

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Colonial Policies and Women's Participation in Public Life: The Case of British Southern Cameroons

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Abstract: Much of the literature on colonial policies towards women has highlighted the ways that these policies spread Western notions of domesticity and narrowed the space available for African women to participate in public life. Drawing from the case of British Southern Cameroons, this paper argues that colonial policies and encounters were in fact more complex. While certain policies did seek to propagate European notions of domesticity and to confine African women to the private space of the home, others opened new opportunities for education, salaried employment, and participation in women's organizations. The paper stresses that colonial encounters often had multiple, and even contradictory, effects and that African women were not merely passive subjects, but agents capable of rejecting and transforming colonial policies and ideologies that did not meet their needs.

INTRODUCTION

Colonial encounters in Southern Cameroons affected women in complex and contradictory ways. As multiple scholars have demonstrated, many colonial policies spread Western notions of domesticity, constricting the space available for women to participate in public life.¹ Other policies, however, opened new opportunities to women for education, salaried employment, travel abroad, and activism in local and international organizations. In this paper, I use the case of Southern Cameroons to demonstrate that British colonial and missionary policies did not seek *solely* to domesticate African women. Although certain colonial projects did aim to create "good" Christian wives and mothers for educated African men, others, particularly during the last decade of colonial rule, sought to promote women's participation in public life. This case study supports and extends recent, nuanced work on colonial encounters that complicates relations between Europeans and Africans, demonstrating that African women were frequently active agents, rejecting and transforming colonial ideologies that did not meet their needs.²

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DOMESTICITY: ONE GOAL AMONG MANY

Colonial encounters between African and European women have frequently been studied through the lens of domesticity. This perspective emphasizes that colonial and missionary institutions played an important role in diffusing Christianity, European languages, and Western norms throughout Africa. This focus on domesticity also emphasizes the role that colonial and mission policies played in socializing African women into European gender norms and “appropriate” forms of social organization. In general, this literature argues that European influences—including colonial administrations, missions, and informal organizations—narrowed women’s sphere of activities and increasingly confined them to the home and family.³ These influences propagated “an ideology of female domesticity that laid stress on women’s reproductive and nurturing roles above their autonomy and productivity.”⁴ The major focus of this literature is on how the colonial state and Christian missions contributed to the “housewifisation” of African women.⁵

Nancy Rose Hunt, for example, examines the links between gender and domesticity in the Belgian Congo. Describing the *foyers sociaux* established by missionaries, social-service agencies, and colonial women’s associations with the support of the Belgian colonial administration, Hunt argues that they are a key component in a “Belgian colonial project to refashion gender roles and instill a Western family ideology into African urban life.”⁶ Within the *foyers sociaux*, women participated in classes on sewing, cooking, housekeeping, and maternal hygiene. They also took part in home visits, decorating contests, graduation ceremonies, and other public rituals, all of which, according to Hunt, attempted to re-define gender roles and domesticate African women.

Similarly, Deborah Gaitskell has examined the diffusion of ideologies of domesticity through colonial and mission institutions in Southern Africa.⁷ Specifically, she has examined hostels for African women established in Johannesburg by the Anglican and Methodist churches and the American Board Mission. Gaitskell argues that these mission-run hostels sought to control African women’s sexuality, protect them from the dangers of city life, and ensure a supply of female domestic workers as the men who previously filled these positions turned to work in the mines.

Yet other work, focusing on different contexts, finds that colonial and mission influences on women are more complex, providing African women with both opportunities and constraints. Examining colonial female education in Mozambique, Kathleen Sheldon finds that despite the limitations of the domestic science curriculum emphasized at such schools, girls and women gained some valuable skills through these schools.⁸ She argues that “[c]riticism of the gender bias of [domestic science] programs ignores that some women were able to use that education to enter into new arenas of work during and after the colonial era.”⁹ Through these programs, some women became literate, gained fluency in Portuguese, and learned other skills that helped them survive in the colonial economy. Sheldon concludes:

It has been easy to critique the Portuguese colonial education system for its racism and sexism, ideologies that were central to the overall organization of the mission school system. Yet a history of that system should also include the experience of a small number of Mozambican girls who desired to attend the mission schools and who later found success as workers and professionals.¹⁰

Her findings complicate our understandings of colonial mission activities, demonstrating that while certain aspects of curriculum served to diffuse Western gender norms and confine women

to the domestic sphere, others provided women with valuable skills that opened new economic opportunities.

Other scholars make similar claims, demonstrating that colonial ideologies served both to limit and to empower women. In his study of the Friends Africa Mission in Kenya, Samuel S. Thomas argues that female students subverted the ideology of domesticity disseminated at the mission school.¹¹ These students strategically used the school to “delay marriages and control their choice of partners” and to move beyond the domestic sphere as they used the skills they learned in dressmaking, needlework, and cooking to provide an independent source of income.¹² Barbara Moss, in a study of the British Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS) in Rhodesia similarly found that women transformed their women’s prayer union to better meet their needs. Moss argues that these women rejected “the dependent image that Christian missionaries and colonial authorities concocted” and created an organization that enabled them to help themselves and other women in the community “[b]y contributing labor and pooling their resources.”¹³ Thus, African women were not just passive recipients of missionary and colonial doctrine, they were also active agents who reinterpreted and reshaped these messages.

Recent scholarship has also directed its attention to colonial women, emphasizing the diversity of women involved.¹⁴ Kumari Jayawardena, for example, has argued that western women’s experience with patriarchy in their own societies led some to fight for women’s liberation in South Asia. Many of the women who traveled to Africa as missionaries, representatives of international women’s organizations, and even as colonial administrators were iconoclasts within their own societies and viewed domestic science courses not as the goal of education but as a launching pad for other work.¹⁵ Examining the work of the World YWCA in Africa, Nancy Boyd describes how Celestine Smith, an African American who briefly worked for the World YWCA in Lagos, Nigeria from December 1934 to June 1935, felt about the YWCA’s work in Nigeria:

While admitting that, to her surprise, she had enjoyed patching and darning, hemming baby clothes, covering lampshades, baking cakes for the Bishop’s tea parties, and other unaccustomed chores, Celestine Smith was appalled by Miss Bentall’s suggestion that her successor be a teacher of dressmaking and home economics. Pointing out that no one in Nigeria will freeze if she never wears a dress, she advises her to choose ‘the most *intelligent, Christian* YWCA Secretary or social worker whom you can find.’¹⁶

Smith recognized that while enjoyable and sometimes useful, domestic science should not be the sole, or even the primary, focus of the YWCA in Nigeria. European women did not always “push” domestic science classes on African women. In some cases, they responded to Africans’ desire to learn some of these skills.

Though nearly all missions and colonial governments diffused domestic ideologies, these ideologies varied in significance and affected women differently. Class, context, religion, and the colonial administration were all important variables that influenced how these ideologies affected specific women. In certain contexts, ideologies of domesticity were tempered by other policies that explicitly sought to increase women’s participation in the public realm. Moreover, African women frequently subverted these domestic ideologies, taking what was useful and leaving the rest behind.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICIES ON WOMEN IN SOUTHERN CAMEROON

Moving from general findings to a specific case, this section examines how colonial policies

affected women in British Southern Cameroons. Southern Cameroons, which the British controlled from 1922 to 1961, were comprised of what are today the Northwest and Southwest provinces of Cameroon. Specifically, the paper focuses on the last decade of colonial rule from 1950 to 1961, which differed in important ways from earlier periods. Colonial records provide evidence that British administrators strove to instill Western gender norms in African women and to mold “suitable” wives for educated, Christian men. But the records also support the claim that the British administration—at least in the terminal colonial period—sought to incorporate women more fully into public life, by providing certain African women with opportunities for education, travel abroad, and salaried employment. Still, it is important to note that significant disparities continued to exist in the kind and length of education of girls as opposed to boys. Additionally, women were recruited for a narrow range of positions within the colonial administration, and women’s associations were constructed as inherently non-political bodies. The colonial administration interpreted activities that did not challenge British colonial rule and capitalist ideals as non-political. Any activity that overstepped these boundaries was deemed political and, therefore, suspect.

Education

While early colonial policies reflected the biases of the overwhelmingly male colonial administrators, after World War II, the British colonial administration focused greater attention on the education of girls and women.¹⁷ This increased attention to girls’ and women’s education was linked to the growth in the number of female colonial officers in the British administration. The success of these initiatives can be partially gauged through school enrollment and attendance figures for girls and women in the Southern Cameroons. The complex nature of the educational system in the territory, which included government, native authority, and mission schools, presents some difficulty in gathering total school enrollment and attendance figures. Nevertheless, British reports to the League of Nations and later to the United Nations provide general data on girls’ school attendance rates in Southern Cameroons, which indicate that they increased over the course of British colonial rule. Narrative reports also indicate that these gains were not accidental but rather a part of a conscious effort to increase girls’ and women’s access to education. The 1954 report notes, for example: “Prejudice against the education of women dies hard, but the number attending school is increasing gradually throughout the territory.”¹⁸

Describing increases in girls’ primary enrollment rates between 1950 and 1980 in sub-Saharan Africa, Claire Robertson notes: “These figures indicate a strong commitment to increasing girls’ education, both before and after independence, but generally higher preindependence growth rates.”¹⁹ In part, rapid growth rates during the 1950s reflected the low levels of girls’ primary school enrollment before this period. They also, however, indicated administrations’ growing commitment to girls’ education during the terminal colonial period.²⁰

Still, even as girls’ attendance rates increased, the gains occurred overwhelmingly at the primary level, meaning that women were still greatly underrepresented in fields requiring higher levels of education. In 1949, the governor of Nigeria, who also controlled Cameroons, established a commission to examine how to train Nigerians (and Cameroonians) to take on Senior Service posts.²¹ The study placed special attention on women, noting:

It has already been recommended that women should be given equal consideration with men for any departmental scholarship and training schemes for which they may possess

the necessary educational qualifications but the Commission considers that in addition a special allocation of thirty scholarships in all should be made during the three year period to enable women to obtain qualifications overseas for posts, such as nursing, secretarial and librarian and certain other specialists appointments, in which a larger number of skilled Nigerian women officers are urgently required.²²

In 1949, Great Britain launched a special training program to increase the number of educated African women in Nigeria and the Cameroons, and in that year, three women from Cameroon undertook studies in Great Britain.²³ In 1950, five women from the Cameroons were pursuing higher education in either Nigeria or Britain due to this program.²⁴ These gains were small, and women were limited to a narrow range of occupations. One respondent, who benefited from this program, noted: "Only a few [Cameroonians] went to Nigeria for education on government scholarships. Very few girls were selected for these places."²⁵ Despite the fact that only a few women benefited from the program, its existence at least indicates that incremental changes were occurring in colonial policies towards women during the terminal colonial period. Reports throughout the 1950s state that there were a growing number of women working as nurses, teachers, and clerks. By 1958, there were 222 teachers, five nursing sisters, and 55 nurses and midwives, and "a number of women [held] clerical positions in the public service and in commercial concerns."²⁶ In this context, higher education provided by the colonial administration to a limited number of women enabled them to take on new roles outside the home.

The colonial administration also sought to eradicate practices like polygyny and bridewealth through education. British reports on the Cameroons emphasize that legal approaches to eradicating these cultural practices were largely ineffective and difficult, if not entirely impossible, to enforce. Recognizing the limits of legal strategies, the documents advocate education as the best avenue toward social change. The 1950 report notes, for example: "the development of education, notably of girls, will have as one of its results, the spreading of a higher conception of the role of women in society... which will lead them to resist the requirements and usages of old and harmful customs."²⁷ From this perspective, exposure to Western norms and values disseminated through schools and centers would lead Cameroonians to choose European over African practices. Western women, as colonial administrators, missionaries, or wives, were to serve as role models, offering African women alternatives to their traditional gender roles.

It is important to highlight that colonial agents frequently had only a cursory understanding of these cultural practices, which impeded their ability to understand the complex ways that these practices affected women's position in society. In her fieldwork in Cameroon, Fiona Bowie, found, for example, that "[t]raditional marriage with exchange of bridewealth gives women some security as a woman's husband cannot dismiss her without losing his 'investment.'"²⁸ Thus, under certain conditions, the prohibition of cultural practices like the exchange of bridewealth could render women's status in society more precarious rather than more secure.

While opening opportunities for professional employment and seeking to eradicate certain cultural practices, one must not overestimate the "liberating" potential of British educational policies. Throughout its years in the Southern Cameroons, Great Britain also employed domestic science education to create "good" wives and mothers. In this context, colonial policies did seek to spread European notions of domesticity to African women. Consider the following quotation from a 1958 colonial report:

The girls ... come in straight from the hill pagan villages, without having previously attended any kind of school, to learn simple cookery, babycraft, health and hygiene, and local crafts. At the end of their two years they can qualify for a Housecraft Certificate or, if they can read a little a Certificate of Merit. The girls usually marry at once on returning to their villages and they make excellent housewives.²⁹

The domestic science centers established throughout the colonial territory were a means through which European norms of hygiene and domesticity could be transferred to African women. The 1950 British report describes the spread of these centers:

In Bamenda province the domestic science organisation, which is in charge of a woman education officer, made good progress. During the year, at the request of the wives of the African junior staff, a woman's institute was started in Bamenda. The institute is managed by a committee of which the president is the only European, and is conducted on much the same lines as a women's institute in the United Kingdom. At its meetings, which take place once a week, the women learn sewing and knitting, play games and do useful work for the community such as mending hospital linen.³⁰

This school and others like it did not seek to encourage women's participation in the public sphere. Nevertheless, some women were able to benefit from domestic science education. As this quotation indicates, these initiatives enabled women to take on leadership roles, which could, and often did, serve as stepping stones to broader involvement in public life.³¹

Domestic science education also provided some women with an economic livelihood as enterprising students used sewing and baking skills learned in these programs to earn an income or even open a small business.³² Information on hygiene and nutrition reduced infant mortality rates and responded to real needs.³³ It would be a mistake, therefore, to believe that the African women who participated in these domestic science groups and classes unquestioningly accepted the gendered discourses offered by European women. Moreover, as noted previously, many of the European women who led these domestic science classes had ambivalent feelings towards their subject matter, viewing them as a jumping off point into broader studies. Elizabeth O'Kelly, for example, used corn mills societies in the Northwest grassfields to attract women to join women's groups but then used the groups to address a wide range of issues.³⁴

In sum, for some women, education opened new opportunities for travel abroad and professional employment. Particularly during the last years of colonialism, the British administration sought to incorporate more women into the civil service. To do so, it needed to promote women's education at the secondary and university levels. For others—and this includes the vast majority of African women—colonial educational opportunities consisted entirely of primary school and domestic science courses. Yet, even within this restricted framework, Cameroonian women were able to take the elements of domestic science courses that were useful to their lives and leave the rest behind. In some cases, they used the skills learned in these domestic science courses to enter the public sphere as entrepreneurs, teachers, and leaders of women's groups.

Women's Participation in Public Life

Certain colonial practices, intentionally or unintentionally, decreased women's influence in the public sphere by undermining their traditional bases of authority. In pre-colonial societies, women's authority stemmed from both their reproductive and productive roles. The colonial administration's introduction of cash crop agriculture and its preference for recruiting men to civil service posts during much of the colonial period undermined women's status. Other policies, however, explicitly sought to increase women's participation in public life. The 1954 report to the United Nations notes, for example: "In the Southern Cameroons there is a trend towards an increasing independence for women which has the encouragement of the Southern Cameroons Government."³⁵ To track these trends, the British colonial administration in Southern Cameroons collected data on women's participation in "native authorities," supported educational programs that aimed to prepare women to take on decision-making posts, and sponsored female participants in regional and international training programs.

The British colonial administration in Southern Cameroons sought information on women's participation in native authorities and collected data on women's representation in local government throughout the territory. Specifically, the government asked administrators across the territory to provide information on whether and to what extent women were participating in the native authorities.³⁶ Synthesizing the data, the administration found that women's participation was generally quite low. In most areas, participation in native authorities was linked to the payment of tax. Since few women paid taxes, women were, unsurprisingly, excluded from leadership positions, although there were a few exceptions. In general, only women with salaried positions or another form of easily assessable income (primarily barkeepers) were therefore eligible to vote and serve in leadership positions. In a few locations, one or two women participated on the councils on an equal capacity with men. In others areas, provisions enabled special representatives of women's interests to participate in native authorities. In Bamenda, for example, the South West and South East Native Authorities allowed for special representatives of women's interests on the councils (four women participated in the first and three in the latter). These women's representatives, however, did not have the same rights and privileges as male members. They were able to represent women in the community but not the community as a whole. In still in other councils, women had no representation at all.

In particular, women gained greater access to political roles following the adoption of the December 1957 Southern Cameroons Electoral Regulations, which allowed women to vote and to stand for election without the taxation requirements that impeded women's ability to participate in political affairs in the past. A 1957 British report on the Cameroons notes that a woman was present on the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly to represent interests of women, a woman was appointed to Southern Cameroons Scholarship Board, and in "Victoria Division each council...nominated women councilors to represent women's interests on the council and one woman [was] appointed a court member on the Tiko Council."³⁷ In addition, the report indicates that "Native Authorities continue[d] to employ an increasing number of midwives, female teachers and some female clerical staff."³⁸ A document on the participation of women in native authorities also indicates that women were taking on a broader range of occupations. They were becoming telephonists, midwives, nurses, teachers, clerics, machine operators, wardresses, and receptionists.³⁹ Although women's participation increased, it continued to lag significantly behind that of men. Moreover, many of the women who served on these councils represented "women's interests" and, therefore, did not have equal rights with male representatives. Still, these examples point to some positive developments that resulted from colonial policies that had the explicit intention of increasing women's participation in the

public sphere.

Women's Organizations

Particularly as the period of colonial rule began to draw to a close, Great Britain recognized the roles that women and women's associations could play in the territory. Circular 212/60 on "The Participation of Women in Public Life," for example, discusses how women were "increasingly participating in the social and public affairs of the community" and noted that the "development of women's clubs has been symptomatic of the new movement."⁴⁰ Britain supported the formation of women's groups in Southern Cameroons and encouraged these groups to form links with international associations. Its motives for this support are evident in the following excerpt:

[M]uch valuable work can be done through the work in each territory of women's organisations and societies. Such organisations, where sufficiently advanced, can be greatly helped in their educative task by affiliation at the territorial level with appropriate, responsible international women's organizations, such as the International Council of Women, the International Alliance of Women, the Associated Country Women of the World, and other such non-political organisations. Such affiliation may also counter any attempt by communist-dominated bodies, such as the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) to secure allegiance of local women's organisations.⁴¹

Thus, while Britain supported the formation of women's associations in Cameroon and the affiliation of these groups with international women's organizations, it only supported certain kinds of organizations, namely non-communist and non-political ones.

Great Britain not only encouraged the formation of such groups but provided funding for representatives of "appropriate" women's organizations to attend international meetings, which enabled Cameroonian women to establish links with women in other countries. The administration chose Minerva Martins, for example, to represent the Southern Cameroons at a United Nations Regional Seminar on "The Participation of Women in Public Life" in Addis Ababa in December 1960. The conference program addressed subjects like women's participation in all levels of government, the wider implications of this participation, and the factors that facilitated and impeded women's ability to participate in public affairs (e.g. educational, economic, social, and legal issues).⁴² As one of a series regional conferences sponsored by the United Nations, it was part of a global effort to increase women's participation in public life.⁴³ An abortive coup in Ethiopia, which occurred during the conference, created unforeseen difficulties. Martins spent several days at the British Consul in Ethiopia, prompting an endless trail of paperwork between the United Nations and Great Britain over which agency should cover her additional expenses.⁴⁴ Despite this unfortunate outcome, the example demonstrates that the British colonial government took tangible steps to increase women's participation in political life in the Cameroons by providing funding and logistical support for Martins' participation in the meeting.

Missionaries, colonial administrators, and wives of colonial agents also encouraged the formation of women's groups in Southern Cameroons. British colonial reports list a number of women's organizations active in the region. These include the Young Ladies' Improvement Society (Victoria), the Women's Progressive Society (Kumba), The Ladies' Dramatic Society (Buea), the Ndola Bitu Women's Fellowship (Buea), and the Ladies' Glee Club (Mamfe).⁴⁵ The

Girl Guides, the female equivalent of the Boy Scouts linked to the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS), also had a small but growing presence in Southern Cameroons. As of 1959, there were 250 registered Girl Guides.⁴⁶ Other organizations included the Red Cross, the Mothers' Union, women's sports clubs, women's farm clubs, and corn mill societies.

The 1950 report to the United Nations notes that a women's institute was established in Bamenda and functioned similarly to Women's Institutes in Great Britain.⁴⁷ Though modeled after a British organization, the women's institute enabled Cameroonian women to take on leadership positions. The Bamenda women's institute was managed by a committee of which only one member (albeit the president) was European.⁴⁸ Thus, even groups patterned after British organizations took on a life of their own and provided women with opportunities to take on leadership positions.

ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CAMEROONIAN AND EUROPEAN WOMEN

Corn Mill Societies

While men greatly outnumbered women in the colonial service, British women served as colonial agents in various capacities, particularly after World War II. Specifically, they tended to work as nurses, teachers and principals, and colonial administrators.⁴⁹ Elizabeth O'Kelly was a British colonial officer in Southern Cameroons from 1950 until 1961.⁵⁰ Upon her arrival in Cameroon, O'Kelly worked at the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) in Buea, where she planned and ran literacy classes and courses on history, geography, arithmetic, hygiene, and diet. In October 1952, she became a woman education officer in the British Colonial Service and was assigned to Bamenda Province in the Northwest grassfields. After talking with Phyllis Kaberry, an anthropologist who worked in the Bamenda area who had recently published *Women of the Grassfields*, O'Kelly learned that grinding corn was one of women's most time-consuming tasks. She created a program to provide grinding machines to groups of women. By 1960, there were 200 groups encompassing thousands of women. Most of this section draws on O'Kelly's perceptions of the corn mill societies since the colonial and expatriate records are better preserved than Cameroonian records. Unfortunately, there are scant written records of the corn mill societies from Cameroonian perspectives.

The first corn mill society was established in July 1954. By October of that year, eight societies were functioning. Groups averaged about 70 members, and each group established rules regarding the use of the corn mill, how the loan for the mill would be repaid, and members' responsibilities. O'Kelly notes that chief rule was "that membership was open to any women regardless of tribe or religion and that the movement was non-political."⁵¹ To ensure that the societies were inclusive, O'Kelly refused to provide a corn mill until it was clear that all women in the area had the opportunity to join. Describing this requirement, O'Kelly states: "Because of this the corn mill societies were perhaps the only group in the country which could claim members from every section of the community and from every tribe and religious denomination."⁵² While earlier organizational forms were primarily emerged along ethnic lines, corn mill societies brought together women of different ethnic and religious groups. For O'Kelly, "One of the greatest achievements of the societies over the years had been the gradual breaking down of the barriers between tribes so that the women worked amicably with each other regardless of their different origins."⁵³ This emphasis on "nontribalism" became even more

central to women's organizations in the immediate post-colonial period as the Cameroonian state sought to build a sense of nationalism.

While the corn mills were an important component of the new associations, they were not the sole reason for women to come together. O'Kelly targeted grassroots women who lacked a formal education and were primarily engaged in subsistence farming. Describing women's ambivalence towards colonial educational initiatives, O'Kelly observed: "women have very little free time and still less inclination to attend the already established domestic science centres which cater largely for the wives of the educated Africans."⁵⁴ This quotation highlights the class distinctions that emerged in the colonial period. At least initially, many women in the rural areas had little interest in domestic science and English classes. Thus, O'Kelly sought to use the corn mills to bring women together to address a wide variety of issues. She states:

[T]he mills were really a bait to attract women to the societies and to classes that might help them in other ways. Now that the women had more time, freed as they were from their most time-consuming task, they did begin to consider other activities. They enjoyed the sociability of gathering around the corn mill and many societies initiated regular meetings. Some women decided that they wished to learn more about cooking and making soap.⁵⁵

In a number of cases, members of the corn mill societies built community halls where they could hold these meetings and classes. These buildings were no small endeavor as they had to be large enough to hold a hundred or more women. Many groups expanded their work to include poultry schemes that relied on the bran from the milled corn to feed the chickens, fuel plantations, which increased the supply of firewood available to women, and, in one case, a cooperative shop.

By 1960, a year before O'Kelly left Cameroon, there were more than 200 corn mill societies comprising over 20,000 members.⁵⁶ The very success of the groups created some difficulties. As the plebiscite to determine whether Southern Cameroons would join Nigeria or Cameroon drew near, male politicians sought to co-opt the corn mill societies. Describing this period, O'Kelly states: "[f]eelings ran high, and as the largest organised body in the country the corn mill societies were under repeated pressure to join one or the other of the two main political parties, and constant vigilance was necessary to ensure that their neutrality was not infringed."⁵⁷ In an increasingly politicized environment, this was not the only attempt to associate women's associations with partisan goals. Emmanuel Konde argues that male politicians similarly attempted to co-opt a traditional, informal women's organization, *anlu*, in the lead up to the plebiscite.⁵⁸ In the immediate post-colonial era, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), which quickly emerged as the most significant political party in independent Cameroon, also sought to bring independent women's groups under the umbrella of its women's wing.

While the accomplishments of the corn mill societies were impressive, at times O'Kelly's discussion of them reflects the patronizing attitude towards Africans common among colonial administrators. Describing how the societies worked in a 1955 article in *African Women*, O'Kelly notes, for example: "it must be borne in mind that arrangements had to be of the simplest when all members are illiterate."⁵⁹ She concludes the article: "whilst gradually, as the women get used to the idea of meeting together, it should be possible to introduce to them a better knowledge of child welfare and hygiene and generally raise their standard of living. That this is necessary there can be no doubt."⁶⁰ These quotations reflect a top-down approach through which information is transferred from Europeans to Africans. O'Kelly also indicates that one

goal of these activities was to explain colonial practices, which Cameroonian women often viewed as arbitrary and authoritarian. O'Kelly explains, for instance, that women in the region did not respond favorably to the introduction of sanitary inspectors in local markets. These inspectors would patrol markets and destroy women's produce that did not meet their food safety requirements. While bringing a sanitary inspector to a corn mill society meeting—a suggestion offered by O'Kelly—would enable women learn more about the requirements and possibly avoid the destruction of their goods, it would not enable them to challenge the very premise of having an external authority impose new rules on food production.

The legacies of the corn mill societies, for good and bad, were far-reaching. During O'Kelly's tenure in the grassfields from 1952 to 1961, the cooperatives experienced incredible growth, encompassing thousands of women. They brought women together to alleviate one of their most time-consuming tasks, to learn new skills, and to socialize. Yet the corn mill societies also demonstrate the pitfalls of relying too heavily on a single leader and on external sources of support, two lessons that still have relevance today. While many of the organizations failed following O'Kelly's departure, others were integrated into programs organized by the newly independent state.⁶¹

The final verdict on the corn mill societies remains ambiguous. Discussing cooperative movements in the Northwest and Southwest provinces, Mark W. DeLancey writes: "A recent report blames the failure [of the corn mill societies] on the inability to increase the functions of the organizations, the lack of cooperative education, the failure to include the women in planning or management, and the inability of the members to locate spare parts for the mills."⁶² A 1977 report published by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) argues that the failure of the corn mill societies decreased women's willingness to enter similar ventures.⁶³ Community development workers provide a different perspective. They argue that the corn mill societies "had become the hub of the cooperative movement in Bamenda."⁶⁴ The success of the corn mill societies between 1952 and 1961 demonstrated that Cameroonian women could successfully form cooperatives and provided experience for the women involved. The societies' subsequent failure, though, made women more cautious of entering into similar arrangements in the future.

Women's Corona Society

Founded in 1937 as a counterpart to the male Corona Club, the Women's Corona Society was an association of women of all races connected in some way—either directly or indirectly—with Britain's overseas service.⁶⁵ The Women's Corona Society established clubs throughout Britain's colonial territories. Members engaged in philanthropic and social welfare work. The organization also provided support to women travelling to and living in Great Britain's colonial territories as well as women visiting England.

Two branches existed in the Southern Cameroons: one in Victoria (present-day Limbe) and one in Buea.⁶⁶ After Southern and Northern Cameroons came under British rule in 1922 as a League of Nations mandate territory, Great Britain ruled these territories as part of Nigeria until 1961. Thus, the Cameroonian clubs were linked with both the Corona Society headquarters in London and branches in Nigeria. According to a letter written by Mrs. J.O. Fields, the president of the Buea branch of the Women's Corona Society, the organization had two primary aims: "service and friendship between members and from members to the community as a whole."⁶⁷

The Cameroon branch undertook a number of tasks. It welcomed newcomers to the community, provided support to members, organized educational programs, and worked closely

with organizations like the Red Cross, the Girl Guides, the hospitals, and the missions. The Victoria and Buea branches held regular meetings “with a varied programme arranged for pleasure, interest, and usefulness.”⁶⁸ Specifically, members organized “how-to-do-it” demonstrations on activities like cake making, embroidery, flower arranging, and dressmaking. They also organized public events like Library Day, Botanist Day, a pet show, and the Victoria Centenary Celebration. Of note is the fact that members of the Bota club refused to help organize a beauty contest as part of the Victoria Centenary Celebration.⁶⁹ Members were willing to support alternate programs such as a children’s party, a history of Victoria, a needlework competition, a parade of traditional African dress, or a baby show, but they drew the line at a beauty contest.⁷⁰

The club’s multi-racial character provided opportunities for its African and European members to have cultural exchanges. Cooking demonstrations, for example, did not only teach African women how to cook European dishes, but also enabled African women to share their favorite dishes with European women. In some meetings, European members provided practical information to Africans travelling to Great Britain, teaching Cameroonian women how to stop a taxi, to greet people on the street, to eat with a knife and fork, to post letters, and to stand in a queue. They also shared advice on dress for Great Britain and where to purchase necessary items. At other meetings, Cameroonian women shared their cultural practices with European members. Anna Foncha, for example, gave a talk on marriage customs in Bamenda province.⁷¹ These exchanges demonstrate that the diffusion of information was not one-way—from Europeans to Cameroonians—but rather a two-way exchange, with both groups sharing information.

The Women’s Corona Society was open to Europeans and Africans, and some, primarily elite, Cameroonian women participated in the organization.⁷² Corona would, for example, invite high-profile women like Anna Foncha, the wife of the future prime minister John Foncha, to baby shows or other events to help raise the hygiene and health of lower-paid Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) workers.⁷³

Still, differences in perspective and priorities between African and European members existed, particularly as independence drew near. A letter written by J.O. Fields to Women’s Corona Society members highlights some of these differences:

Finally, I would ask, with all urgency that I can, that we all do all in our power to foster goodwill between Government and non-Government, and between black and white. Politics are often difficult to understand, and even distressing. Let us try to understand what is going on in these momentous days while Nigeria is being built up into a great country; let us not do harm by ignorance, or by suspicion, or ill will. As women, we do have great influence, we set the whole tone of our homes. Let us, as Corona members, think of this and let us be on the side of the angels.⁷⁴

Despite attempts to bridge cultural differences, Cameroonian women chose to leave the Women’s Corona Society to found their own associations as independence approached. Commenting on these developments, Anna Foncha writes:

In the past women’s activities in the social and economic field were confined to villages or at most in the tribal groups. These activities were soon to assume new faces with the broadening of society and contact with foreign air. As Cameroon was coming into its

own as recently as in 1960 a Corona Society invited a selected number of Cameroon women who enrolled as members. This society may be described as an organisation with a colonial bias, the idea having been mooted by the Colonial Office. It served the needs of expatriate women, some of whose husbands were serving in the overseas territories. It soon became evident that such a society could not serve the needs of a true Cameroon Women Society and this missing link led to the resignation of some Cameroon women from the Corona society.⁷⁵

Foncha believed that this division between expatriate and indigenous women brought Cameroonian women together and led to the creation in September 1960 of the Buea Women Social Organization. As it became clear that colonialism was coming to an end, Cameroonian women chose to form their own organizations rather than continue to participate in those created by expatriate women and linked to the colonial government.

Even as Cameroonian women rejected some of the specific organizations founded by expatriate women, in this case the Women's Corona Society, they engaged in some of the same activities. Groups like the Buea Women Social Organization took on similar projects, increasing the size and number of baby shows, giving talks in hospitals, and sharing information on nutrition and health care. Describing the activities of these new organizations, Burnley stated: "baby foods, baby clothes, and talks in hospitals—these were the kinds of things that kept these groups together."⁷⁶

Though these topics would generally fit within under the rubric of domesticity, discussions of hygiene, nutrition, and health care were far from irrelevant in Cameroonian women's lives. The baby shows taught women how to deal with fevers and other common sicknesses among infants and young children and allowed women to share information on nutritious foods that could increase the health of children. Child mortality was high at the time, and these topics responded to women's real concerns. Describing similar initiatives in Uganda, Tripp notes: "To denigrate domestic training and see it only as part of a civilizing and domesticating imperial project misses its relevance to ordinary women in a very pragmatic sense.... most of it was quite essential to the healthy survival and welfare of children and families."⁷⁷ Moreover, the organization of baby shows served as a means of bringing women together to share information and to address a broad array of issues. These shows initiated conversations between urban and rural women, served as a means to attract new members to women's associations, and led to the "frank exchange of views and first hand information regarding problems common to all in the Federation."⁷⁸ Finally, by mobilizing women around such issues, some women—like Burnley—were able to break out of the private realm to become community activists and politicians. Through tours of West Cameroon organizing baby shows, meetings, talks, and other events, Burnley became well known. These activities raised her profile within political circles and launched her political career. Burnley served as a representative to the West Cameroon House of Assembly from 1970 to 1973 and as a member of the Cameroon's National Assembly from 1973 to 1983.

The newly founded Cameroonian women's groups continued to interact with European women through exchange visits, participation in international conferences, and affiliations with international organizations such as the Associated Country Women of the World (ACWW) and the International Council of Women (ICW). With independence, significant changes in women's organizing occurred as Cameroonian women formed their own multi-ethnic women's associations. However, continuities also existed as these associations maintained some of the same projects and activities as expatriate groups.

CONCLUSIONS

In pre-colonial Cameroon, women's authority stemmed from their productive and reproductive work. Women gained prestige from their roles as primary food producers and as child bearers.⁷⁹ In many societies, there were also specific leadership roles, such as queen mother, set aside for women, but the authority of these positions was often limited to an advisory capacity and to representing women rather than the entire community.⁸⁰ In these realms, women's influence declined during colonialism as the economy shifted from a focus on subsistence agriculture to a reliance on cash crop production and the power of traditional institutions weakened. At the same time, women gained in other realms, particularly in the area of formal political power. In many pre-colonial societies, cultural norms prohibited women from assuming most political roles.⁸¹ While informal constraints continued to limit women's access to formal political offices, a number of women were able to leverage their education and activism in women's associations into political power in the immediate post-colonial period.

The history of encounters between European and African women in Southern Cameroons was characterized by complexity and ambiguity. To be sure, British colonial agents frequently asserted authority over Cameroonian women and imposed norms of domesticity that were irrelevant to Cameroonian women's daily lives. At the same time, it would be a mistake to deny the agency of Cameroonian women in these encounters. Cameroonians managed to take some of the skills attained in colonial schools, domestic science centers, and colonial women's associations and put them to use in the post-colonial era in ways that increased their status in society and facilitated their participation in the public sphere. Dorothy Gwan-Nulla, writing about women's status in the region in 1963—two years after the departure of Great Britain—made a similar point: “Educated women are on the increase and with their education they are eligible to enter into government service or private enterprises. As working class women, the earning of and free use of money renders them a vast degree of independence.”⁸² Gwan-Nulla also indicated that membership in women's associations grew rapidly immediately following independence, building partially on the foundation established in the last decade of colonial rule.

Specifically, there were at least three legacies of Euro-Cameroonian encounters. The first involved the development of multi-ethnic associations. Both the corn mill societies and the Women's Corona Society brought together women from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and sought to bridge ethnic, religious, and even racial divides. Multi-ethnic membership was a significant departure from pre-colonial women's groups, which became even more important in the post-colonial period as the newly independent state sought to establish a national identity. The second legacy involved organizational forms and activities. Cameroonian women carried some forms and activities from colonial to post-colonial groups. While many of the corn mill societies failed following the departure of O'Kelly, those that survived provided a foundation for women's cooperatives in independent Cameroon. The legacies of the Women's Corona Society are easier to trace. Prominent women like Anna Foncha took relevant ideas to new organizations. Thirdly, the corn mill societies and the Women's Corona Society both explicitly stressed their non-political character. Both eschewed participation in political debates, focusing instead on development and social welfare. This choice to avoid political disputes affected the nature and work of organizations after independence, where the norm of “non-political” organizing was disseminated widely.

These encounters also differed in important ways. The corn mill societies were directed at

grassroots women, while the Women's Corona Society sought out educated, elite Cameroonian women. Class differences, in particular, mediated the agency of Cameroonian women. Immediately following independence, the corn mill societies experienced a period of hardship and neglect that stemmed from a dearth of leadership. Women's groups like the Buea Women's Social Organization, in contrast, experienced a period of growth. In fact, a year after its formation, the Buea Women's Social Organization was renamed the Women's Cameroon Society to reflect its broader membership. Unlike the corn mill societies, these associations had a ready supply of educated, politically savvy, and internationally connected Cameroonian women who were willing and able to assume the reins of leadership.⁸³

In conclusion, British colonial policies in the Southern Cameroons affected women in contradictory ways. Certain policies and ideologies constricted the space available to women for public action, while others opened new possibilities for women in the areas of education, salaried employment, public life, travel abroad, and activism in local and international women's organizations. Cameroonian women instrumentally rejected and incorporated elements of colonial practice and selectively incorporated certain gender discourses into their post-colonial activities.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Hunt, Liu, and Quataert 1997; Hansen 1992; Walker 1990, especially chapters by Cock, Gaitskell, and Meintjes; and Gaitskell 1983.

2. See, for example, Special Issue on "Indigenous Women and Colonial Cultures," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 6, no. 3 (2005); Special Issue on "'Destination Globalization? Women, Gender and Comparative Colonial Histories in the New Millennium,'" *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 4, no. 1, (2003); Special Issue on "Revising the Experiences of Colonized Women: Beyond Binaries," *Journal of Women's History*, 14, no. 4 (2003); and Special Issue on "Gendered Colonialism and African History," *Gender and History*, 8, no. 3 (1996). See also Tripp 2004 and 2001; Allman, Geiger, and Musisi 2002; Thomas 2000; Sheldon 1998; and Moss 1997.

3. Mama 1996, 28.

4. Walker 1990, 13.

5. Mama 1996, 29.

6. Hunt 1990, 469.

7. Gaitskell 1979; Gaitskell 1983.

8. Sheldon 1998.

9. Sheldon 1998, 595.

10. Sheldon 1998, 625.

11. Thomas 2000.

12. Thomas 2000, 3, 15.

13. Moss 1997, 103.

14. See Jayawardena 1995; Chaudhuri and Strobel 1992; Strobel 1991; and Callaway 1987.

15. Tripp 2004.

16. Quoted from Boyd 1986, 126-127.

17. Callaway 1987, 115.

18. Great Britain 1955, 80.

19. Robertson 1986, 93.

20. Ibid.

21. British Cameroons was first a League of Nations mandate territory and later a UN trusteeship territory. Great Britain ruled Cameroon as part of Nigeria. In 1961, the UN Trusteeship Council organized a plebiscite in the British-controlled territories to determine whether they would join Nigeria or Cameroon. Northern Cameroons voted to join Nigeria, while the population of Southern Cameroons chose to reunite with Cameroon.

22. Great Britain 1950, 107.

23. Great Britain 1950, 107.

24. Great Britain 1951, 107.

25. Personal interview, April 10, 2002.

26. Great Britain 1959, 166.

27. Great Britain 1951, 115.

28. Bowie 1993, 17.

29. Great Britain 1959, 166.

30. Great Britain 1951, 107.

31. In a study of female leaders in Cameroon, Emmanuel Konde found that the Catholic Women's Association (CWA) has been particularly successful in getting members in high political offices. Indeed, the CWA is second only to the CPDM in having members in parliament. Konde suggests that the CWA empowers women by emphasizing their individual capabilities. One CWA leader notes: "We encourage all our members. We tell them that each and everyone of them can do something . . . that you're capable (296)." This strategy enables women to envision taking on roles in the public sphere. See Konde 1991.

32. Sheldon 1998.

33. Tripp 2004.

34. O'Kelly 1973, 115-124. See also Tripp 2004.

35. Great Britain 1955, 79.

36. NAB, Safe 1957/1, Participation in Native Authorities.

37. Great Britain 1958, 165.

38. Great Britain 1958, 165.

39. NAB, Safe 1957/1, "Participation of Women in Native Authorities."

40. NAB, Safe 1960/1, Circular 212/60, "The Participation of Women in Public Life," March 1, 1960.

41. NAB, Safe 1960/1, Circular 212/60, "The Participation of Women in Public Life," March 1, 1960.

42. NAB, Safe 1960/1, UN Regional Seminar, December 12-23, 1960 in Addis Ababa, Programme.

43. Other regional seminars on the participation of women in public life were held in Bogota, Columbia from May 18-29, 1959, in Lahore, Pakistan on November 21, 1960, and in Ulan Bator, Mongolia from August 3-17, 1965.

44. NAB, Safe 1960/1, UN Regional Seminar, December 12-23, 1960 in Addis Ababa.

45. Great Britain 1954, 108.

46. Great Britain 1960, 59. Within the literature, there are mixed opinions on the value of such organizations. Ifi Amadiume, for example, argues that the spread of European women's associations like the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Girl Guides, and Girls' Brigade to Nigeria contributed to the construction of the "daughters of imperialism." See Amadiume 2000, 39-43. In Uganda, Tripp, in contrast, finds that these organizations brought

European, African, and Asian women together through an explicit ideology of nonracialism and served as the foundation for the Ugandan women's movement. See Tripp 2001 and 2000.

47. The Women's Institutes movement began in Canada in 1897 and in Great Britain in 1915. Women's Institutes were rural women's groups that, as written in the first constitution, sought "To promote that knowledge of household science which shall lead to the improvement in household architecture with special attention to home sanitation; to a better understanding of economics and hygienic value of foods and fuels; and to a more scientific care of children, with a view to raising the general standard of the health of our people." In short, organizations aimed to better the home and the community more broadly and to bring women together without regard to "political, religious, or ethical belief." See Jenkins 1953, 7, 12.

48. Great Britain 1951, 107.

49. For more on the roles that women played in Britain's overseas service, see Callaway 1987.

50. This section draws primarily on four works: O'Kelly 1955, 33-35; O'Kelly 1973, 108-124; Fennelly 1985, 119-154; and Bryson, 1979, 92-94 and 136.

51. O'Kelly 1973, 111.

52. O'Kelly 1973, 115.

53. O'Kelly 1973, 123.

54. O'Kelly 1955, 33-34.

55. Fennelly 1985, 133.

56. Fennelly 1985, 142.

57. O'Kelly 1973, 122-123.

58. Konde 1990. Other scholars, though, take issue with his description of *anlu*. See Awasom 2002. *Anlu*, a traditional sanction mechanism used by the Kom women in Northwest Cameroon, is an example of women overtly challenging British authority. Though different scholars offer different explanations of the 1958 uprising, it was at least partially a protest against colonial policies affecting women, including rising taxes and laws regulating farming techniques. For an extended discussion of *anlu*, see Diduk 1989; Nkwi 1985; Ardener 1975; Ritzenthaler 1960.

59. O'Kelly 1955, 34.

60. *Ibid.*, 35.

61. Fennelly 1985, 145.

62. DeLancey 1987, 10.

63. UN Economic Commission for Africa 1977, 28.

64. Fennelly 1985, 145.

65. For a history of the Women's Corona Society, see Swaisland 1992.

66. Victoria (Limbe) is a coastal town in what was British Southern Cameroons. Buea is located several miles inland at the base of Mount Cameroon. Buea has been a key administrative site since German colonial rule. Both towns are located in what is now the Southwest province of Cameroon.

67. NAB, Safe 1956/1, September 9, 1958.

68. NAB, Safe 1956/2.

69. Bota is a section of Victoria (now Limbe), where many expatriates associated with the colonial administration lived.

70. NAB, Safe 1956/2, Minutes of the Women's Corona Society meeting held at Bota Club, June 19, 1958.

71. NAB Safe 1956/2, Minutes of Women's Corona Society meetings.

72. Helen Callaway argues that in Nigeria the Women's Corona Society became an important multiracial organization where African and European women came together to undertake voluntary work. By 1953, the organization had a school, a nursery, and regular activities in Lagos. Schools were later established in Kano and Jos. In Cameroon, the Women's Corona Society was established much later. As late as 1956, the president of the Buea branch notes that the organization "only exists on paper." Thus, the Women's Corona Society in Cameroon was not as effective at bringing together African and European women on a long-term basis. See Callaway 1987, 11, 215-218.

73. The Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) is a government-controlled parastatal specializing in agricultural production. It was formerly called the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The British handed over the CDC to the independent government, which renamed it the Cameroon Development Corporation. Tea, palm nuts, bananas, rubber, and coconuts are grown on CDC plantations. The CDC is currently in the process of being privatized, although there is little evidence that this is actually taking place.

74. NAB, Safe, 1956/2, Letter written by Mrs. J.O. Fields, November 29, 1956.

75. NAB, Safe 1962/1, "National Council of Cameroon Women."

76. Personal interview, April 10, 2002.

77. Tripp 2004.

78. From 1961-1972, Cameroon was a federal state comprised of West Cameroon (British Southern Cameroons) and East Cameroon. In 1972, Cameroon became a unitary state. Immediately following independence, women's associations organized events that brought together women from the two federal states. NAB 1962/1 "National Council of Cameroon Women."

79. Kaberry 1952, 149-150 and Kaberry and Chilver 1961, 365.

80. Awason 2002, 3.

81. Kaberry 1952, 151-152.

82. Dorothy Gwan-Nulla. "The Role of West Cameroon Women in the Family and Society. Paper prepared for a seminar in Germany from April 29-May 24, 1963 organized by the German Foundation for Developing Countries. National Archives, Buea (NAB), Safe 1960/1.

83. These include Anna Foncha, Gwendoline Burnley, Dorothy Atabong, Prudence Chilla, Josepha Mua, and others.

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Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article: Melinda Adams. "Colonial Policies and Women's Participation in Public Life: The Case of British Southern Cameroons." *African Studies Quarterly* 8, no.3: [online] URL: <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v8i3a1.htm>

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

The Political Economy of Oil in Equatorial Guinea

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the political economy of oil in Equatorial Guinea, one of Africa's newest and most important oil producers. It begins with a brief history of the country and its recent experience with oil-led development. The paper then moves on to integrate the experience of Equatorial Guinea into the literature linking natural resource abundance to poor development performance, authoritarianism, and civil conflict, respectively. The paper concludes by arguing that oil has exacerbated already present pathologies in Equatorial Guinea's political economy, paving the way for future problems of underdevelopment, instability and authoritarian rule, problems that could all be alleviated to some degree by changes in U.S. foreign policy towards the region.

INTRODUCTION

In March of 2004 the government of Equatorial Guinea arrested nineteen soldiers accused of plotting a coup in this tiny, oil rich African country. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean government arrested another seventy soldiers supposedly en route from South Africa to support the coup. Led by South African mercenary Mark du Toit and financed by, among others, Sir Mark Thatcher, the coup plotters hoped to replace President Obiang Nguema with the long-exiled opposition leader Severo Moto.¹

This dramatic turn of events highlights the renewed interest in this former Spanish colony in west Central Africa. The recent discovery of massive oil reserves just off the country's Atlantic shores has already made Equatorial Guinea Africa's third largest producer of oil, with an estimated 181,400 barrels producing each day.² Foreign investment has flown in from around the globe, especially from the U.S. Economic growth has been the fastest in the world and the IMF predicts a staggering 45.1 percent rate of growth for 2005.³ This rapid growth, coupled with the country's miniscule population of less than 500,000, has brought GDP per capita estimates (PPP) to an astounding \$50,240, the second highest in the world after Luxembourg.⁴ Equatorial Guinea's oil wealth could transform the country from an impoverished backwater into an economic powerhouse. Yet few benefits have accrued to the masses -- rampant poverty, disease, and inequality persist.⁵ Life expectancy has stagnated at a dismal 49 years while unemployment

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exceeds thirty percent.⁶ Oil rents have consolidated President Nguema's brutal, authoritarian regime and helped further criminalize one of the world's most criminal states. Growing ethnic and regional tensions, the recent coup plot, and an earlier such attempt in 2003 point to rising political instability in the years to come.⁷

This combination of poor development performance, entrenched authoritarianism, and political instability mirror the experiences of other natural resource abundant countries throughout the world. The so-called "resource curse" has thwarted the hopes of many poor, primary commodity exporters and spawned an extensive academic literature intent on explaining this seemingly paradoxical outcome. This diverse literature can help explain Equatorial Guinea's current plight and shed light on what lies ahead -- further underdevelopment, few opportunities for democratization, increased political instability, and violence. As the best work from the resource curse literature acknowledges, however, the political economy of oil in Equatorial Guinea will follow its own, often idiosyncratic, path. Equatorial Guinea's tiny size, the extraordinary pervasiveness of criminality at high levels of government, the unique nature of its regional and ethnic cleavages, its history of extreme personal rule, its strategic importance to the United States, and the offshore nature of its oil reserves will condition the country's experience of the resource curse in important ways. Ultimately, Equatorial Guinea's predicament lends further credence to the central arguments of the resource curse literature and offers an extreme example of the pitfalls associated with resource-led development in very weak states.

This paper analyzes the political economy of oil in Equatorial Guinea with special attention to the academic literature on the resource curse. It begins with a brief history of the country and its recent experience with oil-led development. The paper then moves on to integrate the experience of Equatorial Guinea into the literature linking natural resource abundance to poor development performance, authoritarianism, and civil conflict. The paper concludes by arguing that oil has exacerbated already present pathologies in Equatorial Guinea's political economy, paving the way for a future of underdevelopment, instability and authoritarian rule, problems that could all be alleviated to some degree by changes in U.S. foreign policy towards the region.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA: FROM TROPICAL BACKWATER TO AFRICA'S KUWAIT

Equatorial Guinea remained until quite recently one of Africa's backwaters. Rio Muni, a small sliver of the African mainland between Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, and Bioko Island make up this tiny country of less than half a million residents. Under Spanish colonization cocoa exports dominated the economy and foreigners, mostly Spanish and Nigerian, controlled the small service sector. The vast majority of Equato-Guineans remained subsistence farmers with little or no integration into the market economy. Limited health and education services and almost no infrastructural development outside the main towns left the colony in a state of gross underdevelopment. Colonialism, therefore, created neither a unified national market, nor effective state institutions and left the masses egregiously impoverished.⁸

Unfortunately, independence heralded an even worse period marked by economic decay and brutal dictatorship. Macias Nguema, the country's first president, came to power in 1968 through relatively democratic means. He then installed one of post-colonial Africa's most oppressive regimes, rivaled only by Idi Amin in Uganda. Nguema's rule combined the worst characteristics of the Latin American *caudillo* and the African "Big Man," centralizing power and cultivating a menacing cult of personality.⁹ He executed a classic purge of the opposition, especially targeting

traditional leaders and intellectuals. His reign of terror killed or forced into exile between a third and a half of the country's population. The purge also drove the country into economic free-fall: the expulsion of Nigerian and Spanish expatriates triggered a ninety-percent drop in GDP as the cocoa industry virtually disintegrated.¹⁰

Nguema filled most government posts with members of his family and his Esangui clan, a subset of the Fang people who dominate mainland Rio Muni. He discriminated openly against the Bubi people, the dominant ethnicity on Bioko and killed almost all of Bioko's Bubi politicians.¹¹ This widespread brutality and favoritism bred ethnic tensions between the Fang and Bubi, who together make up ninety-percent of the country's population, and also fostered divisions between the various Fang clans. Because the Fang dominate the mainland and the Bubi the island, these tensions took on a decidedly regional component.¹²

Eventually, Nguema began murdering increasing numbers of his own clan and family, alienating even his closest supporters. Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Macias' nephew, initiated a violent and successful coup in 1979 and came to power under the title "liberator." His regime ended the reign of terror but continued the police state and dictatorial apparatus installed by Macias. Obiang remains in power to this day, his ruling Esangui clan retaining almost complete control of the country. Human rights groups routinely describe him as one of the world's worst dictators, pointing to gross human rights abuses and tight restrictions on civil and political freedoms.¹³

Under Obiang, Equatorial Guinea became a classic criminal state, with many top-level institutions involved in various illicit behaviors. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, in their seminal work on the criminalization of the African state, list Equatorial Guinea as one of only three African countries already worthy of the moniker 'criminal state' in that the apparatus of rule had become intimately intertwined with wide-scale criminal activity.¹⁴ Robert Klitgaard's *Tropical Gangsters* describes his years working there for the World Bank. It depicts an amazingly impoverished people led by corrupt and ultimately inept gangsters engaged in massive criminal activity and human rights abuses.¹⁵ Criminal industries already known to flourish in Equatorial Guinea include toxic waste dumping, drug trafficking, pirate fishing, arms and aircraft smuggling, and forced labor of children.¹⁶

By the mid-1990s Equatorial Guinea had become a quintessential criminal state, retaining its autocratic political system, witnessing ethnic and regional tensions, and continuing to suffer from extreme under-development and human rights violations. Great hopes for a change came in 1995 when Mobil struck offshore oil at its Zafiro prospecting site. Since then, oil has been found in many other sites off the coasts of both Bioko and Rio Muni, making Equatorial Guinea Africa's most important new oil producer. Economic growth has averaged around 41 percent per-annum, and a building boom has gripped the capital of Malabo and the oil towns of Luba on Bioko and Bata on the mainland. Energy companies have invested billions of dollars in the country over the past decade, and the weekly "Houston Express" flies directly from Malabo to Texas.¹⁷ The benefits of development remain concentrated in the hands of a very small elite, however, with very few trickle-down effects for the masses. The oil industry only employs approximately 10,000 people, mostly expatriates or migrants from the U.S., Nigeria, the Philippines, and Cameroon. Furthermore, few oil rents have been invested in programs to improve the quality of life for the people, with spending on health services averaging a mere 1.23 percent of GDP.¹⁸ Clearly, the boom has done little to improve life for the majority of Equato-Guineans.

While of limited importance to most of the country's people, oil has certainly brought

massive wealth to Obiang's ruling clique. Misallocation of oil rents for lavish personal expenditures have grown to ridiculous proportions. Obiang just bought a multimillion dollar mansion outside Washington D.C. His son Teodorin has become a regular in Manhattan, Hollywood and Paris, where he is famous for driving his many fancy cars up and down the Champs-Elysses. He has even begun his own Los Angeles-based music company. A recent corruption scandal involving Washington D.C.'s Riggs Bank implicated the bank and Obiang for illegally siphoning off millions of dollars from Equatorial Guinea's treasury into personal accounts. Furthermore, most of the money Obiang spends inside the country goes to seemingly misguided huge projects, such as building a new capital, Malabo 2, rather than for roads between villages, new schools, or new hospitals.¹⁹

Despite Obiang's obviously unpalatable record on human rights, corruption and criminality, the U.S. government has worked assiduously to improve relations with Equatorial Guinea. In its efforts to reduce dependence on Mid-East oil, the U.S. has invested heavily in West Africa. Equatorial Guinea provides a particularly attractive investment for American (and other) companies because its leaders have been willing to grant far more lucrative offers than have other African leaders. According to a 1999 IMF report, for instance, oil companies received by far the most generous tax and profit sharing packages in the region.²⁰ President Bush has reopened the U.S. Embassy in Malabo, in spite of protests from human rights groups, and has met with President Obiang personally to discuss oil security in the region, indicating how important the region has become to U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. has thus far eschewed attempts to promote either democracy or a more equitable distribution of income in its dealings with Equatorial Guinea. The recent coup attempts have only strengthened the resolve of the U.S. to support the regime, as future instability in the region could radically impact oil production. A nationalist expulsion of foreign workers, in particular, could prove catastrophic to the oil interests of the U.S. and others. The U.S. should, however, change its policy in this regard and promote democratization and more equitable economic development in the country.²¹

Equatorial Guinea's future experience depends to a great degree on the role of exogenous factors, such as U.S. support, foreign-born coup attempts, and the extent of future oil discoveries. Moreover, its unique history will condition the effects of oil on the economy, polity and society in powerful ways. Nevertheless, the broad similarities among resource exporters demand a thorough, comparative analysis of the political economy of natural resources.

NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH AND POOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economic Approaches

The oldest branch of the resource curse literature focuses on the tendency of natural resource abundant countries to suffer from low economic growth and disappointing development outcomes. Latin American economists Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch were two of the first scholars to address the issue. They argued that primary commodity exporters suffer declining terms of trade over the long run. Prices for commodity exports on the world market will, they claimed, fall relative to prices for manufactured goods, leaving commodity exporters with balance of payment problems and slow economic growth.²² Evidence to support their claim has proven mixed, with some studies showing declines and others showing steadier terms of trade. Cuddington and Wei, for instance, found no support for the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in a

statistical analysis.²³ Sapsford and Balasubramanyan, on the other hand, found evidence to support Prebisch and Singer.²⁴ Since the 1980s, however, terms of trade have declined worldwide for primary commodities and greater consensus has arisen that, at least for this time period, declining terms of trade have presented a problem for many countries.²⁵ While declining terms of trade have not yet affected Equatorial Guinea's oil industry, the economy is becoming centered around oil production to such a degree that future declines in the terms of trade would prove devastating to the Equato-Guinean economy.

Economists have argued that natural resource wealth may have other negative effects on economies. Some have suspected that rapid fluctuations in commodity markets might make commodity-dependent economies especially prone to boom and bust cycles and discourage private investment.²⁶ In volatile markets, such as oil, this may prove especially problematic. We will have to wait for the next fluctuation in oil prices, however, to see if this will affect Equatorial Guinea in any meaningful way, but every indication suggests that a dramatic reduction in oil prices would devastate the country's economy, as ninety percent of all exports come from oil.²⁷ The very volatile nature of oil markets since 1971 suggests that future fluctuations are likely and that they may prove dangerous for Equatorial Guinea in the future unless the country's leaders can adopt effective policies to counter these effects,

Another aspect of resource-led development that has received scholarly attention addresses the minimal linkages between the booming sector and the rest of the economy.²⁸ So far this problem has bedeviled Equatorial Guinea greatly. Since most of the inputs needed for the oil industry come from abroad, indigenous industry has not benefited from the boom, and even the service industry relies mostly on imports. The oil industry in Equatorial Guinea remains, essentially, an enclave with little impact on the rest of the economy. If enclave economies properly invest their resource rents in other parts of the economy as well as in infrastructure and human development, however, they can create growth in other sectors or, improve the quality of health and education services. Theoretically, Equatorial Guinea's enormous per-capita oil revenues should make either of these options far easier than in countries with much lower per-capita resource exports. Equatorial Guinea, however, like most oil producers, has failed to act in this direction, leaving the lack of linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors as a fundamental economic problem for the country. The Equato-Guinean leadership's failure to implement policies to create linkages also points to the importance, well-supported in the literature on the resource curse, of incorporating both political and economic analysis in studies of natural resource-driven development.²⁹

The most well-known and best-studied variant of the resource curse literature, Dutch Disease theory, further highlights the need to integrate economic and political explanations into the analysis of resource exporters. The Dutch Disease gets its name from the effects of oil discoveries on the economy of the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. The newfound oil created an export boom, but the domestic economy soon suffered from inflation and a decline in manufacturing exports that led to lower economic growth and rising unemployment. The oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s produced similar outcomes in countries as varied as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Mexico. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon occurs when the export boom leads to inflation and a consequent appreciation of the real exchange rate. This makes domestic producers in fields other than the commodity sector less competitive and, hence, less profitable. This decline in the strength of other sectors in the economy is the crux of the Dutch Disease.

Corde and Neary have found ample support for the hypotheses of Dutch Disease in their

theoretical analyses.³⁰ Other studies confirm the influence of Dutch Disease on economic outcomes empirically. In a comprehensive statistical study, Sachs and Warner examine ninety-seven countries over a nineteen-year period and show that states with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 had unusually slow growth rates between 1971 and 1989. They explain this phenomenon largely through a Dutch Disease effect.³¹ Case studies also provide ample support for Dutch Disease. Gelb, for instance, documents six cases of Dutch Disease: Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.³² One of his case studies shows how Nigeria suffered from an extreme instance of the “Disease” in the 1980s. Spikes in oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80 led to a large oil windfall for the government, but this windfall and its concomitant spending increases spurred inflation, an exchange rate hike and, consequently, a ninety percent decline in the non-mining sector.³³ Gabon, Equatorial Guinea’s neighbor in the Gulf of Guinea, has also suffered from Dutch Disease. While the country has developed a prosperous oil industry, other sectors of the economy, most notably agriculture, have crumbled while inequality and poverty persist. Economic growth has stagnated. The rapidly approaching end to the country’s oil reserves has prompted many to fear almost total economic collapse in the near future unless new reserves are found.³⁴

Despite the common Dutch Disease experience, many critics have argued that this ailment affects developed economies far more than it affects under-developed ones and that its effects vary greatly by country. Benjamin et al., for instance, show that in Cameroon Dutch Disease affected agriculture but not manufacturing.³⁵ Ross further argues that thoughtful policies can counteract most Dutch Disease effects.³⁶ In the words of Terry Karl, “The Dutch Disease is not automatic. The extent to which it takes effect is largely the result of decision-making in the public realm.”³⁷ Furthermore, as Chaudhry points out, the pursuit of substantively different sectoral and industrial strategies in different oil producers “belies the uniform outcomes posited by the Dutch Disease.”³⁸ Some countries, including Iraq, Malaysia, Iran and Algeria, have “countered the pressures against investment in tradeables by initiating industrialization programs.”³⁹

The experience of Botswana stands as a remarkable example of how sound economic policy can prevent Dutch Disease, even in a poor and highly mineral-dependent economy. Upon independence from Great Britain in 1966, Botswana remained one of the poorest and least developed countries on earth. The discovery a few years later of the world’s largest diamond deposits prompted a massive export boom that made Botswana the fastest growing economy in the world between 1970 and 1990. Rather than watch the rest of the economy crumble, however, competent policy-making warded off the worst effects of Dutch Disease. The government adopted effective macroeconomic policies to keep the real exchange rate stable. To do this they both kept a hold on public spending and built up massive foreign reserves. Rather than borrow from the IMF like most African countries, Botswana now lends the IMF hard currency.⁴⁰ Botswana also managed to keep its largest parastatal, the Botswana Meat Commission, competitive on international markets and has spent government revenues responsibly on effective social programs and infrastructure, not frivolous white elephants. Consequently, Botswana remains Africa’s most successful economy and democracy, thirty-five years after the beginning of diamond production.⁴¹

While effective policy-making shielded Botswana from Dutch Disease, Equatorial Guinea’s experience more closely resembles Nigeria’s. Inflation has grown rapidly, hurting the purchasing power of the impoverished masses and prompting a fifteen percent exchange rate appreciation

between the end of 2001 and the middle of 2003 alone.⁴² Cocoa production declined by thirty percent between 1996 and 2001, as investments shifted rapidly to the oil sector and exchange rate hikes made cocoa producers less competitive.⁴³

Declining terms of trade and price fluctuations are likely to create serious future problems for the economy of Equatorial Guinea, as they have in other oil producers. Poor linkages to the rest of the economy and Dutch Disease already have affected the economy and they threaten to further inflict pain on the economy down the road. Feasible policy solutions exist for both ailments however, but most resource dependent countries have proven incapable of handling these problems politically. What makes resource rich countries more prone to the policy failures exhibited by Nigeria and less likely to respond to resource booms in the way exemplified by Botswana? Political scientists have addressed these failures in myriad ways, many of which remain crucially important to the case of Equatorial Guinea.

Political Science Approaches

Political scientists have focused primarily on poor policy-making, bad institutions, or some combination of the two to link natural resources to disappointing economic outcomes. Middle East specialists, for instance, have linked the rentier nature of the region's oil economies to their generally disappointing development performance. Beblawi defines a rentier state as one that derives the bulk of its revenue from external rents, rather than productive enterprises.⁴⁴ Luciani draws a similar distinction "between 'allocation' and 'production' states, depending on which of these two functions – mere allocation or production and reallocation – is the necessary task of the state."⁴⁵ Mahdavy was the first to address the peculiarities of the rentier state in his analysis of Iran.⁴⁶ He argued that oil wealth makes leaders shortsighted and encourages the promotion of economic policies favoring stability and the status quo en lieu of growth and industrialization. Others claim that oil rents make governments less accountable and, therefore, less responsive, to the needs of the people.⁴⁷ Shambayati similarly argues that low taxes and extensive welfare programs shield rentier states from pressure to create effective development programs.⁴⁸

Equatorial Guinea qualifies as a rentier state in Beblawi's definition, as oil rents constitute the vast majority of the economy. Nevertheless, Equatorial Guinea differs in crucial respects from the Middle East's rentier states. Its extraordinarily weak government institutions and the dearth of social welfare programs, in particular, make it unlikely that Obiang's regime will manage to buy the acquiescence of the masses in the same way as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the criminality of the state has facilitated a far more corrupt management of rents than in the Middle East, which may possibly contribute to greater levels of opposition from the masses to the current economic situation. The neo-patrimonial nature of Equatorial Guinea's regime, however, makes it likely that any attempts by Obiang to quell opposition will take the form of greater spending on clientelism, patronage, and granting of prebends, rather than widespread benefits to the masses.⁴⁹

Beyond their limited applicability to Equatorial Guinea, the theories of the rentier state suffer from two important flaws. First, as Chaudhry rightfully asserts, "theories of the rentier state far outstrip detailed empirical analysis of actual cases."⁵⁰ Pure rentier states do not exist and the various so-called rentier states exhibit important differences in political and economic outcomes. Furthermore, despite their origin in political science, theories of the rentier state remain overly economic. In the words of Okruhlik, "The rentier state framework is limited because it

relegates political choices to the back seat, behind structural economies.”⁵¹

The combination of important insights from the rentier state perspective and the lack of empirical evidence for its claims has prompted more nuanced studies of the relationship between resources and development. Chaudhry, for instance, posits that because oil exporting states form weak extractive institutions, they lack the requisite information needed to formulate and implement effective development policies. Furthermore, without adequate information at their disposal, public spending will be informed by primordial cleavages rather than economic rationality.⁵² For Chaudhry, the decline of extractive institutions engenders a decline in overall institutional quality, national integration, state building and, ultimately, development outcomes, building on Delacroix’s classic theorization of how distributive states will differ fundamentally from “normal” states in their process of state formation.⁵³ She traces institutional development in oil producing Saudi Arabia and labor exporting Yemen, demonstrating, in particular, the marked deterioration in extractive institutions.⁵⁴

Equatorial Guinea’s almost non-existent extractive institutions lend credence to Chaudhry’s assertions. With little knowledge as to what occurs in the remote regions of the country, it is unlikely that Obiang and his cronies could ever develop effective development programs. Weak extractive institutions, however, predate the oil boom and, therefore, are not the consequence of oil, though the resource boom may further erode these institutions, contributing even further to economic backwardness. Overall, Equatorial Guinea’s weak institutions and poor policy-making have made the economic problems associated with oil-led development, e.g. Dutch Disease and poor linkages to the rest of the economy, extremely severe. How much oil will continue to contribute to this unfavorable economic situation remains unclear.

The track record of other weak states in Africa suggests that Equatorial Guinea’s institutions will remain weak and its policy-making poor. In Gabon, oil facilitated the growth of an enclave economy that brought little in the way of development to the areas outside the capital, Libreville. Angolan leaders, rather than invest oil rents in roads or human capital, have plundered as much as \$4.2 million over the past few years alone.⁵⁵ Nigeria remains the preeminent example of the deleterious effects of oil on institutions and policy-making in Africa. In Nigeria, oil played a critical role in the creation of a predatory state under Babangida that paved the way for economic disaster. Rather than facilitate the growth of effective institutions or good policies, oil allowed Babangida to spend carelessly and permit institutions to deteriorate.⁵⁶ Equatorial Guinea is unlikely to fare much better than its petro-state neighbors in Africa, especially given the particularly venal policies of Obiang and his circle. Unless the institutions of government change markedly, the chance for a better economic future appears quite bleak. Unfortunately, oil-led development has also had deleterious effects on other important political circumstances, namely the levels of democracy and political stability.

Natural Resource Wealth and Authoritarianism

An important strand of the resource curse literature argues that resource abundance may significantly hinder democratic development. Proponents of the rentier state thesis have long argued that oil wealth has sidelined democratic development in the Middle East. Others make similar arguments about resource rich states in Africa and Central Asia. Ross has shown that natural resource wealth (especially oil) and democracy are significantly negatively correlated.⁵⁷ Lam and Wantchekon, after “...controlling for GDP, human capital, income inequality and other

possible determinants, ... find a robust and statistically significant association between resource dependence as measured by the ratio of fuel and mineral exports as a percentage of total exports and authoritarianism.”⁵⁸ Wantchekon further finds that a one percent increase in resource dependence as measured by the ratio of exports to GDP leads to a nearly eight percent increase in the probability of authoritarianism.⁵⁹ This overwhelming statistical relationship and the remarkable paucity of democracy in resource-rich countries have prompted something of a scholarly consensus that, at least under some circumstances, natural resource wealth may prove inimical to democracy. No consensus has arisen, however, as to what causal mechanisms link natural resources to authoritarianism. The current literature is dominated by four possible mechanisms: a rentier effect, a repression effect, a modernization effect, and a freedom from international pressure effect.⁶⁰

Scholars of the Middle East have long relied on the rentier state notion, or some related variant, to explain the lack of democracy in that region. Others have begun to apply similar arguments to other regions of the world, most notably Africa. Rentier state theories argue that the freedom from taxation in many resource-rich countries precludes mass movements for representation. Similarly, resource windfalls allow the elites to consolidate power and buy off consent from the masses through government spending.

The rentier state literature emphasizes the close historical relationship between taxation and democratization, reversing the common refrain of “no taxation without representation” to “no representation without taxation.” Free from the need to tax its population, fiscally autonomous states feel no pressure from below to democratize and become able to mollify dissent through spending on patronage and welfare programs. Huntington, for instance, has argued that “the lower the level of taxation, the less reason for the public to demand representation.”⁶¹ Anderson further argues that for oil producers “...such revenues release the state from the accountability ordinarily exacted by the domestic appropriation of surplus. In countries like Kuwait and Libya, the state may be virtually autonomous from its society, winning popular acquiescence through distribution rather than support through taxation and representation.”⁶² Mahdavy argued early on that rentier states should demonstrate limited pressure from below for democratization. Chaudhry echoes this sentiment by pointing out that demands for political participation have more often than not been in response to taxation.⁶³ Crystal further argues that oil wealth in Kuwait and Qatar obviated any need to tax the merchant class, who subsequently gave up any demands for participation.⁶⁴ Crystal’s argument retains particular relevance in light of the tendency in Western political science to link the rise of democracy to the rise of the merchant middle class.⁶⁵ A variation on the taxation-representation link emphasizes the ability of rentier states to spend a great deal of money on patronage and other programs that may, in effect, buy off the population’s acquiescence.⁶⁶

Many African oil-producers have followed a similar path, using oil revenues to further their patronage networks and, therefore, quell opposition. Leaders in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Angola, for instance, have proven able to consolidate their autocratic rule through patronage politics. Leonard and Straus argue that “enclave” economies are a foundation for personal rule on the continent because they centralize state resources and facilitate patronage. According to them, “an enclave economic base allows personal rule to sustain itself over the long run both because enclaves themselves are susceptible to state predation and because enclaves do not depend on widespread productivity for their sustenance. Thus, the state’s primary function can be private patronage distribution...”⁶⁷ It is no wonder that many of Africa’s longest running

dictators, from Bongo in Gabon to Mobutu in Zaire, were also leaders of “enclave” states.

Equatorial Guinea, much like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, has yet to develop effective extractive institutions, and its incoming petro-dollars will certainly provide a disincentive for future development of these resources. Moreover, its tiny population and massive oil reserves should make it quite easy for Obiang and his cronies to further consolidate rule through patronage, and public spending.⁶⁸ While petro-dollars will likely free the government from taxation needs, it remains to be seen, however, whether or not the country will begin spending money on social programs and other projects that have the potential to buy mass acquiescence. So far spending remains abysmally low, though growing opposition to the regime may force the government to increase its spending on services and patronage. The potential certainly exists for a rentier effect to take hold in Equatorial Guinea, whereby the absence of taxation and abundant government spending discourage the growth of movements for democratization.⁶⁹

In the near-term, however, Equatorial Guinea is unlikely to develop similar distributive policies to either the rentier states of the Middle East or African enclaves due to the extreme pervasiveness of criminality in the state itself. Obiang will continue to funnel oil rents into illicit enterprises, rather than distribution. This could spur opposition to the regime from the masses and spawn widespread democratization pressures from below. If such pressures do develop, however, they will probably not spur democracy. Obiang will have access to immense patronage resources to buy off key constituencies (ala the rentier state hypothesis) if he needs to. Moreover, transitions from democratization in extreme cases of personal rule – like Equatorial Guinea – rarely lead to democratic stability.⁷⁰ Consequently, any transition that the masses could push through would have little chance of survival. In this case, transition would most likely engender further authoritarianism, especially given the access to oil rents that any autocrat would have. Moreover, Obiang’s massive access to resources for could allow him to build up immense repressive government structures to discourage democratization movements.

Repression has served as a mechanism linking resource wealth to authoritarianism in other primary commodity exporters.⁷¹ Some resource rich countries are able to build up strong enough repressive apparatus’ to quash any and all democratization movements and/or discourage the masses from pursuing such aims. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the Democratic Republic of Congo under Mobutu Sese Seko, Saudi Arabia under the House of el Saud, among others, provide vivid demonstrations for this possibility in the real world. Not all resource-rich regimes, of course, have followed this path of repression. Botswana used its mineral-wealth to improve state capacity, build infrastructure, develop poor relief programs and build up foreign reserves so as to avoid Dutch Disease. The example of Botswana showcases the importance of political history in shaping the outcomes of resource booms in different countries. Botswana was a young but functioning democracy when diamonds were discovered, with a history marked by a relatively benign and un-invasive colonial legacy, postcolonial stability and astute, responsible leadership.⁷² The Democratic Republic of Congo, on the other hand, had a long history of extreme colonial exploitation (even by African standards), ethnic conflict, and unproductive state institutions when Mobutu came into power.⁷³

Equatorial Guinea’s history, unfortunately, resembles that of the Democratic Republic of Congo far more than that of Botswana. The Spanish colonial regime, then under the throes of Francoism, left in power one of post-colonial Africa’s most brutal and feared dictators, Macias Nguema. Nguema ruled with an iron fist and either killed or forced into exile more than a third

of the country's population. Macias typified the personal rule endemic to Africa at the time, but he brought this rule further than almost anyone.⁷⁴ He ruled the country as his own personal fiefdom, going by the names "Leader of Steel," "The Sole Miracle of Equatorial Guinea," and "President for Life." Macias was rumored to practice witchcraft and even cannibalism. Whether or not he did, the people generally believed that he did and lived in extreme fear of him. While Obiang Nguema's regime has proved less brutal than Macias', yet it remains one of the world's most oppressive.⁷⁵

This record of repression and authoritarianism has not subsided since the discovery of oil. Continued human rights abuses and repression persist. If anything, the government's newfound wealth has increased its repressive capacities. Malabo's Black's Prison has garnered a particular reputation for extreme torture and violence in light of publicized accusations of abuse by the arrested coup plotters in 2003.⁷⁶ Repression, therefore, continues to hinder progress towards democracy in Equatorial Guinea.

A third possible link between natural resources and authoritarianism is what Ross calls an anti-modernization effect, which has its roots in modernization theory.⁷⁷ Economic development and industrialization, many scholars suggest, create large middle classes, "modern" mentalities, rising education, improved living standards and, consequently, demands for democratization.⁷⁸ This argument has often been used to explain the lack of democracy in much of the world's poor countries and the rise of democracy in the wealthy West. It has gained renewed credence in recent years, especially in the wake of statistical studies showing a huge correlation between democracy and high per-capita incomes. Przeworski et al., for instance, find a huge correlation between wealth and democratic consolidation, though not democratic transition.⁷⁹ The relationship between modernization and democratization remains unclear. Nevertheless, many scholars suspect that some affinity between levels of development and democracy does exist.

If natural resource wealth can sideline development, as much of the literature suggests, then it can indirectly sideline democracy, as well, according to modernization theory. Ross presents statistical support for this hypothesis.⁸⁰ The applicability of this argument for Equatorial Guinea will rest on the role of oil in fostering or sidetracking economic development. So far, the dismal record of persistent poverty, agricultural decline and limited employment creation certainly bodes poorly for any future democracy if, indeed there is a relationship between development and democracy. Education and health are improving only marginally, with very little investment going into these sectors. Industrialization has yet to occur, what exists of a middle class is primarily foreign (i.e. Cameroonian and Nigerian), and the modernization of the economy does not appear to be happening.⁸¹

A fourth possible link between natural resource wealth and authoritarianism lies in the freedom from international pressure to democratize effect. Englebert and Boduszynski, for instance, show that African transitions to democracy have occurred mostly in resource-poor, aid-dependent states. They argue that the quality of this democracy is generally weak, and, moreover, primarily instrumental, i.e. regimes democratize to placate the wishes of the aid distributing international organizations. Oil and mineral rich states, on the other hand, have been able to avoid democratization due to their resource wealth.⁸² This most certainly applies to Equatorial Guinea, as petro-dollars obviate the need for development aid, thereby shielding the regime from foreign pressure. Were the U.S. and other countries that currently invest in the country's oil to change their policy to require democratization measures on the part of the Nguema regime, this could change drastically. A change in policy appears unlikely, however, as

U.S. officials continue to promote the idea that the best thing for the future of democracy in Equatorial Guinea is oil-led economic development. We can, therefore, expect the freedom from international pressure effect to persist in the case of Equatorial Guinea.⁸³

The rentier, repression, modernization, and freedom from international pressure effects may all contribute to Equatorial Guinea's current authoritarianism. Repression, in particular, appears likely to continue to hinder democratic developments in the country. While none of these mechanisms brought about the country's authoritarianism, they have likely furthered its development, suggesting that Equatorial Guinea's oil boom has exacerbated the country's political problems. Furthermore, oil wealth has the potential to trigger yet another problem for the country, political instability.

Natural Resources and Violent Conflict

A third variant of the resource curse links resource abundance to violent conflict and political instability. The recent coup attempts in Equatorial Guinea highlight the particular importance of this literature for understanding current events in the country. Many scholars stress the potential for ethnic and regional conflicts in resource rich states. Others emphasize the incentives for rebel-groups created by extensive resource rents. What form, if any, future oil-inspired instability may take in Equatorial Guinea remains unclear. The country's Fang/Bubi tensions, its division between the island and the mainland, and the vast inequalities induced by oil-led development pose serious threats to stability, however.

Many scholars of the Middle East argue that distributive states are bound to suffer from extensive racial, ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. Delacroix, for instance, asserts,

the organizational base of challengers in a distributive state cannot be class. Therefore, other structures of social solidarity will have to be activated. Alternative structures are, by default, traditional structures. The more recently incorporated into the world economy a society, the more available are its traditional social structures. Hence, a distributive state ruling a recently incorporated society will experience a maximum of tribal, ethnic and religious challenges.⁸⁴

Chaudhry similarly emphasizes the propensity for resource booms (and labor remittance booms) to institutionalize and exacerbate primordial cleavages in her analysis of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.⁸⁵ For Shambayati, the non-class cleavages that arise are often ideological in nature, as evidenced by the rise of Islamism throughout the Middle East and, especially, in Iran.⁸⁶ Synthesizing all of these arguments, Okruhlik states "Citizens who question the inequitable distribution of rents, the misallocation of resources and the profligate habits of state representatives have found voice in Islamic, regional and private identities. The state has reinforced social identities."⁸⁷

Watts, in his analysis of oil politics in Nigeria, emphasizes the role of both states and multinational corporations in reinforcing social identities. To Watts

the presence and activities of the oil companies...constitute a challenge to customary forms of community authority, inter-ethnic relations, and local state institutions principally through the property and land disputes that are engendered, via forms of

popular mobilization and agitation. These political struggles are animated by the desire to gain access to (i) company rents and compensation revenues, and (ii) federal petro-revenues by capturing rents, (often fraudulently) through the creation of new regional and/or local state institutions.⁸⁸

Watts' account of endemic ethnic violence in the Niger Delta region and the suppression by the central government of movements for environmental, ethnic and economic justice shows the explosive potential for ethnic violence in poor, institutionally weak, resource rich environments.

The potential for oil to exacerbate ethnic and regional tensions poses a serious threat for Equatorial Guinea. The country has a long history of ethnic conflict between the Bubi and Fang. That most of the beneficiaries of oil-led growth are Fang has spurred widespread animosity among the Bubi, especially since most of the country's oil lies closer to Bioko than to Rio Muni. Movements for secession have grown in Bioko and among Bubi exiles in Spain. As Equatorial Guinea continues on its path of inequitable economic development, the chances of ethnic and regional violence will only increase.⁸⁹

The recent literature on ethnic and civil wars often emphasizes the effects of natural resource wealth on conflict. Collier and Hoeffler, for instance, find that states heavily reliant on natural resources face a much higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states. They emphasize the greed of rebel groups, as opposed to political or economic grievances, as the prime motivation for civil conflict. Access to resources to fund their rebellions and the prospect of monetary reward present the link between resource wealth and violence in their analysis.⁹⁰ Fearon and Laitin, using a different data set, find that countries exporting oil, but not other primary commodities, are more likely to undergo a civil war. Rather than emphasize 'greed' over 'grievance,' they focus on factors conducive to insurgency. Low weight, high value resources such as oil, diamonds, coca, and opium promote civil war by making it easier for rebels to finance rebellion.⁹¹ Fearon argues that, because oil weakens state institutions, it fosters state decay and, consequently, rebellion, a finding later supported in an econometric analysis by Humphreys.⁹² The findings of Fearon and Laitin, Fearon, and Humphreys all point out the complexity of the relationship between resources and violence. Resources alone cannot spur war, but they can contribute to violence in many ways.

Englebert and Ron further demonstrate the conditional nature of the relationship between primary commodities and conflict. In their analysis of the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville, for instance, they show that while oil did contribute to the war, it was not sufficient to spur violence. Furthermore, they argue that the offshore nature of Congo's oil reserves concentrated conflict in the capital city because only control over the state could bring oil revenues to the rebels.⁹³ This insight of Englebert and Ron's suggests that any conflict over resources in Equatorial Guinea will also likely concentrate on the capital, as all of the country's resources are offshore. Only complete control of the state will ensure control over oil rents in Equatorial Guinea making state control, not regional control, the primary objective of any war aimed at oil rent capture. The recent coup attempts both aimed at full control of Malabo, lending further support to this claim.

Ross presents another possible mechanism through which oil may promote instability in Equatorial Guinea: what he calls "booty futures" – the selling of future exploitation rights to natural resources.⁹⁴ Ross postulates that the market for these futures may be unique to Africa and may help explain the preponderance of civil wars and coups on the continent. Ross labels the 2004 coup-attempt in Equatorial Guinea as an example of a "booty future"-spurred coup,

whereby the perpetrators were granted offers for future oil revenues. The extraordinarily large oil reserves in Equatorial Guinea, and the potential for future oil discoveries, makes it likely that further “booty future” sales could encourage more coups and, conceivably, even lead to a toppling of the government.

Equatorial Guinea’s leaders face numerous obstacles if they hope to prevent future political instability. The tendency for resource rich countries, particularly oil producers, to suffer from high levels of political violence and ethnic conflict, the extremely unequal current distribution of oil benefits, and the long history of Fang/Bubi and Bioko/Rio Muni conflicts may combine to bring the country into political violence of some form. The recent coup attempts demonstrate this possibility. Moreover, the offshore nature of the country’s oil reserves suggests that attempts at widespread violence will center on the capital city and on the aim of gaining full control over the government, as occurred in Congo-Brazzaville. As mentioned earlier, these attempts to capture control of the state are not likely to prompt a transition to democracy. Rather, they are likely to spur greater repression by Obiang if unsuccessful and further instability and authoritarianism if successful.

CONCLUSION

Equatorial Guinea has already become one of the largest per-capita oil producers in the world. Yet the majority of Equato-Guineans live in abject poverty under one of Africa’s worst dictators. The literature on the resource curse suggests that these problems will persist, if not worsen, as the country continues to develop its oil industry. Moreover, the proclivity among oil producers for ethnic and regional conflict casts doubt on the country’s future stability. While oil has only been pumping for a decade, all signs indicate that Equatorial Guinea is, in fact, marching towards further development failures, authoritarianism, and political instability, thereby vindicating much of the resource curse literature.

The country’s unique political and economic situation, however, will condition the country’s political economy of oil in ways that might differ from the general prescriptions of the resource curse. The country’s tiny size and massive oil reserves may allow the country to follow a path of development that brings greater wealth to the masses through large-scale social and public services. The current regime shows no sign of an interest in this prospect, though growing opposition from the masses may force this on the leadership. More likely, the extensive criminalization of the Equato-Guinean state may exacerbate the problems of oil-led growth by prompting the elite to engage in even fewer productive or even redistributive activities than occurs in most petro-states. The country’s regional and ethnic split between Bubi and Fang will likely lead to conflict along those lines, as the two lines of cleavage overlap and also coincide with differences in access to oil revenues. The offshore nature of oil reserves further indicates that civil wars linked to resources in Equatorial Guinea will likely follow a similar pattern to those in Congo-Brazzaville, where oil is also offshore as opposed to Nigeria, where oil is both offshore and in the Niger Delta inland.

The increasingly close relationship between the U.S. and Equatorial Guinea will serve as a final and, perhaps especially important, factor in determining the future of the country’s political economy. U.S. strategic interest in the region has thus far prompted an attempt to improve relations between the two countries and maintain stability so as to keep oil production flowing. The U.S. has turned a blind eye to the human rights abuses, criminal behavior, and brutality of

the current regime in exchange for easy oil access. Equatorial Guinea remains at least as dependent on American investors, however, as the U.S. is on the country's oil. Consequently, a genuine attempt on the part of the U.S. to promote a more equitable development pattern or improve political and civil rights, could, conceivably be quite successful. The U.S. government could, quite easily, use economic leverage to force democratization and/or more equitable development outcomes on Obiang. For instance, the U.S. could easily make oil contracts conditional on policy changes and monitor these changes carefully. The U.S. could also offer effective security to the regime along with these economic incentives to force change. Equatorial Guinea's tiny size and massive oil reserves mean that even reforms could provide improvements in the lives of Equato-Guineans. Unfortunately, however, no change appears on the horizon, thereby increasing the likelihood that Equatorial Guinea will continue down its current path of criminality, corruption and autocracy.

NOTES

1. Mark du Toit is a former member of Executive Outcomes (EO), the infamous, now defunct mercenary group. EO has worked, to great success, across the continent, most notably during the Liberian war of the 1990s. EO formed out of the ashes of the Buffalo Battalion, South Africa's paramilitary army that fought in Namibia and Angola during the 1970s and 1980s. Du Toit is known to maintain relations with many old members of the Battalion.

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Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article: Brendan McSherry. "The Political Economy of Oil in Equatorial Guinea." *African Studies Quarterly* 8, no.3 [online] URL: <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i3a2.htm>.

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3

Spring 2006

AT ISSUE

Markets and Morality: American Relations with Tanzania

TONY WATERS

Tanzania has never been high on the list of official US relationships in Africa. And for America, this has probably not been a major problem; the two countries are economically and socially very different. Chronically poor, Tanzania has seemingly little to offer the wealthy and powerful United States. Tanzania has an annual GNP capita of \$290 for its 36.5 million people, which works out to a total GNP of approximately \$10.5 billion. Of the total national product, about \$1 billion arrives in the form of bilateral aid, little of it directly from the United States. Tanzania also produces little that is of interest in the world marketplace. As a result the United States has few aid programs designed directly for Tanzania. Rather, embassy and USAID staff peddle the grab bag of Washington-designed economic assistance programs rooted in ideologies of market economics.

Nevertheless, despite, or perhaps because of its economic disadvantages, Tanzania makes important non-economic contributions to the international system out of proportion to its economic muscle. In particular, Tanzania has a recognized capacity to make moral claims not just because of its poverty, but also because of its political stability, strong record of mediating between unruly neighbors, successful wildlife conservation policies, and hosting of refugees. Such policies focus on the moral responsibilities nations have in the world order, rather than market economics. But moral assertions are a poor fit with the trade-based relationships the United States typically seeks. An exception which perhaps illustrates the two different approaches is in the public health programs sponsored by the Center for Disease Control and USAID since the late 1990s. For the Americans, justification for such public health programs is in the “lost productivity” of ill workers, particularly the young adults who die of HIV/AIDS. For the Tanzanians, the justification is rooted in a moral obligation to assist the sick.

In the field of foreign relations, Tanzania has rarely looked toward the United States. Tanzania’s main focus has instead been on good relations with the southern African countries now ruled by parties it assisted to achieve independence between the 1960s and 1990s, and the social democracies of Europe which provide more direct financial assistance than the United

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States. Much of this European aid is directed toward sectors which are not geared toward direct market production such as public health, water systems, primary education, and wildlife conservation. Tanzania also has consistently close relations with China which built the Tanzania-Zambia railway in the 1960s when Tanzania flirted with Chinese Communism. But with the United States, irrespective of the fact that it has the biggest embassy compound in Dar Es Salaam, relationships are typically at arms length, a condition that changed only briefly following the Al Qaeda attack on the United States Embassy in Tanzania in 1998.

In short, there is a mismatch between the political, economic, and cultural interests of the United States and Tanzania. The United States seeks to use the world market system to further its global goals, and does so using the ideology of the marketplace. American foreign assistance programs emphasize entrepreneurship, and engagement in world commodity markets through programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Millennium Challenge Account. Even American programs implemented for humanitarian reasons, like health, education, and refugee assistance are likely to be justified in terms of lost labor productivity, rather than simple appeals to do what is right irrespective of the economic consequences. But Tanzania, which has little leverage in the world economic system, does not always use such economic dogma to justify policy. Instead, it seeks goals through ideological and moral claims. You protect refugees because it is your responsibility as a neighbor, you treat the sick because it is the right thing to do, and oppose colonialism whether or not it is profitable to do so.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: TANZANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Tanganyika became independent from Britain in 1961, and in 1964 joined with Zanzibar to form Tanzania. Then as today, it was a poor country, blessed with little infrastructure. Improved roads at independence in 1961 were few, and rail transport lacking. The small capital city in Dar Es Salaam had only a shallow port. Rural areas had a rapidly growing agrarian subsistence population of about 9 million who ate much of which they produced, and marketed little in either local or international markets. Coastal areas were largely Muslim, while interior areas were Christianized by western missionaries beginning in the 19th century. Famine, which periodically threatened different parts of the country, was dealt with through relief traditionally funded by the British colonial government in cooperation with church agencies. The few available health and education facilities, were provided by a range of Catholic and Protestant missionary societies from North America and Europe which had the wherewithal to fund and staff remote operations.

The newly independent Tanzania was led by founding President Julius Nyerere and his popular Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Nyerere quickly established an ideologically grounded foreign policy of defiant non-alignment, and a domestic policy of “African Socialism” rooted in nostalgic views of pre-colonial society. Implicitly this policy was hostile to markets which were controlled by a small East Asian merchant minority, rather than by black Africans.

Even in the 1960s, Nyerere’s foreign policy emphasized moral responsibilities including opposition to apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa, decolonization, and the reception of refugees. Relations with Britain were severed in 1965 following Rhodesia’s declaration of independence, and relations with the United States were downgraded to protest American involvement in Vietnam. Both moves involved the loss of development aid assistance to Tanzania. In the late 1960s, the few manufacturing and agricultural enterprises, most of which

were controlled by the East Asian minority, were also nationalized by Nyerere's government, and re-organized into state-owned firms. Production which was already miniscule, declined even further.

Nyerere also believed that it was better to leave natural resources—whether mines, or even Tanzania's outstanding parks—unexploited, rather than permitting foreign companies to make investments and then expatriate profits. It was said that Nyerere once commented that he did not want Tanzania to become a nation of waiters in spectacular national parks where even napkins were imported.

But the most significant part of ujamaa socialism was the re-organization of the vast numbers of subsistence farmers. Beginning in the 1960s, Tanzania also re-organized its rural population, often forcibly, into co-operative farms. This was continued in the 1970s with the support of western donors particularly the Nordic countries, Germany, and the Netherlands. This support continued in large part because Nyerere's hard edged "African Socialism" of the 1970s was tempered by Tanzanian leadership which emphasized the protection of human rights. Despite costs to its economy, Tanzania led the economic boycott of South Africa, and freely admitted refugees from Rwanda, Mozambique, Burundi, and Uganda.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were the darkest hours for Tanzania and what remained of its market economy. A successful war with Uganda's despotic and brutal President Idi Amin in 1978-79, further burnished Tanzania's reputation as a moral leader in the international community. Unfortunately for Nyerere, the gratitude of the international community for eliminating Amin did not include picking up the bills from the war, which were instead paid for with deferred maintenance of roads, state-owned factories, and other government infrastructure. As a result, Tanzania became even more of a backwater. The few facilities at renowned national parks like Mt. Kilimanjaro, the Serengeti, and Ngorongoro Crater deteriorated. Paved roads crumbled, and graveled roads became impassable. Electrical generation diminished, and the few remaining industrial mines closed.

Increasing impoverishment of the market sector led in the 1980s to ever-harsher government controls on economic activity, justified by the nationalist ideology of *ujamaa* socialism. Trading in foreign currency was forbidden, agricultural sales to private traders banned, and businesspeople (many of them Asian) were arrested for "economic crimes." Artificially low prices were fixed for food and commodities needed by the urban population, even as migration into Dar Es Salaam was restricted.

Secondary education also declined, as schools established by mission societies were nationalized, and funding switched to basic literacy programs for the rural villages. This led to high rates of basic literacy for subsistence farmers. But few of these farmers were prepared to enter the modern industrial workforce where higher levels of literacy and numeracy were important. Notably, it was not enough education to stimulate the well-known relationship between female education and declining birth rates; much of the rural population responded simply by retreating deeper from the market where the subsistence lifestyle expanded along with a growing population.

So as the Tanzanian economy stagnated and shrank in the 1980s, the size of the rural population soared. What little improvement in gross national product there was—and during the 1970s and 1980s there was often negative GNP growth—was quickly consumed by a population growth rate of upwards of 3% per year. By the early 1980s, the original 9 million had doubled, and by the 2002 census it almost doubled again to 35 million. Sustaining growth were continued

appeals to donors for famine relief as drought limited harvests of subsistence farmers who had pushed into areas of erratic rainfall and poorer soils. The rudimentary road system, still inadequate for truckers to haul surplus grain to market profitably, was instead used for the distribution of relief grain produced abroad.

Despite grim economic prospects in the early 1980s, Tanzania continued to attract large sums of aid from Europe. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration which was hostile to Nyerere's policies of non-alignment and socialism, distanced itself. Much of the aid came from Scandinavia, which had sympathies with the non-alignment of Tanzania as well as its socialist philosophy. But by the mid-1980s, these donors too began to withdraw support, citing mismanagement of donor-funded projects and corruption. Nyerere retired in 1985 and a new government under his chosen successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, began acceding to demands of the creditors at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to loosen the socialist-era controls on the Tanzanian economy. During the late 1980s, and 1990s, free trade in foreign currency was legalized, the assets of hundreds of state-owned companies (most of which were non-producing) were sold to local and foreign investors, and price controls removed from grain trading. Sleepy Dar Es Salaam which had a population of just over 100,000 at independence in 1961 increased in population some thirty-fold to a population of about 3 million in 2005, largely as a result of growth since 1985.

Irrespective of problems with corruption and inefficiency, Tanzania's continued positive role in the anti-apartheid movement and refugee relief added to its international prestige in the 1990s. Indeed, international refugee relief, and programs organized in Tanzania on behalf of Rwandans, Burundians, and Congolese, were to give a major boost to the Tanzanian economy in the mid-1990s when over \$100 million in cash and foodstuffs was injected into the country to support the refugee relief program. Tanzania also continued to be viewed as an honest independent broker, and played a leading role in peace negotiations among factions from Rwanda and Burundi in particular. In the 1990s, Tanzania became the site for the UN's International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda, as well as regional groupings from southern and eastern Africa. Former President Nyerere became a mediator in Burundi's on-going civil war until his death in 1999.

IMF-inspired economic experiments also continued in the context of shifts from a single party state to one in which several small but noisy parties emerged alongside the dominant successor to Nyerere's TANU, "Chama Cha Mapinduzi" or CCM. CCM is popular particularly with the vast conservative rural population which seeks to preserve a status quo which includes access to agricultural land, a modicum of education and health care, and the provision of famine relief.

By 2005, it was unclear whether the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s had paid off. Despite structural adjustment, the 1990s had only a tepid economic growth rate of about 0.1% per year, well below the 2.3% population growth rate. But, since 2000, economic growth rates have improved, particularly in the cities. GNP growth rates in 2002-03 were pegged at about 5.8%. Although population growth rates slowed from highs of the 1970s, it still continued to climb rapidly. Such population increase has the practical effect of "eating up" many of the advantages of such robust economic growth. The rapidly developing economy reflects an expanding but impoverished urban sector. Rural youth rushed into the city to take jobs supported by tourism, a burgeoning development aid industry, and minor manufacturing. Much of this growth was stimulated by a new tourist sector in Tanzania's national parks and tropical Zanzibar which attracted European tourists. But American tourism remains muted, in part due to

continuing U.S. State Department warnings to tourists that Al Qaeda has been active in Tanzania.

AMERICAN -TANZANIAN RELATIONS

Official America today often treats Tanzania as a mildly annoying child, complaining about lack of security, open markets, a persistently large public sector, and corruption in the management of aid money. Tanzania continues to respond with a masterful game of playing rich donor countries off against each other. Development projects rejected out of frustration by one donor, are often funded by another. Such moves permit the persistence of the ruling CCM elite which needs the aid infusion to sustain power.

Despite frustrations, the American government persists in their attempts to make friends in Tanzania, utilizing the grab bag of programs and assistance like African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Millennium Challenge Account designed in Washington for countries with more established market economies like Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, and Ghana. There is perhaps no better illustration of how limited the Tanzanian economy is than in the country's response to the United States' aggressive economic outreach program AGOA. In 2004, after five years of aggressive promotion, only \$3.6 million was exported under the Act, which according to U.S. data represented 15.6% of Tanzania's exports to the United States that year. Given such economic weakness, it is not surprising that Tanzanian foreign policy continues to focus on an assertion of moral legitimacy, whether in opposition to colonialism and apartheid, support for refugee protection, conservation, and human rights, rather than economic power.

Irrespective of the mismatched policies, the current American response is only to intensify efforts to implement Washington-designed policies on the assumption that project failure is due to public relations issues, rather than the mismatch between American and Tanzanian world views. The result in recent years is why study trips for politicians to study democracy, police officers to study anti-terrorism techniques, and Asian businessmen to encourage participation in AGOA. Other Washington-designed programs include assistance for rural agriculture designed by American agricultural economists and improved security for facilities frequented by official Americans. The USAID budget for Tanzania itself is consistently less than \$30 million per year, with much of the assistance going to American NGOs and companies to promote small business development. A focus on national parks and conservation fills out the short list of programs coordinated by USAID and the US Embassy during the last five years. Newer programs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS are also being established in the context of the President Bush's 2003 Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief programs.

Part of the problem is that American vision for Tanzanian relations has been obscured by its own pre-occupation with the 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda. As a result, the Americans have an overwhelming interest in security issues, which while dominant for the Americans, are irrelevant to the mass of poor rural Tanzanians. Al Qaeda cells may well be active in Muslim areas, but from the perspective of Tanzanians, State Department travel advisories only slow the growth of the still small tourist sector in the country's game parks without a clear improvement in security. Indeed, Tanzanians typically grumble that East Africa is singled out for such blanket warnings and pointing out that unlike Spain or the United Kingdom, there have been no known terrorist attacks in Tanzania since 1998.

In response to the 1998 embassy bombing in Tanzania, between 1999 and 2003 the United

States has spent about \$100 million for a new twenty-two acre embassy complex, airport security, FBI investigations, armored vehicles, construction of diplomatic facilities, and rehabilitation of Embassy staff housing. The amount dwarfs even the export trade between the countries, much less the smaller amount of trade stimulated by AGOA or provided in official aid. Very little of such security spending trickles down to the mass of rural poor who do not frequent Dar Es Salaam, and certainly do not fly in and out of the newly secured airports.

Also damaging to official American-Tanzania relations is the role of consular regulations in granting visas to Tanzanians visiting the United States. Visa applications cost a non-refundable \$50 for a process which is opaque from the Tanzanian perspective, particularly given that people sponsored to attend conferences in the United States by US government agencies and NGOs are routinely denied visas. Such a response is perhaps particularly mystifying in a society like Tanzania which considers hospitality to be a moral indicator of friendship.

But again, urban infrastructure of embassies, airports, visas, and the rhetoric of security is a moot point for the vast majority of Tanzania's rural and urban poor. The fact of the matter is that whether the government in Dar Es Salaam leans towards the capitalist right, or socialist left is largely irrelevant to the 20-25 million Tanzanians who live on subsistence farms, or the millions more moving into the fast-growing cities. Indeed, an uncomfortable fact for the agricultural economists hired by USAID is that their expertise in highly mechanized American agriculture has little to do with subsistence agriculture in Tanzania, where fields are tilled with a hoe and most production is consumed on-farm, never reaching the marketplace. Complicating aid programs is Tanzania's assertion of its place as an "agricultural country," because of the large subsistence sector. It is an agricultural country, but not one which participates extensively in international markets.

Oddly, despite the at-times frosty relationships between official America and official Tanzania, and the general lack of business opportunities, person-to-person relationships between Americans and Tanzanians are often quite good. In large part this reflects relationships outside the marketplace and established by non-official Americans working in Tanzania. American mission societies particularly the African Inland Mission and the Southern Baptists, have had a presence in up-country Tanzania since the late 19th century. Returned American missionaries provide a small constituency for Tanzania in the United States. Peace Corps volunteers have been present in substantial numbers since the late 1980s and have assisted with the revitalization of Tanzanian secondary schools during the last 15 years. Wildlife researchers working in the magnificent game parks and reserves, and even paleontologists working at Olduvai Gorge and other sites, also provide areas of mutual interest. American academics have passed through the University of Dar Es Salaam since 1962, and return as advocates for academic exchange programs. Many Tanzanian faculty have studied in the United States. In recent years, a growing tourist trade means that both tour operators and tourists are developing a familiarity with Tanzania's national parks and the beach resorts on Zanzibar. Notably though, such shared activities have little to do with direct production of manufactures or services for the international marketplace. Such relationships are instead rooted in morals, hospitality, aesthetics, concern for the sick, humanitarianism, education, and other issues of only tangential issues to the international business interests typically focused on by official U.S. policymakers.

WHICH WAY AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TANZANIA?

As long as U.S. diplomatic goals in Tanzania are focused primarily on markets and terrorism, there is likely to be little basis for the type of political, economic, and cultural activity that tie countries together. By the same token, as long as Tanzania is dependent on international largesse for national budgets, it is unlikely to have the independence needed to truly be an effective partner even for the moral issues which both countries value.

Nevertheless, the United States and Tanzania do share some values which are central to international relations. Shared goals include disease control, protection of human rights, conservation, public health, education, and an interest in religious faith. Tanzania's greatest international resource is probably its political stability relative to other countries in the region. The country's role as an "honest broker" in the reception of refugees, hosting of international organizations, and sponsorship of peace talks is an important non-economic resource.

Other areas which are "natural" for US-Tanzania relations include higher education. The University of Dar Es Salaam has a long history of receiving and hosting American university students, faculty, and researchers. There are shared interests in peaceful relationships between Christianity and Islam, too. But perhaps public health is the area where cooperation can be greatest. American institutions, starting with missionary societies in the late 1890s have a long history of involvement with public health in Tanzania. The political stability of the country means too that long term public health data are available. This is valuable for both the humanitarian, and commercial interests of the two countries.

But this range of shared interests and strengths is not now reflected in official United States programs in Tanzania which instead emphasize traditional American commercial interests in agro-business, and industrial production. In the short and medium run, such commercial activities are more important in countries which have a work-force, natural resources, and transportation infrastructure suited to such production. More to the point, Tanzania needs programs which will help it to preserve the value in wildlife reserves for the long run, solidify its "honest broker" position in regional relations, provide secondary school training particularly for females, develop a public health sector which is a model for other countries, and cope with growing urban congestion. Such programs require the development of modern institutions and a workforce as surely as businesses do. Among programs likely to match shared American and Tanzanian interests more closely are:

- Sponsorship of female secondary and tertiary education which has the effect of bringing down birth rates and developing trained and disciplined workers for governmental, civil society, and private sectors.
- Preservation of outstanding park lands and wildlife. This has few economic rewards in the short-run, but potentially outstanding rewards in the long run.
- Tanzania's political stability contributes to a capacity for evaluating long-term public health measures. This is a resource not found in many other countries of central Africa.
- Tanzania's stability also provides an opportunity for the coordination of international humanitarian relief efforts, which has already included both the reception and resettlement of refugees, coordination of diplomatic efforts for the settlement of disputes among neighboring countries, and establishment of international bureaucracies like the regional office for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, and the International Court in Arusha.
- The long relationship between American mission societies, and the alleviation of rural

Tanzanian poverty, provides a mutual interest in the fields of health care, and education.

- Refugee reception and relief contributes to the stability of the eastern and central Africa, and given continuing instability of neighboring countries like DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, is likely to do so in the future.
- The long relationship between university students, faculty and researchers trades on strengths of both countries. In large part because of Tanzania's stability, the university system continues to have a strong faculty with a rapidly growing student body.

But, for the Americans, there is another question about whether an effective relationship between the two countries is in the United States' broader interest. There are many other countries which for geographic, political, and historical reasons can and should have a higher priority. But, new buildings for the U.S. State Department, and Center for Disease Control in Dar Es Salaam office send a different message. The message it sends is that Tanzania should be an effective partner with the Americans. But an effective partner for what? Again, the small size of the Tanzanian economy mitigate against traditional economic relations, at least in the short and medium run. But the United States could focus more on Tanzania's strengths, rather than solely on the immediate global interests of the United States. Tanzania will have 50 million people by about 2015, with tens of millions seeking entry into the world economy, even as their brethren continue to live on subsistence farms. This would mean tailoring programs and relationships with a closer eye to the unique role Tanzania plays in Africa and the world. The strengths both countries share are commitments to good governance, refugee relief, education opportunities, political stability, and the eradication of disease. Tilting policy towards Tanzania in such a fashion is more productive than continuing to preach the gospel of markets and investment in a place which has yet to participate in world markets in a significant fashion.

Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article: Tony Waters. "American Relations With Tanzania." *African Studies Quarterly* 8, no.3 [online] URL: <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i3a3.htm>

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3

Spring 2006

The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880. William B. Cohen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 360 pp.

The French Encounter with Africans provides a review of French thinking about race and slavery as it developed from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Cohen's book emerged in response to three studies of the Anglo-Saxon image of Blacks: Curtin's *The Image of Africa* (1964), Jordan's *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro* (1969) and Fredrickson's *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny* (1971). Cohen's study was intended to constitute a French-focused examination of the image of Blacks, but instead generated unprecedented attention when reviewed in *Le Monde* by Emmanuel Todd who attacked the central thesis of the study: that there existed a consensus in French thought, which relegated the Black to a position of inferiority. So violent was Todd's attack on Cohen's study that it was taken as further evidence of the French reluctance to engage with the race question.

Taking a revisionist approach, Cohen challenges the reputation that France had gained for itself for being a country incapable of race and color prejudice; a perception that was so widely held, he argues, that it had come to form an integral part of the French self-image. Tracing the inequality of Blacks and Whites back to ideas inherited from the Classical world, in the first five chapters of the study Cohen explores the foundations of slavery, the ways in which it was justified, and its development. He goes on to chart the rise of imperialism as well as the demands for the abolition of slavery through emancipation in the nineteenth century, hesitation over which Cohen attributes to deep underlying doubts about Blacks. Chapter eight is a key chapter, which explores scientific racism and the ascendance of race thinking, the culmination of centuries of hostility towards Blacks that found its expression in language borrowed from the biological sciences. The progressive expansion of French Empire, explored in the final chapter of the volume, continued to present Africans as passive, reinforcing existing images of Blacks. In Cohen's words, "Imperialism did not cause any reassessment of Blacks, but rather helped to preserve the negative images that had existed since the earliest stages of Franco-African contact" (283).

The first edition of this once groundbreaking and now classic book was published in 1980, and it is surprising that it has only recently been published in paperback. Although the present edition is identical to the original, the addition of a foreword by Professor Le Sueur of the University of Nebraska provides not only a valuable overview of the text, highlighting its central thesis, but also an appreciation of Cohen's life and achievements as a scholar. Cohen received his PhD from Stanford University and spent his entire academic career at the University of Indiana, serving as Chair of the Department of History for part of that time. Cohen's first two books *Rulers of Empire* and *European Empire Building* addressed the French colonial service in

twentieth-century Africa. He then turned to the study of earlier times, which led to the publication of this volume in 1980. The present edition was published shortly after his death in 2002.

The French Encounter with Africans is clearly written, well structured and detailed without being too dense, making it accessible to a broad readership. Although Cohen's book lacks a bibliography, extensive endnotes provide clarification on points of interest, as well as references. Cohen's approach was controversial when the book first appeared, but the new lines of inquiry initiated by Cohen have since been followed up in the writings of other prominent historians, most notably Tzvetan Todorov. Cohen's ideas are now widely used and accepted, making *The French Encounter with Africans* an important point of reference for both academics and students.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason. Biko Agozino. London: Pluto, 2003. 281 pp.

This book will undoubtedly provide much discussion in criminological circles, but it should not be confined to such a narrow field. Indeed, Biko Agozino has ushered forth a call, among other things, for former European colonies of Europe to adopt a new criminological theory to aid in the liberation of millions from human misery. According to the author, presently "...there is no single such [Criminology] department in the numerous universities in Africa (except in South Africa), the Caribbean, Asia and, to a lesser extent, South America" (9). He warns African and other former colonial nations, however, not to imitate the "mother countries'" criminology apparatuses that are steeped in imperialistic philosophy and practice. For Agozino, western criminological technology has either directly or indirectly stifled the development of those very societies in colonial, postcolonial, and even post-postcolonial times.

Moreover, he contends that western criminologists need to adopt a less arrogant approach to criminology by listening to the voices of the voiceless and powerless from past and present. At its base, the book is bold and iconoclastic. Because of this it is refreshing to read and very informative. The author pulls no punches in his critique of western imperialism as it has intersected and defined much of the so-called Third World's judicial systems. Agozino writes:

Criminology was developed primarily as a tool for imperialist domination and it continues to operate largely as a repressive technology. Other technologies of domination crafted by imperialism, such as the army, the police and the prison, have been generally appropriated by neocolonial regimes around the world. (228)

Agozino is particularly critical of the dearth in western criminological insights into contemporary forms of imperialism and human subordination due to the continued hegemony of the West. Criminological theory tends to emanate from the metropolises of the West and this negatively influences the empowerment of the disempowered—who tend to be most often, but not exclusively, people of color.

What makes *Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason* an interesting and informative read is its use of an interdisciplinary perspective, or what Agozino deems as "a transdisciplinary theoretico-methodological intervention" (1). Thirteen chapters, plus an incisive foreword from Stephen Pfohl, and an elaborate conclusion make up the structure of the book. The topics range from a critique of The Enlightenment and Euro-American Theories of the Judicial Process, to Feminist Perspectives and Critical Criminology, to Executive Lawlessness and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, to an analysis of the late reggae star Peter Tosh. Crucially, Agozino offers a wide-ranging and eclectic scholarly work that is unequivocally "counter-colonial" in its approach. It will no doubt irk the sensibilities of those scholars embedded in European canons and white-approaches to criminological discourse, which are currently the staple diet in most university courses.

In regard to chapter twelve, most Americans will probably not be very familiar with the analysis of Stephen Lawrence, the case of a young middle class black British male murdered by five racist young men in England (April 22, 1993). It is a powerful chapter that interacts with the public inquiry report into the killing, along with James Baldwin, and key theoretical perspectives, including: Marxism, Functionalism, Rationalism and Poststructuralism. A useful table (198) helps the reader situate the theories and writers that adhere to such schools of thought. This will be particularly useful to both undergraduates and graduates.

However, although I am in full agreement with Agozino's overall critique of westernized notions and practice of criminology and its claim to "objective" science that does very little to enable the powerless to attain justice, he still does not fully "escape" the Eurocentric canon. To put it another way, there is a strong and admirable attempt by Agozino to disassociate himself from the theoretical quagmire of Eurocentric discourse, but there is not enough engagement with alternative schools of thought, particularly from the perspective of Africans. Yes, there are the contributions of Nkrumah, Cabral, Fanon, Sivanandan, Hall, Davis, hooks and other black theorists, but most of these scholars were, or are, either Marxist and/or black Feminist. What about scholars who want to research African culture and social experience without the ghost of Karl Marx hanging on their shoulder? Or those like Clenora Hudson-Weems who seek an Africana womanist rather than feminist approach to social theory? This, however, is merely constructive criticism that should enhance in due course, I would hope, Agozino's already laudable theoretical position. Indeed, he admits that his research will need further exploration (247) and contemplation, provided that he can obtain the funding for such counter-hegemonic research endeavors in these draconian conservative times.

Overall, this is a book that deserves to be on all criminological reading lists, and it would be at home in any African centered studies course. It offers a generous amount of scholarly inquiry into an area that has paid scant attention to African and other "people of color's" perspectives in the criminological discourse. It is therefore groundbreaking and a must read.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

African Francophone Cinema. Samba Diop. New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2004. 106 pp.

Africa Shoots Back: Alternative Perspectives in Sub-Saharan African Film. Melissa Thackway. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Oxford: Oxford, UK: James Currey, Ltd. Capetown, South Africa: David Philip, 2003. 230 pp.

Samba Diop's *African Francophone Cinema* is destined for students who have an interest in francophone-African cinema, although Diop does not specify for which educational level it is appropriate. Given its traditional thematic approach and the limited number of films it discusses, I would limit its use to undergraduate introductory courses in film, or as an introduction for the uninitiated scholar. Melissa Thackway's *Africa Shoots Back* is both more ambitious in scope and more successful in its presentation. Although Thackway gives adequate attention to the African narrative traditions and themes outlined briefly in Diop's book, she goes beyond them to acknowledge francophone-African filmmakers for their innovation in style and technique.

She explores how African directors create their own artistic vision, rejecting the restrictive notion of "African cinema." Thackway illustrates convincingly how these filmmakers incorporate traditional images and practices from Africa in their films when beneficial to an understanding of their people, but how they eschew stereotypical images of Africa imposed by the West.

Diop organizes her book by theme—history, oral tradition, myth, religion, gender and sexuality, and postcolonialism—and much of what the book purports to achieve is contained in its summary introduction and conclusion. The body of the book analyzes in some detail films based on their central themes; for example, *Ceddo*, by Ousmane Sembène (Senegal), is used as the backdrop for a general discussion of the history of francophone-African cinema; *La genèse*, by Cheich Oumar Sissoko (Mali), illustrates the role of religion. Such an approach is valid, and there is much good thematic analysis of the films. However, Diop also promises to discuss cinematic technique, but there is very little about it in this text, and she inevitably returns to themes as major points of discussion.

In contrast, Thackway discusses traditional, thematic approaches while also acknowledging the technique and concerns of African directors independent of their categorization as African filmmakers. In her useful introduction Thackway challenges the qualification of Sub-Saharan Africa into linguistic categories—anglophone, francophone, and lusophone—rightly arguing that these distinctions are convenient colonial constructs, but that a minority of the peoples of these regions actually uses European languages with any regularity. Her argument is more lengthy and detailed than Diop's cursory discussion of "diglossia," in which native African languages are used alongside European ones in African cinema. Thackway explains that the term "francophone" refers to a common socio-political heritage, rather than as proof of the primacy of

France as a cultural reference. She is concerned with the traditional preoccupations often delineated in this type of text—themes that she refers to as “representation, identity and voice”—but she enlarges this view to explain how African filmmakers challenge European stereotypes and empower their audiences through the filmic medium. Her chapters are well organized and detailed. In the first chapter, she situates African film in its broader, predominantly European context, and illustrates how current critical cinematic theory may be applied to African cinema. In chapter 2 she explores representation, identity, and voice—how filmmakers use the medium to affirm African identity while challenging negative Western stereotypes. Chapter 3 shows how filmmakers’ cultural identity is developed and how elements of African oral tradition are integrated into film. Chapter 4 is a discussion of memory and history in which the author illustrates how colonial powers repressed or misrepresented African history, and how African directors reappropriate their history and interpret it from an African perspective. Chapter 5 contains an important, but often overlooked, aspect of francophone African film—African films set in Europe, which give audiences a view of the immigrant experience and explore the notion of African identity rarely treated in film, either African or European. Chapter 6 gives women in film their rightful due, exploring themes of empowerment in films by both female and male directors. Special attention is given to three prominent women directors—Safi Faye (Senegal), Anne Laure Folly (Togo), and Fanta Régina Nacro (Burkina Faso).

Diop devotes several paragraphs to problems of production and distribution among francophone-African filmmakers—again, an important point. Receiving little or no funding from their country of origin, these filmmakers must seek financing through the French Minister of Cooperation, and in many cases, what is asked of them by the French government is “authenticity,” which means depicting scenes of agricultural life, indigenous spiritual and cultural rituals, and native dance and music. In other words, it is difficult and sometimes controversial for African artists to depict more modern concerns—post-colonial political and economic strife, the AIDS epidemic, and loss of cultural identity. However, much of this information seems anecdotal, and the text itself is poorly organized and referenced. Long lists of filmmakers and their countries are given in the introductory chapter instead of as a filmography at the end of the text. The filmography that is given at the end includes only the 15 films actually discussed in the text, and then referenced only by director’s name and title of film. It would be helpful to have the country of origin here for quick reference. A short discussion of women filmmakers—Sarah Maldoror (Guadeloupe) and Flora Gomes (Guineau-Bissau) is included in the second chapter on history, but it seems an afterthought or a duty fulfilled, after nearly the entire chapter is devoted to Ousmane Sembène (an important pioneer in African cinema, no doubt). Certain subject groupings are curious and confusing. Why, for example, does Diop include “New Aesthetics” (ostensibly a discussion of directorial technique, distribution, and production) in a chapter largely devoted to gender and homosexuality? Although as stated above, Diop does a creditable job of illustrating themes, some of his analyses are obvious, even to the uninitiated student or scholar, such as when she comments that “...a distinction between documentaries and fiction must be made as the two do not necessarily play similar roles” (66).

The difference between the two books in terms of source material and references is telling. Diop provides nearly ninety sources, but in roughly one quarter of these (many of them journal articles) no date of publication is given, making them difficult to find if one chooses to conduct further research. No still photos of the films are included, which might help to illustrate some of the thematic discussions and spark interest in viewing the films discussed. Thackway, on the

other hand, is thorough and painstaking in her references. She includes an extensive filmography (well over 100 films are discussed in her text), including details such as country of origin, distributors, running time, and medium. The bibliography of reference works is detailed and up to date, and includes a wealth of sources for further study. Since these films are sometimes not easy to find, most helpful is the contact information for major distributors of francophone-African films included at the end. Reference notes appear in the right margins of each page (which I found less distracting than footnotes but more easily accessible than endnotes), and there are dozens of movie stills and reproductions of movie posters to illustrate technical points and key thematic elements. As an introduction to francophone-African cinema, Diop's text is sufficient in spite of its weaknesses, whereas Thackway's text is an excellent source in every regard—as an introduction to the subject, as a reference for serious scholars, and as an assigned text in an undergraduate or graduate course.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Phases of Conflict in Africa. Rose Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser, eds. Toronto: De Sitter Publications, 2005. 184 pp.

Africa has been afflicted by serious armed conflicts perhaps more than any other region on the planet. It is however important to put the causes of these conflicts into proper perspective, rather than simply concluding that they are tribal or ethnic conflicts. In most cases, the underlying causes of these conflicts are closely interwoven in both national and international arenas. Among the international factors are the consequences of the Cold War and its aftermath, as well as the globalization and liberalization of the world economy, which have generated political and economic insecurity in Africa. National factors that have contributed to armed conflicts in Africa include discriminatory political processes, skewed resource distribution, centralized and highly personalized forms of governance, corruption, and mismanagement. In practice, attention to these conflicts is usually at the individual country level and in the contexts of specific countries. The consequence is that conflict resolution strategies fail to appreciate the complex, often regional, nature of conflicts in Africa. This book aims to provide an analytical framework for conceptualising and dealing with some of these conflicts, particularly in West and Central Africa.

The book initially considers the critical issue of terrorism and the way it has affected Africa. The emphasis in the discussion is on the factors that serve to mobilise actors toward the use of violence. The book points out that the underlying causes of terrorism should be sought in social and political injustices and in patterns of inequality. The war on terrorism therefore requires more than armed invasions. It calls for cooperation in attacking despair and indignities that spawn radical political measures and violence. The book maintains that the United States priority has been to reduce the threat of terrorism against American interests at home and abroad, but that there are costs involved and opportunities that African governments can exploit. The bottom line is that Africa should seek to strike more advantageous bargains with the United States by negotiating for the strengthening of governmental institutions to fight terrorism. The book also warns of the dangers of the war against terrorism diverting American attention from economic development and democratisation.

This volume also underscores the historical and cultural factors in the exacerbation of conflicts in Africa. It cites the case of Northern Ghana that witnessed conflicts between 1981 and 1994. These conflicts were an extension of the failure of the post colonial government to reconstruct citizenship in away that balanced ethnic interests. The post colonial government instead marginalized some groups which in turn aggravated conflict between ethnic groups. Most conflicts in Africa are in part informed by traditional legacies of skewed socio-economic and political relationships.

The refugee problem in Africa is another crucial factor linked to conflicts. The text argues that conflicts do not simply spill across boundaries because of movement of refugees. Instead, conflicts arise when refugees enter into a polarized situation or one that already contains the

seeds of discord. In such cases refugees create tensions by creating new alignments or changing old ones. The cases of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are used in the book to illustrate this situation. The historical polarity and movement of refugees in eastern DRC helps to explain the tension and conflicts in that country in the recent past. In Tanzania similar historical circumstances do not pertain and that partly explains why Tanzania has not witnessed violent conflicts involving refugees. The book also deals with the scope of the conflicts in the DRC since independence, illustrating the role of both the regional and trans-national forces.

In the case of West Africa, the book examines the case of Liberia and maintains that while a peace agreement can lay a foundation under which overt war may cease, it is the efforts to consolidate the peace agreement that determine whether that agreement will last or not. It is important to build on peace agreements by paying close attention to the vulnerabilities that each party brings to the negotiating table. The book also considers the question of transitional justice in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone adopted two transitional justice policy options: a Truth Commission and a Special Court. In the recent past, countries that have emerged from conflict or gross human rights abuses have increasingly shown interest in adopting a variety of policy. The book cautions against embracing a 'one size fits it all' approach. It maintains the need to tailor policy options to specific contexts.

The book does well in broadly highlighting the complex nature of most of the conflicts on the African continent. It takes in diverse methodological approaches and ideological assumptions and certainly adds to critical thinking by providing fascinating and factual case studies. Each chapter challenges the reader to rethink the conventional simplistic way of branding conflicts in Africa in tribal/ethnic terms. What perhaps does not come out strongly in the essays on terrorism is the debate on the role of religion in conflicts, particularly where individuals seek to legitimise barbarism in the name of belief. Religion has also worked in tandem with socio economic factors to intensify conflicts in some parts of Africa, including Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. The book also defines conflict in broad terms of perceived incompatibility of interests or competitions for control of scarce resources. Yet in the cases covered, there is little effort to distinguish these from overt and structural but insidious forms of conflict in countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria. Nonetheless, the book is richly relevant to contemporary readers in its ability to highlight complex debates and borrow from diverse sources of data. The various contributors can each stand on their own but they also build on each other. It is a well packaged book on some key cases of destructive conflict in Africa. It should interest both academicians and practitioners interested in intellectual development, dialogue, and practice on conflict broadly and on Africa in particular.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Swahili Modernities. Culture, Politics, and Identity on the East Coast of Africa. Pat Caplan and Farouk Topan, eds. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004. 270 pp.

A photograph of a young woman wearing a greenish veil and holding a mobile phone to her right ear adorns the cover of “Swahili Modernities”, a collection of conference contributions dealing with “Culture, Politics and Identity on the East Coast of Africa”. It should be pointed out that the modernity in the title refers to a much longer period of time than the cover-picture suggests, the most obvious example being José Arturo Saavedra’s chapter on the incorporation of foreign words into Swahili poetry written between 1880 and 1907.

The plural, “Swahili Modernities” reflects not only the many forms in which modernity manifests itself on the East African Coast at various times, but also the diversity of approaches used by the contributors to the volume who have their background - with the exception of Greg Cameron, who is a political scientist - either in language and literature studies or anthropology. The case studies covers almost all of the Swahili Coast with Lamu as the most northern site of research and the Comoro islands the most southern, passing Bagamoyo, Zanzibar and Mafia island.

The book is well structured, although the headings of the three sub-sections “From Malindi to the Comoros: Local-level Case Studies of Swahili Modernities” (chapters 2-6), “Focus on Zanzibar” (chapters 7-9) and “Modernities and Identities in Swahili Texts: Poetry, Songs and Plays” (chapters 10-13) which are given on the homepage to the book have gone missing in the book itself.¹

In the introductory chapter Caplan defines what modernity means in the context of the history of the Swahili Coast, by summarizing the main threads of discussion between the conference participants who were faced with two main challenges: to make clear that the coast of East Africa “has long been an area of perpetual change” (p.3) and to show that “the relationship between modernity and tradition is far from being an either/or matter.” (p. 5). As the editors state in their preface, they aimed to explore “the impact of recent historical changes on the East Coast: globalization and its concomitant, localization; development and under-development; political changes, conflict and contests; and local understandings of and strivings towards the elusive goal of modernity” (viii) – an aim which they definitely accomplished with this volume.

The elusive character of modernity is at the center of Caplan’s own case study on Mafia island for which she employed a creative approach. As her last visit dates back to 1994, Caplan uses the many letters sent to her since then, to analyze the changes which the island has undergone in the period of structural adjustment. She discusses how people deal with the increasing financial demands, which go hand in hand with modernization and also reflects on how these demands translate into requests for financial support placed upon herself, the anthropologist (p. 51) In her conclusion Caplan cautions against “exaggerating the success of coping strategies or romanticizing resistance” (p. 58) which is taking up a great deal of recent

literature on development and modernity and - having known the area for over three decades – takes a much more pessimistic outlook when she states: “In the context of Mafia Island, and indeed, I suspect, of much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the odds are just overwhelming [...] The fact is that people die needlessly and people’s lives are much harder than they should be. Modernity remains elusive” (p. 58-59). In the second, also very stimulating, case study on Mafia island, Christine J. Walley explores notions of the meaning of development to the people on Mafia and contrasts them with the understanding of development by the different actors within the development-business.

Greg Cameron’s „Political Violence, Ethnicity and the Agrarian Question in Zanzibar“ is the first of two chapters which deal with the recent political conflict between the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the Civic United Front (CUF) opposition which also took violent forms such as the demonstrations most notably in the January 2001 where many CUF supporters lost their lives in shootings. He convincingly argues that “the origins of Zanzibar’s contemporary political crisis derived from the agrarian crisis manifested in Pemba’s regional isolation, rather than a reassertion of Arab hegemonic designs on the Isles” (p. 112). This position is partly challenged by Kjersti Larsen’s chapter which is based on observations and conversations during extensive fieldwork in Zanzibar from the mid-eighties on.

The authors who deal with cultural expressions of Swahili identity generally offer more positive perspectives. Assibi A. Amidu describes Swahili poetry as a means to fight out political struggles in Lamu, while Paul Musau discusses how innovations on various levels have changed Taarab from a non-participatory form of music revolving around the main topic love, to a music-style which encourages the participation of its audience and which also addresses socio-political issues such as corruption, education and HIV/AIDS. The only chapter with an explicit gender focus is Farouk Topan’s analysis of the, representations of Female Status in Swahili Literature. Having traced changes in three pieces of Swahili literature which have been produced in different periods of time, he concludes that, “the attitude of men towards issues of gender” which on the level of literature manifests itself on the number of male writers who take “a stand against the exploitation of women” is a decisive factor. (p. 224-225)

All twelve chapters are relatively short and generally read well although there are substantial differences with regards to their quality and originality. Some authors remain very much on the surface of their topic and a more selective editing policy could have improved this collection. Despite these shortcomings the book certainly is of great value to anybody with an interest in the contemporary Swahili Coast and the way its inhabitants face and construct the complexities of modernities.

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Note

1. See <http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/departments/anthropology/staff/pat-caplan/swahili-modernities.php>

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces: Land and Governance in Mozambique. Rosemary Elizabeth Galli. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 313 pp.

Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces examines the ways in which Mozambicans have lost land rights and have been left out of the meaningful decision-making with regard to land management decision-making process. The scenario is a familiar one for Africa. Colonial powers vied for the region and carved it up in ways which did not correspond to customary land tenure regimes. Concessionary companies overwork and brutalize people causing many to flee in order to seek more meaningful employment to pay the high taxes newly imposed upon them. The social consequences of flooding and drought take on new dimensions due to changes in governance which fail to make rural people and their livelihoods a priority. Resettlement schemes and the establishment of wildlife protected areas bring new hardships to rural people. The post-independence government continues many of the practices established during colonial rule, but governance is less transparent and corruption commonplace.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one introduces the reader to the organization of rural space and the specifics of life in several small settlements. Documents from the historical archives of Mozambique as well as colonial mission, district administrator, and company reports serve as the basis of much of the information provided for the earlier years. The depth of coverage varies for the 1975-1991 due to the inability of the author to access relevant primary sources. In addition, several key informants remained silent on the same time period. The second portion of *Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces* explores the ways in which democratic spaces are created. It is built upon information gleaned through oral histories and field research using appraisal techniques. The main argument of the book is the need to bring rural Mozambicans into political and economic decision-making. The author argues that local people should do their own planning and then approach development agencies for funding. The author is critical of the current procedures in which outsiders merely consult local people and then chose which of a community's priorities will be addressed and when. Galli concludes that there is a need for extensive retraining of state officials and that the lowest level state officials are the most receptive to more democratic planning processes.

The book is akin to two monographs bound together: the first section is of interest to historians, anthropologists, and others working on issues of history of trade, migration, and family life. The second, resembling field reports with descriptions of individual buildings and fields is useful to the World Bank and NGO staff. The book hangs together well enough but may not have a wide audience. Graduate students and specialists will find the book useful for its contributions to the study of an African country for which there are few detailed field studies. The value of the book's contributions may be better appreciated after more details from the years 1975 – 1991 become available. Additional information on land tenure is needed. For example, questions such as where were unconsolidated holdings most common, whether trees could be

mortgaged and by whom, the ways in which squatters gained rights over time and how this might have differed by place of origin, ethnicity, gender or other factors might have been addressed. No information is provided on use and management of the marine environment. The duties of various levels of local authority are detailed but how governance is negotiated in rural Mozambique and how has this changed over time is less clear. Questions left unanswered include what opportunities existed for rural people to sit on and participate in governing boards and councils and how is voting undertaken within regional governing bodies and more generally.

The author draws on the work of James C. Scott, Judith Tandler, and Antonio Gramsci to argue that if rural people were able to directly elect district and sub-district level officials they would be put on more equal footing with urban people, but little connection is made between Mozambique and other African countries in terms of placing the country in a broader context of Portuguese holdings, frontline states, or southern Africa more generally. There is also surprisingly little discussion of the literature on space, place, and identity, which would have strengthened the analytical points made in the book.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3

Spring 2006

Tourism in the New South Africa: Social Responsibility and the Tourist Experience. Garth Allen and Frank Brennan. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 305 pp.

Social scientists, Garth Allen and Frank Brennan, have essentially created two interrelated books between the covers of *Tourism in the New South Africa: Social Responsibility and the Tourist Experience*. A social anthropologist and a political economist, the pair worked in South Africa from the mid-1990s to 2002. First, their joint effort is a hopeful yet cautionary tale concerning eco-tourism and development in the context of KwaZulu-Natal. Second, the authors lead readers on a winding path into the psyche of the international traveler, speculations on issues of international citizenship, and accountable tourist behavior. The text should interest scholars of South African studies, tourism studies, development studies, social anthropology, as well as political economy.

In the opening chapters, the authors present a highly detailed overview of South African tourism policy in the 1990s. Following the 1994 transition from apartheid, the state characterizes tourism as a panacea, fostering reconciliation, nation building, job creation, and economic growth. Additionally, Allen and Brennan present a more specific account of tourism development issues facing the northern region of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Encompassing national parks, estuaries, and wildlife areas, as well as many rural African communities, KZN is a prime location for extracting examples of eco-tourism development and its impact on local groups.

The authors' primary goal is to contribute to the literature on community-based ecotourism. In their view, the current discourse, often understandably weighted towards issues of conservation and sustainability, could benefit from a tinge of "realism." They assert that development planners need to better recognize the "tangles of vested interests and the political factors" that complicate the web of decision makers, stakeholders, and affected parties. To this end, the authors summarize and evaluate case studies of contemporary programs, such as those at Dukuduku Forest, Phinda Resource Reserve, and Kosi Bay in KZN. They identify and characterize the key participants and the strengths and weaknesses of each program. Their scrutiny is aimed at constructing improved, viable models of interaction between national offices, the private sector, and individual communities. Importantly, they stress the need for both environmental and cultural specificity when designing programs.

To further expose "tangles", Allen and Brennan pinpoint a number of realistic impediments to sustainable development initiatives in South Africa's rural areas. One prevalent and pertinent issue is the participation of local African groups. To begin, South Africa's history of institutional injustice towards blacks lingers over African communities and impedes their trust of new programs. A recently publicized concern for the nation, there is continued debate over who—the government, individuals, or the community—is the final decision maker concerning land ownership and use. Similarly, the authors question the struggle between community and personal interests. They ask: Is the self-determination and individualism lauded under the new free-capitalist and democratic South Africa fundamentally at odds with the equally lauded goals of community action and empowerment? In sum, Allen and Brennan characterize KZN as "unfertile ground" for development until these factors, along with crime

and political and ethnic turbulence, are addressed.

Seemingly fragmented from the initial discussion of ecotourism, the second section of the text directs its focus to the socially responsible vacationer. In an interesting turn, the authors address the moral and ethic dimension of tourism, expressly through the dilemmas presented to international tourists. Allen and Brennan speculate whether tourists should modify their individual behavior as guests of another nation. (This issue is also addressed by E. Chambers 2005 among others). They raise many questions related to toleration and obligation. In the South African case: should visitors abide or react to social injustice such as racism in the host countries? They also question what prompts some tourist behaviors: Do tourists make purchases out of a sense of compassion or compulsion to “give back” to the community they visit?

Despite the highly theoretical and conjectural nature of this section, the text offers several ideas worthy of further dialogue. For instance, they discuss how interactions between tourism bodies can venture towards greater goals, such as conservation. In this vein, Allen and Brennan make the case for an international code of conduct for travelers. Their argument contains a hypothetical discussion of the archetypal, “Good Tourist,” someone who will have the initiative to learn customs and act respectfully in travel situations despite encountering dissimilar norms and values. Conversely, Allen and Brennan tender a few problematic examples. For instance, they postulate that rumors of crime and violence dissuade visits to South Africa or restrict tourists’ activities while in South African cities. Though a valid concern, the authors offer few crime-related statistics and no personalized information from interviews with victims or non-victims. Their argument rests on a fictional character who is debating the consequences of leaving his hotel room after dark to visit the Durban beachfront.

For this reader, the text holds some weak points. First of all, the personalities of this section, a hedonistic jet-setter (reminiscent of the “Ugly American”), the “Good Tourist”, and the timid traveler, composite characters alike, are perhaps too generalized. Throughout the text, there is little discussion of methodology or direct quotation of informants. The analysis could be improved with more remarks on their current interviews and observations or more thorough unpacking of vignettes. Finally, despite engaging with issues of ethnic group participation, they neglect a thorough discussion of the impacts of cultural tourism that couple eco-tourism initiatives and certainly collide with new South African tourism policies.

The strength of this work lies in the authors’ appreciation of the nuanced character of tourism. Tourism is a dialectical social process. Combined with development, it is a further complicated network of political-economic factors, environments, and stakeholder groups. Admittedly, Allen and Brennan’s work is exploratory and offers more avenues for future research than definitive answers concerning either ecotourism development or social responsibility. In conclusion, it is the connections linking the two sections of the text, such as that between the altruistic tourist and their potential impact on programs of ecology and conservation, or that between good governance and good citizenship, which will allow for successful development programs in the future.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Uncertain Safari: Kenyan Encounters and African Dreams. Allan M. Winkler. Lanham, MD (USA): Hamilton Books, 2004. 149pp.

It is always a pleasant surprise to find a book that is written about one's own experiences. Many of us have taught or studied in Africa, yet accounts of that experience are rare. There is a whole industry of Peace Corps books, some of them excellent (George Packer's *The Village of Waiting* [1984], about Togo, comes to mind). There are travel books, many of them covering East Africa, some of them self-indulgent, others works of literature (take the late Shiva Naipaul's delightful *North of South* [1978]). And there are journalist's accounts of their lives in Africa, often providing a thoughtful analysis (Blaine Harden may not have invented the term "Big Man," but his book *Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent* [1990] certainly brought it to a wider audience. Accounts of the teacher's experience in Africa, however, are rare.

This makes Allan Winkler's book a useful contribution. Winkler taught as a Fulbright professor in the history department of the University of Nairobi in 1995-96, and has visited Kenya for extended periods since 1990. As he puts it in his preface, his book tries to capture his love for Kenya and is "meant as an affectionate portrait of people, places, and problems" (p. 6). While the book is honest and generally readable, it isn't entirely successful at conveying the author's affection for Kenya.

The book is structured as a series of relatively independent essays. While certain themes reappear as well as certain characters (Winkler's neighbor, Mary, a fellow instructor at the university, from whom he learns about the Kenyan social context), the chapters could stand on their own—and indeed perhaps they were originally written as separate essays. The chapter on education, "Teach the Children Well," is especially refreshing, as it recounts the experiences many of us have faced teaching in a foreign environment: the lack of materials, the classes cancelled for no apparent reason, the intelligent but, by American standards, passive students. For Winkler, his encounters are generalizable: "the crumbling infrastructure at the University of Nairobi...[was] typical of the country as a whole" (p. 44). He has shipped several hundred books, intending to donate them to the university library. With help from the American Embassy, the books are traced to a warehouse at the port of Mombasa and arrive in Nairobi. But given Winkler's experiences with the university library ("It was a mess" [p.52]), he decides to contribute the books to his department to create a library, but building a few bookshelves becomes an enormous undertaking:

The entire episode was a kind of microscopic study of the problems of trying to get things done in a developing country....The bureaucracy was almost impenetrable, dominated by officials afraid to take the initiative, for fear of committing too much, accomplishing too little, and losing their jobs (p. 53).

Winkler applies this approach to most of his experiences in Kenya: based on his personal experiences, he draws general conclusions. As a historian, he realizes the risks of this approach,

and in the chapter on corruption (“The Politics of Fear”) he supports his generalizations with interviews with the editor of the Daily Nation, Tom Mshindi, opposition leader Richard Leakey, and with former attorney general Charles Njonjo, forced out of office in a power play in the 1980s. Unfortunately, the only thing we learn from the latter interview is that Njonjo was “unwilling to talk about the carefully orchestrated attack...that had brought him down” (p. 110). One does get a feel for the way the country works—the byzantine machinations of politics and power—but like the teacher who only spends a year there, one is left wondering exactly what is going on.

Winkler blames the colonial experience for Kenya’s corruption and its failure to live up to its promise at independence. By implication, this applies to all of Africa:

One autocrat after another has drawn skillfully on the lessons of the colonial past and used the patterns of repression devised then to secure personal and political advantage in the post-independence years (p. 104).

While this is certainly true in many instances, it does not explain why corruption and inefficiency have percolated to all levels of Kenyan society, and Winkler doesn’t offer other suggestions. On President Moi, who finally “retired” in 2002, Winkler gives some nice one-liners (he finds it symbolic that the monument to Moi in Uhuru Park is in a state of disrepair [p. 108]), but ultimately he doesn’t tell anything new about Moi:

I felt myself caught up in this carefully cultivated charade...I had to give Moi grudging respect for the support he demanded and received, just as I had reluctantly applauded Lyndon Johnson when he imposed his will on the United States in the mid-1960s (p. 108).

The connection to Lyndon Johnson is never explained, and the non-sequitur is emblematic of the way Winkler throws together fascinating tidbits in this book. The result of this honest book is interesting, certainly to anyone who has taught or worked in Africa, but it never really brings Kenya to life.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Paul Richards, ed. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005. 214 pp.

At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Roland Paris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 290 pp.

No Peace, No War and *At War's End* probe the nature of armed hostilities while paying close attention to their social context and process. It should be noted that despite their different methodologies and perspectives, both tomes speak simultaneously to scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding, and to others interested in the challenges of managing civil violence. In spite of the similarity of topics and their general treatment of the issues at hand, this review discusses each book in turn in order to better accentuate their import and potential.

Paul Richards' edited volume is the product of a research project on the anthropology of violent conflict. A comparative analysis of the chapters in this collection illustrate that the intent of the investigation is the unpacking of the concepts of war and peace from the load of meanings deposited on them by security experts and international relations scholars. The point of departure for the contributors is debunking the dominant media perception that rogue states and terrorist networks are causes rather than symptoms of the volatility of international life. In its execution of this objective *No Peace, No War* adopts the conceptual tool-kit of anthropological research. Consequently, such a novel take on the issue of contemporary armed conflicts makes possible a number of important conjectures on the relationship between war and peace.

The collection challenges its readers to think about war (and also peace) as aspects of social processes and not merely as the outcomes of a set of causes. This proposition is particularly pertinent to the post-Cold War conflicts, the overwhelming majority of which occurred within and not between states. Richards' volume locates such wars within the social context that nurtures them. This allows conflict to be conceptualized as "something made through social action, and something that can be moderated through social action rather than viewing it as so exceptional as to require 'special' explanatory effort" (p. 3). The utility of this argument is advanced in eleven essays on societies vulnerable to or affected by war. The following section concentrates on the treatment of the "African" cases, as they are likely of greater interest to the readers of this journal.

In this context, one should admire Sten Hagberg's perspicacious treatment of the volatile inter-ethnic peace in Burkina Faso. In an investigation which seeks to explain the persistence of the uneasy peace in the country, Hagberg draws attention away from the part played by the central authorities and external actors and instead focuses on the role of local administrations. He points that it is the functioning of local bureaucracy (sustained by regular payments of salaries) more than anything else that keeps the lid on civil unrest in the country. Hagberg's analysis contributes to the emerging literature linking post-Cold War civil conflicts (not only in Africa) to the breakdown of local administrations and in particular "the subsequent corruption of local dispute-resolution procedures" (p.

55). This point dovetails with Sverker Finnström's treatment of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Finnström embarks on a socio-linguistic examination, which he terms "knowing by engagements" (p. 98) of the interactive cultural and political practice of interpretation and counter-interpretation of the conflict by the various protagonists. The processes of marginalization due to the malfunctioning of state-institutions are at the heart of Caspar Fithen's and Paul Richards' study of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The authors emphasize the "operational failure of traditional group solidarities" (p. 117). The dissolution of these traditional social relationships in the country leads them to suggest the emergence of competing affinities organized around cultures of violence. The analysis of this chapter, however, could have greatly benefited from a comparison with similar studies of the wars in former Yugoslavia, which link the levels of violence to the ruin of social hierarchies. The difficulty to rebuild social solidarities is reiterated by Mats Utas in his chapter on the reintegration of Liberia's child-soldiers. Utas, like Finnström, emphasizes the importance of knowing and engaging the social environment in the process of peacebuilding.

A similar argument is advanced by Bjorn Lindgren in his essay on political violence in Zimbabwe. The thrust of his thesis is that conflicts never really end, but continue to live in the memories of violence and the reality of dislocation. Therefore, Lindgren points that sustainable peace projects require attention to the social accommodation of these experiences. Yet, despite the enlightened approach of these essays all of them pale in comparison with the closing exploration by the late Bernhard Helander on the long and complex war in Somalia. During the 1990s the country has become a poignant symbol for both political scientists and representatives of international institutions. Helander suggests that the failure of the peacebuilding initiatives in the country is due to their objective to resuscitate the state institutions so that peace can flourish. As the provocative title of his essay "Who Needs a State" suggests, Helander revisits the practices of local stateless societies by considering the delivery of social services in Northeast Somalia. In this respect, he makes an important contribution not only to understanding the process and context of modern conflict, but also adds to the growing literature on post-Westphalian statehood.

In these and many other ways, *No Peace, No War* provides a much-needed account of the role played by social processes in post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. It also invites readers to consider alternative ways for overcoming the dilemmas of state-failure and state-collapse. It is expected that some would object to the anthropological approach advanced by the volume; but even the detractors would have to admire the coherence and consistency with which it has been followed by the contributors. The collection would therefore appeal to the advanced student of international affairs and in particular to scholars exploring the issues of ethnic strife.

Dealing with the aftermath of violent conflicts is also the focus of Roland Paris' *At War's End*. His pragmatic objective is to suggest ways for making peacebuilding more effective. Paris considers this an essential requirement in countering the problems of civil conflict in the post-Cold War era. Unlike *No Peace, No War*, Paris' text utilizes the traditional conceptual tools of international relations theory and security studies. However, *At War's End*'s main finding would not surprise the contributors to Richards' volume. Paris proposes that peacebuilding is a "specific kind of social engineering, based on particular assumptions about how best to establish durable domestic peace" (p. 6). His claim then is that all major peacebuilding initiatives of the 1990s discounted this societal dimension in their work. Instead they focused on the twin-aspects of liberalization: democratization and marketization. The argument is that such peacebuilding practice is influenced by the ideas of the US President Woodrow Wilson.

Having conducted an ideational overview of the notion and practice of peacebuilding, Paris strikes at its foundation. He conjectures that instead of outright liberalization, the foremost objective of peacebuilding should be institutionalization – the construction of “effective political and economic institutions prior to implementing extensive liberalizing reforms” in order to “bolster the ‘conflict dampening’ qualities of societies” (p. 235). Such proposition might not seem exceptionally original, however due to Paris’ approach and methodology it differs qualitatively from the neo-Gramscian critique traditionally leveled at humanitarian interventions. In order to assert his claim, Paris revisits the fourteen peacekeeping operations conducted between 1989 and 1999. Again owing to considerations of relevance, the following section reviews the discussion of peacebuilding initiatives in Africa.

At War’s End sets off its evaluation of internationally-sponsored liberalization efforts with the cases of Angola and Rwanda. However, instead of recounting the failure of the peacebuilding endeavors in these countries, Paris embarks on a meticulous investigation of the actual reconstruction effort. His exploration provides circumstantial evidence that the liberalization initiatives may have actually worked against the establishment of stability. Likewise, in the comparative treatment of Cambodia and Liberia, Paris discerns a diversion of democratization process (at least) partially sustained by the peacebuilding effort. Liberia’s case in particular corroborates his claim that “hasty liberalization efforts might actually work against the goal of establishing a stable and lasting peace in countries that are just emerging from civil wars” (p. 96). Paris draws a similar conclusion in his treatment of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Like the contributors to *No Peace, No War*, he emphasizes the importance of knowing and engaging the social context in the promotion of sustainable peace initiatives. Probably, the main challenge to his hypothesis is posed by the cases of Namibia and Mozambique, which by and large tend to be considered as success stories of peacebuilding. Yet, Paris queries whether the effort there was of the same nature as in the other post-Cold War intra-state wars. He argues, therefore, the conflicts in Namibia and Mozambique were “not ‘civil’ wars at all” (p.148). Indeed, the wars there were both instigated and sustained by external actors. Paris displays that when the outsiders abandoned the battlefields, there was “little ‘demand’ for continued fighting, thereby reducing the risks of rapid liberalization exacerbating tensions among formerly warring parties” (p. 135).

Such overview of the peacebuilding efforts during the 1990s convinces Paris in the sensibility of establishing a system of domestic institutions capable of managing the disruptive effects of democratization and marketization. Perhaps, the only flaw in this line of argument is the lack of criteria for gauging the capability of these institutions. This definitely is an issue to be tackled by further research and *At War’s End* is undoubtedly going to inspire additional enquiries into its issues.

For scholars of post-Cold War affairs in the African continent both tomes offer a wealth of information and possible templates for examining the question of order. The virtue of both Richards’ and Paris’ volume is that they are not seeking to give definitive answers and impose perspectives, but inform, provoke and challenge their readers to explore new avenues in the explanation and the understanding of the conflicts of the 1990s. In this respect, *No Peace, No War* and *At War’s End* would be with us for quite a while both as an excellent reference source for scholars of conflict studies as well as a repository of knowledge for anyone interested in the process and the context of civil wars.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3

Spring 2006

The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations Intervention. Lanham. Obiaga Ndubisi. University of America Press, 2004. 120 pp.

Interventions by humanitarian organizations in conflict settings are mainly premised on the moral principle and the unquestionable need to alleviate suffering among the distressed population. However, their altruistic interventions are contentious, challenging and potentially capable of negative and unintended consequences. In his short but critical book, Ndubisi Obiaga, a Professor of Politics at Fort Valley State University, investigates activities and roles of several humanitarian organizations responsible for relief operations in the famine stricken areas during the Nigerian Civil war of 1967-1970. Hypotheses guiding the study and well explored in the text include attempts by the humanitarian actors to influence behaviour of belligerent's leadership, legitimacy, psychological and material support given to the Biafra regime by the humanitarian organizations.

Chapter one explores the multifaceted debate on the nature of intervention by third parties in civil wars. Some of the contentious issues confronting humanitarianism and analysed by the author include the meaning of intervention, the relationship between non-intervention and neutrality, justifications, political nature and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. In its broader meaning, intervention becomes inevitable with consequences of strict impartiality likely to be more deleterious. Non-intervention can encourage the stronger party in the conflict: "A great nation intervenes in the domestic realm of other states when it says 'yes' and when it says 'no', by its sheer existence," Obiaga writes. Obiaga understands intervention through motivational and consequential analysis. Motivational analysis consists of actions that are "consciously conceived to affect the authoritative structure of the target" while consequential analysis consists of a "policy which has unintended or inadvertent consequences, indistinguishable from the consequences of intervention", an example being the case where relief aid strengthened the Biafra regime.

In the second chapter, the author explores the historical perspective of the Civil war, the role and interests of various third parties in the conflict. Interaction of many forces is attributed to the origin of the conflict, with prominence given to ethnic rivalries and competition for state control among the Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani, the three dominant ethnic blocs in Nigeria. He then gives reasons and sequence of events that eventually led to concerted demands for a Biafran state and declaration of Independence in May 30, 1967. Motivations by foreign business firms, nation states, international organizations and humanitarian groups were varied. For the business firms and nation states, economic rationale was dominant, with oil being the prime interest of oil companies such as the Shell-B.P, the American Gulf, and the French SAFRAP. Britain, the ex-colonial power, had the highest stakes in the crisis with an estimated 52% total investment in the country while France's investment totalled \$71.28 million. Further interest was stimulated by the 1967 Middle East war and the closure of the Suez Canal, factors that increased demand and

value of the Nigerian oil. Additionally, Nigeria had a geographical advantage since oil from Middle East required transportation around the Cape.

America remained neutral while Britain and Russia gave Lagos military support and backed the “One Nigeria” concept. China’s support for the Biafran cause was influenced by a global Sino- Soviet rivalry and strong dislike for Lagos pro-Western policies. Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast supported Biafra on humanitarian grounds although Obiaga notes that Nyerere’s support may have been a “political gambit to bring diplomatic pressure on President Gowon” to negotiate with rebels. The perceived fear of balkanisation and a continental security threat resulting from Biafra’s secession motivated most African states to support Lagos. Support from France, China, Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and Ivory Coast and direct dealings of the U.S with secessionists in relation to humanitarian assistance strengthened the status of Biafra in its unsuccessful efforts to obtain international recognition.

In the last two chapters, Obiaga analyzes intervention, impacts, challenges and controversies that surrounded operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Churches. A detailed analysis shows that despite their humanitarian acts and motivations, humanitarian organizations attempted to influence behaviour of the leadership and also provided rebels with psychological and material support. The Church and missionaries were biased, political and committed to the rebel’s political goal of self-determination. Obiaga also interrogates the dual interpretations of the Geneva Convention and demonstrates how it was used by the government to justify starvation as a weapon of war. The Chapters also highlights the problems of access, limited negotiation capacities and unintended consequences as some of the operational challenges facing humanitarian organizations in situations of civil strife.

In the conclusion, Obiaga asserts that humanitarian organizations, together with other third parties, acted as major propaganda tool for Biafra and prolonged the war through material and psychological support to the rebels and a toughening of the Lagos’ attitude. Moral obligation forces third parties to intervene in grave situations regardless of possible repercussions because consequences of non-intervention can be more deleterious than unintended consequences. Starvation in Biafra exemplifies such a situation.

Obiaga’s book is a welcome and an invaluable contribution to the academic debates and literature on humanitarian intervention. The analysis of Nigerian conflict and a well-selected bibliography adds a comparative value to the existing literature covering more recent complex emergencies in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is a useful book for researchers, academics and students interested in African conflicts. Staff working with relief agencies will definitely find the book indispensable.

The book doesn’t exhaust the subject and this was not the author’s intent. Some areas that lack deeper analysis and might need further research include the role of mercenaries and strategies to mitigate the unintended consequence of humanitarian intervention, an understanding that is imperative in peace building and conflict resolution. Considering the books length and by giving too much space to the nation states and international organizations as third parties to the conflict, the author did injustice to the book’s title. One would expect a more in-depth analysis of humanitarian organizations. The book’s quality is also compromised by lack of thorough editorial work

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652–2002. Sampie Terreblanche. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002. 527 pp.

Sampie Terreblanche has the erudition and unique insights into both sides of the political divide in South Africa to make him an excellent choice to attempt this ambitious book. A leading South African economist, he was until 1987 a member of the ruling National Party, the party of apartheid, but later became one of their fierce critic, becoming a founding member and economic adviser of the Democratic Party, while also being involved in clandestine meetings with the ANC in the 1980s.

At one level this book is a detailed economic and political history of South Africa. At another, it is a sustained critique, from a social democratic perspective, of the entire history and contemporary significance of inequality and globalization in a South African setting. This dual approach helps explain both the length and the complex structure of the book, which consists of four parts: “Power, Land, and Labour”; “The Transition and the ‘New South Africa (1990-2002)’”; “Colonialism, Segregation, and Apartheid (1652-1994)’”; and “An Incomplete Transformation: What’s To Be Done?” The book darts backwards and forwards in time. This structure, together with numerous cross-references and abbreviations, may irk some readers but accords with the author’s aim to write committed history and pose practical strategies for genuine transformation.

The book is based solely on secondary, rather than archival, sources and is intended as a broad synthesis, although Terreblanche was privy to some hidden facts on the transition period. On the “incomplete transformation” from 1994 he is adamant: enormous problems of poverty, health, land hunger, and lingering racism and exploitation remain. The question he poses is whether these challenges might have been better met by a more comprehensive, state-centered approach in the best tradition of European social democracy rather than over-reliance on building a “new black elite” wedded to neo-liberalism. In this regard, Terreblanche exposes the little-known informal meetings between white big business and ANC leaders that in the transition period allowed for a less overt economic victory of the Old Guard alongside an impressive political victory for the ANC (Terreblanche narrates this thesis in a new Canadian film, *Madiba: The Life & Times of Nelson Mandela* (CBC, 2004). Even if global trends have rendered radical options less realistic, it is a persuasive argument and one not without champions in the South African academy and even in some echelons of state power.

Terreblanche’s definition of, and elaboration on, the history of the “black elite” is at times somewhat simplistic: there is little, for example, on the complex historic ties between different black social strata. The black elite is treated as a passive end-product of entrapment by the white bourgeoisies and the new black “petit bourgeoisie” mysteriously uses trade union power (pp. 135-7). Even so, the focus on elites serves his purpose well. The more contemporary parts of the book compare favorably with other recent critiques of the status quo, such as Patrick Bond’s

Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000). Terreblanche also criticizes the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for failing to confront systemic exploitation (p. 124). Despite some controversial formulations, for example the contention that affirmative action has fed black elitism (p. 136), he is always thought provoking. His Afrikaner establishment origins and an elision of the pantheon of African nationalist history leave him open to charges from such quarters that he downplays the ANC government's very considerable achievements. Yet the evidence of a long history of inequality is there in its historical "warts and all," and for this the author must be commended.

Although the author likes to think of this as primarily a history book, it is much more an engaged dialogue between past and present. Whilst some historians may begrudge the nuances lost through the author's inattention to archival research or fashionable trends in social history, Terreblanche's focus on inequality and on historical, rather than supposedly innate, causes of poverty (pp. 42-44), together with his own background, give this book greater potential, particularly among white South African readers, for impact beyond cloistered scholarly studies. And although the author is careful to acknowledge ANC achievements, it will be interesting to see the reception accorded the book in the black elite circles he trenchantly criticizes.

Generally, the author has made a solid attempt at analyzing the work of numerous scholars across an enormous span of 350 years to achieve his task of writing a history of inequality relevant to today's South Africa. Some notable authorities, such as Charles van Onselen, are strangely absent, but most of the usual suspects are discussed together with a representative host of new generation political economists such as Bond and Julian May, as well as works in Afrikaans. In emphasizing the continuing theme of economic exploitation and disempowerment of indigenous peoples by settler capitalism, Terreblanche joins the wide river of committed anti-apartheid scholarship typified by scholars such as Martin Legassick, Shula Marks, and Bernard Magubane, but he writes more in the provocative style of recent revisionist historians, if on a more sweeping scale.

Technically the book is well produced if arranged somewhat schematically. A baker's dozen of tables add quantitative value and ease the tedium of a long text, though they cover only the last century. Numerous other statistics also are adduced. We learn, for instance, that in a country crying out for urgent state services to confront HIV-AIDS and poverty, corporate taxation declined from 27% in 1976 to only 11% in 1999: a weak fiscal base for any transformation. Some tiny typographical errors have crept into the index: "Sizulu" for Sisulu and "Moshweshe" for Moshweshwe.

The deep and justified respect for liberation heroes of the Mandela generation will persist. So too will the need to know more about the history and significance of today's burning problems. This important and intensely compassionate book will aid that understanding and deserves wide readership among historians, sociologists, economists and political scientists—and also among the young white South Africans whom the author targets to make substantial sacrifices to tackle poverty (p. 5)—indeed all interested in South Africa should read, and act upon, this book.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa. Peter Alegi. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004. 221 pp.

Can soccer explain the world -or at least South African history?¹ Peter Alegi's ambitious, compelling and much anticipated *Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa* seeks to do the latter with great panache. Alegi brings South African popular and social history alive much as a deft mid-fielder would bring the ball alive in a soccer cup final. His analysis covers everything from aspects of African leisure time to trade unionism and from rural traditions of sport to the struggle for urban space. Alegi shows clearly the ways in which the sporting spectacle of soccer embodies not only the fault lines of race and class in South Africa, but also the ways in which Africans contested and shaped the very limited spaces available to them in their liberation struggle. In so doing, Alegi allows the reader to get caught up in his clear enthusiasm for the 'beautiful game'.

A critical question for South African history is of course where soccer fits in relation to other dominant forms of masculine leisure, identity, and white patriarchy. In this vein one can well imagine how many white colonial South Africans who became obsessed with rugby but not soccer, would have embraced Henry Blaha's oft quoted quip about the perceived differences between rugby and soccer: 'rugby is a beastly game played by gentlemen; soccer is a gentleman's game played by beasts....'² Given the historical importance of rugby to white South Africa, and the comparatively constrained place of African soccer such a false dichotomy captures some of the ways whites in South Africa emphasized and even celebrated perceived differences as they constructed their world of segregation and apartheid. Yet, as Alegi argues in *Laduma!* African soccer grew and thrived in South Africa despite these constraints.

Alegi sets out to expand on existing broader works on leisure time, sport and identity through his analysis of the history of what was primarily African soccer in South Africa, and he accomplishes much in this regard. Alegi shows how African soccer was built upon far more complex and sophisticated terrain than would first appear, even if the pitches that young African soccer players honed their skills on were of mud and dust. He situates the rise in popularity of soccer within the context of African athletic and martial traditions (chapter 1) and then explores the class and urban dimensions of the sport as it grew in the segregated cities of South Africa (chapter 3,4 and 5). Here, Alegi makes a significant contribution to African urban history by adding to our understanding of the way sports provided outlets for social, political and even economic associations in a society deeply divided by class and race. Perhaps the most compelling material comes in chapters 7 and 8 where Alegi contrasts the struggles of blacks to foster non-racial sporting in South Africa with the bald-faced racism of the dominant white sporting authorities.

There are also some fascinating team histories including detailed stories of the now famous Orlando Pirates (chapter 6) and accounts of the various African soccer leagues which struggled

to survive through the apartheid era. Alegi also gives consideration of the major playing styles; those adopted from abroad and those which originated in the African townships. Yet, there is perhaps less of interest here for die-hard soccer fans than for more serious academic historians. Indeed, Alegi has provided a vivid and captivating history based on very sound, extensive archival research and a multitude of interviews with fascinating characters from the world of South African soccer. He weaves both serious secondary scholarly sources in with references to popular media such as film and the celebrated magazine, *Drum*. He also provides a useful analysis of the relevant historiography, which is placed at the back of the book in an appendix, rather in the introductory material, and so do not help the reader frame his work at the start.

While *Laduma!* makes a significant contribution to our understanding of South African society during segregation and apartheid, I have some concern about the ways in which the book deals with gender and patriarchy. Alegi does acknowledge the very gendered ways that soccer developed (p.4 and p 55), and there is a brief discussion of women's involvement with supporters' clubs (pp. 127-28). He, moreover, argues that certain elements of the township culture surrounding gang violence, masculinity and identity are in need of further research (p. 94). Overall, however, he tends to shy away from a critical analysis of the ways in which the social dynamic of the male-dominated sport seemed to reinforce patterns of patriarchy. A more thoroughgoing look at the ways that the culture of soccer shaped not just male identities, but also male attitudes toward women and visa versa would have been helpful.

Despite these reservations, *Laduma!* is a welcome addition to the field of African history. It is a well researched, cogently argued work with crisp writing. Although some might be inclined to see the book as an attempt to overreach by ascribing so much significance to soccer in South Africa, at almost every turn, Alegi provides fresh insights which demonstrate just how significant soccer and leisure time are for understanding African history.

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NOTES

1. For an ambitious but compelling effort at the former see Franklin Foer, *How Soccer Explains The World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization* (New York Harper Collins, 2004).
2. There are many variations of this phrase with various attributions, but see W. Clark, *Rugby Quotes* (viewed at <http://wesclark.com/rrr/quotes.html>) For rugby see *The XVth Man, Letters to Young Rugby Football Players* (Glasgow, Blackie and Son Ltd., 1907), p. 7 and for the South African dimension see A. Grundlingh, A. Odendaal and B. Spies, *Beyond The Tryline. Rugby and South African Society* (Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1995).

African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

In Rwanda we say...The Family that does not speak dies (Video Documentary). Anne Aghion, Director. Brooklyn, NY: First Run-Icarus Films, 2004. 54 min.

There has been much interest in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda lately due to the ten year anniversary which was commemorated in April of 2004. Even Hollywood came out with a Rwandan themed film titled *Hotel Rwanda* to coincide with the anniversary. I think that this is a good development, and we should not let the genocide be forgotten lest it be repeated. The film *In Rwanda we say...The Family that does not speak dies* is not a big budget film like *Hotel Rwanda*, but it is a low budget documentary filmed on location which lets the survivors speak for themselves about their experiences ten years after the genocide took place. For that reason alone, it is a valuable document for students of the Rwandan genocide. The film is almost exclusively in Kirwanda, with English subtitles. This film is a sequel to the documentary "Gacaca, Living Together Again in Rwanda?" also directed by Aghion. This sequel begins with the release of hundreds of prisoners who had gone through the Gacaca court system, had confessed their crimes, and were pardoned.

The documentarians specifically follow the path of one Rwamfizi, a rural farmer from a village in the hills called Rubona. Rwamfizi tells his side of the story; which is that he was part of the Hutu night patrols who occasionally murdered people, but that he was falsely accused of killing specific people in Rubona. On the other side we have returned Tutsi men and Hutu widows who were married to slain Tutsi men who claim that Rwamfizi is a liar. It is impossible to know who is telling the truth here, ten years after the fact, and the filmmakers leave it to the audience to form their own opinions. Importantly, the survivors tell the film crew how *they* feel, except for when someone rattles off the official Rwandan government party line on reconciliation. Also telling, is how the film shows the divide between those willing to forgive and pardon, and those who refuse to reconcile with those they consider to be the former assassins of their families.

The widows also say "These whites ask us if we are happy.... These whites ask the strangest questions!" This brings up the issue of the role of the filmmakers. Their style is to remain out of sight. They want the story to tell itself from the mouths of the survivors. Yet this presents problems. The director never states what their reasons are for making the documentary, who invited them, and how they persuaded their informants to talk. This raises the following questions. Were these people paid? Did they fear not talking to the film crew? Did they fear straying off the official party line? And were the encounters between ex-prisoners and survivors drinking beer together in the local boutique staged for the camera when presented as everyday moments captured on film? Unfortunately, we don't know because the director never addresses these methodological questions. The other shortcoming of the film is that the background to the Rwandan genocide is not presented, so the uninitiated audience soon becomes confused about why the informants are acting certain ways and saying certain things. The filmmaker mistakenly

assumes a real knowledge of the background of the genocide on the part of the audience.

Secondly, the informants are only identified by their names, not as either Hutu or Tutsi. This may be in keeping with current official policy of the Rwandan government that all citizens are simply Rwandan, and there is no ethnic divide. However, if no informants are identified (except by their names) the audience has to guess based on their testimony whether they self-identify as either Hutu or Tutsi. Only then does the testimony begin to make sense. For example when one informant says “We must get along with them, they outnumber us”, the initiated know that he is talking as a Tutsi man, surrounded by a Hutu majority. Unfortunately, again for the uninitiated, it may be difficult to make these identifications independently.

Therefore in sum, this film is a valuable historical document. It should be viewed critically by students of the genocide. Other viewers will need some basic background knowledge to be able to make any sense of this film which is dialogue heavy, and in which the informants speak with many of the same assumptions concerning background understanding on behalf of the audience that the filmmakers seem to take for granted.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

'Letting Them Die': Why HIV/AIDS Prevention Programmes Fail. Catherine Campbell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 214pp.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to spread. Daily, the epidemic's toll is felt by families, communities, businesses and nations. For twenty-five years, within each of these levels, a variety of programs have been designed and implemented to strengthen prevention efforts. It has proven especially difficult to develop programs that incorporate a range of activities that will reach multiple audiences and address the multiple factors that place people at risk of HIV/AIDS.

Catherine Campbell's book is the most comprehensive review to date of one multi-faceted prevention program. I read the book shortly after talking with people in Namibia about their experiences with a workplace-based HIV/AIDS prevention program. The views of participants in that Namibia project closely echo the observations of Campbell about a community-based HIV/AIDS project in South Africa, the focus of this book. Her analysis of the many elements that determine the effectiveness of an HIV/AIDS project is applicable to many projects across Africa. Unfortunately, too, her conclusions that even well-resourced projects often fail to achieve their goals—and fail to stem the epidemic—are widely applicable. The question, then, is why, after a quarter of a century, have national and international responses to the epidemic achieved so little? Campbell's study goes a long-way toward answering this question.

Campbell moves her analysis beyond what has been the center of most HIV/AIDS projects: the focus on changing individual sexual behaviors. She looks at the mix of social, economic and policy determinants of sexual behavior within the context of one community-based HIV/AIDS prevention project. She seeks to show how the initial conceptual framework that informs project design and implementation leads to success or failure at subsequent stages of the project. She argues that HIV/AIDS projects need to be formulated with an understanding of the economic and social pressures that exist at and on local communities. At the same time, those projects must recognize that gender, class and social power relationships will shape how a project is perceived and manipulated by members of communities.

One of most insightful sections deals with the project's efforts to involve in the project women who sell sex. The women were recruited to be peer educators. They were expected to interact with other sex workers, with clients and community members to raise awareness about HIV/AIDS and promote prevention. All of the women were poor, had little control over their work and had no experience as facilitators for change. A lengthy process of recruitment and training occurred. The process was hindered by the power of a community "Chief" who sought to gain financially from the project. Eventually, the obstructionist "Chief" was killed and replaced by a younger man who promoted greater democratic involvement in community affairs. Over time, the role of women—and the project's peer educators—was enhanced by this turn of events.

Campbell argues that at both community and national levels, project participants must feel they have a voice in decision-making processes. The peer educators gained a level of that confidence through the respect they achieved. But, the channels for participation were relatively narrow. As with the peer educators I observed in Namibia, the efforts of those described by Campbell were limited by the gaps that occurred early in the project's conceptual and design stages.

Creating and implementing multi-dimensional projects are not easy tasks, particularly given the implosion of many public health systems, the skepticism of communities toward promises of improvements in living conditions, and the options available to both women and men to make a living in contemporary Africa. Unlike many of the international and national agencies focused on HIV/AIDS issues, Campbell does not argue that more money is the initial requisite for improved projects. In essence, her analysis argues for design teams with broader perspectives than has been the case to date. In turn, improved design of HIV/AIDS programs will take into account a wider range of disciplines and the lessons they have learned. Indeed, one is struck in Campbell's assessment and in reviewing other HIV/AIDS programs how little has been learned and applied from the experiences of fifty years of community development work.

The book offers many valuable insights for HIV/AIDS planners and practitioners. One would ask of Campbell to distill her analysis into a shorter, more concise format that will be read and used by the people who now shape HIV/AIDS programs.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

In and Out of Focus: Images from Central Africa, 1885-1960. Christaud Geary. London: Philip Wilson, 2002. 128 pp.

This book, based on a wonderful exhibit originally organized at the National Museum of African Art in Washington, has insightful approaches to evaluating the ways Europeans and Africans created, transmitted, and employed photographic images for varied ends. Geary describes the formation of a Central African “image world” where photographers, publishers, subjects, and consumers all sought to produce and control images that often proved far more long-lived than the reputation of the photographers. To counteract the anonymity of most photographers in colonial Africa, Geary worked with Polish scholar Krzysztof Pluskota to examine the oeuvre of Polish photographer Casimir Zagourski, who worked from 1924 until 1944 in Léopoldville (Kinshasa), the capital of the Belgian Congo.

The author does an outstanding job of placing his subjects in a range of historical contexts: the technical and artistic development of photography, the history of colonial Central Africa, and the complex relationship between anthropology and images in the twentieth century. Geary begins with a short essay, “A World of Images,” that sets up the main themes of the entire work and introduces readers to the formation of colonial photographic styles, especially the “type” image that essentialized ethnic identities. He then gives an overview of the images disseminated in Europe about Central Africa, especially the Belgian Congo. In his masterful review of images produced in the era of Leopold II’s notorious Congo Free State, he shows how both the opponents and supporters of Leopold II deployed images of violence and ethnic “types” in their discussions. Officials posed Africans in “traditional” scenes along with abetting the creation of photographs celebrating economic and educational benefits of colonization. Some African photographers in the Free State, such as Herzekiah Andrew Shanu, saw their careers ruined once they joined in the protests against Leopold II. Still others, such as Frederick Starr (the first anthropologist at the University of Chicago), defended the Free States usage of staged images of “untouched Africa.”

After the Belgian government took the colony over shortly before World War I, images continued to play a key role in how Central Africa was understood. Changing technology altered the types of photographs that were produced, as postcards lost popularity and new journals like *L’Illustration Congolaise* introduced readers to the Belgian Congo. Tourists, whether they were members of the Belgian royal family or foreigners in search of adventure, sought out “traditional” African types. Africans, especially chiefs favored by the colonial state, responded to others’ expectations by encouraging tourists to take photographs. Geary notes how images of Mangbetu women from northern Congo appeared on stamps, travel books, and postcards. Mangbetu leaders knew that their guests expected to see hairstyles and clothes based on decades-old photographs and learned to change from Western style dress to “traditional” outfits and to carefully stage what they wanted visitors to photograph.

Pluskota and Geary devote two chapters to Zagourski. The authors uncovered a wide range of photographs and biographical information gleaned from family interviews, state archives, and personal letters. Zagourski appears as neither a stooge of colonial propaganda nor a selfless photographer defending indigenous ways of life, but a complicated man seeking to build a reputation and capturing the ethnographic present on film. He came to Africa at the age of 40 in 1924, for reasons the authors have difficulty discovering, and ran a photography studio for the next two decades. Zagourski proved to be a skillful businessman who sold elaborate albums and sought money from the colonial government to continue making photographs and films. His artistic creations drew from the common belief of “salvage anthropology” which held that indigenous cultures needed to be caught on film before they vanished. Though these images often appear staged, they are still stunning to see.

Of course, Africans too were photographers and people who wished to be filmed. Accordingly, the last chapter explores their craft in Central Africa. African subjects were not docile props, but actively took part in how they would appear. Turn of the century portraits taken by Africans show the self-representations of a coastal urban elite that enjoyed following conventions of European family photography. For example, Tutsi royal leaders seeking to prop up their legitimacy found photographs one way of displaying their power and connection to a tradition they actively helped construct. Geary also provides a brief but impressive collection of biographies of African photographers as well as examples of their works.

This book is a joy to look at, and has the potential to be quite useful in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in art history, imperialism, and African studies courses. First, it combines careful archival research with a beautiful set of images that can be used to examine how images were produced about Africa. Second, the study offers a nuanced view of image making that would compliment broader themes of colonial rule and the artful construction of “customary” practices. For classes that deal with the Congo Free State, this book makes an intriguing text to assign with Adam Hochschild’s *King Leopold’s Ghost*. Finally, it recapitulates in succinct and skillful prose much of the recent literature on colonial photography.

There are a few quibbles one could have with this excellent book. Missionaries as photographers rarely enter the discussion, despite the tremendous amount of images they produced. For a book on Central Africa, it is surprising that Gabon, a place where African photographers worked from the 1870s onward, does not receive much coverage. Finally, the references to Frederick Starr suggest the anthropologist mistakenly used violent imagery that worked against Starr’s goal of defending Leopold II. This was no accident; Starr was an anti-imperialist who thought violence inevitably came with conquest, but placed the blame for brutality on African soldiers working for Leopold instead of the colonial government’s own policies. Starr’s photographs of chained prisoners could be interpreted as proof that Leopold II was trying to restrain the supposedly unavoidable cruelty that came with colonization. Despite these minor criticisms, do not hesitate to read this beautiful study.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

The Syntax of Chichewa. Sam Mchombo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 149 pp.

The Syntax of Chichewa is a thorough description of Chichewa syntactic structures. It is informed by extensive research based on various aspects of African languages, in particular Bantu languages. This book is very impressive in that in addition to describing Chichewa syntactic structures, the author creatively addresses the different interfaces: between phonology and morphology, phonology and syntax and morphology and syntax. Additionally, the various contributions of the study of African languages to linguistic theory are highlighted. Instead of restricting himself to a particular theoretical framework, the author provides an elaborate description based on a diversity of theoretical approaches. This is achieved through an analysis of areas such as phonetics and phonology, clause structure, relative clauses, argument structure and linguistic processes in the verb domain.

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the Bantu language family and places Chichewa in three Southern African countries. In addition the chapter provides general demographics of the language. Chapter one also outlines the general features of Chichewa while providing the various proposals to account for the status of noun prefixes in Chichewa and Bantu languages in general. Through the description of the phonological system of Chichewa, the author shows the relevance of tone to syntactic configurations. In particular this interaction between tone and relative-clause formation is explored in detail in chapter 2 and 4. The author also discusses stress assignment and highlights areas that may require further research within the area of tone (p. 16).

The discussion on clause structure (chapter three) is particularly interesting because it highlights the role of tone in determining the relation of the external noun phrase (NP) to the verb since this cannot be accounted for by its structural position or government. The author also mentions comparable analysis of the treatment and status of the object markers in other languages such as Kirundi and Kihaya. Chapter three closes with a discussion of modals and how they differ from verbal suffixes.

Chapter four provides an elaborate description of nominal complementation, in particular the relative clause. The role of relative clause in cleft and question formation is also described in detail. In addition, the author discusses the various roles of the subject marker and object marker in relative clause formation. In this chapter, the author provides an excellent example of the application of linguistic theory to provide a unified analysis. Additionally, the author poses questions that may be of interest to scholars working with other languages that are related to Chichewa.

Chapters five and six deal with the morphology of the verb stem. The author discusses verbal extensions in detail. Also, the author also talks about the status of pre-verb-stem morphemes and contrasts these with post verb-stem morphemes and provides a tree to represent the verb in

Chichewa (p.70). Mchombo further discusses the much debated issue of the ordering of verbal suffixes in Bantu and provides some of the questions that guided research in this area in Bantu languages.

The concluding chapter outlines some of the linguistic processes associated with the verb-stem. These include reduplication, compounding and nominal derivation. The author also discusses how various theoretical approaches have attempted to account for morpheme ordering in Bantu. Mchombo makes reference to Mirror Principle, Templatic Morphology and Thematic Roles and provides brief historical accounts of each approach.

Overall, the book is clearly arranged and written in an accessible style. It provides data from a variety of languages that may be used in cross-linguistic studies or within Bantu languages. In addition, the book provides examples of how to apply and test theory in less researched languages, a skill that is beneficial for linguistic students interested in Bantu languages. *The Syntax of Chichewa* would be a valuable teaching/learning resource for students of Bantu linguistics.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Energy Services for the Urban Poor in Africa: Issues and Policy Implications. Kebede, Bereket and Ikhupuleng Dube (eds.). London: Zed Books, Ltd in association with African Energy Policy Research Network (AFREPREN), Nairobi, Kenya, 2004. 297pp.

Energy Services is a compilation of country case studies designed to address the challenge of providing the ever-growing urban poor population on the continent with modern energy services such as electricity and kerosene that would replace traditional biomass based fuels such as wood and charcoal. The cases come from the SADC region (Zambia and Zimbabwe) and from East Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania). In order to make cross-country comparisons and draw more general conclusions each case study was to address five broad areas: 1) the extent to which the poor can afford modern energy services; 2) the role of upfront costs in providing modern energy services to the poor; 3) the extent to which energy subsidies targeted toward the poor actually reach the poor; 4) the impact of energy subsidies on government finances; and 5) the impact of the current system of electricity tariffs on small and micro enterprises (SMEs). Each case study then offers policy recommendations based on the study's findings.

Most of the case studies are quite detailed in terms of the data used, with most of the data are derived from government agencies, state-owned utilities, or through surveys. The amount and detail of the data used were quite surprising given the known difficulties with obtaining the necessary data, or the reliability of the data. I find this especially true of the Zambian case where I have knowledge of data problems with the state-owned electric utility ZESCO at their most recent price review proceeding. Moreover, the use of survey data was also relied upon quite heavily in the Zambian and Ethiopian cases, and should make any reader question the validity of the data used to reach some of the over-arching conclusions. Only in one case study (Tanzania) was there a truly open acknowledgement of the aforementioned data problems.

Some of the over-arching findings of the studies may be surprising to Africa watchers, especially with respect to affordability. The first is that the urban poor can afford unsubsidized energy services. The second finding, related to the first, is that the poor cannot afford to pay for the upfront costs associated with consuming modern energy services such as electricity connections, house wiring, stoves, lamps, etc. Consequently, many of the cases recommend subsidizing the up-front costs rather than subsidizing consumption, as has traditionally been the case in pro-poor policies, or to amortize the cost of the up-front investment by consumers over a period of years noting the current practice would require the poor to pay the up-front costs as a lump-sum payment. These findings and recommendations are similar to the findings and recommendations of World Bank and UN studies on serving the poor in places such as Latin America and South Asia.

A third general finding indicates most subsidies for energy consumption are NOT captured by the poor! This is also consistent with findings from other studies from around the developing world. The reason subsidies end up benefiting the non-poor is because they are subsidies on

consumption, as mentioned above, not on connection or up-front costs. Therefore, anybody who is connected receives the subsidy (usually non-poor), but the poor who have trouble affording the up-front costs are excluded. This result further bolsters the recommendation for subsidizing up-front costs.

The impact of subsidies on government finances is not so clear cut. However, the reader is left wondering what constitutes “government” and there was no consistent measure of the impact on the fiscal health of government across cases. The general impression is that subsidies have little impact on public finance as evidenced by cost-reflective and revenue sufficient tariffs in Ethiopia and the less than 5% impact in Tanzania. However, the subsidies in electricity in Zambia and Zimbabwe have been debilitating to the state owned companies and while they do not necessarily constitute government spending, the large company deficits are clearly a long-run burden on those governments. The authors should have provided more consistency here.

Overall, the book is well done and it accomplishes the goals set forth by the editors of the compilation, in spite of the data limitations and data questions, and verifies that providing energy services to the poor in Africa is financially viable if the best possible policies are implemented. Moreover, it reinforces, in the African context, what has been found in other parts of the world with respect to energy service provision for the poor. It is a must read for anybody working in development and energy in Africa including and especially World Bank and IMF professionals as well as government policy makers in Africa. There are many other smaller lessons that can be drawn from the cases presented, other than those provided above, and that could be applied with appropriate modifications to change policy in the local context.

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African Studies Quarterly

Volume 8, Issue 3
Spring 2006

Continent of Mothers, Continent of Hope: Understanding and Promoting Development in Africa Today. Skard Torild. New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2003. 260 pp.

In this book, Skard draws on her rich experience working and living in Central and West Africa to recount the complex social, economic and political realities in the region. Skard carefully analyzes the overall development implications of conflicts, illiteracy and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, with particular emphasis on women and girls. She reveals a wide range of institutional, ideological and cultural issues that have bearings on the ways in which development assistance has been undertaken in the region. Ultimately, the book is about effective and ineffective development interventions in Africa. The book argues for an unbiased and targeted development approach that ought to take into account the prevailing social, historical, cultural and political realities.

The discourse swings back and forth in history, from the slave trade and colonial exploitation to de-colonization and post independence governance, carefully scrutinizing their contribution to the prevailing crises in the region whilst analyzing their implications for meeting development objectives in the future. By drawing attention to some of the most deadly and brutal civil wars in the region and highlighting the appallingly violent attributes of these conflicts, Skard not only recounts the past but also challenges readers to ponder the future of Africa. For example, she briefly touches upon a crucial, and yet paradoxical aspect of peace building: the practice of rewarding rebels in an effort to end violence as was done in Liberia with Charles Taylor (p.19). Simultaneously, Skard reveals Africa's remarkable resilience amidst lawlessness, injustice, poverty, disease, and oppression. In particular, she sheds light on the often-understated role of women in courageously upholding the fracturing social fabric as a result of enduring hardships. Consequently, the book argues well for the meaningful and deliberate inclusion of women in the development process if peace and prosperity are to prevail.

Furthermore, Skard underscores the importance of fully appreciating the dynamics between traditional and modern values in the region before introducing new development approaches. Such understanding ensures that one builds on indigenous and positive practices rather than re-inventing the wheel. Skard supports this argument with examples of successful community and local initiatives such as Lemden Women's Cooperative in the arid Brakna region of Mauritania, which was founded in 1985 by local educated women (p.235). Despite the harsh environment and strong traditional and religious influences, the Women's Cooperative brought remarkable socio-economic and environmental improvements to Lemden village. Skard applauds the initiative and argues that with the necessary financial and technical support, such types of initiatives could transform the continent, even in areas dominated by men and tradition.

Drawing on personal experience, Skard makes note of a few successful development interventions in Central and West Africa sponsored by UNICEF. At the same time, she gives a detailed account of her leadership and managerial challenges within UNICEF that, in her view,

reflected a clash of culture between Westerners and Africans (p. 207; 208). Skard's interpretation of cultural clash seems to be confused with an institutional culture that, in my view, better represents the challenges described by Skard. For instance, problems associated with the local staff include the inability to dissociate business from personal affairs, nepotism and unpunctuality. The fact that the private sector operates within the same environment and cultural constraints and yet does not suffer from the same problems points to the institutional not cultural value of accountability and purposeful leadership. Just as the private sector adheres to these values to stay in business, the public sector can impart them to their host community as part of the development package rather than giving their tacit endorsement to unacceptable practices (p. 208).

Skard's attempt to pull together a wide range of peace and development issues in Central and West Africa in a succinct and engaging fashion is certainly the strength of this book. However, due to the sheer number of themes covered in this limited volume, some of the key points are addressed in an abrupt and superficial fashion including the underlying theme of the book - women and mothers in Africa. Furthermore, the book suffers from broad generalizations concerning 'Africans' and their 'culture' often based on isolated incidents, specific geographic locations, institutional culture and the decisions of unelected officials. This results in an incomplete and at times inaccurate portrayal of Africans and their diverse culture and history. For instance, Skard claims that in sub-Saharan Africa, Islam has spread from the north while Christianity came much later and penetrated slowly from the south (p. 184). This generalization is altogether erroneous when one examines the history of Ethiopia, a country that accepted Christianity in the fourth-century and has an ancient civilization including its own written language, still in official use. Despite criticizing donors for their lack of sophistication in handling diverse and complex development issues in Africa and the Western media for their stereotyped image of the continent, Skard is not immune to her own accusations. Although a few generalizations can be made regarding certain themes in Africa such as issues of governance and economic status, not to mention race, it is not only hypocritical but also intellectually shallow to generalize Africans with respect to their various cultures, religions, histories and civilizations.

Nevertheless, the book is particularly insightful for young and committed development professionals who are dedicated to fighting poverty and the unacceptable level of violence that still rages on the continent. Moreover, Skard's expert account of development politics and what it has and has not changed on the continent should be a good resource for researchers and junior and seasoned development professionals alike. While it will introduce new professionals to the complex world of development, it will provoke discussion and debate among others with more experience.

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