the admonition of Glenny and Hurst (1971):

The choice of institutions is not between coordination and no coordination but, rather, between effective coordination by an agency which stands in the no man's land between the institutions and the state government and the ingestion of coordinative powers into the executive branch of the government. (p. 38)

Furthermore, they (p. 39) reinforced the import of this point by predicting that the development of management information systems is facilitating this possible executive (as well as legislative) assumption of power. Relatively, then, state-board coordination perhaps takes on a more benign countenance.

In addition to concurring with the belief that a state board can temper the impact of state government, Balderston (1971, pp. 106-109) suggested other advantages for institutions that can accrue from an effective state coordinating board. He noted that a college's role, assuming it were judged legitimate and thus validated by the state's master plan, could be protected. Likewise, appropriate budgetary needs might be protected from attack. Internal planning could be facilitated by the availability of state-wide data from the board and the stability resulting from the master plan. Finally, subject to the public effectiveness of its leadership, a state agency could have a positive effect on the public perception of higher education. Taken as a whole, these possible state-board contributions represent a stabilizing influence on the extra-institutional environment that could aid in the preservation of essential autonomy. In addition to these possible advantages, Johnson (1975) and Goodall (1974, pp. 226-227) suggested that the colleges and universities may specifically welcome one aspect of state-level coordination during the no-growth era: That is the review of existing programs. Johnson stated that administrators "privately . . . will admit that the state-level reviews may give them more latitude and power to eliminate weak programs that sap their funds" (p. 49). To this, Goodall also added that legislators too may prefer to have such potentially unpopular decisions made elsewhere. Again, therefore, the result of state-board activity can be an indirect strengthening of institutional autonomy.

The consensus of many observers, then, is basically represented by a statement by the Education Commission of the States' Task Force on Coordination, Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education

(1973): "The task force believes that the most effective means of preserving and enhancing the functional autonomy or reasonable independence of institutions lies in effective planning and cooperation with the appropriate state agencies" (p. 74).

A review of the foregoing thus reveals agreement that state-level coordination of postsecondary education plays an important role in the process of insuring that the needs of state government and the public it serves are met. Accordingly, coordination is probably necessary and certainly inevitable. Moreover, effective state boards can provide valuable service for individual colleges and universities and can also help protect a degree of institutional autonomy. At the same time, however, state boards do represent a possible source of harm to postsecondary institutions if these boards act so as to reduce institutional autonomy to a level below that necessary to allow for the flexibility required for effective and efficient operation. This minimum level may have been reached in some instances; whether it has or not, the possibility of doing so exists. During the current no- or slow-growth era, widely expected to continue for the rest of the century, the impact of state-level coordination on institutional autonomy will, if anything, grow, according to Berdahl (1975, p. 1) and Ketter (1975, p. 80). In the words of Glenny (1972), "Greater state intervention and less institutional autonomy is a trend which will accelerate" (p. 48).

Furthermore, this trend, even if it is slowable or stoppable, can hardly be reversed because of the significant pressures, documented previously here, that impel coordination. In 1977, for example Jacobson reported the ruling, on the basis of the state constitution, of the supreme court of Nebraska protecting the power of the Regents

of the University of Nebraska to manage the school free from state-government interference. Nonetheless, the university administrators admitted that they had to continue to act so as to maintain harmony with the state and its basic desires, since the legislature represented its major source of funds. Consequently, the present environment necessitates some coordination and an attendant decrease in autonomy, regardless of tradition and legal structures.

Therefore, the issue of coordination versus autonomy continues to evoke concern and will likely continue to do so. Coughlin (1977) has provided witness to this fact of life for postsecondary education, reporting the completion of one study in the area and the commencement of another. The former, a Federally sponsored report, predictably recommended additional cooperation between the Federal government, the state governments, and the colleges "because the allocation of scarce resources requires greater 'efficiency and coordination to prevent overlap and costly duplication'" (p. 9). The latter was a study, to be concluded in 1979, funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation on these same Federal, state, and local relationships with, among other questions, specific regard for "how a university can reconcile its financial dependence on the Federal and state governments with its traditional autonomy and academic freedom" (p. 9).

The situation is, then, that state-level coordination is inevitable, necessary, desirable, and potentially harmful. The ultimate problem remains that stated, in representative fashion, by Martorana (1975): "The task is to find ways to preserve the creativity and diversity of services in postsecondary education which flow from institutional autonomy and freedom while assuring that these advantages

do not generate a wasteful and vicious competition among the institutions and systems involved" (p. 203).

### The Autonomy and Coordination of Community Colleges

This same problem confronts the community colleges in particular. It has been seen that these colleges have paralleled higher education as a whole in terms of their growth and the growth of state-level power to coordinate them. Likewise, concern has arisen within these colleges over a perceived diminution of their autonomy. This concern, of course, has similar roots to that discussed above, but in some cases, it is further heightened by the traditional local orientation of most community colleges.

This significant factor in the community college response to coordination was pinpointed by Stuckman (1969b):

The concept of coordination is not compatible with the traditional philosophy of the locally-governed community college. In attempting to meet the educational and occupational needs of its service community, each institution has paid little or no regard to the activities of its neighboring institutions. Commensurate with the pattern of local autonomy, each institution has traditionally developed its own philosophy, educational programs, and areas of interest. (pp. 2-3)

Clearly, this attitude in part produced the need for state coordination of the colleges; at the same time, it also explains the strong feelings of concern over their lessened autonomy that necessarily flowed from this coordination.

Singer and Grande (1971) expressed this concern when they indicated their belief "that the one factor which, if continued, could create the greatest change in the future direction of the community colleges is the increased role by the state in either coordinating or governing institutions which historically has been played by local

agencies" (p. 38). Gleazer (1973) emphasized in more specific terms this local/state conflict peculiar to the question of autonomy in community colleges:

There will be more state-level boards. . . . Local boards are apprehensive that this may mean decreasing community orientation and the capacity to respond easily and quickly to local needs. Where local boards exist, often there is a strong sense of community loyalty and faith in the merits of localism. (p. 137)

He added that, in systems lacking local boards, concern was growing over the ability of the colleges to respond to local needs.

That this potential threat has concerned the local leadership of many colleges has been revealed by surveys. For example, G. L. Hall (1974, p. 6) noted a 1972 survey of community college trustees by Peter K. Mills for the Association of Governing Boards. It indicated that more than 60% of the trustees felt institutional independence to be in danger, with 42% believing increased centralization of decision making to be a cause. More recently, a 1975 poll of board chairman of colleges and universities cited by Martorana and Kuhns (1977, p. 44) revealed that 64% believed that institutional planning in the academic realm was facing increasing intervention by the state. Moreover, this belief was even more prevalent, at 82%, among the chairman of community college boards. Additionally, Martorana and Kuhns (p. 45) noted Norman Harris' report, developed from meetings with over 80 community college presidents nationwide in 1973 and 1974, that these administrators considered the impact of state coordination to be a major concern of their colleges.

In evaluating the 1965 reorganization of community colleges in Illinois into a state-coordinated system, which he strongly favored,

Erickson (1968) listed a sampling of specific questions that had or could arise in his state over the state/college relationship:

Is the Statement of Standards and Criteria for the Evaluation on Recognition of Illinois Public Junior Colleges too prescriptive? Will procedures for state approval of proposals to add new curriculums diminish local creativity and initiative? Do procedures for approving detailed vocational-technical curriculums and qualifications of teachers by the State Board of Vocational Education reduce the autonomy of local faculties for curricular development and staffing? Are policies and procedures for state approval of capital projects for shared funding flexible enough to permit development of adequate campuses for truly comprehensive programs? (p. 26)

Obviously, the specific issues that arise will vary from state to state, yet these questions provide an inkling of the sorts of problems that can exist and that result in concern at the institutional level.

The initial period of growth for significant state-level coordination of community colleges was just ending when Wattenbarger (1968, p. 11) predicted, correctly it seems, that the trend in that direction was irreversible. He then proceeded to identify the central problem that emerged from the trend--the necessity of preserving the most significant strengths of local control. Similarly, Martorana (1968) stated, "The most delicate and critical issue that a state board for community junior colleges must face . . . is [determining] the proper relationship to maintain between its role and that of the individual colleges it oversees" (p. 27). As Gleazer (1973, p. 151) pointed out, the question is properly not a simple one of "either/or" but rather the complex one of developing an appropriate division of labor in decision making. Stuckman (1969b) identified the difficulty in devising such a proper allocation of roles when he noted the alternatives: "Too much authority vested in the [state coordinating] agency is inimical to institutional autonomy; too little authority results in little or no coordination

which is detrimental to the provision of quality education and, thus, to the state's welfare" (p. 11). Overall, C. W. Hall (1968) summed up the final aim in creating this effective state/local relationship as trying "to bring together, in productive harmony, the values of statewide coordination and the vigor of local control and responsibility" (p. 34).

The basic issue, therefore, is fundamentally the same as that indicated for all of higher education, and the heart of the issue is likewise similar, the dual personality of state coordination. As was very briefly reviewed above and thoroughly established earlier, the coordinating process clearly has valuable results for the state and its citizens and, accordingly, has become a virtual necessity. On the other hand, the process also holds the potential for harm if it reduces college autonomy to a level where the college's effectiveness in meeting the educational needs of the public is diminished. Obviously, this potential for harm is conditional upon the assumption that autonomy, to some degree, is a necessary ingredient for the successful operation of a community college.

The earlier quote from Stuckman indicated that a great deal of autonomy is generally traditional for community colleges. Yet, existence is not tantamount to necessity. However, those expressing concern over coordination's possible effect on community college autonomy implied, as has been seen, that this autonomy was indeed requisite to quality; and this viewpoint is common in the literature.

For example, in 1968, after analyzing the initial rise of state-level coordination of community colleges, Martorana (p. 29) pointed out that these new state boards and agencies, despite their necessary value,

had, in his opinion, to grant a good deal of power to the "local administrative structure" to insure the attainment of the boards' own goals of system and unit effectiveness and economy; the boards alone could not efficiently operate the colleges. At about the same time, Wattenbarger (1968, p. 9) suggested that studies to that point had placed local control of community colleges in a position approaching the religious qualities commonly attributed to cleanliness. These studies indicated that the strong autonomy represented by local control generally resulted in the rapid growth of colleges in a state system, compared to that in state-governed systems; in more comprehensive curriculums, especially in the occupational areas; and in higher evaluations on traditional measures of quality, such as faculty and facilities. He did not, however, believe the evidence completely justified calling local control a necessary and sufficient cause of such results; nonetheless, he (p. 11) considered it clear that the strengths of autonomy should be retained as much as possible within the structures for coordination required by the times.

Cohen and Evans (1968, p. 32), reporting on a statewide conference in New Jersey to develop guidelines for its state/local relationships, identified four factors making the maximum possible local autonomy desirable. First, as suggested above by Wattenbarger, autonomy had historically been shown to aid college development. Second, the use of some local taxes to support partially the colleges implied some inherent right existed to a degree of local control over their allocation. (This basis for autonomy exists in most, but not all, states.) Third, contemporary administrative theory, they said, indicated that decisions should be made at the level at which they are implemented.

They considered this requirement especially important in organizations, like the colleges, made up primarily of professionals. Fourth and last, autonomy was necessary if the colleges were to be able to respond to local educational needs.

Without denying the significance of the first three, the last factor seems to dominate the arguments of supporters of reasonably strong community college autonomy. The idea was often implicit in the previously presented statements of concern over autonomy in these colleges, and it is the primary item--along with local funding, less universal and perhaps less important--that separates the issue of community college autonomy from that of institutional autonomy for all of higher education. Stuckman (1969b, p. 13) emphasized this factor in stressing the importance of autonomy for these colleges, as did Zoglin (1974) more recently. In a similar vein, Brossman (1974) noted, "Decision making at the level where people are most affected by the decisions in most cases provides judgements that put students first" (p. 87). In other words, autonomy promotes responsiveness. Early in the decade which was characterized by the explosive growth of community colleges, the 1960's, McConnell (1962, pp. 132-133) had seen this fact when he recommended that 2-year university extension centers were an inadequate substitute for community colleges because, being merely integral arms of a state university, they failed to provide programs that met unique and diverse local demands.

A number of specific reasons why such responsiveness is critical in community colleges have been advanced. Reflecting McConnell above and Wattenbarger earlier, Harris (1972, p. 246) stated that the community-needs orientation of these colleges was, in part, responsible for the

valuable diversity in vocational preparation that had become available. Knoell (1976) pointed out--on the basis of her study of community college students, supported by the California Postsecondary Education Commission--that a majority of these students were part-time and had goals that often did not fit into traditional programs, transfer or terminal. Consequently, she argued, the colleges required a significant level of autonomy in order to be able to create educational opportunities appropriate for these students' desires, desires that were constantly changing and often unique to a single or small number of colleges within a system. The necessity of community college responsiveness is further underlined when it is noted, as Zoglin (1974, pp. 20-21) did, that for many students a single community college represents their only viable source of postsecondary education. As a result, a college in this position must have the ability to react to any reasonably broad demand for education within its service area.

Finally, responsiveness to its local public is not only the stock-in-trade and *raison d'etre* but indeed the lifeblood of community colleges. Gleazer (1974, p. 7) noted that this characteristic has in the past and will in the future largely account for the growth of these schools. As Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972, pp. 36-37) pointed out, a community college, more than any other type of higher education institution, is dependent upon community support--for money, moral support, and students. To earn this support, the college has to be able to provide the services desired of it. And certainly, to a great extent, a healthy college is in the state's interest as well. Examined closely, then, the community responsiveness argument for a good deal of community college autonomy does appear to be a strong one. When to this

argument the other factors mentioned are added, the complete case is rather impressive.

Nonetheless, a somewhat opposite viewpoint can be taken. Reacting to certain recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Richardson (1972) stated his belief that neither substantial local funding nor a local governing board is essential for community colleges and that local decisions are not inherently better than state-level ones. He summarized his attitude by saying, "The emphasis placed upon local autonomy, while desirable from the standpoint of those of us who currently enjoy it, does great disservice to states such as Virginia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Colorado where strong state systems have been established and are providing excellent community college services" (p. 26). To the extent that Richardson was saying that a specific system structure automatically guarantees neither adequate nor inadequate college autonomy, few would probably argue with him. Yet, it is telling that one of the states he named as exemplary among those with state-governed community college systems had itself admitted the necessity of fairly strong local input. Thus, two years after its founding in 1966, the Virginia system delegated some operating responsibilities to its colleges' local advisory boards and provided for direct local appointment of board members as opposed to appointment by the governor (Wellman & Hamel, 1969, pp. 52-54). The point then that seems to have been illustrated is that the process of coordinating community colleges at the state level should recognize the value of providing at least some local autonomy, especially given the importance of strong college/community relations.

Consequently, the support for significant autonomy for community colleges appears broad, clear, and generally convincing. Likewise, however, the forces impelling state-level coordination of community colleges, as reviewed earlier, appear to compel the conclusion that this process too is not only inevitable but also legitimate and necessary. Added to this conclusion is the fact that several observers have suggested, as was pointed out for higher education in general, that coordination has some potential for protecting the autonomy and integrity of the individual college, in addition to benefitting the state. For example, Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972, p. 31) said that an effective coordinating board, one that has earned the confidence of the state government and the institutions, is in a position to bring rationality to the process of determining state funding, thus stabilizing the planning environment for the colleges. A more general statement of institutional advantage was made by Millard (1973), who expressed the opinion that a coordinating board could "strengthen the roles and leeway or functional autonomy of institutions in fulfilling their purposes or reasons for being" (p. 8). Brossman (1974) provided an illustration of how this might happen. He noted that the existence of Federally mandated 1202 commissions could easily lead to greater centralization of control over community colleges, and he felt that in California the Board of Governors of Community Colleges, the state-level coordinating board, was the only agency that would "be able to modify it [the effect of the 1202 commission], attenuate it, and channel it in the right directions" (p. 95) and thus maintain the extant autonomy enjoyed by the colleges.

In the final analysis, then, one sees in the community college arena, as was true of postsecondary education generally, an unavoidable conflict of desires--the state government's desire for coordination, with its goals of meeting the public's educational requirements within the standards of efficiency also demanded by the public, and the community college's desire for the autonomy necessary to effect its goals, quickly responding to local educational needs effectively and with efficient use of not only the state's but also the local district's resources. Obviously, both desires are legitimate; therefore, the resolution of the conflict is not and cannot be simple, a win-or-lose affair; rather, it must be balanced and equitable, serving to maximize the goals of both parties.

Kerr (1975) succinctly set forth both the importance and the difficulty of reaching such a resolution:

The basic dangers of centralized control are institutional homogeneity and loss of institutional flexibility. States can be urged to prevent these consequences by insisting only on such controls as are absolutely necessary and giving to institutions the greatest amount of autonomy possible. But that is easy to say and there are no obvious structural mechanisms to propose to guarantee such a result. (p. 10)

The purpose of this study was not, unfortunately perhaps but realistically, to discover and set out those ideal structural mechanisms that have eluded Kerr. It was, however, its purpose to aid in that search, with particular reference to community college systems.

CHAPTER TWO  
THE STUDY

Introduction

In Chapter One, the rise of state-level coordination of post-secondary education was traced. It was seen that after World War II the student population of postsecondary education began growing rapidly, and this growth continued at an increasing rate, finally reaching its peak during the 1960's. As well as growing in size, the colleges and universities also grew in number. Likewise, the expenditures of higher education grew and, partially because of the greater sophistication of programs and the required facilities, grew at a rate higher than that of the student increase. Accordingly, government revenues dedicated to higher education also grew absolutely and in percentage of total budgets. In response to this growth and to other factors, state governments began to decide that this state activity now required greater oversight. As explained by McConnell (1962, p. 136), their goals were primarily to insure a diversity of opportunity sufficient to meet the educational needs of the states' citizens and to do so in a fiscally efficient manner, so that maximum quality and quantity could be obtained with the finite resources available. The result of this concern was the creation of state-level boards to coordinate and/or govern the activities of the institutions of higher education.

In the early 1970's, the growth of the traditional college-age population suddenly began a sharp decline. This fact, coupled with a

downturn in the economy, quickly effected a drastic slowdown in post-secondary education's growth, ushering in an era widely termed steady state. This situation produced not a lessening in the states' desire to coordinate higher education, but a heightening of that desire. For now these governments realized the harmful effects of inefficiency in the system were even greater; and additionally, because of a slowing growth of revenues and rising requests for services by the public, the states' desire for operational economy increased. The result was and has been since that time the placing of even more demands and responsibilities on the shoulders of the state-level coordinating process. The number and power of these boards has therefore continued to grow.

Within the community college field, events have generally paralleled those of postsecondary education as a whole. These colleges grew, both in number of units and total number of students served, at a rate even greater than that for postsecondary education as a whole. As a result of this growth, the community colleges became a very significant partner in the higher education systems of most states. Thus, they came increasingly under the eye of the public and, therefore, of the state governments. Prior to this era of expansion, the colleges had typically functioned under the coordinating oversight, often insignificant, of state boards of education. Now, however, the state governments realized, as they did for higher education as a whole, that the maintenance of effectiveness and efficiency, from a state-wide perspective, of community colleges required more active state-level coordination. Consequently, in many cases the colleges were placed under the purview of a separate state-level board or agency or set under the oversight of a higher education board, where they would presumably receive more

attention than they had previously. In cases in which no change in the coordinating structure occurred, the process itself often became more aggressive.

Since the early 1970's, the community colleges, like other segments of higher education, have seen their growth rate slow. They have not, however, shared in the deleterious direct effects of the steady-state era to the same degree as their partners have. Yet, largely because of their new full-partner status, the colleges have fully felt one of the indirect effects of the recent times. Just as has been true for postsecondary education as a whole, the community colleges, overall, have continued to come under increasing control by state-level coordinating boards and agencies.

In Chapter One the reasons behind the rise of state-level coordination of both higher education generally and the community colleges specifically were reviewed. It seemed apparent, after the views of a number of observers were considered, that state coordination was clearly valuable, probably necessary, and undoubtedly inevitable in most instances. Moreover, the conditions of the current steady-state period have only underscored these characteristics. Indeed, several commentators suggested that effective state-level coordination provided positive results not only for the state in reaching its system-wide goals but the institutions as well in maintaining their operational integrity, especially relative to the effects of the alternatives to state-level postsecondary education boards and/or system boards.

Regardless of these attributes, however, individual colleges and universities have typically viewed the trend to more active state coordination with concern. Furthermore, from the review in Chapter One,

it appeared that, like the concerns prompting the swelling state-level role in decision making, these counter concerns are also basically legitimate. This legitimacy seemed especially compelling in the case of the community colleges. These colleges inherently exist to meet a significant portion of the postsecondary-education needs of a relatively small local area. Their organizational health, as well as their value to the state-wide system, heavily depends upon fulfilling this function; consequently, they require that autonomy necessary to respond effectively to local demands. And, as Knoell (1976) pointed out, these local demands are often unique to one or a small number of community colleges within a state system and, additionally, are constantly shifting. As a result, the decisions a college must make cannot, in many cases, be made effectively at the state level. At the same time, however, this desirable and necessary local orientation of a community college reinforces the need for a state board to insure that local operations correspond to the requirements of system-wide effectiveness and efficiency. Martorana (1968) stated the inherent contrast well:

Local institutional boards and administrative staffs necessarily are most concerned and best able to handle matters that directly and specifically affect their own institutions. They cannot and should not be expected to give attention and meaningful direction to the broader statewide and large regional issues and interests touching upon community junior colleges even though the well-being or the success of their institution may be affected seriously. (p. 28)

It seems clear, then, that the situation facing postsecondary education generally and the community colleges in particular is a complex one. Simple solutions cannot satisfy both state and college concerns. Effective state coordination of the institutions is vital; likewise, some degree of college autonomy is equally vital. And overly

extensive amounts of either can seriously debilitate the functioning of the other--to, it seems, the ultimate benefit of neither. Thus, as Moody (1978) stated, "The reality of control of the public two-year institutions is that control is a balance between decision making at the state level and decision making at the institutional level. . . . An intriguing challenge is the continuing search for an optimal balance between central coordination and institutional autonomy" (p. 70).

As was stated at the conclusion of Chapter One, the purpose of this study was not to find and present this "optimal balance." It was, rather, to develop and provide information that will help to refine the questions surrounding the development of more effective, if not ideal, combinations of state-level-board and local-college roles in decision making for community colleges and that will help in finding viable answers to these questions. At the same time, as a part of this process, preliminary recommendations are made.

### The Problem

#### Statement of the Problem

The problem, therefore, of this study was to identify the issues and nonissues in the division of governance power between the state-level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual community colleges (to include local boards) and then to investigate these identified issues and nonissues from three selected aspects. These issues and nonissues were delineated in terms of 55 specific governance activities and were developed from the professional opinions of chief executives of state-level staffs and chief executives of community colleges regarding the preferred placement, at the state or local level or somewhere in between, of these governance activities. Specifically, the following questions were answered.

1. For which of 55 specific governance activities did a Delphi panel consisting of chief executives of state-level staffs and chief executives of community colleges reach consensus, thus identifying a nonissue, or fail to reach consensus, thus identifying an issue, on the preferred level (from among five levels, solely state to solely local) at which the activity should be exercised?

2. For which of the issues identified above were the differences in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the governance activity related significantly to chief-executive role level (state or local college)?

3. For which of the issues identified above were the differences in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the governance activity related significantly to the type of state-level governance structure for community colleges (governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating board) within which the Delphi panelists worked?

4. Did the general pattern of preferred placements of nonissue governance activities, those for which the panel reached consensus, tend to congruence with a pattern of governance-activity placements hypothesized on the basis of bureaucratic administrative theory, with a pattern based on collegial theory, or with neither pattern?

#### Delimitations

1. The study dealt only with the community college segment of postsecondary education.

2. The study dealt with the professional opinions of community college educators at the administrative level only, specifically (1) chief executives of state-level staffs serving state boards or agencies

engaged indirect coordination or governance of community colleges and  
(2) chief executives of community colleges.

3. The data were obtained from a 36 member Delphi panel composed of state-level chief executives and institutional chief executives, questioned during 1975 and 1976.

#### Limitations

1. The random selection of the respondents from among the two populations was limited by the fact that after selection a selectee had to agree to be a member of the Delphi panel. The consequences of this selection bias were impossible to identify.

2. The random selection of the respondents from among the population of community college chief executives was limited by the fact that, for each selected state-level chief executive, one community college chief executive was randomly selected from the population of only the state represented by that state-level chief executive. In other words, the sample of community college chief executives was not randomly selected from the entire population, and this selection bias limits the generalizability of that sample's responses. It should be remembered, however, that the bias was diminished somewhat by the fact that the selection of the states to be represented was random, since the selection of the state-level chief executives was random within the limitation noted in 1 above. The reason for this departure from random selection is explained in the later section "Sample Selection."

3. The desire for equal role (state and college) representation on the panel dictated a sample size for community college chief executives so small relative to the population that generalizing their opinions to the population may be unwarranted. The reason for equal

role representation is explained in the later section "Sample Selection."

### Justification

In Chapter One and again briefly in the introduction to this chapter, the growth, reaching an apex in the 1960's, of postsecondary education as a whole and of the community college segment in particular was noted, along with the corollary development of state-level boards and agencies to coordinate this growth and maximize system effectiveness in terms of meeting state postsecondary-education needs and utilizing state financial resources most efficiently. The 1970's brought a decline in this growth, ushering in the steady-state era, predicted to last perhaps until the end of the century. This period of slow or no growth in postsecondary education did not, however, bring any relief from the trend to centralization of power in the hands of state boards. In fact, for reasons explained previously, the trend escalated.

The development and strengthening of these boards in turn precipitated concern over the effect the state-level role in coordination and governance of postsecondary education might have upon traditional institutional autonomy. The studies of Moos and Rourke and of Glenny in 1959 generally marked the surfacing of this issue as one of major significance. Moos and Rourke (1959) defended the importance of institutional autonomy. Glenny (1959), on the other hand, suggested that necessary state coordination and adequate institutional autonomy were not mutually exclusive; but he agreed that the issue was critical, saying, "The greatest single problem of coordination is how to achieve . . . [its] objectives without destroying the initiative, flexibility, and diversity of the public institutions" (p. 263). This

issue was reviewed in some detail in Chapter One and one conclusion seemed clear: The problem is real and, furthermore, is complex. It was evident that a degree of state-level power is probably necessary and, in any case, inevitable. At the same time, the case for a degree of institutional autonomy was also convincing. For community colleges specifically, the contradictory nature of the issue was even more glaring. Because of the local orientation of their mission, these colleges clearly require the autonomy necessary to allow effective response to shifting educational needs, sometimes unique to their service areas. Yet this inherently requisite local orientation makes it more difficult for these colleges to consider adequately state-wide concerns in planning or operating; as a result, this necessary autonomy must be balanced by state-level oversight. As many observers have noted, striking this balance, while undoubtedly vital, is an extremely complex and delicate task.

One approach to this task is to attempt to specify in concrete terms the roles in governance and decision making that each level should play. In 1963, in one of the earlier statements of guidelines for state-level activity, Brumbaugh implied the usefulness of this approach when he recommended that a state agency should limit itself to planning and coordinating, vice getting involved in managing institutions. Yet, in order to do so, he noted, the agency needed a clear understanding of exactly what constituted the appropriate planning and coordinating activities.

Nonetheless, by 1974, Halstead, in an excellent restatement of the fundamental problem, revealed that no real answer had been reached. He stated:

The debate regarding centralized versus decentralized authority in higher education has progressed beyond arguing the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. Discussion of the pros and cons of both central coordination and institutional autonomy has resulted in considerable agreement among educators about the relative merits of both practices. The evidence also reveals--and herein lies the crux of the controversy--that a winning combination is a yet unidentified balance which would retain most of the advantages of central control with a minimal sacrifice of institutional sovereignty. What persists as a continuing and intriguing challenge--and an issue of no little disagreement--is the search for a compromise between central coordination and autonomy that would create an optimal balance. (p. 11)

Thus, Halstead felt that no balanced allocation of roles had been made, despite the fact that the need had been expressed earlier. Moreover, this lack of concrete recommendations existed even though a recognition of their desirability was clearly widespread, as pointed out in Chapter One of this study, and a direct recognition of their usefulness had been expressed by a task force of the Education Commission of the States. That body's Task Force on Coordination, Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education (1973) had stated that the "clarification of levels of administrative responsibility" was one of the prime questions facing state planners. They went on to say, "Each state should delineate levels of authority of coordination and governance and develop state plans that suggest levels of decision making consistent with these authorities" (p. 71).

The value in specifying state and college governance and decision-making roles has also been recognized relative to community college systems in particular, and again this recognition has been longstanding. Wattenbarger (1968, p. 11), for example, pointed out that in 1965 B. Lamar Johnson noted the necessity of clearly defining and assigning the authority and duties of both the state and local elements in a

community college system; and Schultz and Wattenbarger (1968, p. 27) reemphasized this point. At about this same time, Martorana (1968, p. 26) too underscored its importance, suggesting that clarifying the state/college relationship was among the three major tasks facing any state-level community college agency. Moreover, he believed it to be "the most delicate and critical issue" of the three (p. 27). Likewise, Stuckman (1969b) stated shortly later, "If the process of coordination is to serve the state's welfare, the designated roles and prescribed authority of the statewide coordinating agency vis-a-vis the junior colleges should be precisely defined" (p. 11).

In 1972, the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (Note 1) repeated this concern. A draft of the 1972 A.A.C.J.C. Assembly report proposed:

In order to clarify areas of decision-making authority and responsibility, state agencies and multicampus colleges, in cooperation with local colleges and the communities they serve, should develop a taxonomy of decision specifying to the extent possible those areas of authority which will be reserved to the local college to give it adequate freedom to respond to the needs of its own constituency. (p. 8)

Since that time concern over more adequate and concrete role clarification has continued to exist. For example, in 1974, G. L. Hall reported a survey of chairmen of state-level boards overseeing community colleges, and 47% of the respondents indicated that such boards needed a clearer definition of their specific role (pp. 18, 36). Additionally, Martorana and McGuire (1976) noted that, in a survey of legislative activity in 26 states and Puerto Rico from 1973 to 1975, over two-thirds of the states acted on bills related to state-wide coordination, and many of these represented attempts to clarify state-level-board roles (pp. 8-9). They concluded that "the issue of how best to balance the

state-level and local-level control to achieve a statewide system of postsecondary education is not yet effectively resolved" (p. 17).

From the discussion in the first chapter, then, one can conclude that widespread and legitimate concern does exist regarding state-level versus local-college decision-making roles, for postsecondary education in general and the community colleges in particular. As noted above, a number of observers have suggested that concretely clarifying the appropriate powers for each level would be a very useful response to this concern over roles. The fact that the desire for this clarification continues to be stated indicates that no satisfactory response has been made. The literature on state-level coordination and governance has grown rapidly in recent years, but no clear and detailed statements of state and local decision-making roles exist. Many of the studies are primarily descriptive, focusing on the governance structures and operational procedures of a single state or of selected states. Some are comparative and evaluative, but the prescriptive suggestions that have resulted have generally been broadly conceptual in nature. Consequently, in light of the concerns voiced previously and the dearth of adequate responses to these concerns in the literature, especially for the community college field, a study dealing in specific terms with the division of decision-making powers between state-level boards and the individual community colleges seemed valuable.

As was pointed out in the statement of the problem, the purpose of this study was not to provide a definitive answer to these concerns, a concrete and all-encompassing list of what should be done by whom. Rather, it was to provide information that would significantly aid

in the ultimate development of detailed taxonomies such as recommended earlier by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges. To this end, four tasks were undertaken: the concrete delineation of decisions that must be made, the identification of the areas of agreement and controversy regarding the level at which the delineated decisions should be made, the determination of the relationship of selected factors to areas of controversy, and finally the investigation of the applicability of two basic administrative theories to defining state and local roles in decision making.

First, then, 55 decisions were delineated that, in most states, must be made at some level, state or local. A lack of comprehensiveness and concreteness has characterized past studies, a fact which is reflected in the previously cited calls for clarification of the roles of the elements in state systems. This concrete delineation of required decisions may provide a more adequate base for future studies in this area.

Second, the identification of the areas of agreement and disagreement among professional community college administrators from the state and local-college levels regarding the preferred division of specific decision-making powers between the state boards and the local colleges more precisely clarified the actual issues within the general controversy. This clarification may help future researchers concentrate their focus on the most important aspects of the problem. Thus, they will be able to narrow themselves to examining those specific decision areas where actual controversy remains, consequently enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness. At the same time, a compilation of the decision areas where agreement does exist regarding the level at which

they should be made can immediately begin to serve as a recommendation to be considered in the allocation of powers within state community college systems.

Third, the relationship of two factors--respondent role level (state or local college) and respondent governance-structure environment (whether the state-level board had governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating-only authority)--to the existence of disagreement over the placement of specific decision-making powers was analyzed. Doing so adds to the understanding of the problems and therefore may aid in their resolution and, again, can allow future studies to be focused more clearly on appropriate aspects of the issues.

Finally, it was determined whether bureaucratic administrative theory, collegial theory, or neither theory appeared to explain the pattern of decision-making-power assignments for which agreement existed. This facet of the study contributes to the establishment of a theoretical foundation for the design of coordinating and governing structures for state systems of community colleges and, as a result, can again aid in the resolution of governance-power conflicts between state-level boards and the individual colleges. The application of basic administrative theory to the coordination-autonomy issue in postsecondary education has been touched upon only briefly in the literature, even though the potential value of doing so has been noted.

For example, in 1968 Schultz and Wattenbarger recommended the development of "clearly stated principles which may be used to determine those decisions that should be made at the institution level and those that should be made at the state level" (p. 27). Similarly, Stuckman

(1969a), at the conclusion of his study on the administrative implementation, and its institution-level effects, of selected functions by two state-level-agency staffs for community colleges, stated:

Responsibilities . . . inherent in the coordinating process beg for definition and delineation as regards who, i.e., the state coordinating agency staff or the local governing board of a junior college and institutional administrators and teaching faculty, should make which decisions. It is recommended that a study be conducted with the purpose being to formulate principles which could serve as guides to state coordinating agency staff members who must daily tread the thin line between institutional autonomy and institutional accountability to the state. (p. 115)

Certainly, it would seem that the most adequate approach to the derivation of broadly meaningful principles to guide the appropriate assignment of decision-making powers is through the application of administrative theory to the design of state postsecondary-education system structures and practices. The assumption is that theoretically derived principles can prove more universally useful and more mutually consistent than principles derived solely from opinion and experience. One objection that might be raised regarding the use of traditional administrative theory in examining and prescribing college/state-system relationships is that these theories typically focus on the functioning of humans within an organization, vice organizations within larger organizations. Yet the characteristics of human organizations fundamentally reflect the characteristics of their members; thus, similar theoretical concepts would likely exist for both. In this vein, Halstead (1974) saw a college "as an entity with a character that must be achieved through the pursuit of goals" (p. 224) and requiring management from above basically corresponding to that

required to encourage human productivity. The application of existing theory would consequently appear valuable.

While others have called for principles, Martorana (1975) appeared to state the utility of a theoretical approach more directly. He stated:

If planning and coordination were more carefully defined and refined in their functions and were buttressed by a sounder knowledge based on their philosophies as well as their techniques, . . . the evils that now seem inherent in the coordinating organizations [he had specified stultifying centralization of control] can perhaps be avoided at the same time that the promises they also seem to hold could be enhanced. (p. 203)

It seems reasonable to perceive of Martorana's operational "philosophies" as theories guiding actions. More recently, Wattenbarger (1977) looked at the allocation of decision responsibility in multiunit districts of community colleges, a category in which he included state systems with a single state-level governing board. He noted that little actual research exists to guide such allocations and then stated, "The need for a theoretical base is apparent" (p. 12). One purpose of this study was to provide a beginning step in developing that base.

In summary, then, this study contributes in four primary ways to the eventual resolution of the problems arising from the conflicting requirements of state coordination and college autonomy, with particular reference to the community colleges. First, it provides a possible framework for additional research by delineating, as concretely and comprehensively as generally practical, those decision-making powers that must be allocated between state-level boards and local boards/colleges. Second, it aids the more efficient focusing of future research by identifying those decision-making powers whose specific

implementation level is widely agreed upon, nonissues, and those whose level is not agreed upon, the issues requiring resolution. Third, it also aids in sharpening the focus of future research by analyzing the relationship between professional opinions on power-allocation issues and two factors--professional role level, state or local, and professional governing/coordinating-structure environment. Finally, it represents an initial step towards providing a theoretical base for continuing research in this area. It is hoped and believed that these contributions will prove useful to the deeper understanding of the coordinating process, its promises and potential pitfalls.

#### Definition of Terms

1. Chief Executive of a Community College--For the purposes of this study, the highest administrative officer of a community college (variously called the president, chancellor, etc.) was considered the chief executive of the community college.

2. Chief Executive of a State-Level Staff--For the purposes of this study, the highest administrative officer of a state-level staff for community colleges (variously called the state director, chancellor, etc.) was considered the chief executive of the state-level staff. Operationally, these persons were defined as each state's representative member of the National Council of State Directors of Community-Junior Colleges as of the July 30, 1974, membership list.

3. Community College--For the purposes of this study, a public, two-year, postsecondary educational institution or group of institutions organized as an administrative unit at the first level below the state and identified by the 1975 Community, Junior, and Technical College Directory (Drake, 1975) as being a community, junior, or technical

college or college district and as having a comprehensive (transfer and technical) program was considered a community college, whether it was a single-campus, multicampus, or multiunit structure.

4. Consensus--For the purposes of this study, consensus of respondent opinion regarding the preferred placement of a particular governance activity at one of five levels, solely at the state level to solely at the college level, was considered to exist if at least one-half of the respondents placed the activity at the same level and at least a total of three-quarters of the respondents placed it at that level, the level immediately higher, or the level immediately lower.

5. Delphi Technique--The Delphi technique is a process for eliciting the opinions of a number of persons using a sequential series of interrogations (usually a questionnaire) interspersed with anonymous feedback consisting of a statistical summary of the responses of the group, called a panel, being questioned. The technique is designed to replace face-to-face conferences or one-time surveys.

6. Governance Activity--For the purpose of this study, each specific decision-making power that is exercised by a state-level board for community colleges, its state-level staff, a local community college governing or advisory board, or a community college administration and staff and that noticeably affects the implementation of the college's educational mission was considered a governance activity.

7. Issue--For the purposes of this study, a governance activity was identified as an issue when the respondents failed to reach consensus regarding the preferred placement of that governance activity.

8. Nonissue--For the purposes of this study, a governance activity was identified as a nonissue when the respondents reached consensus regarding the preferred placement of that governance activity.

9. State-Level Staff--For the purposes of this study, the professional staff that is responsible for community college operations and that serves the state-level educational board most directly concerned with the coordination and/or governance of community colleges within that state was considered the state-level staff.

### Hypotheses

The following null hypotheses were proposed in order to guide the analysis of the data.

1. For each governance activity, no consensus exists among the respondents regarding the preferred placement of that activity.

2. For each issue, no significant difference exists between the opinions of state-level chief executives and of community college chief executives regarding the preferred placement of that activity.

3. For each issue, no significant difference exists among the opinions of chief executives from states with a state-level governing board, from states with a state-level coordinating-governing board, and from states with a state-level coordinating board responsible for community colleges.

4a. For all nonissues, the consensus placement of these governance activities by the respondents is not significantly congruent with the placement suggested by bureaucratic administrative theory.

4b. For all nonissues, the consensus placement of these governance activities by the respondents is not significantly congruent with the placement suggested by collegial administrative theory.

### Procedures

#### Introduction

In the study the general steps outlined below and detailed in subsequent sections were followed. First, a sample of chief executives of state-level staffs and chief executives of community colleges was selected. Then an initial list of governance activities was developed from the literature, and from these, phase I of the Delphi questionnaire was constructed and sent out. Respondent opinion on the governance activities and the questionnaire format obtained by phase I was used to construct the phase II and III forms, and these were sent out in turn. The data gathered by phase III were then analyzed, in terms of the hypotheses stated above, in order to answer the specific questions posed in the statement of the problem.

#### Sample Selection

After it had been decided to approach a study of the conflict between state-level coordination of community colleges and the autonomy of these colleges by attempting to identify the issues and nonissues regarding what governance powers each level should exercise, it was necessary to determine how these issues and nonissues could be identified. It seemed logical to do this on the basis of the considered opinions of those professionals most directly concerned and affected by the problems of state-wide coordination and its institutional impact, chief executives of state-level staffs and of community colleges. Stuckman and Wattenbarger (1971, p. 44) seemed to have supported this

logic when they had suggested that, if coordination's strengths were to be realized and its pitfalls avoided, the specific roles of a state-level board and a state's community colleges should be mutually delineated by these partners in the state system. If this suggestion were to be followed, a sample of persons representing these two points of view was necessary. Chief executives from the two levels appeared most desirable. As professionals, in contrast to lay board members at either level, they likely had a deeper and more informed understanding of the controversy. As chief executives, in contrast to lower-level administrators, they likely had a more comprehensive understanding of coordination's impact, good and bad, on all facets of their organizations' operations. Consequently, it was decided to approach the general problem through a Delphi-technique interrogation of chief executives from the two levels, state and college.

Next, the specific composition of the panel was considered. First, it was hypothesized that chief-executive level, state or college, would be related to their opinions on preferred placement of governance activities. Therefore, since the Delphi technique provides intermediate feedback on respondent opinions before the respondents make their final choices, it was felt necessary that neither level dominate the panel. As a result, a panel equally divided between state-level and community college chief executives was decided upon. Second, it was hypothesized that the governance structure of the system in which a chief executive worked would be related to his preferred placement of governance activities. Although it was believed that this factor would be adequately represented by a random sample of states, it was considered important that chief executives from each governance

structure again be equally divided by state and college level so that no one level would dominate any particular governance structure. Accordingly, it was decided to match state-level and community college chief executives by state. Finally, a total Delphi-panel size of 40 was chosen, since this number seemed manageable but, with 20 state systems represented, seemed to provide the desired national perspective.

These guidelines having been set forth, the actual selection of the panel was begun in February, 1975. Initially, the chief executives of state-level staffs were chosen. First, from a 1974 list of members of the National Council of State Directors of Community-Junior Colleges, 33 chief executives were chosen using a table of random numbers and recorded in the order chosen. The first 20 were then sent a letter (Appendix A) explaining the study and requesting their participation. They were asked to respond, yes or no, with a stamped, self-addressed post card provided. One of the initial 20 declined the request; thus the 21st state-level chief executive on the ordered list was sent the letter requesting participation. His acceptance completed the state-level chief-executive portion of the panel.

Next chief executives of community colleges were selected for the panel. From each state represented by a state-level chief executive, three chief executives of community colleges (as defined previously) were randomly selected from the listings in the 1975 Community, Junior, and Technical College Directory (Drake, 1975) and recorded in the order chosen. Then the first community college chief executive recorded from each state was sent the invitation letter noted above. Three weeks later, those who had not responded were sent the invitation letter again, along with a cover letter (Appendix B). Of the initial 20

community college chief executives invited to serve on the panel, 17 agreed to do so. When a negative answer was received, the second chief executive on the ordered list for that state was sent the invitation. All three second choices agreed to serve on the panel, and the sample selection was completed.

Therefore, the planned sample of the study, the Delphi panel, consisted of 20 chief executives of state-level staffs and 20 chief executives of community colleges. The actual sample, however, varied from this slightly. First, one state-level and three community college chief executives, after agreeing to serve, failed to respond to any of the three phases of the Delphi interrogation. Second, in two instances at the state level and one at the college level, the chief executive delegated responsibility for answering the questionnaires to an administrator serving directly below him. It is not believed that this action had any deleterious effect on the validity of the study, since these respondents were professionals fulfilling the spirit underlying the sample design. The actual sample, then, consisted of 17 chief executives and 2 "vice" chief executives of state-level staffs, and 16 chief executives and 1 "vice" chief executive of community colleges. The panel is listed in Appendix C. A total of 19 states were represented--17 by respondents from both levels and 2 by respondents from the state-level only.

#### Phase I

During the time that the sample was being selected, the governance activities were being identified and written, and the phase I questionnaire was being prepared. The governance items were developed from the literature supplemented by the observations of the author. The

latter was necessary because, as noted earlier, no concrete and comprehensive list of governing decisions required at the state and/or college level existed; nonetheless, several sources contributed significantly to this task: Most notable were studies by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973); Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971); and Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971). In addition, unpublished information, provided by Dr. John C. Mundt, on an internal study being done in the State of Washington regarding its state/local community college relationships (Note 2) yielded valuable ideas. His unsolicited aid was appreciated. As the governance activities were being written and compiled, it was desired that they comprehensively cover the total controversy but that each item be specific and concrete. At the same time, however, it was preferred to limit the total number of items so that answering the questionnaires would not unduly tax the schedules of the respondents. Consequently, the desire for comprehensiveness and for specificity had to be balanced. The result was a list of 55 governance activities.

After the governance activities had been identified and written, the phase I questionnaire itself was constructed. This form (Appendix D) contained the question that would be asked on the phases II and III forms--at what level, in their professional opinion, should each of the governing items preferably be exercised at?--and stated the five levels--solely at the state agency/board level to solely at the local community college/board level--from which they would be asked to choose. With these future directions in mind, the respondents were asked to indicate whether each of the 55 governance-activity items (1) was clearly stated and appropriate for consideration; (2) was appropriate

but unclearly stated; (3) should have been combined with another item, which they were asked to identify; or (4) was not appropriate for consideration and should have been deleted. They were asked to rewrite the unclear items (2 above) and, if possible, the combined items (3 above). Finally, they were invited to add any additional items they felt should be included. The form also included a place to report address changes and a brief five-question survey soliciting information regarding the governance structure of their state community college system.

During the last week in June, 1975, the phase I forms were sent to the respondents. A stamped, self-addressed return envelope was provided. Since knowing the identity of the person completing the form was essential for data analysis, the first answer page of each questionnaire carried an obvious abbreviation identifying the respondent, for example, NY/S for New York's state-level chief executive. This was done in case the chief executive removed the attached cover letter before answering and returning the form; an abbreviation, rather than the name, was used merely for convenience. A reminder post card was sent as necessary after 3 weeks.

Of the 40 members of the Delphi panel, 33 or 82.5%, from 19 states, returned phase I (91.7% of the ultimate panel size of 36 described in the previous section). A 34th respondent returned the form uncompleted, noting his regret at not being able to participate further. For every governance item, a clear majority--the least was 22; nearly all were in the high 20's--indicated the item was clear and appropriate. A single chief executive suggested one item to be added. As a result, the list of 55 governance activities was retained for

phases II and III without alteration, except for minor changes in wording in response to those suggestions that did seem to strengthen an item's clarity without altering the basic phrasing deemed good by the majority. In phase I the panelists had also been invited to comment on the definitions of the governance-level choices to be used in the next two phases; no comments were offered. Thus, the results of phase I appeared to support the design of the phase II and III forms.

### Phase II

After the phase I responses were reviewed, the phase II form was developed. This questionnaire (Appendix E) explicitly defined, just as was set forth in phase I, the five possible levels at which a governance activity could be placed and then listed the 55 governance activities, asking the respondents to indicate at what level each should be exercised. This indication was made by circling the appropriate number on a 5-point scale accompanying each item. Again each questionnaire included a place to report address changes, and each carried the abbreviation designating the responding chief executive. Two cover letters were written, one for those having answered phase I (Appendix F) and one for those not having answered (Appendix G). A questionnaire and the appropriate cover letter, along with a stamped, self-addressed envelope, were mailed to each of the panelists in August, 1975.

On phase II, 28 or 70% of the designed panelists (77.8% of the ultimate panel size) returned the questionnaire, again representing the same 19 states. The responses for each governance activity were tabulated, and the interquartile range was figured. In other words, for each governance activity, the placement levels on the scale in which

the middle half of the responses fell were identified. The number of levels covered by the middle half ranged from only one level to three levels, with two being the most common.

### Phase III

With the data obtained from phase II, the phase III questionnaire was developed. The phase III form (Appendix H) was identical to the phase II one, with two exceptions. First, on the response scale for each governance activity, the levels (numbers) representing the inter-quartile range identified above for that item were underlined. In this way, anonymous feedback regarding the phase II results was provided the respondents so they could consider this information as they decided upon their final answers for the Delphi survey. Second, the directions for phase III were expanded to explain the feedback method to the respondents. Again, as was done for phase II, two cover letters were written, one for chief executives having answered phase II (Appendix I) and one for those not having answered phase II (Appendix J). A phase III questionnaire, along with the appropriate cover letter and a self-addressed, stamped envelope, was sent to each of the panelists in late January, 1976. An abbreviation identifying the respondent was placed on the questionnaires as before.

Representing the same 19 states, 33 panelists (82.5% of the planned panel and 91.7% of the panelists actually participating) returned the phase III form, ending the data collection portion of the study. As initially designed, the Delphi technique (the theory of which is explained in some detail in Chapter Three) usually involved four phases, the last repeating the third and the second with small changes. However, Cyphert and Gant (1971, p. 273) suggested the fourth phase was

probably unnecessary, noting that it produced few changes in the responses. Consequently, a fourth phase was not used in this study. Since an additional phase is likely to produce a further convergence of the opinions, in this case its deletion may in fact lend greater credence to the identification of nonissues, those governance activities for which consensus existed regarding their preferred-placement level.

For the entire Delphi interrogation, then, 36 of the 40 Delphi panelists responded to one or more phases, as described in "Sample Selection" earlier. Among the 36, 3 responded to only one phase (1 to II and 2 to III); 8 responded to two phases (all but 2 of these to the first and last); and 25 responded to all three. This 25 represented 69.4% of the actual panel of 36 and 62.5% of the planned 40-member panel, and it included chief executives from 16 states.

#### Level Assignment of Governance Activities by Theory

The next required step in the study was to place each governance item at the level, in terms of the 5-point scale, at which bureaucratic, and then collegial, administrative theory appeared to indicate it should properly be exercised. In order to do so, first guidelines for both theories were developed, on the basis of a selected review of the theories, to apply in determining the theoretical placement of the governance activities. Stating explicit guidelines was deemed essential if the theoretical placements of the governance activities were to maintain consistency throughout the 55-item list. Clearly, such consistency was necessary to protect whatever validity the hypothetical placements had within each theory. These guidelines are presented at the end of the section on theory in Chapter Three. Once the guidelines had been developed, the actual assignment of governance items to the

levels at which they theoretically should be exercised was done, first for bureaucratic and then collegial administrative theory.

### Data Analyses

With the completion of phase III of the Delphi interrogation and the development of theoretical governance-activity placements, the analysis of the data on the basis of the five hypotheses set forth previously could begin, in order to answer the four questions specified in the statement of the problem.

So that the first hypothesis could be considered, the phase III data were initially tabulated for each governance activity to show how many respondents believed that particular activity should be exercised at each of the five alternative levels. Then the data for each activity were inspected to see if consensus, as defined previously, existed among the chief executives regarding at what level the activity should be exercised. Those items for which consensus existed were identified as nonissues, and those for which no consensus existed were considered issues.

Next, the second question of the study was considered, dealing with the relationship between respondent role level and opinions regarding the preferred placement of each governance-activity issue. In order to do so, the panel responses for each issue were divided, at each of the five levels, into two groups, those of state-level chief executives and those of college-level chief executives. Then the second null hypothesis, no significant difference between the responses of chief executives at the state-level vice the college-level, was tested with a nonparametric test of one-way analysis of variance for two groups, the Mann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 116-127). For

this hypothesis, as well as those following, nonparametric tests were chosen largely because the data represented ordinal measurement (in terms of the 5-point scale) rather than the interval measurement required by parametric tests. In this case, since no specific direction for the differences was hypothesized, a two-tailed test was used; and the level of significance was set at .05. The calculations included the correction for ties as set forth by Siegel.

The third question of the study, whether responses on issues were related to the system governance structure within which the panelists worked, was looked at next. For this question, the responses for each issue and at each alternative level within that issue were divided into three groups: those responses from chief executives, regardless of level, working in a state with a state-level board exercising coordination power over community colleges; those from chief executives working in a state having a state-level board with coordinating-governing power over the colleges; and those from chief executives working in a state having a state-level board with governing power over the colleges. These figures were then analyzed relative to the third hypothesis, no difference in responses among these three groups of chief executives. The hypothesis was tested for each governance activity using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis-of-variance test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 184-193), a test applicable to  $k$  (three or more) groups. Just as for the second hypothesis, a two-tailed test was used, the significance level was set at .05, and the statistic was corrected for ties.

Finally, the data were analyzed in terms of the fourth question of the study, whether the consensus preferred placement of nonissues was congruent with the hypothesized placement of those governance

activities based upon bureaucratic or upon collegial administrative theory, or neither. In other words, did either theory appear to underlie, whether consciously or not, the thinking of the chief executives for those governance activities on whose preferred placement they agreed. The data were placed into two sets for this analysis, one pairing the consensus placement of each nonissue with the hypothesized placement of it based upon bureaucratic administrative theory and the other pairing each nonissue placement with its hypothesized collegial counterpart. The corresponding null hypothesis (number 4a or 4b) was then tested for each set. The hypotheses, identical except for the theory concerned, postulated no significant congruence between respondent placement and hypothesized placement.

Unfortunately, no single practical statistic exists to test the degree of congruence, the tendency to overlap exactly, of paired data. However, congruence can be seen as being made up of two elements, correlation and equality of central tendency. For example, if one had two ordered lists of numbers, therefore each number on one list being paired with the number next to it on the other list, the lists would be perfectly congruent if each pair of numbers consisted of two identical numbers, for example, 2, 2; 13, 13; 6, 6; etc. These congruent lists would have a perfect positive correlation and exactly the same central tendency (median in the case of numbers representing ordinal measurement). On the other hand, two ordered lists that had a perfect positive correlation but had different medians would not be perfectly congruent. They would not overlap; the second number in each pair would always be different from the first, and the magnitude and direction of the difference would be the same for every pair. Likewise, if

the two lists had the same medians, one would know nothing about the relationships within the pairs. Thus, taken singly, correlation and median tell one nothing about congruence; taken together, they define it. Accordingly, testing for both of these elements was used as a test for congruence.

For each of the 2 sets of paired data, then, the following process was used to test the corresponding hypothesis. First, a set of paired data was tested for a significant difference in the central tendency, the median, of consensus placements and hypothesized placements. This was done using a nonparametric two-way analysis-of-variance statistic, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 75-83). A two-tailed test was used, and the level of significance was set at .05. If no significant difference in central tendency was found (one of the elements of congruence), then the correlation was calculated using a nonparametric statistic, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (Siegel, 1956, pp. 202-213). The formula appropriate for use with ties was the one used to figure the coefficient. Next, the significance of the resulting coefficient was calculated. Since only a positive correlation corresponds to congruence, a one-tailed test was used; and the level of significance was set at .025. Finally, then, if no significant difference in medians and a significant correlation were found, the null hypothesis, no significant congruence, was rejected.

#### Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report consists of a review of selected pertinent literature, the report of the results of the data analyses, a discussion of the implications of the analyses, and a summary of the

study and its possible usefulness. Chapter Three contains the review of related literature. First, selected writings on state-level coordination of higher education generally and of community colleges in particular are reviewed, with emphasis on opinions and recommendations regarding system governance structure and the division of governance responsibilities between the state and the institutions. Next, a brief review of administrative theory and its application to higher education and state coordination of higher education is provided, primarily to present some background in this area as it relates to the study. Last is a discussion of the Delphi technique, its structure and use. Chapter Four contains the results of the study, the data analyses for each of the four questions in the statement of the problem. In Chapter Five these results are examined for their implications regarding the assignment of governance responsibilities to state-level boards and to institutions. The nonissues and then the issues are discussed, governance activity by governance activity. Finally, Chapter Six contains a summary of the study, comments on its broader implications, and suggestions for further research on the controversies surrounding state coordination of community colleges and of higher education institutions generally.

CHAPTER THREE  
A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF RELATED  
LITERATURE

Introduction

In Chapter One the background of the controversy over state coordination of postsecondary education and its impact on the autonomy of institutions was examined. Reviewed in this chapter is material more directly related to the exact topic explored by the study, the division of governance power between state-level boards and individual colleges and the applicability of administrative theory to this process. Additionally, background information on the research method used in the study, the Delphi technique, is presented.

Accordingly, first are reported a number of works containing information, opinions, and/or guidelines regarding the allocation of decision-making responsibilities to the states and the colleges. This portion of the chapter is divided into two sections, one on higher education generally and one reporting studies on community colleges in particular. Next, a background for the theoretical aspect of the study is presented. The bureaucratic and collegial administrative theories are briefly explained, and then some studies suggesting their applications to the administration of postsecondary institutions and systems are reviewed. Finally the methodology and uses of the Delphi technique are reviewed.

## State Coordination and Higher Education

In this section materials dealing with state coordination and higher education as a whole are examined. The review is primarily limited to identifying the information presented by past observers relative to the division of governance powers between state-level boards and individual institutions. Descriptive studies are not included; that past and current practice is not entirely satisfactory is indicated in Chapter One. Rather, the intent is to present professional thought on what should be done. The review is basically organized chronologically, except that multiple writings by an author are usually grouped together. Published works of the current decade are represented most thoroughly, but some of the most significant earlier contributions in the field are also reviewed briefly.

Two of these early studies appeared in 1959. Moos and Rourke studied the effect of several facets of state government, including state coordination agencies, upon the autonomy of public institutions granting at least the baccalaureate degree. The study surveyed and reported the existence of state-government agencies affecting the activities of colleges and summarized generally anecdotal reports of the impact of these agencies upon the institutions. However, no attempt was made to identify systematically specific state actions which were considered to have a clearly adverse effect upon the colleges.

At the same time, a book by Glenny (1959) dealt specifically and primarily with state coordination of higher education. He traced its historical development, identified and evaluated three forms of state-coordination structures, and delineated and examined four major

state-agency functions. These were (1) planning and policy making, (2) function and program allocation, (3) budgeting institutional operations, and (4) budgeting capital outlay projects.

Since that study, Glenny has commented several times on state coordination. Among these, in 1971 he and Hurst updated the basic information in the 1959 work. Again, he saw three major types of state boards: voluntary boards, single governing boards, and coordinating boards. He and Hurst suggested that at first glance single boards seemed to have the greatest potential because of the power they wield; yet, they said, research had revealed that coordinating boards performed nearly all functions as satisfactorily as single boards and that coordinating boards were superior in long-range planning, a function they considered paramount. Consequently, they recommended the coordinating structure over a state-level governing board. Generally following Glenny's 1959 classification, they saw several powers as necessary for an effective state-level board. Master planning for the system was identified as the central activity of the board, but they did note that the trend in this area was to carry out this function so as to require public and system-element input, often by assigning the planning responsibility to standing or ad hoc committees rather than solely to the board staff. Additionally, they said, effective master planning required evaluation of the plan's implementation; and accordingly, boards had to have the power to collect data from the institutions. The other powers they considered vital were the "authority to approve or disapprove all new programs and new campuses; to review operating and capital budgets; [and] to set certain admission standards, tuition, and fees" (p. 25). The

first two largely represented functions necessary to the implementation of master planning. The third also fell into this category, but they did not clarify what certain meant. Finally, they suggested that a steady-state era (just approaching at that time) might necessitate board approval power over existing, as well as new, programs.

In this same year, Glenny was senior author of one of the most complete sets of guidelines for state-level-board operations. In this work (Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971), the authors again expressed a preference for coordinating vice governing boards at the state level because of their flexibility and their strength in the planning area. They repeated all the necessary board powers delineated by Glenny and Hurst but added a few. Short-range planning was specifically included in the planning function. Without reservation, they recommended approval power over existing institutional programs and also recommended that the entire range of approval powers be exercised over private colleges in cases where state funding was significant. They added one completely new power, that the board "administer directly or have under its coordinative powers all state scholarship and grant programs to students, grant programs to nonpublic institutions, and all state-administered federal grant and aid programs" (p. 7). At the same time, in nearly every case they suggested that these functions be carried out in a manner formally providing for college-level input.

In addition the study specified areas where decision making should be reserved for the institutions. Briefly, these areas included (1) student affairs, except for master-plan mandates in

general admission standards and enrollment ceilings and mixes; (2) faculty affairs, including salaries and negotiations except as affected by funding levels; (3) hiring and appointment, including college-level chief executives and board members; (4) staff travel approval; (5) content and methods of programs, courses, and research; (6) college-level contractual relationships; and (7) maintenance of campus law and order. They also felt that colleges should be free of most state procedural controls (often emanating from state agencies other than the board) such as pre-audits, central purchasing, or central staff-personnel procurement. Finally, and perhaps interestingly, the authors believed that both the state board and individual institutions should be able to present and defend their own budget recommendations before the legislature.

A 1972 article by Glenny added little to the above, except that he emphasized that steady state would heighten the impact of state-level-board activities on the colleges. One contrast did exist; he now foresaw the possibility of professional negotiations gravitating to the state level to the degree that funding-level decisions were made at that level.

Another of the early significant studies appeared in 1962. McConnell in this book presented what its title named, A General Pattern for American Public Higher Education. In doing so, he provided a clear, thorough, and convincing foundation on which the concept of the state system could be firmly placed. Having laid this base, he went on to discuss the state-level structure required of such a system and examined the values and the weaknesses of state-level coordination. He added little, however, in terms of concrete

solutions to the controversies surrounding the delineation of state-level powers, primarily reiterating the functions identified by Glenny before him as the basic activities that should be exercised by a state board.

In 1963, Brumbaugh set forth one of the earliest sets of guidelines for effective state-level functioning. In terms of specific state-board powers, however, he did not contribute much to what had come before. As others had done, he emphasized the central nature of planning and plan implementation to state-board activities.

A. D. Henderson examined the control of higher education in 1969, examining the exercise of authority both within institutions and over institutions by the state. On the latter topic, he tried to identify the fundamental characteristic separating appropriate state versus institutional powers. Curiously perhaps, though he had introduced administrative theory into his discussion of intrainstitutional management, he did not use this approach in his discussion of a system's management. At this level he suggested that state-board powers revolved around political, or public-policy, questions, while describing legitimate institutional questions as being educational. Taking this avenue of analysis, he ended up with the familiar maxims of the state role centering around planning and coordination of the state system and the institutional role in governance centering on operations.

By 1970, articles and books dealing with state coordination of higher education began to appear much more frequently, especially in terms of works going beyond merely describing the practice, and perhaps the thinking behind it, in one particular state. In one such

article with this broader perspective, Morton (1970) saw state-level boards as occupying a position between state government and higher education and saw their effectiveness as necessitating the "middle-man" role. Becoming too closely identified with either side would, he believed, decrease their effectiveness. Morton perceived the four fundamental functions of state boards to be (1) the development of state higher-education goals, (2) the assessment of existing institutions in light of these goals, (3) the assignment of institutional role and scope, and (4) the evaluation of financial resources available and necessary to meet the goals set. Like others, then, he saw state-board activities as centering on master planning and its implementation and on budget review, especially as it related to planning.

Smart (1970) examined state board activities relative to the crises that surrounded the Vietnam-War-era campuses and state-capitol reactions to these crises. While his focus was limited, Smart's suggestions probably apply generally to the action-reaction relationship that often exists between state governments and higher education. He believed that state boards had failed to address this problem and recommended that they prepare, in effect, opinion papers attempting to balance the public interest and institutional welfare on such topics as "academic freedom, free speech on the campus, student behavior in the community and academic jeopardy, student and faculty rights and responsibilities, and maintenance of order on campus" (pp. 375-376). He did not state that a state-level board should unilaterally set college policy in these areas but rather exercise some leadership for these campus-level decisions and be ready with a

framework on which to base, at short notice, fully considered advice to state governments reacting to a sudden crisis. Smart, therefore, was saying that state boards should assume a leadership role even in areas where a direct role in decision making was inappropriate.

A major work appearing in 1970 and 1971 was a three-year study of state-wide planning in higher education and its institutional effects. The research consisted of in-depth case studies of four states with a history of state-level planning: California, Florida, Illinois, and New York. It was reported in two books, one on state-level planning (Palola, Lehmann, & Blischke, 1970) and a second on college-level planning (Palola & Padgett, 1971). In the first, the authors concluded that state planning had typically improved both institutional performance and autonomy, though noting that the formal (specifically granted) autonomy of the colleges had been restricted. Additionally, they suggested that a slowing of system growth (at that time just beginning to loom on the horizon) could cause further restriction of both formal and actual autonomy. They considered program formulation the prime function of educational planning and broadly defined a division of labor in this area. The state-wide agency would delineate the basic missions and roles of the higher-education segments of the state, such as the community colleges, the regional universities, and the state universities. Where existing, segmental boards or agencies would do the same for the institutions under them; and the institutions would decide upon their own program needs. The second report, while primarily focusing on college-level planning and processes, reiterated this division of labor and

recommended that the colleges, within their assigned role, be given wide latitude in developing their programs and curriculum.

In addition to the second report from the above study, 1971 saw the appearance of other significant works investigating state coordination of higher education. Two of these, coauthored by Glenny, were described earlier. Another important contribution was by Berdahl. This book reported his study of 19 state-level coordinating agencies. On the basis of his study, Berdahl suggested that state-level-board activities should primarily be in substantive vice procedural areas. These proper areas were basically those often mentioned previously: planning, program review and approval, budget review, and capital outlay review. Procedural controls, on the other hand, he saw as more deleterious to education than valuable to efficiency. Thus, he decried overly binding line-item budgets, preaudits, central purchasing and personnel arrangements, and other intrusions into internal institutional management. He did consider necessary, however, state-board actions affecting procedure when they were required in support of the substantive functions above, for example, postaudits, the setting of budget format, and defining standard measures for data reporting.

In the same year, Hefferlin (1971) took another approach to reach similar ends. He suggested that the concept of professionalism could serve as a basis for determining the proper governance role of state-level boards, and especially their staffs, relative to the governance role to be reserved to the institutions. From the viewpoint of professionalism, laymen decide upon the results the professionals should produce while the professionals then figure out how to reach

these results. However, exactly how state-level staff and board members fit into this concept is not clear. As Hefferlin pointed out:

On the one hand, to the legislator and the governor they are professionals. As such, they must recommend policies for adoption; but decisions about these policies rest with elected officials while alternatives for implementing them remain with the board. On the other hand, in dealing with individual institutions, the planner and the board are not professionals, knowledgeable about separate campuses and their operation; they are laymen, and they must leave the means of attaining results up to campus experts. (p. 58)

From this point of view, the state-board/institution relationship again leaves, as suggested by Berdahl, the state board making substantive decisions and the colleges making procedural ones. But Hefferlin's analysis revealed a sticking point. From the state government's perspective, state boards are assigned responsibility for results and are delegated the authority as professionals to exercise this responsibility; yet, when applied to the state-board/institution relationship, the professionalism concept, at least at first glance, largely robs the state board and its staff of the authority required by their responsibility. Thus, Hefferlin's article added little to contemporary recommendations regarding state-board versus college governance roles, but perhaps it did contribute, without fully recognizing it, to an appreciation of the complexity of the dilemma.

Balderston (1971) looked first at the advantages and disadvantages state coordination held for institutions and then from this base commented on a proper state-level role. Chapter One contained Balderston's stated advantages and disadvantages, but very briefly, he saw state coordination as bringing a desirable stability to the

environment in which colleges must operate through its master planning and budget-review functions, as serving as an efficient distributor of state-wide data it has gathered and of funds (especially Federal), and as having the potential to present effectively higher education's case to the public and the government; however, he felt state boards could easily upset institutional efficiency by interfering with internal management and lessening internal morale, especially through their program-review function. Basically Balderston recommended that the state-board function in the same general areas suggested by others; he strongly recommended, however, that in all of its activities a state board should be required to include strong institutional participation in decision making. State-board powers, he felt, should be clearly defined and limited.

Also in 1971, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education looked at, as its study's subtitle stated, State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education. Put very simply, they concluded that the state was responsible for it but should not interfere with it. In this view, the Commission suggested that the state board should act solely in the areas of long-range planning and consulting, the latter apparently being defined as giving advice to the colleges and the state government. Fortunately, the Commission took a closer look at state-board functions in 1973, and this time they came up with one of the more concrete sets of guidelines that exist.

In this 1973 statement, the Commission acknowledged both the importance and inexorable growth of state power over institutions of higher education and even shied away, unnecessarily it seemed, from using the word autonomy in reference to the state/institution

relationship. They suggested that the connotations of autonomy were too strong and instead preferred to talk in terms of institutional independence in certain areas, specifically citing aspects of "intellectual conduct," "academic affairs," and "administrative arrangements" (p. 18). Briefly, this independence amounted to preserving traditional academic freedom, providing the schools wide latitude in the design of program and course content and methodology, and allowing college administrations considerable internal freedom in fiscal and personnel management. Based upon this foundation, the Commission then tabulated, matched in comprehensiveness and concreteness only by the guidelines of Glenny et al. (1971), responsibilities falling to the state and its board and to the institutions and their boards. They suggested the state should have rather strong power in some of the traditional areas within master planning, especially relative to size and growth. Thus they recommended state-level decisions regarding subsystem and institutional role and scope, the establishment of new campuses and major program areas (such as a new college within a university), and size controls directly and through control of the total number of admissions, student mix by level, and subsystem admission standards. They recommended institutional independence in individual admissions, faculty selection, and course content and academic standards for courses and programs. In contrast to Glenny and most others noted earlier, they also suggested that institutions be free to develop new programs falling within assigned role and scope. In a similar view, they felt innovation by the colleges should be encouraged, but not mandated, by the state-level board through advice, grants, and funding incentives; however,

decisions on the actual implementation of these innovations should still be made by the institutions. Regarding budgetary and fiscal concerns, the Commission made recommendations that again followed the pattern set above. They considered state-level responsibilities to be determining the level of institutional appropriations and evaluating the effectiveness of institutional use of these funds. Accordingly, they recommended funding in both the operational- and capital-budget areas primarily on the basis of formulas. On the other hand, intra-institutional budgeting was seen as a role of the campus administration. Likewise, the assignment and use of personnel and the design and utilization of facilities were considered institutional responsibilities. State-level evaluation of these campus decisions was seen as appropriate on a postaudit, vice a preaudit, basis. In order to carry out this evaluative function, the state would set the standards to be used and the accounting methods required. The Commission departed from these basic guidelines only to recommend state control over the general level of salaries, but again, deciding upon individual salaries was considered a campus activity. In short, the commission discouraged state budget review on a line-item basis other than in postaudits. Overall, then, the Commission recommended state-level powers in terms of setting the basic parameters within which the campus leadership would be free to operate in the manner it considered most satisfactory.

Meanwhile, in 1972 J. L. Miller had suggested what might be seen as a "federal" approach to the allocation of power in higher education. In his view, state-level boards should be granted only those responsibilities that can be effectively exercised only by an

organization with a state-wide outlook, and all other powers should be reserved for the institutions. While this concept is noteworthy, its application resulted in a division of powers basically corresponding to those set forth previously. Thus, he saw necessary state-level activities to be centered around long-range planning and the oversight of the implementation of such planning. Specific powers required to carry out the above included making institutional role assignments and reviewing and recommending to the state government college operating budgets and, to a degree, capital budgets. Unlike the Carnegie Commission but like most other observers, he believed the state-level board needed the authority to review new programs in the colleges. His opinion regarding the review of existing college programs was more tentative. He felt it often unduly antagonized the institutions yet suggested it was very probably necessary in order to complement and insure the integrity of the board's authority for new-program review. Reflecting the ideas of Hefferlin (1971) and others, he considered institutional power to be characterized as deciding upon the most appropriate means by which to fulfill the objectives assigned the institution by the state-level board, primarily through its long-range plans.

In addition to the important contribution of the Carnegie Commission, a number of other articles and studies touching upon state-level powers in higher-education decision making appeared in 1973. Among these, Coffman (1973) discussed the impact of a planned program budgeting system (PPBS) on state-level activities. In his opinion the use of PPBS requires a governing board at the state level. Accordingly, he envisioned a greater state role in the

budgeting process than typically recommended in the studies reviewed to this point. For example, on the basis of enrollment projections, the state board would determine institutional requirements for faculty by area and level and set the proportions of each college's budget to be allocated to particular program areas. Under these guidelines the board would review and approve budgets submitted by the institutions. Likewise, the board would develop and implement a data-collection and evaluation program. Generally, these activities did not represent unique state concerns compared to previous recommendations, but the degree of state power in these areas was greater than that usually suggested earlier.

In another 1973 work, Heilbron, within an examination of the higher-education trustee, recommended a state-level role generally similar to most of the previous studies. Overall, he again saw the state-board role as focusing upon master planning and the implementation of the plan. Thus he recommended state-level functioning in establishing "basic personnel practices," setting general admission standards for each of the state's higher education subsystems, reviewing new programs, and approving college budgets in terms of their total amount. On the other hand, the institutions should be concerned with, for example, specific personnel decisions, intra-program curriculum changes, and the actual allocation of budgeted funds within the college operating budgets. Overall, Heilbron suggested that state-level governing boards for all of higher education were inappropriate, since he felt such boards could not deal adequately with a diversity of institutions. However, he

considered governing boards for no more than 25 similar institutions to be less objectionable.

Along with the report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973) discussed previously, another extensive report on coordination and higher education was presented in 1973 by The Task Force on Coordination, Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education of the Education Commission of the States (E.C.S.). This group's report strongly endorsed the need for a state-level body specifically to coordinate postsecondary education within a state; furthermore, the Task Force emphasized the importance of clearly delineating the decision-making roles of all levels existing within a state's system--from statewide boards, through intermediate boards, to the individual institutions. However, they also suggested that no single allocation of powers could be devised to fit the particular environments--historical, political, and educational--of all the states. The ideal role structure, they stated, would vary from state to state. Despite this view, the report did contain a number of recommendations regarding state-level board activities relative to three areas: planning, program review, and budget review.

As has been typical, the Task Force saw planning as the central function of a state-wide coordinating board, and they specified several activities as falling within this function. They suggested the board should determine the goals of the state-wide system as a whole. Upon this foundation the board should determine and assign the basic objectives and the associated role and scope of each of the institutions. The Task Force considered board power in these areas primary but emphasized the necessity of involving the institutions in these

decisions and of providing broad institutional leeway within the decided-upon parameters. They additionally recommended the board have major responsibility for evaluating the implementation of its plans and for setting up articulation procedures among the institutions. In part as a result of its role in evaluation, the board would also serve as the primary source of information and advice on postsecondary education for state government.

Second, the Task Force saw program review as a board function necessarily flowing from its planning responsibilities. They recommended that the board have the power to review and approve both new programs and, a more controversial area, existing programs being offered by the colleges. Likewise, they proposed similar board power over administrative units within the colleges in the areas of instruction, research, and public service. On the other hand, decisions regarding courses, they said, should be made at the institutional level.

The third suggested area of board activity was budget review. Here, the Task Force felt that the determination of institutional allocations was a state decision, though strong institutional input into the decision was necessary. They favored lump-sum allocations to the colleges or perhaps (and this point was unclear) lump-sum allocations to designated broad program areas within the colleges. In any case, the Task Force believed the institutions should not be precluded from shifting funds between administrative units within broad areas. Corresponding to these recommendations, they felt the evaluative aspect of budget review should be a postaudit process rather than a preaudit one, i.e., determining how well the funds

have been used vice telling the colleges how to use them. Institutional participation in the establishment and revision of the budget review process was encouraged, but overall it was seen as primarily a state function. These powers concerned state funds; the Task Force added that institutional use of income from outside sources should be subject to state-board review but not control.

The Task Force's recommendations were, as they intended, limited in scope and often broad in nature. As pointed out earlier, they felt the details of the state/institution relationship could be defined only within the context of a particular state; nonetheless, they believed each state did need to establish clearly those details for its own situation. Consequently, the Task Force reported three sets of guidelines from other sources concerning this relationship. One was the Carnegie Commission (1973) recommendations summarized earlier. Another was a set of suggestions by Harclerod. These are identical to those reported by Harclerod in a subsequent article (1975) and reviewed later in this section.

The third group of guidelines (The Task Force on Coordination, 1973, p. 80) was developed by the American Association of State Colleges and Universities and issued November 19, 1971, as Institutional Rights and Responsibilities. As might be imagined, given the Association's constituency, the guidelines recommended a state-level role somewhat weaker than that proposed by many sources, and they supported significant college input into all state-level decisions. This general bias was most glaringly evident in the area of planning, almost universally considered by others as the overriding concern of a state board. The Association described the function of the board

in this area in rather passive terms, saying the board "articulates plans of institutions and governing elements" (p. 80). Thus, the implied state-board role was that of a reactor vice a leader. Likewise, they saw the state role in evaluation primarily in terms of coordinating college efforts in self-evaluation. Oddly, it seemed, the Association's recommendations in the program review area called for rather strong state-board action. They proposed state-level decision-making power in program allocation, which is not unique compared to the recommendations of others but does not appear to correspond with their own suggestions regarding state-level planning power. Furthermore, they suggested some state-level approval power in the program-content area, which is somewhat unique compared to typical guidelines. Regarding the review of operational budgets, the Association recommended a state-board role largely advisory in nature, although they proposed approval power for the state coordinating board over capital budgets. They agreed with most guidelines by suggesting the state board establish broad vice detailed policies governing college fiscal operations. Nearly all the Association's guidelines tended to describe the state-board role in vague terms, and their recommendation in the area of personnel selection was perhaps vaguest: The board "coordinates [personnel selection] among elements within [broad] state policy" (p. 80). Overall, the recommendations of the E.C.S. Task Force itself, which specifically claimed to be generally avoiding concreteness, were often more concrete than those of the Association.

The next year Millard (1974), the Director of Higher Education Services for E.C.S., reiterated the basic recommendations of The

Task Force on Coordination, strongly supporting the need for an aggressive state-level coordinating function. He again emphasized the centrality of planning as the paramount state activity, especially noting the importance of the state boards allocating institutional role and scope, exercising power in program review, and implementing an objective, data-based evaluation system. At the same time, he also supported the need to provide for meaningful college input into state-level decision making, particularly in the development of state-wide master plans. In a subsequent article (Millard, 1975), he continued to contend that state-level coordination was required and specifically cited the particular value of state-wide planning leading to role and scope assignments for the various colleges. Likewise, he restated his belief that the institutions must be allowed to participate in these planning decisions.

Also in 1974, Goodall identified six issues he felt would significantly affect the future path of higher-education coordination. In doing so, he stated opinions on the proper state-level roles in program and budget review. In the first area, he supported the necessity of state-board review of both new and existing programs; however, he felt that, in order to preserve the rational nature of such review and thus enhance institutional acceptance of these decisions, the review process should largely be delegated to a non-board-based committee of academics and knowledgeable laymen. He also recommended that the budget-review powers of a state board be tempered somewhat by allowing the individual institutions and/or subsystem governing boards to defend their own original budget

requests to the legislature, instead of reserving the defense of the requests before the legislature solely to a state-wide agency.

Finally, in the same year, another very important study (Halstead, 1974) regarding the state-level coordinating process appeared. This work emphasized the methods and techniques of the state-wide planning process, but Halstead necessarily provided a comprehensive look at thought up to that time relative to the structure and function of a state-level board for higher education. While he suggested little that was new, he in effect endorsed a number of principles. First, he agreed with the E.C.S. Task Force that no one structure and division of state versus local decision powers fit every state situation. Nonetheless, he did put forth a number of general recommendations. Overall, he seemed to feel that a state-level board for all of higher education should be a coordinating board, and he noted approvingly Paltridge's belief that lay members should predominate on such a board. On the other hand, he stated that a state-level subsystem board could properly be a governing board if the institutions it served were largely homogeneous in their concerns and objectives. However, he felt that the board of a subsystem consisting of colleges with strong local perspectives and thus varying concerns would be better served by a coordinating board. He specifically suggested that community colleges would typically fall into this latter group.

Regarding the functions of state boards, Halstead reported and concurred with Paltridge's contention that state versus college roles should be clearly defined but readily changed should redefinition become warranted. More specifically, he noted and agreed with

the opinion of Fincher (and additionally the opinions of most of those reviewed here previously) that planning, especially continuous long-range planning, was a board's paramount activity; and he supportively recorded Paltridge's recommendation that a board have its own professional planning staff. Halstead detailed this planning role as including the development of state-system objectives, the identification of corresponding system educational activities or program priorities, the recommendation of institutional roles and scopes, and the evaluation of state educational requirements and likewise of the effectiveness of state educational services. Overall, he described these functions as characterized by "leadership, advice, and recommendations" (p. 21). At the same time, he noted with approval Medsker's call for significant institutional participation in the planning process, agreeing that this input was essential in maintaining a desirable and productive level of state and college consensus on educational objectives and programs. However, he recommended, by endorsing Fincher's proposition, that the state-level-board role in planning was primarily in terms of the state-wide system plan, not institutional master plans. Development of the latter he saw as basically a college-level activity. Like a number of earlier observers, Halstead felt that program review, being based upon system planning, was an appropriate state-board function, and he specified this role as including the approval of both new and existing degree programs and of new campuses. In an area related to master planning and program review, he stated that state-level control over general admission standards was probably necessary.

Regarding budget review, Halstead, like several others, supported the need for flexibility in order to enhance the institutions' ability to administer their programs efficiently. Thus, he felt that the state board should review institutional budgets and consolidate them into a system-wide budget for recommendation to the state government. However, the actual allocations should basically be done by the colleges, therefore leaving the schools capable of shifting funds internally when desired. State-level evaluation of institutional fiscal efficiency should then, he felt, be done on a postaudit basis. Another evaluative activity of the state board in the financial field, according to Halstead, should be the analysis of monetary resources available for the financing of the state system, a fiscal activity tied in with master planning. He also noted, without fully endorsing the concept, that state boards often take on major responsibility for the planning, financing, and construction of large capital projects. Finally in this area, following Glenny et al. (1971), he proposed that the state board should administer the allocation of state and Federal student-aid money.

Generally, except as noted otherwise above, Halstead believed institutions should play the major role in the areas of student affairs, faculty affairs, administrator appointments, program and course planning, college-budget preparation, and the maintenance of campus order. In the fiscal realm, he specifically recommended institutional decision power over salaries, faculty load determinations, and the allocation of monetary support to particular academic areas. Overall then, Halstead appeared to concur with the Federal Constitution approach to the division of power, whereby decision-making

roles not specifically centralized at the state level are automatically reserved to the various subdivisions of a state's system of postsecondary education.

In 1975, discussion of state-level coordination and control of higher education seemed to reach a peak. While no comprehensive studies like those in 1971 (Glenny et al.) and 1973 (The Carnegie Commission; The Task Force on Coordination) came out, a large number of shorter statements were published.

Callan (1975) looked at the potential means of evaluating state-level boards for higher education and, in doing so, made several observations about board structure and role. First, he suggested that board structure was not a critical factor, being unrelated to the results of board activities. Interestingly, he later stated that board procedures were a significant factor in determining board effectiveness. To a degree, the two assertions seem contradictory, for though structure and procedure certainly do not share a one-to-one correspondence, some reasonable correspondence between the two would appear inherent, thus seemingly tying structure and effectiveness together inevitably if not perfectly.

Like many others, Callan saw state-system planning as the paramount state-board function. He suggested the state plan should, among other things, specify system goals, assign responsibilities for implementing the goals (which seems to mean making role and scope assignments), and concretely state what information is to be collected by whom in order to evaluate the success in meeting the goals. At the same time, he recommended that early institutional (as well as public) input is necessary in the master planning process. Overall,

he felt that the master plan provided the foundation for state-board budget and program review. He included both old and new college programs in the later area.

Graham (1975), from his perspective within state government, saw the major function of state-wide boards to be acting as the major conduit of public input (from state government and the general public) into higher education while simultaneously insulating higher education from rapidly shifting political currents. In order to fulfill this function, the board's prime activities, he felt, were planning for the state system, with particular concern for anticipating future problems, and evaluating the system so as to provide valid and rational support for the decision making in planning. This second activity, evaluating, required the state board to collect and analyze data under an efficient management information system. At the same time, he recommended that the process of making decisions allow input from those elements affected by the decisions.

Holderman (1975) specifically noted that a state board, unlike the state government and the colleges between which it stood, had no real public constituency. Consequently, it was perhaps in the best position of the three to review and recommend rationally the establishment and disestablishment of college programs. But, like Graham and many others, he believed a board should solicit wide participation in its decision making.

Basically concurring with Holderman, Johnson (1975) looked at the program-review function of state boards in more detail. Under this function, she specifically recommended not only that the board be authorized to approve or disapprove new programs but also that it

have authority regarding "the deletion, merger, reallocation, and suspension of existing programs" (p. 46). And within the term program she included both any instructional activities collectively leading to some terminal objective and any administrative unit from the department level on up, including units outside the standard set-up such as institutes and learning centers. On the other hand, she specifically recommended that decisions on courses and their content be made at the institutional level. Furthermore, she stated that state-level functions in the program-review area should be carried out within a procedure providing for institutional and subsystem-level board consultation, with perhaps the use of advisory committees. In addition, Johnson noted the relationship of the program-review function to master planning, that program review flowed from and depended upon thorough, continuous planning based upon complete and accurate data. She emphasized the significance of this relationship and, accordingly, stressed the need for state-board power to obtain the data necessary from colleges and subordinate boards. Though being more detailed in her discussion of the program-review function, Johnson ultimately echoed the views of the majority of observers seen earlier. And in more general terms, she echoed others regarding additional state-board functions as well, specifically noting her concurrence with Glenny et al. (1971) relative to the necessity of state-board powers in operating and capital budget review and recommendation and in the coordination of state-financed financial aid for students. These, of course, were in addition to the powers in planning, data collection, and program review already touched upon.

Another presentation, by Leslie (1975), added little concerning specific recommendations for the allocation of powers to state-level boards versus individual colleges and universities; in this regard he reviewed the significant work of Berdahl (1971) and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1971, 1973) examined here earlier. The strength of the statement, rather, lay in the background into which Leslie set these earlier suggestions. He emphasized that the functions of these two segments of a higher education system, state boards and institutions, should follow directly from their particular purposes. But, as related in Chapter One, the functions so derived are often conflicting, giving rise to a real and legitimate problem in the allocation of power. He generalized the state-board purpose as maintaining accountability within the system and, after reviewing alternate means of obtaining this conditions, recommended what he called "managerial accountability" as the appropriate one. This method he defined as "holding organizations and their actors accountable for performance" (p. 44) and contrasted it especially with state-board assumption of operational responsibility. With this foundation, Leslie reviewed approvingly the recommendations of Berdahl and the Carnegie Commission.

Millett (1975), in examining state-board activities, saw a significant contrast in the roles of two types of such boards, state-wide coordinating boards and state-wide governing boards. The former he saw as having a state-government orientation; the latter an institutional orientation. Accordingly, he suggested that the typical duties of coordinating boards were primarily designed to meet state concerns and included the approval of new campuses and programs;

the review of existing programs; and the administration of Federal assistance channeled throughout the state, of state financial aid for students, and of some of the details of state appropriations. On the other hand, governing-board duties usually revolve around institutional concerns. Thus, typical duties included selecting institutional chief executives; operating the personnel system; establishing the governance, administrative, and fiscal structures and procedures of the colleges; and setting degree and program requirements. Overall, his discussion seemed both too vague and too limited to fulfill its potential usefulness. He deemphasized the potential conflict arising in states where both types existed, though admitting that the boards' powers would overlap, and did not discuss the strengths or weaknesses of state structures having only one type board or the other.

Rather than discussing the allocation of powers, Odegaard (1975) commented on what he considered the appropriate structure and decision-making process for a state board, saying that "how to make a right decision" is more important than "who has the right to make a decision" (p. 93). He stressed the state-board role as a forum for a state-government/institution dialogue, emphasizing rational decision making based on adequate information. To this end, he believed that a board including nonvoting representatives of government and colleges and using ad hoc committees with strong institutional membership was desirable. This structure and process, he felt, would help insure the adequacy of the information base for decisions and also, because of the participatory element, promote decision implementation at the institutional level. Thus,

Odegaard voiced in more detail the concerns of other observers who had noted the value of institutional inputs in some form into state-board functions.

Odegaard described his preferred procedural structure for state boards as replicating the ideal form of university governance; on the other hand, Perkins (1975) took a considerably less favorable view of the governing process in institutions, characterizing decision making in curricular matters especially as anarchic, and he felt this situation complicated the effective functioning of coordinating boards. As a result, Perkins believed state boards typically left most curricular decisions to the colleges. At the other extreme, these boards did allocate in gross terms state appropriations to the institutions. Intermediate decisions-- "admissions, internal budget allocations, and salaries and benefits" (p. 188)--were resolved, he stated, through a process of accommodation. Finally he suggested that increasingly directive coordination was conflicting with decreasing power on the part of institutional administrators to implement the demands of the coordinators. But Perkins failed to recommend any proper division of power in response to this conflict.

The paramount role of planning in state-board activities was stressed by Woodard (1975). Like others, he noted the necessity of a state board's having the power to obtain current and adequate data to support its planning and the attendant decision making. As a part of this data, he stated that the board must be apprised of the present and projected goals and objectives of institutional activities, in addition to mere statistical descriptions. Along

with this sort of data-base input, he also recommended that a state board actively involve institutional representatives as influential advisors in the process of both long- and short-range planning. Like Odegaard (1975), Woodard believed institutional involvement in planning would, along with positively affecting the inherent value of the resulting plans, increase the effectiveness of their implementation at the college level.

As noted earlier here in the discussion of another report (The Task Force on Coordination, 1973), Harclerod has suggested guidelines for an appropriate state-board role, and he presented these comprehensively, along with their theoretical basis, in a 1975 article. The principle underlying Harclerod's recommendations was that the patterns of decentralization developed and used by large business organizations during the last fifty years could be effectively applied in the design of the structures and the allocation of powers for state systems of higher education and their elements. Accordingly, he reviewed these patterns and summarized the resulting division of functions within decentralized businesses and then suggested what powers these business practices implied should properly belong to a state board for higher education. The first major function he stated should be exercised by a state board was planning. Thus, in terms of state-wide needs, the board should develop a master plan, including plans for program and facility development at individual colleges as well as a statement of state-wide needs and policies. The planning process would result in "guidelines, standards, and, occasionally, basic procedures to guide the operations of individual institutions" (p. 37). Second,

he recommended the state board and its staff approve college master plans and, on the basis of these, institutional budgets. In addition, the board would present and support the approved budget requests to the appropriate state government units. Third, he believed the board should evaluate "institutional achievement of approved objectives, including fiscal postaudit and analysis of institutional application of statewide policies and guidelines" (p. 38). Finally he suggested that the board should advise institutions on operational matters, when requested by the college or deemed necessary by the state board. However, he emphasized that decisions in such matters should be made at the campus level; the state role should remain advisory only. Overall then, Harclerod recommended a strong state-board role in planning, budget review, and evaluation but stressed the need for college control of operations. His support of a strong state role in institutional master planning seemed more at odds with the suggestions of other observers than his other recommendations, and he did not clarify the exact nature of this role.

As was noted in Chapter One, the question of how to balance state concerns over efficiency and effectiveness of a state-wide system of higher education with institutional concerns over autonomy continues to be at issue; however, since 1975 recommended answers to the question have appeared infrequently. For whatever reason, other topics have dominated the literature of higher education. But in one recent article, Chambers (1977), traditionally a foe of formal state-level coordination, stated some principles he felt should guide what he had apparently begun to see as an inevitable

process in collegiate life, state-board budget review and fiscal evaluation. He noted that activities in these areas necessarily have an impact upon the academic functions of colleges and that this impact can easily become detrimental. Accordingly, he recommended that state-budgeted appropriations for institutions be in the lump-sum form and that institutions not be subject to preaudit of their internal budget allocations. In concert with these principles, he specifically stated that nonstate revenue of colleges and universities should not be absorbed into a state's general revenue fund for reappropriation; rather, the institutions should have full and free use of such funds. Chambers stated that these principles have often been ignored in state systems, this despite the fact that they are largely identical to the recommendations of many earlier observers.

Looking at the literature on the role of a state board for higher education then, one sees that the degree of agreement among the many commentators is rather remarkable. First, the state-board role in planning is typically seen as paramount. This function is usually seen as including the assignment of institutional role and scope. The major controversy here involves the amount of state-board power relative to institutional master plans, including facility development. Second, nearly everyone agrees that the state board should have strong powers in reviewing new programs and administrative units proposed by institutions. Agreement is less universal regarding state-board power in reviewing existing programs and units. Third, budget review is widely perceived as a state-board function, and most of the observers supported lump-sum

appropriations evaluated through postaudits. Almost all deplored strict line-item budgets and accordingly espoused institutional freedom to shift funds among campus units. Touching upon all of the above, evaluation of institutional actions, in terms of fulfilling the state-system master plan and meeting standards of fiscal efficiency, was largely considered a state-board function. Necessarily then, virtually no one disputed the state-board power to collect the required data from the system elements. Finally, nearly everyone noted that state-board procedures in these areas should be formulated so as to obtain institutional and subsystem-board input into the decisions regarding plans, policies, budget recommendations, and evaluation criteria and techniques. At the same time, disagreement did exist, both in the areas specified above and in the exact extent or nature of state-board powers generally agreed upon. Last, one other characteristic seemed apparent; with few exceptions--Harclerod (1975) being the most obvious--the recommendations were rarely derived from a clear, fully developed, and comprehensive set of justifying principles. Justifications, where presented, were usually either very broadly stated and thus rather vague or limited to supporting one or two specific suggestions from among many. Perhaps this factor partially explained why the role of state-level boards remains controversial despite the degree of consensus this review uncovered.

#### State Coordination of Community Colleges

The previous section reviewed selected published recommendations regarding the structure and decision-making role of state-level boards for higher education generally, along with the decision-making

roles that should be reserved for the colleges and universities. This section examines selected sources commenting on these same questions relative to state-level boards for community colleges specifically. The sources reviewed have been selected from those appearing from 1967 to the present, and they are reviewed here chronologically. Few truly comprehensive studies on the question of power allocation between state-level community college boards and the local colleges have appeared; consequently, some basically descriptive studies have been included for the insight they provide or the specific recommendations they contain.

As noted in Chapter One, during the 1960's community colleges were growing by leaps and bounds--as a group, in number, and individually, in size. Furthermore, their specific role as institutions of postsecondary education was still evolving. Finally, in many states they were coordinated, often as an after-thought, by state boards of education. As a result, during this time the focus of the community college literature was on campus activities, not on system coordination. Only when community colleges had emerged as a significant and visible element of postsecondary education as a whole did the topic of coordinating and/or governing state-wide systems become the subject of extensive comment. In effect, Christian and Wattenbarger set the stage for such comment when, in 1967, they attributed the phenomenal growth of Florida community colleges during the preceding ten years to the existence of a system master plan and the leadership of the state-level board. They emphasized that the state role involved coordinating and aiding local initiative as opposed to directly controlling local

activities, and they espoused that approach. While they did not present concrete guidelines regarding the state/local relationship, their comments provided a starting point for the issue of state control versus local autonomy for community colleges.

At the same time, Morrissey (1967) looked in more detail at a system with a single governing board. While Morrissey talked in terms of governing "multi-unit colleges," the tone of his article indicated that his focus was on large, if not necessarily state-wide, systems, and indeed he cited the Massachusetts community college system as an example. He recommended a structure in which a central chief executive reports to the system governing board and works with the colleges through a council of the college chief executives. In general, he saw the basic responsibilities of the system board and staff to be setting policy, insuring accountability, and providing support for the colleges. On the other hand, the task of actually initiating activities he perceived as normally a college function. Morrissey provided more concrete examples of these statements as applied in fiscal and capital planning and operations. In both areas, he described the college as initiating planning for budgets or facilities within general board guidelines, with the system staff and board reviewing and approving the planning. In the fiscal area, however, once the budget had been approved by the system board, he recommended that the colleges be empowered to shift allocations within the college as necessary, except for salaries. Likewise, he recommended that the system staff continuously audit but not approve college expenditures. Overall, then, he appeared to recommend a process, under a single governing board,

that still reserved significant authority for the individual colleges. It should be noted that Morrissey directed his comments to single-board systems; he did not pass judgment on the issue of single-board systems vice coordinating-board systems.

The next year, Wattenbarger (1968), as reported in Chapter One, noted that the literature to that time had supported the value of local control for community colleges. Nonetheless, he reported, a number of states had turned to systems governed at the state level, and he suggested several causes for such shifts in the locus of power. He concluded that such trends were irreversible but stressed that the most significant strengths of local control should and could be preserved despite the increasing power at the state-level, whether through state coordination or actual governance. Finally he reviewed earlier recommendations of B. Lamar Johnson, which in effect suggested that respective state and local responsibilities needed to be clearly defined within a system, and Wattenbarger then called for the analysis of the state/college relationship and the statement of concrete principles upon which such definitions could be based. He did not, however, provisionally recommend any such principles himself. Later in the year, he collaborated in a reiteration of these concepts (Schultz & Wattenbarger, 1968).

Similarly, Martorana (1968) noted the importance of clarifying the state/college relationship within state community college systems, given the increasing state-level role. While noting that the exact nature of the relationship necessarily would vary with the statutory bases of the states, he made several recommendations. First, he stated that state-board functions should generally

focus on matters affecting state-wide concerns. Thus, he suggested proper state-board activities included state-wide master planning, the establishment of new institutions, program review, and the design and revision of the means of providing fiscal support for the colleges. Second, he felt the state board should provide leadership for the system through advisement on many aspects of college operations. Third, he saw the state board as the primary spokesman for community colleges at other than local-district levels, especially before various state-level organizations and agencies. A related function was developing policies and programs to promote community college articulation with other levels of education within the state. In addition, he emphasized the need for the state board to act as an evaluator of college operations in order to support its other activities, and he noted that this role required state-board power to obtain and analyze a comprehensive range of data from the colleges. Finally, he felt that the state board should promote a "sense of system" among the colleges. At the same time, however, he also stressed the need for the promotion of "strong institutional identities" (p. 28). Furthermore, Martorana warned that a state board, in carrying out these functions, must resist the temptation to extend its control to areas of college operations. Such actions, he believed, would lower rather than increase the efficiency, economically and qualitatively, of the system.

In the same year, C. W. Hall (1968) reported on his survey of relatively equal samples of chief executives of state-level staffs for community colleges (he called them state officers), college

chief executives, and experts in community college education. First he noted that at least half of every group preferred that community colleges be coordinated as a separate entity or within the higher-education structure of the state rather than through the state's department of education, despite the fact that a large majority of the states represented in the groups functioned under the department-of-education pattern. In addition, on the basis of the survey Hall made several recommendations regarding the role of the state officer and, by extension, of the state-level board and its staff. Overall, these were very similar to those voiced by Martorana (1968) above. Basically he (p. 33) suggested the state-level organization develop and implement the state-wide master plan; develop policies for the establishment of new colleges; "clarify the functions and role of the junior colleges" (perhaps implying program review); carry out state-wide college research and insure college compliance with state-board standards and policies (apparently an evaluation function); "prepare, present, and defend the state junior college budget," advise state-government elements on other community college matters, and otherwise serve as the spokesman for the state system; and finally advise the individual colleges. Additionally, like Martorana, he stressed that the state role should strive to coordinate vice control the operations of the local colleges in order not to sap "the vigor of local control and responsibility" (p. 34).

Along with broad statements like those discussed above, a number of articles appeared in 1968 looking at the state/college relationship from the perspective of a particular state. One of

the most extensive of those focused on New Jersey (Cohen & Evans, 1968), reporting on a conference of consultants and state and college representatives about this issue. As noted in Chapter One, the conference report cited factors underlying both the need for state-wide coordination of community colleges and the necessity of maintaining significant college autonomy. The report recommended that the state-level role be clearly defined and that this role include "statewide system planning; coordination to achieve minimum levels of quality and to insure equalization of opportunity in all areas of the state; serving as the major spokesman for the system to the legislature and the public; keeping records and directing research; providing services to individual college staffs to improve institutional quality; and reviewing and evaluating the plans of individual colleges" (p. 32). Overall, then, the recommendations were quite similar in nature and scope to those reviewed previously. In addition, however, the report specifically noted that the state-level staff should not be too large; excessive size, it contended, often resulted in undesirable interference in college operations.

Erickson (1968) described the creation and structure of a state coordinating board for community colleges in Illinois and related the conditions leading to it, as discussed in Chapter One. He discussed approvingly the state board's efforts in involving the colleges in the board's carrying out of various functions and in the further refining of its role and noted the use of an Advisory Council of Presidents to aid communication. However, he did not describe the state-board/college relationship in detail. Lombardi

(1968) likewise discussed the creation of a similar board in California. He emphasized that college concern over autonomy resulted in the enabling legislation's carrying several statements encouraging the maintenance of maximum local control over college operations. He made no specific recommendations, however. Johnston (1968) described the coordinating structure in Mississippi but also made no recommendations regarding the state/college relationship in general. In 1969, Wellman and Hamel discussed the progress of the young community college system of Virginia and described the system's structure. As a system with a state-level governing board, perhaps the most significant item in the article, as noted in Chapter One, was the fact that the local college boards, initially purely advisory in function and appointed by the state's governor, were allotted greater operational power and became locally appointed two years after their creation.

In the same year, Stuckman (1969a) studied the function-implementation of two community college state-level staffs, Florida and Illinois, and identified eight functions exercised by both of these agencies: (1) developing, evaluating, and reviewing the state community college master plan; (2) assigning institutional role through program planning; (3) allocating state operating and capital-outlay funds to the colleges; (4) developing uniform financial-accounting procedures; (5) developing program-articulation agreements with other segments of higher education and the secondary schools; (6) developing accreditation standards; (7) establishing capital-construction-project priorities; and (8) reviewing building plans. These functions largely resemble the recommendations reviewed

earlier. On the basis of the study, Stuckman felt that generally these functions did not adversely affect the ability of the institutions to meet local needs and noted that the colleges had wide latitude in structuring their programs and courses, thus allowing them to adapt to changing community requirements.

In a related work, Stuckman (1969b) discussed more comprehensively the appropriate state-level and college roles in decision making. He stated the general principle that the state role should revolve around the coordination of the system, while the making of decisions regarding the actual operation of a college should be done by the college. Additionally, he explained and supported the idea that the structure of the state/college relationship should be based upon the concepts of collegial administrative theory, which would basically call for significant institutional participation in many state-board activities; a more detailed look at his comments in this area is taken in a later section of this chapter. In line with these ideas, he made several recommendations concerning appropriate decision-making roles. He clearly implied that state-board responsibilities included system master planning, including the assignment of institutional role and scope, and approval power over the establishment or significant expansion of programs at a college. On the other hand, he stated that the state board should not be able to force a college to offer a particular program. In general, college master plans for programs and facilities should be formulated by the colleges and merely reviewed at the state level. Furthermore, curriculum design should be a campus responsibility. In fiscal matters, he suggested the state board should concentrate

on ensuring that funds are allocated fairly to the institutions based upon their fulfillment of their assigned and approved purpose. To facilitate this function, the state board must be able to design and implement a system-wide management information system, but this should be done in concert with the institutions. The colleges, he felt, must then be free to manage the use of their appropriations and, in a related area, have control over the recruitment and use of their personnel. In line with the state board's system-wide perspective, other state-level responsibilities would include the developing of articulation agreements with other segments of post-secondary education and serving as the primary community college spokesman before other arms and agencies of state government and bodies of citizens with state-level influence. Yet, in all its functions, Stuckman emphasized that the state-level staff must act so as to provide for institutional input into and knowledge of the staff and board decisions. He suggested that this involvement could be engaged through the use of topical councils made up of presidents, academic officers, and other categories of institutional representatives, with each council chaired by the appropriate state-level staff member. Overall communication could be additionally furthered by a coordinating committee of council representatives and staff members and by the wide dissemination of reports on council activities.

In 1971 Stuckman and Wattenbarger reiterated these same ideas, saying, "The [state-level] agency. . . must assume a leadership role and initiate formal, ongoing cooperative activities with the community colleges in the state" (p. 44). In order for the agency

to do so, they again recommended the use of councils, which would "serve as forums where the coordinating agency and institutions formulate procedures, develop recommendations for policy, and determine consensus in ways which facilitate the functioning of the individual institutions" (p. 44). They added that the councils could also provide a means of rapidly clarifying and revising policies and role allocations when questions or problems arose. Finally, they made basically the same recommendations as Stuckman (1969b) did above regarding specific powers that should be exercised by the state-level agency.

Wattenbarger and Christofoli (1971) reported a study on the structures through which state-level boards for community colleges coordinated academic affairs within their systems. The reported means ranged from action by the state board alone to the use of formally constituted state-wide councils of varying composition. The use of such councils was the most commonly reported method (about a quarter of the states studied), but their duties varied from being powerful and concretely defined to being purely advisory and somewhat vague. They made no specific recommendations regarding the preferred structure for state-level coordination of academic affairs, though one could perhaps presume that Wattenbarger would support a council of the sort described previously (Stuckman & Wattenbarger, 1971).

In another 1971 article, Wattenbarger and Cage examined the trends in the financing of community colleges, noting that full state funding was becoming more common. Major opposition to this trend stemmed from the belief that it decreased the responsiveness

of colleges to local needs. For example, they pointed out that this belief caused the California legislature to reject the 1967 recommendation of the California Coordinating Council for Higher Education for full state support of the state's community college system. However, while agreeing that this decrease in local college autonomy was a common result, Wattenbarger and Cage did not agree that it was a necessary result, citing Florida as an example of an exception to the rule.

Also in 1971, Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi reported a comprehensive descriptive study of the structure and functions of the nation's state-level boards for community colleges as of 1970. This study, which dealt with 43 of the 45 state-coordinated or -governed systems of community colleges existing at that time, classified the state-level boards of such systems into four structural types--boards serving only community colleges, boards serving all of higher education, state-university-system boards, and state boards of education--as described in Chapter One. Functionally, the report classified these boards as coordinating, coordinating-governing, and governing. Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi had surmised that states with relatively large community college systems would tend to have state-level boards serving only community colleges and boards functioning in a coordinating role. Interestingly, however, they found no readily apparent relationship between system size and the structural type or functional role of the system board.

Along with classifying the boards, they also examined the decision-making role each board reported playing for 20 selected governance activities. In describing these activities, they

divided them into two groups. In the first group they listed those activities that they perceived as logically being state-level responsibilities. These were:

establishing criteria and standards for the creation of new colleges, evaluating institutions, formulating budget recommendations to the governor and state legislature on state fundings, allocating and/or reallocating state funds, serving as legislative spokesman for the colleges, and developing a master plan for facility and program requirements. (p. 19)

A second group they saw as appropriately assumed by the colleges.

These were activities regarding:

the establishment of new service and educational programs, applications for federal aid, admission regulations, tuition and fee schedules, probation and suspension policies, grading policies, articulation agreements, formulation of a salary schedule for professional employees, tenure and promotion policies, award of tenure and promotions, award and termination of appointments, and preparation of an institutional budget. (pp. 19-20)

In setting up this division of responsibility, they noted that it was not absolute and that decision making in some areas could be shared. Furthermore, they did not specifically present the division as a recommendation for practice; nevertheless, it tends to represent one.

The study found that no clear differences appeared among the ranges of governance activities exercised by each of the four structural types of state-level boards for community colleges. Rather, as expected by Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi, the differences were related to the functional role of the board--governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating. They found that within each category boards, though far from identical, shared a general pattern of responsibilities assumed fully or through review.

Systems with governing boards were the most centralized. For none of the governance activities listed above did a majority of such systems grant the colleges full autonomy in decision making. Rather, nearly all the boards assumed primary responsibility for the state-level governance activities, as defined by Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi, and over half assumed primary responsibility for most of the activities classified above as institutional. A majority of the boards exercised secondary responsibility, reviewing and/or approving institutionally initiated plans or decisions, for the remaining activities: establishing probation and suspension policies and grading policies, awarding and terminating appointments, awarding tenure and promotions, and preparing the institutional budget.

The greatest variability in state-board power occurred among those systems with governing-coordinating boards; overall, however, such systems were less centralized than those with governing boards. Nevertheless, again full institutional autonomy did not exist in a majority of these systems for any governance activity studied.

Systems with coordinating boards were the least centralized. For only a small number of activities did a majority of these boards take primary responsibility: setting the criteria for new-college establishment; recommending a system budget to the state government; allocating state funds to the colleges; and, less universally, evaluating the colleges. Additionally, these boards generally exercised secondary (review and approval) power in several other areas. Unlike the other two categories of state-level boards, the coordinating boards tended to grant the colleges full autonomy

in several areas: establishing policies regarding academic probation and suspension, grading, and faculty tenure and promotion; setting professional-employee salary schedules; and making tenure, promotion, and appointment decisions.

In summary, Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi found that, in practice, the division of governance responsibilities between the state-level board for community colleges and those colleges varied considerably among the states but that a somewhat common pattern existed within groups of boards categorized by functional role. They classified the 20 governance activities studied into those appropriate for state-board action and those appropriate for college action but did not specifically recommend any pattern of power allocation.

Also in 1971, Singer and Grande looked at the governance activities of state-level boards responsible for governing or coordinating only community colleges and identified several powers exercised by these boards that they considered undesirable. These powers included establishing and maintaining curricular standards for the system, supervising the general and academic operation of the colleges, exercising budgetary control, selecting the colleges' chief executive officers, and setting tuition rates. By their criticism Singer and Grande thus implied that these powers should be fully or largely assumed by the colleges. However, they did not follow these implications with concrete recommendations for the allocation of power within their sometimes vaguely described areas of concern.

The next year, Wattenbarger and Bender (1972) noted that the "responsibility for decision making, planning, budgeting, and

evaluation" (p. 17) had been shifting from the college to the state level. They pointed out that in an ideal system each level had important roles in governance and called for study of this relationship; however, they made no specific recommendations.

Harris (1972) suggested that the wide diversity of available career-education opportunities in the community colleges, which had resulted from the traditional community-needs orientation of these colleges, was in danger of being limited because of the growth in state-level governance power within the various state systems. A state role was valuable, he said, but needed to be limited and shared with the colleges. In planning, he felt that the state should be concerned with analyzing program needs state-wide and the college with determining local needs. For programs established, the college would have primary responsibility for determining and obtaining the instructional resources required. Together, the state-level agency and the college should develop the procedures for program approval and certification and for evaluation of program effectiveness. The state agency could then administer these procedures, giving it some control over local college activities. Finally, he saw the distribution of funds as another state activity, again providing that agency with some control over local programs; however, he recommended that fund-distribution procedures be devised jointly. Harris indicated that this division of responsibility would preserve an adequate level of college autonomy.

Also in 1972 a book by Richardson, Blocker, and Bender appeared closely examining community college governance. They focused on the internal governance of the community college, exploring its theoretical

background and then presenting detailed recommendations for practice. They basically called for a dual structure, with decision making occurring within a participative structure centered around a constituent assembly and with policy administration being carried out through a more traditional bureaucratic structure. Less comprehensively, they also commented on the governance of multiunit colleges and state systems. These comments primarily examined the question of whether their recommendations for a single college were applicable to larger organizations, and the answer was a conditional yes. They pointed out that multiunit college systems typically seem to demand a dual administrative structure, one geographically based and the other based on functional area, and went on to suggest that the dual structure, decision making and administration, they recommended for single colleges would fit well into the requirements of the multiunit system. On the other hand, they were not fully certain that an all-system constituent assembly as the centerpiece of the decision-making structure would be as effective for a system as for a campus because of its increased remoteness from the constituent population. Nonetheless, they did endorse the use of an assembly but strongly stated that decisions should be made as close as possible to the level of those members of the organization directly affected. Thus, their ideas ultimately led to the issue of the allocation of responsibility and power among the levels of a system, and they emphasized that both the unilateral powers and the shared responsibilities of the system units needed to be clearly stated if conflict were to be minimized. Pointing out that the division of power will vary among systems, they made few recommendations regarding

an appropriate division. They did suggest that, for systems with a single governing board, professional negotiations should be carried out at the board level. In addition, they stated that budgetary decisions belonged in the decision-making (participative) side of the recommended dual structure and that the role of the fiscal arm of a system's administrative structure was to keep track of campus expenditures rather than to approve them. Overall, it can probably be inferred that Richardson, Blocker, and Bender felt that a system agency or board should make no policy decisions without formal input from the system's components.

That same year, Richardson (1972) emphasized a point that follows from the recommendations of the above book but was not explicitly stated, that local boards for community colleges are not essential for such colleges to be responsive to their communities' needs. Perhaps his unstated reasoning, based upon the previous recommendations, might be that a state-governed system using the participative decision-making structure proposed or at least abiding by its spirit in terms of the value of college-level input can be providing adequate leeway for college decision making. In the article, Richardson identified several state-governed systems he felt were serving their college communities well.

As noted in Chapter One, in 1973 Gleazer reported his impressions of the future problems and opportunities that would face community colleges, drawn from a 1970-71 survey of one hundred community colleges and interviews with citizens, politicians and community college educators from the local to the state level. Among his conclusions was that state-level concern, especially on the part

of the legislatures, over the operation of community colleges was growing. Accordingly, he felt state-level control over college operations would expand. Likewise, he stated that local demands for college responsiveness were mounting, creating tension over the allocation of authority between college and state. Overall, he suggested that a significant state-level role was required but that decisions at that level must be made with strong involvement of those affected at the college level perhaps through the use of advisory committees, an idea that seems similar to the council system recommended earlier by Wattenbarger and others. In addition, Gleazer stated that the governance roles at each level should be defined, but he presented only broad guidelines for such a definition:

The task at the local level is to identify needed resources and implement programs specified at the district level. The district-level task is to differentiate and specify the roles of its institutions. And the statewide agencies' major task is to specify the goals and priorities for districts so that statewide needs are adequately met. (p. 151)

This statement seems to cover directly only activities in the areas of planning and program review. Later in the study, Gleazer also identified evaluation as a major state-level concern.

In a companion volume to that by Gleazer, Bushnell (1973) presented the specific data of the study along with his own conclusions based on them. Some of the data revealed the belief among community college presidents that state-level power was increasing and would continue to do so. And, like Gleazer, Bushnell recommended that decisions, at whatever level, be made only after formal input by those who would be affected. However, he did not comment on a proper allocation of governance power.

In an article that year, Wattenbarger (1973) primarily examined the reasons behind the rise in state-level action in community college coordination and governance, but within that discussion he suggested that state-wide master planning was the most important state-level function.

In 1974, G. L. Hall reported a study of state coordination of community colleges from the perspective of state-level boards. First he analyzed the 1972 agendas and minutes of the meetings of state boards for community colleges. He found the boards spent their time, in order from the most time spent, on finances, facilities, curricula, personnel, policy, and students. It should be reemphasized that this analysis considered board time, not staff time, a fact which might explain the low standing of policy discussion. Otherwise, the areas of major board concentration were perhaps as anticipated and roughly followed the more typical admonishments of where state-board concern should be focused. Thus, the boards apparently spent a major portion of their time on planning and program review (facilities and curricula) and budget review (finances). On the other hand, areas commonly recommended to be largely in the realm of college decision making, faculty and student affairs, accounted for less board time (personnel and students). Of course, this information says little about the exact nature of the state-board activity in these areas, and Hall made no concrete recommendations regarding a proper role. However, Hall did survey state-board members regarding what problems they considered most pressing and what role, in broad terms, they felt the board should play in solving these problems. They saw finances, curricula, and

articulation as their highest-priority problems, and for these, a majority believed the solutions should come from joint action by the state board and the colleges. Altogether, for each of the various problems identified, 59% felt the solution should be arrived at jointly, 29% at the state level solely, and 5% at the college level, with 5% not responding. Perhaps one can conclude from these data that, while state-level board members believe the board should assume a strong leadership position, they do not generally feel it should act without some college involvement.

In two 1974 pieces, Martorana indicated some of the governance activities he felt belonged at the state level or at the college level. In one (Martorana, 1974b), while examining the potential effect of 1202 commissions on community colleges, he suggested that appropriate state-level activities included planning, especially designating the missions of the particular colleges and insuring the articulation of their programs with other educational systems; leading the budgetary process so as to insure that the colleges have the resources to fulfill their missions; and evaluating the colleges through the use of various types of postaudits and a management information system. He emphasized that the state role should not merge into actual college operations by decrying the use of preaudits and by stressing that the purpose of an information system should be limited to evaluation. In the second article (Martorana, 1974a), he provided some examples of appropriate internal college decisions: "hiring or firing personnel, administration of the budget, [and] development and management of instruction programs" (p. 76).

Other 1974 articles that primarily described conditions in one particular state also provided some comments on the state-level role in community college governance. Brossman (1974) stated that "the philosophy of the California community colleges is to place decision making, wherever possible and feasible, at the institution and district level, rather than at the state level" (p. 87), and he strongly supported this basic approach to dividing state and college roles in governance. He gave a number of specific examples of this concept in action in his state, thus implying that these role allocations were desirable. In the area of program review, he noted that the state board approved new programs at the college but that the colleges required no state approval for new courses. Likewise, the state set forth minimum qualifications for faculty, but the colleges decided whom from among those qualified to hire. Regarding capital-project planning and budgeting, the colleges planned and administered the construction of facilities, but the state approved and authorized these college actions by placing the college plans on the basis of priority in an annually updated ten-year master plan for facilities and distributing state capital-outlay funds as called for in this master plan. Zoglin (1974), writing from the same California perspective, expressed a similar philosophy. She stated that any community college district should have a local governing board and that the state-level board's responsibility was making sure that each college within its state system met minimum standards vice enforcing standardization. However, she provided no concrete recommendations regarding what powers each level should exercise to effect this relationship.

Whereas in California the community colleges are funded jointly by the state and the local districts, in Florida the system is fully state funded. Nonetheless, L. G. Henderson (1974), in describing the latter system, expressed a philosophy regarding the state-level role in governance similar to that of Zoglin, and he noted, "While accountability and minimum standards are essential qualities [of state coordination], they do not require standardization of institutions" (p. 105). Thus, he described the state-level role as primarily involving planning, the setting of state-wide standards, and the evaluation of the colleges. These functions were supported by an extensive series of information systems, including a common course-numbering system. Finally, he stated that the decision-making process included a high level of involvement by the colleges, in part through the use of the council system, the recommendation (Stuckman, 1969b; Stuckman & Wattenbarger, 1971) for which was reviewed earlier in this section.

One facet of the structure of the Minnesota community college system was described by Helland (1974). At that time the system board, the sole governing board for the state's community colleges, had just completed negotiating a state-wide contract with the system faculty. The noteworthy point here was that the agreement closely delineated the roles of and relationships between the faculty and administrators within the colleges. Regardless of whether or not this was a serious problem, clearly one could conclude that the organizational flexibility of the college-level officials had been significantly restricted.

Since 1974, fewer works have appeared dealing with the issues of the organizational structure or the allocation of governance powers within state systems of community colleges. Among those that have are two 1975 articles touching briefly on these topics. In one, Kerr (1975) recommended that all community colleges have local governing boards or, lacking these, at least local advisory boards. Wattenbarger and Hansen (1975) discussed the lack of coordinated planning among community colleges and other educational systems offering adult-continuing and vocational-technical education within states. They implied that, for a community college system, the responsible state-level agency should assume a leadership role in coordinating planning in these areas.

In a 1976 article, Martorana and McGuire reported a survey of 26 states and Puerto Rico of legislative action during the previous 3 years affecting community colleges. Among other things, they noted that several states had increased the restrictiveness of state-level control over college-level program expansion requiring new facilities and over new-college establishment. Their analysis emphasized the identification of trends in legislative action rather than the appropriateness of such trends.

In 1977, Wattenbarger examined the process of making decisions in multiunit districts for community colleges, including state-governed systems. However, he clearly focused in the article on districts of less than state-wide scope. Nonetheless, one noteworthy comment was that central decisions should be made only after the greatest possible campus-level participation.

More recently, Charles (1978) edited a book containing discussions specifically on the balancing of state and college governance roles in community college systems. The articles, however, were typically reports on particular state situations and, though informative, did not contain general guidelines or recommendations regarding governance-power allocations.

As was true for studies of state coordination and governance of higher education as a whole, the recommendations contained in works pertaining to state community college systems were often in agreement. At the same time, however, these recommendations have typically been both broad and vague, and the study by Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971) showed that, in practice, the division of state and college governance powers varied considerably from system to system. Furthermore, no set of recommendations focusing on community college systems exists that is as comprehensive or concrete as some for general higher-education systems, such as those by Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) and the Carnegie Commission (1973). Finally, the guidelines that do exist, though they do seem to reflect broad agreement, for the most part suggest only that broadly defined responsibilities should be primarily exercised at the state or college level; the exact nature of that responsibility and to what degree it should be shared with the other level are not specified. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to judge accurately how deep or strong the apparent consensus actually is. On a more general level, however, clear agreement on one idea does seem to emerge: Nearly every

discussion supported the idea that state-level actions should not occur without some reasonable degree of formal input from the institutions over and above routine management information data. Nonetheless, the overall implication of this review appears to be that a good deal of room remains for fruitful study of the issues in this area. The work to date has certainly been valuable but has been neither conclusive nor exhaustive.

#### The Theoretical Background of the Study

As stated in Chapter Two, one purpose of this study was to investigate the application of basic administrative theory to the process of state-level coordination and control of community colleges, most specifically by determining whether the general pattern of preferred placements of nonissue governance activities, the allocations of decision-making powers with a state system of community colleges for which the Delphi panel of state-level and college-level chief executives reached consensus, tended to congruence with a pattern of governance-activity placements hypothesized on the basis of bureaucratic administrative theory, with a pattern based on collegial theory, or with neither pattern. In other words, did either of these two basic theories appear to underlie or explain the consensus opinions of the professional administrators studied? This portion of the chapter provides a brief background for the consideration of this question.

First, the general tenets of these two theories, bureaucratic and collegial, are surveyed. Next, the guidelines that were used to construct the hypothesized governance-activity placements for each theory are presented. Then, largely in order to offer a

concrete foundation on which to perceive the theories, selected writings on the application of the theories to postsecondary institutions in general and community colleges in particular are reviewed. Finally, selected writings discussing the application of the theories to the process of state-system coordination are reviewed.

### The Two Theories

As pointed out above, this investigation of the relationship between administrative theory and the process of state-system coordination was approached from the viewpoint that two major theories exist. This viewpoint seems warranted. For example, Morphet, Johns, and Reller (1967, pp. 98-99) made this distinction between bureaucratic and collegial concepts in their discussion of administrative organization. At the same time they pointed out the obvious, that this dichotomy is not clear-cut but exists on a continuum. Nonetheless, because the dichotomy enables the continuum to be both perceived and used productively, the distinction has persisted in the literature. Accordingly, the same was done in this study.

Monahan (1975b), in historically reviewing the growth in administrative theory, suggested that the dichotomy has existed virtually since the beginning of theorizing about organizations. He attributed the initial scholarly interest in organizations to Henri Saint-Simon in the late 18th century. Saint-Simon recommended that organizations be "consciously directed" and that the provision of authority within the organization be "based on skill and knowledge rather than upon hereditary privilege and wealth" (p. 16). These attitudes Monahan described as representing

a rationalistic or cognitive viewpoint. On the other hand, according to Monahan, August Comte, Saint-Simon's protégé, stated that organizations should develop through "natural evolution" (p. 16). Comte's view Monahan described as naturalistic or affective. Finally he equated rationalism with the bureaucratic concept and naturalism with the collegial concept.

Monahan felt the dichotomy itself was then recognized by Ferdinand Tönnie's differentiation of community and society. Tönnies described community as a system where group association was based on personal feelings; in contrast, he saw society as an impersonal and rationalistic system where association was by contrast. Furthermore, he saw the two as sequentially related, with the basically medieval concept of community moving to the modern concept of society.

Finally, Monahan suggested that Max Weber, who initially and most thoroughly stated the principles of bureaucracy, also saw social organizations as progressing from less to more rational structures. Thus, in discussing authority, Weber described a progression from charismatic authority, where group loyalty is focused on a single person, to traditional authority, where loyalty is accorded to a hereditary elite, to bureaucratic authority, where loyalty is focused upon a superordinate role in an organization. For Weber, this final type represented the triumph of rationality.

Thus, for Weber, the hallmark of the bureaucratic structure he described was its rationality. Monahan (1975a) identified five basic elements of Weber's organizational theory. First, the organization is a hierarchy. Second, each position in the hierarchy has a particular role and thus must be filled by a person having the

specific competencies to fulfill the prescribed role. Accordingly, any person filling a particular role inherently takes on the status, powers, and duties defined for that role. Records must be maintained of all actions and decisions within the organization so that consistently applied policies may be developed. Likewise, such policies are necessary so that the actions for each role can be defined and thus predicted.

Baldrige (1971b) noted some additional but consistent characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy. He noted that the hierarchical structure necessarily incorporates a formal chain of command and thus fixed lines of communication. Because specific competency is the basis for assigning a person to a particular role, it follows that that assignment is by appointment by superordinates and that promotions have the same basis. At the same time, Weber's bureaucracy would assure tenure in his role to the competent technician, and the reward system uses salaries. Bennis (1975) characterized the aim of Weber's bureaucracy as depersonalizing the organization and its activities. With a set hierarchy of prescribed roles acting and interacting within fixed policies, the organization was to function rationally and predictably, with the disruptive potential of human nature systematically minimized.

Since Weber's original formulation, a number of persons have added significant points to or elaborated upon particular concepts of bureaucratic theory. Perhaps, as Knezevich stated (1969, p. 507), these extensions do not themselves constitute theory; if not, they at least represent recommendations for practice that are thoroughly grounded in bureaucratic theory and have heavily

influenced its modern application. Among these contributors, as described by Monahan (1975b), Henry Fayol emphasized the importance of internally structuring an organization on the basis of functions within the overall enterprise and originated such terms as scalar chain and unity of command.

F. W. Taylor, the major figure in the so-called "scientific management" school, took Fayol's concern for the division of labor and Weber's call for the clear definition of roles of each position in the hierarchy and took these precepts most completely into the realm of rationalism. He advocated minutely exhaustive analysis of the tasks of production followed by equally minute design and prescription of how each task should be performed. All this was to be done so as to maximize production by establishing total predictability. The mode of operation of no employee was to be left to chance decisions by that employee. In part, Taylor's approach was determined by his opinion of humans in the organization. He was described as seeing employees as persons who "were basically lazy, resisted work, required discipline (and surveillance), and produced fundamentally on the basis of incentives" (p. 35). Matching this view of men was Taylor's attitude regarding the resolution of conflict. According to Bennis (1975), conflict was to be resolved in favor of the organization.

Other major contributors noted by Monahan (1975b) included Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick. Gulick is remembered for his acronym POSDGORB, which summarized his analysis of the tasks of administration: planning, organizing, staffing, directing,

coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Urwick delineated principles regarding proper span of control and the delegation of authority.

From this theory has emerged the basic structure that, according to Morphet et al. (1967), prevails among organizations throughout the modern world, and the tenets of the structure have often been summarized (Kimbrough & Todd, 1967; Richardson, Blocker, & Bender, 1972). An especially comprehensive, detailed, and thus informative list of such tenets was presented by Morphet et al. (1967). They emphasized that not every principle characterized every bureaucratic structure.

Leadership is confined to those holding positions in the power echelon. . . .

Good human relations are necessary in order that followers accept decisions of superordinates. . . .

Authority and power can be delegated, but responsibility cannot be shared. . . .

Final responsibility for all matters is placed in the administrator at the top of the power echelon. . . .

The individual finds security in a climate in which the superordinates protect the interests of subordinates in the organization. . . .

Unity of purpose is secured through loyalty to the superordinate. . . .

The image of the executive is that of a superman. . . .

Maximum production is attained in a climate of competition and pressure. . . .

The line-and-staff plan of organization should be utilized to formulate goals, policies, and programs, as well as to execute policies and programs. . . .

Authority is the right and privilege of a person holding a hierarchical position. . . .

The individual in the organization is expendable. . . .

Evaluation is the prerogative of superordinates. . . .  
(pp. 102-4)

Overall, they saw the bureaucratic organization as "a pyramidal, hierarchical organizational structure, in which all power for making decisions flows from superordinates to subordinates" (p. 99).

Directly examined, the aims of bureaucratic administration appear admirable, especially from the viewpoint of the organization. One has an enterprise comprehensively planned to reach its goals with the greatest efficiency--a rationalistic system of fully predictable actors and actions fitting together as perfectly as "scientific" analysis can provide to contribute the the ultimate system goals. A trite metaphor which the literature seems to avoid assiduously appears completely justified: One has a well-oiled machine.

Nonetheless, a number of observers have suggested that some basic design flaws, errors in the bureaucratic theory, prevent the machine from functioning as smoothly as it is expected to. Anderson (1975) tried to summarize the problems that had been identified. He stated:

In attempting to structure an organization so that it can rationally and predictably pursue specified goals, the groundwork is laid for dysfunctional elements within the organization. Many of these dysfunctional elements are a direct result of the attempt to delineate authority and responsibility inherent in individual offices through a body of rules, and to impersonalize relationships between members of the organization with whom they come in contact in the performance of the official functions. (p. 265)

In effect, he said that a completely rational system could not be constructed of human parts within a human environment, primarily

because bureaucratic theory inaccurately assessed the effect of the human dimension on the system.

Others have suggested that these flaws become especially debilitating in increasingly sophisticated modern organizations. Knezevich (1969), Atwell and Watkins (1971), and Bennis (1975) all pointed out that organizations today rely ever more heavily on highly trained technical and professional specialists. The superordinate finds it mountingy difficult to fulfill the role or meet the image of superman. Often he cannot design and direct the actions of such subordinates; he can only coordinate them. For example, Kimbrough and Todd (1967) stated, "Planning in the traditional bureaucratic organization is an elite process, often resulting in harmful conflict and in apathy toward the suggested goals" (p. 222). One might surmise that these undesirable consequences resulted from a technically flawed plan or merely from a planning process inadequately designed to account for the human dimension of an organization. Either explanation accords with the sort of criticisms of bureaucracy reviewed above.

Monahan (1975b) suggested that critical evaluations of bureaucracy and "scientific management" first arose during World War I and led to the "human relations" period in administrative thinking. He saw such thinking as a reaction to the extremes of rationalism and as marking the reemergence of naturalism, the affective side of the dichotomy presented early in this section on theory. Bennis (1975) characterized this period, whose peak he placed in the 1940's, as believing that a happy work force necessarily results in an effective organization, that the leader need merely unleash the

innate productivity of his employees. He considered this idea naive and described the presenters of modern collegial theory as attempting to combine the insights of the human relationists with an appropriate dose of pragmatism.

The basic insight, then, that underlies collegial administrative theory is that the organization should be devised to accommodate the human dimension rather than to exclude it. Accommodation vice exclusion is seen as necessary because exclusion is considered impossible. Knezevich (1969) credited Chester Barnard with an early recognition of the possible relationship between an organization and its human components. Barnard recommended that an executive should act to maximize both the effectiveness (the meeting of organizational goals) and the efficiency (the meeting of the individuals' personal goals) of his organization, and he went on to say that these two concerns were intertwined. As Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972, p. 88) reported, Barnard stated that an employee will perform a particular requested action--and thus benefit organizational effectiveness--when he understands the request, believes it appropriate to the organization's aims, believes it reasonably congruent with his own interests, and is actually capable of doing it. Thus, a degree of efficiency favorably affects effectiveness.

A standard model of the relationship between the individual and the organization was developed by Getzels and Guba. As presented by Knezevich (1969, pp. 517-8), the model postulated two interacting dimensions within the organizations of a social system. The first dimension, the "institutional" or "nomothetic," consists of the institution, the roles it defines for individuals, and the specific

institutional expectations of the individual based on each role. The second dimension, the "personal" or "idiographic," is made up of the individual, his personality, and his resulting need-dispositions. The interaction of the two dimensions and their components produces the actual behavior of the individual and, by extension, of the organization.

Argyris (1969) examined the possible consequences of this interaction and specifically suggested the possible deleterious outcomes if the nomothetic dimension represented a traditional bureaucratic structure. He stated:

Most human problems in organizations arise because relatively healthy people in our culture are asked to participate in work situations which coerce them to be dependent, subordinate, submissive, to use few of their more than skin-surface abilities.

Healthy human beings (in our culture) tend to find dependence, subordination, and submissiveness frustrating. They would prefer to be relatively independent, to be active, to use many of their deeper abilities; and they aspire to positions equal with or higher than their peers. Frustration leads to regression, aggression and tension. These in turn lead to conflict. (The individual prefers to leave but fears doing so.) Moreover, it can be shown that under these conditions, the individual will tend to experience psychological failure and short time perspective. (p. 190)

Argyris suggested that because of this frustration, the worker will display various behaviors damaging to the effective functioning of the organization, such as resigning, absenteeism, depression, apathetic work, grumbling, and sabotage. Furthermore, he may create informal (or formal) groups to sanction such behavior. Finally, he may even transfer this basically undesirable activity to the remaining areas of his life.

At the same time, said Argyris, management will react to this behavior by attempting to increase the employee's dependence, subordination, and submissiveness and thereby merely increase the worker's frustration. The end result, therefore, is a cycle of steadily deteriorating employee and organizational health.

McGregor (1960) postulated the assumptions regarding human behavior that lead management to act in the manner described by Argyris. McGregor designated these assumptions as Theory X.

1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can.
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all. (pp. 33-4)

On the other hand, in Theory Y McGregor presented a rather different set of assumptions which would significantly alter the management behavior Argyris decried.

1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest. The average human being does not inherently dislike work. Depending upon controllable conditions, work may be a source of satisfaction (and will be voluntarily performed) or a source of punishment (and will be avoided if possible).
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of rewards associated with their achievement. The most significant of such rewards, e.g., the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization needs, can be direct products of effort directed toward organizational objectives.

4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility. Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and emphasis on security are generally consequences of experience, not inherent human characteristics.

5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organization problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.

6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized. (pp. 47-48)

The reward system that McGregor refers to above is based upon a hierarchy of needs very reminiscent of the work of Abraham Maslow.

McGregor (1969) described the hierarchy as follows:

1. Physiological needs--food, rest, exercise, protection from the elements.
2. Safety needs--protection from danger, threat, deprivation. For a man in a dependent relationship, this need is translated into security. A man free from the threatening relationship of dependence translates this need to the "fairest possible break." When confident of fairness, this man is willing to take risks.
3. Social needs--association, acceptance, friendship and love.
4. Ego needs--Internal needs include self-esteem, independence, competence and knowledge, achievement. External needs include status, recognition, appreciation.
5. Self-fulfillment needs--realizing one's own potential, continued self-development, creativity of existence. (p. 151)

The desire to fulfill these needs motivates the behavior of the individual with a hierarchical priority running from the lower-order needs (physiological) to the higher-order (self-fulfillment). Thus, in general, the human attempts to satisfy a lower-order need before acting upon a higher-order need. McGregor posited, however, that a need which is basically met no longer acts as a motivator for that

person. Since traditional management generally acts to satisfy only the physiological and safety needs of its employees, these rewards (wages, fringe benefits, security) fail to continue to motivate workers, and apathetic or aggressive behavior by the worker results. It is this undesirable behavior which elicits the formulation of Theory X assumptions about human behavior. Consequently, McGregor declared that those assumptions describe learned vice inherent human nature. They are, therefore, invalid and lead to the same sort of self defeating management behavior presented by Argyris.

The collegial theory of organization represents an attempt to develop a theory of organizational structure and administration which is based upon the general assumptions of human nature expressed above and thus avoids the shortcomings of the bureaucratic, authoritarian approach that have been pointed out by Argyris, McGregor, and others. The general intent, therefore, is to construct an organization which can effectively carry out its organizational goals and can, at the same time, meet the needs, especially the higher-order needs, of its employees, therefore minimizing management-employee conflict and eventually maximizing production. According to Morphet, Johns, and Reller (1967), the collegial organization basically attempts to do this with a dual structure. A relatively hierarchical bureaucratic structure is maintained to implement programs and policy; on the other hand, a pluralistic and egalitarian structure is used to make program and policy decisions.

Morphet et al. detailed a number of principles underlying such an administrative organization, many of which come or can be derived

directly from the basic assumptions regarding man expressed by McGregor.

Leadership is not confined to those holding status positions in the power echelon. . . .

Good human relations are essential to group production and to meet the needs of individual members of the group. . . .

Responsibility, as well as power and authority, can be shared. . . .

Those affected by a program or policy should share in decision making with respect to that program or policy. . . .

The individual finds security in a dynamic climate in which he shared responsibility for decision making. . . .

Unity of purpose is secured through consensus and group loyalty. . . .

Maximum production is attained in a threat-free climate. . . .

The line and staff organization should be used exclusively for the purpose of dividing labor and implementing policies and programs developed by the group affected. . . .

The situation and not the position determines the right and privilege to exercise authority. . . .

The individual in the organization is not expendable. . . .

Evaluation is a group responsibility. (pp. 107-109)

It would appear that the common denominator of the above principles revolves around a formal dispersal of powers formerly reserved for superordinates within a bureaucracy, such as leadership, authority, responsibility, and evaluation. The desired outcome is the reduction of the dependence and submissiveness of the employee and a rise in his dedication to the organization, his higher-order needs satisfaction, and his ultimate productivity.

Likert (1961) presented a fairly detailed model providing one example of the possible application of the collegial theory to the administration of an organization. He recommended a structure based upon what he called the work group, consisting of a superordinate and his immediate subordinates. Said Likert:

Management will make full use of the potential capacities of its human resources only when each person in an organization is a member of one or more effectively functioning work groups that have a high degree of group loyalty, effective skills of interaction, and high performance goals. (p. 104)

Likert agreed that his proposed group looked very little different from the traditional pattern of a leader and his lieutenants, but he suggested that the big difference came in the mode of communication utilized. The traditional pattern emphasizes man-to-man communication in which a lieutenant may contact the leader personally, presenting his case in isolation from the whole. Decisions are often made free from the influence of other lieutenants representing different subsections of the organization. Such a situation produces competition both among men and functional sections of the organization which may adversely affect the effectiveness of the whole.

If, however, group communication is the rule, more accurate decisions may be made and the effectiveness of the whole enhanced. Each person adds his personal expertise and the particular viewpoints of his function, as well as the strengths of his personality. As a result, decisions are made in the light of information provided by all functional sections to be affected, and each group member is ego involved in the outcome. Additionally, general communication among peers and with their hierarchical leader is significantly increased.

Likert did note that there are "situational requirements" (p. 112) (various environmental, extra-organizational considerations) which may limit the decisions possible in a given problem, and the group leader may be in a position to be best aware of these. Accordingly, if he cannot convince the group to consider these requirements, the leader may overrule the group decision; however, such authority can be used only at the serious expense of some group loyalty and effectiveness.

The organization as a whole consists of a hierarchical series of work groups with overlapping memberships. These overlapping memberships provide for the all-important flow of communication up, down, and across the organization and are, therefore, most essential to the overall effectiveness of the organization. He described the activities of these overlapping memberships as the "linking pin function" (p. 113). Each group leader, who as the overlapping member of the group above him constitutes the "linking pin," must be able to provide leadership not only for those below him but also for those above him, in that he must be able to provide influence and input to the higher group to which he belongs for the "linking pin" to work. Likert declared that for the organization to derive the greatest benefit from effective work groups, the "linking pin function" must be operative. He also suggested that additional "linking pins" should be provided by staff and ad hoc groups, thus multiplying group overlap and further enhancing intraorganization communication.

The group, however, remains the central unit of Likert's organizational structure. The functioning of the whole is most

effective only when each and every work group is functioning well. Dysfunction of a work group affects the effectiveness of the organization more seriously the higher the inadequate group is in the hierarchy.

Likert summed up the characteristics of such an organization:

An organization should be outstanding in its performance if it has competent personnel, if it has leadership which develops highly effective groups and uses the overlapping group form of structure, and if it achieves effective communication and influence, decentralized and coordinated decision-making, and high performance goals coupled with high motivation. We should expect such an organization to have high productivity; products of high quality; low costs; low waste; low turnover and absence; high capacity to adapt effectively to change; a high degree of enthusiasm and satisfaction on the part of its employees, customers, and stockholders; and good relations with unions. In short, the theoretical model called for by the newer theory appears to be an ideal organization. Existing organizations can move toward this model with benefit to all. This appears to be the direction in which the high-producing managers are, in fact, moving. (p. 240)

As one can see, Likert believed the collegial approach to administration offers all but boundless opportunities for maximizing both effectiveness and efficiency (as defined by Barnard) within an organization, and his optimism is perhaps contagious. Certainly, the foundations of the theory--from the basic insight of Getzels and Guba to the more detailed support by Argyris and McGregor--are often compelling, as well as attractive to many people. Nonetheless, collegial administrative theory is not without its problems.

Bennis (1975), for example, felt that many supporters of this approach believe that organizational effectiveness is directly and unfailingly correlated with employee satisfaction, that in the properly managed enterprise there should be no conflict between the maximum achievement of both organizational and individual goals.

On the other hand, Bennis suggested that at a point the correlation changes from positive to negative, that ultimately organizational and individual desires do begin to conflict. If Bennis is correct, the productive application of the theory may be complex.

Additionally, collegial theory heavily rests upon a view of human nature and beliefs regarding human needs and motivating factors that constitute a psychological theory that is widely, but certainly not universally, accepted. To the extent that this supporting psychological theory is flawed, the administrative theory will also suffer. For example, Argyris (1969) himself, as noted earlier, said that men "aspire to positions equal with or higher than their peers" (p. 190). If this quality is carried to a possible logical extension and if man is also as aggressive as some biologists, sociologists, and psychologists believe, then perhaps an organization will not be able to maintain a climate amenable to open and pluralistic decision making but instead will eventually revert back to an authoritarian, bureaucratic structure. The validity, then, of collegial administrative theory in large part depends upon its supporting psychological theory. Of course, the same relationship holds true for bureaucratic administrative theory. As McGregor pointed out, each of the two theories rests upon a contrasting view of human nature; either, then, can have inadequacies if its basic assumptions are flawed.

A final complexity that can disrupt the hypothesized harmony of a collegial organization is its relationship with its environment. Although environmental pressures or input can enter an organization at any level, for many organizations most significant input is

funneled through top-level management. As Likert noted, greater familiarity with this input may at times force superordinates to overrule group decisions. Likewise, the central goals of many organizations are also not subject to collegial decision making; rather, outside forces--stockholders and a board of directors, the public and a governing board, the legislature and a state-level board--may set these goals. Either circumstance, environmentally forced executive authority or extraorganizational goal setting, serves to limit the collegial organization's ability to direct itself and to that extent may diminish the power of the theory to fulfill its promise. Of course, these potential conditions do not necessarily invalidate the theory, but they do complicate its application.

Finally, then, both administrative theories, bureaucratic and collegial, sound good in isolation but reveal blemishes upon critical examination and comparison. It was not, however, the aim of this study to reach a decision regarding the relative validity of the theories; instead, it was to determine if either theory, or neither, appears to correspond with the general pattern of the consensus opinions of the Delphi panel regarding the level at which specific governance activities should be exercised within a state community college system. Thus, the major purpose of this brief review of the theories has been to provide a foundation for the statement of the guidelines used to hypothesize the level at which each of the 55 governance activities studied should be placed according to bureaucratic and then collegial administrative theory.

The following guidelines were used to hypothesize the allocation of governance-activity powers according to bureaucratic administrative theory.

Decision making is basically a superordinate function; and while authority can be partially delegated, final responsibility necessarily remains at the highest level. Consequently, the bureaucratic system is characterized by detailed planning and close supervision of the activities of subordinates. At the same time, system members are carefully chosen for their specialized competence, but this competence is defined as the ability to carry out the dictated actions of the superordinate and to dictate the actions of subordinates. In accordance with this idea, decision making may be delegated but no lower than to the level immediately supervising those implementing the decision, not to the implementation level itself. In addition, communication is at the pleasure of the superordinate. Downward communication is thus assured; upward communication generally occurs only at the request of and in the form desired by the superordinate. Furthermore, the system provides for only a flow of communication up and down the hierarchy. Other than supervising and being responsible for the actions of subordinates, the superordinate's concern for the subordinate is primarily limited to the latter's security. Finally, the individual or element filling a role in the hierarchy is expendable, and evaluation is solely the duty of the superordinates.

The following guidelines were used to hypothesize the allocation of governance-activity powers according to collegial administrative theory.

Decision making is the function of those, superordinates and subordinates, affected by the particular decision; and both authority and responsibility can be partially delegated. Consequently, the collegial system is characterized by cooperative planning of the goals and broad policies guiding subordinates, by supervision in terms of monitoring the success of and the congruence to broad policies of the actions of subordinates, and by the provision of requested advice concerning these actions. System members are chosen for their specialized competence in contributing to planning on the basis of their specific knowledge and individual insight, devising and then implementing methods of reaching their planned goals, and facilitating these same activities by their subordinates. Accordingly, decision making is delegated to a group consisting of or at least representing those system members affected, to include implementers and appropriate superordinates and peers. This decision-making process necessarily incorporates a free flow of communication up and down the system as well as across the system when useful. The power of the superordinate to request information is not diminished, but communication is not limited by the request. The superordinate's concern for the subordinate includes meeting the latter's security needs and fostering his personal growth at least to the degree necessary to facilitate his contribution to group decision making and his individual decision making for undertaking his role in implementing the plans of the group. The individual or element filling a role in the system is normally not considered expendable. Evaluation is a group activity of those affected, superordinate and subordinate, by the element being

evaluated, with its aim being to facilitate the improvement of the element's performance.

These guidelines of course represent approaches tending toward the extreme ends of the real-world bureaucratic-to-collegial continuum of potential organizational structures. The differences were emphasized so that the governance-activity placements hypothesized for each theory would be clearly distinct. At the same time, the guidelines were intended to and are claimed to be derived faithfully from the preceding discussions of the two theories.

#### Theory and the Administration of Colleges

In this portion of the chapter, a brief selection of writings on the theoretical dimensions of administering institutions of higher education is reviewed. The purpose of this review is to place the general concepts presented in the preceding section in a context more familiar with probable readers of this study and thus to fill out the presentation of the theoretical background of the reported research. The review has two major divisions. Writings taking a theoretical look at the administration of institutions of higher education generally are examined first; writings concerning community colleges specifically are discussed second.

Of course, many books and articles over the years have discussed the administration of colleges and universities. Most, however, presented procedural analyses or recommendations based upon the experiences of the authors or upon a survey of similarly experientially based works. Far fewer presented theoretical

analyses or recommendations founded on general organization theories. Some of those that have done so are looked at here.

Even among those works that are theoretical in nature, only a few specifically discuss the administration of colleges from the viewpoint of either bureaucratic or collegial theory. This is true despite the apparent fact noted previously that these two approaches dominate much of the basic work in organizational theory. For example, in 1968 Moran stated that few theoretical studies had been made of collegiate administrative structure but that he felt two views were prevalent. Some analysts, he said, saw universities as basically a close-knit community of academics. On the other hand, others saw them as a loose federation of groups of academics, such as suggested by Clark Kerr in his "multiversity" concept. He described these as unitary and federal approaches and suggested that perhaps universities often reflected both approaches, with purely administrative activities organized in a unitary fashion and academic tasks carried out within a federal structure. He made no attempt to tie these views to the bureaucratic/collegial dichotomy.

Perhaps reflecting Moran's federal versus unitary view, Boland (1971), in a study of a sample of baccalaureate-granting institutions, concluded that larger schools usually dealt with their environment through a centralized administrative structure but that considerable faculty autonomy characterized internal academic functioning. In contrast, smaller schools typically had a more traditional corporate structure embodying less faculty autonomy. On the same topic the Carnegie Commission (1973) stated that

increasing size corresponded with increasing complexity and formality in the administrative structure of an institution, a view that does not seem totally congruent with Boland's. The Commission further noted, with some approval, that no one theory appeared to describe adequately the structure of colleges and universities; rather, different structures were often used in one institution to carry out different functions, for example, business functions and academic functions. Perkins (1975) likewise saw a contrast between the administrative process used for purely administrative functions and the process used for academic-area functions. However, he felt this division of methods often produced debilitating conflict, with uncoordinated decisions arising through complex compromises on the part of small pressure groups instead of through wide debate. Accordingly, he characterized university governance as anarchic. None of these descriptions of or comments on collegiate administrative structure referred directly to the theories reviewed previously; however, one common thread perhaps runs through them. Each appears to provide some support for the idea that higher-education institutions naturally require or may benefit from using more than one type of structure simultaneously. This idea seems to fit in with the dual-structure approach that Morphet, Johns, and Reller (1967) stated was often used in organizations operating under collegial administrative theory.

Some writings have directly referred to bureaucratic and collegial theory. Baldrige (1971b) agreed that these were the primary theories used to describe organizational structures, but he did not feel they adequately described university organizations.

Bureaucratic theory, he stated, did not accurately reflect the amount of input into policy-level decision making in universities; at the same time, he suggested, collegial theory failed to account for the conflict existing in that decision making, and he considered the theory as more prescriptive than descriptive. He went on to formulate a political model, describing the decision-making process as typically involving conflict between small power elites, which shift with the issue, and ending in compromise. He noted that this process characterized goal-setting decisions rather than implementation, again perhaps adding credence to the dual-structure idea noted above.

Writing later, Richardson (1974) saw the same three theories noted by Baldrige as those generally used to describe the administrative structure of higher-education institutions. However, he reversed Baldrige's evaluation of the theories, stating that the political model was limited by being purely descriptive and thus was largely incapable of providing guidelines for institutional operation. On the other hand, he felt bureaucratic and collegial theory, being based upon theories of the nature of organizations, were capable of recommending as well as describing. Overall, Richardson believed all three could contribute to the development of viable administrative structures and processes for a particular school. Specifically, he felt the bureaucratic approach was most applicable to purely administrative functions, the collegial approach to other decision making, and the political approach to decision making in the face of severe conflict.

Earlier A. D. Henderson (1969) had recommended, like Richardson, a collegial (participatory was his term) structure for decision making in colleges. He stated that increasingly differing viewpoints held by faculties and trustees could produce serious institutional conflict, and he believed the participatory process could perhaps ameliorate this divergence. He further suggested that the collegial method was especially appropriate for institutions of higher education because of the somewhat intangible nature of institutional goals and the nearly peer relationship of faculty, administrators, and trustees.

Peterson (1971) also appeared to support decision-making processes congruent with collegial theory, though he did not specifically refer to the theory. First, he noted that calls for the decentralization of institutional decision making had become more common. Basically agreeing with Boland's (1971) view noted previously, he stated that increased institutional size typically corresponded to greater structural decentralization; however, he pointed out that this condition did not necessarily result in decentralizing decisions as well. He suggested that decentralized decision making could best be promoted by widening participation in the decision process. This suggestion, of course, echoes the recommendations of collegial theorists.

Writings on administrative processes in community colleges, like those for institutions of higher education generally, have rarely been based on a theoretical foundation; however, discussions touching upon the application of general organizational theory to community colleges do exist. In one, Baldrige (1971a) hypothesized

that these colleges would tend to authoritarian, bureaucratic structures. He suggested that, for all higher-education institutions, greater environmental pressure upon the institution would correspond to lower professional autonomy for the faculty, which he basically defined as the degree of faculty control over the various decisions affecting their work. As a corollary, he then hypothesized that locally controlled community colleges would be high on environmental pressure and thus low in faculty autonomy, a condition congruent with the bureaucratic approach. Bushnell (1973) appeared to provide some support for this analysis, suggesting that the community college typically requires a "results-oriented" administration and that this requirement can easily foster bureaucratic tendencies. However, he recommended that this natural drift be avoided:

A results-oriented approach to administration, if applied without consideration of the interests of those faculty or other staff if imposed from the top down in the name of "scientific management." Shared decision making and a sense of participation can help alleviate this potential hazard to the community junior college. (p. 130)

In this passage, then, Bushnell virtually summarized the line of thinking followed by collegial theorists, as described earlier. Likewise, Zoglin (1974), who strongly supported local-board control of community colleges, also supported a collegially based structure for the colleges, pointing out that a participatory decision-making process would help insure that board decisions were made with due consideration of expert professional opinions.

Richardson, writing alone or collaborating with others in numerous publications, has served as the primary advocate and explicator of the application of collegial theory in the community

college. In 1970 he wrote that the traditional administrative structure of community colleges, generally based on or at least consistent with bureaucratic theory, worked reasonably well for coordinating the routine activities of the institutions but operated inadequately in the realm of problem solving. First of all, he noted that the bureaucratic approach, in which authority flowed down the hierarchy, failed in most cases to tap the special expertise of the professional individuals and groups at the lower levels of the organization. Likewise, he stated that the bureaucratic watch-words of unity of command and chain of command limited the flow of communication between experts. Rather, all coordination between the different functional elements of the college was specifically funneled to the top of the pyramid, the president. This significant restriction on the direct flow of information between lower-level organizational elements, in Richardson's opinion, seriously hampered the college's ability to solve most effectively problems affecting multiple areas of college operation. He thus recommended that the channels of communication be freed up significantly through the establishment of an administrative council of second-level officers and by authorizing these officers of nonacademic areas, such as business or student affairs, direct access to department chairpersons. He further added that these chairpersons should be assigned responsibility for these nonacademic concerns within their departments. The consequent increase in possible communication would, he believed, enhance the problem-solving ability of the colleges.

The next year, Atwell and Watkins (1971) specifically referred to and supported Richardson's basic ideas and, in addition, attempted to expand the theoretical foundation for this approach. They did so by briefly reviewing the same sorts of behavioral-science concepts examined here earlier in the presentation of general collegial theory. Largely reemphasizing the ideas of Richardson, they stated that contemporary organizations increasingly depended upon the work of different groups of specialists to reach overall goals and that enhancing the coordination of and cooperation among these groups would positively affect organizational effectiveness. The community college, they felt, was such an organization of specialists, and they consequently believed that the greater intrainstitutional communications and teamwork they considered inherent in a collegially based structure would prove valuable for the colleges.

At the same time, Richardson himself (1971) was presenting new recommendations that more comprehensively applied the concepts of collegial theory, reflecting more completely the dual-structure idea of the theory. These recommendations reached their most detailed form in the 1972 book by Richardson, Blocker, and Bender. In the book, they thoroughly examined the basic foundations of collegial or, in their words, participative administrative theory and then, using McGregor's terminology, recommended that community colleges move away from the prevailing Theory X structures to decision-making processes based upon Theory Y assumptions. They suggested that giving faculty and students a formal role in defining college objectives would raise the commitment of these two groups to the goals and, as postulated by McGregor, increase their positive

involvement in reaching the goals. To reach this end, they recommended, in some detail, a dual administrative organization for the colleges, one for governance and one for coordination. Governance they defined as the process of making decisions, especially regarding policy or changes in operational procedure, and their recommended governance structure represented an attempt to implement the concept that those persons affected by a decision should make them. With this concept in mind, they put forth a three-tiered governance structure. First, they stated that the three major categories of people in the college--administration, faculty, and students--each have a formal organization and that these organizations be given the power to decide questions affecting only their members. At the second level, they recommended a series of standing committees, each concerned with a specific area of college operations, such as curriculum, academic standards, or student affairs. Composed of representatives of the three organizations, each committee would be responsible for developing proposals on questions arising in its area of concern that affected more than one constituency of the college. At the third level would be an all-college senate consisting of ex-officio and elected representatives from each of the three groups. Here committee proposals would be discussed and final decisions reached to be forwarded to the college president for presentation to the governing board. Richardson et al. pointed out that the president could also present alternative recommendations to the board and that the board could, of course, act as they saw fit. However, they stated that consistent failure by the

president to support or by the board to adopt senate proposals would negate the theorized value of the process.

Coordination they defined as the implementation and monitoring of routine college operations within the guidelines established by the governance structure. For this half of the college administrative organization, they suggested that a bureaucratic approach was appropriate, but they did recommend that the flow of communications be freed from strict adherence to the concept of following the hierarchical chain of command and be authorized and encouraged to move across functional lines in a manner similar to that set forth earlier by Richardson (1970). Finally, they emphasized their belief that effective problem solving through the governance structure should be of greater concern than consistently snag-free implementation within the coordination structure. Accordingly they noted that decisions made within the latter area should be fully disseminated to those affected and should be subject to review within the governance structure whenever recommended by one of the three constituency organizations. Overall, they believed a dual-structure in this pattern would enhance the organization's efficiency (in Barnard's sense) while maintaining or improving its effectiveness.

Since the appearance of the 1972 book Richardson has continued to write on college application of organizational theory. In 1973 he reiterated the specific recommendations of the book, and a 1974 article on theory and institutions of higher education in general was reviewed earlier in this section. The following year, Richardson (1975) noted the emergence of a third major theory, Baldrige's (1971b) political model of governance, and discussed the insights

all three approaches provided for designing effective administrative structures for community colleges. Along with restating the basic ideas of the 1974 article, he emphasized that the political model of governance specifically accepted and dealt with organizational conflict and decision making within that context, whereas the bureaucratic and collegial theories represented approaches designed to contain and eliminate conflict. As a result, the former recognized faculty collective bargaining as a legitimate governance process. He went on to suggest that collective bargaining and participative governance were basically competing decision-making processes but that they could coexist. If both were used, however, he suggested that effective participative governance would serve to limit the number of problems that required resolution through collective bargaining. Touching upon the same topic in a 1976 article, Richardson predicted that community colleges would eventually be forced to move away from bureaucratic governance (vice coordination) structures to procedures utilizing collective bargaining (the political model) or participative governance (the collegial theory). His prediction seemed to reflect the earlier proposition in Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972) that collective bargaining was an outgrowth of the inadequacies of bureaucratic governance structures. Furthermore, the tone of his article perhaps implied that future community college administrative structure would be more likely to combine bureaucracy and collective bargaining than collegiality and collective bargaining, a condition one can probably assume he regrets.

This possibility may have, in effect, been reflected by Helling (1975). He stated that collective bargaining, along with the

assumption of multiple roles by the community colleges, had served to fracture and concretely specify the roles of college personnel from top to bottom. Consequently, he felt the need for collegial governance had been removed, and he proposed that the colleges revert to a strictly Weberian bureaucracy consisting of a hierarchy of specialists.

Nonetheless, the appeal of collegial theory, if not the incidence of its application, is not necessarily subsiding. In order to support their views, two 1976 articles discussing the use of management by objectives (MBO) in community colleges referred to the value of applying collegial procedures in the institutions. One (Hamilton & Hinko, 1976) supported the use of MBO, in part because it incorporated collegial decision making. The other (Segner & Britton, 1976) opposed MBO, saying it prevented effective collegial procedures from being used.

#### Theory and the Administration of State Systems of Higher Education

In the preceding section, selected writings looking at the application of organizational theory to institutions of higher education were reviewed. In this section works relating theory to state systems of higher education and thus to the process of state coordination and governance are examined. As in the previous section, items concerning higher education in general are covered first, followed by those dealing specifically with state community college systems.

Basically, it can be said that the literature contains virtually no studies directly discussing organizational theory, especially bureaucratic or collegial theory, and its specific relationship

with or application to the coordination and governance of state systems of higher education. As has been seen in Chapter One and earlier in this chapter, discussions of the need for state coordination, the need for institutional autonomy within such coordination, and the desirable roles of state boards and local institutions within the coordinating process are numerous. Yet, in nearly every case, these discussions have not related their comments, in any direct way, to general theories of organization or administration. Furthermore, in some cases, no reasonably obvious theoretical base can be inferred from the comments. For example, the Education Commission of the State's Task Force on Coordination, Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education (1973) stated, "Each state should delineate levels of authority of coordination and governance and develop state plans that suggest levels of decision making consistent with these authorities.... Whenever feasible in accordance with effective statewide planning, decisions should be made as close to the operational levels as possible" (p. 71). On one hand, this statement appears to reflect the collegial concept that those affected by a decision should either make or share significantly in making that decision. On the other hand, as set forth earlier, bureaucratic theory can also provide for the delegation of decision-making power. It was proposed that the difference between the two theories came in the determination of which level the delegation of power would end at--the level at which the decision will be implemented, as ideally called for by collegial theory, or the level of the immediate supervisor of the implementing individual or group, as called for by bureaucratic theory. The Task Force's suggestion, "as close to

the operational levels as possible," could accommodate either approach. Likewise, the recommendation that levels of responsibility be clearly delineated follows from the bureaucratic desire for a concrete, rationally derived system; yet either theory could provide this condition, depending upon the nature of the decision processes under which the delineation was made. Thus, without necessarily questioning their value, one can see that these Task Force guidelines do not specifically draw on either theory.

At the same time, many of the comments reviewed previously do appear to imply an unstated foundation in one theory or the other. Coffman (1973), for instance, strongly supported the use of planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) in state higher-education systems. In order to do so, he said, the system required a state-level governing board so that decisions warranted by PPBS could be made. Richardson (1975) described PPBS as an extension of the bureaucratic approach, and Coffman's proposals certainly respond to the bureaucratic reliance on decisions at supervisory levels.

In contrast to Coffman, a majority of the works cited in Chapter One or in this chapter that gave the appearance of some theoretical allegiance seemed to ally themselves to a collegial foundation. Thus, a great number of the recommended allocations of governance roles within a state system, as described previously, were accompanied by admonitions that institutional participation, to a greater or lesser degree, in various state-level decisions was desirable, important, or necessary. For example, Millard (1974) stated that successful and effective state coordination required the "involvement of the segments and the institutions in the planning process" and

"reasonable support from the institutions and segments involved"

(p. 35). To the institutions he said:

At this juncture in postsecondary education, I suggest, the kind of functional autonomy commensurate with experimentation, free inquiry, and institutional integrity depends as never before on the willingness of institutions or institutional decision-makers to work cooperatively and with the appropriate state agencies in coordinated decision making, including decisions about appropriate levels for decision making. (Millard, 1975, p. 206)

These comments clearly appear to echo the basic proposition that the collegially based organization provides for wide participation by subordinate elements in the decision process and, in return, receives fuller support by these elements for organization goals.

Again, comments reported by Halstead (1974) contained similar theoretical implications. For example, summarizing an idea of J. G. Paltridge, Halstead stated, "Conflicts usually ensue when framers of the [state-system] rules allow their enthusiasm for order to restrict institutional functions that are properly and necessarily autonomous" (p. 15). Certainly this statement closely reflects the claim of collegial theorists that the bureaucratic system, with its extreme emphasis on rational structure, inevitably produces dysfunctional conflict between subordinate individuals and the organization. Similarly, summarizing Leland Medsker, he said:

The state-system control pattern must be one which recognizes an institution as an entity with a character that must be achieved through the pursuit of goals. In other words, an institution is a personality which, like a human being, has--or should have--hopes and ambitions to be fulfilled. If they remain unfulfilled, an institution, like a human being, can be expected to become nonproductive. (p. 224)

Once more, then, one sees assumptions from the collegialists being adapted to a discussion of state coordination; moreover, here

assumptions originally presented relative to individuals are being directly attributed to organizations within a larger system as well.

Nonetheless, in these examples and the many similar instances existing in the literature on state coordination and governance of higher-education systems, the theoretical foundations, whether bureaucratic or collegial, of such comments can only be inferred; a direct reference to theory is virtually never made.

Only one exception to this situation was noted. Harclerod (1975) recommended appropriate governance roles for the state and institutional levels in a state higher-education system, as described in a preceding section of this chapter, on the basis of an examination of organizational patterns in use in large business enterprises. He identified five such patterns but actually discussed only three: "functional management" and two decentralized patterns, "decentralization of federated groups of companies" and "simulated decentralization" (p. 28). He did not refer to the bureaucratic/collegial dichotomy; however, to a degree the dichotomy did appear to be reflected in his thinking. Thus, he attributed the functional-management concept to Fayol, who was placed in the bureaucratic camp in the earlier review of theory in this chapter. Furthermore, he described the advantages of functional management as being its provision of clearly defined tasks and organizational stability and described its disadvantage as being its inability to bring its subordinate elements together in coordinated and dedicated support of organization, vice element, goals. These views are very reminiscent of the perceptions of others about bureaucratic structures.

Likewise, his justifications for the decentralized patterns normally tended to echo the assumptions of collegial theorists.

He went on to say that businesses, in light of the problems associated with functional management, had increasingly and successfully turned to decentralized organizational patterns in the last fifty years. He believed these patterns had allowed effective coordination of the overall organization while providing its elements with the autonomy necessary for maximum efficiency at their level. He described the central management of such organizations as typically having a relatively small staff and being responsible for "development of overall policy, master planning, large capital costs, fiscal controls, and evaluation of each division's success in meeting its objectives" (p. 33). He added, "Executive structures are streamlined to facilitate fast decision-making on important policy issues which do have to be discussed with central offices; however, operating decision-making on important issues is placed at the divisional level (comparable to the individual college or university campus)" (p. 33).

He next outlined typical divisional responsibilities. First, the divisions are responsible for formulating their own master plans and budgets for review by central management. Then, together with the central office, they develop the short- and long-range objectives upon which they will later be evaluated. They "normally maintain their own accounting, personnel, and payroll systems and records, ... do their own purchasing, and ... conduct their own minor construction programs" (p. 34). Finally, they are responsible for the operational

management of the division, including the development of and evaluation on the basis of their own internal objectives.

Reflecting collegial ideas, Harcleroad stated that the high degree of operational autonomy implicit in the decentralized pattern served to motivate those at the division level. Similarly, noting that centralized control is often seen as promoting organizational efficiency, he stated, "System efficiency based only on order [the bureaucratic ideal] can curb or eliminate the spontaneity and free expression which results from individual autonomy, which is so essential to creative professionals who are the lifeblood of both service and business organizations" (p. 37).

Harcleroad proposed that this basic pattern would be as effective for state systems of higher education as it had been in large businesses, because of their significant similarities. In addition, he felt the pattern was equally applicable to subsystems within the state structure, such as a community college system or a large multi-unit college or university. On the basis of the pattern, he recommended the responsibilities he believed should be assumed by the state-level agency or board of a state system. These were reviewed in the first portion of the chapter. Briefly, these included primary authority in system master planning, to include the development of guidelines for institutional operations; reviewing and approving institutional master plans and budgets; presenting and supporting plans and budgets before the appropriate segments of state government; evaluating the institutions fiscally and educationally on the basis of cooperatively developed objectives; and, last, advising (and only advising) the institutions on their operations when warranted by the evaluations or

requested by the institutions. Within these constraints, the institutions would operate as they deemed appropriate. Of course, these constraints represent far more than just friendly suggestions by the state agency; nonetheless, Harclerod can readily be perceived as presenting a structure largely congruent with basic collegial-theory concepts such as participative development of organizational goals and significant delegation of authority for implementation decisions to those elements doing the implementing.

Just as in the realm of higher education generally, few studies discussing the state systems for community colleges have directly linked their comments to general organizational theory. Certainly, as seen in Chapter One, numerous works have discussed the need for coordination of state community college systems and/or the need for a degree of college autonomy within these systems. Likewise, a number of writings have examined the allocation of appropriate governance roles to the state and college levels within the systems, as reviewed earlier in this chapter. And, again like the literature for higher education as a whole, many of these examinations have implied some theoretical preference, but typically these preferences have been left unstated. In most cases, the implied preference seemed to be for a collegial approach. Thus, many of the discussions included such general admonitions as avoiding excessive state-level control, placing decision making at the implementation level to the greatest degree possible, and involving the institutions in state-level activities. Gleazer (1973) represents just one example: He recommended that the state coordination structure formally reflect procedures to insure college input into

recurring state-level decisions and, additionally, that ad hoc committees of relevant college personnel beformed to aid in reaching decisions to specific problems that arise.

A few studies making such comments did state their theoretical preferences. As noted in the preceding section, Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972) thoroughly looked at the reasons behind and the means of applying the tenets of collegial theory to the internal governance structures of single community colleges and college campuses. They also examined the use of similar procedures in multicampus colleges and multicollege districts, within which they vaguely included state community college systems. Their conclusions in this area were reviewed in some detail in the third section of this chapter and are reviewed here only briefly. First of all, they suggested that the dual organizational structure they had proposed for single colleges was especially suitable for a multi-college situation. In a multicollege system, they noted, a somewhat dual pattern was virtually inevitable, traditionally following geographic (campus) and functional (fiscal affairs, academic affairs, etc.) lines. Such a pattern, however, violated basic bureaucratic principles regarding a clear hierarchy and thus compounded what they considered were bureaucracy's inherent inadequacies. On the other hand, their proposed collegial model, using one structure for routine administration and another for governance (decision making), fit more naturally into the multicollege scheme. At the same time, they were a bit undecided about the exact form the governance half of the pattern should take. Somewhat hesitantly, they recommended the same basic system--involving a central assembly of administrators, faculty, and

students--for decision making as they had for single colleges. They did note, however, that the assembly approach could prove less effective in the multicollge environment because of its remoteness from its constituents. Therefore, they recommended that decisions affecting only one campus be made at that level whenever possible. In addition, they stated that the interdependency of the campuses should constantly be stressed and that the limits of campus autonomy be clearly defined in order to lessen potential intercampus rivalry and frustration. Overall, their presentation in this area perhaps lacked the confidence necessary to be completely convincing.

Indeed, in 1976, Richardson himself apparently backed off from suggesting that a collegial structure could be applied at the state system level. Rather, he stated that faculty input, at least, at that level could only be achieved through the collective-bargaining mode, saying, "State systems, by their very nature, are large formal bureaucracies which can only be dealt with successfully by other large formal bureaucracies" (p. 55).

In contrast to the hesitancy of Richardson, Blocker, and Bender, Stuckman (1969b) took a more positive attitude to the application of collegial ideas to state community college systems. He noted that developing structures and procedures for state-system coordination that were based upon collegial theory could introduce some occasional uncertainty into the process, in comparison to a purely bureaucratic approach; nonetheless, he felt the advantages of doing so far outweighed the disadvantages.

First of all, he believed that a collegially structured and operated system would more adequately provide the colleges within

the system the requisite flexibility to respond effectively to both the problems and the opportunities arising within their particular service areas. As pointed out in Chapter One's discussion of the case for community college autonomy, such flexibility is perhaps especially valuable for these colleges, compared to most senior institutions, because of their unique local orientation.

In addition, Stuckman stated that cooperation between the institutional and state levels in a system would be enhanced in a collegial operation. This condition would result, he said, from the presence of the mutual development of system goals by the system elements and the distribution of the benefits of reaching these goals in proportion to institutional contributions to their achievement. This idea reflects the collegial assumption that subordinate elements will have greater involvement in organizational goals in whose development they participated and in whose achievement they have a stake.

Likewise, he noted that conflict among levels of an organization will result from noncongruent perceptions on the part of these levels regarding each other's role in the system. Again, then, collegial system procedures providing for mutual definition, vice superordinate assignment, of roles and permitting redefinition when needed will promote intrasystem communication and accurate role perceptions, thus minimizing one cause of conflict. It is also important, in his opinion, that the roles defined through this process be clear and concrete so that no level will be surprised by the actions of the other.

Finally, drawing upon general systems theory, Stuckman proposed that a state system of community colleges is a "natural system" (p. 26), one in which each level is dependent upon the effective functioning of the others to achieve its own objectives most effectively. In such a system, equilibrium is desirable and is promoted by feedback among the levels. Thus, a state-level board or agency must know the effects of its actions on the colleges if the system is to remain in equilibrium, allowing for peak effectiveness. Again, a system operating on collegial principles should allow and encourage the needed feedback.

In order to provide these desired system conditions, Stuckman recommended, as described in the third section of this chapter, a system structure using a number of topical councils, each consisting of the appropriate administrator from the various colleges (presidents, chief academic officers, chief business officers, etc.) and chaired by the appropriate state-level staff member. He also recommended a coordinating council made up of the chairpersons and representatives from each of the topical councils. These groups, he said, would allow institutional input into policy formulation, goal development, and role definition; would promote congruence of role perceptions among the system levels; and would provide for communication and feedback among the system elements--the conditions he identified as necessary for greatest system effectiveness. At the same time, he emphasized that the council structure would not operate as intended without the cooperation of the state board and its staff: "Recommendations which emanate from council proceedings must be seriously considered by the statewide coordinating board and

its staff, or the council will cease to function adequately. If this course, the state junior college system will have forfeited one of its most, if not the most, stabilizing elements" (p. 36). With this warning, Stuckman was concurring with both Likert (1961) and Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972), both of whom pointed out within their own recommendations regarding the application of collegial theory that authority groups or figures in a collegial structure must generally heed the results of participative decision making or lose the theorized benefits of the collegial process.

On the basis of these considerations, Stuckman made a number of recommendations regarding appropriate governance roles for state-level boards and agencies and the individual community colleges. These recommendations were described thoroughly in the third section of this chapter but are summarized briefly here. He saw as proper state-level activities system master planning, the approval of new or significantly expanded college programs, the provision of fiscal resources for the colleges commensurate with their authorized educational needs, the establishment and operation of a system management information system, the development of articulation agreements with other segments of education in the state, and the assumption of the role of state-wide and state-level spokesman for the colleges. At the same time, in line with his support of collegial processes, Stuckman emphasized that the development of implementation procedures and the making of specific decisions associated with these activities must involve college input through the council structure and that final decisions must be fully communicated to the colleges. Activities he mentioned as

properly within the college role were developing college master plans for state-agency review, initiating college program proposals, designing curriculum, managing appropriated funds, and recruiting and managing personnel.

Overall, then, Stuckman did believe a collegial approach to the coordination of state community college systems was both valuable and possible, and he outlined a means of applying the theory. He perhaps best summarized his views when he said:

Effective and efficient statewide coordination of junior college activities with the preservation of institutional integrity, i.e., respect for the institution's stated role and character, can be achieved if the statewide coordinating agency and the several junior colleges cooperate as equal and worthy partners in the state junior college system to effect mutually-accepted goals and if the agency and the institutions have mutually delineated their responsibilities of the state junior college system's goals. (pp. 35-6)

A final article to be reviewed did not specifically address state community college systems nor did it espouse the application of a specific theory. Nonetheless, it presented conclusions of significant interest here. In the article, Wattenbarger (1977) examined decision processes in multicollege community college districts, a category within which he included state systems under a single governing board. His analysis drew heavily from studies of actual practices in selected samples of such districts, and among the conclusions he reached, four seem particularly germane.

First, he suggested that no specific organizational structure was necessarily required for participatory decision making. By their variety, the recommended collegial structures (Likert, 1961; Richardson, Blocker, & Bender, 1972; Stuckman, 1969b) that have been examined at various points in this chapter appear to support

this idea. Thus, Likert's structure was virtually a standard bureaucratic hierarchy utilizing collegial decision processes, whereas Richardson et al. recommended a governance structure drastically at odds with the usual hierarchy. Stuckman's proposal perhaps fell somewhere in between. The implication appears to be that structure is a nonessential though useful tool for allowing collegial decision procedures to operate.

Second, Wattenbarger contended that executive personalities heavily influence the extent to which decisions are centralized or decentralized. Again, comments by Likert, Richardson et al., and Stuckman appear to back up this conclusion, all pointing out that collegial processes will deteriorate and die without superordinate support.

Third, Wattenbarger stated that organizational structure will most influence decision procedures when that structure is concretely set forth and clearly understood. Stuckman seemed to recognize this principle by noting the importance of all levels in a system accurately perceiving the roles of the other levels.

In a fourth observation, Wattenbarger may have underscored the importance of the other three; he stated that the various extant structures generally have more similarities than differences. At first, this observation seems to contrast sharply with the seemingly wide gulf between the assumptions underlying bureaucratic and collegial theory. One might think that this wide disparity would produce greater differences in structure at the application level than it apparently does. The conclusion to be drawn may, therefore, be that small factors, those differences that do exist,

are magnified in importance. If that is the case, then, if an organization is productively to harness rather than haphazardly to suffer the effects predicted by theories, the leadership must make conscious choices between and on the basis of theories; these choices must be concretely reflected in the organization's administrative processes; and these processes must be accurately perceived by the organization's elements.

After looking at the literature suggesting structures and procedures for the coordination and/or governance of state systems of higher education generally and community colleges in particular, one can see that general administrative theories have had an impact on thinking in these areas. The many recommendations often appear to be reflecting theoretical principles. Yet, only rarely have proposals been clearly and directly tied to a theory. As a result, the evidence does not appear to warrant one assuming that the conscious theoretical choices, whose importance is suggested above, are being made within the various state systems of higher-education institutions.

#### The Delphi Technique

This final portion of the chapter contains a review of the Delphi technique, the means used in this study to find out the opinions of chief executives of community colleges and of state-level staffs regarding the preferred placement of specific governance activities within a state community college system. Reviewed are the basic purpose, the usual procedures, and some of the uses of the technique. Finally, the reasons for having used the technique in this study are briefly stated.

According to Andes, Johns, and Kimbrough (1971) and Waldron (1971), the Delphi technique was developed in the early 1960's by the Rand Corporation, primarily under the auspices of Olaf Helmer, Theodore Gordon, and Norman Dalkey, and was originally used for forecasting future technological events. The technique was further refined by the Institute for the Future in Middletown, Connecticut, and the Syracuse Educational Policy Research Center at Syracuse University.

As quoted by Waldron, Helmer described the Delphi technique as "a carefully designed program of sequential individual interrogations (usually best conducted by questionnaires) interspersed with information and opinion feedback" (p. 1). It is generally used in place of face-to-face confrontations (conferences) or one-time surveys. Its basic characteristics are anonymity, repetition with controlled feedback, and statistical summarization of the results.

Waldron described the following general procedures. First a panel of experts is selected. A phase I questionnaire is distributed asking the panel to submit items in the area of concern, such as possible future technological advances or institutional goals.

A phase II questionnaire is distributed consisting of the items constructed from the previous responses and stating the criterion on which the panel should consider the items, such as likely date of occurrence or level of priority. The responses should be numerical or tied to a numerical scale so as to be quantifiable. The responses are statistically summarized, usually by use of the median or interquartile range.

The phase III questionnaire is distributed, consisting of the same format plus the summary of the previous responses. Panel members are permitted to revise their earlier opinions in light of this feedback. Those persons who continue to answer in the upper or lower quarter of the responses for any item are asked to briefly explain the reasons for doing so. The phase III responses are analyzed as before.

A phase IV questionnaire is distributed with the same format including a phase III response summary plus short summaries of the reasons cited by the dissenting panelists. Panelists are again asked to consider their responses in light of this feedback. These final responses are again statistically summarized to produce the panel "consensus."

Waldron suggested that the anonymity of the process lessens the effect of dominant individuals (or, conversely, that of particularly obnoxious panel members) and reduces group pressure to conform, in comparison to a face-to-face conference. Furthermore, there is less resistance on the part of an individual to change a publicly stated opinion. The use of a statistical summarization as the panel "consensus" does not force the group to form a common opinion, lessening group pressure for conformity; yet, at the same time, each person's opinion is reflected in the final group response. Waldron described these factors as the "non-objective" variables found in face-to-face processes and, therefore, suggested that any convergence of the responses in a Delphi panel is generally the result of objective consideration.

His study did suggest, however, that personality factors affect an individual's tendency to conform to the majority opinion. The time lag between response and feedback also appears to affect the responses. Greater convergence of opinions seems to be related to greater time lags. He noted that the use of the Delphi technique provides for the utilization of a group of experts who might otherwise be difficult to bring together at one time and place. At the same time, he pointed out, the subjective selection of the panel could easily bias the results.

Andes, Johns, and Kimbrough (1971) used the Delphi technique to determine the likelihood and desirability of future changes in the organization of large school districts. They cited the same general advantages in the use of the Delphi process as Waldron. They noted that the technique had been used in forecasting technological and scientific developments and their societal consequences, long-range developments in Connecticut, and future developments in education in Utah, as well as for clarifying and setting priorities for intermediate-school-district objectives and for soliciting a consensus regarding goals of a school of education in a university.

Weaver (1971) noted that the Delphi "methods are non-data based and rely on collective expert judgement" (p. 269). At the same time, however, he pointed out that experts are presumably considered as such because of their knowledge of the subject at hand, their rationality, and their objectivity. The technique's greatest weakness, as he saw it, is that its results do not include an explanation of the reasons behind the conclusions as would a conference report. Although originally designed as a forecasting

tool, Weaver suggested that the technique had other more promising uses in the educational field, such as a teaching tool forcing individuals to think more deeply about the future and as a planning tool to aid in the development of priorities for an organization by its members.

Cyphert and Gant (1971) used the Delphi technique to aid in the participatory development of goals for the School of Education of the University of Virginia. By purposely distorting the feedback on one bogus question, the authors reversed the overall opinion of the panelists, thus illustrating a definite "bandwagon effect" inherent in the technique. They also noted that there was very little change in the group opinion from phase III to phase IV, thus questioning the need of the fourth round.

In a study by Campbell (1966) of 40 graduate students in business, 20 Delphi panelists were more accurate than 20 students questioned without feedback in 13 of 16 short-range predictions in the economic realm.

J. W. Miller (1973) utilized the Delphi technique in a study to clarify and redefine the principles, functions, and resultant organization of nongovernmental postsecondary accreditation. In his study 94.6% of the experts invited to serve on the panel accepted, and he enjoyed return rates of over 90% on every phase. Regarding the technique, Miller noted that he found no evidence to disagree with its commonly stated advantages and disadvantages. He concluded that, "The procedure would appear to have wide applicability in education where objective answers to problems are not possible and where

subjective judgements and opinions can contribute to solutions" (p. 85).

To a large degree, Miller's quote described the aim of the data-gathering portion of this study, to obtain "subjective judgements" to contribute to the ultimate solution of questions currently having no "objective answers." Professional opinions were sought from a geographically dispersed sample of experts, chief executives directly involved in and affected by the governance of community colleges in a state system. The Delphi technique provided a feasible means of getting these opinions. Likewise, because of its use of repeated questioning incorporating anonymous panel feedback, the technique provided some assurance that the opinions obtained would represent the result of more than cursory consideration by the respondents. For these reasons, the Delphi technique was chosen as a very appropriate method of gathering this study's data.

CHAPTER FOUR  
THE RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

As described in Chapter Two, the purpose of this study was to advance the knowledge of and to aid further study of the governance processes appropriate for effective coordination of state systems of community colleges, processes that reflect a balance between the requirement of the state for a system efficiently contributing to the fulfillment of the educational needs of the citizenry and the requirements of the colleges for enough autonomy to meet efficiently the unique and shifting needs of their district residents. As has been seen, the two aims, state and college, are both important, fundamentally are mutually supportive, but are often conflicting. In order to achieve this basic purpose then, the actual problem of the study was to identify the issues and nonissues in the division of governance power between the state-level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual community colleges (to include local boards) and then to investigate these identified issues and nonissues from three selected aspects.

Accordingly, the procedures detailed in Chapter Two were followed. First, 55 specific governance activities were delineated. Then a 40-member Delphi panel was selected consisting of chief executives of state-level staffs for community colleges and chief executives of community colleges. Next, the panelists were questioned using the

Delphi technique regarding the preferred placement--at the state level, the college level, or somewhere in between--of each of the delineated governance activities. Finally, the professional opinions elicited by the Delphi questioning were analyzed to determine answers for the following questions.

1. For which of the 55 governance activities did the Delphi panel reach consensus, thus identifying a nonissue,, or fail to reach consensus, thus identifying an issue, on the preferred level at which the activity should be exercised?

2. For which of the identified issues were the differences in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the governance activity related significantly to chief-executive role level (state or local college)?

3. For which of the identified issues were the differences in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the governance activity related significantly to the type of state-level governance structure for community colleges (governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating board) within which the Delphi panelists worked?

4. Did the general pattern of preferred placements of nonissue governance activities, those for which the panel reached consensus, tend to congruence with a pattern of governance-activity placements hypothesized on the basis of bureaucratic administrative theory, with a pattern based on collegial theory, or with neither pattern?

In this chapter the final results of the Delphi questioning and data analysis are presented with each of the questions above considered in turn.

### The Nonissues and Issues

For the first question above, the following null hypothesis had been proposed in order to guide the analysis of the data: For each governance activity, no consensus exists among the respondents regarding the preferred placement of that activity. As noted in Chapter Two, for each governance activity, consensus was considered to exist if at least one-half (17) of the 33 respondents to the phase III questionnaire placed the activity at the same level on the 5-point scale, solely at the state level to solely at the college level, and at least a total of three-quarters (25) of the respondents placed it at that level, the level immediately higher, or the level immediately lower on the scale.

The various preferred placements indicated by the Delphi panelists responding to the phase III (final) questionnaire for each of the 55 governance activities are given in Table 3. The data for each governance activity were inspected to see if the null hypothesis, no consensus, was accepted or rejected.

Inspection of the data revealed that the null hypothesis was accepted for 21 governance activities, defining these activities as issues. Consensus existed, a rejection of the null hypothesis, for 34 governance activities; therefore, these activities were designated nonissues. Overall, the panel did not indicate that any nonissue should be exercised solely at the state agency/board level. However, consensus was reached on 4 governance activities preferably being exercised primarily at the state agency/board level, 4 being exercised with shared authority, 3 being exercised primarily at the local community college/board level, and 23 solely at the local

Table 3

Number of Delphi Panelists Preferring a Governance  
Activity Be Exercised at the Specified Level

Governance Activity	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Solely college
1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state	0	24 <sup>a</sup>	8	1
2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multicollege district	0	0	1	27 <sup>a</sup>
3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district	7	20 <sup>a</sup>	4	2
4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district	1	7	9	12
5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college	0	0	2	21 <sup>a</sup>
6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college	0	0	1	11
7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program	0	6	7	12

Table 3--continued

Governance Activity	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Solely college
8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program	2	9	14	2
9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system	0	16	14	0
10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings	0	5	18 <sup>a</sup>	2
11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements <sup>b</sup>	2	12	10	1
12. Approve <u>specific</u> program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.) <sup>b</sup>	1	0	8	8
13. Approve new courses	0	1	8	14
14. Approve instructional methodology and technology	0	0	0	33 <sup>a</sup>
15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies	0	0	1	25 <sup>a</sup>
16. Establish grading policies	0	0	1	25 <sup>a</sup>
17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies	0	0	2	24 <sup>a</sup>

Table 3--continued

Governance Activity	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college Solely college
18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings)	0	10	16	2 5
19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program	0	3	7	16 7
20. Develop general admission standards	2	1	11	10 9
21. Approve individual student admissions	0	0	0	1 32 <sup>a</sup>
22. Set student tuition and fee charges	2	5	7	14 5
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature	1	8	15	9 0
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature	1	11	13	7 1
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature	2	10	19 <sup>a</sup>	2 0
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions	7	22 <sup>a</sup>	1	2 1 194

Table 3--continued

Governance Activity	Level within state systems				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college
27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college	0	1	0	13	19 <sup>a</sup>
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services	0	4	6	20 <sup>a</sup>	3
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition	0	9	11	13	0
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value	1	3	2	12	15
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition	2	2	6	18 <sup>a</sup>	5
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services	$\frac{1}{2}$	2	0	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 <sup>a</sup>
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications	0	1	3	12	17 <sup>a</sup>
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property	0	0	0	8	25 <sup>a</sup>
35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs	0	3	1	14	15
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff	0	0	0	0	33 <sup>a</sup>
					195

Table 3--continued

Governance Activity	Level within state systems				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff	0	0	0	2	31 <sup>a</sup>
38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages	0	1	3	15	14
39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions	0	0	1	0	32 <sup>a</sup>
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies	0	0	2	10	21 <sup>a</sup>
41. Award tenure and promotions	0	0	0	0	33 <sup>a</sup>
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank <sup>b</sup>	0	1	0	0	31 <sup>a</sup>
43. Assign faculty duties by area and workload	0	0	0	0	33 <sup>a</sup>
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel	0	0	4	16	13
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments	0	0	0	1	32 <sup>a</sup>
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments	0	0	0	2	31 <sup>a</sup>
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege-district executive officer (president)	1	1	2	8	21 <sup>a</sup>
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel	0	1	2	5	25 <sup>a</sup>

Table 3--continued

Governance Activity	Level within state systems				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees	1	2	1	13	16
50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees	1	0	1	12	19 <sup>a</sup>
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs	2	13	15	2	1
52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance	1	18 <sup>a</sup>	11	3	0
53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities	0	0	28 <sup>a</sup>	4	1
54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards	0	16	16	1	0
55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	26 <sup>a</sup>	6	$\frac{1}{2}$

<sup>a</sup>Consensus as defined was reached by the panel for this governance activity at this level.  
<sup>b</sup>One panelist did not indicate a preferred level.

community college/board level. Each of these nonissues is briefly discussed in Chapter Five; consequently, the nonissues are not listed here. However, in Table 3, numbers marked with a superscript a indicate that the corresponding governance activity is a nonissue which should be exercised at that particular level.

#### Issues and Chief-Executive Level

For the second question of the study, the following null hypothesis had been proposed in order to guide the analysis of the data: For each issue, no significant difference exists between the opinions of state-level chief executives and of community college chief executives regarding the preferred placement of that activity. In other words, was the role level, state or college, of the panelists a possible factor in their lack of consensus regarding the preferred placement of a particular governance activity. If role level were a factor, it could be surmised that the distributions of the responses of the two groups for that activity would be different; the null hypothesis for this premise, then, would be that stated above.

In order to test the hypothesis, the panel responses for each issue, a governance activity on which the panel reached no consensus, were divided into the two distributions as presented in Table 4. Appendix K presents these distributions for all governance activities that were nonissues. Then the null hypothesis was tested for each issue governance activity using the Mann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 116-127), including the correction for ties. A two-tailed test was used, and the level of significance for rejection of the

null hypothesis was set at .05. The calculated  $U$  and its probability level for each issue are presented in Table 4.

Overall, the null hypothesis was rejected for 8 of the 21 issues. These issues where the responses of the state-level chief executives differed significantly from the responses of the community college chief executives were the following. (The numbers with the governance activities are their numbers on the phase III questionnaire.)

4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus or multicollege district.

7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.

8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.

13. Approve new courses.

18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).

19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.

22. Set student tuition and fee charges.

54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards.

For these issues, then, the role levels of the chief executives certainly appeared to be a factor contributing to the lack of agreement over the preferred level at which the governance activity should be exercised. In addition, as might be expected, for all these issues, inspection of the data revealed the tendency was for state-level chief executives to prefer that the governance activity be

Table 4

For Each Issue, the Number of Delphi Panelists,  
by Role Level, Preferring a Governance Activity  
Be Exercised at the Specified Level and the  
Calculated Between-Levels  $\bar{U}$

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and role level	Level within state system					$\bar{U}$
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college	
4. Authorize the establishment or dis- tablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district						
State	1	6	4	5	1	79**
College	0	1	5	7	3	
7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program						
State	0	6	4	6	1	54.5***
College	0	0	3	6	7	
8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program						
State	2	6	7	2	0	78.5**
College	0	3	7	4	2	

Table 4--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and role level	Level within state system					U
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college	
9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system						
State	0	11	4	2	0	98.5
College	0	5	10	1	0	
11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements						
State	2	7	5	3	0	91
College <sup>b</sup>	0	5	5	4	1	
12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.)						
State	1	0	3	11	2	108.5
College <sup>b</sup>	0	0	5	4	6	
13. Approve new courses						
State	0	1	6	6	4	74**
College	0	0	2	4	10	
18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings)						
State	0	8	8	0	1	70***
College	0	2	8	2	4	

Table 4--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and role level	Level within state system					Solely college	<u>U</u>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college		
19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program							
State	0	2	6	8	1	71***	
College	0	1	1	8	6		
20. Develop general admission standards							
State	2	1	6	6	2	82*	
College	0	0	5	4	7		
22. Set student tuition and fee charges							
State	2	3	5	6	1	80**	
College	0	2	2	8	4		
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature							
State	1	7	5	4	0	87.5*	
College	0	1	10	5	0		
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature							
State	1	9	3	3	1	88*	202
College	0	2	10	4	0		

Table 4--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and role level	Level within state system				<u>U</u>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition					
State	0	6	7	4	0
College	0	3	4	9	0
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value					
State	1	1	1	8	6
College	0	2	1	4	9
35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs					
State	0	1	1	8	7
College	0	2	0	6	8
38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages					
State	0	1	1	11	4
College	0	0	2	4	10
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administra- tive personnel					
State	0	0	3	10	4
College	0	0	1	6	9

Table 4--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and role level	Level within state system				U
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees					
State	0	2	0	9	6
College	1	0	1	4	10
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs					
State	2	8	5	1	1
College	0	5	10	1	0
54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state- level agencies/boards					
State	0	13	4	0	0
College	0	3	12	1	0

<sup>a</sup>The number of each governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.  
<sup>b</sup>One panelist did not indicate a preferred level.  

\*  $\underline{p} < .10$ .  
\*\*  $\underline{p} < .05$ .  
\*\*\*  $\underline{p} < .02$ .

exercised at a level closer to the state level than that preferred by college chief executives. Indeed, had this tendency been hypothesized, the associated null hypothesis would have been rejected on the basis of the one-tailed test with a significance level of .05 for 13 of the 21 issues, the original 8 issues plus the 5 issues noted in Table 4 as having a  $\bar{U}$  with  $p < .10$ . On the whole, therefore, chief-executive role level appeared to be a factor related to disagreement over the preferred level at which governance activities should be exercised within a state community college system; however, the overall tendency itself was not tested in the study.

#### Issues and System Governance Structure

The third question of the study was basically whether the type of governance structure within which a chief executive, regardless of role level, worked appeared to be a factor contributing to disagreement over the level at which a governance activity should be exercised in a state community college system. That it could be a factor seemed possible since an earlier study (Wattenbarger & Sakaguchi, 1971) had shown that, in practice, the level at which 20 governance activities were exercised did vary among groups of state community college systems classified according to three governance structures based upon the functional role of the state-level board: governing, coordinating-governing, and coordinating. If it were a factor, it could be surmised that the distributions of the responses of the three groups of chief executives classified by the system governance structure within which they worked would differ. Accordingly, a third null hypothesis had been proposed to guide the analysis of the data: For each issue, no significant difference exists among

the opinions of chief executives from states with a state-level governing board, from states with a state-level coordinating-governing board, and from states with a state-level coordinating board responsible for community colleges.

In order to test this hypothesis, the panel responses for each of the 21 issues were divided into the three distributions as presented in Table 5. These distributions for all governance activities that were nonissues are presented in Appendix K. Then the null hypothesis was tested for each issue governance activity using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis-of-variance test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 184-193), including the correction for ties. Again a two-tailed test was used, and the level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis was set at .05. The calculated  $H$  for each issue is presented in Table 5.

The null hypothesis was accepted for all 21 issues. Therefore, the functional type of state-level community college board--governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating--of the state within which a panelist worked did not appear to be a factor significantly contributing to panel disagreement on any of the issues. Likewise, one can probably conclude that system governance structure as classified was not a factor significantly related to the preferred levels at which the panelists felt the various governance activities should be exercised, although the overall distributions of the three groups were not themselves tested. Of course, it should be noted that the panelists were specifically instructed to avoid being influenced by this factor. For example, the instructions for the phase III questionnaire (Appendix H) stated, "Please remember that we are asking for

Table 5

For Each Issue, the Number of Delphi Panelists, by System Governance Structure, Preferring a Governance Activity Be Exercised at the Specified Level and the Calculated Among-Structures  $\bar{H}$

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system				$\bar{H}^b$
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college college	
4. Authorize the establishment of disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district					
Governing	0	0	2	1	1
Coordinating-governing	0	2	0	3	2
Coordinating	1	5	7	8	1
7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program					
Governing	0	0	2	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	2	2	1	2
Coordinating	0	4	3	11	4
8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program					
Governing	0	1	2	0	1
Coordinating-governing	0	4	0	2	1
Coordinating	2	4	12	4	0

Table 5--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system					H <sup>b</sup>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college	
9. Develop and approve articulation agree- ments and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system						
Governing	0	1	2	1	0	1.433
Coordinating-governing	0	4	2	1	0	
Coordinating	0	11	10	1	0	
11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements						
Governing	0	2	0	1	1	.763
Coordinating-governing <sup>c</sup>	1	2	2	1	0	
Coordinating	1	8	8	5	0	
12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.)						
Governing	0	0	1	2	1	1.353
Coordinating-governing <sup>c</sup>	1	0	0	2	3	
Coordinating	0	0	7	11	4	
13. Approve new courses						
Governing	0	0	2	1	1	1.421
Coordinating-governing	0	0	2	3	2	
Coordinating	0	1	4	6	11	

Table 5--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system				H <sup>b</sup>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings)					
Governing	0	1	1	1	2.797
Coordinating-governing	0	5	0	1	1
Coordinating	0	4	15	0	3
19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program					
Governing	0	1	0	2	1
Coordinating-governing	0	1	2	2	2
Coordinating	0	1	5	12	4
20. Develop general admission standards					
Governing	0	0	2	1	1
Coordinating-governing	1	0	4	1	1
Coordinating	1	1	5	8	7
22. Set student tuition and fee charges					
Governing	0	1	1	1	1.112
Coordinating-governing	1	2	1	2	1
Coordinating	1	2	5	11	3
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature					
Governing	0	1	1	2	0
Coordinating-governing	1	0	2	4	0
Coordinating	0	7	12	3	0

Table 5--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system				H <sup>b</sup>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature	0	2	0	1	.253
Governing	1	2	1	3	
Coordinating-governing	0	7	12	3	
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition	0	1	0	3	4.354
Governing	0	4	2	1	
Coordinating-governing	0	4	9	9	
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value	0	1	1	0	.647
Governing	1	1	0	2	
Coordinating-governing	0	1	1	10	
35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs	0	0	0	2	1.674
Governing	0	1	1	3	
Coordinating-governing	0	2	0	9	

Table 5--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system				H <sup>b</sup>
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages					
Governing	0	0	2	0	
Coordinating-governing	0	1	0	2	.531
Coordinating	0	0	1	13	
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administra- tive personnel					
Governing	0	0	2	0	
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	3	.299
Coordinating	0	0	1	13	
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees					
Governing	0	0	1	1	
Coordinating-governing	1	1	0	0	.338
Coordinating	0	1	0	12	
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs					
Governing	0	1	1	1	
Coordinating-governing	0	5	2	0	3.987
Coordinating	2	7	12	1	

Table 5--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> and system governance structure	Level within state system				$\underline{H}^b$
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	
54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards					
Governing	0	2	1	1	.423
Coordinating-governing	0	4	3	0	0
Coordinating	0	10	12	0	0

<sup>a</sup>The number of each governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.

<sup>b</sup>No  $\underline{H}$ 's revealed differences at the set level of significance of .05.

<sup>c</sup>One panelist did not indicate a preferred level.

your professional opinion, given your knowledge and experience, of the preferred level at which an activity should be exercised, regardless of actual practice in your state." These results, then, imply that the opinions elicited by the Delphi process did indeed constitute carefully considered professional opinions and that such opinions can be independent of actual practice.

#### Nonissues and Administrative Theory

The final question of the study was basically whether the prescriptive tenets of either of the two major theories of administration, bureaucratic and collegial theory, appeared to underlie, consciously or unconsciously, the pattern of governance-activity placements for which consensus existed among the panelists. If such an underlying relationship existed, it was hypothesized that the general pattern of placements for the nonissues would tend to be congruent with a pattern of placements based upon the tenets of the underlying theory.

In order to examine such a hypothesis, it was first necessary, therefore, to determine for each governance activity the hypothetical level at which bureaucratic administrative theory, and then collegial administrative theory, would most likely recommend that activity be exercised. So as to provide a consistent rationale for this hypothetical determination of theoretical preferred placements, guidelines were developed following a brief review of the theories. These guidelines, one set for each theory, were stated in Chapter Three.

On the basis of the guidelines set forth for bureaucratic theory, the governance activities were placed as described below. They are presented in groups by level, moving from solely state to solely

college. The level itself is first defined, then the related theoretical justification for placements at this level is stated, and finally the governance activities assigned to this level are listed.

The first level was defined in the Delphi questionnaires (Appendices D, E, and H) as:

Solely at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate agency/board/governmental legislative or executive unit) with degree of institutional input at the discretion of the state-level agency/board.

Briefly, the bureaucratic guidelines stated that decision making was basically a superordinate function, never being delegated beyond the level immediately supervising the implementing level. Furthermore, upward communication was at the pleasure of the superordinate. Thus, at this level would be placed governance activities clearly reflecting state-level and/or system-wide concerns and being implemented at the state level or at the highest institutional levels, for example, decisions on policies applicable to all colleges in the system. In addition, these would be activities concerning which the state-level agency or board believed information adequate enough to allow rational decision making would be available routinely through a management information system or through minimal consultation with college-level subordinates. Given these criteria, the following governance activities were assigned to this level. (The number with a governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.)

1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state.

3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district.

9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.
18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).
20. Develop general admission standards.
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.
35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs.
38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages.
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege district executive officer (president).
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.
50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees.
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.
52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance.

54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards.

55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.

The second level was defined in the questionnaires as:

Primarily at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate) with mandatory and significant institutional inputs and/or recommendations.

The characteristics of governance activities placed at this level would largely be similar to those above except that these would be activities requiring substantial initial input by the colleges, such as in budget development; requiring input, perhaps college-specific, beyond that routinely available from the data-reporting system; or requiring substantial expert advice from subordinates. In some cases, these would include making decisions reflecting the state-level concern for total system efficiency but primarily affecting a single college or district. Overall, then, these would be governance activities requiring state-level decision making in order to maintain the strict top-level control and supervision of system operations prescribed by bureaucratic theory yet demanding a significant amount of input from the institutional level. On the basis of this rationale, the following governance activities were assigned to this level.

2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multicollege district.

4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district.

5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college.

6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.

7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.

8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.

10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.

11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.

15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.

16. Establish grading policies.

17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies.

19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.

22. Set student tuition and fee charges.

23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions.

27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.

30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.

31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.

32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.

33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.

34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.

39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions.

40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.

42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.

44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.

45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.

46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.

48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of non-professional (support) personnel.

53. Explain or disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.

The third level was defined in the questionnaires as:

With shared authority. For example: State agency/board reviews institutional recommendations and formulates own recommendations. Both are passed along to superordinate for equal consideration.

Bureaucratic theory requires that authority for all decisions be clearly specified; therefore, no governance decisions were assigned to this level.

The fourth level was defined in the questionnaires as:

Primarily at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with due consideration of state-level recommendations or within detailed state-level guidelines.

Governance activities placed at this level on the basis of bureaucratic theory would be those basically affecting only the college carrying out the activity. In these cases, the state-level agency or board would satisfy its concern for efficient institutional operation through the establishment of, as part of higher-level governance activities, policies and procedures to guide these activities and through the evaluation of the performance of institutional superordinates in following these policies. Typically, these activities would be ones implemented at a subordinate level within the college; therefore, the approval and supervision of their implementation would, under bureaucratic principles, appropriately be done by superordinates at the college. Accordingly, the following governance activities were assigned to this level.

12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repairs, etc.).

13. Approve new courses.
21. Approve individual student admissions.
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.
41. Award tenure and promotions.
43. Assign faculty duties by area and workload.

The fifth and last level was defined in the questionnaires as:

Solely at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with little or no state-level input or within broad state-level guidelines.

Because bureaucratic theory calls for strong superordinate control and supervision of all operations within an organization, governance activities placed at this level would have to be ones that had almost no effect on overall system efficiency, since this level provides for virtually no state-level impact on decisions. Because the governance activities delineated in this study were intended to represent the major decisions required within a community college system to fulfill its educational role, these activities generally are not sufficiently insignificant to be of no real state-level concern. As a result, only one governance activity was assigned to this level.

14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.

Once the theoretical placements of the governance activities had been established in accordance with the principles of bureaucracy, it was next necessary to establish such placements on the basis of collegial theory, likewise using the appropriate guidelines set forth in Chapter Three. These placements are again presented by listing for each level the activities assigned to

that level; however, the full questionnaire definition of each level as presented above has not been repeated but only summarized as necessary.

The first level in the questionnaires, solely at the state agency/board level, provided for no or little required institutional input into the decision. Since collegial theory calls for a decision process involving all organizational elements generally affected by the decision being considered, only governance activities with no impact upon the colleges would be placed at this level. Since all the delineated activities would have institutional effects, none were placed at this level.

The second level, primarily at the state agency/board level, provided for final decisions being made at the state level in the context of significant input by the colleges. Of course, collegial theory calls for group decision making, implying that no one element in a group makes the final decision. Nonetheless, all three major descriptions of potential collegial applications reviewed in Chapter Three (Likert, 1961; Richardson, Blocker, & Bender, 1972; Stuckman, 1969b) clearly pointed out the power of superordinates to accept or overturn (along with the theoretical consequences of doing so) group decisions. Choosing whether or not to exercise this veto power thus becomes, in practice, the final decision. Accordingly, governance activities for which the state agency/board has this veto power would be the ones that would be placed at this level. Such activities would be those primarily implemented at the state-level and clearly and significantly influencing overall system efficiency, fiscally and/or educationally.

On the basis of this rationale, the following governance activities were assigned to this level.

1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state.

3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district.

9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.

11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.

20. Develop general admission standards.

23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facility budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions.

35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs.

51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.

52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance.

54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards.

55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.

The third level in the questionnaires, with shared authority, was intended to indicate an activity on which neither the state agency/board nor the community college/board made the final decision. At first glance, this level would seem the proper one for virtually any activity in a collegially operated system, given the theory's emphasis on decision by the group. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the discussion of the preceding level, in actual practice final decision-making power does exist within collegial organizations in the form of superordinate veto power over group decisions. Therefore, the assignment of governance activities to either state or college levels was made on the basis of whether state-level veto power would exist, under the tenets of collegial theory, for the activities. If it would not, then final-decision power would lie at the college level, and the theoretical placement of the activities would be at one of the two college levels. As a result, only the following governance activity was assigned to the shared-authority level; it was placed here because, in a collegial system, final decisions and implementation could occur at both levels, state and college, for this activity.

53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.

The fourth level, primarily at the local community college/board level, provided for final decision making at the college level within detailed system guidelines or state-level recommendations. Basically collegial theory states that once the organization's goals and objectives for an organizational element have been developed, that element determines the means of fulfilling the objectives on the basis of its own special expertise along with input from other less directly effected elements and levels within the organization. Accordingly, governance activities at this level would be those involving a college's implementation of goals and objectives determined within higher-level activities when that implementation could significantly affect overall system efficiency. State-level concern for this efficiency would be met by the state-level role in making recommendations and shaping relevant guidelines, as well as evaluating college efficiency (governance activity 55 above). The following activities were assigned to this level.

2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multicollege district.

4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district.

5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college.

6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.

7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.

8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.

10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.

18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).

21. Approve individual student admissions.

22. Set student tuition and fee charges. (Actually, this placement would depend upon the nature of the system. The rationales stated above for collegial-theory placements would call for this activity to be placed at the second level, primarily state, in a fully state-funded system.)

28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.

29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.

38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages.

47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege district executive officer (president).

49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.

50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees.

The fifth and last level, solely at the local community college/board level, provided for final decision making at the college level within, at most, broad state-level guidelines. Governance activities at this level would be those again involving a college's implementation of its assigned objectives but would be detailed elements in the implementation, often ones where the actual implementation would occur at subordinate levels in the college. Therefore, the direct effects of decisions in these activities would be felt almost exclusively by elements within the college; thus the decision-making group called for under collegial principles would consist solely of college personnel. Likewise, the effects on total system efficiency would be indirect and diluted; appropriately, then, the state-level role would also be diluted and indirect, primarily being reflected in the state agency's evaluation of total college efficiency. Otherwise, the state-level role would be purely advisory. On the basis of this description, the following governance activities were assigned to the solely college level.

12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.).

13. Approve new courses.

14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.

15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.

16. Establish grading policies.

17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies.
19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college or real or personal property.
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.
39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions.
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.
41. Award tenure and promotions.
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.
43. Assign faculty duties by area and workload.
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel.

Once these theoretical preferred placements of the governance activities had been set for each of the two theories and once the nonissues had been identified, it was then possible to investigate the question of whether either theory appeared to underlie the thinking of the Delphi panelists regarding the preferred placement of governance activities for which defined consensus existed. In order to guide the analysis of the data, the following twin null hypotheses had been proposed: For all nonissues, the consensus placement of these governance activities by the respondents is not significantly congruent with the placement suggested by bureaucratic administrative theory; and for all nonissues, the consensus placement of these governance activities by the respondents is not significantly congruent with the placement suggested by collegial administrative theory.

As described in Chapter Two, the data were placed into two sets for this analysis, one pairing the consensus placement of each nonissue with the theoretical placement of it on the basis of bureaucratic principles and the other pairing each nonissue placement with its theoretical collegial counterpart. These paired data are presented in Table 6. As explained in more detail in Chapter Two, congruence, the quality of exactly overlapping, statistically consists of equality of central tendency and perfect positive correlation in combination. Testing the data for these qualities, therefore, constituted a test for congruence as required by the hypotheses.

First, then, the paired data made up of the theoretical bureaucratic placements and the consensus placements of the

Table 6

Levels at Which Nonissue Governance Activities  
Should Be Exercised According to Bureaucratic  
Theory, Panel Consensus, and Collegial Theory

Governance activity <sup>a</sup>	Bureaucratic theory	Panel consensus	Collegial theory
1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state	1	2	2
2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for <u>a</u> community college or multi-college district	2	4	4
3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multi-college district	1	2	2
5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college	2	5	4
6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college	2	5	4
10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings	2	3	4
14. Approve instructional methodology and technology	5	5	5
15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies	2	5	5
16. Establish grading policies	2	5	5

Table 6--continued

	Governance activity <sup>a</sup>	Bureaucratic theory	Panel consensus	Collegial theory
17.	Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies	2	5	5
21.	Approve individual student admissions	4	5	4
25.	Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to super-ordinate board/agency or governor/legislature	1	3	2
26.	Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions	2	2	2
27.	Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college	2	5	5
28.	Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services	1	4	4
31.	Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition	2	4	5
32.	Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services	2	5	5
33.	Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications	2	5	5
34.	Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property	2	5	5
36.	Approve in-state travel for college staff	4	5	5
37.	Approve out-of-state travel for college staff	4	5	5

Table 6--continued

	Governance activity <sup>a</sup>	Bureaucratic theory	Panel consensus	Collegial theory
39.	Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions	2	5	5
40.	Approve tenure and promo- tion policies	2	5	5
41.	Award tenure and promotions	4	5	5
42.	Approve mix of faculty by area and rank	2	5	5
43.	Assign faculty duties by area and workload	4	5	5
45.	Award or terminate faculty appointments	2	5	5
46.	Award or terminate admin- istrative appointments	2	5	5
47.	Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege district executive officer (president)	1	5	4
48.	Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel	2	5	5
50.	Conduct collective bargain- ing with nonprofessional (support) employees	1	5	4
52.	Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance	1	2	2
53.	Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities	2	3	3

Table 6--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup>	Bureaucratic theory	Panel consensus	Collegial theory
55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals	1	3	2

Note. Level numbers represent the following: 1, solely at the state agency/board level; 2, primarily at the state agency/board level; 3, with shared authority; 4, primarily at the local community college/board level; and 5, solely at the local community college/board level.

<sup>a</sup>The number of each governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.

nonissues were tested for a difference in central tendencies using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956, pp. 75-83). A two-tailed test was used, and the level of significance was set at .05. The test indicated a significant difference in the central tendencies of the bureaucratic and consensus placements,  $T = 0$ ,  $p < .00001$ . Since congruence requires that the paired sets of data have similar central tendencies, the null hypothesis, no congruence, was accepted, and it was concluded that bureaucratic theory apparently did not underlie the thinking of the panelists regarding the preferred placements of the nonissue governance activities.

Next, the paired data consisting of the theoretical collegial placements and the consensus placements of the nonissues were analyzed in terms of the null hypothesis. Again, the data were tested first for a difference in central tendencies in the manner described for the bureaucratic/consensus data. The test indicated no significant difference in the central tendencies of the collegial

and consensus placements,  $\underline{T} = 10$ ,  $\underline{p} > .05$ . In fact, the medians of the two placement patterns were 4.63 for the collegial and 4.78 for the consensus, both of which contrasted sharply with the bureaucratic-pattern median of 2.72. Therefore, one quality of congruence, similar central tendencies, was not disproved.

Accordingly, the data were analyzed for the second factor in congruence, positive correlation. The correlation was calculated in terms of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (Siegel, 1956, pp. 202-213). A high positive correlation was found,  $\underline{r}_s = .796$ . Its significance was then investigated using a one-tailed test and setting the level of significance at .025. The correlation was found to be significant,  $\underline{t} (32) = 7.44$ ,  $\underline{p} < .0005$ . Consequently, it was concluded that collegial administrative theory did appear to underlie, whether consciously or unconsciously, the thinking of the Delphi panelists regarding the preferred placements of the nonissue governance activities.

#### Summary

Briefly, in this study the Delphi technique was used to elicit the professional opinions of a sample of chief executives of community college state-level staffs and of community colleges regarding the preferred placement--at the state level, at the college level, or somewhere in between--of each of 55 governance activities that typically must be carried out in a state community college system. The elicited opinions were then analyzed to answer the four basic questions of the study.

First, the opinions were analyzed in order to identify the issues and nonissues among the governance activities. The panelists

generally agreed on the preferred placement of 34 governance activities, thus identifying the nonissues. They agreed that 4 of the governance activities should be exercised primarily at the state agency/board level, 4 exercised with shared authority, 3 primarily at the local community college/board level, and 23 solely at the local community college/board level. The panelists did not agree on the preferred placement of 21 governance activities, thus identifying these as issues.

Second, the opinions expressed on the preferred placement of the issue governance activities were analyzed to see if a relationship existed between the levels of the preferred placements and the role levels, state or college, of the panelists. A significant difference at the .05 level was found between the distributions among the five levels, solely state to solely college, of the preferred placements expressed by state-level chief executives and by community college chief executives for 8 of the 21 issues. Furthermore, in every case, the preferred placements of state-level chief executives tended to be closer to the state level than the preferred placements of college chief executives, just as one might expect. It was concluded that for these eight governance activities the role level of the panelists appeared to be a factor contributing to disagreement on preferred governance-activity placement.

Third, the opinions expressed on the preferred placement of the issues were analyzed to see if a relationship existed between their levels and the functional structures--governing, coordinating-governing, and coordinating--of the state-level community college

boards in the state where the panelists worked. No significant difference at the .05 level was found among the level distributions of the preferred placements expressed by chief executives from the three types of states for any issue governance activity. It was concluded that the functional structure of the state-level community college board was apparently not a factor contributing to disagreement among the panelists regarding preferred governance-activity placement.

Finally, the consensus placements of the nonissue governance activities expressed by the chief executives were compared to the theoretical placements of these same governance activities suggested by bureaucratic and then by collegial administrative theory in order to see if either theory appeared to underlie, whether consciously or not, the thinking of the panelists. The consensus placements were found to be significantly congruent with the placements suggested by the tenets of collegial theory but not congruent with those suggested by bureaucratic theory. Therefore, it was concluded that the principles of collegial administrative theory appeared to underlie, consciously or unconsciously, the thinking of the chief executives regarding the level at which the nonissue governance activities should be exercised in a state community college system.

These findings would seem to have implications for the allocation of governance power within state systems of community colleges. These implications are discussed in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY  
FOR THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNANCE  
POWERS IN STATE SYSTEMS

Introduction

As was pointed out in Chapters One and Two, during the past two decades various internal and environmental pressures on postsecondary education forced a recognition of the need for substantial state coordination of its elements; and accordingly, the states created, revised, and recreated structures and processes at the state and system levels to effect this coordination. The instigating pressures and the need to respond to them were and continue to be clearly legitimate; nonetheless, postsecondary institutions often rankled under the perceived loss of autonomy inherent in the effecting of system coordination, and this conflict between state-level coordination and institutional autonomy became a topic of repeated discussion. The review of these discussions in Chapter One revealed that the problem of balancing the valid state-level and institutional concerns over coordination was real, complex, and continuing--both for postsecondary education generally and, because of their pronounced local orientation, for community colleges in particular. The purpose of this study, focusing on the community colleges, was to provide additional insight into this problem by examining a central aspect of it, the allocation of governance powers among levels in state systems of community colleges.

Specifically, in the study the Delphi technique was used to elicit the opinions of a sample of chief executives of state-level staffs for community colleges and of chief executives of community colleges regarding the preferred level, from solely state to solely college, at which 55 different governance activities should be exercised in a state system. As reported in Chapter Four, it was found that the chief executives generally agreed on the preferred-placement level for 34 of the governance activities but failed to reach consensus as defined in the study for 21 activities. These 21 governance activities were identified as issues, and analyses of the chief-executive opinions on these issues found that for a number of them the role level, state or college, of the chief executives appeared to be a factor contributing to the lack of agreement concerning their preferred placement. On the other hand, the state governance-structure environment in which the chief executives worked--whether the state community college system had a governing, coordinating-governing, or coordinating board--did not appear to be a factor contributing to disagreement for any of the issues. Finally, an analysis of the preferred placements of the 34 nonissues, those governance activities on which the chief executives did reach agreement regarding the level at which they should be exercised, found that these placements significantly accorded with theoretical placements based upon collegial administrative theory.

These findings, along with recommendations in the review of related literature in Chapter Three, would seem to have implications for the allocation of governance powers within state community college systems, and this chapter contains these implications. The 34

nonissues are discussed first, followed by an examination of the 21 issues.

### The Nonissues

In the justification for this study, it was stated that the preferred placements of the nonissues, the levels at which the questioned chief executives generally agreed that particular governance activities should be exercised, could immediately serve as guidelines for an appropriate allocation of governance powers in a state system of community colleges, an allocation that would presumably satisfy state needs for system accountability as perceived by state-level chief executives and satisfy institutional requirements for flexibility as perceived by college chief executives. In addition, the strength of the recommendation represented by any nonissue placement would be further enhanced to the degree that the placement accorded with opinions in the literature and was basically consistent with collegial principles, which were seen to underlie the overall pattern of nonissue placements.

Therefore, the nonissues and their placements are presented here as suggestions for practice--sometimes qualified, elucidated, or further supported as appropriate by accompanying comments. They are grouped by suggested level, moving from solely state to solely college.

The first level then is solely at the state agency/board level. In the three phases of the Delphi questionnaire (Appendices D, E, and H), this level was described as providing for final decisions (or recommendations to be forwarded to the superordinate board or agency or the appropriate legislative or executive element of state government) being made at the state level with little or no input from the

colleges. No nonissues were placed by the chief executives at this level. Their failure to recommend that any governance activities be exercised at this level seems congruent with the ideas expressed in the writings reviewed in Chapter Three. Again and again, those authors emphasized the importance of allowing, to a greater or lesser degree, institutions to have a reasonable role in decision making at the state agency/board level. Likewise, this failure is in accordance with the principles of collegial administrative theory, which calls for some participation in the decision process by all organizational elements significantly affected by a potential decision. Consequently, it seems warranted to recommend that no governance activities, decisions on educational or operational matters affecting the state community college system as a whole or the colleges within the system, be exercised at the state level in the absence of reasonably comprehensive college-level input.

State-level decision making with the provision for such full institutional input basically constituted the definition of the second level in the questionnaires, primarily at the state agency/board level. The chief executives placed four governance activities at this level. (The number with a governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.)

1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state.
3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district.
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions.

Little controversy surrounds these recommendations; the placements agree with, in general, opinions in the literature and also with the principles of collegial theory.

52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/ implement compliance.

The consensus placement of this governance activity again agreed with that theorized on the basis of collegial theory; however, it should be noted that slightly less than a plurality of college chief executives agreed with it, with a greater number suggesting it be exercised with shared authority (the next lower level). None of the reviewed writings directly commented on this activity, and the few vague references to it provided no clear clue concerning its proper placement. Nonetheless, the activity seems one that is clearly a system-wide concern falling within the basic coordinating role envisioned by the legislative creators of state boards and agencies, and the placement here seems warranted.

The third level in the questionnaires, with shared authority, provided that, for a particular governance activity, final decisions could be made at either the state or college level, depending upon the particular decision, or that recommendations to a superordinate educational or governmental element would be made by both levels in the state system. In Chapter Four, it was suggested that virtually no governance activities could be exercised at this level because it denied, in most cases, the assignment of final authority to either level; and this denial is clearly a violation of traditional bureaucratic principles and generally fails to accord with collegial principles as well, where many theorists agree that group decisions

are still subject to veto, and thus final authority, by the group superordinate. Nonetheless, four governance activities were placed at this level by the chief executives on the Delphi panel.

10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.

This governance activity appears to represent clearly the problem discussed above concerning placements at this level. It would seem evident that the power to "approve" must ultimately reside either with the state agency/board or with the colleges. Perhaps the panelists were suggesting that colleges or districts concerned would initiate and formulate such agreements, with the state agency disapproving or approving them but never dictating their terms. If this were the case, in this study it was intended that such a relationship would be included within the previous level, primarily at the state agency/board level. On the other hand, in Chapter Four it was theorized that collegial principles would call for this activity to be exercised at the next lower level, primarily at the college level, giving the colleges and districts free rein to enter such agreements within the restraints of fairly detailed state-level procedures and guidelines. The literature was of no help here, for it contained no clear references to this activity. Overall, it is concluded that the intentions of the chief executives regarding this governance activity were unclear; accordingly, this nonissue placement is not presented here as a recommendation for practice.

Fortunately, the panel intentions regarding the other nonissues at this level could be interpreted more easily.

25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

Here the chief executives clearly seemed to be saying that both the state agency/board and the individual colleges should be involved in defending and advocating their respective budget requests before elements of state government; however, it should be noted that a plurality (by one only) of state-level chief executives believed this activity should be exercised primarily at the state level. That group agreed with the placement theorized on the basis of collegial principles. On the other hand, the literature is divided on this activity, with some (Hall, C. W., 1968; Harclerod, 1975; Balderston, 1971) stating or implying that it is primarily a state-level function and others (Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971; Goodall, 1974) agreeing with the panel that it should be shared. In any case, the recommendation of the Delphi panel was that it be exercised with shared authority.

53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.

This placement by the panelists agrees with that theorized from the tenets of collegial theory and points out that both levels in a state system have an important role in this activity. As often stressed in the literature, the state agency/board must actively present the community college message throughout the state and before state-level and state-wide groups and organizations; likewise, the individual college or district must do so within its own service area.

55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.

The literature on state-wide coordination emphasized the major importance of a state agency's/board's evaluating the overall success of a college's operations in order to meet its responsibility for system accountability and to reinforce its master-planning function, and perhaps with this idea in mind, the theorized collegial placement of this activity was at the primarily-state level. Nonetheless, the chief executives recommended that this activity be exercised with shared authority. Their probable intentions in doing so are likely wise; they seem to be suggesting the obvious fact that both levels must be aggressively involved in evaluation, each carrying out this function in terms of the objectives primarily set forth at their respective levels. A corollary to this principle, and one that clearly follows from collegial theory, is that each level should jointly develop and coordinate their evaluation procedures with the other so that the processes will dovetail efficiently. This idea too seems implicit in the panel's placement of this activity; therefore, their recommendation appears to be a good one.

The fourth level on the questionnaires, primarily at the local community college/board level, provides for final decisions to be made at the college level with due consideration of state-level recommendations or within detailed state-level guidelines. The chief executives placed three nonissues at this level.

2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multicollge district.

With this placement, the panelists seemed to be saying that the state agency/board has a considerable role in college master planning but that final authority for the plan resides with the college concerned. Their placement agreed with that theorized from collegial principles; likewise, it was generally supported by the opinions expressed in the literature. Those opinions often allowed for state-level review of the college plans, and such review is consistent with placement at this level; however, this placement would not provide for state-level approval power over these plans, as recommended by a few commentators, most strongly by Harclerod (1975).

28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.

As Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972) noted, this is an activity that those calling for increased institutional accountability and efficiency sometimes feel should be centralized; nonetheless, the literature, starting perhaps with Moos and Rourke (1959), was virtually unanimous in basically supporting this placement, and it seems equally justified by collegial theory. The panelists presumably felt that exercising the activity at this level would provide for institutional flexibility while allowing a state agency/board role sufficient to insure college efficiency.

31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.

Especially because of the large amounts of money involved, absolutely and relatively, control over capital expenditures has been increasingly centralized, even more than that over operating expenditures, as noted by Corson (1971), Gleazer (1973), and Halstead (1974).

Perhaps reflecting this concern, the comments in the literature had little unanimity in this area, though nearly all did reflect a belief that some state-level role, but not necessarily approval power, is appropriate in this area. On the other hand, the theorized collegial placement of this activity was at the solely-college level, largely because it is a college-specific decision. The state-level role, from this viewpoint, was felt to be properly exercised in strongly influencing the college's development of procedures to govern capital purchases (governance activity number 29). The placement recommended by the panel chief executives, then, appears to reflect both general ideas by calling for college-level decision making within detailed state agency/board guidelines. Indeed, since the monetary sums involved in these decisions do cause them to affect significantly overall system efficiency and since they will likely be made at the highest levels in the college, this recommended placement strays little from the tenets of collegial administrative theory.

The lowest level in the questionnaires, solely at the local community college/board level, described decision making as at the college level within, at most, broad state-level guidelines. In Chapter Four it was suggested that, on the basis of collegial theory, governance activities at this level would typically be ones affecting most directly subordinate elements in a particular college and having a diluted effect on overall system efficiency; accordingly, the role of college subordinates in decision making would be emphasized, and the state-level role would primarily be exercised through contributing to the college's development of procedures to guide such activities. Thus, the state agency/board role in the actual implementation of

the governance activity would be slight. The chief executives agreed on placing 23 governance activities at this level. In many cases, these placements were consistent with both the large majority of opinions expressed in the literature and the theorized collegial placements, if not necessarily with actual practices in the states. As a result, these recommendations are presented without comment except when some significant inconsistency does exist between the panel's placement and the placement theorized from collegial principles or implied by opinions in the literature.

5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college.

6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.

Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) recommended that a state-level board have approval power for both of the above governance activities, claiming that such power was a necessary extension of the master-planning and program-review functions they believed were central to the board's coordination of the system. Often citing their opinion, most other writers referring to these activities concurred with their recommendations. On the other hand, these activities' theorized collegial placements indicated they should be exercised at the college level but within detailed state-level guidelines or procedures. Nonetheless, by their placements, the chief executives went beyond either of the above ideas, basically implying that the colleges should have free rein in making these decisions

apparently subject only to general adherence to the system master plan.

14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.
15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.
16. Establish grading policies.
17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies.
21. Approve individual student admissions.

No source has suggested that this governance activity be exercised at other than the college level, but a number of experts (Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971; Carnegie Commission, 1973; Halstead, 1974) suggested that general admission standards should be developed (governance activity 20) at the state level, saying that doing so is a necessary extension of master planning. This idea thus may suggest that the approval of individual admissions might be exercised at the primarily-college level (within detailed state-level guidelines) vice at the solely-college level (within broad state-level guidelines). Likewise, with similar reasoning, it was theorized that collegial principles would place admission-standards development at the primarily-state level and admissions approval at the primarily-college level. Yet, the Delphi panelists assigned the approval of admissions to the solely-college level, therefore saying that the state-level role here should be in broad terms only.

27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.

Perhaps noteworthy here is that writers in the literature basically agreed with this placement, again and again decrying, with only

occasional qualifications, requirements that state-approved line-item budgets be strictly followed.

32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.

33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.

A slight plurality of state-level chief executives preferred that this activity be exercised at the primarily-college level, thus suggesting a somewhat greater state-level role in this college activity. Similarly, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) had recommended state-level review of such applications in cases where the projects would be extremely expensive or long-lived.

34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.

36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.

37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.

39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions.

40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.

On this activity, the state-level chief executives were equally divided regarding whether it should be exercised at the primarily-college or solely-college level. Disagreement in the literature with the panel's placement was isolated and indirect.

41. Award tenure and promotions.

42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.

43. Assign faculty duties by area and workload.

Two studies (Gleazer, 1973; The Task Force on Coordination, 1973) noted that legislatures were increasingly calling for more

state control over these last two governance activities, but professional opinion as represented by the literature and this study has opposed this idea.

45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.

46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.

47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege-district executive officer (president).

The study's theorized placement of this activity on the basis of collegial principles was at the primarily-college level, suggesting a stronger state influence, and Millet (1975) noted that state-level governing boards usually had this power. Nonetheless, the panel clearly indicated a belief that the state-level role in this area should be slight.

48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel.

50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees.

A slight majority of state-level chief executives believed this activity should be exercised at the primarily-college level; nevertheless, the panel placements of this and the preceding activity (number 48) were a clear rebuff to the notion of placing colleges under state personnel-procurement systems.

In conclusion, the chief executives on the Delphi panel basically agreed on the level in a state community college system at which a majority (34) of the 55 governance activities delineated in this study should be exercised. In doing so, they seemed to reveal, as reported in Chapter Four, an underlying belief in the administrative principles

posited by collegial theory. Likewise, they typically did not stray too far from the stated or implied recommendations existing in the literature on state-level coordination of higher education. Where they did differ from either the theory or the literature, they usually did so in favor of the institutions. Thus, the pattern of the consensus placements of the governance activities can be seen as reinforcing the principle of providing community colleges with fairly substantial autonomy. At the same time, the panelists certainly did not deny that a state-level role in coordinating the system was at times appropriate and thus presumably necessary. Yet, they seemed to have some difficulty in deciding what this role was. Reviewing the nonissue activities and their placements, one can see that the chief executives found it much easier to agree on what the state-level agency/board should not do than what it should do.

Nonetheless, these placements represent a uniquely concrete and detailed statement of professional opinion regarding the allocation of governance responsibilities in state systems of community colleges, a statement whose value is enhanced by its fundamental agreement with previous general recommendations and by its internal theoretical consistency. Consequently, with the exception of the placement for governance activity number 10, it is believed that these placements constitute a valuable contribution to guidelines for the operation of state community college systems and that they deserve the serious consideration of decision makers at the state-government and system levels.

### The Issues

As noted above, the chief executives on the Delphi panel failed to agree on the preferred level at which 21 of the 55 governance activities should be exercised in a state community college system, especially in terms of clearly delineating the proper role of the state-level agency/board for community colleges. Nonetheless, the results of this study--the opinions expressed by the panelists, the factors perhaps contributing to panel disagreement, and the implied relationship of administrative theory to state-system operation, along with the earlier recommendations set forth in the review of the literature--do seem to provide useful information about the potential resolution of the identified issues. Such implications are examined in this portion of the chapter.

The issues are examined in the order they appear in the Delphi questionnaires. A governance activity is first presented, followed by a discussion of the implications of the study regarding its possible placement in a state system. The data referred to regarding panel opinions for each issue are fully set forth in Table 4, presented in Chapter Four. Again, the number of each activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.

4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district.

Earlier it was noted that the panel chief executives agreed that authority over the establishment or disestablishment of colleges or districts should be exercised at the primarily-state level, while similar authority over service programs and academic administrative units should be exercised at the solely-college level. Here, on a

governance activity falling between those above in terms of its effect on overall system efficiency, the panelists could not reach consensus. A plurality (12) placed it at the primarily-college level; however, the responses of the state-level chief executives and of the community college chief executives differed significantly,  $U = 79$ ,  $p < .05$ . A plurality (7) of college chief executives placed it at the primarily-college level; a plurality (6) of state-level chief executives placed it at the primarily-state level. Clearly, the panelists felt that both the colleges and the state agency/board should have a good deal of influence in this activity, but they could not agree on where final decision-making authority should be exercised. A clear consensus on this question was evident in the literature; virtually everyone commenting on this issue recommended that the state agency/board have approval power (for example, Stuckman, 1969b; Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971; Carnegie Commission, 1973). On the other hand, it was theorized in Chapter Four that collegial principles would dictate placing the activity at the primarily-college level. From this viewpoint the activity directly affected only a single college or district, thus placing final authority within that unit, and the strong but indirect effect on system efficiency would be reflected by requiring the college decision to adhere to detailed state-level guidelines. Considering everything, one obviously finds that the placement of this governance activity is indeed an issue. Yet, it is equally apparent that only two real alternatives exist, placing it at either the primarily-state level or the primarily-college level. Therefore, wherever final authority is placed, both the colleges and the state

agency/board should have a significant role in the decision process.

7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.

Again, though the panelists agreed that authority over the establishment or disestablishment of service programs or academic administrative units should reside at the solely-college level, they could not agree on the placement of similar authority for instructional programs. A plurality (12) felt it should be exercised at the primarily-college level. Once more, however, the responses of chief executives at the state and at the college levels differed significantly,  $\underline{U} = 54.5$ ,  $\underline{p} < .02$ . A bare plurality of community college chief executives (7) placed it at the solely-college level; those at the state-level were equally divided (at 6 each) between the primarily-college and primarily-state levels. As they did for the preceding governance activity, the opinions expressed in the literature nearly all supported placing final authority over this activity at the state level (for example, Halstead, 1974; Holderman, 1975; Johnson, 1975), but the tone of that support was sometimes hesitant. For instance, J. L. Miller (1972, p. 243) described this power when placed at the state level as "somewhat useless" and at times responsible for intrasystem "warfare"; yet, he said it was perhaps a power required by the state agency/board in order to block new programs "'bootlegged' into the curriculum by an institution." Also as before, the theorized collegial placement of the activity did not coincide with that implied by the literature. For basically the same reasons as those set forth for the preceding activity, the theoretical

placement was at the primarily-college level. Unlike the preceding activity, however, the evidence here may suggest a resolution of this issue. One has seen that in the literature and among state-level chief executives the support for placing this activity at the state level was widespread but less than wholehearted. In contrast, college chief executives on the panel were adamant in their opposition to this placement, a plurality placing it at the solely-college level and not one placing it at the state levels. Likewise, collegial theory, which the placements of nonissue activities coincided with very closely, would apparently suggest it be exercised at the primarily-college level. Consequently, it is suggested that a viable compromise is placing this activity at the primarily-college level, thereby giving the colleges final authority over the fate of existing programs within limits set by detailed state-level guidelines.

8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.

Just as they could not agree on the placement of authority over the fate of existing instructional programs, the panelists also could not do so for new programs; however, the general tenor of opinions differed. Although the spread of responses from state-level chief executives and from college chief executives did vary significantly,  $\underline{U} = 78.5$ ,  $\underline{p} < .05$ , a plurality of both groups (7 each) believed the activity should be exercised with shared authority, and three college executives placed it at the primarily-state level. In the literature, support for placing the activity at the state level was virtually unanimous and, in this case, unwavering as well. On the other hand, the suggested placement of the activity according to collegial theory was again at the primarily-college level. One might then conclude

that--if literature stands on one side, theory stands on the other, and the panel tends to the middle--the middle, with shared authority, represents the obvious compromise. However, as explained in some detail in Chapter Four, it is believed here that the power to approve or authorize, even by the standards of collegial theory, cannot be shared in any pure sense. Hence, it is proposed that this governance activity must be exercised at either the primarily-state or the primarily-college level, but the evidence does not clearly favor one over the other. At the same time, both levels, college and state, obviously deserve a strong role in this area.

9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.

On this issue the panelists were almost equally divided between suggesting that it be exercised at the primarily-state level (15 panelists) and that it be exercised with shared authority (14 panelists). A majority (11) of state-level chief executives preferred the former while a majority (10) of college chief executives preferred the latter, although the overall distributions of the responses of the two groups were not significantly different,  $U = 98.5$ ,  $p > .10$ . In the literature, the opinions expressed on this topic typically implied that the state agency/board should assume a leadership role for this activity (for example, Martorana, 1968; Stuckman, 1969b; Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971). In fact, Cohen and Evans (1968) cited the need for such leadership as a major factor supporting the desirability of creating a state community college agency or board. Likewise, it was theorized that collegial administrative principles suggest placing this activity at the primarily-state level, primarily

because of its obvious system-wide nature. A review of these ideas, then, appeared to suggest that the state agency/board role in this activity should be primary. If one agrees, as suggested earlier, that approval authority cannot be shared, then the only remaining placement widely supported by the panelists is at the primarily-state level. Therefore, it is suggested that placing this activity at that level appears appropriate.

11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.

Substantial numbers of panelists supported placing this activity at each of the three middle levels--primarily at the state level, with shared authority, and primarily at the college level--with a plurality (12) favoring the first. A plurality (7) of state-level chief executives also favored placing the activity at the primarily-state level, while the college chief executives were split (5 each) between feeling that it should be exercised primarily at the state level or with shared authority. Again, if one accepts the notion that approval power cannot truly be shared, then the apparent alternatives are placing the activity at the primarily-state or the primarily-college level. Either placement, of course, acknowledges that both levels in the system deserve a strong role in carrying out the activity. The comments in the literature provided no clear guidance in this case. Some writers seemed to imply the need for a strong state agency/board role. For example, Cohen and Evans (1968) noted that one responsibility of a state agency is "coordination to achieve minimum levels of quality . . . in all areas of the state" (p. 32). Making sure that the same degree from different elements in the system

generally represented similar achievement would perhaps be an inherent part of this responsibility. On the other hand, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) stated that the state-level board should stay out of the planning of programs. The key factor here may be what constitutes general minimum requirements. On the assumption that these would indeed be general, it was proposed that collegial theory would call for this activity to be exercised at the primarily-state level, since the impact would be system-wide. Overall, the recommendation here is that this governance activity should be exercised at either the primarily-state level or the primarily-college level, recognizing that in either case both elements in the system, the state agency/board and the colleges, would be provided the significant role necessary. However, it is further suggested that placing the activity at the primarily-state level be given serious consideration as long as the nature of the approved program requirements do remain general and minimum.

12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.).

This governance activity, of course, deals with the planning of specific programs rather than the development of basic guidelines for broad groups of programs as addressed by the preceding activity. Consequently, as one would expect, the panelists, though not reaching consensus, did express opinions generally at variance with those expressed above. Thus a plurality (15) of chief executives--including a majority (11) of those at the state level--felt that the activity should be exercised at the primarily-college level. College chief

executives as a group were more divided; roughly equal numbers believed it should be exercised with shared authority, primarily at the college level, and solely at the college level, with a plurality (6) favoring the latter. In the literature, the writers that directly touched on this topic (Stuckman, 1969b; Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971; Halstead, 1974) clearly contended that the design of specific programs was a function of the colleges, and nothing elsewhere directly or indirectly disputed this idea. Likewise, this study's theoretical collegial placement of the activity was at the solely-college level, on the grounds that decisions in this area most directly affected and therefore were largely the responsibility of subordinate elements within a college. All the evidence, then, appears to point to placing this activity at the college level, but whether it should be at the primarily- or solely-college level is not immediately obvious. The answer to that question seems linked to a system's placement of the preceding governance activity. If the approval of general program requirements is exercised at the primarily-state level, then perhaps the approval of specific program requirements falls at the primarily-college level. If, on the other hand, the approval of general requirements is at the primarily-college level, it clearly seems that the approval of specific requirements would become a solely-college activity.

13. Approve new courses.

This governance activity seems even more limited in its potential extracollege impact than the previous two; nonetheless, the panelists again failed to reach agreement regarding its preferred placement in a state community college system. While a plurality (14) felt that

the activity should be placed at the solely-college level, the opinions expressed by state-level chief executives and college chief executives differed significantly,  $U = 74$ ,  $p < .05$ . A majority (10) of college chief executives preferred the activity be placed at the solely-college level, but equal pluralities (6 apiece) of state-level chief executives recommended that it be exercised with shared authority or at the primarily-college level. As for the previous governance activity, the relevant statements in the literature concurred that this activity should be exercised at the college level. For example, Johnson (1975), who strongly supported the state agency's/board's power to determine the programs offered by a college, stated that the board "should allow decisions about individual courses and course content to stay at the institutional level" (p. 46). Similarly, it was proposed that collegial theory would call for placing this activity at the solely-college level. Reviewing these ideas, one can clearly conclude that they suggest new-course approval should be a college function; however, the degree that the state agency/board should influence that decision is not readily apparent. The answer to that question may be linked to the answer a state system has for the same question regarding the preceding governance activity. Thus, if college decisions on specific program requirements must follow detailed state-level guidelines (as called for by a primarily-college level placement), then it necessarily seems that new-course approval must do the same. Likewise, relative college autonomy over programs would seem to imply the same for course development.

18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).

On this issue, nearly a majority (16) of the panelists believed it should be exercised with shared authority, with equal numbers of state-level and college-level chief executives agreeing to this placement. Nonetheless, this fairly strong appearance of agreement is misleading for two reasons. First, looking beyond this middle, one finds that the two types of chief executives, state-level and college, actually disagreed significantly,  $U = 70$ ,  $p < .02$ . All but one of the remaining state-level chief executives felt the activity should be placed at the primarily-state level; all but two of the remaining college chief executives preferred it be placed at a college level. Second, as has been stated several times previously, it is contended in this study that, with few exceptions, the authority to approve cannot be shared; therefore, it is proposed that this activity cannot be exercised with shared authority. On the other hand, it does seem clear that the panel as a whole did indicate a belief that both levels in a state community college system, the state agency/board and the colleges, do deserve a significant role in this activity as would be provided by placing it at either the primarily-state or the primarily-college level. The question of which of these two alternatives is more appropriate is rarely addressed in the literature, but the few comments made seemed to favor the state-level placement. For instance, the Carnegie Commission (1973) stated that the development of "policies on size and rate of growth of campuses" (p. 27) was primarily a function of public agencies, including the state agency/board. In contrast, the theoretical

collegial placement for the activity proposed in this study was at the primarily-college level. In conclusion, no clear recommendation regarding the placement of this activity can be derived from the panel responses, the literature, and collegial theory. Yet, these same sources do seem to indicate that the activity should be exercised at either the primarily-state or primarily-college level, giving in either case both major elements in a system significant influence.

19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.

This governance activity is related to the one above but provides for more direct impact upon a college's operation. Perhaps reflecting this idea, the panelists tended to prefer a college-level placement for this activity, with a plurality of 16, again divided equally between state-level and college chief executives, stating that it be exercised at the primarily-college level. Once more, however, the overall distributions of the responses of the two groups varied significantly,  $\underline{U} = 71$ ,  $\underline{p} = .02$ : Virtually all the state-level chief executives supported the above level or one higher in a system; nearly all the college chief executives did the opposite. Nevertheless, the panelists did agree to an extent in that only three preferred a state-level placement. Comments on this activity in the literature were extremely limited and somewhat contradictory. Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) implied that the state agency/board should have a significant and perhaps deciding role in this area, while the Carnegie Commission (1973) implied that the colleges should have the greater power. And collegial theory, it was proposed in Chapter Four, suggests that this activity be exercised at the

solely-college level since its effects are primarily felt within the college. Obviously, then, differing viewpoints regarding the placement of this activity exist. At the same time, however, there is no strong and clear support for placing it at the state level: therefore, again on the assumption that approval power cannot be shared, placing the activity at a college level appears definitely justified. Whether college decision making within this activity should be subject to strong or limited state-level influence is not clearly indicated, however, by the evidence.

20. Develop general admission standards.

For the discussion of this issue, it seems useful to look at the literature and theory first. The comments in the literature clearly supported the notion that the state agency/board should have a strong role in determining the basic admissions standards for each of the various types of postsecondary institutions in a state, a conclusion also reached by Halstead (1974), who said that this power was an essential extension of the master-planning function. At the same time, it must be noted that invariably these sources (for example, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971; Carnegie Commission, 1973; Heilbron, 1973) were talking in terms of state-wide coordination of higher education generally rather than focusing specifically on community college systems. Nevertheless, it seems warranted to suggest that their recommendations would equally imply that a state-level board for community colleges would, for example, ultimately have the authority to call upon the colleges to be open-admissions institutions. Likewise and for similar reasons, it was proposed that collegial theory would provide for this activity being exercised at the

primarily-state level. On the other hand, very few panelists supported a state-level placement of this activity. A plurality (11) believed it should be exercised with shared authority, and nearly equal numbers preferred it be placed at the primarily-college level and at the solely-college level. In addition, the opinions of the two groups of chief executives, state-level and college, did not vary significantly,  $U = 82$ ,  $p < .10$ . In all, one can indeed say that the placement of this governance activity constitutes a controversy, with the literature and collegial theory apparently suggesting that it be exercised at the primarily-state level and the panelists clearly disagreeing. Yet, the controversy may not be as great as it first appears. With nearly three-quarters of the panel chief executives feeling the activity should be placed at the primarily-college level or higher, they did seem to indicate that a significant but not decisive state role was appropriate. If one again assumes that the state agency/board and the colleges cannot, in a pure sense, share the authority for developing general admission standards, then placing this activity at the primarily-college level may be a reasonably accurate reflection of the general attitude of the panelists. Such a placement seems especially logical when one considers that the panelists did agree that approving individual student admissions (governance activity 21) should be a solely-college activity, thus being exercised within only broad state-level guidelines. These various factors, then, do appear to justify recommending that this activity be placed at the primarily-college level; but in contemplating such a placement, a system must consider the apparent calls for a stronger state role expressed in the literature.

22. Set student tuition and fee charges.

On this topic, a plurality (14) of the panelists believed the activity should be exercised at the primarily-college level; likewise, pluralities of state-level chief executives (6) and college chief executives (8) agreed on this level. On the other hand, the overall distributions of these two groups of panelists did differ significantly,  $\underline{U} = 80$ ,  $\underline{p} < .05$ ; and panel responses ranged over all five levels, clearly labeling the placement of this activity as an issue. No direct recommendations regarding this activity existed in the literature, but several sources (for example, Glenny & Hurst, 1971; Singer & Grande, 1971; Halstead, 1974) noted that coordinating boards as well as state-level governing boards often play a deciding role in setting tuition and fees. Of these sources, only Singer and Grande voiced any objection to this role; the others, therefore, apparently condoned it. In contrast, in terms of the principles of collegial theory, it was proposed that the activity would be placed at the primarily-college level; however, it was also suggested that placing it at the primarily-state level might also be justified by the theory in the case of a fully state-funded system. Perhaps the wide variety of panel responses reflected this dichotomy. Overall, the evidence does appear to support the idea that two possible placements are most viable, at the primarily-state level and at the primarily-college level, each recognizing that both levels in a system deserve an important role in decisions on tuition and fees. The final decision on the placement of this activity within a particular state community college system would then presumably be largely governed by the fiscal support pattern of that system. At the same time,

however, the rather strong panel support for placing this activity at the primarily-college level does suggest that even in fully state-funded systems serious consideration be given to limiting the state agency/board role to setting boundaries within which the colleges can make tuition and/or fee decisions. Under these conditions, the institutions and their boards would be able to determine the level appropriate for their constituencies--whether, for example, the citizens in their service area desire an enriched program at higher cost or need and want the best education at the lowest possible cost. That the answers might vary among predominantly urban, suburban, and rural districts seems a reasonable assumption. Concurrently, the state-level guidelines should insure acceptably equal educational opportunity throughout the state. Finally, then, it seemed apparent that the placement of this activity must provide both the state agency/board and the colleges significant influence over the decision; accordingly, the alternatives are the primarily-state level and the primarily-college level. For this activity, more than most, perhaps the ultimate choice will depend less on the concepts of administrative theory than on social; moral and philosophical; and thus, in a democracy, political concerns.

23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

Budgeting is obviously a central concern in the operation of any large organization; therefore, in light of the significance of this governance activity, it is perhaps not surprising that the chief executives on the panel did not reach agreement on its placement.

They did, however, clearly indicate that both the state agency/board and the colleges in a state system deserve a strong role in the decision-making process. A plurality (15) of the panelists felt the activity should be exercised with shared authority, and substantial numbers supported placing it at the primarily-state level (8) and at the primarily-college level (9). Only one chief executive did not agree with one of these three placements. A majority (10) of college chief executives favored the middle placement while a plurality (7) of the state-level chief executives favored the state-level alternative, but the overall distributions of the two groups were not significantly different,  $\chi^2 = 87.5$ ,  $p < .10$ . Clearly, the panelists felt that only these three placements were viable.

It seems useful to clarify the probable implications of each. Placing this activity at the primarily-state level suggests a process in which the state agency/board reviews the budgets proposed by the colleges and then, in close consultation with the colleges, develops the consolidated budget or the budgets to be submitted upward. Exercising this activity with shared authority suggests a process in which the state agency/board reviews the budgets proposed by the colleges and then, in close consultation with the colleges, develops its own recommended consolidated budget or institutional budgets; then its recommendation and the colleges' recommendations, perhaps revised if they wish, are sent upward. Placing the activity at the primarily-college level suggests that the state agency/board reviews the budgets proposed by the colleges and recommends to the colleges desirable changes based upon its state-wide perspective; but only the colleges' proposals, revised as they deem warranted, would be

submitted upward. At this point, the state-agency/board role presumably would be limited to responding to questions from above or perhaps submitting a position paper vice a comprehensive budget recommendation.

References to this topic, as one might imagine, abounded in the literature, but they presented no clear picture. The writers unanimously supported the concept of state-level review of proposed institutional budgets; however, review is a part of all three above alternatives, and the impact that this review should have was not universally agreed upon. The Task Force on Coordination (1973) of the Education Commission of the States, Heilbron (1973), and Harclerod (1975), for example, implied that the state agency/board should have a decisive role. On the other hand, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) and Halstead (1974) tended to support shared authority. Significantly, virtually no support for the truncated state-agency/board role implied by a primarily-college level placement was evident in writings published in the last ten years. The theorized placement of the activity on the basis of collegial principles emphasized the role of the state agency/board even more than the literature; the activity was placed at the primarily-state level largely because of the direct effect of institutional budgets on overall system efficiency.

Overall, the contributions of the literature and collegial theory imply that exercising the activity at the primarily-state level and exercising it with shared authority are the two most promising alternatives. The case for placement at the primarily-college level is further weakened when one remembers that a majority

of college chief executives favored the shared-authority level. Similarly, the fact that only one college chief executive preferred a state-level placement for the activity, in contrast to a more balanced distribution of opinions from state-level chief executives, could suggest that exercising this activity with shared authority could be an effective compromise that satisfies college concerns without unduly weakening the role of the state agency/board. The relative appropriateness of such a placement is further reinforced by the fact that the panel did agree that the state agency/board and the colleges should share responsibility for defending budget requests before a superordinate board and/or elements of the state government (governance activity 25).

24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

Generally, the considerations presented regarding the preceding activity hold true for this activity as well and therefore are not repeated. For two reasons, however, the final conclusion to be drawn regarding the most appropriate placement of this governance activity is somewhat different. First, the split between the opinions of state-level and or college chief executives was more pronounced, even though the overall distributions did not vary significantly,  $\underline{U} = 88$ ,  $\underline{p} < .10$ : A majority (9) of state-level chief executives preferred placing the activity at the primarily-state level while a majority (10) of college chief executives favored the shared-authority level. Second, the support in the literature for a decisive state-level role was stronger. As a result, the evidence suggests that

placing this activity at the primarily-state level and placing it at the shared-authority level are both alternatives appropriate for consideration by a system.

29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.

This governance activity is, of course, related to the one above and to activity number 31 about the actual approval of such projects, which the panelists agreed should be exercised at the primarily-college level. On this activity a plurality (13) of chief executives also preferred that level, but substantial numbers felt that it should be exercised with shared authority (11) or at the primarily-state level (9). Disagreement was not significantly related to chief-executive role level,  $\underline{U} = 90$ ,  $\underline{p} > .10$ . Since all the responses fell within these three levels, the panelists clearly believed that both the state agency/board and the colleges deserved a significant role in this activity. The literature contained virtually no direct recommendations in this area, though Halstead (1974) and Glenny (1972) both noted, without objection, that state agencies/boards often assume the major role in this activity. On the other hand, it was proposed, on the belief that the larger impact of this activity is on the colleges, that collegial theory would call for it being exercised at the primarily-college level. Therefore, the evidence is not particularly conclusive; however, if one assumes that the colleges and the state agency/board cannot both establish procedures and standards and that therefore the authority cannot truly be shared, it does appear that the appropriate choices regarding

the placement of this activity are limited to the primarily-state level and the primarily-college level.

30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.

Although each of the five possible levels was supported by at least one panelist, the vast majority of chief executives indicated that this activity should be exercised at the college level, with a plurality (15) preferring the solely-college level. A majority (9) of the college chief executives also supported that level while a slight plurality (8) of state-level chief executives favored the primarily-college level, but overall the differences between the opinions of the two groups were not significant,  $\underline{u} = 112.5$ ,  $\underline{p} > .10$ . Likewise, previous writers appeared to support the placement of this activity at the college level, with their consistent opposition (for example, Morrissey, 1967; Carnegie Commission, 1973) to state-level preaudit of institutional expenditures. In addition, the theoretical collegial placement of the activity was at the solely-college level, on the presumption that college-level subordinates would be those most affected by decisions in this area. The evidence, therefore, clearly suggests that this governance activity should be placed at either the primarily-college or the solely-college level, calling for college decision making on the basis of either detailed or broad state-level guidelines. However, the panel agreed that the establishment of procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services (governance activity number 28) should come at the primarily-college level; under these conditions, it seems to follow that the detailed guidelines for decisions within this governance

activity, the approval of such purchases, would emanate from the college and that, accordingly, the state-level influence would necessarily be limited to that of broad guidelines. The implication, then, is that the placement of this activity most congruent with the panel's consensus placement of the related governance activity is at the solely-college level. Consequently, it is suggested that approval power for purchases of equipment and services be exercised at the college level and preferably at the solely-college level.

35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs.

For this activity, the great majority of panel chief executives agreed that it should be exercised at the college level, a plurality (15) placing it at the solely-college level and almost as many (14) doing so at the primarily-college level. The differences in the opinions of state-level and of college chief executives were insignificant,  $U = 127$ ,  $p > .10$ . The few references to this topic in the literature, however, disagreed with the panel's ideas. In 1971, stating that it was an important means of implementing master plans, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge explicitly recommended that this activity be carried out by the state agency/board in consultation with the colleges, clearly therefore placing it at the primarily-state level. Later references (Halstead, 1974; Johnson, 1975; Millett, 1975) to this activity merely repeated or directly cited the recommendation of Glenny et al. Similarly, it was proposed that the tenets of collegial theory provided for the activity being exercised at the primarily-state level, on the grounds that it represented the

use of state resources to achieve state-wide, versus college, objectives. Obviously, then, the evidence in this study is contradictory and points toward no conclusion regarding the proper placement of this activity other than indicating it should not be exercised at the solely-state level.

38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages.

As for the preceding two activities, the chief executives again were nearly unanimous in preferring that this activity be placed at one of the two college levels. A plurality (15), including a majority (11) of the state-level chief executives, favored the primarily-college level; nearly the same number (14) favored the solely-college level, including a majority (10) of college chief executives. On the other hand, those writing on this topic appeared to prefer a somewhat stronger role for the state agency/board. For example, the Carnegie Commission (1973) stated that state agencies/boards should basically control the "general level of salaries" (p. 26). Likewise, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) approved of state-level salary guidelines. In contrast, however, Halstead (1974) implied that the only state-level role in salaries should come in the form of lump-sum state allocations in this area. Therefore, while the commentators did approve of state influence in this area, neither the extent nor the form of that influence was clearly stated. In the belief that this activity most affected the individual colleges but that it was also a legitimate state concern, it was theorized that collegial principles would call for it being exercised at the primarily-college level. Overall, the case for placing this activity at the primarily-college

level, thus providing for a limited but significant role for the state agency/board, looks good. Nonetheless, even the solely-college level allows for some state-level role, in the form of broad guidelines, and such a role may satisfy the intentions of the recommendations in the literature. It appears, therefore, that the evidence here suggests that this activity should be placed at one of the college levels, with the primarily-college level perhaps being the more appropriate of the two.

44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.

The panelists heavily agreed that this activity should be placed at a college level. A plurality (16) believed that it should be exercised at the primarily-college level, and a smaller though substantial number (13) favored the solely-college level. A majority (10) of state-level chief executives preferred the former while a majority (9) of those at the college level preferred the latter; however, the difference was not judged particularly significant,  $\bar{U} = 87.5$ ,  $\underline{p} < .10$ . In considering this activity, one must remember that regardless of state-level action, the colleges are subject to the guidelines of various accrediting agencies and organizations; the question here, then, becomes whether the state agency/board should also enter this area and, if so, to what degree. Heilbron (1973), Brossman (1974), and Millett (1975) pointed out that some states do so in varying degrees, but no one explicitly recommended that state-agency/board actions be comprehensive, detailed, and decisive. The Carnegie Commission (1973), for example, stated that the noninstitutional role should be limited to oversight of civil

rights concerns vice professional and academic standards. From the viewpoint of how collegial administrative theory suggests an organization should operate, it was proposed that the activity would be placed at the solely-college level, because of the feeling that the immediate superordinates, colleagues, and subordinates are those most directly affected by and knowledgeable regarding the standards for potential employees. The overall evidence of this study thus suggests that this governance activity should be exercised at the college level, but it does not point clearly to a more specific placement at either the primarily- or the solely-college level. At this point, perhaps one should be reminded that the panelists did agree that final hiring decisions regarding the college professional staff (governance activities 45, 46, and 47) should be made at the solely-college level.

49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.

One could easily argue that this activity is closely linked with number 38, which involved the approval of professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages. Consistent with that view, the pattern of the responses by the panel chief executives was largely similar in that the vast majority of the panelists placed the activity at one of the two college levels. A plurality (16), including a majority (10) of college chief executives, preferred that it be exercised at the solely-college level; a slightly smaller group (13), including a majority (9) of state-level chief executives, favored the primarily-college level. The difference between the response patterns of the two types of chief executives, however, was not found to be significant,  $U = 104$ ,  $p > .10$ . Though this topic

seems potentially important, few direct references to it existed in the literature on state coordination of postsecondary education; whether studies focusing purely on collective bargaining discuss its impact on state-system operation is not known. In virtually the only straightforward recommendation found, Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) stated that negotiations should take place at the college level within, if necessary, state agency/board guidelines and/or budgetary parameters. However, later Glenny (1972) noted that in state-funded systems collective bargaining could easily gravitate to the state level, and Richardson (1976) reiterated this view. The state-governed Minnesota community college system has provided an example of this fact (Helland, 1974). Thus, whether preference and practice can coincide in this area may be problematic. In any case, the theoretical collegial placement of the activity at the primarily-college level did concur with the opinion of Glenny et al. Therefore, the evidence in this study suggests that the preferred level at which professional-staff negotiations should occur is the college level; the state-level role should presumably be restricted to establishing only necessary guidelines. Yet, whether this preference can be implemented may be open to question and certainly will vary among the states.

51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.

A plurality (15) of panel chief executives recommended that this governance activity be exercised with shared authority, and just slightly fewer (13) favored the placement at the primarily-state level.

Since the remaining levels received only sparse support, one can apparently conclude that the chief executives felt that the state agency/board should carry out this responsibility and that the colleges should have a relatively influential role as well. The question becomes whether the colleges also have a right to appear formally before the elements of state government to express directly their views, as a shared-authority placement would imply. Just as one might expect, a majority (10) of college chief executives favored that idea while a plurality (8) of state-level chief executives preferred that direct representation be limited to the state agency/board; however, the differences in the overall responses of the two groups were not great enough to be significant,  $\underline{U} = 101.5$ ,  $\underline{p} > .10$ . The assessment in the literature was similar to but no more illuminating than the responses of the panel. Sources (for example, Hall, C. W., 1968; Stuckman, 1969b; Balderston, 1971; The Task Force on Coordination, 1973) directly commenting on this issue agreed that representing the system before governmental elements was a key role of a state agency/board, but they neither explicitly stated nor even clearly implied an opinion on whether the colleges should be allowed equal direct representation. Only McConnell (1962) stated that representation should be an exclusive role of the board/agency. However, the proposed placement of the activity on the basis of collegial theory, at the primarily-state level, did suggest that exclusiveness. Nonetheless, the overall evidence here, it is concluded, indicates only that the activity should be exercised at the primarily-state level or with shared authority. The later possibility, however, should perhaps receive especially serious consideration by a system

in light of the fact that the panelists did agree that both elements in a state community college system should have direct input into governmental action on budgetary requests.

54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards.

With only one exception, all the panelists felt this governance activity should be exercised either at the primarily-state level or with shared authority, with equal numbers (16 apiece) preferring each. However, the state-level chief executives and the college chief executives split significantly,  $U = 55.5$ ,  $p < .02$ , between those two; just over 75% (13) of the state-level chief executives favored the higher level, and exactly 75% (12) of the college chief executives favored the shared-authority level. The overall recommendation in the literature appeared to be that the activity should be exercised at the primarily-state level. Starting with McConnell in 1962, numerous writers clearly stated the necessity of a state agency/board having access to and obtaining information on the institutions in a state system so that it could effectively carry out its master-planning role. Stating what others had implied, Berdahl (1971) said the such agencies and boards should be the ones to decide what information they needed and to define the forms in which that information should be reported. Stuckman and Wattenbarger (1971) likewise agreed to the need for a clearly organized data system, but they emphasized that the system should be developed jointly with the colleges. In a study specifically on this topic, Toole and Hoffner (1974) reported the difficulties the data-reporting

task causes institutions; nonetheless, they too agreed the task was necessary and, among other things, recommended that system procedures be further unified but done so in continual consultation with the primary reporters, the institutions. The conclusion readily evident from all the comments was that final authority regarding data reporting should lie at the state level but that this authority should be exercised only in the light of extensive consultation with the colleges, thus virtually defining the primarily-state level. Similarly, it was theorized that collegial administrative principles would also call for the placement of this activity at the primarily state level, on the grounds that it clearly affects both the colleges and the state agency/board but that the latter is affected most directly. Therefore, both the literature and theory seem to support the state-level alternative over the shared-authority level. Further, if one agrees that this activity is one for which final authority must be assigned, then exercising the activity with shared authority would be appropriate only if the activity were perceived to be referring to both internal college procedures and system procedures. Under those conditions, it is agreed that the shared-authority placement is valid. If, however, one considers the activity to be addressed only to the system-wide data reporting process, as intended in the study, then it seems necessary to recommend that the activity be exercised at the primarily-state level.

The governance activity above is the last of those for which the Delphi panel could not reach consensus regarding its preferred placement in a state community college system. In this study these

governance activities were described as issues; nevertheless, it has been seen that the evidence gathered together in this study can aid in determining appropriate levels at which to place these issue activities. Thus, through an examination of the opinions of the panel chief executives, the recommendations of earlier writers, and the implications of collegial administrative theory, in most cases, the boundaries within which resolution of the issues can take place have been narrowed. Typically, it has been possible to reduce the viable alternative placements to two; and in a few instances a single, specific placement level has followed logically from the available information. Overall, it is felt these discussions and suggestions concerning the issue governance activities, along with the presentation and discussion of the panel's consensus placements of the nonissue activities, represent a relatively comprehensive, detailed, concrete, and thus useful addition to existing guidelines regarding the effective allocation of governance powers and responsibilities within a state system of community colleges.

CHAPTER SIX  
A REVIEW OF THE STUDY,  
ITS CONCLUSIONS, AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This chapter contains a summary of the study and a brief discussion of its general implications for state coordination of community college systems and for future research in this area. First, the material in the preceding chapters is quickly reviewed, ending with a summary of the study's specific results and their implications, as described in Chapter Five, for the allocation of governance powers in state community college systems. Next, broader implications of the study for state coordination of these systems are presented, and finally suggestions for further research in this field are discussed.

Summary of the Study

The Context of the Study

Stated most simply, the topic of this study was the allocation of governance or decision-making responsibilities between the basic elements, the state agency/board and the colleges, in state systems of community colleges. This topic became one of importance with the creation by state governments, largely during the past three decades, of structures and procedures to coordinate the operations of institutions of postsecondary education within their borders. Chapter One contained an examination of the reasons behind the development of these

coordinating elements and the controversial impact they have had upon the institutions. It was seen that the initial impetus for these actions by the state governments was the rapid growth in the demand for postsecondary education beginning after World War II and rapidly escalating until the 1970's. This growth forced the establishment of more and more colleges and universities and the phenomenal expansion of these new schools and those already existing. Obviously this increase in the size and number of institutions required an increase in the states' financial support of postsecondary education. This growth in state expenditures was further exacerbated by additional costs demanded by the rising sophistication of the knowledge that these institutions were called upon to create and to impart. Consequently, the proportion of public budgets allocated to these institutions grew significantly. At the same time, the general public's awareness of postsecondary education was also growing. More people were being directly affected by it; furthermore, more people desired to be affected by it.

The result of these conditions was that state governments no longer felt that the institutions could be left to operate as they saw fit. Rather, the governments realized that the provision of postsecondary education opportunities for the citizens was now a major and costly responsibility that required expert direction if it were to be carried out effectively and efficiently. Coordination of the colleges and universities by a specially constituted agency or board was increasingly seen as the answer to this need for direction. At this point, according to McConnell (1962), the fundamental objectives of state coordination were to plan this growth so that it would respond to diverse educational

needs of a state's citizens and do so in a fiscally sound manner. Since that time the need for coordination has continued unabated, but the reasons for it have shifted somewhat. In the 1970's the demand for higher education began to decline because of a drop in the traditional college-age population. At the same time, other demands for public monies were growing apace. Now it became the task of state coordination to insure that any growth in postsecondary education was justified and that contractions occurred where called for. Furthermore, state governments tended to see this slowed growth as an opportunity to streamline the system in order to save even more money for use in carrying on other activities demanded by the public. Consequently, the pressure on state coordinating elements to perform as desired in these areas increased with a slowing of growth in postsecondary education. And in many cases, this pressure has caused state governments to expand the power of these agencies and boards in hopes that their effectiveness can be increased.

As one might expect, the institutions have not responded to these actions without complaint. The increase in external control over their operations produced numerous claims that their autonomy was being seriously eroded, resulting in an inability to fulfill their functions in the manner they believed best. The result, then, was the emergence of a controversy over the validity of competing claims that, on the one hand, the institutions had to be aggressively coordinated if they, as a group, were to be educationally effective and fiscally efficient and that, on the other hand, the institutions needed considerable autonomy if they were also to be, as individual entities, effective and efficient. These seemingly contradictory contentions were reviewed in Chapter One, and it was concluded that both were fundamentally legitimate. The need for

state-level coordination of postsecondary education appeared unassailable; likewise, it was apparent that the institutions required a degree of autonomy if they were to fulfill capably their objectives. The problem therefore was to identify a division of powers between these elements that responded to and balanced the needs of both.

All of these currents affected the community college segment of postsecondary education as well, except that the effects may have been more pronounced. Thus these colleges began this era as a relatively insignificant part of the whole, typically locally governed with little oversight by any state-level agency. During this era they grew to become a major and highly visible segment of most states' postsecondary education establishment, and accordingly, they have likewise come under the purview of state-level structures and procedures to coordinate their activities. At the same time, however, their innate local orientation has necessarily remained, and this orientation perhaps underlines the necessity for these colleges to maintain a degree of institutional autonomy if they are to retain the ability to respond to educational demands that, often being local rather than state-wide in nature, are more likely to be unique and shifting than those made upon institutions with regional or state-wide constituencies. Consequently, the issue of state coordination versus college autonomy is perhaps especially acute in state community college systems. Gleazer (1973) summarized the problem, saying, "Clearly there is need for overview, coordination, and rational decision making at the state level. At the same time there is need for local involvement and for decision making at the local level. The problem is to combine the best of these ideas" (p. 153).

Finding this ideal combination was not the purpose of this study; however, it was its purpose to contribute information that would aid in

this ultimate task, the task of determining what governance powers should be assumed by state agencies or boards for community college systems, what governance powers should be exercised by the colleges, and to what degree these two elements in state systems should work together in carrying out these powers. Chapter Three contained a review of much of the work that had been done in these areas, especially existing recommendations regarding the allocation of governance powers both in state higher-education systems in general and in state community college systems in particular. The literature in both areas is extensive, yet it falls short of identifying that ideal combination.

In the discussions dealing with higher education generally, a good deal of agreement among the recommendations of the various authors was found. In addition, some of the guidelines presented were fairly comprehensive, providing recommendations on the desirable allocation of decision-making responsibilities in a large proportion of the presumably significant areas; the most notable of these guidelines were those set forth by Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) and the Carnegie Commission (1973). Indeed, the relative unanimity among the authors and comprehensiveness of the available recommendations seemed a bit surprising in light of the continuing controversy that exists, as revealed in Chapter One, over governance-power allocation. However, two basic omissions in the available guidelines perhaps contribute to this situation. First, the recommendations were typically, upon close examination, rather vague; specifically, the exact nature of the power that a state agency or a college might wield over decision making in a particular area was not, in many cases, clearly delineated, especially in terms of what influence the

other level might have on that decision. Therefore, the recommendations often left a good deal of room for questions regarding how they might actually be applied. The second omission was in the justifications given for the recommendations. In many cases the justifications were just broadly worded statements of principle or assertions backed up by the experience of the author. Notably lacking were recommendations specifically derived from a theory of administration. The only significant exception to this situation was an article by Harclerod (1975). He suggested that state systems could profit from the experiences of large business organizations that had adopted a decentralized administrative structure, and he to a degree tied this structure to general organizational theory. Nonetheless, his resulting recommendations were neither particularly concrete nor as comprehensive as some of the other sets of guidelines. Overall, the commentaries reviewed on the allocation of governance responsibilities in general state postsecondary education systems provided a good deal of information and tended to agree in a number of areas, but they lacked a concreteness and a strong justifying foundation that would seem valuable in enhancing their impact on actual practice.

The literature focusing specifically on state systems for community colleges was also extensive, but it had the same general weaknesses as that on general higher-education systems. Thus, the recommendations presented were usually rather broadly stated, and the support behind them was insufficient to provide as strong a foundation for the ideas as desirable. Again the opinions expressed were rarely tied to general administrative theory. One major exception was a discussion by Stuckman (1969b). His study examined the implications of collegial administrative

theory on the operations of state community college systems. On the basis of that examination, he recommended, with solid theoretical support, structures and procedures for state-level decision making that would provide for the strong institutional input that collegial principles would presumably call for. However, his recommendations regarding the specific division of governance powers between the state agency or board and the colleges it serves, while valuable, were not particularly comprehensive or concrete. Indeed, no single set of guidelines for the allocation of governance responsibilities in a state community college system existed that approached being as complete in its coverage as the best of those available for general postsecondary education systems. Clearly, then, a more comprehensive and detailed study in this area seemed warranted.

#### The Purpose and Procedures of the Study

It was the purpose of this study, therefore, to attempt to help fill the apparent voids noted in the literature by first identifying, more comprehensively and in greater detail than done previously, the issues and nonissues in the division of governance power between state-level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual colleges (and their local boards) and then investigating the relationship of two factors to the existence of the issues and the relationship of general administrative theory to the nonissues. In order to do so, it was proposed, as described in Chapter Two, to develop a list of specific governance decisions that typically must be made at some level in a state system of community colleges and then to question, using the Delphi technique, a sample of chief executives of staffs serving state-level community college boards and of chief executives of community colleges

regarding the level in the system at which they believed each of the various decisions should be made. Issues and nonissues would be identified by inspecting their responses. In addition, the responses for identified issues would be analyzed to see if the level at which the chief executives worked and the type of system governance structure in which they worked appeared to be factors contributing to disagreement among the chief executives concerning the level at which the decisions should be made. Finally, the decision-making levels the chief executives had agreed upon would be analyzed to see if those levels seemed to follow the general principles of bureaucratic administrative theory, collegial administrative theory, or neither theory. Thus, it was hoped that the study would provide those studying or concerned with the allocation of governance powers in state community college systems information especially useful because of its comprehensiveness, its concreteness, and its relationship to theory.

As described in Chapter Two, one of the first steps in the study was to develop a list of the decision-making powers that are exercised by a state board and/or agency for community colleges or by the local board and/or administration of a community college and that noticeably affect the carrying out of the educational mission of a college in a state community college system. Such decision-making powers were termed governance activities. The list of governance activities, developed from the literature on state coordination supplemented by personal observation and consideration, was designed to be comprehensive in its coverage of such activities and concrete and detailed in its statement of each; at the same time, it was desirable that the list be sufficiently brief to allow for a palatable questionnaire. The balancing of these concerns resulted in a list of 55 governance activities.

As the governance activities were being delineated, the sample of chief executives to be questioned, the Delphi panel, was being selected. First, 20 chief executives of state-level staffs were selected following the modified random procedure described in Chapter Two. Then from each state represented by a state-level chief executive, a community college chief executive was selected, again using a modified random process. Therefore, the selected Delphi panel consisted of 40 chief executives equally split between the state and college levels. Ultimately, 36 chief executives responded to at least one of the three phases of the Delphi questioning, and 33 answered the phase III questionnaire, on which the analyses of the data were based. Of these panelists, 17 were from the state level and 16 from the colleges, and they represented 19 states.

Once the governance activities had been delineated and the Delphi panel selected, the Delphi questioning, to be conducted in three phases, could begin. First the panelists were sent the phase I questionnaire (Appendix D). This questionnaire described the instructions to be used on the succeeding questionnaires and listed the governance activities. The panelists were asked to evaluate the clarity of the instructions and the clarity, appropriateness, and comprehensiveness of the governance activities and to recommend desirable changes. The panelists' responses dictated only a few very minor alterations.

Incorporating these changes, the phase II questionnaire (Appendix E) was constructed and sent out. On it the panelists were asked to indicate for each governance activity the level from among five choices--"solely at the state agency/board level" to "solely at the local community college/board level"--at which they believed the

governance activity should preferably be exercised in a state community college system. They were specifically asked to respond on the basis of their professional opinion rather than the actual practice in their state.

Following the return of the phase II questionnaires, the phase III questionnaire (Appendix H) was constructed and sent out. It was basically identical to the previous one except that for each governance activity the levels representing the middle half of the phase II responses were indicated. The panelists were asked to respond as before in light of this additional information.

#### The Results of the Study

Once the phase III questionnaires had been returned, the responses could be tabulated and analyzed in order to answer the four major questions of the study.

The first question was whether, for each governance activity, the panelists reached consensus, thus identifying a nonissue, or failed to reach consensus, identifying an issue, on the preferred level at which the governance activity should be exercised. Consensus was defined as existing among the panelists for a particular governance activity if at least a majority agreed on the level, from among the five alternatives, at which the activity should be placed and at least three-quarters placed the activity at that level, the level immediately higher, or the level immediately lower on the scale. As reported in Chapter Four, the panel chief executives reached consensus on the preferred placement of 34 governance activities; therefore, these activities were designated nonissues. For these, they agreed that 4 nonissues should be exercised primarily at the state agency/board level, 4 with shared authority, 3

primarily at the local community college/board level, and 23 solely at the local community college/board level. They did not believe any nonissue should be exercised solely at the state agency/board level. On the other hand, the panel failed to reach consensus on the preferred placement of 21 governance activities; consequently, these activities were designated issues. The issue and nonissue governance activities are listed in a later portion of this chapter.

The second question examined in the study was whether, for each issue identified above, the role level, state or college, of the panel chief executives appeared to be a factor contributing to the lack of consensus among the panelists regarding the preferred placement of that governance activity. It was suggested that if role level were a factor, the distributions of the responses of the two groups, state-level chief executives and college chief executives, would differ. Therefore, for each issue, the two distributions were tabulated and tested for differences using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test with the level of significance set at .05. As reported in Chapter Four, out of the 21 issues, significant differences between the two distributions were found for 8 activities. For these activities, then, it appeared that chief-executive role level was a factor contributing to disagreement over their preferred placement. In addition, inspection of the data revealed that in each of these cases the tendency was for state-level chief executives to prefer that the governance activity be exercised at levels closer to the state level than those preferred by college chief executives. In fact, if the direction of the differences had been hypothesized and thus a one-tailed test used, significant differences between the response distributions of the two groups

would have been found for five additional issues. As a result, concluding that chief-executive role level tends generally to be factor contributing to disagreement over the preferred level at which governance activities should be exercised seems reasonably justified, although this tendency was not specifically tested for all issues taken together.

The third question of the study was basically whether, for each issue, the type of state-system governance structure within which the chief executives worked, regardless of their own role levels, appeared to be a factor contributing to lack of panel consensus on the preferred placement of that governance activity. Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971) had noted that in general the allocation of governance powers varied among state systems grouped by type of state-level board for community colleges--governing, coordinating-governing, and coordinating. Thus it was surmised that the distributions of the responses of the three groups of chief executives classified by the type of state-level board for the system in which they worked might differ, thus promoting the lack of consensus existing for the issue governance activities. To test this idea, the panel responses were divided into these three distributions, and the distributions were tested for differences by using a two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test with the level of significance set at .05. No significant differences were found among the distributions for any of the 21 issues, as reported in Chapter Four. Therefore, it was concluded that the system governance structure within which the chief executives worked did not appear to be a factor contributing to panel disagreement over the preferred placement of any of the issue governance activities. Likewise, although the overall distributions were not

specifically tested, it seems likely appropriate to conclude that in general system governance structure is not a factor significantly affecting the opinions of the state-level and college chief executives regarding the preferred allocation of governance powers within state systems.

Finally, it should be noted that the panelists were explicitly instructed to respond to the questionnaires in terms of their professional opinions rather than in terms of actual practice in their states. These results suggest that they did so, implying that the data obtained by this study did indeed represent the carefully considered professional opinions of the panelists.

The final question of the study was basically whether the prescriptive tenets of either of the two major theories of administration, bureaucratic and collegial theory, appeared to underlie, consciously or unconsciously, the pattern of governance-activity placements for which consensus existed among the panelists. If such an underlying relationship existed, it was hypothesized that the general pattern of placements for the nonissues, those activities on which panel consensus existed, would tend to be congruent with a pattern of placements based upon the tenets of the underlying theory.

In order to examine such a hypothesis, it was therefore first necessary to determine for each governance activity the hypothetical level at which each of the two theories would most likely recommend that activity be exercised. So as to provide a consistent rationale for the hypothetical determination of these theoretical preferred placements, guidelines were developed for each of the theories following a brief review of them. The reviews and the guidelines were presented in Chapter Three. Summarized in

the most simplistic generalities, the guidelines for bureaucratic theory suggested that decision making is primarily a superordinate function, with each level in an organization carrying out the dictates of its superordinate level and dictating the actions of its subordinates. Authority is largely centered at the top of the organization, and though it can be delegated, it generally cannot be delegated beyond the immediate supervisor of the implementing level. In addition, intraorganizational communication is to flow vertically, and it normally takes place only at the pleasure of superordinates. In contrast, the collegial theory guidelines posited that decision making is a group function that should specifically involve those to be affected by the particular decision. Consequently, those who will implement the decision would be major participants in the making of the decision. At the same time, however, theorists concretely describing the application of collegial principles agreed that in a group the superordinate does have ultimate veto power over the decision, though using such power regularly will attenuate the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. In addition, communications in the collegial organization can flow horizontally or vertically as appropriate and are not controlled by the superordinates.

On the basis of these guidelines, then, theoretical preferred placements of the 55 governance activities for each of the theories had been made independent of the panel responses; these placements were presented and explained in Chapter Four. Once the nonissues had been identified as described earlier, two sets of paired data were set up, one pairing for each nonissue activity the consensus placement and the theorized bureaucratic placement and the other doing the same for the

consensus and collegial placements. Then the congruence of the paired data, the tendency to overlap exactly, was tested for each of the sets of data. As described in Chapter Two, congruence statistically consists of equality of central tendency and perfect positive correlation existing together for a set of paired data. Therefore, as a test for congruence, each set of paired data was tested first for a difference in central tendency using a two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test with the level of significance set at .05. As described in Chapter Four, the consensus and bureaucratic placements were found to be significantly different,  $T = 0$ ,  $p < .00001$ ; consequently, it was concluded that they were not congruent and that bureaucratic theory did not appear to underlie the thinking of the panelists in their placement of the nonissues. However, the consensus and collegial placements were not found to be significantly different,  $T = 10$ ,  $p > .05$ . Accordingly, the correlation of the paired data for those placements was calculated using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient; a high positive correlation was found,  $r_s = .796$ , and that correlation was found to be significant,  $t(32) = 7.44$ ,  $p < .0005$ . Therefore, the consensus and collegial placements were concluded to be generally congruent, thereby indicating that collegial administrative theory did appear to underlie, whether consciously or unconsciously, the thinking of the chief executives on the Delphi panel regarding the levels at which the nonissue governance activities should be exercised in a state community college system.

#### Implications for Governance-Power Allocation

Probably the most obvious and direct implications of this study are those regarding the allocation of governance responsibilities in state

systems of community colleges and, to a degree, in state postsecondary-education systems generally. In the justification of the study in Chapter Two, it was suggested that the placements of governance activities for which the panelists reached consensus could immediately serve as such recommendations, and those were discussed in Chapter Five. Likewise, in Chapter Five, it was suggested that the study also had implications for the desirable allocation of the issue governance activities that were identified, and these two were examined in Chapter Five. Those recommendations and implications are summarized here.

First, the recommendations stemming from identified nonissues are looked at. Again, these governance activities are those for which the chief executives on the Delphi panel reached consensus regarding the level in a state system at which the activity should preferably be exercised. It seems reasonable to assume, then, that these preferred placements balance both the states' need, as perceived by the state-level chief executives, to insure the system responds efficiently to state-wide educational requirements and also the colleges' need, as perceived by the college chief executives, for the flexibility to meet local and internal objectives effectively and efficiently. If one basically accepts this assumption, then it seems to follow that these placements do constitute recommendations for practice that are worthy of serious consideration by those concerned with the operation of state systems. These recommendations are presented by listing the nonissue governance activities in groups by the level at which the panelists felt they should be exercised, beginning at the state level. The number of each governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.

The first level in the study, solely at the state agency/board level, calls for final decisions to be made by the state agency/board with little or no input from the colleges. The panel did not indicate that any governance activities should be exercised at this level.

The second level in the study, primarily at the state agency/board level, basically calls for final decisions to be made by the state agency/board but only after close consultation with or consideration of significant, formal input by the colleges. The panelists agreed and therefore it is recommended that four governance activities be exercised at this level.

1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state.

3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district.

26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions.

52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/ implement compliance.

The third level in the study, with shared authority, calls for final decisions to be made by either the state agency/board or the colleges, depending upon the nature of the specific decision, or for both to make and/or defend recommendations before a superordinate agency/board or element of state government. It is also assumed that decisions at either level will be made in light of significant input from the other. The panelists agreed that four governance activities should be placed at this level; however, for one of them this placement is not concurred with, and thus only three governance activities are recommended for placement at this level.

25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.

55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.

The following activity was also placed at this level by the panelists; however, it is contended, as explained in more detail in both Chapters Four and Five, that approval authority of this sort cannot be shared in any pure sense. Consequently, it is suggested that this activity be exercised either primarily at the state agency/board level or primarily at the local community college/board level.

10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.

The fourth level in the study, primarily at the local community college/board level, calls for final decisions to be made by the colleges in the light of significant state-level input or within detailed state-level guidelines. The panelists agreed and it is recommended that three governance activities be exercised at this level.

2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multicollege district.

28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.

31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.

The fifth and final level in the study, solely at the local community college/board level, calls for final decisions to be made by the colleges with little state-level input or within broad, vice detailed, state-level guidelines. The panelists agreed and it is recommended that 23 governance activities be exercised at this level.

5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college.

6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.

14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.

15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.

16. Establish grading policies.

17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies.

21. Approve individual student admissions.

27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.

32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.

33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.

34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.

36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.

37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.

39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions.

40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.

41. Award tenure and promotions.
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.
43. Assign faculty duties by area and workload.
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multicollege-district executive officer (president).
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel.
50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees.

In addition to these recommendations based upon the nonissues identified in the study, it was also suggested at the beginning of this section that the information in this study also contains implications for the allocation of the 21 governance activities that were identified as issues. Thus, in Chapter Five, for each of these issues the responses of the panel chief executives, the opinions existing in the literature on state coordination, and the concepts of collegial theory were examined regarding what they seemed to say about the appropriate level for exercising the activity; and on the basis of these considerations, it seemed possible to narrow down the choice of appropriate levels to, in most cases, two alternatives and, in a few instances, one apparent choice. Again, it is suggested that these recommendations are worthy of serious consideration. The issue governance activities are listed here, grouped into categories with like recommendations regarding level alternatives. The number of each activity is, as usual, its number on the phase III

questionnaire. While looking at these recommendations, the reader is urged to keep in mind the definitions of the levels given above.

The evidence in this study appeared to warrant the recommendation that those concerned with the operations of state community college systems should give serious consideration to the placement of two issue governance activities at the primarily state agency/board level.

9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.

54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state-level agencies/boards.

The evidence in the study appeared to warrant the recommendation that those concerned with state-systems operations give serious consideration to the placement of two issue governance activities at either the primarily state agency/board level or the shared-authority level.

24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.

The evidence appeared to warrant the recommendation that serious consideration be given to the placement of six issue governance activities at either the primarily state agency/board level or the primarily local community college/board level.

4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multicampus college or multicollege district.

8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.

11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.

18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).

22. Set student tuition and fee charges.

29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.

The evidence appeared to warrant the recommendation that serious consideration be given to the placement of the following issue governance activity at the shared-authority level.

23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.

The evidence appeared to warrant the recommendation that serious consideration be given to the placement of two issue governance activities at the primarily local community college/board level.

7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.

20. Develop general admission standards.

The evidence appeared to warrant the recommendation that serious consideration be given to the placement of six issue governance activities at either the primarily or the solely local community college/board level.

12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.)

13. Approve new courses.

19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.

38. Approve professional-staff salary schedules and fringe-benefit packages.

44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.

49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.

The evidence appeared to warrant the recommendation that serious consideration be given to the placement of the following issue governance activity at the solely local community college/board level.

30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.

For the following issue governance activity, the evidence was so conflicting that no recommendation was indicated except that it apparently should not be placed at the solely state agency/board level.

35. Administer all state-funded student scholarship and grant programs.

Finally, it is important to point out that the evidence in this study indicated that no governance activities should be exercised solely at the state agency/board level.

These recommendations, then, represent the implications of the study regarding the allocation of governance powers in state community college systems. At the same time, they obviously will not be and cannot be implemented in their entirety by all or probably any state system, though it is believed that they warrant some attention. Their potential value is in part a product of not only the evidence supporting them but also the

relative comprehensiveness and concreteness with which the governance activities and placement levels are delineated. Thus, if nothing else, the recommendations may provide a more adequate framework for thought in this area than has been available previously. Furthermore, the evidence itself, rather than the conclusions drawn from it, may prove more valuable for those concerned with the operations of state systems. Thus, the recommendations have been summarized here because it seemed necessary that they be consolidated into an easily accessible form at some point in this report, but the most productive use of the study presumably comes when one evaluates and draws one's own conclusions from the supporting data and information presented in Chapters Four and Five.

Finally, in addition to the rather specific conclusions summarized above, a few broader conclusions can be drawn from the study.

First, at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapters One and Two, it was stated that the division of governance responsibilities both in state systems for postsecondary education in general and in state community college systems was a controversial topic. Numerous comments in the literature certainly seemed to support that contention. Likewise, Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971) reported that actual practices in the various community college systems varied considerably. Yet, when the existing recommendations on this topic were reviewed in Chapter Three, a good deal of unanimity was discovered. And again, when state-level and college chief executives were questioned in this study, they could reach agreement on the preferred placement of a majority of governance activities; and even for the identified issues, the dispersion of their responses was rarely as great as one might have expected. Thus, it seems that concerned

professionals in higher education do not stand as far apart in this area as actual practice in the states would lead one to believe. Consequently, one can infer that the potential for a partial resolution of the controversy exists. At the same time, however, another possible inference is that one must look beyond the professionals for the stumbling blocks on the path to such resolution, leaving one with a less optimistic view of the future of this controversy.

A second conclusion that seems justified by the study is that the concept of reasonable institutional autonomy has widespread and again perhaps surprisingly strong support among professionals in community college administration. For example, the Delphi panelists had no trouble in agreeing on a large number decision areas that they believed should basically be the sole province of the colleges. Furthermore, while the data indicated that in a number of instances state-level chief executives preferred a stronger state agency/board role than did their college counterparts, they did not seem to believe the state role needed to be as strong as it appears to be in many systems. This attitude may therefore act as a partial brake to what some seem to see as an inexorable drive to highly centralized systems, or it may indicate that professionals have a limited influence over these decisions.

A third and related conclusion is that the application of the principles of collegial administrative theory to the operation of state community college systems appears to be, whether consciously or unconsciously, strongly supported by professionals in the field. Again, this idea has twin implications; it suggests both that collegial theory can perhaps provide a concrete avenue to the resolution of state and college

conflict in the realm of state coordination and also that this avenue may have or possibly will confront external impediments to its application.

The additional research that these general conclusions suggest is discussed shortly.

#### Contributions to Future Research

In addition to the possible value of this study in terms of its implications for the allocation of governance responsibilities in state community college systems, the study can hopefully contribute to the understanding and possible resolution of this controversy in more objective ways. Thus, as previously suggested during the justification of the study in Chapter Two, the study appears to contain information valuable to further researchers in this area.

First, the delineation of the governance activities that typically must exist in a state system can perhaps provide a useful foundation on which to design further studies on this topic. To the knowledge of the author, this delineation is more complete in its coverage and more concrete in its description than any previously existing. Thus, it is hoped it will serve as a more solid jumping-off point for future work.

Second, the identification of the issues and nonissues, in specific terms, in the general area of governance-power allocation should allow future researchers to focus their attention on the most useful and productive aspects of the topic. Likewise, the apparent confirmation of role level as a factor contributing to the existence of controversy in this area can also aid in the efficient design and analysis of future research. Similarly, the finding that professional opinions in this area appear to be largely independent of actual practice can do the same.

Finally, the finding that professional opinions are far from devoid of any theoretical consistency seems to suggest that the area of state-system structures and procedures is ripe for investigation and analysis from theoretical perspectives. If one assumes, as this writer does, that a coherent theoretical framework provides the best foundation for productive research, then this finding becomes especially significant.

#### Suggestions for Further Research

It has been suggested above that this study contributes to the potential productivity of future research concerning organizational structures and processes for state systems of community colleges. Research in three particular directions appears to offer especially fruitful possibilities.

As noted earlier, agreement on the desirable allocation of governance responsibilities in state systems was found to be greater than one might have expected, and in this study 34 specific governance activities were identified for which state-level and college chief executives reached some consensus regarding the level at which the activities should be exercised in a state system. Yet, actual practice presumably varies considerably. It would seem useful to confirm the validity of this hypothesis that professional opinion and actual practice differ by comparing the consensus placements of the nonissue governance activities with the levels at which these activities are currently exercised in the states. An investigation of the rationales behind those practices that do differ from the panel's recommendations should provide important and objectively derived insights into the roots of the state-coordination and college-autonomy controversy.

A study on the issues identified by this study might also be useful. The exact nature of the disagreement in these areas could be determined with greater precision by breaking down, where possible, the issue governance activities into ones even more specific and concrete; specifying more limited and concrete statements of alternative placements for each activity derived from the placements recommended for those issues in Chapter Five; and then following a procedure similar to this study's to elicit a clearer picture of the professional opinions regarding the preferred placement of these issues.

Last, it is recommended that opportunities to explore further the relationship of administrative theory, especially collegial theory, to state systems be taken advantage of. This study contained only a limited look at the literature in this area, and one assumes that a deeper examination could find research, especially in noneducation areas, more adequately dealing with the relationship of the theory to large and complex organizational systems. Such research, if found, might well provide additional insight into the application of collegial concepts to state systems. In addition, collegial theory of course posits that particular administrative behaviors tend to produce particular outcomes in the organization, in terms of both organizational effectiveness and the behavior of humans and perhaps subsystems within the organization. Attempts to verify the existence of these posited relationships would help confirm or deny the validity and thus the value of the theory. Of course, designing studies of this sort will likely be difficult because of the traditional difficulty of defining and measuring appropriate outcome variables in higher education; nevertheless, the potential significance would perhaps warrant the effort.

Overall, the potential for the expansion of knowledge in the area of state coordination of both higher education generally and community colleges in particular appears to exist, and the value of doing so seems readily evident.

APPENDIX A  
INITIAL LETTER REQUESTING  
PARTICIPATION ON DELPHI PANEL

The Institute of Higher Education at the University of Florida is now beginning a study, to be conducted under my direction by Mr. Fred Kiehle, to identify and clarify the issues in the division of governance power between the state level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual community colleges (and their local boards). These issues are to be developed in terms of the agreement or disagreement among the professional opinions of those educational administrators most directly concerned and familiar with the situation--chief executives of state level staffs and chief executives of community colleges--regarding the preferred placement, at the state or local level, of specific governance activity decisions. Consequently, we are asking for your aid and participation in our project.

Each participant (Delphi panelist) will be questioned by means of the Delphi Technique, a series of repeated questionnaires incorporating anonymous feedback of the responses of fellow panelists. We expect to use three repetitions, with the first to be mailed about the beginning of March and each of the remaining following at three to four week intervals. The questionnaire will be limited to forty items, so as to be adequately inclusive but palatably brief in time required of you. Please understand that it is important that, if a participant, you complete all three repetitions.

We believe that this study can help to provide information valuable in the future analysis of the function, process, and structure of state level coordination of community colleges and will act to provide direction to the issues for further research in this area. Accordingly, we sincerely desire your participation in the project as a Delphi panelist. All participant responses will, of course, be held in confidence and will be reported so as to maintain the anonymity of the particular respondent and state. Please return the enclosed postcard indicating whether you would be willing to serve as a panelist as soon as convenient. We appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely,

James L. Wattenbarger, Director  
Institute of Higher Education

APPENDIX B  
FOLLOW-UP LETTER REQUESTING  
PARTICIPATION ON DELPHI PANEL

I have enclosed a copy of the letter we sent to you last month asking your participation as a Delphi Panelist in a project by the Institute of Higher Education to identify issues regarding the division of governance power between the state level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual community colleges (and their local boards). As noted in the other letter, we believe this study will prove valuable in the analysis and design of future research in the state coordination area.

As of yet, we have not received the postcard indicating whether or not you received our invitation to serve on the Delphi panel. The development of the panel is nearing completion, but, of course, we cannot begin the study until all panelists are identified. Consequently, we would very much appreciate your returning the enclosed postcard noting your decision as soon as possible. Please return the card even if you have returned the one sent previously, in case the earlier card was lost in the mail. As your state level chief executive will be a panelist, we would certainly appreciate your participation as representative of college level chief executives in your state.

Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

James L. Wattenbarger, Director  
Institute of Higher Education

JLW:pdb

enclosures

APPENDIX C  
DELPHI PANELISTS

The following persons participated in one or more phases of the Delphi questioning. The position given for each is the position held at the time the questioning began.

Joseph E. Bruno--Coordinator of Community Colleges, Office of Higher Education, Pennsylvania Department of Education.

Reed L. Buffington--President, Chabot College, Hayward, California.

John Cleek--Executive Assistant to the Chancellor, State Regents for Higher Education, Oklahoma.

Gerald H. Fisher--President, Garland County Community College, Hot Springs, Arkansas.

Benjamin E. Fountain, Jr.--State President, State Department of Community Colleges, State Board of Education, North Carolina.

R. L. Grigsby--President, Midlands Technical College, Columbia, South Carolina.

Gus Guichard--Executive Vice-Chancellor, California Community Colleges.

William G. Hasemeyer--Area President, Mid-Plains Technical Community College Area, North Platte, Nebraska.

Raymond M. Hawkins--Director, Community College Programs, Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System.

James L. Henderson--President, Coastal Carolina Community College, Jacksonville, North Carolina.

Lee G. Henderson--Director, Division of Community Colleges, Florida State Department of Education.

John B. Hirt--President, Community College of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

E. Lantis--Dean of Development, Southern Campus, Delaware Technical and Community College, Georgetown, Delaware.

- Joe A. Leone--President, Oscar Rose Junior College, Midwest City, Oklahoma.
- Max J. Lerner--Vice-Chancellor for Two-Year Colleges, Ohio Board of Regents.
- F. Dean Lillie--Director, Community Colleges, State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education, Colorado.
- Leland B. Luchsinger--President, Community College of Denver, Denver, Colorado.
- George V. Moody--Director, Division of Junior Colleges, State Department of Education, Mississippi.
- John C. Mundt--Executive Director, State Board for Community College Education, Washington.
- Alfred C. O'Connell--Executive Director, State Board for Community Colleges, Maryland.
- Omar L. Olson--President, Lorain County Community College, Elyria, Ohio.
- Charles E. Palmer--Executive Director, State Board for Technical and Comprehensive Education, South Carolina.
- Dell Reed--President, Crowder College, Neosho, Missouri.
- Cornelius V. Robbins--Associate Chancellor for Community Colleges, State University of New York.
- Dale C. Schatz--Director, Junior College Programs, State Department of Higher Education, Missouri.
- Robert C. Schleiger--Executive Director, State Board of Community Colleges, Nebraska.
- Oscar E. Shabat--Chancellor, City Colleges of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
- Bert S. Slafter--President, Western Wyoming Community College, Rock Springs, Wyoming.
- Alfred J. Smith, Jr.--President, Howard Community College, Columbia, Maryland.
- Thomas Spencer--Assistant Director for Community Colleges, Department of Higher Education, Arkansas.
- William E. Steward--President, Wenatchee Valley College, Wenatchee, Washington.
- Paul K. Weatherly--President, Delaware Technical and Community College.

Fred L. Wellman--Executive Secretary, Illinois Community College Board.

Charles Wing--Executive Secretary, Community College Commission, Wyoming.

Charles V. Wright--President, East Central Junior College, Decatur,  
Mississippi.

Benjamin R. Wygal--President, Florida Junior College at Jacksonville,  
Florida.

APPENDIX D  
PHASE I QUESTIONNAIRE  
AND COVER LETTER

We appreciate your indicated willingness to participate as a Delphi panelist in the Institute's study of the issues in the delineation of state level agency versus local community college governance roles. We believe that this study will help to provide information valuable in future analysis and research regarding the function, process, and structure of state level coordination of community colleges.

The development of the Delphi panel proved a more protracted process than expected; however, we are now ready to begin this phase of the study. Enclosed you will find Phase I of the Delphi questionnaire. It consists of a list of "governance activities" developed from the literature. In Phases II and III of the questioning, you will be asked to answer the following question for each of the governance activities:

In your professional opinion, each of the following governance activities for community colleges should preferably be exercised--

1. Solely at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate agency/board/governmental legislative or executive unit) with degree of institutional input at the discretion of the state level agency/board.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate) with mandatory and significant institutional inputs and/or recommendations.
3. With shared authority. For example: State agency/board reviews institutional recommendations and formulates own recommendations. Both are passed along to superordinate for equal consideration.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decisions with due consideration of state level recommendations or within detailed state level guidelines.

Page Two

5. Solely at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with little or no state level input or within broad state level guidelines.

For Phase I, with the above in mind, you are asked to indicate by checking the appropriate column whether each item:

1. Is clearly stated and appropriate for consideration, or
2. Is appropriate but unclearly stated. (Please rewrite, on the form, the item so that it is clear to you.), or
3. Should be combined with another item. (Please indicate in the column the item number with which you feel it should be combined, and, if convenient, write out the combined item.) or
4. Is not appropriate for consideration and should be deleted.

Please add at the end of the form any additional items you feel should be included.

The Phase II questionnaire will be constructed using the information you are providing. We also welcome your comments regarding the governance level choices to be used in Phases II and III. A brief questionnaire regarding the coordination/governance structure for community colleges in your state is also enclosed. This information is needed to insure the accuracy of the data to be used in the analysis of the Delphi responses.

Please return the completed questionnaire in the stamped envelope provided. In order that we may proceed quickly to Phase II, please try to mail the completed form within one week of receipt. We appreciate your cooperation as a Delphi panelist.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Kiehle, III  
Institute of Higher Education

INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
 University of Florida  
 Gainesville, Florida 32611

Governance Role Delphi Questionnaire, Phase I

Please check one per instructions in letter.

- Governance Activity
1. Develop the long and short range master plans for the community college system. (If unclear, rewrite here.)
  
  2. Develop the long and short range master plans for a community college.
  
  3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college.
  
  4. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a campus or college within a multi-campus college or multi-college district.

Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic unit (center, department, institute, etc.) within a community college.				
6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (Counseling, community services) within a community college.				
7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree program.				
8. Authorize a new degree program.				
9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.				

- 10. Approve inter-college/district agreements on program related student exchanges or out of district offerings.
  
- 11. Approve general/basic requirements for degree programs.
  
- 12. Approve specific program requirements for degree programs.
  
- 13. Approve new courses.
  
- 14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.

Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.

<p>15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.</p>	<p>Clear and appropriate.</p>	<p>Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.</p>	<p>Combine with item number ____.</p>	<p>Delete.</p>
<p>16. Establish grading policies.</p>				
<p>17. Maintain civil order on campus and establish student conduct probation and suspension policies.</p>				
<p>18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).</p>				
<p>19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student type and program.</p>				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
20. Develop general admission standards.				
21. Approve specific student admissions.				
22. Set student tuition and fee charges.				
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.				
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.				
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions (would qualify as a college level function if you believe legislative appropriations should be on a specific college by college basis).				
27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.				
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.				
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.				
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value (such as \$50.00).				
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.				
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.				
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.				
35. Administer all state and funded student scholarship and grant programs.				
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.				
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.				
38. Approve specific professional salary decisions.				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
39. Approve professional salary schedules and fringe benefit packages.				
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.				
41. Award tenure and promotions.				
42. Approve mix of faculty by type and rank.				
43. Assign faculty duties by area and work load.				
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.				
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.				
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief campus executive officer (president).				
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of non-professional personnel.				
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.				
50. Conduct collective bargaining with non-professional employees.				
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.				

	Clear and appropriate.	Appropriate but unclear. Please rewrite.	Combine with item number ____.	Delete.
52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance.				
53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.				
54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to the state level agency/board.				
55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.				

Please provide below any additional items you feel should be included:

INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
University of Florida  
Gainesville, Florida 32611

State Community College Coordination/Governance Structure Questionnaire

1. What is the name of the state board with responsibility for governing and/or coordinating the public community junior colleges in your state?

---

2. Institutions under the jurisdiction of this state board include:

- a. All public community junior colleges only.  
 b. All public institutions of higher education.  
 c. All public educational institutions, including elementary, secondary, higher education institutions.  
 d. The state university, with subsequent responsibility for community colleges administered under its aegis.  
 e. Other responsibilities. (Please describe.)

---

3. In what overall capacity does the state board serve, as provided by Constitutional provision, statutory provision, or regulation?

- a. A governing board, legally charged with the direct control and operation of the colleges.  
 b. A coordinating board, legally charged with organizing, regulating, or otherwise bringing together overall policies or functions in areas of planning, budgeting and programming, but which does not have the authority to govern.  
 c. A governing-coordinating board, legally charged with responsibilities in both governing and coordinating the colleges as delineated in a and b.

If the state board is established as a governing board, does it in practice function as a governing board?

- a. Yes  
 b. No

4. What is the relationship of the state board to other state

Coordination/Governance Structure Questionnaire, p. 2.

educational boards?

	Board of Higher Ed.	Board of Education	Board of Voc. Ed.
a. Same board as the	_____	_____	_____
b. Subordinate to	_____	_____	_____
c. Same level of res- ponsibility as	_____	_____	_____

5. What is the relationship of the state board to local community college boards?

\_\_\_\_\_ a. There are no local college boards.

\_\_\_\_\_ b. Local board is advisory only.

\_\_\_\_\_ c. Local board is institutional governing board.

\_\_\_\_\_ d. Other. (Please specify.) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX E  
PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE

Institute of Higher Education  
University of Florida  
Gainesville, Florida 32611

GOVERNANCE ROLE DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRE, PHASE II

Instructions: For each of the following governance activities, items 1 through 55, please answer the following question:

In your professional opinion, this governance activity should preferably be exercised:

1. Solely at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate agency/board/governmental legislative or executive unit) with degree of institutional input at the discretion of the state level agency/board.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate) with mandatory and significant institutional inputs and/or recommendations.
3. With shared authority. For example: State agency/board reviews institutional recommendations and formulates own recommendations. Both are passed along to superordinate for equal consideration.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with due consideration of state level recommendations or within detailed state level guidelines.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with little or no state level input or within broad state level guidelines.

Circle the one number (1 through 5) at the right of each governance activity which corresponds to level at which you feel that activity should be exercised. If, for example, you believe a particular

activity should be exercised "solely at the local community college/board level," circle the number 5. Please remember that we are asking for your professional opinion, given your knowledge and experience, of the preferred level at which an activity should be exercised, regardless of actual practice in your state. Insofar as possible, we are asking your opinion in terms of state community college systems in general. Consequently, please respond to all items, even though a particular governance activity may not be readily applicable to your state situation.

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

## Governance Activity

Circle one only

- |  |   |   |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Develop the long and short range master plans for the community college <u>system</u> of the state.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. Develop the long and short range master plans for <u>a</u> community college or multi-college district.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of a community college or multi-college district.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of a campus or college within a multi-campus college or multi-college district.                                | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.                         | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity

Circle one only

- |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.                               | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. Approve inter-college (or inter-district) agreements on program related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.                           | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Approve <u>specific</u> program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.). | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. Approve new courses.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 16. Establish grading policies.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 17. Establish student conduct probation and suspension policies.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity	Circle one only				
20. Develop general admission standards.	1	2	3	4	5
21. Approve individual student admissions.	1	2	3	4	5
22. Set student tuition and fee charges.	1	2	3	4	5
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	2	3	4	5
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	2	3	4	5
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	2	3	4	5
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions (would qualify as a college level function if you believe legislative appropriations should be on a specific college by college basis since state agency would have little control).	1	2	3	4	5
27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.	1	2	3	4	5
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.	1	2	3	4	5
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.	1	2	3	4	5
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.	1	2	3	4	5

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity	Circle one only				
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.	1	2	3	4	5
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.	1	2	3	4	5
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.	1	2	3	4	5
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.	1	2	3	4	5
35. Administer all state funded student scholarship and grant programs.	1	2	3	4	5
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.	1	2	3	4	5
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.	1	2	3	4	5
38. Approve professional staff salary schedule and fringe benefit packages.	1	2	3	4	5
39. Approve individual professional staff salary decisions.	1	2	3	4	5
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.	1	2	3	4	5
41. Award tenure and promotions.	1	2	3	4	5
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.	1	2	3	4	5
43. Assign faculty duties by area and work load.	1	2	3	4	5
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.	1	2	3	4	5
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.	1	2	3	4	5

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity	Circle one only				
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.	1	2	3	4	5
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multi-college district executive officer (president).	1	2	3	4	5
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of non-professional (support) personnel.	1	2	3	4	5
49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.	1	2	3	4	5
50. Conduct collective bargaining with non-professional (support) employees.	1	2	3	4	5
51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs.	1	2	3	4	5
52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance.	1	2	3	4	5
53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5
54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state level agencies/boards.	1	2	3	4	5
55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX F  
PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE  
COVER LETTER FOR  
PHASE I RESPONDENTS

Your cooperation in completing the Phase I Delphi questionnaire in the Institute's study of the issues in the delineation of state level agency versus local community college governance roles has been most appreciated. The Phase II questionnaire is attached. You will note that all fifty-five of the Phase I items have been included with little or no change in wording. For each of the Phase I items, a clear majority of respondents indicated the item was "clearly stated and appropriate for consideration"; consequently, no major alterations were called for. Some typographical errors have been corrected, and respondent suggestions have been incorporated into items in cases where a minor change would definitely improve clarity but would not significantly change the validated structure and meaning of the original.

For the attached Phase II questionnaire, please remember that you are asked to respond to each item in terms of the preferred or ideal level--in light of your professional experience, knowledge, and opinions--at which a particular governance activity should be exercised, regardless of the actual practice and structure in your state. At the same time, we understand that the existing administrative, educational, political, and social environment in your state will likely flavor the tenor of your responses.

Please return the completed questionnaire in the stamped envelope provided. In order that we may proceed to Phase III without delay, please try to mail the completed form as soon as possible, preferably within one week of receipt. We appreciate your cooperation as a Delphi panelist.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Kiehle, III  
Institute of Higher Education

APPENDIX G  
PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE  
COVER LETTER FOR  
PHASE I NONRESPONDENTS

Although we have not yet received your completed Phase I questionnaire in the Institute's study of the issues in the delineation of state level agency versus local community college governance roles, we have received sufficient responses to warrant the development of a Phase II questionnaire with confidence in the clarity and worth of the items. This questionnaire is attached. You will note that all fifty-five of the Phase I items have been included with little or no change in wording. For each of the Phase I items, a clear majority of respondents indicated the item was "clearly stated and appropriate for consideration;" consequently, no major alterations were called for. Some typographical errors have been corrected, and respondent suggestions have been incorporated into items in cases where a minor change would definitely improve clarity but would not significantly change the validated structure and meaning of the original.

For the attached Phase II questionnaire, please remember that you are asked to respond to each item in terms of the preferred or ideal level--in light of your professional experience, knowledge, and opinions--at which a particular governance activity should be exercised, regardless of the actual practice and structure in your state. At the same time, we understand that the existing administrative, educational, political, and social environment in your state will likely flavor the tenor of your responses.

As we are now entering the heart of the study, your participation in Phases II and III of the Delphi panel will be most appreciated. As previously noted, we believe this study will prove valuable in the analysis and design of future research as well as current practice in the state coordination area. Since the representative panel is not large, without your participation the value of the study will be considerably diluted. Please return the completed questionnaire in the stamped envelope provided. In order that we may proceed to Phase III without delay, please try to mail the completed form as soon as possible, preferably within one week of receipt. We will appreciate your cooperation as a Delphi panelist.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Kiehle, III  
Institute of Higher Education

APPENDIX H  
PHASE III QUESTIONNAIRE

Institute of Higher Education  
University of Florida  
Gainesville, Florida 32611

GOVERNANCE ROLE DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRE, PHASE III

Instructions: For each of the following governance activities, items 1 through 55, please answer the following question:

In your professional opinion, this governance activity should preferably be exercised:

1. Solely at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate agency/board/governmental/legislative or executive unit) with degree of institutional input at the discretion of the state level agency/board.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level. For example: State agency/board makes final decision (or recommendation to superordinate) with mandatory and significant institutional inputs and/or recommendations.
3. With shared authority. For example: State agency/board reviews institutional recommendations and formulates own recommendations. Both are passed along to superordinate for equal consideration.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level. For example: local college/board makes final decision with due consideration of state level recommendations or within detailed state level guidelines.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level. For example: Local college/board makes final decision with little or no state level input or within broad state level guidelines.

Circle the one number (1 through 5) at the right of each governance activity which corresponds to level at which you feel that activity should be exercised. If, for example, you believe a particular activity should be exercised "solely at the local community college/board level," circle the number 5. Please remember that we are asking for your professional opinion, given your knowledge and experience, of the preferred level at which an activity should be exercised, regardless of actual practice in your state. Insofar as possible, we are asking your opinion in terms of state community college systems in general. Consequently, please respond to all items, even though a particular governance activity may not be readily applicable to your state situation.

For each item, the numbers corresponding to the middle one-half of the Phase II responses have been underlined in order to provide you with feedback regarding the opinions of your fellow Delphi panelists (chief executives of state level staffs and of community colleges). You may or may not wish to alter your Phase II response after considering this information.

Phase III will complete the Delphi questioning. We appreciate your cooperation.

#### Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

#### Governance Activity

Circle one only

- |  |                                  |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 1. Develop the long and short range master plans for the community college <u>system</u> of the state.   | 1 <u>2</u> <u>3</u> 4   5        |
| 2. Develop the long and short range master plans for a <u>community college</u> or multi-college district.   | 1   2   3 <u>4</u> 5             |
| 3. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of a community college or multi-college district.  | <u>1</u> <u>2</u> 3   4   5      |
| 4. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of a campus or college within a multi-campus college or multi-college district.                                | 1 <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> 5   |
| 5. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college. | 1   2   3 <u>4</u> <u>5</u>      |
| 6. Authorize the establishment or dis-establishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college.                         | 1   2   3 <u>4</u> <u>5</u>      |
| 7. Review and authorize the continuance or disestablishment of an existing degree, diploma, or certificate program.  | 1   2 <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> |

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

## Governance Activity

Circle one only

- |  |   |          |          |          |          |
|--|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 8. Authorize a new degree, diploma, or certificate program.  | 1 | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5        |
| 9. Develop and approve articulation agreements and transfer policies with other segments of the state education system.                        | 1 | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5        |
| 10. Approve inter-college (or inter-district) agreements on program related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings.                    | 1 | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | 5        |
| 11. Approve general minimum degree, diploma, or certificate requirements.  | 1 | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | 5        |
| 12. Approve specific program requirements for degree, diploma, or certificate programs (i.e., liberal arts, nursing, automotive repair, etc.). | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | 5        |
| 13. Approve new courses.   | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
| 14. Approve instructional methodology and technology.  | 1 | 2        | 3        | 4        | <u>5</u> |
| 15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies.  | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
| 16. Establish grading policies.  | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
| 17. Establish student conduct probation and suspension policies.   | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
| 18. Approve size and growth rate of institutions (enrollment floors and ceilings).   | 1 | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5        |
| 19. Approve college enrollment mix and growth rate by student level and program.   | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | 5        |

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity	Circle one only				
20. Develop general admission standards.	1	2	<u>3</u>	4	5
21. Approve individual student admissions.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
22. Set student tuition and fee charges.	1	2	<u>3</u>	4	5
23. Approve proposed institutional operating budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	<u>2</u>	3	4	5
24. Approve proposed institutional capital or facilities budget for submission (separately or within system budget) for consideration by superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	<u>2</u>	3	4	5
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/legislature.	1	<u>2</u>	3	4	5
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions (would qualify as a college level function if you believe legislative appropriations should be on a specific college by college basis since state agency would have little control).	1	<u>2</u>	3	4	5
27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	5
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services.	1	2	<u>3</u>	4	5
29. Establish procedures and standards for capital projects and land acquisition.	1	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	4	5
30. Approve purchases of equipment and services above a specific value.	1	2	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	5
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition.	1	2	<u>3</u>	4	5

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

Governance Activity	Circle one only				
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
35. Administer all state funded student scholarship and grant programs.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
38. Approve professional staff salary schedules and fringe benefit packages.	1	2	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
39. Approve individual professional staff salary decisions.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies.	1	2	3	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
41. Award tenure and promotions.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
43. Assign faculty duties by area and work load.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
44. Establish eligibility standards for professional academic and administrative personnel.	1	2	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
45. Award or terminate faculty appointments.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments.	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>

## Response Code

1. Solely at the state agency/board level.
2. Primarily at the state agency/board level.
3. With shared authority.
4. Primarily at the local community college/board level.
5. Solely at the local community college/board level.

## Governance Activity

Circle one only

- |   |   |          |          |          |   |
|---|---|----------|----------|----------|---|
| 47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multi-college district executive officer (president).  | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | 5 |
| 48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of non-professional (support) personnel.  | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | 5 |
| 49. Conduct collective bargaining with professional employees.  | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5 |
| 50. Conduct collective bargaining with non-professional (support) employees.  | 1 | 2        | 3        | <u>4</u> | 5 |
| 51. Represent the community colleges before the legislative/executive branches of government during the development and enactment of relevant legislative programs. | 1 | <u>2</u> | 3        | 4        | 5 |
| 52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance.   | 1 | <u>2</u> | 3        | 4        | 5 |
| 53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities.  | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5 |
| 54. Develop management and data system procedures and determine the extent of data to be reported to state level agencies/boards.                                   | 1 | <u>2</u> | 3        | 4        | 5 |
| 55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals.  | 1 | 2        | <u>3</u> | 4        | 5 |

APPENDIX I  
PHASE III QUESTIONNAIRE  
COVER LETTER FOR  
PHASE II RESPONDENTS

Thank you for your cooperation in completing the Phase II Delphi Questionnaire in the Institute's study of the issues in the delineation of state level agency versus local community college governance roles. The Phase III questionnaire is attached. It is basically identical to the Phase II questionnaire except that information regarding the Phase II responses of the panel has been provided. Consequently, you may wish to consider this information while deciding upon your own final response to each item.

I appreciate your patience regarding the delay in submitting Phase III for your consideration. Given this interruption (resulting in part from my relocation to a new position at Galveston College in Texas), I would again like to remind you that you are asked to respond to each item in terms of the preferred or ideal level--in light of your professional experience, knowledge, and opinions--at which a particular governance activity should be exercised, regardless of the actual practice and structure in your state. At the same time, we understand that the existing administrative, educational, political, and social environment in your state will likely flavor the tenor of your responses.

The completed questionnaire may be returned in the stamped envelope provided. I appreciate your patient cooperation as a Delphi panelist.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Kiehle, III  
Department of English  
Galveston College  
Galveston, Texas 77550

Enclosures

APPENDIX J  
PHASE III QUESTIONNAIRE  
COVER LETTER FOR  
PHASE II NONRESPONDENTS

We did not receive your response to the Phase II Delphi questionnaire in the Institute's study of the issues in the delineation of state level agency versus local community college governance roles. As the representative Delphi panel is not large, we would sincerely appreciate your cooperation in completing the attached Phase III questionnaire. It is basically identical to the Phase II questionnaire except that information regarding the Phase II responses of the panel has been provided. Consequently, you may wish to consider this information while deciding upon your own response to each item.

Please remember that you are asked to respond to each item in terms of the preferred or ideal level--in light of your professional experience, knowledge, and opinions--at which a particular governance activity should be exercised, regardless of the actual practice and structure in your state. At the same time, we understand that the existing administrative, educational, political, and social environment in your state will likely flavor the tenor of your responses.

As we noted before, we believe this study will prove valuable in the analysis and design of future research as well as current practice in the state coordination area. Accordingly, we consider your participation important and will appreciate your response. The completed questionnaire may be returned in the stamped envelope provided.

Sincerely,

Fred E. Kiehle, III  
Department of English  
Galveston College  
Galveston, Texas 77556

Enclosures

APPENDIX K  
RESPONSES OF DELPHI PANELISTS, BY ROLE LEVEL  
AND BY SYSTEM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, FOR NONISSUES

Table 7

For Each Nonissue, the Number of Delphi Panelists, by Role Level and by System Governance Structure, Preferring a Governance Activity Be Exercised at the Specified Level

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Solely college
1. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for the community college system of the state				
State	0	15	2	0
College	0	9	6	1
Governing	0	2	1	1
Coordinating-governing	0	5	2	0
Coordinating	0	17	5	0
2. Develop the long- and short-range master plans for a community college or multi-college district				
State	0	0	1	14
College	0	0	0	13
Governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	6
Coordinating	0	0	1	19
3. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of a community college or multicollege district				
State	4	11	1	1
College	3	9	3	1
Governing	1	3	0	0
Coordinating-governing	1	4	1	1
Coordinating	5	13	3	1

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college Solely college
5. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of an academic administrative unit (department, division, center, institute, etc.) within a community college	0	0	2	7
State				8
College	0	0	0	3
Governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	5
Coordinating	0	0	2	14
6. Authorize the establishment or disestablishment of service programs (counseling, community services, etc.) within a community college	0	0	1	8
State				8
College	0	0	0	3
Governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	5
Coordinating	0	0	1	14
10. Approve intercollege (or interdistrict) agreements on program-related student exchanges or out-of-district offerings	0	4	7	1
State				1
College	0	1	11	3
Governing	0	1	1	1
Coordinating-governing	0	1	1	5
Coordinating	0	3	16	2

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college college	Solely college
14. Approve instructional methodology and technology					
State	0	0	0	0	17
College	0	0	0	0	16
Governing	0	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	0	22
15. Establish student academic probation and suspension policies					
State	0	0	1	6	10
College	0	0	0	1	15
Governing	0	0	1	1	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	3	4
Coordinating	0	0	0	3	19
16. Establish grading policies					
State	0	0	1	5	11
College	0	0	0	2	14
Governing	0	0	1	1	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	3	4
Coordinating	0	0	0	3	19
17. Establish student-conduct probation and suspension policies					
State	0	0	2	4	11
College	0	0	0	3	13
Governing	0	0	0	1	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	2	4
Coordinating	0	0	0	4	18

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college college	Solely college
21. Approve individual student admissions					
State	0	0	0	1	16
College	0	0	0	0	16
Governing	0	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	1	21
25. Present arguments and supporting material for proposed operating and capital budgets to superordinate board/agency or governor/ legislature.					
State	1	8	7	1	0
College	1	2	12	1	0
Governing	1	1	1	1	0
Coordinating-governing	0	2	4	1	0
Coordinating	1	7	14	0	0
26. Allocate appropriated state funds among the institutions					
State	3	12	1	1	0
College	4	10	0	1	1
Governing	1	2	0	1	0
Coordinating-governing	2	5	0	0	0
Coordinating	4	15	1	1	1

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college
27. Allocate appropriated state funds among programs within a college					
State	0	1	0	8	8
College	0	0	0	5	11
Governing	0	0	0	2	2
Coordinating-governing	0	1	0	3	3
Coordinating	0	0	0	8	14
28. Establish procedures and standards for purchases of equipment and services					
State	0	3	2	10	2
College	0	1	4	10	1
Governing	0	2	0	2	0
Coordinating-governing	0	1	1	3	2
Coordinating	0	1	5	15	1
31. Approve specific contracts for budgeted capital projects and land acquisition					
State	1	1	4	8	3
College	1	1	2	10	2
Governing	0	1	1	1	1
Coordinating-governing	2	0	0	3	2
Coordinating	0	1	5	14	2

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system			
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college Solely college
32. Approve rental agreements for facilities, equipment, or services				
State	½	1	0	6½
College	0	1	0	4
Governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	2	0	2
Coordinating	½	0	0	6½
33. Approve major federal or foundation grant or project applications				
State	0	1	2	8
College	0	0	1	4
Governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	2
Coordinating	0	1	2	8
34. Approve institutional administration of capital and income of private gifts to the college of real or personal property				
State	0	0	0	3
College	0	0	0	5
Governing	0	0	0	1
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	2
Coordinating	0	0	0	5

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system			Solely college
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	
36. Approve in-state travel for college staff				
State	0	0	0	17
College	0	0	0	16
Governing	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	22
37. Approve out-of-state travel for college staff				
State	0	0	0	16
College	0	0	0	15
Governing	0	0	0	3
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	21
39. Approve individual professional-staff salary decisions				
State	0	0	0	17
College	0	0	1	15
Governing	0	0	1	3
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	22
40. Approve tenure and promotion policies				
State	0	0	1	8
College	0	0	1	13
Governing	0	0	1	2
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	5
Coordinating	0	0	1	14

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system			Solely college
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	
41. Award tenure and promotions				
State	0	0	0	17
College	0	0	0	16
Governing	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	0	22
42. Approve mix of faculty by area and rank				
State	0	1	0	16
College <sup>b</sup>	0	0	0	15
Governing	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing <sup>b</sup>	0	1	0	5
Coordinating	0	0	0	22
43. Award or terminate faculty appointments				
State	0	0	0	16
College	0	0	0	16
Governing	0	0	0	4
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	1	21
46. Award or terminate administrative appointments				
State	0	0	0	16
College	0	0	0	15
Governing	0	0	0	3
Coordinating-governing	0	0	0	7
Coordinating	0	0	1	21

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college college	Solely college
47. Award or terminate the appointment of the chief college or multi-college-district executive officer (president)					
State					
College	1	1	1	5	9
Governing	0	0	1	3	12
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	1	2
Coordinating	1	1	0	2	3
0	0	0	1	5	16
48. Approve policies, salaries, and hiring or dismissal of nonprofessional (support) personnel					
State					
College	0	0	1	3	13
Governing	0	1	1	2	12
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	0	3
Coordinating	0	1	0	2	4
0	0	0	1	3	18
50. Conduct collective bargaining with nonprofessional (support) employees					
State					
College	0	0	0	10	7
Governing	1	0	1	2	12
Coordinating-governing	0	0	1	1	2
Coordinating	1	0	0	1	5
0	0	0	0	10	12

Table 7--continued

Governance activity <sup>a</sup> , role level, and system governance structure	Level within state system				
	Solely state	Primarily state	Both equally	Primarily college	Solely college
52. Interpret legislative and executive requirements and insure/implement compliance					
State	1	12	3	1	0
College	0	6	8	2	0
Governing	0	2	1	1	0
Coordinating-governing	0	4	1	2	0
Coordinating	1	12	9	0	0
53. Explain and disseminate to the public information on community college role and educational opportunities					
State	0	0	15	2	0
College	0	0	13	2	1
Governing	0	0	3	0	1
Coordinating-governing	0	0	5	2	0
Coordinating	0	0	20	2	0
55. Evaluate college academic and financial efficiency and productivity in meeting programmatic goals					
State	0	0	16	1	0
College	0	½	10	5	½
Governing	0	0	3	1	0
Coordinating-governing	0	½	3	3	½
Coordinating	0	0	20	2	0

<sup>a</sup>The number of each governance activity is its number on the phase III questionnaire.

<sup>b</sup>One panelist did not indicate a preferred level.

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### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Fred E. Kiehle, III, was born September 10, 1945, near Fort Worth, Texas. His parents are Fred E. Kiehle, Jr. and Frances T. Kiehle. As his father was an officer in the U. S. Marine Corps, he spent his youth in several different areas in the United States, receiving his elementary and secondary schooling in Virginia, Florida, and California. He entered the University of Florida in 1963 and studied there and at Palm Beach Junior College for the B.A., graduating in 1967 with a major in English literature.

He then attended Naval Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island, and received a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve in December, 1967. After further Naval schooling, he served aboard the Pacific Fleet destroyer Lyman K. Swenson as Combat Information Center Officer.

In 1970 he returned to the University of Florida to begin graduate study and earned an M.Ed. in community college English education in 1971. He then commenced doctoral study in higher education administration, continuing on-campus study through 1975. While at the University, he worked in the College of Education's Graduate Studies office, half-time for two years and then full-time, working under the Assistant Dean as the coordinator of nondegree and master's degree programs in the College. In the summer of 1975, he studied full-time as a Kellogg Fellow.

That fall he accepted his current position as an instructor of English at Galveston College, Galveston, Texas. In addition to his teaching and committee work at the community college, he occasionally teaches technical writing at the Moody College of Marine Sciences and Maritime Resources of Texas A. and M. University, also in Galveston.

He and his wife, Mary Jo, live in Galveston with their two sons, Andrew and Tyler.


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
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Educational Administration and Supervision in the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 1979

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