

# The New Type of Senegalese under Construction: Fadel Barro and Aliou Sané on *Yenamarrisme* after Wade

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**Abstract:** Senegal's *Y'en a Marre* movement, formed in early 2011, was instrumental in mobilizing the nation's population, and especially its youth, to participate in the 2012 presidential election and to prevent the incumbent president from hijacking the political institutions and electoral process in order to remain in power. Since the 2012 election, far from evaporating, *Y'en a Marre* has pursued a broader agenda of projects (*chantiers* in French; a *chantier* is a construction site) in support of its objective of fostering an "NTS" (*Nouveau Type de Sénégalais* / New Type of Senegalese). The NTS agenda proceeds from the understanding that strong national institutions can only be founded on a society of responsible and engaged citizens who act with integrity and expect the same from their leaders. The most recognizable public faces of *Y'en a Marre* were those of the noted rap artists at its center, who were often in front of the cameras and behind the microphones during press conferences. Two journalists, however, Fadel Barro and Aliou Sané, are at the core of the movement and are some of the most eloquent spokespeople regarding the philosophy, development, actions, and priorities of its members. In this interview article, Barro and Sané discuss the evolution of *Y'en a Marre* since the 2012 election, including, in particular, the NTS *chantiers* the movement has prioritized: citizen action (citizenship training plus democracy watch), leadership, and entrepreneurship. Barro and Sané explain *Y'en a Marre*'s strategies for social change in Senegal; the growing number of affiliated groups in Africa and among the diaspora in Europe and America; the concrete steps they are taking to realize their plans; and their vision for the future of the movement, the nation, and the continent.

## Introduction

Senegal's *Y'en a Marre* movement, formed in early 2011, was instrumental in mobilizing the nation's population, and especially its youth, to participate in the 2012 presidential election and to prevent the incumbent president, Abdoulaye Wade, from hijacking the political institutions and electoral process in order to remain in power.<sup>1</sup> Since the 2012 election, far from evaporating, *Y'en a Marre* has pursued a broader agenda of projects (*chantiers* in French; a *chantier* is a construction site) in support of its objective of fostering an "NTS" (*Nouveau Type de Sénégalais* / New Type of Senegalese). The NTS agenda proceeds from the understanding that strong national institutions can only be founded on a society of responsible and engaged citizens who act with integrity and demand the same from their leaders. Founding members of the movement and key players in its inner core group, the two journalists Fadel Barro and Aliou Sané have become familiar public figures alongside the noted rap artists with whom *Y'en a Marre* has been identified since its inception. Popular

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v14/v14i3a2.pdf>

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ISSN: 2152-2448

enthusiasm and media attention for the movement have spread beyond Senegal, so that it now has a pan-African and intercontinental presence. Furthermore, the coverage and analysis of the movement has progressed from the press article or broadcast report to the scholarly study and film documentary.<sup>2</sup> In the interviews upon which this article is based, Barro and Sané relate the philosophy, character, and evolution of *Y'en a Marre* as it lays the foundations for a lasting social movement, while still seeking to remain true to its original calling as a protest movement and “sentinel of democracy.”

Certain dates stand out in the brief history (so far) of *Y'en a Marre*—January 16 and 18, 2011; March 19, 2011; June 23, 2011—and *Y'en a Marre* members commonly invoke significant dates for the values they represent to the movement. Whereas January 16 and 18 (genesis of *Y'en a Marre*) or June 23 (mass protests against Wade's attempt to amend the constitution) are important markers of the popular exasperation and mobilization against chronic government corruption, mismanagement, and manipulation that spawned the movement, they are not the dates mentioned by Barro and Sané when they discuss the future of *Y'en a Marre* post-Wade. Following the 2012 presidential election and the success of their efforts to prevent Wade from acceding to what was widely considered an unconstitutional third term in office, *Y'en a Marre* members are now interested in shifting the emphasis in their public image from one of protest and conflict to one of positive, constructive action, and for that reason, both Barro and Sané begin their remarks by invoking the date of March 19, 2011.<sup>3</sup>

### The Interviews

**Fadel Barro:** I think I should start by defining the concept of *Y'en a Marre*. What are we trying to do, what's the philosophy of our current action? There is something important to keep in mind from even before Abdoulaye Wade left office—the date of March 19, 2011, when we launched the concept of the New Type of Senegalese (NTS).<sup>4</sup> We were already saying, in a way, that the many problems faced by the people of Senegal don't just come from Abdoulaye Wade, they go beyond the politicians. It's the whole system, and to change it, we have to take a look at ourselves. We have to examine our own behavior, our habits with regard to the country and to public life. What is our share of the responsibility? That's what motivated our idea of the NTS. Even before Abdoulaye Wade left office, we said that change in Senegal will not come from a political leader, much less from a political party or coalition of parties. Change will come from each Senegalese understanding that the problem of Senegal is his or her problem. So we weren't expecting Macky Sall to come and change everything, that's important to note.

**Aliou Sané:** On March 19, 2011, when we called the Senegalese to a big rally, we launched the manifesto that I consider one of the most important things *Y'en a Marre* has produced. It lays out the basic principles of a citizens' republic for the advent of a New Type of Senegalese. What does that mean? It means that the manifesto addressed not only the state and the role it should play, but it called on the citizen to take a hard look at himself and to say, “I'm fed up with myself” (“*Y'en a marre de moi*”). Fed up with the citizen who sees the problems in the community around him but stands idly by, who does nothing to change things, who takes no action to try to move forward and goad the state to act, who doesn't demand that the state fulfill its side of the contract.

**Sarah Nelson: In your vision of the NTS, what are the roles and the responsibilities of the individual and of the state?**

**FB:** You know, we in *Y'en a Marre* have always said that there is no single system that is right for everyone. People talk about parliamentary systems, presidential systems, semi-presidential ... it's all just theoretical. Africa suffers from that kind of thinking—from trying to simply copy systems that don't conform to our realities. So we can't just choose a system and apply it, but what we can do is express what our people want and how to make our country work based on who we are.

In this country, people come to Dakar and they have no regard for the public good, for traffic laws, for anything. But when they go back to where they're from, be it Medina Baye or Touba or Tivaouane, they may be Christian or atheist, they may live in Fatick or in Casamance in the Sacred Wood—when they go back there, nobody needs to tell them that they're not allowed to urinate here or how they should behave there, because they naturally show respect, it's part of who they are.<sup>5</sup> But when the same guy who respects those codes within his religious community or his family or his ethnic group comes to Dakar and you talk to him about the Constitution, he has no idea what you're talking about. To him, the Constitution has nothing to do with the people, it's a matter for the intellectuals, it's not his concern.

So now how do we start with that reality and build a strong republic based on it? We are not going to be able to answer that question right away, but we can start by proposing new paradigms and reflecting on them. There are good aspects of other systems, and certainly we should be open to them, but how can we alloy them to ourselves, to who we are, in order to build a strong republic that respects itself and that moves forward, for God's sake!

I'll give you a simple example. If the marabout of Touba or of Tivaouane or of Medina Baye calls his disciples to come and work his fields, everyone goes, because according to our mindset as Wolofs, in our tradition, there was something called *tolou bour*.<sup>6</sup> *Tolou bour* means "the king's fields," but the king's fields were the community's fields. Everyone went to work there, and then afterwards, they got something in return. But since that doesn't exist anymore, now they devote that energy to the marabout, who uses it for his own personal gain. What we need is the kind of leader who, without being a marabout, is capable of calling the population to community service in the interest of advancing the country. One problem for Africans, in reality, is that the people who lead them don't identify with them; we've got that problem in Senegal. In my view, that's where we need to go—we need to have states capable of mobilizing the masses in a common project of development, because the masses understand that it's in their interest, that it's done by them and for them; not states made up of political and intellectual elites, who know everything, who plan everything from their offices and just impose it on the population. That's what we've had for fifty-three years now, and what has it done for us? Absolutely nothing! How much money has been invested in Africa and in Senegal? What has it done for us? Absolutely nothing! And even—I've said this to the members of civil society groups, and I said it in front of President Barack Obama—even the civil society groups, how many billions have those people received?<sup>7</sup> Just as African heads of state are responsible for having misappropriated a lot of money, we ought to question all of the civil society types who say, "Work for the community!" but who have not managed to have much of an impact on development, in the end.

We have to come to terms with that. Is it a matter of money, or is it more a problem of attitude, of mentality? I think that Africans, across the board, need to begin developing those alternate paradigms; we need to conceive our states based on who we are and not try to adopt readymade solutions. And I think, honestly, that Macky Sall won't be the one to carry that kind of reflection through to fruition, it won't be this generation of politicians that we have right now. And since we [*Y'en a Marre*] don't want to get involved in politics, then let's work on our *chantiers*.<sup>8</sup> Let's get our youth committed to the task, and since we are lucky enough to have people listen to us, let's get our communities, Senegalese citizens, involved in it, so that they can see that outside of the current power structures, little by little, we can create a different system. It may be that one day the two systems will clash, though we're far from that for the time being—and I hope it would be in a peaceful manner; but if we create the mechanisms and people see that they can take the lead and change things on their own, then our states are bound to follow.

**SN:** On January 18, 2013, Fadel, you observed the second anniversary of the genesis of *Y'en a Marre* by publishing a statement of principles entitled, "*Yenamarrisme* is a philosophy of citizen action."<sup>9</sup> In that piece, you recalled the dynamism and energy deployed during the 2012 elections and asked, "How can we maintain that dynamism? How can we put that energy to work for the country's development and avoid being seduced by the privileges that the new powers can offer, avoid being coopted by the system?" And indeed, although you've been offered government posts under the presidency of Macky Sall, it seems that *Y'en a Marre* leaders are not inclined to pursue the aims of the movement by assuming the responsibility of governing. What is your thinking on this?

**AS:** After all the struggle of that period, the citizens' struggle that led to the second handover of power, President Macky Sall received us and congratulated us and reaffirmed his appreciation of the role we'd played.<sup>10</sup> He thought that we should join his administration by accepting top-level government positions and helping him put in place his agenda. We declined. We thanked him for his appreciation, but we told him that we felt *Y'en a Marre* had another role to play. We need to stay in our role as a sentinel of democracy. In any state, there needs to be a government that sets policy and governs, that guarantees the separation of powers, a strong judicial system, a free and independent press; but there also needs to be a strong public opinion, supported by civil society and social movements, and we felt that to preserve democracy, to allow democracy to thrive in this country, *Y'en a Marre* needed to maintain its sentinel position.

**FB:** The first proposal from the Senegalese government to come and work with them was really an act of corruption. It was March 18, 2011, and Abdoulaye Wade sent someone to talk to me at the central police station to ask me for the first time to "leave those young guys." They said, "You should leave those rappers; all they do is shout insults. You're an intelligent young man with ideas, that's what the president needs, just say the word and we'll make you a government minister." I told them I wasn't interested because I wasn't acting as an individual; it wasn't my person that was important, it was *Y'en a Marre*. That was under Abdoulaye Wade.

After Abdoulaye Wade left, Macky Sall received us when we went to congratulate him. With Macky, it was more a gesture of appreciation, it was not an act of corruption, it must be said. He said, "You contributed a lot to the defeat of Abdoulaye Wade and to my election,

whether you say so or not. You shouldn't be afraid of exercising power—that's how you can change things." That's his point of view. He offered a lot of different things—positions as ministers or ambassadors—but we told him that we appreciated his recognition, and yet we felt we could be much more useful by working on developing that strong public opinion and that critical mass capable of changing the country. We would be abandoning our fight for change if we accepted his offers, and he understood.

There has been another proposal, very recently; the other guys don't even know about it yet. They came back to me and offered a minister gig again, and I told them the same thing. I'm going to talk to the other members about it, but I haven't had the chance yet. Anyway, they tried again to convince me to come and work with Macky Sall. But we know that it's not time yet, and we've decided to keep following the path we're on all the way through to the end because ... well, we're not all that young—I'm thirty-five, I'm not a kid anymore—but at the same time, I'd say I've still got the time to follow this dream through and maybe to make mistakes and start over; but we've started something important, and we need to follow it through. We'll see, you know?

**SN: Can you explain what you're working on now?**

**FB:** After the election of Macky Sall, we decided we needed to organize ourselves so that what we represented was not just theoretical explanations, but concrete actions. We came up with what we called the NTS *chantiers*, the *chantiers* of the New Type of Senegalese. The idea is to channel the energies that young people deployed during the presidential election to get rid of Abdoulaye Wade, and to turn them into a positive force, not only to uphold Senegalese democracy and pursue the struggle for good governance and against corruption, but also to embody the struggle for development.

**AS:** When we formed the *Y'en a Marre* movement, we conceived of the *esprits* and determined what an *esprit* would be.<sup>11</sup> It is a component part of *Y'en a Marre* in a given locality. Each *Y'en a Marre esprit* is composed of at least twenty-five members, of which ten are women. The *esprits* diagnose the problems of their localities and reflect on what they can do by organizing.

**FB:** So the NTS *chantiers* focus on two main areas—citizenship and development. On the citizenship side, we are targeting communication for social change, since it's basically a question of behavior and mentality. We are setting up NTS clubs in schools, in order to nurture ongoing discussion about civic action and the public good among students.

**AS:** The NTS clubs are one of our leading initiatives. Right now, we are doing a lot of speaking in schools, and we help students organize clubs and engage in various kinds of civic actions—things like school improvement projects and returning the national flag to the schools. It can seem like an insignificant detail, but in Senegal now, in primary schools, for example, they no longer fly the national flag. We organize the young people and have them contribute fifty CFA francs each, so that the national flag can fly again in their schools.<sup>12</sup> Instilling respect for the flag and for other emblems of the nation is part of the effort to imbue young people with a sense of civic pride and responsibility, so that they will reject all the small, everyday acts of incivility and corruption, and instead recognize that they have a duty of exemplarity to cultivate, both with regard to the state and within their local communities.

**FB:** Next, we are working with the city of Dakar to launch a competition called "Clean Neighborhoods—it's clean, it's mine" ("Quartiers propres—*c'est propre, c'est ma propriété*"), so

that different neighborhoods in Dakar or in Senegal will compete with each other in civic action, investment in human capital, cleanliness of common spaces, etc.

We are also doing what we call “itinerant popular juries,” where the movement travels around to different places and organizes big forums where the people have a chance to speak.

At the same time, we are developing a watchdog project on democracy and good governance. Our Democracy and Good Governance Watch (*l'Observatoire de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance*) relies on the network of *Y'en a Marre esprits*. We train the *esprit* members in citizen monitoring, in reading budgets, etc., so that they can track what is happening at the local and regional levels. All of that information will be collected on a website we are calling the Monitoring Site (*le Site du monitoring*), which will not only keep track of all the information that is made public, but it will also allow individual Senegalese to participate, to tell how things look from where they sit, and to weigh in on how things are working in their localities.

**AS :** Over the past two months, we have had a lot of discussions with potential partners who could help us implement these plans. We felt it was necessary to organize the whole “Sentinel of Democracy” (*Sentinelle de la démocratie*) component of *Y'en a Marre*, which was an ad-hoc, temporary kind of thing while Abdoulaye Wade was in power, into something more permanent and ongoing. So we wrote a plan for the Democracy and Good Governance Watch project, concerned especially with tracking the follow-through on election promises. It is in the planning stages right now; we have secured funding, and we will launch in August. Our partner is Oxfam, and they have agreed to underwrite a first phase that will involve seven of the twelve regions of Senegal. We will do some training in Dakar, with two or three people from each of the regional *esprit* watch groups. But there will be on-site training, too, where we will go and meet with people where they are, in line with *Y'en a Marre's* emphasis on community action, popular action, which should be as inclusive as possible. By bringing some of the local members to Dakar for training, we're creating a structure that allows the different *esprits* to meet and get to know each other, exchange ideas, share best practices, all of that.

You know, there is a problem right now in all of the regions with the takeover of land by foreign agro-business. The state hands over land to them, and then the populations of the localities find themselves working as hired labor on their own land. For young people in those areas, there will be training on land use processes, so they'll know how it is supposed to work, they'll understand their right to contest improper procedures, and they'll learn to what channels citizens can have recourse.

There is all of this at the local level, but there is also the national level, with Macky Sall and his governance. During the campaign, he made a number of commitments on essential priorities for the Senegalese people. We will be able to keep track of his progress on the Monitoring Site. If there are areas of positive movement, we will definitely recognize them, but we'll also point out where things are not moving forward; and then every three months, we will be publishing what we're calling “Citizens’ Reports” on all of those questions.

### **SN: Is this effort at government accountability something entirely new in Senegal?**

**AS:** No, it's not new. There was a platform like this during the last election, called SUNU 2012, and others, too. We didn't invent the idea, other people have done it, but for the most part, it has been short-term efforts. And then besides that, generally with those other efforts,

people developed them and the youth were the target audience for what had been developed upstream from them, they just helped carry it out; but here, the young people are leading the process from start to finish. There is another interesting site that's been developed now, called "Mackymètre."<sup>13</sup> It's a site that tracks what Macky Sall is getting done, but we think it's too elitist; it's not very understandable, it's not inviting for ordinary people. So anyway, what we're doing is not new, but what's different about it is that we're making it an ongoing project, with young people at the helm, accessible and welcoming to ordinary people, and then finally there's the local aspect—we're providing a window on even the smallest localities, and that was not a feature of what's been developed before.

**SN:** Everything you've explained so far relates to the *chantiers* of citizen action. What about the *chantiers* for economic development?

**FB:** As part of the *chantier* of leadership and entrepreneurship, we're developing something called "initiative core groups" ("noyaux d'initiative"). We help young people group together and pool their problems, or the problems of their localities, but especially we help them pool their resources: their human capacity—what they can do, what training they have had, what training they still need—and also the possibilities offered by their local area. We organize them into little development units, the initiative core groups. In concrete terms, what are the groups doing? For example, in Kaolack, there are groups working on salt production, and in Thiès, there is a group working to produce chalk, which is being imported now, but the resources are there to produce it locally.

And in Gadiol, there is an initiative core group working to commercialize new fishery resources. You know, in 2003 there was flooding threatening to engulf much of Saint-Louis, and so to save the city, the president at the time, Abdoulaye Wade, opened a breach in the Barbary Tongue.<sup>14</sup> The breach was ten meters wide at first, but today it has grown to three kilometers. So the Atlantic Ocean is washing away the Barbary Tongue, and whole villages on the coast along with it; there is a village called Doune Baba Dièye that has been wiped off the map. So there are populations there who used to live off of agriculture and freshwater fisheries in the Senegal River, who now are losing their fields and dealing with the salination of the water and land. Well, when we went there to meet with the *Y'en a Marre esprit* and the young people of Gadiol, we all said to ourselves that this doesn't have to be an inevitable catastrophe. We asked ourselves how we could turn this manmade disaster to our advantage. Because I like to say that we *Yenamarristes*, we try to change the situation of young Africans from a burden to a resource, a means, an energy source; that's what I said to President Barack Obama, and it appealed to him very much.

So with that philosophy in mind, we noticed in Gadiol that along with the ocean water came some marine species that people had never seen there before, such as mullet and a new kind of oyster. The oyster is of a very high quality, and mullet eggs bring 25,000 CFA francs on the market; so we have an initiative core group pooling their individual contributions right now and gearing up to go into business selling the mullet, mullet eggs, and oysters. In addition to that, they are in an attractive tourist area, but it's not very well known. We told them, if you clean up your village and make it attractive, you can develop a kind of socially responsible tourism that would benefit the local population, as opposed to what there is now, which is big hotels on the Barbary Tongue, where the tourists go directly and don't even interact with the population. So we started another initiative core group to work on developing that kind of tourism. They have already begun fixing up the village,

and they are going to set up a small information office at the entrance to the village, where people can find out about possible activities, including things like going to see the women who harvest salt or grow onions. So it would offer an alternative to the high-end kind of tourism that exists now.

**AS:** I can give you another example. In Niety Mbar—in the *esprit* of Pikine Niety Mbar—there are a number of guys who are maybe eighteen, twenty, twenty-five years old. Their dream is to succeed in traditional Senegalese wrestling, and they spend a lot of time at the beach, lifting weights, building up their muscles. But it's hard to break into wrestling, and most of the guys don't have much chance of making it. So what happens? Those are the guys—big, muscular guys—that the politicians use to settle their disputes with each other; they arm them and send them off to assault people.

Well, some of those guys came to us and said, "Organize us." So we organized them into an initiative core group, and they all started contributing 500 CFA francs a week, and eventually they had enough to start their business. They bought uniforms and they set themselves up as a formal, legally established security agency; they contract with all the *Y'en a Marre* artists to provide security at concerts, and they're paid for their work.

**FB:** And the latest initiative core group that we've set up is our agricultural project. Right now, I'm doing the paperwork to access land in the Senegal River valley and in the Saloum to grow rice and sesame.<sup>15</sup> By 2015, we want to be producing NTS rice, grown here and consumed here. We'll start with small plots of land that will be farmed by young people who leave Dakar to work there and also by people who live there already. Maybe eventually it will grow into real agro-business with large operations, but for now we need to start small, it's the symbolism of producing our own NTS food that is most important. And just today, President Obama told us that he is prepared to provide us with technological support for the development of our agricultural projects.

So that's our approach—trying to see how we can build on who we are and what we have, on the strength of our ingenuity and commitment; because we like to say that to develop this country, it takes ingenuity and commitment, and money will come after. *Y'en a Marre* is interested in pursuing these concrete development projects, in addition to playing our role as sentinel of democracy. We don't want to just focus on what Macky Sall is doing and throw stones, because if that's all we do, we won't have much to show for it in the end.

**SN: Can you tell me about your recent meeting with President Obama?**<sup>16</sup>

**FB:** I explained to him everything we're doing, and he was very supportive. He said, "Be strong." And he even talked about *Y'en a Marre* later in his speech at the University of Cape Town. So clearly, he really understood what I was saying, and he was very proud and very supportive.

**SN: Your work is right in line with the kind of community organizing he did early in his career.**

**FB:** Yes, that's right. He didn't mention that to me, but the people who were there talked about it afterwards. When I talked to him, Obama paid really close attention to what I was saying, and it made a strong impression on him. In fact, someone said to me, "You remind the president of his youth."

**SN:** I'm pleased to hear that the Obama administration has offered support for your agricultural projects. In general, though, it sounds as if the main financing of *Y'en a Marre* projects comes simply from the contributions of its members--is that right?

**FB:** Yes, for the initiative core groups; for the moment, all we've asked for from the NGOs is technical support on those projects. But for the Democracy Watch, it takes a lot of money because we need offices, we need to train the young people, we need to supply them with things, etc. For that, Oxfam of the Netherlands is supporting us. But for the initiative core groups, the development projects, we just want the young people to get off the ground on their own. That's the only way they can have a chance of lasting. If someone just hands them the means to start up, nothing will change; they'll start, they'll use up all the money, and that will be that.

**SN:** *Y'en a Marre* has recognized that a major problem at the heart of Senegalese politics is that parties are organized around leaders and systems of patronage, rather than around ideological or ethical principles. Power and personality have mattered more than democratic ideals. The cult of personality is also common in the world of musicians and performers. How has *Y'en a Marre* worked to avoid a culture of stardom and celebrity in the movement, and to keep the artists' fans focused on the common aims that motivate them to action?

**AS:** First of all, I would add to your remark about Senegalese politics that even in the realm of civil society, groups have been centered on single personalities; take, for example, RADDHO—if you mention RADDHO in Senegal, everyone thinks of Alioune Tine.<sup>17</sup> And in politics, when young people got involved, it was normally within a partisan context, so that whatever they did, it was aimed at pleasing the party leader. So when the Macky Sall youth snipe at *Y'en a Marre*, they're doing it to curry favor with him.

*Y'en a Marre* has managed to create a different dynamic. You can see it even in the structure of the organization: there is no single person who is *Y'en a Marre*. We have an inner core group, which we've now broadened to include some coordinators from various *esprits*; we have a structure we call the General Assembly, where all of the important decisions are made; but around that inner core, we have sprouted *Y'en a Marre esprits* everywhere, and the idea with those *esprits* is to create leaders everywhere. So *Y'en a Marre* has lots of leaders. If I, Aliou Sané, mess up as a leader, the movement goes on; if Fadel messes up, the movement goes on; if Thiat messes up, the movement goes on; if Malal messes up, the movement goes on.<sup>18</sup> Whereas today if Macky Sall were to mess up, the APR would be dead.<sup>19</sup> If Alioune Tine messed up, RADDHO would be dead. That's the great thing about *Y'en a Marre*, I think, and the thing we need to maintain at all cost.

**SN:** *Y'en a Marre* is known as a youth movement. Going forward, is it important for the group to maintain that character, or to broaden and include people of all ages?

**AS:** All ages, it's very inclusive. At the beginning, everyone saw *Y'en a Marre* as just a youth movement, but it's changing. Last Saturday, we were invited to a conference where *Y'en a Marre* was recognized as Model Leader for 2013, and there was an old man there—the imam of Rufisque, he's almost seventy-five; he came with the Rufisque *esprit*, and he spoke at the conference and said that whatever *Y'en a Marre* does in Rufisque, he takes part in it.<sup>20</sup>

**SN:** Do women take part in *Y'en a Marre*? I see far fewer women than men in photos of *Y'en a Marre* gatherings. Ideally, would you see them participating in equal numbers to men, and if so, what are the barriers to that?

**AS:** From the start, when we composed the charter that sets the rules for the formation of *esprits*, we specified that of the twenty-five members needed to found an *esprit*, at least ten needed to be women. So you can see that right from the start, we saw the need to promote the emergence of women leaders and broad participation by women.

However, we take a different approach from that of the politicians who harp on the idea of parity and who go hunting for women that they can hold up as tokens. And then there's another thing. Why have the women in the movement been less visible? It's because unfortunately, at the start of the movement, our peaceful civil action was met by the state with extreme violence, which caused the death of thirteen people in Senegal. In that context, it was very difficult for the women to be out in front.

But there are great women at the heart of the movement. Sofia—Denise Sow—was there the day the movement was born, and she does extraordinary work. She's the one behind all of the social media—the Facebook page, the website during the campaign—and she always kept us in line. When things got tense she reminded us we needed to stick together, she did an incredible job.<sup>21</sup> But she never wanted to be in the spotlight. Sometimes we really pushed her to come forward and speak to the press, but she always preferred to stay in the shadows and just do her part. At the award ceremony last Saturday, she finally spoke publicly for the first time. And in fact, she said that she is not a supporter of the parity approach, because it feels to her like an indirect way of accepting a certain inferiority for women. Women have a leading role to play, just like men, and they need to simply assume it, rather than waiting to be invited in. She pointed to herself as an example; she fought alongside everyone else, and today she's there whenever decisions are being made for the movement, her opinion holds sway, people listen to her. And there are other women coming to the fore now, too—there is Seynabou Sy Ndiaye, who was in the *esprit* of Gaston Berger University in Saint-Louis and who is now in Dakar working on her doctorate in sociology, for example, and there are many more.

**FB:** Yes, it's true that there are fewer women than men in the movement, for various reasons. You can't force a change, you have to let it develop; we invite women's participation, we're giving them responsibilities, and little by little their participation will increase. It's also worth noting that it takes time and practice to build political and organizing skills. In the past, there have been lots of mediocre politicians who were all men. So we need to give women the latitude to be mediocre before they become skilled, just like men.

**SN:** In an article entitled, "Urban Youth and Senegalese Politics: Dakar 1988-1994," author Mamadou Diouf identifies two distinct groups of urban youth, which he refers to as students and marginalized youth (*déclassés*).<sup>22</sup> To what extent does *Y'en a Marre* merge those two groups? Clearly, you and the other leaders of the movement have high levels of education and model a respect for knowledge and informed analysis. Do the rest of the movement's participants also have a higher level of education than the average in Senegalese society, or do you see the movement as a cross-section of society?

**AS:** I would say without hesitation that it is representative of society as a whole, and that's what's so interesting about it. *Y'en a Marre* forms a bridge between Aliou Sané who has an advanced degree in communication, Cheikh Fadel who has an advanced degree in

communication, Malal who has a degree in English, ... and Ibou who is a street vendor and who is also in the inner core group. Honestly, if it weren't for *Y'en a Marre*, he and I would never have encountered each other anywhere, because we're just not on the same paths in life.

Just yesterday, there was someone from the Kaolack *esprit* who came to the coordination meeting to present an agricultural project to us. He saw an opportunity in his area to grow sesame and sell it to a group of Chinese merchants. He presented his idea to us, and now he is working with Julien, who is a young *Yenamarriste* with a master's in political science. So this young *Yenamarriste* who's a farmer comes from Kaolack with an idea for a project, and he can work with Julien, who has done advanced studies, to define the project, study the feasibility, and put it all down on paper so that we can examine it and see how to move forward together. The structure of *Y'en a Marre* allows that collaboration to happen.

**SN:** In "Yenamarrisme is a philosophy of citizen action," Fadel said, "The Senegalese social contract can be conceived as a triangular relationship between the politicians, the citizens, and the marabouts." Do you have an image in mind of an NTM--a new type of marabout? Or, alternatively, would the NTS have a different kind of relationship with the marabouts than in the past?

**FB:** You know, this kind of marabout, it's a pretty recent phenomenon in Senegal, actually. It took hold in the mid-twentieth century. Touba was created towards the end of colonization.<sup>23</sup> When the colonizer dominated the kings in Senegal, the kings tried to shore up their power by allying themselves with the marabouts, and they all started marrying into marabout families. At the same time, the people looked to the religious leaders as figures of cultural resistance against the colonial regime, which made the kings all the more interested in allying themselves with the power and respect the marabouts commanded among the population. So that's how this system got started, but it's evolved today into a system where the marabouts pursue their own interests, and the politicians are complicit. They all come to Touba to present their proposals, since as long as they have the blessing of the marabout, they can do what they please. We need to work toward a system where the marabouts, instead of issuing voting directives to their followers, issue citizenship directives. Or at the very least, we can try for greater transparency; we have no way of knowing anything about all of the money at play in the system. In the U.S., there are lobbyists and there is a lot of money poured into the system, but at least people can find out about it—you're required to declare it.<sup>24</sup>

Anyway, the reality of the political system in Senegal is that the marabouts are present, and they are influential. A system such as the one we have right now, which is closely modeled on the French system, cannot properly deal with that reality because it does not exist in France. Just because Montesquieu said something, does not make it universal truth. Montesquieu was not familiar with marabouts. What he said was great, and we can apply parts of it, but it is up to us to build our own system that reflects our realities.

**AS:** The marabouts represent a real power in this country, and we have to take that into account. The line we take is that we need to break with the type of marabout who cozies up to the political class, who receives large sums of money from them, and who issues voting directives to his followers on the eve of the election. In our view, the marabouts' power should be put to a better use—to exhort their *talibés*, their disciples, to be good citizens, to be NTS, and to work to preserve democracy. We think that new types of marabouts need to

emerge, and there are indeed some marabouts who say so, too, now. For example, the grand caliph of Touba has said things to that effect; in his general attitude, he has distanced himself from the politicians, and he did not issue a voting directive. At the time of the elections, we went to meet with him, and we explained our position on the question. But there are mid-level marabouts who continue to trade on their status in the old way. However, there is something else that is changing, and that is that there are more and more citizens who are becoming conscious of this problem and who are drawing the line between their religious and political lives. They are coming to see that they can have a spiritual connection with their marabout and still have the freedom to make up their own minds on political candidates. There are a lot of people who think this way now, but *Y'en a Marre* is still one of the few entities to say it openly because it is still a sensitive question.

**SN:** *Y'en a Marre* is extending its influence beyond the borders of Senegal, isn't it? You've been traveling quite a bit to meet with *Yenamarristes* in other countries.

**FB:** Yes, we're working with *Yenamarristes* elsewhere in Africa. The idea is to talk to each other and organize so we're all on the same wavelength and speaking in the same terms, and then also to draw inspiration from each other.

**AS:** We've been traveling a lot, especially in Africa. Thiat and Kilifeu just came back from Burkina Faso, where they helped organize a march last Saturday against the establishment of a senate where the president could install his cronies.<sup>25</sup> I've been twice to Tunisia, and I've been to Ivory Coast, where I led an integrity camp for forty young Africans and told them about the experiences of *Y'en a Marre*. There are movements now in lots of other countries—Burkina, Togo, Gabon, Mali ... They're not all called "*Y'en a Marre*"; some are, but there are other names, like "Etiamé," "Ça suffit," the "Sofas," etc. Anyway, there are a lot of similar movements being created in Africa, and we have put in place a working group that will network with those African brothers and organize a big gathering in Bamako for sometime next year. We want to come together to perhaps develop a common roadmap in certain areas, because we realize that most African states share some of the same problems—problems of political leadership and governance—so we would like to generate synergy on a pan-African scale to work for the emergence of a New Type of African, too.

**FB:** And then on June 1, 2013, we held an international meeting in Paris that brought together the diaspora in Europe—the Forum of *Y'en a Marre Esprits* in Europe (FEYE).

**AS:** At the forum we discussed the problems of African emigrants and students in Europe, and a lot of ideas came out of the exchanges, which can be proposed to the entities responsible for addressing those concerns. And there was also an intergenerational dialogue that took place there, a discussion between *Yenamarristes* and people of older generations. There was Lamine Diack, the Senegalese head of the IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations); his generation also did a lot of important work on citizenship issues in their day, but they suffered setbacks. How can we learn from both their successes and their failures? In *Y'en a Marre*, we're not trying to say that we young people have all the answers; we can learn a lot from our elders.

And do you know what was great about that forum? There were young *Yenamarristes* who come from very disadvantaged backgrounds, who are not educated, who have never traveled before, and those young people had the chance to get on a plane, go to Europe, meet with their Senegalese brothers over there and with other European brothers, and share

ideas about the challenges of our time. That was something I really liked. For those young people to be able to widen their horizons, to participate in something like that in Paris and then come back home—that's another great thing about *Y'en a Marre*.

**SN:** What would it look like if the goals of *Y'en a Marre* were attained? How would your children's problems be different from yours?

**FB:** We would see an engaged citizenry, people would live well. Those are the large goals towards which *Y'en a Marre* is working, but we are not yet accepted across the breadth of society. People think that *Y'en a Marre* is all about negativity, that all we know how to do is say no, that we don't do anything. That's why we are concentrating on these *chantiers*. We can make speeches about grand ideas, but what we really need to do is to concentrate on what is possible, what's feasible. Our *chantiers* are concrete things that we can actually do. We can form clubs in the schools, we can organize neighborhood competitions, we can create initiative core groups, and we can develop the Democracy and Good Government Watch project. It's difficult work, and it will take a very, very long time, but that's what will change people's minds.

**AS:** We feel quite sure that we won't be the ones to reap the rewards of the struggle we're in right now. But we're fighting so our children and grandchildren can grow up in a country where the citizen is at the center of the republic, a country where the separation of powers and good governance are the rule in the conduct of public affairs. A country where there is rigor and discipline at every level of society. Above all, we want our children to be able to thrive and flourish in a society of justice, law, peace, and progress for all, a society that works and produces wealth and opportunity equitably for all its sons and daughters, without preference or discrimination.

**POSTSCRIPT:** Just a couple of minutes into the interview with Aliou Sané, the power suddenly went out on his end of the Skype session and he was plunged into darkness.

**AS:** You see? We're still saying, "Y'en a marre!"

**SN:** Does it happen often?

**AS:** No, no, I must admit that it's gotten much less frequent now. I hope that will last. It's been a long time since there have been any power outages here at my house.

**SN:** Why? What's made the difference, do you think?

**AS:** Well, I think the current government—I guess they realize that the electricity problem was a source of social tension. If you recall, after June 23 in Senegal, the reason there were riots here in Dakar—it was chaos on June 27, 2011—was because there had been mass power outages. All of Dakar was in the dark, and frankly, people were upset, and they went into the streets to protest. I think the government realizes they have to be careful about that. Now, there is certainly no permanent solution to the problem yet, but they are working on making the outages a thing of the past. I know there's no permanent fix yet, but, well, they realize that they'd better supply electricity to people's homes because if they don't, the protests can mobilize again.

## Conclusions

As Aliou Sané readily recognizes, *Y'en a Marre* is not the first movement in Senegal or in the region to have pursued aims of promoting good governance, an engaged electorate, economic self-determination, or individual initiative. In the interview, Sané refers specifically to other watchdog efforts that have been mounted around the 2012 election and since, but *Y'en a Marre* also fits into a somewhat longer history of youth action in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa.<sup>26</sup> The generation of West Africans born after independence came to the fore in the 1980s, and throughout the region, countries saw student strikes disruptive enough to cause the cancellation of entire academic years. In Senegal, Abdou Diouf succeeded Léopold Sédar Senghor in 1981, and although the country had officially adopted a multiparty system, the continued dominance of the Socialist Party (PS), in combination with a worsening economy, left young people disenchanted with the official structures of *encadrement*—the government-sponsored youth organizations meant to contain and channel the youth in ways supportive of the ruling party. Rather than engaging in activities under the aegis of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, young Senegalese created their own local “athletic and cultural associations” (*associations sportives et culturelles*, ASCs), through which they undertook neighborhood cleanup and beautification projects, they offered education, they contended with providers of public utilities and transportation, they built playgrounds and established libraries, and they ventured into professional training through the creation of economic interest groups (*groupements d'intérêt économique*, GIEs) and small and medium-sized businesses (*petites et moyennes entreprises*, PMEs).<sup>27</sup>

The affinities between the approach of the ASCs and that of *Y'en a Marre* are evident when Fadel Barro points to the kinds of *chantiers* that *Y'en a Marre* is launching—“we can form clubs in the schools, we can organize neighborhood competitions, we can create initiative core groups, and we can develop the Democracy and Good Government Watch project.” Another notable antecedent to *Y'en a Marre*'s initiatives was a collective effort known as *Set/Setal* (*set* = clean, *setal* = to clean up), which began after a period of torrential rains in Dakar in September 1990.<sup>28</sup> Historian Mamadou Diouf defines it as:

[T]he mobilization of human effort for the purpose of cleansing in the sense of sanitation and hygiene, but also in the moral sense of the fight against corruption, prostitution, and delinquency. The movement's primary concern was to rehabilitate local surroundings and remove garbage and filth. It also undertook to embellish these sites, sometimes naming them, often marking them with stele and monuments to bear witness by recalling moments or figures from local history or appealing to the private memories of families or youth associations. *Set/Setal* is clearly a youth movement and a local movement...<sup>29</sup>

In its fusion of outward and inward cleansing, the concept of *Set/Setal* resembles that of the NTS, which also involves outward and inward change. A participant expressed this essential fusion, as well as the primacy of citizen action over state control which *Set/Setal* represented:

*Set/Setal* is in the hearts and souls of all young people. If people think that [d]oing *Set/Setal* is simply sweeping the streets and painting the walls, they are mistaken because there are people paid to do that. You can't make street-sweepers out of every one of us. The authorities haven't understood a thing.

They don't know how to listen. To do *Set/Setal* is to rid ourselves of this colonial heritage that regulates our way of being, of conceptualizing things. *Set/Setal* is an absolute obligation to find a way out and this necessity to express new concepts in a new language, in this struggle for life.<sup>30</sup>

In its political action, too, there is clear continuity between *Y'en a Marre* and its antecedents, but also a clear attempt to reject certain aspects of them and choose another path. For *Yenamarristes*, who were born around 1980 or later, there had been a single party (the PS) and a single man (Abdou Diouf) in power for their whole lives, when finally in 2000 Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) succeeded in unseating Diouf, after having been the perennial second-place finisher in every presidential election since 1978. Wade's Sopi ("change" in Wolof) movement had rallied strong youth support in the 1988 and 1993 elections, and Wade had benefitted very significantly in 2000 from the highly visible support of a number of well known rap artists. The hope among his young supporters was that Wade truly would bring a change to the stagnant economic situation and extremely high unemployment rates among youth, even those with higher degrees. Well before his bid for reelection in 2007, however, it had become clear to those supporters that Wade's government was every bit as corrupt and rife with self-dealing as the one it had replaced. The rappers who had helped Wade win election in 2000 (Didier Awadi of Positive Black Soul, Keyti, Xuman, etc.) opposed him in 2007, but he won anyway in the first round of voting, with 56 percent of the vote.<sup>31</sup>

When the founding members of *Y'en a Marre* conceived the movement in early 2011, they could look to the successful example of a hip hop-led movement in 2000, but they could also be guided by the cautionary example of 1988, when youth support was not enough to propel Wade's Sopi movement to victory over Diouf, and what followed was a prolonged period of serious violence. *Y'en a Marre* concientedly steered away from violence, from their early initiative called *Daas Fananal*, "My voting card, my weapon," throughout the period up to and through the 2012 election. In this, as in several other particulars that are both explicit and implicit in the above remarks by Barro and Sané, the leaders of *Y'en a Marre* have been at pains to counter the criticisms leveled at them and to confound the negative assumptions about "a bunch of rappers" trying to lead a movement. In their book on *Y'en a Marre*, published just eight months after the electoral victory of Macky Sall over Abdoulaye Wade, Vieux Savané and Baye Makébé Sarr express a number of those criticisms.<sup>32</sup> They contend that an outmoded, non-participatory model of decision-making hampers the group's effectiveness, with a hermetic inner core group (the *noyau dur*) of old buddies calling all the shots. In an implicit reply to this observation, Aliou Sané emphasizes in the interview the increasing age, gender, and class inclusivity of the movement. Savané and Sarr remark on what they see as an excessive tendency to court the media and to make grandiose declarations at the expense of real and effective action. Fadel Barro responds explicitly to this common accusation near the end of his comments above, by contending that now in the post-election evolution of the group, they are devoting themselves almost entirely to working on their *chantiers*. Savané and Sarr end their book with a challenge to *Y'en a Marre* to remain true to their mission of citizen action and democracy watch and not to succumb to the temptation of exercising power in their own right. Barro explains in some detail that this is precisely what they intend to keep doing.

Perhaps the most pervasive motive for disapproval or denigration of *Y'en a Marre*, which Savané and Sarr do not espouse themselves, is simply the negative reaction among

some Senegalese, and probably particularly among older generations, to the group's youth and to the hip hop identity of its leaders and many members. This is a manifestation of the contestation over the traditional relationships between juniors and seniors, a contestation which is prevalent throughout West Africa and which has been the object of much scholarly attention.<sup>33</sup> Each side of the relationship has criticism to direct at the other—the seniors see the unemployed youth who spend their days drinking tea as lazy and disrespectful, and their hip hop lifestyle, as un-Islamic.<sup>34</sup> The juniors lament their inability to find decent work, even after having completed the studies that were to have prepared them for it, and they hold responsible their elders—government authorities and others with power—for this state of affairs, which keeps them in a forced suspended adolescence. Further, they defend hip hop as educational, as entirely compatible with Islam, and as a vehicle of engaged discourse, consciousness-raising, integrity, truth, and authenticity.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, much of West African rap is focused on that kind of serious mission, more so than the imported American varieties. Rap is the idiom of recent generations in West Africa. Some significant segment of U.S. youth may get their news from satirists like Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert, but Senegalese youth watch the "rap newscast" (*journal rappé*) presented by well known, politically conscious artists Xuman, rapping in French, and Keyti, in Wolof.<sup>36</sup> *Y'en a Marre* appears on the *journal rappé* as the subject of reports, and its leading members—Thiat, Fou Malade, Simon—also contribute rap commentary.

Thiat of the group Keur Gui (Omar Cyril Touré) is an exceptionally eloquent spokesman for the aims of *Y'en a Marre*, and a serious, focused, and disciplined practitioner of socially conscious rap, all of which has landed him in jail both before and since the genesis of *Y'en a Marre*. On July 23, 2011, Thiat addressed a crowd assembled to renew the call for Wade to respect the Senegalese constitution and withdraw his candidacy. The date was chosen to recall the events of one month earlier, June 23, when Wade had made his abortive attempt to change the constitution. Thiat was promptly detained after his appearance because of a remark he made to the crowd. Speaking in Wolof, he put a twist on a well known maxim from the seventeenth-century Wolof philosopher Kocc Barma Fall. The maxim is, "An elder is always useful in a community" (*Mag mat naa bayi cim reww*). Thiat's twist was to add, "unless the elder is a liar," in reference to President Wade.<sup>37</sup> The fact that this rather tame, erudite affront could result in Thiat's detention is particularly rich, given that the story from which the maxim comes is a tale about the philosopher's being unjustly condemned to death for having defied a tyrant.

In an interview that Thiat did in Burkina Faso in summer 2013, he was asked about the reasons for his expressed admiration of the Burkinabé Thomas Sankara.<sup>38</sup> He might have noted Sankara's youth: he was just thirty-three when he became president and thirty-seven at his death, but Thiat cited three other reasons: Sankara's defense of women's rights; his policy of "consuming what we produce and producing what we consume" as the true path to African independence; and his courage in standing up to *la Françafrique*, the system of France's neocolonial domination of Burkina Faso and its neighbors. In Thiat's use of Wolof or Burkinabé wisdom to communicate his vision for Africa, and in Aliou Sané's and Fadel Barro's explanations of the civic and economic *chantiers* being pursued by a progressively more inclusive *Y'en a Marre*, one can glimpse the construction of a New Type of Senegalese, which indeed appears to be underway.

## Notes

- 1 The French expression “*y'en a marre*” is used to express exasperation, the idea of being “fed up.” This movement’s adoption of the name echoes a well known song by the Ivorian rapper Tiken Jah Fakoly, “Y’en a marre,” which pillories corrupt African states and the effects of abusive globalization on suffering populations.
- 2 Note, for example, the present ASQ special issue, as well as the book *Y'en a marre. Radioscopie d'une jeunesse insurgée au Sénégal* (L'Harmattan, 2012), by Vieux Savané and Baye Makébé Sarr, and the film by Audrey Gallet, *Boy Saloum. La révolte des Y'en a marre* (2013).
- 3 The remarks presented in this article come from separate interviews conducted over Skype on July 4 (Sané) and July 9 (Barro), 2013. The interviews were conducted in French, and all translation to English is by the author. Interview transcripts are in the author’s possession. Thanks to an International Faculty Development Seminar organized by the international education consortium CIEE, the author had visited Senegal and met Fadel Barro, Aliou Sané, and other members of *Y'en a Marre* in June 2011, just before the June 23<sup>rd</sup> massed protests against Wade.
- 4 It should be noted that the choice of March 19 for the announcement of *Y'en a Marre*’s NTS initiative was significant in itself. March 19, 2000, was the date of Abdoulaye Wade’s election to his first term as president, and his supporters had been celebrating the anniversary of that event each year since 2000.
- 5 All of the places to which Barro refers here are important spiritual centers for different groups within Senegalese society. Medina Baye, Touba, and Tivaouane are holy cities for the two largest Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal—Medina Baye (in Kaolack) and Tivaouane are centers of Tijaniyya (connected with the spiritual leaders Ibrahim Niasse and El-Hadji Malick Sy, respectively), and Touba is the center of Mouridism founded by Cheikh Amadou Bamba. Fatick is a center of Serer population and religion, with holy sites where traditional ceremonies are held. The Casamance region in the south of Senegal is an area of Diola population and more is animist and Christian in religion than Islamic; the Sacred Wood in the Casamance is the site of important mass initiation ceremonies for young Diola men, which happen only once a generation.
- 6 A marabout is a spiritual leader and teacher in the Sufi tradition of Islam and in the Senegalese brotherhoods, which follow that tradition. The term can be applied to wandering ascetic holy men and to teachers in Quranic schools; here, Barro is referring to the leaders at different levels in the hierarchies of the Muslim brotherhoods.
- 7 Fadel Barro was one of thirteen representatives of Senegalese civil society groups who met with President Obama on June 27, 2013, at the Gorée Institute on Gorée Island, during Obama’s visit to Senegal.
- 8 In the period following the election, *Y'en a Marre* drew up a plan of action centered on a series of *chantiers*, or projects. The word is left untranslated in this article because it represents a deliberate choice of terminology by the *Yenamarristes*, and it evokes the notion of things being under construction.
- 9 The statement was published on the same day in many different Senegalese newspapers and news sites, including the one cited in the bibliography below. It can also be found on the movement’s Facebook page, where it was posted on January 26, 2013.

- 10 The first handover of power was in 2000, when Abdoulaye Wade and his party, the Senegalese Democratic Party (*Parti démocratique sénégalais*, PDS), were elected and replaced the Socialist Party (*Parti socialiste*, PS), which had been in power since independence in 1960, through the presidencies of Léopold Sédar Senghor and Abdou Diouf.
- 11 “*Esprit*” is the term chosen by *Y'en a Marre* for the local affiliates of the movement. The word in French means “spirit” or “mind.” It is left untranslated in this article because the use of the term in this way is unique to *Y'en a Marre*.
- 12 The West African CFA franc is the currency used in Senegal, and its exchange rate is pegged to the euro, so its value relative to the U.S. dollar varies somewhat; but the exchange rate with the dollar is roughly 500 CFA francs to one dollar. Thus, 50 francs would be approximately equivalent to 10 cents.
- 13 See <http://www.mackymetre.com/>.
- 14 The Barbary Tongue (*la langue de Barbarie*) is a spit of sand thirty kilometers long running parallel to the coast of northern Senegal from Saint-Louis southward and separating the Atlantic Ocean from the last stretch of the Senegal River as it reaches its mouth.
- 15 The Senegal River forms the northern border of Senegal, and the Saloum is in the central part of the country, where the precolonial Kingdom of Saloum was. The Saloum River flows westward through Kaolack to the Saloum Delta and the Atlantic Ocean.
- 16 For Radio France International coverage of the June 27, 2013 Obama-Barro meeting, see <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130629-fadel-barro-senegal-y-marre-obama-est-president-sympa-attentif>.
- 17 RADDHO: *Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme* / African Encounter for the Defense of Human Rights. Alioune Tine is a well known Senegalese activist in defense of human rights and good governance. He was an organizer of the group M23 (*Mouvement du 23 juin* / Movement of June 23), which brought together a number of civil society groups to oppose the 2012 candidacy of Abdoulaye Wade, alongside *Y'en a Marre*.
- 18 Besides himself and Fadel Barro, Aliou Sané names two other core members of *Y'en a Marre*—Thiat of the rap group Keur Gui (Omar Cyril Touré), and Malal Tallak aka Fou Malade.
- 19 APR: *Alliance pour la République* /Alliance for the Republic, the party of President Macky Sall.
- 20 On Saturday, June 29, 2013, *Y'en a Marre* was honored as “Model Leader for 2013” by the NGO LEAD Afrique Francophone.
- 21 Sofia is the narrator of the story of Keur Gui and *Y'en a Marre*, as it is told in the documentary film by Audrey Gallet, *Boy Saloum*.
- 22 Diouf 1996, pp. 230-35.
- 23 Indeed, the city of Touba was built up only after the death of Cheikh Amadou Bamba (1853-1927), the founder of Mouridism. It is on the site where he experienced a vision in 1887; he is buried there, and the Great Mosque of Touba, completed in 1963, was built next to his tomb. The Tijani leaders associated with Medina Baye and Tivaouane were of similarly recent generations: Ibrahima Niasse (Medina Baye, 1900-1975) and El-Hadji Malick Sy (Tivaouane, 1855-1922).

- 24 Granted, this is perhaps an overly rosy view of the transparency of financial influence on electoral politics in the U.S., particularly after the 2010 Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
- 25 Thiat and Kilifeu are the two members of Keur Gui. The name of the group means “the house” in Wolof, Thiat (pronounced like “chat”) means “little brother,” and Kilifeu means “big brother.”
- 26 See Diouf 1996, 2003, 2005.
- 27 Diouf 1996, pp. 232-36; 2003, pp. 7-8.
- 28 Diouf 1996, pp. 243-49; 2005.
- 29 Diouf 1996, p. 243.
- 30 From an interview reported in Diallo 1993, p. 213, as quoted in Diouf 1996, p. 245.
- 31 For an account of rap artists’ involvement in the 2000 and 2007 elections, see the documentary film *African Underground: Democracy in Dakar*.
- 32 Savané and Sarr 2012, pp. 71-87.
- 33 For just a few examples, see Ralph 2008, on Senegal; Newell 2012, on Ivory Coast; Soares 2010, on Mali; and Masquelier 1999, 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, and 2013b, on Niger.
- 34 On attitudes around tea-drinking, see Ralph 2008, and Masquelier 2013b. The most extensive discussion of generational conflicts over hip hop style and way of life is provided by Masquelier 2010a.
- 35 Masquelier 2010a; 2010b, p. 229.
- 36 Videos of broadcasts are available at <http://www.youtube.com/user/jtronline>.
- 37 My thanks to Mr. Ibrahima Faye for his explanation of Thiat’s reference to Kocc Barma Fall.
- 38 Barry 2013. Thomas Sankara (1949-1987) was president of Burkina Faso from 1983 until his assassination in the 1987 coup d’état led by Blaise Compaoré, who is president today. Sankara was a Marxist pan-Africanist devoted to countering the post-colonial domination by France.

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