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The Dualities of Contemporary Zimbabwean Politics: Constitutionalism Versus The Law of Power and The Land, 1999-2002

SUSAN BOOYSEN

Abstract: This paper explores the dualities in the coexistence within Zimbabwean politics of constitutionalism and legality versus a complex combination of paralegal, suprallegal, oppressive and brutal political action, especially as this pertains to elections and land. The analysis is set in the period 1999-2002. The investigation concerns the issue of how the Zimbabwe African National Unity (Patriotic Front) government had been using a complex combination of constitutionalism-legality and the unconstitutional-paralegal to ensure political survival, despite national resistance and international pressure. An epilogue presents a brief thematic comparison between the core arguments in this article, and developments from 2002-2003. The article has three interconnected parts. The first presents the major contours of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe. It argues that the state contested and manipulated both the practice and discourse of human rights, recasting the 'individual' and the 'liberal' in the context of 'African' and 'socialist', but with the slant to favour the government of the day. The second section highlights how ZANU-PF built the extensive constitutional, legal and electoral-domain front of constitutionality and multi-partyism, precisely to defeat and undermine opposition challenges, whilst maintaining itself in power. It argues that in the electoral domain ZANU-PF uses the legality of constitutionalism to aid and veil unconstitutional, arbitrary, and authoritarian means of maintaining power, and simultaneously garners the moral force of land and colonialism to create 'political immunity'. Thirdly, the article deals with the convergence of liberation politics, land and elections. It assesses the way in which ZANU-PF's anchoring of its electoral conquest in the issue of the land and post colonial liberation superimposed forms of legitimacy and justice that tended to override (in the eyes and minds of many citizens and parts of the international community, including SADC) paralegal and suprallegal action. The abrogation of constitutionalism in the domain of land effected some electoral favour and also conferred a degree of political immunity because of the 'sacredness' in the post-colonial struggle for land justice. The conclusion reviews possible

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explanations and notes the extent to which the period of 1999 to 2002 witnessed the convergence of constitutionalism, legality, and the moral force of land reform, with coercion, oppression and legal-institutional manoeuvring to maintain fragile regime power.

Introduction

By the time of the 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe, contestation between the worlds of constitutionalism and legality, and supra-legal political practice within the belly of the constitutional epitomised developments in the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) struggle for political survival. The dualities of constitutionalism, legalism, and formal party-electoral actions, versus actions beyond constitutional provisions and law, contribute to an overall characterisation of contemporary Zimbabwean regime politics as precariously vacillating between these two worlds. The co-existence of the legal and the supra-legal means that, for each reality and understanding that emerges, observations from the other side of the constitutional-legal divide reveal another reality.

'An edifice of legality', or 'pretence of constitutionalism', are phrases that opposition and community voices in Zimbabwe used to describe the contradictions between the upholding of the law, constitution and liberal-democratic practice, on the one hand, and the actions or measures of ZANU-PF in maintaining and justifying their hold on political power, on the other. ZANU-PF alternately denied practices of coercive and paralegal state action, or otherwise defended these in terms of security, anti-colonialism and nationalism. ZANU-PF pointed to opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) actions as unpatriotic, driven by foreign funding, and disinterested in resurrecting the pre-colonial bond between people and the land.

This article therefore argues that in Zimbabwe circa 1999-2002 there was a chasm between new constitutionalism, and ZANU-PF's use of the shell of constitutionalism as a *cordon* around its counter-constitutionalist political practice, as well as its portrayal of challenges to its abuse of constitutionalism as the defence of settler privilege. In both the interconnected domains of electoral and land action, the Zimbabwean ruling party upheld a facade of constitutionalism and legality.

Constitutionalism, defined minimally, alludes to the principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by rules that determine the validity of legislative and executive action. The procedure according to which this action must be performed is thus prescribed, or the permissible content of the action is delimited. As De Smith notes, constitutionalism "becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb the arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political power."¹ Shivji outlines the 'new constitutionalism' that articulates with African orientations and contexts. He emphasises several pillars of the right to people's and national self-determination; the right to practise democratic self-governance and the participation of citizens therein; the collective right of people and social groups to organise freely for political, ideological and other purposes (including the right to resist oppression); and the right to security and integrity of the person. These pillars present to the people of Africa the "assurance of the legitimacy of their struggle."² In similar vein and in defence of rights as part of a new African orientation, Mamdani points out that discourse about rights can invoke the image of a defence of settler privilege, whilst there is a continued denial of justice for a 'native

majority'.³ Legalism, in turn, is conceptualised as government and political action that is conducted in terms of national laws, as well as the legally adopted rules and procedures of that political system - but with the connotation that there is a facade of legal and procedural action that veils actions that are contrary to the spirit of constitutionalism. Legality refers to action that has the stamp of the law. Paralegal is used to denote violent actions, for instance torture, abductions and intimidation. Supralegal refers to actions that are projected as being above the law or actions that are justified through a higher morality, for instance as is projected to prevail in ZANU-PF's 'struggle against continued colonialism'. Furnace politics is the term that this article uses to denote political practice, which belies claims to constitutionalism.

The facade of supremacy of the law and legality of political and electoral measures, and, on a certain level, adherence to electoral procedure and multi-partyism, started caving in under the pressure of the electoral domain trilogy of the 12-13 February 2000 constitutional referendum, the 24-25 June 2000 parliamentary, and the 9-10 March 2002 presidential elections. A growing chasm emerged between constitutionalism-legality, and furnace politics within the legal-constitutional shell.

The first objective of this article is to outline the contours of legalism and constitutionalism in contemporary Zimbabwe and to analyse how the legalism-constitutionalism dimension was manifested in the period of 1999-2002. The analysis is positioned in the context of the debate on new constitutionalism in Africa. The second objective is to map the contrasts between constitutionalism and the opposing underworld of the constitutionally or legally manipulated life of electoral management and opposition control. A consistent theme is the interplay of constitutionalism and legality with boundary-illegality and paralegal action. In the domain of land and political power, analysed in the third section, it is the legacy of colonialism that is directly challenged through both land seizure and the legitimate discourses of pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism. The article indicates how 'the law of the land' and the need for post-colonial justice were used to largely legitimise otherwise forceful, coercive, and unconstitutional action. The article assesses the reasons why ZANU-PF engaged in the 'game' of constitutionalism and legalism, given the overwhelming of evidence of unconstitutional, paralegal and oppressive political behaviour.

THE MAJOR CONTOURS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LEGALISM IN ZIMBABWEAN POLITICS, 1999-2002

The duality of constitutionalism-legalism versus actions that are partly or fully anchored in unconstitutional, paralegal and supra-legal state operations was particularly characteristic of Zimbabwe circa 1999 to 2002. This range of actions helped entrench ZANU-PF's hold on political power.

Constitutionalism and Decolonisation in Zimbabwe

Constitutionalism was bestowed on many African countries in the form of their independence constitutions. In several cases across Africa, the liberal model of democracy held sway in the design of new constitutions. African regimes, as Shivji points out, have been practical in their choice of the liberal model. Also, African regimes have been tinkering with

their constitutions in the direction of liberalisation, sometimes under pressure, “and maybe to re-establish their credibility with the West.”⁴ These liberal perspectives departed from preceding statist orientations that found their inspiration in sources as varied as African authenticity, American realism, and the Soviet non-capitalist thesis. Two factors contributed to degrees of non-acceptance and illegitimacy of independence constitutions: the fact that the preceding colonial-African regimes did not rule in terms of the principles of constitutionalism and that the particular Western form of constitutionalism was seen to be foreign to Africa. Examples of such incompatibility are the concepts of individual rights or the separation of powers between the head of state and head of government.⁵

Post-liberation Zimbabwe has been characterised by its contestational relationship with the inherited Lancaster House Constitution. Constitutional amendments in Zimbabwe were exercised at least 18 times in 21 years. Many of the changes were uncontroversial attempts at the indigenisation of the Zimbabwe Constitution, once the limitations that were imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement had fallen away. Other controversial changes included those that were designed to entrench ZANU-PF in power. These ‘entrenchment changes’ often occurred in the leeway that was provided by the constitution’s provision for wide presidential powers. The Electoral Act of 1990 specifically related the conduct of elections to presidential omnipotence. The combination of constitutional and legal concentration of power in the president therefore provided the setting for Zimbabwe’s special case of a ‘liberation party rule through elections’. When the tide started turning (circa 1999 to 2002) and popular resistance began translating into formalised opposition politics, the constitutional and legal provisions were used to effectively constrain challenges to ZANU-PF.

The Zimbabwe constitutional debate engaged with the dual pressures of moving away from Lancaster House constraints towards indigenisation and socio-economic transformation, and, on the other hand, engendering change that would create space for the voices of civil society and opposition. These pressures articulated with the broader debate on the nature of constitutionalism in Africa. Several authors point to the need to develop constitutions that would not mechanically lift from the Western historical experience, but would build a constitutionalism that recognised African realities.⁶ As Mamdani notes,

the point is not to oppose one-sidedly the demand for human rights and the rule of the law; it is, on the other hand, to struggle towards a definition of the agenda of human rights and the rule of law that will not displace the discourse on power and popular sovereignty but will in fact lead to it. To do so, of course, is not possible without arriving at a conception of rights that flows from a concrete conceptualising of the wrongs on the continent.⁷

From Constitutional Indigenisation to Presidential Fiat

Over the years, the Zimbabwe constitution has remained a contested document. First, there was the component of ‘foreignness’ (and this is something that has continued), the idea that the constitution remained a non-Zimbabwean, colonial relic.⁸ Secondly, struggles developed around the appropriation and, as many argue, the abuse of reactionary components of the Lancaster House Constitution, by the ZANU-PF government in order to sustain its hegemony.

This constitution should be interpreted in the context of the preceding phase of both white settler colonialism-republicanism (which was unconstitutional and illegal), and the liberation struggle's action against the edifice of the Smith regime's form of constitutionalism. In the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, however, the liberation forces compromised and achieved less than they might have expected as the result of a liberation war. The British government was seen to have "deliberately designed a constitution aimed at preserving and protecting the interests of the white minority group. To this end, the original Lancaster House Constitution (LHC) had several entrenched clauses which prevented the first Zimbabwe government from amending the constitution easily."⁹ Other authors and politicians concur, for example, E. D. Mnangagwa states:

In the case of Zimbabwe, the new constitution was encumbered in the sense that it contained certain entrenched provisions which ensure that certain policies could not be changed until a specified time had elapsed or until the matter was determined by a specified majority vote in the House of Assembly.¹⁰

Indigenisation was an important consideration in early constitutional changes in Zimbabwe. For instance, one of the earlier changes was the removal (by the expiry date of the provision) of the twenty seats that were reserved for whites in parliament.¹¹ Related changes were the substitution of a ceremonial presidency and premier for an executive president, as well as the abolition of the senate to create a 150-member unicameral legislature.¹²

The 1979 constitution made provision for both the retention of land-use patterns for a certain period and several socio-economic constraints on the post-liberation state. For instance, private property was guaranteed for ten years. On the question of land, it has been pointed out that even if "a new government of Zimbabwe were committed to implementing a comprehensive land reform programme, the inhibiting cost would put it out of reach of the government."¹³ One early constitutional amendment to address some of the land concerns was the authorisation in 1990 (Act 11) of the acquisition of land for resettlement.¹⁴ The decade of the 1990s saw the development of land programmes which, with limited success in implementation, fed into the turn-of-the-century land action that superseded legal and constitutional frameworks.

The Zimbabwe constitution had been changed not only to indigenise and offer restitution, but also, as in 1987 (Amendment No. 7), to remove the president from questioning by and accountability to parliament. Some provisions of this amendment placed the president above parliament while other provisions placed him above the judiciary in that the judiciary was denied the right to question the substance of or the process through which presidential decisions and policies were derived.¹⁵ The constitution furthermore makes provision for presidential powers ('Temporary Measures') that essentially give the president powers of rule-making equal to those of the rest of the legislature. Amendment No. 7 grants the president immunity from "being personally liable to any civil or criminal proceedings..."¹⁶ Makumbe states that this amendment concentrated so much power in the president that "he does not need either parliament or his ministers and deputy ministers in order to run the country."¹⁷ He alludes to the constitution having become an instrument of authoritarian government in the hands of the ruling ZANU-PF. He observes that many of the thirteen amendments of the

constitution of Zimbabwe that had been passed by Parliament by 1998 had tended to perpetuate the tenure of office of the ruling ZANU-PF.

The convergence of the need for an indigenous constitution and concern about presidential usurpation of power led to constitutional initiatives on the part of civil society, including those embodied in the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in the late 1990s. The government-sponsored reaction was the appointment of the Constitutional Commission. The draft constitution offered to the Zimbabwean electorate in the February 2000 referendum was rejected. The government, however, continued its pursuit of enhanced power on the basis of the often-amended Lancaster House Constitution.¹⁸ After the June 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF no longer had a two-thirds majority, and constitutional amendments were obstructed. Increasingly, therefore, extensive presidential powers became the substitute for constitutional and law-based measures of governance.

The president of Zimbabwe throughout the period of analysis continued to enjoy a range of powers that allowed him to exercise control over the electoral process. The major law that regulates presidential powers on elections is the Electoral Act of 1990. Section 151 of this Act provides for the president to “make any such statutory instruments as he considers necessary or desirable to ensure that any election is properly and efficiently conducted and to deal with any matter or situation connected with, arising out of or resulting from the election”.¹⁹ From the 1984 constitutional amendments (Act 4), the president had gained the right to appoint (amongst others) the members of the Electoral Supervisory Committee (ESC), judges, ombudsmen, police, defence forces and the auditor-general. In effect, the president became the sole ruler of the electoral process. The president practically appoints all of the personnel of the three core electoral institutions of Zimbabwe: the Election Directorate, the Delimitation Commission, and the ESC. In the appointment processes, the president is required to consult with specified bodies, but he is not obliged to follow their advice. These appointments seem to articulate with ZANU-PF party political patronage networks.²⁰ Sections 15 (1) and (2) afford the president the power to regulate the electoral process to the extent that he is able to suspend or amend any provisions of either the Electoral Act or any other law in so far as it applies to elections. In 1995, the president used this provision to reduce the number of categories of persons that could exercise postal ballots.²¹ These changes continued into 2002.

It is widely accepted in Zimbabwe that neither the Registrar-General nor the ESC are independent.²² The civil servants that are appointed to supervise the elections are ZANU-PF loyalists. In 2000, then-chairperson of the ESC, Elaine Raftopoulos, attempted to enforce neutrality (or, non-ZANU-PF dominance) in ESC operations. A court struggle ensued, and the results emasculated the ESC. In preparation for the 2002 election, the ESC was reconstituted with its voter education function diluted and subsequently steered away from NGO participation. The new ESC also asserted full control over election monitors.

Several authors note ZANU-PF’s methods of marginalising and eliminating opposition.²³ They provide details about ZANU-PF’s methods of dealing with opposition. Dirty tricks, electoral manipulation, and violence against opponents have been an integral part of ZANU-PF governance ever since it came to power in 1980.²⁴ What distinguishes the period of 1999 to 2002 is the extension of a multi-faceted strategy for simultaneous annihilation of the opposition and construction of a 2002 presidential electoral victory that would allow ZANU-PF to reinvent the

party and construct a new hegemony based on anti-colonial liberation discourse. ZANU-PF actions at this time comprised not only the extension of constitutional and legal provisions in order to build the space for elaborate legal-constitutional action against opposition, but also the extra-legal use of violence and coercion to enforce the envisaged hegemony a *Third Chimurenga* required. The measures also aimed at promoting ZANU-PF's longer-term project for the reconstitution of ZANU-PF as a hegemonic liberation movement government.²⁵

Constitutionalism and Zimbabwean Adaptations of Multi-party Democracy

In its 22 years of regular engagement in elections, ZANU-PF has on several occasions changed positions with regard to one-partyism, socialism, neo-liberalism, Marxism, and pan-Africanism.²⁶ In 1980, ZANU-PF campaigned as a "would-be single party of a Marxist-toned Zimbabwe"²⁷ In 1985 it followed a Marxist script that was designed to root out dissidence. By 1995, it was showcasing its adoption of ESAP. Sylvester points out that ZANU-PF has always 'iconised' itself as the torchbearer of the struggles that others might have been too weak to embrace.²⁸ In the late-1990s, this zeal converged with the mission to counter a 'multi-party onslaught' on its power (which ZANU-PF construed as the MDC, 'puppet' NGOs on media organisations, and a range of colonial and Western powers). This onslaught comprised a set of legal-constitutional and paralegal actions that would deliver electoral practices regulating election outcomes.

Some tolerance of opposition still prevailed in the 1999-2000 campaign for the constitutional referendum, despite growing ruling party intimidation of the anti-constitution activists.²⁹ In preparation for the June 2000 parliamentary elections, however, ZANU-PF launched a wide-ranging campaign of intimidating opposition, controlling the media, and mobilising voters around the issue of land. By 2002, ZANU-PF's political tolerance had further decreased, but the party paraded the formal processes and rules of multi-party elections as evidence of democracy. It also continued using the existence of a fair number of political parties (irrespective of level of political action and organisation) as evidence that Zimbabwe was a vibrant multi-party democracy.³⁰ It furthermore used the outer face of multi-party democracy to help drive its thrust for African recognition of the March 2002 elections. ZANU-PF presented a multi-pronged oppressive onslaught against electoral and civil society opposition, rendering Zimbabwe a multi-party democracy in only a nominal way. Subsequently, in the post-election period ZANU-PF threatened to continue its campaign for reduced opposition action and impact.³¹

One of the persistent anomalies of the Zimbabwean case of constitutionalism has been the ability and periodic willingness of the courts to bring government to order. Up to 2001, this was a relatively strong feature. However, pressure came to bear on certain judges to step down (including former Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay) especially from government and war veterans following judgements in cases of land redistribution.³² A phase followed in which ZANU-PF had much more assurance of a compliant judiciary. High Court judges such as Rita Makaura and Ben Hlatswayo occasionally delivered judgements that went against the ZANU-PF government. On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, ZANU-PF from 2001 to 2002 could be virtually assured of favourable judgements.

This preliminary delineation of the dualities of contemporary Zimbabwean politics highlights the extent to which Zimbabwe diverges from the principles of constitutionalism, as defined in an African context. Despite the constitutional and legal edifices, methodical constitutional disorder prevailed. Not only was the principle of constitutionalism selectively upheld, but the ZANU-PF government also felt compelled to create an elaborate edifice and pretend to operate by legal and constitutional criteria. In some instances, the edifice was proactively instituted, but more frequently the ZANU-PF government acted retrospectively to effect legalisation.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LEGALITY AS AN INSTRUMENT TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS

This section analyses the range of actions that constituted the systematic multi-front ZANU-PF assault on popular and electoral action during the mobilisation of civil society, NCA, and MDC against ZANU-PF's exercise of state power. Under the burden of this opposition surge and two electoral near-defeats (see Table 1: *Zimbabwe Parliamentary and Presidential Election Results, 1980-2002*), ZANU-PF by 2002 had become increasingly vehement and elaborate in its measures to control opposition and secure its own hold on power. Beyond the broader constitutional and legal changes that led to the powerful Zimbabwe presidency, it was the far-reaching and intensifying application of legal-constitutional and oppressive-authoritarian powers, concurrent with an insistence that liberal-democratic standards were being upheld, that characterised the 1999-2002 period. This section focuses on the threefold interplay of constitutionalism-legality, unconstitutional and paralegal acts presented in the language of constitutional-legal interventions, and outright disregard of constitutionalism in the form of actions that were 'beyond the law' or paralegal.

Table 1

ZIMBABWE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1980-2002

Number of elected seats and percentages

POLITICAL PARTY (Note 1)	1980 (Note 2)	1985	1990	1995 (Note 3)	2000	2002 Presidential election	2000 Referendum
ZANU-PF (Mugabe)	57 (63,0%)	63 (77,2%)	117 (75,4%)	118 (81,4%)	62 (48,8%)	Proportion of vote to ZANU-PF candidate: 1990: 80%	697,754 to 578,210 votes (54,7% versus 45,3% of the votes). 5 m voters
ZAPU (PF-ZAPU)	20 (24,1%)	15 (19,3%)	-	-	(0,4%)		
ZANU-Ndonga	0	1 (1,3%)	1	2	1		

(ZANU)	(2%)		(0,9%)	(6,5%)	(0,7%)	1996: 93% 2002: 57% Mugabe 1,7m Tsvangirai: 1,3m 5,6+ m voters in 2002	
MDC (Note 4)	-	-	-	-	57		
(Tsvangirai)					(47,1%)		
RF/CAZ	20	15	-	-	-		
UANC	3	- (2,2%)	-	-	-		
(from '94:UP)	(8,3%)		(0,5%)				
ZUM	-	-	2 (16,6%)	0	0		
Independent	0	5	0	1	0		
			(,34%)	(5,86%)	(2,1%)		
Forum Party	-	-	-	-	-		
(from '94: UP)							
UP	-	-	-	6,3%	0		
					(1,2%)		
ZUD	-	-	-	-	0		
					(0,2%)		
TOTAL VOTES / CONTEXT	Electorate of 2,9m	+/- 3 m votes cast for 80 'black seats'	Preceded by merger ZANU & ZAPU	Boycotts; 55 ZANU- PF seats not contested (Note 5)	Emergence of MDC, un- free context		
PERCENTAGE TURNOUT	94-98+% (Note 6)	97,3%	42,8-60% (Note 7)	53,9% (Note 8)	50% (Note 9)	55%	26%

Note 1: ZANU-PF=Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front); ZAPU: Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union; MDC= Movement for Democratic Change; RF/CAZ=Rhodesian (Republican Front/Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe; ZUM=Zimbabwe Unity Movement (Tekere); UP=United Parties.

Note 2: Figures for the 'White Voters' Roll' elections of 1980 and 1985 are not included in this table (Saunders, 2000).

Note 3: Only 65 of the 120 constituencies were contested.

Note 4: The MDC challenged 37 of these seats; the 37 Zanu-PF constituency wins were being contested

for reversal.

Note 5: 85 of total of 150 seats therefore uncontested.

Note 6: Estimated percentage; no registration figures available (Saunders, 2000:46). Other estimates are that the percentage was closer to 94% (Booyesen, 2001).

Note 7: Estimated percentage, based on questionable ESC registration figures (Saunders, 2000:46). Other estimates are that the range of participation was between 54 and 65% (Booyesen, 2001). Sylvester (1990:376) refers to a poll of 'less than 60%'. Represents a sharp decline in comparison with turnout of 95% and above in previous elections.

Note 8: Other sources estimate participation at 57% (see Booyesen, 2001).

Note 9: Estimated that 50% of the total of 5 049 815 voters voted (Booyesen, 2001).

Sources: Saunders, 2000:38; 46; Booyesen, 2001; Sithole, 2000; selection of additional print media sources

On the eve of the 2002 presidential election, a body of repressive legislation was in place, in the name of preserving law and order as well as national security.³³ Such laws, while in many cases couched in patriotic terms, were designed to suppress opposition and pave the way for ZANU-PF's retention of power. Generally, ZANU-PF managed to keep electoral measures and processes veneered in the language and practices of legality and liberal democratic procedure.³⁴ As the civil society and party political opposition threat grew from late 1999 to 2002, ZANU-PF's counter-offensive assumed shades of demonising political opposition, anti-colonialism, and real or construed linkages between political opposition and imperialist influences. The offensive also projected ZANU-PF as a force of pro-national sovereignty and pan-Africanism. Despite what amounted to a total onslaught on opposition, the ZANU-PF government continued to publicly promote its commitment to 'free and fair' elections. Zimbabwean political and electoral authorities concentrated attention on the core aspects of the conduct of the poll. The 'ability' and 'freedom' to vote on the polling days were pegged as icons of the liberal-democratic project. Yet, beyond this narrow core of electoral action, there were extensive measures in place to subvert the opposition.

To analyse how the degrees of constitutionalism versus 'beyond the law' actions manifested themselves in the electoral domain, this section explores electoral management, the application of violence and coercion, and the ideological framing and logistical decapitation of opposition. These measures constitute the *Third Chimurenga*, or the so-called final phase of the liberation struggle that would return the land to the people.³⁵

Electoral Contests in the Context of Campaigns of Violence and Terror

In the propagation of the *Third Chimurenga*, ZANU-PF attached little value to elections as the means for the realisation of popular aspirations. Rather, the two elections became part of the means to dispose of an enemy that included, inter alia, the contesting opposition parties. At the December 2001 ZANU-PF congress, Mugabe urged supporters to view his 2002 re-election

campaign as 'total war'.³⁶ The ZANU-PF campaigns around all three of the 2000-2002 voter contests used force and coercion that ranged from direct, violent attacks on the MDC to wide-ranging projects of community terror. The urban and rural electorates in this period were subjected to widespread violence. In one of the most prominent techniques for control and coercion, the new militia (national youth trainees working for ZANU-PF) supplemented the role of the war veterans and riot police, setting up base camps close to town and villages centres to intimidate, abduct, and torture residents who were suspected of being opposition party supporters.³⁷ Community opposition was driven back into subservience and electoral abstention. Through this process, ZANU-PF regained an edge over the MDC opposition.

The project of community terror commenced in the run-up to the 2000 elections.³⁸ Base camps mushroomed from the late 2000 by-elections to the 2002 presidential elections. They were erected both in high-density urban areas and across most of the rural communal lands to house, feed and train ZANU-PF militias. The camps also became centres for re-education, intimidation, and torture. Militia activities included the setting up of roadblocks, at which soldiers, war veterans, and youths either confiscated the identity documents of citizens who could not prove ZANU-PF membership or forced the acquisition of ZANU-PF membership cards.³⁹ Some torture centres in Harare also became polling stations.⁴⁰ In other places, base camps were across the road from voting stations.⁴¹ News services reported many similar instances.⁴² In 2002, militia actions extended to the confiscation of identity cards and intimidation of voters queuing on the March polling days.⁴³

The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) worked closely with ZANU-PF war veterans in campaigns of terror. The CIO is funded through the "special services" category in the budget votes, and the use of these funds may not be questioned in parliament, nor may items and expenditures be scrutinised by government auditors. The estimates (2000 Zimbabwe Budget Estimates) indicated that compared with the previous year's Z\$1,2billion, this budget item would receive Z\$3 billion (a 143% increase). The war veterans are funded through the Ministry of Defence, set to receive Z\$429 million.⁴⁴

Violence was most prevalent in the provinces where the ZANU-PF grip on the electorate was seen to be loosening, especially in Manicaland and Midlands.⁴⁵ Furthermore, there was intense contestation of violence statistics as indicators of the nature of electoral procedures. The weight of evidence gave credence to allegations of systematic and extensive state violence. For instance, *The Herald* of 6 March 2002) observed that more than half of reported cases of political violence in the first 25 days of February 2002 (241) had been traced to the MDC, and 223 to ZANU-PF. University of Zimbabwe academics put the loss of lives at 107, substantially higher than police estimates.⁴⁶ Earlier in 2002, the MDC had published a list of 89 of its supporters who had died as a result of ZANU-PF attacks. Statistics from the Mass Public Opinion Institute (7 March 2002) were: 70,000 displaced, 107 killed, 397 abducted, 83 MDC rallies banned, and 5,308 opposition supporters tortured.

The processes of coercion and violence started manifesting themselves in the run-up to the February 2000 referendum. War veterans and so-called 'thug forces' then continued their electoral clean-up functions for the June 2000 elections. There were regular reports of illegal roadblocks, confiscation of identity cards, and the presence of war veterans in the vicinity of voting stations. Several rural areas were completely sealed off from the outside world. No-go

areas became frequent occurrences across Zimbabwe. *Crisis Alert* noted that ‘no-go areas’, ‘curfews’, and ‘militia road blocks’ had become part of the vocabulary of the 2002 election.⁴⁷ No-go areas were most prevalent in provinces under ZANU-PF control, especially Mashonaland West, East and Central. In Makoni-North constituency, the only form of access for the MDC was to scatter campaign literature on nearby roads at night.⁴⁸ Widespread assaults on the organisers, officials, and agents of the MDC occurred in the run-up to both the 2000 and 2002 elections, and in the intermediary by-elections.⁴⁹ Assaults, abductions and murder of activists and polling agents became commonplace.⁵⁰ Analyses of the 2000 election indicate that ZANU-PF had either encouraged or condoned electoral violence. After the 2000 election, there was an official pardon for those (overwhelmingly ZANU-PF) who had committed these acts.⁵¹

Electoral Management and Pushing the Boundaries of the Legal

The president of Zimbabwe fully utilised his constitutional and legal powers for the management of elections. The government’s measures for near-totalitarian control of multi-party elections were increasingly sharpened from the June 2000 elections onwards. This was facilitated by the exercise of executive powers, in combination with presidential control over the legislature and the judiciary. In June 2000 and March 2002, court cases and new legislation, often in the form of Statutory Instruments, emerged right up to the polling days. The rules for the conduct of elections changed and so did rules for the electoral activities of media, parties, and civil society. The changes pertained to the voters’ roll, eligibility to vote, constituency versus national bases for voting, postal voting, selection of staff for the administration and implementation of elections, the impartiality of monitors and voting staff, and responsibility for voter education.⁵²

The president of Zimbabwe appoints all core electoral personnel under the Electoral Act of 1990. These include the Registrar-General and the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). The Registrar-General, Tobaiwa Mudede, is mainly responsible for implementing presidential measures and directives. Events in 2000 proved that staff “adhere or get out.”⁵³ In 2000, the ESC suffered a reduction of powers in the accreditation of monitors and observers as well as its voter education functions. Subsequent to these changes, ZANU-PF was effectively in control of voter education. In 2000, NGOs still autonomously conducted voter education. In 2002, the ESC assumed full control of all aspects of voter education, including the curriculum and the channelling of voter education funding. Furthermore, in 2002 election monitors were appointed from the ranks of civil servants or the security forces, no longer from civil society. There was also evidence that CIO staff had strategic placements within voting stations, sometimes actually marking names off the voters’ roll.⁵⁴ The 2002 Electoral Amendment Act, amending section 34 of the Electoral Act, gave the Registrar-General the power to alter the voters’ roll at any time without directly informing the voters concerned and without giving them the right to appeal.

The ‘voters roll process’ severely impacted on the ability to exercise ‘the right to vote.’ The management of this process, including decisions on eligibility, the dates for registration, displacement of voters, etc. contributed to confusion and disenfranchisement. In both the 2000 and 2002 elections, the Registrar-General’s office did not treat the voters’ roll as a public access document as is required in terms of section 18 of Zimbabwe’s 1990 Electoral Act.⁵⁵ Up to 36

hours before commencement of the 2002 poll, the final voters' roll had not been made public. Evidence of removals from the voters' roll only came to light when it was too late to challenge.

In 2002, the widespread powers of the Registrar-General facilitated the engineering of the voters' roll process to effect both disenfranchisement and selective or limited voter turnout. These actions included the Registrar-General opening the voters' roll for inspection and registration changes between 19 November and 23 December 2001. He closed it with effect from 10 January 2002. On 29 January 2002, using his powers under s94(2) of the Electoral Act, he retrospectively gazetted a later date of closure, namely Sunday 27 January 2002. After the roll was closed and in contravention of s25 (1) and s34 (1)(c) of the Electoral Act (amended by the General Laws Amendment Act), 5,000 permanent residents who had ceased to be citizens but retained their right to vote under the Constitution of Zimbabwe Schedule 3 s3 (3)(b) were excluded. The closing date of the voters roll was then further extended to 3 March 2002.⁵⁶ Even beyond this period, evidence surfaced of continuous registration (for instance in Chinhoyi). The Registrar-General claimed that voter registration at this time was part of the continuous functioning of his office and that these people were not being registered with a view to participation in the March election. Selective removals from the voters' roll also became easy after several MDC branch chairpersons in 2001 were forced to hand over MDC membership lists.

Because of terror campaigns by militias, war veterans and the hired 'thug forces', many Zimbabweans were displaced from their usual places of residence or registration, and consequently, the place to exercise their vote. The process of fast-track land reform also resulted in additional tens of thousands of farm labourers (regarded as 'totemless' because of possible Malawian or Mozambican origins) being displaced.⁵⁷ Displacement was reinforced through the March 2002 Supreme Court ruling specifying that the election would be held on the basis of constituency voters' rolls. This followed the 25 January 2002 High Court ruling by Justice Makarau that the election was to be held on the basis of a non-constituency common roll.⁵⁸ Temporary displacement was also effected through the closure of tertiary state educational institutions for the polling period (and indeed beyond). This disenfranchised large percentages of students who were registered to vote in their campus constituencies.⁵⁹

The number of 2002 voters in Zimbabwe was estimated to be 5,6 million.⁶⁰ It had been approximately 5.1 million in 2000.⁶¹ The office of the Registrar-General released the final voters' roll on the Thursday before the Saturday-Sunday March 2002 election. It was then reported that another 400,000 names were to appear on the supplementary voters' roll, and that most of these additions would be from the ZANU-PF heartland of the Mashonaland provinces.⁶²

On election days in Harare and Chitungwiza, confusion prevailed about the location of voting stations (dual or tripartite elections were to be held: for president and council, or president, mayor and council). This confusion contributed to low voter turnout. This situation contrasted with the relatively orderly dissemination of polling station information in 2000. Then the location of voting stations had been published in newspapers, albeit only a number of days prior to polling.⁶³

Disenfranchisement also happened through an overload of urban polling stations. In 2000, urban residents had approximately 50% more voting stations than in 2002 (official figures were never released). The MDC and the Combined Harare Residents Association stressed that the

reallocation of urban voting stations to rural areas effectively wrought the disenfranchisement of urban voters, in that it would have required a voting throughput of one ballot per 10 seconds in some urban areas, based on a 70% turnout.⁶⁴ The Registrar-General, in a ZBC “Face the Nation” interview on 1 March 2002, emphasised that the reduction in the number of urban voting stations was intended to assist rural people who had previously been subject to long distances of travel to the polling stations. He never gave reasons as to why there had to be a trade-off between urban and rural. This form of disenfranchisement was highly visible, especially in Harare in 2002.⁶⁵

In the final days of the 2000 election process, it was widely believed that the Registrar-General ‘manufactured’ large numbers of marked ballot papers. Counting processes in the Harare South constituency confirmed that postal ballots from the DRC, channelled into this strategic constituency, were uniformly marked in favour of the ruling party.⁶⁶ With regard to 2002, the Registrar-General on 6 February 2002 ruled that applications for a postal ballot (then still within terms of the General Laws Amendment Act) would commence on or around 7 February, and these could be returned up to the first day of polling.⁶⁷ Three days before the election, reports surfaced that army members had been required to vote in the presence of their superiors.

Amendments to the Electoral Act (ss20 and 21) also effected a form of ‘class disenfranchisement’. In 2002, one requirement to vote was proof of residence. The ZHR estimated that many lodgers and tenants in high-density areas had no lease agreements or proof of tenancy. This disqualification extended into rural areas, where traditional leaders would often have been the only persons able to vouch for residential details. Other forms of mainly urban disenfranchisement happened through ‘deregistration’ (omitting previously confirmed names off new rolls), splitting voting between presidential and municipal/mayoral votes, delaying voting processes (through go-slows, lunches, and station closures) discouraging turnout (through militia presence and nearby militia training camps), and attrition induced by long voting lines (personal observation, 10-11 March 2002). The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition pointed to the inflation of the voters’ roll with ‘phantom names’ that facilitated the subsequent stuffing of ballot boxes.⁶⁸ Statutory Instruments 41A-F, adopted in March 2002, had reinstated aspects of the General Laws Amendment Act which could not be implemented because of the Supreme Court nullification of the Act (28 February 2002). This law, amongst others, had limited postal votes and civil society engagement in voter education. The Statutory Instruments reinstated the restrictions.

Vote specialists also pointed to several flaws in the 2002 management of ballot papers and ballot boxes. First, the Registrar-General refused to release the details of the specific number of ballot papers that had been printed. This refusal occurred amidst opposition fears that:

- ⊙ voters in ZANU-PF heartland areas were being forced to mark ballots
- ⊙ these might be channelled into pre-loaded ballot boxes
- ⊙ ballot boxes would only be sealed at the apertures and not at the seams
- ⊙ not all ballot boxes would be screened by party agents
- ⊙ mobile voting stations would deliver ample opportunities for ballot fraud (in the form of substitution of ballot boxes *en route* between voting venues).⁶⁹

Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court of Zimbabwe played crucial roles in the implementation of ZANU-PF's election strategy. On the eve of both the 2000 and 2002 elections, the judiciary at crucial junctures offered rulings that were favourable to ZANU-PF. In 2000, the High Court ruled against appeals by the ESC. In 2002 the Supreme Court overruled the High Court's judgement in favour of voting on a national rather than constituency base. However, there were exceptions. In 2002, the High Court (Sunday 10 March) ruled in favour of extending voting by one more day. A week earlier the Supreme Court had overturned the General Laws Amendment Act, because of its unprocedural adoption. This relative balance between pro- and anti-ZANU-PF judgements, however, only illustrates the extent to which ZANU-PF did not depend on a compliant judiciary to effect many of its electoral plans. In the case of the General Laws Amendment Act, the government used Statutory Instruments to amend the Electoral Act of 1990 and instituted all of the provisions in the General Laws Amendment Act required to manage the poll in their own way, including the accreditation of monitors/observers and the conduct of voter education.

The Engineering and Ideological Framing of Opposition Election Campaigns

Beyond the legal-constitutional measures (including their adaptations, reformulations and post-defeat reintroductions), ZANU-PF made effective use of control over mass media to limit the impact of opposition and optimise the effect of the governing party. Governing party control over information combined with the constraints that it imposed on the campaign activities of the MDC, helped to ensure that voters would primarily hear ZANU-PF's interpretations of the electoral battle. Various laws, such as the Citizen Amendment Act (2001), the Broadcasting Services Act (2001), and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) served this purpose.

ZANU-PF's 2000 and 2002 rural dominance was secured with a combination of measures: delivery of land to many of the previously landless and threats of war or personal retribution should ZANU-PF's rural dominance be threatened. The urban anti-ZANU-PF vote, in contrast, was largely countered through a suppression of the pro-MDC vote through the forms of disenfranchisement already outlined above and the widespread fear of either violence or war in the event of an MDC victory.⁷⁰

ZANU-PF constitutional, legal, and paralegal action hampered the MDC's ability to campaign. Restrictions ranged from its ideological demonisation by ZANU-PF to logistical issues, such as selective provision of transport to rallies. The range of legislation, including the 2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Statutory Instruments, meant that the MDC had to obtain government permission to have rallies, and that it was not allowed to provide bus transport to their rallies. ZANU-PF itself openly flouted this regulation. ZANU-PF had a virtual monopoly over public advertising space. Militias ensured that shop and taxi owners would fear for their lives and property should they either remove ZANU-PF posters or allow the MDC to display posters.⁷¹

Other constraints included accusations against the MDC leader of an assassination plot, the burning of MDC offices in Bulawayo, and several attacks on offices in Harare, continuous legal charges against MDC leaders, and the bombing of the printing presses of the MDC-sympathetic *Daily News*. Although the assassination plot allegations were soon questioned and/or dismissed,

the Mugabe 2002 presidential campaign thrived on suggestions of opposition weakness and gullibility.⁷² Whereas the independent Zimbabwe press continued to provide coverage of opposition voices, ZANU-PF enjoyed virtual monopoly access to the electronic media, such as ZBC television. Short-wave radio stations that broadcast from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands did spring up in the months preceding the election. There was little, however, that could counter the extended and established chain of government information.

'Ideological warfare' and the delegitimisation of opposition had a significant role in the electoral performance of ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF contested and manipulated both the practice and the discourse of human rights, recasting the 'individual and the 'liberal' in the context of 'African' and 'socialist'. It projected opposition challenges as reactionary, racist, colonial, and devoid of patriotism. Raftopoulos points out that whereas ordinary voters were unlikely to have been affected by the revival of ZANU-PF liberation rhetoric, the ZANU-PF-sympathetic middle and intellectual classes were substantial enough to have warranted this new ZANU-PF hegemonic project. ZANU-PF effectively used the reality of continuous colonial fault-lines of dispossession, as well as land scarcity, to construct a campaign message that "anti-ZANU-PF equals anti-land fast-tracking and reform, and equals support for reactionary forces, sell-outs and puppets of the British/Western-imperial project that wish to destroy the sovereignty of the Zimbabwean state and people."⁷³ Patriotism, nationalism, sovereignty and movement to a land-centred 'new future' were combined with a one-dimensional assignation of blame for problems on the MDC, white farmers, businesses, and their international associates.

Raftopoulos characterises this disjuncture in Zimbabwean politics as "a severe break" that had developed between the discourse and politics of the liberation struggle (as channelled through party ideologues), on the one hand, and that of the civic struggles for democratisation in the post-colonial period.⁷⁴ He observes that this friction developed in the context of a declining liberation movement that had drawn a lethal distinction between a violence driven, 'anti-imperialist' project centred on the land question, and the politics of human rights which ZANU-PF characterised as an imposition of global imperatives. The civic opposition, in contrast, had espoused its agenda largely through the language of citizenship rights, articulated most clearly in the campaign for constitutional reform. However, Raftopoulos states, "this politics of democratisation has not sufficiently negotiated its connections, as well as its differences, with the legacies of the liberation struggle."⁷⁵

Electoral observation, far from being the supposedly neutral project of assessment, became an integral part of the Zimbabwean electoral process from 2000 onwards.⁷⁶ Increasingly from 2000 to 2002, the state was engineering who the observers would be and what they would be permitted to see.⁷⁷ Observers were manipulated through delaying the processes of accreditation so that there would be an overwhelming focus on the two polling days, and, at most, the week preceding polling. The determined effort to stamp out critical electoral exposure had its first serious trial run in June 2000. There were delays and refusals in accreditation. To the extent that accreditation in 2000 did happen, it became effective only two days before the poll. Control over election observation was further fine-tuned for 2002. Large organisations such as the EU were excluded.⁷⁸ Furthermore, observers in both elections were 'self-censored'. For fear of their personal safety, they did not venture far beyond the main centres and bigger cities. Observer

missions have simply been too small, even in combined numbers, to effect countrywide coverage. Yet, most missions tended to report that their observers 'covered all province.'⁷⁹

These were elections that could not be lost by the governing party. Beyond talk of rigging in the form of stuffing ballot boxes (which remained a possibility in both 2000 and 2002), an array of measures contributed to a stacking of the odds in favour of ZANU-PF. Many of these actions occurred beyond the electoral domain. Yet, the end-result put on display was one of multi-party parliamentary elections and competitive presidential elections. These electoral actions all played out on the stage of multi-party politics, but were positioned in a world where liberal democracy was 'not enough' to address the fault lines of the state that was inherited from colonial powers. ZANU-PF mobilised several lines of action, supplementing the accepted repertoires of multi-party contestation with extra-constitutional or paralegal measures, as well as action by executive fiat and state-administrative monopoly. It might even be argued that liberal, multi-party democracy is inappropriate as a model of government, given that Zimbabwean society demands far-reaching socio-economic change, including corrections of continuing colonial fault-lines.

THE LAW OF POWER AND THE LAND IN SUPERSEDING CONSTITUTIONALISM

The 1999-2002 electoral crisis in Zimbabwe revolved around land ownership in conjunction with the unfinished business of the colonial past and the determined attempts by the former liberation movement government to maintain itself in power.⁸⁰ The brutalities attendant upon retaining power became obscured through ZANU-PF's recourse to constitutional and legal packaging for pervasive coercion and violence. On the other hand, ZANU-PF's actions to maintain itself in power took recourse to a superior morality, namely that of resisting continued and renewed colonialist intervention in Africa. Objections against the methods of ZANU-PF's actions would themselves be construed as unpatriotic and in defence of colonial powers' disregard for the continent. The land programme's violations of rights and constitutionalism were therefore offset by the illegitimacy of colonial and white settler occupation (as well as subsequent purchases and accumulation) of prime land.

ZANU-PF contextualized the turn-of-the-21st century Zimbabwean land struggles in terms of the *Third Chimurenga*, or the completion of the struggle for decolonisation and return of the land to the people. It may be argued that, out of the ashes of feared electoral loss and the problem of how to deal with war veterans, there arose a land strategy that turned elections into only a small part of the broader struggle for post-colonial justice. The unresolved issue of post-colonial land justice in Zimbabwe was undoubtedly a part of the alienation between a large proportion of Zimbabwean voters and their liberation movement government. Land action, however, also became the crux of a ZANU-PF strategy for political survival, invoking aspects of the liberation struggle ethos. Moreover, the renewed emphasis on land found resonance amongst other African leaders. The strategy of fast-tracked land redistribution from 2000 onwards would be slow to turn the economy around, but provided an inner-sanctum of post-colonial legitimacy and ZANU-PF could then use the powerful arguments of pan-Africanism to buy time. Evidence of ZANU-PF insincerity in the land project manifested itself in widespread elite manipulation of land redistribution, the fact that ZANU-PF supporters were the main

beneficiaries, and the reality that there was little facilitation or support for post-invasion agricultural and settlement initiatives.⁸¹ By early 2002, evidence started emerging that both government officials and politicians, not to mention ZANU-PF non-government functionaries, benefited on a much larger scale by gaining access to prime land.

Rupture Between Land Redistribution and Rights Issues

Many of the land actions contrast with new constitutionalism in Africa, as articulated by Shivji (1991). Mhanda observes that the “liberation struggle was driven by political, economic, social and cultural demands” and that “land distribution was just one of the key economic demands”.⁸² Raftopoulos, on the basis of major writings on the liberation struggle, notes:

A programme of violent land occupations, sanctioned by the ruling party, that abrogates other issues around political and civil rights, is at odds with an important part of the nationalist legacy. Even during the difficulties of the liberation war itself, when violence and coercion formed a central part of nationalist mobilisation, rural communities attempted to impose a moral economy of controls over the activities of the liberation forces, through traditional leaders, and long existing party structures.⁸³

The 2000 election slogan of ZANU-PF, “The Land is the Economy, the Economy is the Land” came to epitomise the convergence between contemporary economic crisis, electoral threats to ZANU-PF, and the political will to allow the liberation movement government the chance to resurrect itself. It was in December 1999, at the ZANU-PF conference, that the party realised that it would not survive politically without actions such as the land campaign.⁸⁴ Both its sliding popular fortunes and the inescapable problems of its relationship with war veterans contributed to this realisation. The reality of ZANU-PF’s position was reinforced by the constitutional referendum results of February 2000.⁸⁵

It is therefore through this extensive project of land and liberation-cum-pan-Africanism that ZANU-PF strategised for its longer-term electoral survival. Beyond the scrutiny of election observers, ZANU-PF used violence and coercion to enforce its land project because “belly dissent” was likely to escalate before there would be economic revival. ZANU-PF needed the suppression of dissent and disregard of individual rights in order to remain in power long enough to witness a reversal of electoral fortunes. Ordinary Zimbabweans talked about the need for change. Only some of this, however, was connected to the land. Inside Zimbabwe, it was predominantly the politics of the belly (hunger, unemployment, and frustration with inability to get ahead in life) that caused a large proportion of voters to desire a new government.⁸⁶ The 2002 election result, however, also demonstrated that in parts of Zimbabwe there indeed would be pro-ZANU-PF voting as an expression of gratitude for land redistribution.⁸⁷

Legal Measures on Land and Overrule by the President

Liberal democracy’s shortcoming - that it is not a panacea for economic ills - is an insufficient explanation for years of relatively little action on the issue of land justice in Zimbabwe. Up to 1997, the acquisition of land in Zimbabwe was based on a slow and cautious,

market-based approach to land reform. The 1980s did witness low-intensity land occupations, but the government discouraged these. The ZANU-PF government, in the decade between the end of Lancaster House and the 2000 referendum, had several opportunities to expedite the land reform process. Parallel to the adoption of ESAP and its effects on the Zimbabwean economy, war veterans challenged the authority of ZANU-PF and the president in 1997 by demanding gratuities for their role in the liberation struggle. This was a turning point, and the president would become increasingly reliant on violent means of mobilisation.⁸⁸

Constitutionalism became a relative value. In the language of new constitutionalism for Africa, certain individual rights (such as property rights) created the space for social and group rights.

The 2000-2002 period constituted a historical juncture that uniquely facilitated a relative breach of constitutionalism in favour of long-awaited, far-reaching land reform. The historical moment was conducive to the pardoning of 'lawlessness' by other former colonially occupied states that suffered from similar backlogs of post-colonial restitution, and by former colonial powers that suffered a mild form of colonial guilt.

To some extent, the ZANU-PF government complied with the insistence (Zimbabwean, Southern African and other international) that their land reform project should be conducted in a lawful manner. As was the case with regard to various electoral measures, however, these legal measures often only emanated after initial ZANU-PF action was followed by opposition efforts to fault the action on legal grounds. In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and individual farmers challenged the invasions, the listing of farms, and the 'fast-track' programme in the Administrative Court. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favour of the government. It found that there was no legal basis for the Administrative Court to demand the existence of a land reform programme before it could confirm or reject government acquisition orders.⁸⁹ The government then tabled the *Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Bill* in April 2001 to undermine the legal efforts by the commercial farmers.⁹⁰

Opposition members of parliament dismissed the Bill as a plot to 'legalise the illegal.'⁹¹ The donor community also expressed its displeasure. According to the *Zimbabwe Independent* of 4 May 2001, diplomatic sources reckoned that the Bill undermined the goodwill created after the United Nations Development Programme visited Zimbabwe in December 2000 and the government made commitments to non-partisan, organised and transparent land reform. This prompted the United States to hasten the approval of the *Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (2001)* which sought to pressure Mugabe to improve human rights, respect the constitution, restore good governance and ensure conditions for economic prosperity -- in exchange for development funding.⁹²

It is in this context that Mugabe overruled his Cabinet's support for two April 2000 High Court rulings that ordered new land settlers to withdraw from occupied farms. Freeman points out that Mugabe also brushed aside attempts by then Home Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa and Deputy-President Joseph Msika to secure withdrawals from the farms.⁹³ A purge of intra-government and ZANU-PF opponents of the land programme followed. This was at a crucial point shortly before the June 2000 elections and ZANU-PF needed a project that would distinguish it from the opposition. A range of examples of paralegal action and presidential overrule can be cited. In one of the most far-reaching instances from October 2001, President Mugabe's newly constituted Supreme Court (with a new chief justice and three new

justices) reversed all previous rulings that fast-track seizures had been illegal. They stated that land reform was proceeding according to the law. This was one of the criteria of the September 2001 *Abuja Agreement*. The ruling meant that the government could now claim to be fulfilling the conditions of the Agreement.⁹⁴

'The Economy of the Land' Clashing with Constitutionalism

The new land revolution was built around the assertion that the return of rural land would be the genesis of a new Zimbabwean economy. Jobs and housing would be created in rural Zimbabwe and the stream of migration to the cities would be reversed.⁹⁵ The *Third Chimurenga* was then conceived as the struggle to give the land back to the black majority.⁹⁶ In the words of a ZANU-PF election advertisement, "Like life itself, jobs come from the land, not factories which will not be there if the land is not in the hands of the people."⁹⁷ The official denial of the importance of industrialisation belied the fact that the Zimbabwean economy depended on international trade relations and its own internal industrialisation. The land project was utopian in its assertion that it could be the basis of the future Zimbabwean economy. Moore points out that without plans for industrialisation and high wages for the urban proletariat, the 'return of the land' to a mythical peasantry is not progressive.⁹⁸

The Zimbabwe economy is now generally considered, and objectively judged by all standard macro- and micro-economic indicators, to be bankrupt. By 2002, the country was already hugely in debt, only partially and temporarily rescued by the spoils of the DRC war and temporary Libyan oil rescue missions.⁹⁹ Without a rapid economic plan to alleviate hunger, poverty, unemployment, and ensure realistic economic reversal programmes for the large urban centres, land redistribution would not win the time required for adequate numbers of Zimbabweans to feel its benefits.

The low prospects for economic revival could indicate a prolongation of the coercion prevalent in the 2000 to 2002 period. Essential neo-constitutionalist rights would remain suspended. In 2000-2002, ZANU-PF also commenced its project for the reorganisation of civil society. Working through a range of newly constituted civil society organisations such as trade unions, ZANU-PF hoped to supplement its projects of control and destabilisation of existing civil society structures with new alternative organisations.¹⁰⁰ This alternative civil society network would help the ZANU-PF state to move to lower levels of coercion and build the new hegemonic project.¹⁰¹

The longer-term suspension of core aspects of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe was also indicated by the fact that the Zimbabwean economy remained suspended between its integration into neo-liberal globalism and the pronounced 'return to socialism'.¹⁰² Extensive privatisation combined with equally extensive political elite patronage derived from interest-holding in privatised transport, telecommunications, and other industries. Nhema points out that privatisation was not initiated in a context of private sector competitiveness and this negatively affected consumers.¹⁰³ As he further observes that there were few indicators ZANU-PF might be moving away from policies of state capitalism and corporatism.¹⁰⁴ On the one hand, this could mean that despite a lack of public focus, ZANU-PF might be committed to drive both the land and the industrialisation legs of the economy. Alternatively, the fact that Zimbabwe in

recent years has 'de-industrialised' could mean that whilst industrialisation goes into a decline and the land reform project collapses, the extensive economic crisis in Zimbabwe might provide the backdrop for further deconstitutionalisation to aid political survival.

The heads of state of Southern Africa have largely supported the ZANU-PF government in its efforts to keep water and electricity flowing, to find relative approval of electoral outcomes, and to provide a cordon of support against the Western world that insisted on orderly, lawful, and gradual land reform.¹⁰⁵ One of the donor preconditions for support of land reform was that funds for 'orderly' land reform would not be released unless there was a return to the *Land Reform and Resettlement Programme* which Zimbabwe had agreed to in 1998. This agreement had specified conditions for land reform and transfer that included adherence to the rule of law, stakeholder involvement, and full compensation. Land talks with the British government collapsed on the eve of the 2000 election, when Zimbabwe refused to return to the 1998 agreement. At a September 2000 summit in Windhoek, SADC leaders endorsed Zimbabwe's land reform programme.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

This article has analysed how the ZANU-PF government of Zimbabwe in the period of 1999-2002 used a complex combination of constitutional-legal and paralegal-supraleagal measures in conducting elections and reclaiming liberation movement zeal.

On the first tier of analysis, this article emphasised the ZANU-PF government's determination to create the semblance of constitutionalism and legality, of procedural democracy, of adherence and loyalty to 'multi-party democracy'. On the second tier, however, there was an extensive reliance on the paralegal and the abrogation of fundamental rights to organise and oppose, and the denial of the constitutional right to personal security. The ZANU-PF government defended the paralegal, supraleagal, and constitutional executive power excesses on the basis of its actions being lodged in the constitutional and the legal. The question arose as to the motivation for such an elaborate and concealing edifice of constitutionalism and legality.

The analysis assessed the labyrinth of interconnections between elections, land, and electoral retention of political power. An elaborate network of constitutional and legal measures was used to effect what usually would be regarded as unconstitutional, oppressive, and dictatorial. As the details of this network unfolded in the analysis, and as the effects of the measures emerged, it became clear that ZANU-PF had effected its own political survival. Through its appeals to being a constitutional multiparty democracy and having used the land campaign to effect post-colonial land justice, ZANU-PF had constructed a defence of its power which will take a substantial period - possibly an electoral term or longer - to disentangle. Through this constitutional-paralegal combination, ZANU-PF had survived a trilogy of electoral and opposition movement assaults. It had ensured that dislodging the party in the post 2002 period would be a complex and daunting endeavour.

The ZANU-PF government weighed in with an approximately equal balance between the constitutional-legal and paralegal-coercive in the two domains of elections and land. Its action in the domain of land, however, gained added immunity from African and other international sanctions through its twin appeals to continued resistance against colonialist intervention and

post-colonial land justice. The fact that some land justice had been effected, even if it had been through extra-legal and coercive measures, created a forceful legitimation of a regime that had been re-elected in a constitutionally and legally dubious manner. The great dilemma for Zimbabwe, and for many other post-colonial or neo-colonially occupied states, is to decide whether there are circumstances in which contemporary manifestations of collective and social group rights of restitution to the dispossessed should prevail over adherence to constitutional and legal procedure and justice - *if* the former cannot be achieved by means of the latter. The jury is out on whether the two had been mutually exclusive in the case of Zimbabwe 1999-2002, or whether it had been a contrived incompatibility in the name of retention of political power.

Epilogue

By March 2003, the evidence was abundant that multiple pressures were mounting on the Mugabe regime. There was, for instance, a stream of reports of negotiated efforts to get Mugabe to hand power to a ZANU-PF successor, evidence of behind-the-scenes negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDC, the refusal by the MDC to disband its legal challenge to the 2002 election, signs of South African and Nigerian vacillation in upholding an undiluted defence of the Mugabe regime, a rapidly escalating collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, and continuous exposure of human rights violations by intelligence, security and paramilitary forces. These pressures started penetrating the cordon of invincible legality and constitutionalism, which had carried the Mugabe government through the trilogy of electoral challenges. Yet, the effect of the pressures remained uncertain and the stalemate continued. Given the political and economic exhaustion of both the MDC and the general population, combined with hunger, unemployment, and reports of fragmentation of the MDC, a range of outcomes remained possible. Possible outcomes included an internal ZANU-PF succession, Mugabe clinging to power for the rest of his presidential term, or an African-mediated cooperative interim government. By early 2003, however, a new resolution remained a distant prospect, given the intractability of the complex constitutional, legal and security entrenchment of ZANU-PF.

Notes:

1. Quoted in Shivji, I.G. (ed.) "State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic Perspective". *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1991, p. 28
2. Shivji, 1991: 46.
3. Mamdani, M. "Social movements and constitutionalism in the African context". In Shivji, I. G. (ed.) *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1991.
4. Shivji, 1991: 27.
5. Shivji, 1991.
6. See Mamdani, 1991, & Shivji, 1991.
7. Mamdani, 1991: 241.

8. Makumbe, J. M. "Electoral Procedures and Processes in Zimbabwe". In Sichone, O. (ed.) *The State and Constitutionalism in Southern Africa*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1998.
9. Ibid: 64. In the 1990 election, ZUM attacked ZANU-PF for its record on land distribution, contending that the constraints that were imposed were not the sole explanation for failure to meet targets. See Sachikonye, L. "The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: A Post-Mortem." *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 48: 93-99, 1990.
10. Quoted in Mandaza, I. "Perspectives on Armed Struggle and Constitutionalism: The Zimbabwe Model. In Shivji I. G. (ed.) *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1991: p. 71.
11. Act 15 of 1987, which abolished the "white roll seats" from parliament.
12. Act 23 of 1987 created the executive presidency (which meant that the president could appoint top officials in government and, in effect, placed the president above the law) and Act 31 of 1989, respectively. Sithole, 2001: 161 comments on the fact that the combination of an executive presidency and strong governing party control over the legislature led to an "excessively powerful" presidency.
13. Mandaza, 1986: 39
14. Ironically, Zimbabwe emerged out of the period of constitutional constraints when it was already submerged in the constraints wrought by agreements with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).
15. Makumbe, 1998
16. See Amendment No. 7, Section 30(1) Subsection (2).
17. Makumbe, 1998: 68
18. Ihonvbere, J. "Constitution-making and Constitutionalism in Post-Colonial Africa. *SAPEM*. August/September: 46-48, 2000.
19. For a discussion of Section 151, see Ncube, 1994:13. One of the implications is that the president could even declare election results null and void and still be constitutionally correct. The regulatory powers of the president are described in EISA, 2000: 30.
20. See Makumbe, 1998
21. Ibid
22. For the regulations regarding their appointment, see *EISA Handbook*, 2000.
23. Mandaza 1995.
24. Freeman points out that ZANU-PF's approach to the 2000 election had been unsurpassed in this genre of electoral intervention. See Freeman, L. "Gulliver in Southern Africa: South Africa and Zimbabwe in the Post-apartheid Era". Paper delivered at the University of Natal (Durban), 2001.
25. See NCA Supplement, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 10 March 2002 for a detailed exploration of the build-up of repressive legislation on the eve of the March 2002 election. See the Electoral Amendment Bill and Statutory Instruments 41A-F for full details of the formulation of these extensions, and compare these amendments and instruments with the retracted General Laws Amendment Act for the details on how the amendments and instruments virtually replace the General Laws Amendment Act, through a route which could still uphold the provisions in time for election day 2000.

26. Africa over the years has had relatively positive experiences with one-partyism. Such examples are cited as Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Cameroon and Tanzania. Most African states ruled by either one party or the military, however, have not fared as well. Analysts also point out that the transitions to multi-partyism themselves are characterised by boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, violence, etc. See Songmin & Jiang, 1992: 13-16. Also see Mandaza & Sachikonye, 1991. See also Lewis Machipisa, "Mugabe plans to return to his socialist roots", *Business Day*, 16 October 2001.
27. Sylvester, C. "Whither Opposition in Zimbabwe?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33: 407-423, p. 406
28. Ibid
29. Holland, S. Panel discussion. Conference of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific. University of Western Australia, Perth. 26-29 November 1999.
30. Mugabe, R. G. Address at rally, Rufare Stadium, Harare, 23 June 2000.
31. Raftopoulos, B. Interview. Harare. 11 March 2002.
32. See *EIU Country Report*, March 2001: 14-15
33. See Mottiar, S. "Effects of the New Zimbabwean Legislation on the Prospects for a Free and Fair Election." <http://www.org.za/WEP/zimbabwe-mot-1.htm>. 25 February 2002.
34. Sithole, S. and Makumbe, J. "Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) Hegemony and the Incipient Decline". *African Journal of Political Science*, 2(1), 1998.
35. The details below should be seen as summaries and illustrations of the state and election actions to which the paper refers. Because of the important, but contested, nature of much of the electoral practices of ZANU-PF, the rest of this section provides as much detail as possible within constraints of space.
36. *Southern African Reports*, 5 January 2002, p. 7
37. Alternately, they have been called the "Green Shirts", or the "Green Bombers". Amnesty International, 2000 provides an overview of terror tactics in the run-up to the 2000 elections. The report also focuses on the range of rights that were infringed.
38. Freeman, L. 2001
39. See M. Sayagues in *Mail and Guardian*, 1 July 2000.
40. South African observer, Interview, *Die Burger*, 15 March 2002.
41. For example, in Glenview 3 Shopping Centre, Budiriro constituency, Personal observation by the author, 10 March 2002.
42. See *Jo-Ann McGregor e-newsletter*, 8 February 2002, regarding similar occurrences in Chivhu.
43. Personal voter interviews Avondale and Glenview; *The Daily News*, 12 February 2002
44. These figures are all dwarfed by the Z\$19,8 billion in requested food aid, as requested by Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Simba Makoni, from the UNDP in *The Mirror*, 12 November 2001. A further Z\$14,4 billion would come from the Zimbabwean government.
45. Sachikonye, L. Address to a meeting of the Mass Public Opinion Institute, Monomotapa Hotel, Harare. 7 March 2002.
46. Mass Public Opinion Institute meeting, 7 March 2002.

47. Crisis Alert, 22 February 2002, p. 6 also published a list of 77 recorded youth paramilitary training bases. Also see *Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Briefing paper* No. 5: 2-3.
48. *Special Assignment*, SABC, 6 March 2002.
49. Booyesen. S. "Multi-stage Monitoring and Declaring Elections Free and Fair: The June 2000 Zimbabwe Election." *Journal of African Elections*. Vol. 1 (2), 2002a.
50. See *Special Assignment*, SABC, 5 March 2002; and *Zimbabwe Independent*, 8 March 2002.
51. Clemency Order No. 1 of 2000. The Human Rights Forum estimated that 90% of human rights violations that occurred during the election were pardoned. By November 2000 a total of 111 individuals who had been implicated had been released. The MMPZ, 2001: 42 reported that 90% of the more than 1000 violent incidents were attributable to ZANU-PF supporters.
52. Ruhanya, P. "MDC wins poll case." In *J. McGregor Newsletter*, 28 February 2002.
53. Interview Elaine Raftopoulos, former ESC chairperson (sidelined days before the 2000 election, after questioning government actions regarding ESC operations), June 2000.
54. Mhanda, W. Interview, Harare. 12 March 2002. (Mhanda is the leader of the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform and former commander of the ZIPA group).
55. *ZHR NGO Forum*, 2002
56. *Zimbabwe Independent*, 8 March 2002.
57. *BBC World*, 17 September 2001, reported on this dimension of inclusion and exclusion in Zimbabwean politics.
58. *ZHR*, 2002.
59. Ibid
60. Mudede, T. 1 March 2002. *Face the Nation*. Interview on ZBC.
61. *EISA Briefing Document*, May 2000
62. *Zimbabwe Independent*, 8 March 2002. Renewed contestation of figures on the size of the March 2002 electorate emerged in early 2003. Census data then revealed the size of the Zimbabwean population as 11,6 million. An electorate of 5,6 million means that 48,28% of Zimbabwe's population is over 18 years of age and eligible to vote. See *Daily News*, 10 March 2003.
63. *The Daily News*, 21 June 2000
64. Combined Harare Residents' Association. Introductory speech. Harare, 5 March 2002.
65. Personal observation by author, 10-11 March 2002.
66. Personal observation, 26 June 2000; Also see Booyesen, 2001.
67. See *ZHR*, 2002.
68. *Election Bulletin 2*, 2002.
69. See *ZHR*, 2002: 6
70. For a comparison of Mugabe's urban versus rural election campaign of March 2002, see *Moto*, March 2002. The analysis points out that Mugabe was not intending to give up power - despite leading Zimbabwe through a futile one-party state, and the disastrous ESAP with its massive inflation and the DRC project, which finished off the ailing economy.

71. Interviews with shop-owners in Mufakose, March 2002; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 10 March 2002.
72. For details on the alleged plot, see Jo-Ann McGregor e-newsletter, 15 February 2002; ZBC 1 special broadcast, Sunday 3 March 2002. For other examples of charges against the opposition leadership, see *EIU Country Report*, March 2001: 13.
73. Raftopoulos, 2002.
74. Raftopoulos, B. "The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe." Paper. Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, 2001, p. 16.
75. Ibid
76. Booyesen. S. "Multi-stage Monitoring and Declaring Elections Free and Fair: The June 2000 Zimbabwe Election." *Journal of African Elections*. Vol. 1 (2), 2002a; Booyesen. S. "In the Crossfire of Zimbabwe's War for Political Survival". *Africa Insight*. Vol. 32(3), 2002b; (also see Pottie, D. "Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe, 2000." *Journal of African Elections*. Vol. 1(1): 61-70, 2001)
77. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, 1 November 2001: 14628-9.
78. See *Irin News*, 8 February 2002
79. For instance the South African Observer Mission; see *Sunday Times*, 17 March 2002.
80. The land reform process was controlled out of the office of President Mugabe, bringing together the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), senior officials of ZANU-PF, provincial governors, senior army officers (led by General Perence Shiri and retired Brigadier Ben Matanga), top police officers and the Liberation War Veterans" Association (first under the late Chenjerai Hunzvi, and later led by Joseph Chinotimba). The implementation forces comprised large numbers of war veterans and associated forces that in 2000 included the so-called "thug-forces" of unemployed Zimbabweans that were recruited from the ranks of the unemployed, party officials, and provincial governors. In many instances, security forces supplied active and passive (guarantees of no intervention) back-up. Also see S. Moyo, 2003: 59-75.
81. Ankomah provides an exposition of the ZANU-PF justifications of and figures on officials and government ministers that have benefited ("less than 10%"). See Ankomah, B. "Righting Colonial Wrongs". *The Sunday Mail*, 10 March 2002. Also see *Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition*, 2003.
82. Quoted in Raftopoulos, 2001: 1
83. Raftopoulos, 2001: 1
84. Noko, E. Interview. June 2000. Noko is Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ZANU-PF.
85. For more details, see Moore, 2000; 2001. In the referendum, ZANU-PF's draft constitution was defeated by 697,754 to 578,210 votes (54,7% versus 45,3% of the votes).
86. For the official forecasts of increased food production on the basis of land resettlement, see *Africa Confidential*, 10 August 2001:5). In contrast, in the late 2001 budget speech, it was noted that the agricultural sector would undergo a major decline -- of 12,2%, as opposed to the earlier estimate of 9,5%. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, 16 October 2001: 14968.

87. Mandaza, 2002 noted in analysing the March 2002 election trends that constituency swings from MDC (2000) to ZANU-PF (2002) have occurred in a number of regions that had benefited from land reform.
88. Raftopoulos, 2001: 11
89. *The Herald*, 03 July 2001
90. The purpose of the Bill was to restrict or suspend, for a certain period, legal proceedings for the eviction of occupiers of rural land who by 1 March 2001 occupied land in anticipation of being resettled and would still be occupying that land at the time of the enactment of the Bill. See *Extraordinary Government Gazette*, April 2000.

91. Parliamentary Debates, 2001: 7311.
92. *Zimbabwe Standard*, 15 July 2001.
93. Freeman, 2001
94. *EIU Country Report*, December 2001: 13; *Africa Confidential*, 23 November 2001.
95. Noko, 2000
96. *The People's Voice*, 23 February 2002.
97. *The Herald*, 4 March 2002.
98. Moore, D. "The Zimbabwe Crisis: An Original Twist on the Problem of Primitive Accumulation, State Formation and the Universalisation of Property Rights in the Era of Neo-liberal Globalisation". Paper, African Association of Political Science. Fort Hare, 2000. See also Moore, D. "Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land? Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19 (2): 253-266, 2001; Moyo, S. "The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe: 1990-1999," *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 26(1): 1-28, 2000; and Kinsey, B. "Land reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging evidence from Zimbabwe's Resettlement Programme", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25,2: 173-96, 2000.
99. This contrasts with evidence of individual enrichment of Zimbabwean officials and politicians. See *Southern Africa Report*, 18 January 2002; *Africa Confidential*, 20 April 2001; Venter, 2000: 2-3.
100. Nhema, A. G. *Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2002. See also Saunders, R. "Never the Same Again: Zimbabwe's Growth Towards Democracy, 1980-2000. Harare: Edwina Spicer Productions, 2000.
101. Raftopoulos, 2002
102. See Machipise, L. "Mugabe plans to return to his socialist roots", *Business Day*, 16 October 2001.
103. Similarly, price controls were instituted by the ZANU-PF government in the face of scarcities of principal, mass consumer foodstuffs. But control could not ensure supply.
104. Nhema, 2002
105. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa has, on several occasions refrained from criticising the Zimbabwe land strategy, emphasising that the problem is, first and foremost, the issue of the land. See, for example, *Southern Africa Report*, 26 April 2000:1. Also see Booyesen, 2002b.

106. Freeman, 2001 points out that the representatives of Southern Africa ruling parties met in October 2000 to “plot strategies to reinvigorate the glory of past struggles against colonial and white minority rule.”

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Zimbabwe's Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation-State Formation and Democratization in the Age of Neo-Liberal Globalization

DAVID MOORE

Abstract: This paper utilizes classical and 'modernization' theoretical perspectives on primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratization to analyze the 'conjunctural' aspects of the current Zimbabwean crisis. Taking a structural perspective on the long-term factors, the paper provides the context to the violence-ridden and economically devastating current crisis of land reform, elections, succession, and class-stalemate. It also develops an analysis of 'medium' term factors such as years of structural adjustment. Written just after, and taking into account the March 2002 Presidential elections, the paper concludes that strengthening democracy is essential for the resolution of structural socio-economic problems—even though such an assertion may appear to be a 'voluntarist' solution to a structural problem.

"The Land is the Economy and the Economy is the Land" ¹

"This is no ordinary plebiscite ...it is...a crucial defining moment which will determine the direction this nation will take in terms of its sovereignty." ²

"I can't believe we are fighting again for the right to vote." ³

The above quotes signify three perspectives on what might be called the 2000-2002 Zimbabwean election. ⁴ They bring together the conjunctural 'events' of the 'long election' (which in itself contains elements of succession crisis within the ruling party), the land invasions, and the struggles involving 'sovereignty' around them. They reflect the long term crises of transition—those of 'primitive accumulation,' nation-state formation, and democratization—faced by all 'developing' societies (or societies 'becoming capitalist,' however unevenly and haltingly so). This merger of transitions in the *longue dure and les vnements* (or structure and agency) are combined on the terrain of the 'middle term' contextual arena—that of more than a decade of debilitating structural adjustment programs, the specific modalities of

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a2.pdf>

a world (dis)order emerging out of the bipolar Cold War, and the (re)emergence of political opposition and an active civil society in Zimbabwe.⁵ Thus Zimbabwe's state-society complex is facing a condensation and high-lighting of three elements of long-simmering crises and transformation in the context of a collapsed time frame in which two crisis-ridden 'moments' (the middle and the short term) are stacked on top of the structural/historical dimension.⁶ This paper specifies the content and the form— the contour of the conjuncture and the terrain – of Zimbabwe's 'organic crisis.'

The structural or *longue dure* elements of this triple crisis consist of:

a) Primitive accumulation, which encompasses the alteration of pre-capitalist ('communal' and/or feudal) agrarian relations of production to capitalist ones, and the formation of a capitalist class. As Marx is often quoted, capitalism emerges from its preceding modes of production with 'blood dripping from every pore.'

The process of primary accumulation is by no means 'natural' or spontaneous: state force and many other 'non-market' modalities are necessary.⁷ In the 'third world' it may never emerge and thus the blood usually flows more slowly; but the emergence of 'war-torn Africa' suggests a permanently stalemated process of violence in some regions.⁸ At other moments, the process speeds up in a very uneven and contradictory way – also probably with violence. The process is always quite unique in spite of its structural base. Many of its variations can be attributed to the historically specific ways in which a combination of externally 'imposed' and internally developing capitalist social formations 'articulated' with pre-existing modes of production. One may say that primitive accumulation always has 'twists in its tail' and the ideological perspectives accompanying and contesting it will add many twists to its tale.

In Zimbabwe and other African settler-colonial societies, primitive accumulation has identifiable and comparable characteristics—race and the agrarian question. Capitalist agriculture has been dominated by white settlers who carried out their process of primitive accumulation by forcibly taking 'native' land and denying African farmers not merely commercial opportunities, but also a chance to become capitalist land owners.⁹

b) Nation-state construction, which involves the creation of a national 'community' and territorial space accepted by other regional and international 'sovereigns.' This involves both the struggle to create 'imagined communities' out of regionally, ethnically and racially dispersed 'communities' and the metaphorical and real battles for state managers to maintain relative autonomy and gain power *vis vis* their near and far neighbors and non-state— but very powerful— actors in the global political economy.¹⁰

The state managers involved are intricately related to and often part of the bourgeoisie emerging in the process of primitive accumulation. They have complicated alliances with myriad international classes, groups, and agencies. They often condemn their objective allies: hence the many contradictions of 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric from those on the periphery of global capitalism who, on close analysis, collude with their ostensible enemies.

Further complicating the process, especially in Africa, is the legacy of the arbitrarily constructed borders within which 'national' identities are forged. This process obviously has 'local' and 'international' dimensions. In Zimbabwe, the near genocide in Matabeleland in the 1980s could be seen as part of the former, while involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1997 (especially 1998), combined with a renewed anti-imperialist rhetoric, brings in the latter aspects.

c) Democratization, is a process through which power and participation are gradually won by more and more social groups, and (ideally) come to be exercised in mutually agreeable modes of representation and conflict resolution. As Rita Abrahamsen's *Disciplining Democracy* makes clear in the Zambian case, the currently dominant modality of 'democracy' is liberal, and its restrictive purchase does not come near to solving the problems of socio-economic disparity and its own idiosyncrasies encourage 'thin' forms of participation.¹¹ Socio-political analysts may tend to dismiss 'democratization' as a 'superstructural' phenomenon, but this essay contends that in the universal structural-historical sense, as well as its manifestations in the contemporary 'third world,' it has as much impact on transformational processes as primitive accumulation and nation-state formation.

The historical development of powerful working classes often has a strong relationship with 'democracy,' and *vice versa*.¹² The strongest 'democratic' societies thus also have high levels of 'social' democracy. This form of democracy, which combines a universalistic discourse of first-order civil rights with separate judiciary and parliaments, has historically provided a powerful purchase against the authoritarian emerging bourgeoisies common to peripheral social formations undergoing the trials of primitive accumulation and nation-state formation.¹³

Democratization trajectories often lead to violence as opposition is repressed and fights back. Opposition forces also make counterintuitive alliances with international forces and ideologies. One only has to think of the transformation of working class based opposition movements, born in struggles against the travails of structural adjustment in Africa, into political parties espousing neo-liberal ideas. Such realities mean that the issues of sovereignty and primitive accumulation are intricately tied up with 'democratization,' and that one must move on the terrain of the middle level and 'events' to unravel their connections.

This paper will proceed to combine the structural elements of Zimbabwe's crisis with its middle and immediate levels. At an abstract level they can be represented graphically. At the level of narrative these categories can be explicated by expounding upon the quotations at the beginning of the paper.

longue dure	Primitive accumulation, Nation-state formation, Democratisation
Moyen dure	Neo-liberalism, Post-Cold War disorder, Rise of opposition (ZCTU, NCA, MDC)
Les vnements	Land invasions, sovereignty: 'new liberation' & DRC war, election & succession

The components of the crisis are intertwined: an economic crisis is aggravated and catalyzed by more political spheres. That is why the crisis is organic. Its integral nature is revealed if the quotes are unraveled.

PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND LAND: WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIES?

'The land is the economy and the economy is the land' was the main campaign slogan for ZANU (PF) in the parliamentary elections of June 2000. It appeared to celebrate a renewed 'land reform' process coincidental with the post-February constitutional referendum invasions of between 1,000 and 1,600 large scale commercial farms (LSCFs). This was hailed by ruling party propagandists and its supporters as the beginning of the end of a racially skewed agrarian system.¹⁴

By mid-2001 ZANU (PF) claimed to have taken over 3,500 farms on over 3.5 million acres, with 105,000 people resettled in its 'fast-track' land reform process (on the other hand, the Commercial Farmers' Union claimed only 35,000 people had been resettled).¹⁵ Immediately after the 2002 election more commercial farms were invaded. Whether or not the new settlers are the deserving poor, 'war veterans', or the urban unemployed temporarily installed and subsidized by the state and the army as part of a vast intimidation strategy, the fact that the land issue is currently resonant among the people suggests that its historical roots need investigation.¹⁶

The notion of primitive accumulation at least reminds one that a society where half of the population (i.e., over six million people) live in very poor, only partially marketized 'communal land,' while half of its land is 'capitalist' and owned by just over 4,000 people, is prone to conflict.

A potential problem with using the 'primitive accumulation' framework is that it could seem to accentuate a strict piding line between 'capitalist' and 'non-capitalist' forms of tenure, much as the more orthodox discourse speaks of a 'dual sector' in agriculture and even a stark pidge between urban and rural dwellers. Thus one too easily finds clearly demarcated chart-like representations of the land issue in Zimbabwe, like the following, to indicate land pisions before 2000:

- 4,400 LSCF farmers on 11.2 million hectares, averaging over 2,000 hectares each;
- 1 million families or 6.5 million people on 16 million hectares of land in the communal areas (CA);
- 10,000 small scale commercial farmers (mainly black) on 1.2 million hectares;
- 70,000 black resettlement families with 3.5 million hectares; and
- A state farming sector of about 0.5 million hectares.

In contrast, but still remaining within the 'dual sector' discourse (albeit with the 'state' incorporated more definitely, in a clear ideological gesture), the Commercial Farmers' Union's (CFU) statistics suggest a different picture in late 2001:

- 39.6 million hectares of land in total, with 33 million reserved for agriculture and the rest for 'national parks, forests and urban settlement';
- The state owns 22 million hectares out of the 33 million, meaning that it owns sixty-seven per cent of all agricultural land – including communal lands;
- Commercial farmland comprises 11.2 million hectares of which union members had 8.56 million hectares before the current acquisition program;
- The 8.3 million hectares claimed by the state for 'fast-tracking' is over 95% of the 8.56 million hectares previously owned by CFU members;
- CFU membership is less than 3,555 in comparison to 4,500 before September 2001;
- CFU members owned only 20.7% of Zimbabwe's best farmland, contrary to ZANU(PF)'s assertion of seventy per cent;
- There were 7,132 farms listed by September 2001 with '2,335 errors and duplications on the lists of acquisition;'
- 495 were since delisted, while 4,593 were still subject to listing and further action.¹⁷

A 'black and white' view of these abstractions tends to cluster the patterns into 'capitalist' or 'non-capitalist.' Closer studies, however, indicate a high degree of differentiation and a multitude of 'ownership' and control patterns in the CAs. As Blair Rutherford's finely textured study of farm workers reveals, many of these 'rural proletarians' all but own *misha* in the supposedly 'communal' areas (and many of them are not exactly sure whether or not they paid a 'chief,' a kraal-head or a ZANU (PF) official for it) and many of them employ wage laborers. To further complicate the bifurcated discourse, he found that a significant number in his survey of CA 'owners' were actually born outside Zimbabwe.¹⁸

As Beacon Mbiba notes, even in the minority-rule era, 'there was (is) a 20-30 per cent core group "owning land" (but without freehold title)' in addition to the very small, but more famous, owners of land in the Native Purchase Areas (the 10,000 small scale commercial farmers on 1.2 million hectares noted above).¹⁹ Other writers note that in the CAs, title is 'invested' in the resident but is in fact a mix of customary and 'state defined tenure.' Farmers usually inherit 2 hectares of land, 0.5 hectares of which are homestead sites that can be sold due to the infrastructure on them — or, as Rutherford puts it, according the 'labor' put into them. Grazing and woodlands are 'communal.' Although the state has *de jure* ownership of the land, the authority for land transfer is most often a kraal-head or a 'chief,' but the rise of Village Development Councils (VIDCOs) has sometimes placed a ZANU (PF) member in new positions of responsibility.²⁰

In post-1980 resettled areas, resettlement officers are supposed to handle issues of land transfer and even expel farmers if they do not maintain good farming practice or other standards of 'good behavior.'²¹ On LSCFs it should be noted that many of the paternalistic patterns of domination and control — but also of 'obligation' in many cases — between owners and workers, such as reduced farm-shop prices and extensive credit arrangements, are more akin to 'feudalism' than to strictly defined bourgeois-worker relations.

In the post-2000 invaded areas, there is considerable debate about 'who owns what.' In some cases certificates are given to people who are able to negotiate for them with the appropriate 'war veteran' but in most cases the 'settlers' have a most indeterminate form of

tenure.²² According to one source, some invaded farms are pided up into sections under the control of war vets who then bring in 'settlers' from their own parts of the country. The war vet in charge of each group receives intermittent payments from the army or the WVA headquarters, which he may or may not distribute to his wards. On one farm, the senior war vet did not receive payment for months. The white farmer then hired him as a security guard.²³

The existence of varieties of land tenure by no means invalidates the concept of primitive accumulation since this transformation is a protracted process, taking years and involving *political* struggle as well as much state intervention.²⁴ Perhaps Arrighi's 'classical' text on Zimbabwean political economy also signposts the same phenomenon: he chronicled the 'semi-proletarian' status of Africans in the Rhodesian social formation many years ago.²⁵ As Mark Duffield warns us about the *moyens dure*, current efforts to 'liberalize' the world economy are leading to 'non-liberal' (indeed war-dominated) modes of production in its 'hinterlands.'²⁶

Therefore, the question to ask is whether or not current land restructuring efforts in Zimbabwe lead to the fulfillment of the whole primitive accumulation process in that country. That is, do they lead to an urban proletarianization of rural dwellers as well as the commodification of agrarian social relations? The answer is, no.

For this transformation to take place, industrialization is needed to accompany a process of agrarian restructuring. If not, the process of capitalist differentiation will go in one of two directions. It will either take a long process of 'spontaneous' transfer of agricultural surplus product into urban-industrial 'sectors', with the peasants losing out in the struggle for agrarian accumulation to working class positions in the cities. Alternatively, it could lead to a semi-subsistence stalemate, and the 'urban-rural' gap, blurred in interminable survival strategies, will remain more or less permanent.²⁷

Current debates in Zimbabwe highlight the different interests involved in this transformation. One 'bourgeois' approach (aside from the *white* bourgeoisie!) to the current efforts at land reform is clear enough. It calls for the state to legalize the privatization of the new settlements as soon as possible. The Affirmative Action Group (AAG)—one of the original lobby groups representing what the emergent black bourgeoisie—has called for the state to 'issue title deeds to thousands of resettled farmers to enable them to fully develop their properties, saying that it is 'pointless' for the government to continue with the 'fast-track' reform without the "necessary documentation to prove one's claim to the piece of land."²⁸ In response, the 'government' was reported as having approached financial institutions to provide guaranteed housing loans (no mention was made about credit for farming inputs).²⁹

However, a conference in March 2002 of the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC), a competing 'economic empowerment' organization, avoided AAG's clarity on tenure.³⁰ Its vice-president, an insurance executive, said that the conference's theme 'Economic Empowerment is Land' was to create awareness among its members about the implications of land reform for their success or lack thereof. He criticized foreign sanctions, and linking them to ideas of the *dependencia* approach, he argued that Zimbabwe's raw materials are being exported to Western countries only to be refined and then imported at exorbitant prices. He therefore proposed a total indigenization of the country.

The president of the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) was more cautious in his praise for fast track land reform, suggesting its goals should be sustainable food production

at a cost affordable to the general populace, that private and public sectors ensure farmers produce adequate raw materials for local industries and sufficient volumes of exportable goods. However, he too was vague about land tenure. It took until the end of the conference for one executive to declare that long leases should be given to the farmers so that they could be used as security for loans from financial institutions.³¹

Thus, even the emerging accumulating class seems to be disconcerted by the current conjuncture. They see problems with the present policies, but also wish to continue their good relations with the party-state apparatus that has muddied the waters.³² Meanwhile, the already entrenched party-state bourgeoisie has ensured that in the new dispensation they will be allocated at least ten per cent of the new lands.³³

Presenting the 'traditional' point of view on agrarian social relations, an appointed member of parliament, Chief Jonathan Mangwende, said in October 2001 that the land resettlement program was not decongesting the overpopulated rural areas because the chiefs were not being given their due recognition in the process. He claimed that the names of people for the resettlement program should come from the chiefs, but this had not happened. He pointed out that one of the clauses in the constitutional drafts, circulated by ZANU (PF) in its late 1999 efforts, advised that chiefs should be in charge of all resettlement.³⁴ Perhaps ZANU (PF)'s pre-2002 election promises to hire new secretaries for traditional authorities and to equip them with e-mail was enough to re-convince them to support the ruling party.

As the previous words on the relationship between land and industrialization have suggested, discussion of 'primitive accumulation' cannot end with agrarian relations alone. It must also focus on the formation of a 'bourgeoisie' in its agrarian, 'comprador,' financial, and industrial forms. It needs to take into account its relationship with the state and classes of a similar ilk at the international level.

One must also ask how structural adjustment programs, that have stripped Zimbabwe's once healthy education system, have made fertile ground for the armed force's head to build a private primary school.³⁵ The war vets, too, must be considered as an 'interest group' – with hierarchical gradations and corruption patterns potentially leading to class differentiation – with a special relationship to the state that has turned into an avenue for accumulation as well as purely 'political' power.³⁶ In general, it would appear that a bourgeoisie which might have been on the road to a productive and industrially-based accumulation in the early to mid-1980s has been turned by neo-liberal policies and authoritarianism into one based on financial speculation, war economies, and the plundering of historically alienated agricultural spaces, but it will take much more investigation to determine its exact contours.

One can conclude this section on 'primitive accumulation' with the following proposition. It appears that the racial structural flaw in the process of primitive accumulation (the *longue dure*), while possibly on the way to gradual amelioration with the 1980s reforms, came to a halt with a combination of externally imposed structural adjustment programs and donor disenchantment. This transformed the internal ruling group, which forgot its liberation war rhetoric, and instead dropped the alliances and ideological affinities adopted during that struggle.³⁷ This *moyen dure* process came to a halt and turned into a 'crisis of events' when the economic consequences of neo-liberalism (for example, debt and de-industrialization) and the rise of strong opposition (partially created by them) led to a faltering of ZANU (PF) leadership's

alliance with the 'war veterans.'³⁸ This alliance was sealed in August 1997 when the veterans' were awarded a lump sum of Z\$50,000 and monthly pensions of Z \$2,000, with promises to resurrect land reform (twenty per cent of which would go to members of the WVLA).³⁹ The cost was in the range of Z\$4.5 billion.

When added to many more billions siphoned out of parastatal corporations in the preceding few years, the fiscal strain led to 'Black Friday' in October 1997, when the Zimbabwean dollar lost seventy-five per cent of its value.⁴⁰ From there on, event piled upon event to add chaos to the conjuncture. Over 1,400 farms were slated for acquisition but were soon delisted. The Kabila regime was supported against the 'rebels', the Rwandans and the Ugandans. Promises of donor money for the new land reform program were reneged upon. What was then only an oppositional social movement formalized into the MDC.

The failure of the February 2000 constitutional referendum pushed Robert Mugabe (and perhaps a group of *mafikizolo*, or 'those who came yesterday,' aspirants to ZANU(PF)'s leadership) even further into alliance with the 'war vets' and some peasants who were sporadically invading LSCFs.⁴¹ But such chronicles or events fail to differentiate their structural and historical roots. Another lens through which they can be viewed is the way Zimbabwe's rulers have responded to the many challenges to their sovereignty.

NATION-STATE FORMATION: SOVEREIGNTY AND COMMUNITY LOST AND REGAINED?

On the issue of state-building and sovereignty, the 'land is the economy' discourse is intricately related to the Zimbabwean ruling group's ostensible desire to free itself from a neo-colonial relationship to white farmers, Britain, and 'western imperialism' in general (while also wishing to avail itself of its avenues to conspicuous consumption).⁴² The support of regional and third world leaders can also be garnered in this fashion. The chess-board of international relations is a component part of ZANU (PF)'s tactics and strategies. Thus, the rhetoric against whites in Zimbabwe and Tony Blair and his "gang of gay gangsters" can be understood as a discursive effort to rebuild a fading hegemonic project, using the international backdrop.

Recourse to the faade of state sovereignty through patriotism and 'traditional' values is nothing new, of course, but it takes on almost hysterical tones in an age where 'globalization' has changed the language of 'progressive alternatives' to neo-liberalism well beyond the boundaries that it has irrevocably altered.⁴³ Those who challenge the reconstruction of this discourse are referred to as 'puppets' and 'enemies of the people' mobilizing armies on the borders of a re-sanctified territory.⁴⁴


The formation of a cohesive nation-state is one of the historical tasks of 'modernity' as defined by classical political and sociological theory, and it is not granted without violence and dastardliness.⁴⁵ The question — posed by both *dependencia* and conservative theorists — is whether or not it can be constructed in the 'third world'.⁴⁶

Contemporary structuralist accounts tend to say that for Africa, if the process of nation-state formation was progressing during the sixties and seventies, it was halted with the advent of structural adjustment policies.⁴⁷ If Zimbabwe is an example of a *failed* structural adjustment project — and even the *failed* efforts of global democratizers in their NGO and state-led forms —

we may be witnessing the revival of an authoritarian populist anti-imperialism in tandem with a regional imperialism. This is manifested in the Zimbabwean involvement in the DRC (itself a nation-state in an awkward process of construction) in competition with Uganda and Rwanda. Libyan 'support' in the form of oil for Zimbabwe swapped for real estate, is another example of 'mini-imperialisms' in the fray.

Thus we arrive at the *Herald's* quote on the dawn of the election, defined as: "a crucial defining moment which will determine the direction which this nation will take in terms of its sovereignty." These words bring the whole election down to a battle against 'recolonization' by 'the west' – especially by the former colonial power. The United Kingdom is said to be pulling the strings of its puppet, the MDC. An example of this discourse is a ZANU (PF) newspaper advertisement consisting of a cartoon portraying 'Tsvangison' dressed as a tea-boy serving Tony 'Bliar' (sic) a map of Zimbabwe in a cup. The tea-boy asks Blair, "Is this what you want to have on March 9 & 10, Baas?" Blair responds, "Yes, yes, my boy Morgan, but keep some for the EU, Australia and Canada." Under the cartoon are the bold, upper case phrases:

TSVANGISON AND HIS SELLOUTS THINK ZIMBABWE IS TEA



- DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR BIRTHRIGHT
- DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR HERITAGE
- DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR SOUL
- DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR COUNTRY
- DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR LAND

ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN!

ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM



ZANU PF



Tel: 753329 Fax: 752388 Email: zanupf@africaonline.co.zw Websites: www.zanupf.com zanupfpub.co.zw

Another example of a sovereignty discourse aimed at Zimbabweans can be found in the party/state run *The People's Voice*, which started as a rural mouthpiece for ZANU (PF) in the early 1980s. In an edition full of the president's portraits and wishes for a happy 78th birthday paid for by various parastatals, a two-page article by the secretary for administration of ZANU (PF) Harare province, runs through the anti-imperialist trope. "Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his life-long fight against British imperial perfidy," starts off with:

Britain, the country that perfected the art of imperial domination into a science is engaged in a do or die tussle with Cde Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe. It has been hurling whatever weapon it can lay its hands on as it tries to remove him from power. It is armed with a sinister arsenal that it has amassed from its years of over-lordship of other countries, many of them much bigger than Zimbabwe. It also has a veritable phalanx of kith and kin allies in former dominions, a shared lingua franca with America, the only world power that remains as well as the close racial affinities of Germanic northern Europe.

The target of all this imperial froth and venom is Cde Robert Mugabe, a ferociously intellectual African with unbending pride and unshakable belief that the Black race shall once again have its encounter with destiny as it overcomes the blight of slavery and the violent alienation of colonialism.⁴⁸

This discourse is different from the liberation war days of *Zanu News*. Then, Scandinavians and anti-apartheid solidarity groups across 'Germanic northern Europe' and other western spaces gave considerable support to ZANU (PF) keeping its rhetoric on an even keel. This 2002 version, however, is much more 'communitarian' in its racial language, while at the same time melding the individual leader with the destiny of the nation-state.

The article goes on to praise the president for single-handedly stabilizing a "mortally threatened" Mozambique, being "the stalwart of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa until its eventual demise" (thus forgetting the antagonism between newly independent Zimbabwe and the ANC, such that even Thabo Mbeki was a guest of Chikurubi prison), and for "helping preserve the sovereignty of the pivotal Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the process thwart[ing] a misguided British attempt to encircle Zimbabwe." Mugabe is credited with building a modern African nation – an "anvil upon which British imperialism has painfully knocked its head" – "to a level that is yet to be attained by any African country" (and this for a nation that has only three million, the article says). It is hard to know how many Zimbabweans were convinced by this rhetoric. Placed against a history of 'ethnic cleansing' in the mid-1980s in Matabeleland, the wounds of which are still open, it seems inadequate to the task of nation-building.

Judging by the actions of regional states and people in the aftermath of the Abuja agreement, it has some international and continental purchase, however – including with the president of South Africa.⁴⁹ Strains of pan-Africanist discourse on the Zimbabwean situation have also spread to the USA. A group of 'concerned Howard University students' submitted an article to the *Herald* declaring their solidarity with "the very popular Pan-Africanist Cde Mugabe and his party" fighting "western countries who are worried about maintaining white supremacy ... giv[ing] funding to an oppositional leader", and calling for a massive campaign in the USA to end the sanctions.⁵⁰

Aside from the discourse on sovereignty and Pan-Africanism, the spending on the international sovereignty-boosting DRC exercise has had a more substantial impact. The Zimbabwean state, military, and financial complex has gambled heavily and time alone will tell if the shares in the DRC's mines will bear much revenue. In the meantime, 10,000 to 13,000 troops demand upkeep. While the economy bears the costs, some of the generals and their kin who own transport and textile companies, are the immediate beneficiaries. It may be of importance to note that the first 'sanction' on Zimbabwe was IMF's refusal to continue operations when it detected improper accounting on war expenditure.

It is likely that as the DRC war festers, the 'warlordism' accompanying that process may infect Zimbabwe too. Increased militia style attacks on farms and MDC supporters suggest this possibility. Nation-building may be confused with exclusionary violence.⁵¹ As the literature on war-torn Africa suggests, the combination of structural adjustment ravaged political economies and authoritarian politicians is potent. Whether democratization processes are a counter-tendency is an open question.

DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT IS THE FIGHT FOR?

On the 'democratization' stage, many observers see the 'land question' as but an election winning ploy for ZANU (PF). Those who are implementing it, however, operate at another level. For them, the language of land rights challenges that of civil society and the opposition. First order rights are seen as the preserve of the bourgeoisie, while substantive social rights, of which land is the most basic, is made out to be the legacy of the liberation war.

If one took the ZANU (PF) discourse seriously, the 'long election' was about countering the empty western and liberal rhetoric of 'freedom to sleep under a bridge or in the Carleton Hotel' with socio-economic freedom in the form of land to the tiller and price controls for the urban consumer. It is ironic then, that the man who in the mid-1970s challenged Mugabe and the ZANU 'old guard' from the left (and for so doing was placed in Mozambican jails for three years) was articulating the classic language of bourgeois liberalism. "Here we are, twenty-two years later, still fighting for the right to vote. The whole country fought for this in the bush, and we still have not got it".⁵² Most objective observers contend that voters were kept away from their Harare area polling stations and others added to the rural rolls in the last few weeks of registration, that intimidation accounted for a lot of the absentees, and around a million Zimbabweans living outside the country were disallowed from the polls. If these people had voted for the MDC, the 420,000 or so votes separating the 'winners' from the 'losers' would be accounted for and the election could indeed be seen as 'stolen.' But just as importantly for Wilfred Mhanda and the other members of the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform, one of the key goals of the liberation war – democracy – was still-born two decades after an ostensible victory for 'majority rule.'

Conservative historians of the *longue dure* might contend that such goals in the 'third world' are premature. As Samora Machel condemned young Marxists for being 'ultra-leftist, Trotskyist and infantile', in the 1970s, so might a structuralist today caution patience on the democratic front. After all, if Zimbabwe is barely approaching a feudal mode of political rule – in which problems of leadership succession have society-wide consequences – or if an absolutist

state is needed to manage an unevenly articulated transition to modernity, is it not too early for too much democracy?⁵³

Is not the *Herald's* editorial correct to note that "while our democracy is in its infancy the people...have demonstrated maturity" – except for the 'spoilers' funded by the west, who are in any case planning a civil war if their expectations are not met.⁵⁴ Should not 'the west' and its Zimbabwean civil society clones be patient (perhaps in the meantime accepting a government of national unity, imposed from above – and also outside – so that a form of lite pacting could ease the transition to democracy along)?

If such discourse had any purchase at all it could be taken up by ZANU (PF), but its language also accepts the modalities of 'western' democracy: it is simply hypocritical about this in its claims that challenges to its rule emanate from the imperialists.⁵⁵ All sides to the debate agree that all adult Zimbabwean citizens should have the right to choose their rulers – the minimum condition of liberal democracy. However, there is an argument – and it was put forth by the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform as civil society groups and the MDC hammered out their approach to the election – that by accepting participation in an election that was flawed from the beginning (because it did not meet the SADC minimal condition of an independent electoral commission), the MDC fated itself to failure. It would have been better to refuse to participate in elections that did not meet the minimal conditions of *African* neighbors. Consistent with this line is the argument that the results of the 2002 presidential election should be declared null and void. New ones should be called that will meet basic regional standards. Finding the *international* support for such demands will be extremely difficult – as will finding the stamina in civil society.

Nevertheless, such expansionary perspectives on democracy forestall efforts of lite pacting and slow down grass-roots political participation. In the end, democratic pressure on all aspects of the state and economy is the only way to raise incomes which could trigger the virtuous circle of consumptive and productive increases necessary to kick-start social formations out of the triple impasse of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation, and further democratization. Rather than being epiphenomenal to the first two historical-sociological prerequisites to 'modernity', democracy may be fundamental to it.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to analyze the current Zimbabwean crisis with a three-fold conceptual apparatus. It contends that Zimbabwe's 'organic crisis' consists of a combination of problems rooted in long-term transitions of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation, and democratization which have 'erupted' in the context of 'middle-term' processes and policies such as structural adjustment, the effect of post-Cold War globalization in Africa, and the rise of opposition politics. The 'short-term' conjuncture includes land invasions, violent elections, and severe economic problems. Democratization might appear, intuitively, to be the least important part of this troika, but if pursued diligently and carefully may well be the key to Zimbabwe's turn-around. Most Zimbabweans appear to believe this proposition, but have been prevented by force and fraud from participating in its testing. They may have to resort to more force of their own in order to participate in this most basic of experiments.

Notes:

1. ZANU(PF) election slogan, June 2000. In March 2002 there were variations on the theme such as 'People First. Our land is our prosperity,' 'Work the Land, Reap Prosperity, Build the Nation,' and 'What Would You Vote For? Plots to Kill ... or Plots to Till. On March 9 and 10 Vote for Your Land, Vote for President R.G. Mugabe.'
2. 'Comment: D-Day for Zimbabwe,' *The Herald*, (Harare) March 9, 2002, p. 1.
3. Wilfred Mhanda, aka Dznishe Machingura, founding member and director, Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform, March 10, 2002. For aspects of Mhanda's biography and his relationship to ZANU(PF)'s history see my "Democracy, Violence and Identity in the Zimbabwean War of National Liberation: Reflections from the Realms of Dissent," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 29, 3, (December 1995), pp. 375-402; R.W. Johnson, 'How Mugabe Came to Power,' *London Review of Books*, 22 February 2001, pp. 26-27 and my letter in response, *LRB*, 23, 7 (April 5, 2001), p. 6; also 'The Alchemy of Robert Mugabe's Alliances,' *Africa Insight*, (Pretoria) 30, 1 (May 2000), pp. 28-32.
4. This long election could be split into three phases: the first was the constitutional referendum of February 2000, narrowly lost by ZANU(PF); the second was the June 2000 parliamentary election and the third was the March 2002 presidential election. The last two components of the 'long election' – considered by some to be a referendum on Robert Mugabe's rule – were narrowly won by the ruling party in the context of much intimidation, violence, and manipulation. The 2002 election results saw over 1,609,000 votes for Mugabe and 1,230,000 for his main opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change: The editor of the *Zimbabwe Independent* estimates that almost 350,000 of Harare's 800,000 voters were denied voting rights, and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network says that 400,000 rural people were added to a secret voter's roll. (*Mail and Guardian*, March 15-21, 2002, pp. 2, 15). For details on the violence up to the 2002 election see the first few pages of my 'Zimbabwe: Twists on the Tale of Primitive Accumulation,' in Malinda S. Smith, ed. *Globalizing Africa*, Trenton: Africa World Press, forthcoming; for figures on the 2000 election see my 'Democracy is Coming to Zimbabwe,' *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 36, 1 (March 2001), p. 163.
5. The use of these categories comes from Fernand Braudel. They are used to some effect in Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longmans, (1989) 1993.
6. The phrase 'state-society complex' is a key component of Robert Cox's theoretical apparatus. See his *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces and the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, and *Problems in World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
7. Micheal Perelman, *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
8. Claudia von Werlhof, "'Globalization" and the "Permanent" Process of "Primitive Accumulation": The Example of the MAI, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,'

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9. I have explored these issues briefly in "Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land? Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19, 2 (July 2001), pp. 253-266 and David Moore, 'Neoliberal Globalisation and the Triple Crisis of "Modernisation" in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Africa,' *Third World Quarterly*, 22, 6 (December 2001), pp. 909-930. Along with the issues of nation-state formation and democratisation, they are inspired by a reading of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, analysed with an African perspective in my 'Africa: The Black Hole at the Middle of Empire?' *Rethinking Marxism*, 13, 3/4 (Winter 2002).
 10. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983.
 11. Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* London: Zed Books, 2000.
 12. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Elaine Stephens & John Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
 13. Michael Mann, "The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic Cleansing," *New Left Review*, 235 (May-June 1999), pp. 18-45, for an argument suggesting that the best defense against genocidal forms of modernization is a combination of liberal political systems and ideologies with strong working classes.
 14. The 'opposition' private newspaper *The Daily News* (June 21, 2000) reported 1,631 large scale commercial farms invaded between February and June, while the Commercial Farmers Union (also part of the 'opposition' in the eyes of the ruling party, but usually conservative in its estimates of recently resettled land) reported 1,060 (quoted from the *Financial Gazette*, June 15, 2000, in Jocelyn Alexander, 'Settling an Unsettled Land: "Squatters," Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe,' paper at seminar on 'Rethinking Land, State and Citizenship through the Zimbabwe Crisis,' Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, September 4-5, 2001, p. 20.)
 15. Basildon Peta, 'New land grab to put 300,000 jobs on the line,' *Financial Gazette*, (Harare), July 5, 2001; F. Masiokwadzo, '35,000 people "extraneous" in land crisis,' *Zimbabwe Independent*, 3 August 2001. In early 2000 there were about 4,400 LSCFs.
 16. I use quotation marks around the term 'war vet' because, as the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform (ZLP) and many other observers and participants repeat, many of the members' of the War Veterans' Association (WVA) claims to their status are suspect.
 17. Forward Maisokwadzo, '95% commercial farms listed,' *Zimbabwe Independent*, September 28, 2001. The CFU said it 'could not quantify the number of farms fast-tracked, but said 900 farms have been occupied.' However, Maisokwadzo writes, 'CFU leaders have recently privately said 2,700 farms have been seized under fast-track.'
 18. Blair Rutherford, *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe*, Harare: Weaver, 2001, pp. 201-230. The issue of citizenship

should be referred to the section on 'democracy:' suffice for now to mention that in 2000 Robert Mugabe stated that 'those without totems' should not be considered Zimbabwean, by whom he meant 'foreign' farmworkers and an undifferentiated mass of urban residents.

19. Beacon Mbiba, 'Communal Land Rights in Zimbabwe as State Sanction and Social Control: A Narrative,' *Africa*, 71, (October 2001), pp. 429-430.
20. Rutherford, *Working ...*, 2001; Michael O'Flaherty, 'Communal Tenure in Zimbabwe: pergent Models of Collective Land Holding in the Communal Areas,' *Africa*, 68, 4 (December 1998) pp. 537-57; Allison Goebel, "'Then It's Clear Who Owns the Trees': Common Property and Private Control in the Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area,' *Rural Sociology*, 64, 4 (December 1999), pp. 624-40.
21. Susie Jacobs, 'The Effects of Land Reform on Gender Relations in Zimbabwe,' T.A.S. Bowyer-Bower and Colin Stoneman, eds. *Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, p. 184.
22. For the most inclusive account of the invasions, see J. Alexander, 'Settling ...' My 'Democracy ...,' 'Is the Land ...?' and 'Zimbabwe: Twists ...' also deal to some extent with the invasions. Interview, Charles Pfukwa, Harare, March 12, 2002. Mr. Pfukwa stated that on a resettled farm near Chipinge 34 out of 100 at a meeting to discuss these issues had completed 'the legal niceties,' but then stated that the authority for the A1 settlements was 'still being formed.'
23. Anonymous interview, Harare March 7, 2002.
24. Perelman, *The Invention ...*, 2000.
25. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia*, The Hague: Mouton, 1967, and chapters in Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays in the Political Economy of Africa*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
26. Duffield, *Global Governance ...*, 2001.
27. Jens A. Andersson, 'Reinterpreting the Rural-Urban Connection: Migration Practices and Socio-Cultural Dispositions of Buhera Workers in Harare,' *Africa*, 71, 1 (January 2001), pp. 82-112.
28. Brian Raftopoulos, 'Fighting for Control: The Indigenization Debate in Zimbabwe,' *Southern Africa Report*, (Toronto) 11, 4 (December 1996).
29. 'Group calls on State to Issue Title Deeds,' *The Herald*, (Harare), June 19, 2001.
30. 'Land Reform gets Backing: Major Conference set for Sunday,' *The Herald*, March 1, 2002, p. 6.
31. Caiphaz Chimhete, *Mirror*, (Harare), 'Land Reform: Agriculture Revenue Set to Double,' March 8-14, 2002, pp. B1-2. The text revealed that this doubling would be dependent on its execution in a 'professional manner' and proper inputs and financial resources.
32. This researcher is not sure what proportion of the emerging bourgeoisie is aligned with the Movement for Democratic Reform (MDC), although apparently the owners of the Kingdom Bank are committed MDC backers.
33. Baffour Ankomah, 'Righting Colonial Wrongs,' *Sunday Mail*, March 10, 2002, pp. 113-14, quotes Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo (formerly of ZAPU) saying that 'less than ten per cent' of the recent land acquisitions have gone to well-established members of

- the black elite. There is a special facility in the program for 'indigenous large scale commercial farms' called the Commercial Farmers' Settlement Scheme. Recall that in 1997 the Development Trust of Zimbabwe, headed by Joshua Nkomo, owned 319,929 hectares – second only to the Anglo-American Corporation's 474,200. Sam Moyo, *The Land Acquisition Process in Zimbabwe (1997/8)*, Harare: United Nations Development Programme Resource Centre, 1998, pp. 30-31. Moyo also noted in 1998 that the 1997 listings exhibited 'exclusive tendencies [and] ... corrupt practices in land allocation schemes benefiting elites in the name of black capitalist development' (p. 35).
34. 'Chief Attacks Land Reforms,' *Daily News*, October 24, 2001.
 35. R.W. Johnson, 'Zimbabwe Inc.' *Focus* (Johannesburg), 19 (2000). Also, participant observation by author of election queues near Warren Park, Harare, March 10, 2002.
 36. Norma Kriger, 'Zimbabwe's War Veterans and the Ruling Party: Continuities in Political Dynamics,' *Politique Africaine*, 81, (March 2001), translated as 'Les Veterans et le Parti au Pouvoir: Une Cooperation Conflictuelle dans la Longue Dure;' R. Mukundu, 'Hunzvi, Mhlanga named in \$45m Zexcom scam,' *Zimbabwe Independent Online*, October 27, 2000. <www.mweb.co.zw/zimin> accessed November 1, 2000.
 37. Lionel Cliffe, 'The Politics of Land Reform in Zimbabwe,' T.A.S. Bowyer-Bower and Colin Stoneman, eds. *Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp.42-3; Bill Kinsey, 'Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe's Resettlement Programme,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 2 (March 1999), pp. 173, 177-9; Sam Moyo, 'The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe: 1990-1999,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26, 1 (2000); see also my 'Zimbabwe; Twists...'
 38. Patrick Bond and Masinba Manyana, *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Struggle for Social Justice*, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002.
 39. The 'event' which marked the agreement to pay the pensions is said by some observers to have been a war veterans' raid on State House, during which the Presidential Guard failed to fire. Well before that, however, the 'war vets' were expressing their discontent. One observer stated that at a 'heroes day' event earlier that year they beat drums throughout Mugabe's speech.
 40. Peter Alexander, 'Zimbabwean Workers, the MDC & the 2000 Election,' *Review of African Political Economy*, 85 (September 2000), p. 388. Official conversion rates to the American dollar in September 1997 were approximately ZWD 12.12 to 1 \$US, making these figures approximately US\$ 278 per month and a lump sum of \$4,165, for a total of approximately US\$380 million. However, the 75 per cent plunge decreased those values significantly. By February 21, 2002 the official exchange rate was ZWD 53.22 to the US dollar – but the parallel market ranged from 300 to 350.
 41. Anonymous interview, March 2002. J. Alexander, 'Settling ...,' pp. 14-16.
 42. It should be added that the ruling class rhetoric of racism is not too deeply felt: the Rautenbachs and Bredenkamps of the formerly Rhodesian bourgeoisie are well-entrenched accomplices of ZANU(PF) incorporated.

43. See Mark T. Berger's 'The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 211-234 and 'The Nation-State and the Challenge of Global Capitalism,' *Third World Quarterly*, 22, 6 (December 2001), pp. 889-908.
44. Members of the ruling party went so far as to enlist an Israeli 'political consultant' based in Montreal and an Australian journalist to frame Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in a plot to assassinate Robert Mugabe. This has resulted in treason charges against MDC leaders: Vincent Kahiya, 'Menashe a master of "dirty tricks",' *Zimbabwe Independent*, February 15, 2002; Peta Thorneycroft, 'Tricks, lies and videotapes,' *Mail and Guardian*, February 15-21, 2002, p. 11. Lest we forget that this politics is not new, many years ago John Day entitled a book on the rise of ZANU(PF) and company *International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian Nationalists*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
45. Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,' Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
46. Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
47. Reno, Warlord ...1998; Duffield, *Global Governance ...*, 2001.
48. Chris Mutsvangwa, Secretary for administration, ZANU PF Harare Province, 'Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his life-long fight against British imperial perfidy,' *The People's Voice*, 24 February – 2nd March 2002, pp. 15-16.
49. In September 2001 the Zimbabwean delegation to Abuja declared it would stop violence on farms in return for British promises to resume dialogue on aid for resettlement. SADC was supposed to monitor the situation but let the 'campaign' continue. See also John Battersby, 'Angry Mbeki Lashes Out at "White Supremacy",' *The Sunday Independent*, March 10, 2002, p. 1.
50. Concerned Howard University, US, Students, 'Land Ruthlessly Taken from Indigenous People: Africans Forced to Move to Areas with Poor Soil,' *Herald*, March 11 2002, p. 8. See also Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980*, Durham and Harare: University of North Carolina Press and SAPES Trust, 2001, p. 285, for an approving commentary on the tumultuous Harlem reception to Robert Mugabe's October 2000 address. However, a poll conducted by the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples of 217 people saw 65.9% agree that the 2002 Zimbabwean election was not free and fair: www.naacp.org/polls/results.php, thus indicating the Howard University students may not be representative of African Americans.
51. ZANU(PF) Organising Secretary and Manicaland supreme Didymus Mutasa has been quoted as saying that Zimbabwe would be better off with only 6 million people – 'with our own people who support the liberation struggle.' Christina Lamb, 'Thugs who rape in the name of Mugabe,' *Sunday Times (Johannesburg)*, 1 September 2002, noted in Roger Southall, 'Democracy in Southern Africa: Moving Beyond a Difficult Legacy,' forthcoming in *Review of African Political Economy*. In light of many accusations that

food aid is denied to MDC supporters, and even Ndebele people, such statements approach the status of 'genocidal.'

52. In fact, the anomaly is not so great between the 1970s and 2000 discourse: the radical challengers to Mugabe in the middle of the liberation war had a clear sense that the 'national democratic revolution' they were fighting for should emphasise 'democratic.'
53. An intriguing article entitled 'The Zvimba Dynasty,' *The People's Voice*, 24 February-2 March 2002, appears to confirm rumors about this village's – whose men surround the president's office – claim to the Mugabe dynasty. A photograph of Grace Mugabe – who, rumors state, was strategically placed in the president's office in order to begin such a dynasty – in a large kitchen is captioned thus: 'Behind every successful man there is a woman. First Lady Cde Grace Mugabe gets ready to prepare a meal for her beloved husband, Cde R.G. Mugabe.'
54. Comment, 'A Clear Message to the World,' *The Herald*, March 11, 2002, p. 8.
55. 'MDC to get \$10,2 million UK funding,' *Herald*, October 28, 2001; Herbert Zharare, 'USAID Buys War Vets to De-campaign Mugabe,' *Zimbabwe Mirror*, 8-14 March 2002.

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Industry and the Urban Sector in Zimbabwe's Political Economy

PDRAIG CARMODY AND SCOTT TAYLOR

Abstract: The land question and Zimbabwe's current crisis of governance appear to be intimately related. However, an extensive survey of the population in the mid-1990s ranked land access very low on the list of priorities when compared to employment creation. Zimbabwe's current constitutional and political crises spring primarily from the urban, not the rural areas. Initially the MDC's primary support base was in the urban areas amongst workers disaffected with rising prices and unemployment. Even if the MDC accedes to power, it will have to face the same set of expectations from workers for improvement in their living and working conditions. Consequently, the regeneration of Zimbabwe's political economy will depend, in part, on the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's urban industry. This paper examines developments in Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector since 1997. It explores trends in employment, output and exports by sub-sector in order to understand the evolution of sector during the years of crisis and the implications for Zimbabwe's political economy.

Ironically, Rhodesia became a model for a Frankian form of 'delinking'.¹

Zimbabwe launched a promising economic reform program in 1991 that was instrumental in liberalizing and briefly stabilizing the economy, but the momentum of adjustment was not sustained. As a result, per capita income contracted by an annual average of 1.4 percent during the decade.²

Introduction

The Zimbabwean economy is in crisis. The budget deficit for 2002 was estimated to be 17.7% of gross domestic product (GDP).³ The economy may have contracted by 7.5% in 2001. Inflation has skyrocketed and social indicators are deteriorating. Real incomes per head have fallen 23% in the last five years.⁴ Zimbabwean society has become increasingly wracked with instability, authoritarianism and brutality; although these trends were particularly acute during

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a3.pdf>

the run-up to the March 2002 elections, they have scarcely abated in the ensuing months.⁵ How has this situation come about, in what was, until recently, one of Africa's most stable and prosperous societies?⁶

Some analysts contend that Zimbabwe's current politico-economic crisis revolves around the land question, the dimensions of which have been well documented.⁷ However, whereas disparities in land ownership and distribution unquestionably pose long-term structural problems for Zimbabwe, this paper argues that the immediate origins of the contemporary crisis lie in the precipitous decline in the urban-industrial sector. Indeed, "a survey of 18,000 rural and urban households in 1995 found that only one percent of respondents wanted land, only two percent thought redistributing land could resolve poverty, and most wanted jobs and better salaries."⁸ Notwithstanding the possibility that these surveys may underestimate demand for land reform, the economic and political crisis engulfing the country from the mid-1990s onwards was primarily the result of the deindustrializing effects of World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment policies, combined with the absence of a competitive electoral system.

Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was inaugurated in 1991. Although the program expired in 1995, its aftereffects continue to be felt. Indeed, the emergence of meaningful political competition in Zimbabwe, in the guise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), established only in 1999, is due partly to the impact of ESAP and the rise to prominence of the labor movement.⁹ MDC has its origins in the country's trade union movement, as it was workers who were most affected by increasing unemployment and declining real wages under ESAP. Following parliamentary elections in 2000, MDC now holds 56 seats in Parliament and represents a credible political force, although the party's success and influence is constrained by an electoral system that overwhelmingly favors the ruling party. The government's response to the MDC's challenge was to try to rhetorically and politically displace the economic crisis from the urban to the rural areas, where two thirds of the population continues to live, and where the long-dormant land issue still has traction. Irrespective of which party is in power, however, the resolution of Zimbabwe's economic crisis will depend, in large part, on the regeneration of the country's urban-based manufacturing sector.

ESAP AND ITS IMPACTS

It is well known that after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian Front government the economy boomed and there was substantial economic diversification, despite the imposition of economic sanctions by the United Nations.¹⁰ The legacy of industrial diversification gave the ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front) government greater latitude, at least with regard to external forces, in its choice of development strategy at independence. Internally, Moore argues that there was a domestic class stalemate, although the settler fraction of capital remained powerful.¹¹

In Zimbabwean political economy there is a debate about the role and cohesion of the settler fraction of capital. For example, Moyo claims that "together with transnational capital, white agrarian interests control key sectors such as tourism, forestry, commodity exports and the narrow agro-industrial sector underlying the urban political economy."¹² Others argue

industry was more diversified and that the industrial bourgeoisie (represented by the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, CZI) and the agrarian bourgeoisie were relatively independent of each other.¹³ In any event, the perceived convergence of their interests – as the CZI adopted a pro-liberalization stance – with those of the state elite was an important factor in the adoption of ESAP.¹⁴

While Zimbabwe long ranked as one of Africa's most industrially diversified economies, this position has eroded considerably. Some recent analyses trace Zimbabwe's economic decline from the immediate post-independence period.¹⁵ By most accounts, however, the "Zimbabwean model" was relatively successful economically in the 1980s.¹⁶ Indeed, following reforms to the preexisting control regime, such as the introduction of new export incentives, based on newly recalculated statistics, the economy grew rapidly by 4% a year from 1986-1990.¹⁷ However, South African destabilization had been costly, and Zimbabwe's debt at the start of its structural adjustment program was equivalent to its defense costs in the 1980s.¹⁸ With two recessions in the 1980s, internal and external advocates for adjustment argued that high government deficits, an overvalued currency, and restrictive access to industrial inputs could only be relieved through a SAP. The predicted benefits for manufacturing proved to be wishful thinking, however.

ESAP undermined the country's industrial base, and the urban sector was particularly affected.¹⁹ Manufacturing's share of GDP declined from about 20% to 16% during the first phase of ESAP. Some observers blame this on the use of inappropriate policy instruments and sequencing during ESAP, with tariffs imposed on intermediate inputs to manufacturing.²⁰ However, tariffication and the imposition of tariffs on intermediates were part of the program.²¹ Bjurek and Durevall argue that deindustrialization "was to some extent expected[in the short-term] since trade liberalisation exposed manufacturing companies to foreign competition, while benefiting other sectors such as agriculture," although in the longer term, manufacturing was meant to be one of the main beneficiaries of the program.²²

Of the 31 manufacturing sub-sectors that Bjurek and Durevall studied "during the periods 1981-1985 and 1986-1990, productivity increased in most sub-sectors, while during the period 1991-1995 more than half of the sub-sectors show decreasing productivity."²³ "Manufacturing sector liberalization led to a decline in both real wages and employment, and an increase in capital intensity," again in contrast to the predictions of orthodox theory.²⁴ Employment in manufacturing contracted from 205,000 in 1991 to 187,000 by mid-1995.²⁵

The specific effects of structural adjustment on manufacturing have been explored in detail elsewhere.²⁶ However, the program's overall impact was deindustrializing, with foreign competition increasing dramatically. For example, whereas final consumption demand for footwear prior to ESAP had been almost exclusively met internally, afterwards "of the 18 million pairs of footwear purchased yearly, 10 million pairs were imported cheaply from China, leaving a demand of only eight million pairs for local producers."²⁷ Of the manufacturing firms which Chipika *et al.* surveyed, half reported increased profitability during ESAP, whereas 84% of workers felt their standard of living had fallen. Inflation and dramatic decreases in real wages shifted the income distribution away from urban unskilled labor, as wages and salaries as a percentage of GDP fell from 57% in the 1980s to only 45% by 1995.²⁸ The World Bank

regarded reduced real wages as a “brutal but necessary” adjustment to generate export-led growth.²⁹

In the key textile, clothing and footwear sub-sector, which was meant to be an engine of growth under ESAP, 56% of firms had decreased profits from 1993/4 to 1995/6, as the full force of trade liberalization took effect, with 18% saying their profits were unchanged and 26% noting an increase.³⁰ Between 1991 and 1996 manufacturing output fell by 16%.³¹ This was a disastrous record for a program designed to promote productive accumulation and, with increased unemployment and rapidly falling real wages, also laid the foundations of serious legitimation problems.

ESAP also had important macro-economic impacts. In 1996 the external debt service ratio had been reduced to 17.5% from 20.5% in 1990. In part this was the result of a 40% increase in exports. However, this export growth was itself largely due to recovery in the agricultural sector from the drought of 1995.³² The terms of trade moved against Zimbabwe after 1996, and the sustainability of some manufacturing exports was open to question as they resulted from the deflation of the domestic market.³³ Since the trade deficit, when measured with a corrected “equilibrium” exchange rate, reached 20% of GDP.³⁴ Imports of luxuries for the elite increased dramatically. “From 1990-95, the real import value of TVs and VCRs rose by 45%, passenger car import were up by 258%, and imported yachts and pleasure boats 243%.”³⁵ Partly as a result, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 45% to 75% of GDP from 1990-1994.³⁶ Ultimately the program failed, chiefly because it led to the autonomous development of the trade and financial sectors, which proved detrimental to production.³⁷ Even orthodox analyses conclude: “ESAP failed where it counted most: it did not lead to a substantial and sustained increase in investment.”³⁸

Some observers claimed the failure of ESAP in Zimbabwe was the result of the inability of the government to adequately restrain and cut-back public expenditure, thereby crowding out private investment and generating inflation.³⁹ Others argue that the failure of structural adjustment was inevitable because the theory underlying it is fundamentally flawed.⁴⁰

The theory underlying structural adjustment is indeed deeply flawed, given the unrealistic assumptions behind it. In fact, considerable evidence suggests that because of close adherence to the prescriptions of the adjustment program, Zimbabwe’s economy declined substantially in the 1990s. In Zimbabwe, the government vigorously enacted the reforms, implementing trade liberalization through free access to foreign exchange a year ahead of schedule.⁴¹

Structural adjustment was meant to enable countries to escape the debt trap. In Zimbabwe, while there was some excessive expenditure, such as large pay increases for cabinet ministers, the government initially pursued a tight fiscal policy, as prescribed. Central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, excluding interest payments, fell from an average of 30.4% in 1986-90, to 28.8% in 1991-95.⁴² However, higher interest rates and currency devaluation, which made paying back foreign loans more expensive, meant budget deficits increased. The way in which these were financed, through short-term Treasury Bills under the new “free market” regime, led to high interest and inflation rates.⁴³ There was also revenue reduction as a result of cutbacks in taxes, as called for by ESAP.⁴⁴ “If the level of revenue in 1991/92 (28.8 per cent of GDP) had been maintained over the following three financial years, the budget deficit would have fallen to below the 5 per cent of GDP by 1995/6 and below 3 per cent in 1996/7.”⁴⁵

Likewise, if interest rates on Treasury Bills had stayed at 1991/2 levels the 5% target would also have been met.

A 1998 IMF review cited in Robinson argued that the program was poorly designed from the start and that the required scale of public sector cutbacks was likely to put the program under "great political strain."⁴⁶ Thus, in a convenient sleight-of-hand, the problem was perhaps too much government "ownership" of the reforms, with the World Bank noting that budget cutting had become an end in itself.⁴⁷ As a result of missed macro-economic targets being missed, the IMF and World Bank suspended disbursement of structural adjustment credits in 1995.

The IMF prediction of "great political strain" proved prophetic. The economic liberalization measures had dramatic political implications. Sachikonye noted that the patronage base of ZANU-PF shrank as liberalization depleted the size of the public sector.⁴⁸ In the early stages of ESAP, the government promoted the "ideology of indigenization" and manipulated gender ideology to compensate for the loss of patronage resources and economic decline.⁴⁹ These strategies of diversion had severe temporal limitations, however.⁵⁰ In the medium-term, the social impacts of ESAP began to generate societal resistance, which the government sought to counter, both by increasing expenditure on the one hand, and fomenting disorder on the other.

Throughout the first decade of independence, so long as the industrial sector continued to provide employment and the economy experienced modest growth, the status quo was acceptable in urban areas.⁵¹ However, as ESAP threatened the industrial sector, and in the longer term, generated increased unemployment, the government was faced with the choice of abandoning the program or facing electoral defeat.⁵²

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN OPPOSITION AND THE RISE OF THE MDC

Beginning in 1995, the political commitment to ESAP began to evaporate as urban opposition mounted.⁵³ However, diminished patronage resources meant that the principal tool available to ZANU-PF as it attempted to power was a racially-charged populism that sought to lay Zimbabwe's economic problems at the feet of its market-dominant white population. This strategy was designed to shore up support in rural constituencies, where ZANU-PF support had always been strongest, as well as placate rising urban discontent. While the strategy achieved some traction among peasant populations, urban residents did not buy into ZANU-PF's rhetoric that whites were the principal obstacles to indigenous empowerment and improved living standards.

By 1996 it had become clear that Zimbabwe's urban areas could not be counted on as reliable bases of support for the ruling party.⁵⁴ The regime recognized that this threat had to be contained, if possible, and that increased political resources would have to be diverted to rural areas and potential supporters. Arguably, ZANU-PF itself was never an urban phenomenon. Dating back to the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF's armed wing drew on rural peasants from the Zimbabwean countryside, and relied on recruitment (and frequently, coercion) of rural dwellers to fuel the war effort.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, there was a concerted attempt to capture urban support in the 1996 presidential elections by resorting to an increasingly virulent anti-white rhetoric as

President Mugabe and his handlers sought to shift the blame for urban decline to white farmers and industrialists.⁵⁶ This effort did not convince many, as the government's commitment to "indigenization" was, by that time, highly discredited and seen to benefit only a narrow black elite.⁵⁷ Mugabe ultimately recaptured the presidency in 1996 (uncontested), although the election failed to convince urban constituencies, and was marked by record low turnouts.

THE RURAL-URBAN NEXUS

The Zimbabwean political economy is affected by the porosity of the rural-urban boundary. Given the historical importance of migration and remittances, with many households' livelihood strategies "straddling" both sectors it is important to pay attention to the rural-urban nexus in Zimbabwe.^[58]

Paradoxically, the government's rising anti-white rhetoric served to limit its economic and political options, while its narrowing patronage base made it increasingly dependent on a diminishing number of societal clients, thereby increasing the latter's bargaining power vis--vis the government.⁵⁹ This diminished state autonomy was effected by several key actors who rose to the fore: a small elite that used threats and intimidation – and its connection to the government – to capture the indigenization agenda; and the so-called "War Veterans" of the liberation struggle.⁶⁰ Of these groups, the "War Vets" rose to become a substantial threat to ZANU-PF and to Mugabe himself. Having alienated labor and urban populations, as well as white capital, in part by evoking the unfulfilled goals of the liberation struggle, the government lacked the capacity to challenge the rising power of the war veterans. To do so would have threatened ZANU-PF's very credentials as the heirs of the post-colonial state.

The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association was formed in 1991. Early in the decade, the liberation war veterans broke with ZANU-PF over its conversion to neoliberalism and the consequent lack of opportunities for its members.⁶¹ When it was discovered in 1997 that the War Victims' Compensation Fund had been looted, to the tune of Z\$450 million (at the time, about \$44 million USD), by senior officials in ZANU-PF, war veterans organized mass demonstrations. They also directly confronted President Mugabe at his residence where they demanded pensions and land redistribution.⁶² The fact that they were not resisted by the Presidential Guard suggests they had the backing of the army.⁶³ Mugabe thus was under direct pressure to placate the war veterans and agreed to give them lump-sum and pension payments costing Z\$4.5bn.⁶⁴ The War Vets thus emerged as a powerful constituency, even if the appellation did not accurately describe all the members of the association.

The settlement with the war veterans led to a surge in imports in anticipation of increased demand and a huge increase in the budget deficit and hence, inflation. Coupled with the decision to seize large-scale commercial farmland, and previous balance of payments pressure, this resulted in the macro-economy spiraling out of control.⁶⁵ On November 14, 1997 the value of the Zimbabwe dollar fell 74%, as international investors panicked.⁶⁶

While the payments to the veterans served as a trigger, there were longer term reasons for the crisis. One component of ESAP was openness to foreign portfolio investment. Inflows of "hot money" create trade deficits, which eventually prompt foreign portfolio investors to withdraw their capital, given the likelihood of devaluation to restore trade balance.⁶⁷

Zimbabwe was a top "emerging market" in 1996 as its stock exchange had risen by 70% in US dollar terms that year.⁶⁸

The currency crash imported inflation and led to urban riots over price increases in maize and fuel. President Mugabe was also under political pressure due to the rising urban discontent over food and other price increases, which was periodically expressed through rioting, strikes by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and later through electoral pressure from the incipient MDC.⁶⁹ There was also rising student unrest.⁷⁰ As a result, foreign exchange controls were re-imposed in 1998.⁷¹

In 1998 a ZCTU general strike forced the cancellation of a 5% surtax to pay for war veterans pensions, a move which was supported by capital. Despite conceding, President Mugabe resorted again to anti-white rhetoric, and claimed that white capital and the black working class had allied against the peasants and the veterans.⁷² Increasingly he came to define the rural areas as the moral "heart of the nation."⁷³ However, somewhat paradoxically, whites remained the dominant economic force in the rural areas at the time.

Although ESAP had undermined productive accumulation in manufacturing, it promoted it in commercial agriculture. However, the fact that most large-scale commercial farms remained under white ownership, coupled with the squeezing of the incipient black business class by ESAP, heightened racial tensions.⁷⁴ Mugabe sought to exploit this situation for political gain.

According to Dashwood, "peasants, over two million of whom are now chronically dependent on government food handouts, continue to vote for ZANU-PF out of fear of loss of these handouts as much as out of genuine support."⁷⁵ These handouts were available to those with ZANU-PF membership cards. However, with the consolidation of the opposition under the MDC, this was insufficient to ensure electoral victory. Indeed, the parliamentary elections of June 2000, in which MDC captured 57 of 120 the seats contested, revealed that the major urban centers had completely abandoned ZANU-PF, and that even the party's rural support had weakened.⁷⁶ It is worth noting that by this time "ZANU ministers had come to the conclusion that ESAP was their most important policy error."⁷⁷

Given the fact that the direct threat came from the war veterans and that the majority of the electorate lived in the countryside, Mugabe's preferred strategy of intimidation and promoting land invasions seemed obvious, particularly in light of the loss of the February 2000 constitutional referendum⁷⁸ and the close result in the subsequent parliamentary elections.⁷⁹

The initial shock-troops of the land invasions were not peasants, but urban unemployed youth (mostly too young to be genuine "war veterans") who were paid by the army and subsequently incorporated into the army reserves.⁸⁰ This helped to get the ball of rural disorder rolling, while also deflecting an important source of discontent in the urban areas. Frustration with the grossly unequal and racialized distribution of land was widespread in the rural areas, particularly given that 89% of the population were living in poverty, versus 50% in the urban areas.⁸¹ This may have been further heightened by deteriorating economic conditions, inflation, and reductions in remittances from the urban areas as a result of industrial decline.

The regime's strategy to transfer the zone of conflict from the urban centers to the rural areas, where traditionally it could claim greater support, initially yielded modest results. However, as violence and economic decline spread, even these traditional constituencies began

to abandon ZANU-PF. Therefore, faced with waning rural support, an unwieldy coalition with the War Vets, and the near-disappearance of urban support, it became critical to the ZANU-PF government to keep the increasingly powerful military leadership on board.⁸²

In spite of the dire condition of the domestic economy, alternative opportunities for patronage, particularly for military-related firms and the indigenous business class, were opened up by the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), making violence a mode of accumulation.⁸³ In reference to the war in the DRC, an official of the trade development organization, Zimtrade, noted that “within Zimbabwe the small to medium guys[often indigenous firms] are being squeezed out. Thus they are being forced to look outwards.”⁸⁴ Some ZANU-PF owned and affiliated companies also established operations in the DRC.⁸⁵

The military has been both placated and empowered by its new politico-economic role. In an unprecedented display of strength and hubris prior to the 2002 presidential election, the military declared that it will be the final arbiter of who governs Zimbabwe.

We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.⁸⁶

Before the 2002 elections, security personnel received a 100% pay raise, which was the same as the inflation rate, versus 50% for other workers.⁸⁷ Additional orders for riot gear were also placed.⁸⁸

As the 2002 presidential election neared, the strategy of fomenting discontent over land, buying off war veterans and facilitating business opportunities for the military was complemented by attempts to buy the urban vote with price controls on basic foods, as well as intimidation and factory invasions by the ZANU-controlled Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions.⁸⁹ As indicated above, however, beyond ZANU’s hired thugs and youth brigades, and the War Vets, the party’s support in urban areas is virtually non-existent. Electoral advantage could only come at the cost of further economic decline, at least in the immediate term.

LOOSE MOORINGS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ZIMBABWEAN STATE

It is tempting to blame economic mismanagement, corruption, or the megalomania of Mugabe for the country’s current woes, as some observers have done, but such analyses are so one-sided that they lack much explanatory power.⁹⁰ As Abrahamson notes, one of the problems with the good governance discourse is that it only pays attention to democracy within countries and not within international institutions and relations.⁹¹

Alternatively, the strategy to foment and “institutionalize” disorder could be seen as a rational way to maintain power.⁹² This, however, is also a limited way to conceptualize the problem. Bayart (1993) and Sandbrook (1993) argue that after independence local capital and the Zimbabwean state formed one of the few historic blocs in Africa which had succeeded in

generating hegemony. Thus, it is worth asking why a strategy to foment disorder became rational. As ESAP undermined the productive base of the economy, it destroyed the alliance which underwrote the first ten years of independence. Moore argues that "perhaps the Marxian idea of Bonapartism...could be invoked to interpret the collision of the social and the personal on Robert Mugabe's head."⁹³

States are embedded in their societies and in the international system. They can be thought of as institutions to mediate and resolve conflicts.⁹⁴ The fault lines of some of these conflicts take the form of internal and external demands. Under globalization, where the capital-labor relation is well entrenched, the state often takes on a facilitative role for transnational forces, leading it to become a "courtesan state."⁹⁵ However, absent draconian repression, states depend on the consent of the governed for their continued functioning. As Hibou notes:

The unending quest to satisfy the donors' financial requirements has particularly pernicious consequences. Since the survival of the government depends increasingly on its external resources, it is increasingly led to concern itself more with its exterior respectability than its interior legitimacy.⁹⁶

Thus, this occurs when the state displays negative autonomy from domestic social forces. That is where the state appears autonomous from domestic social forces, but that autonomy is the obverse of embeddedness with and dependence on transnational forces, and therefore reflective of their priorities.⁹⁷ Cutbacks in government spending and formal sector jobs loss may result in a crisis of hegemony. The global extension of the law of value may thus conflict with society's needs.⁹⁸ The state must then adopt other strategies to attempt to ensure its own reproduction.⁹⁹

Where the demands of globalization conflict drastically with the demands of the society in which the state is embedded, the link between the external and the internal may be broken as the state is forced to choose. In Zimbabwe state policy is subject to dramatic shifts in policy depending on whether external constraints or the potential loss of power resulting from internal socio-economic conditions are more pressing. The state can implement transformative projects, such as ESAP (externally-driven) or land invasions (internally-driven), but these do not reflect autonomous planning for social transformation in the way argued for by Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) and Evans (1995). Rather, the party-state moves with the tides of electoral and economic pressures to maintain power. Given the diversification of Zimbabwe's economy, it has had more latitude historically to pursue this than other states, though this latitude now is clearly diminished.

In Zimbabwe, previous contributions which detailed the embourgeoisment of the state elite did not draw the distinction between the convergence of interests of private and state elites and their coincidence.¹⁰⁰ When push-came-to-shove, as the avenues of productive accumulation were closed off by ESAP, accumulation by the state elite came again to rest on access to state power. Thus, contrary to Dashwood's (2000) claim, the state-based petty bourgeoisie had not transformed itself into a fully fledged bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe.

Whereas the ideology of socialism once served to suppress accumulation within the state elite, the adoption of ESAP loosened that constraint.¹⁰¹ As instability and insecurity grew in the

1990s, this elite is increasingly hasty to enrich itself, and the forms of accumulation have consequently become mercantilist and non-productive.¹⁰²

CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY AND IMPACT ON THE POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

ZANU-PF's abandonment of the neoliberal model was not instantaneous. The long-delayed second phase of ESAP, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (Zimprest) was announced in 1998.¹⁰³ While it contained many of the elements of ESAP, it also advocated policy reversals on issues like tariffs, pegging the exchange rate, and selective price controls.¹⁰⁴ The IMF refused to fund the program until tariffs on luxury goods imports were reduced and price controls reversed. However, the provisions of the program were soon violated, leading to a suspension of disbursements.

Foreign investment peaked in Zimbabwe in 1999, as maxi-devaluations of the currency made labor cheaper. However, as the political situation deteriorated in 2000 foreign investment inflows began to fall and many multi-national corporations, such as sugar producer Tate and Lyle, have withdrawn.¹⁰⁵

Despite the government's abandonment of ESAP, industrial production has flat-lined.¹⁰⁶ Zimbabwe's industrial activities were hit multiple times: first by the deindustrializing effects of ESAP, and second by the contraction in the agricultural sector, with which it is highly articulated, which is estimated to have declined 12.2% in 2001.¹⁰⁷ The commercial agricultural sector has since been decimated by widespread designation of farms for seizure, land invasions by the "War Vets," and threats to farmers and laborers alike. Moreover, political instability has also resulted in plunging tourist receipts.¹⁰⁸ In the wake of the widely condemned 2002 presidential election, Zimbabwe has become an international pariah and foreign exchange shortages have become even more acute. Industrial inputs (already diminished by ESAP) and fuel, for example, have been virtually impossible to secure in the current environment. Thus the laws of motion of global capitalism result in its increasing "implosion" as they undercut the basis for political order, necessary for capital's reproduction, in the periphery.¹⁰⁹

The government's current economic policy bears some resemblance to the control regime that was inherited from the pre-independence period. This statist shift in policy was formalized in the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme issued by the government in 2000. However, rather than being strategic and articulated, the government's policy implementation has been largely ad-hoc.¹¹⁰ It has been marked by attempts to transfer the costs of budgetary financing to the private sector by forcing pension funds to hold government bonds at negative real interest rates, thereby enabling the reduction of the budget deficit.¹¹¹ Whereas successful East Asian control regimes channeled finance to areas of the economy with high social rates of return, financial controls in Zimbabwe, for the most part, merely prescribe exchange rate values and interest rates. Even if it were desired, the state currently lacks the capacity to mobilize resources to channel to domestic industry. Only industrial and mining concerns controlled by the military and/or political elite continue to receive state benefits through illicit transactions and rents generated in the DRC.¹¹² The remainder of the industrial sector, however, is still perceived as largely white, and therefore, in the current climate, "foreign."¹¹³

International pressure – which mounted after the March, 2002 presidential elections and the accelerated removals of white farmers that followed – has been largely ignored by the government. However, regionally, South Africa could still “turn off the lights” (electricity supply) as it could have for the Rhodesian regime. It has been reluctant to do this, however, given the add-on effect of a politico-economic meltdown in Zimbabwe on South Africa, and high levels of domestic support for the land invasions there. Given the extent of economic contraction in Zimbabwe it is clear that international constraints cannot be ignored indefinitely. However, the expectations of some observers that a standard IMF program would be implemented in the second half of 2002 have proved false.¹¹⁴ Indeed, rather than turning to the West, Mugabe's regime has deepened its relations with, and reliance on, states like Libya.¹¹⁵

Ironically, ZANU and the MDC have traded places over economic liberalization. The core members of MDC, namely those from the ZCTU, initially were among the harshest critics of the ESAP program.¹¹⁶ It was not until after the formation of MDC in 1999 that party supporters embraced the neoliberal agenda. In so doing, MDC set itself apart from the now anti-SAP ZANU-PF and attempted to cement a domestic class alliance and attract funding from white capital and the “international community.”¹¹⁷

At the current time, the MDC's prospects for governing seem remote, yet the party is the only credible alternative to ZANU-PF in existence. Therefore, what might a future MDC government do with its industrial and urban constituency? Would its policies reinvigorate the urban industrial sector? MDC's origins lie in the labor movement, but the hardship imposed on labor and industrialists alike by ESAP allowed these strange bedfellows to find common cause beginning in the late 1990s. Business actors in developing countries are often loath to engage in pro-democracy movements.¹¹⁸ However, in contexts where government capriciousness has severely undercut business prospects, as in Zimbabwe, they appear to have little to lose.¹¹⁹

Commercial farmers began to support the opposition with the advent of land designations and invasions. Thus the MDC is a cross-class counter movement against economic decline, corruption, and violence, which have resulted from ESAP and the government's strategy to deflect attention from economic failure. The locus of this counter-movement is focused on the state, which is itself the site of social struggles by both domestic and transnational forces. This may be cause for later division should MDC ever ascend to power.¹²⁰

The MDC's economic policy program is largely orthodox in its content, despite the strong labor presence in the party. Labor concerns would likely be subverted to economic orthodoxy if the MDC were to come to power in the future, as they were in Zambia and South Africa, where the Movement for Multi-party Democracy and the African National Congress, respectively, also had substantial labor constituencies.¹²¹ The economic secretary of the MDC, Eddie Cross, was a leading official of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, formerly one of the main advocates for ESAP.¹²² Indeed, the MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai views the neoliberal model as inevitable, noting “I still hate the World Bank and IMF, but I hate them like I hate my doctor.”¹²³

The MDC's embrace of the neoliberal model and pledge to protect property rights (read: white commercial farming and industrial interests) would likely be met enthusiastically by the international community. However, it is unlikely that “market friendly” policies adopted by MDC could resuscitate Zimbabwean manufacturing. Absent urban recovery -- marked by

industrial growth and substantial re-employment -- the capital-labor divisions within MDC's ranks pose major challenges to the survival of the party in its present form.¹²⁴ Its immediate challenge is to survive in the wake of ZANU-PF's post-election effort to crush the MDC and its supporters.

In sum, the current policy alternatives in Zimbabwe range from continuation of Mugabe's economically destructive radical populism, to embrace of the MDC's reconstituted neoliberalism. Given Zimbabwe's experience with each, the prospects for industry under either scenario are perhaps equally bleak. The challenge is further heightened by the looming famine, partly brought on by drought.

REGENERATING THE URBAN-INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

From 1991 to 1995, ESAP severely undermined Zimbabwe's industrial base. The corrupt and capricious policies, wrapped in a radical populist guise, pursued by Mugabe and ZANU after 1997 substantially finished the job. The industrial sector is now in shambles, as innumerable factories across multiple sub-sectors have been permanently shuttered. Investment has all but dried up. Unfortunately for the cause of Zimbabwean development, the grip of ZANU-PF has tightened since the March 2002 presidential elections, and the president and his supporters have become far more intractable, contrary to expectations.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, the alternative presented by the embattled MDC and its supporters appear no more likely to restore industrial function and capacity in Zimbabwe, even in the unlikely event they were given a public airing.

Writing in 2000, Patrick Bond noted that "a long period lies ahead in which damage done to a once strong industrial base must be repaired."¹²⁶ Bond could not have been aware that his prediction would sound like a vast understatement only two years later. Although the agricultural sector -- the country's principal source of export revenue -- is also in disarray, the regeneration of the urban industrial sector is equally critical to Zimbabwe's future, both economically and politically. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine industrial revitalization without similar trends in agriculture, as the agricultural sector is an important source of inputs for the country's industries. Thus, although the *immediate* crisis in Zimbabwe may not center around land, a restructured agricultural sector will play an important role in any revitalization of industrial production. The choice is thus what type of holistic development strategy Zimbabwe should pursue.

These changes require first political solutions, which, at the moment at least, appear extremely remote. Nonetheless, short of surrendering power to the generals, the leaders of the Zimbabwean state must engender some degree of legitimacy among the population, or at a minimum, key sections of it. The twin bases of sustainable state legitimacy come from employment and livelihood creation, and social service provision. The challenge in Zimbabwe is to renew and restructure the state and the market, with input from communities to achieve these goals.

The range of possible political scenarios in Zimbabwe has grown nearly impossible to predict. With that major caveat in mind, there are a number of possible strategy choices for Zimbabwe's industrial future, and for the economic development of the country as a whole.

Bond, for example, argues that Zimbabwe's economy grew fastest when it delinked in the 1930s and after UDI, and that this should be replicated and deepened through a reorientation to investment to meet basic needs.¹²⁷ He also argues that there is a core group of progressive social forces, such as women's and church organizations and the ZCTU, which would attempt to keep the MDC honest in terms of its social commitments if it were to come to power in the future. However, the conditions under UDI were different from today, and in any event, Rhodesia was only partially "delinked". According to Thompson, given the extent of British investment in Rhodesia, the British government supported the white minority regime economically.¹²⁸ Cheap black labor made it an attractive destination for multi-national investment as well, with the number of American subsidiaries there growing from 54 to 66 from 1970 to 1976. The Rhodesian regime maintained "property rights" and a "stable investment environment," at least until the latter part of the liberation war. The Rhodesian government was also supported with loans from the South African apartheid regime.

Conditions are vastly different today.¹²⁹ However, Bond supports his endorsement of delinking by drawing on a United Nations Development Programme commissioned report which argues that to overcome its current problems Zimbabwe must draw on the strong internally-oriented economy inherited from UDI and the spirit of *Chimurenga* (liberation war).¹³⁰

On the other hand, however, Brecher *et al* argue that:

A strong case can be made that delinking is tantamount to autarky.... under today's conditions. Imagine a single country withdrawing from the WTO, refusing to service its debt, and putting a full array of progressive requirements on foreign investment. Aside from the obvious short-term consequences (e.g. inability to acquire parts, machinery or raw materials, except by barter), it would be cut off in the long run from modern technology, the Internet and everything else that is developed in the global economy. This is a formula for permanent underdevelopment.¹³¹

Rather they argue that global economic conditions must be changed to make national development possible. Sandbrook also argues for global as well as domestic reform agendas. However, substantive global reform in the current environment appears difficult to achieve, despite movement by the international financial institutions towards accepting elements of the "Post-Washington Consensus."¹³²

Others contend that change must necessarily take place through nation states. Mediated integration into the global market may still be possible.¹³³ For example, Cuba can still attract foreign direct investment with a regulated economy.¹³⁴ However, this in turn is dependent on the existence of a strong state, which neoliberalism has undermined.

Hettne 2001 argues that mediated integration is now only possible based on increased regional cooperation, with the choice for Southern Africa being either "regionalization or recolonization."¹³⁵ Stoneman argues that it was Zimbabwe's neglect of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference which enabled the World Bank to push through its structural adjustment agenda. However, "new regionalism" is also problematic given the small size of Southern Africa's economy and the mobility and structural power of international finance capital. This power may mean that the forces of globalization may trump those of regionalization unless there is a fundamental rethinking of the macro-economic policy regime and current structures of production. Neoliberal inspired Spatial Development Initiatives

promoted by South Africa have not been successful in attracting the required scale of investment to regenerate the regional political economy.¹³⁶

In sum, there appear to be five possible choices of development strategy currently:

- Unmediated integration into the global market (the IMF/World Bank approach)
- Mediated integration/new regionalism
- Delinking
- Neoliberalism in macroeconomics with grassroots empowerment or,
- Market socialism/ecological economics

Which of these is ultimately adopted in Zimbabwe will depend in no small part on the outcome of the struggle for democracy, social justice, and livelihood currently enjoined by Zimbabwe's people. Eventually, however, whichever macro-development path is pursued, it is clear that the regeneration of the urban-industrial sector is a prerequisite for the (re)construction of a (counter) hegemony.¹³⁷

Notes:

1. Moore 2001a, p. 914.
2. International Monetary Fund 2000, p. 5.
3. EIU 2002a.
4. IMF. Cited in EIU 2002b.
5. This included kidnapping and beating opposition members of Parliament and the charging of the opposition presidential candidate Morgan Tsvingarai with treason ("Claims of Political Violence in Zimbabwe", 2002).
6. Authoritarian tendencies were in evidence earlier in the suppression of dissent in Matabeleland from 1982-85, and the attempt to move to a one party state in the late 1980s.
7. See Moyo 1995, 2000a; Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000.
8. McGregor 2001, p. 346. A more recent survey revealed that only six percent of respondents identified land as the most pressing issue, despite the fact that the government had made land its most prominent political issue at least since 1997. The land question ranked sixth behind inflation, unemployment, the currency crisis, poverty and AIDS (see Johnson 2000).
9. Raftopoulos 2001.
10. See Ndlela 1986.
11. Moore 2001a.
12. Moyo 2000b, p. 6.
13. For example, Herbst 1990; Skalnes 1995.
14. Skalnes 1995; Dashwood 1996; 2000.
15. Jenkins and Knight 2002.
16. See Riddell 1990; Stoneman 1992.

17. Robinson 2001
18. Thompson 2000.
19. See Gibbon 1995
20. For example, Mabugu 2001.
21. See Carmody 2001.
22. Bjurek and Durevall 2000, p. 466. The government anticipated manufacturing benefits (see Government of Zimbabwe 1991).
23. Bjurek and Durevall 2001, p. 470.
24. Bjurek and Durevall 2001, p. 477.
25. CSO 1996.
26. See, for example, Sachikonye 1999; Carmody, 2001; Gunning and Oostendorp 2002.
27. Chipika et al. 2000, p. 56.
28. Mumbengegwi and Mabugu 2001.
29. Cited in Kanyenze 1995, cited in Knight 2001.
30. Fifty seven firms responded to this question (Carmody survey 1996).
31. Gunning and Oostendorp 2002a.
32. Bjurek and Durevall 2000.
33. Gunning and Oostendorp 2002a.
34. Ratts and Torvik 1998.
35. Bond, 2000, p. 175.
36. Jenkins 1997.
37. Carmody, 2001.
38. Gunning and Oostendorp 2002b.
39. For example, World Bank 1995; Jenkins 1997.
40. See Bond, 1998. The World Bank resident representative admitted that "the reforms under ESAP could certainly not be regarded as a roaring success" (Allen 1999, cited in Yeros 2001, p. 73).
41. Gibbon 1996.
42. Robinson 2001.
43. Ibid.
44. Gibbon, 1996
45. Robinson 2001: 41
46. Robinson 2001. See also Meredith 2002. Meredith claims that by the end of the 1990s the government was spending on Z \$6 per child on education per child enrolled in school (p. 161).
47. World Bank 1995b, cited in Bond and Manyanya 2002, p. 37. ESAP was designed with input from the World Bank. "Ownership" of reforms is very much in vogue with the international financial institutions, partly perhaps as a way of deflecting criticism onto governments. The theoretical case for "ownership" is laid out in Killick 1998.
48. Sachikonye 1995.
49. Ranchod-Nilsson 1998; Taylor 1999.
50. Harvey 1994.

51. In the decade prior to ESAP, Zimbabwe experienced positive economic growth, except for the recession years 1982 and 1987 (CSO, Harare. Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 3/96)
52. Sachikone 1993; 1996.
53. Robinson (2001) argues that the IMF may have suspended support prematurely, based on technicalities and Mugabe's anti-IMF rhetoric. Another explanation might be that given that the international financial institutions hoped Zimbabwe would be a successful adjuster, they were determined not to allow any program slippage.
54. The victory of independent candidate for parliament, Margaret Dongo, in 1995 was perhaps was the first indicator. A series of demonstrations organized by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 1999 also cemented this view. More recently, the electoral performance of the MDC in urban centers far outstripped ZANU-PF in the 2000 parliamentary elections, and in 2001, MDC gained further advantage by beating the ruling party in key urban centers: Masvingo, Gweru, Bulawayo.
55. Kriger 1992.
56. Taylor 1999.
57. The Indigenous Business Development Centre had previously complained that "the current finance schemes set aside by Government, which have provided only up to \$400,000 for each project is inadequate for entry into any serious venture that requires an average of \$2.5million" (IBDC, 1997: 2 quoted in Dashwood 1999, p. 583. See also Taylor, 2002.
58. Andersson 2002.
59. This is not unlike the situation Reno (1998) describes for Zaire in the twilight of Mobutu's reign.
60. Following the deepened intervention in the DRC, the military became another actor with substantial influence over the ruling party and the president . Anonymous, "The New Scramble for Africa," Unpublished working paper, Washington, DC, September 2000. See also, Report to the UN Security Council (11/19/01), cited in EIU 2001, p. 20, and Nest 2001.
61. Sachikonye 1995.
62. Dashwood, 1999; 2000.
63. There was discontent in the army given the effects of inflation on their member and that "only 5 percent of its vehicles were in working order, monthly pilot training had been abandoned, and 70 percent of troops in one brigade had been off duty for a year or more, on forced leave in order to save money" (Herbst, 2000: 19). According to Dashwood (1999: 585) Mugabe was "clearly responding to the threat of a potential revolt within the ranks of the army and police".
64. Moore 2001b.
65. Dashwood 1999
66. Bond 2000.
67. Gabel 1997.
68. Gordon 2001.

69. The only force capable of uniting Zimbabwe's disparate and unfocused urban "constituency" was an urban-based movement. The MDC was established with key support from labor leaders, many of whom gained leadership positions in the party.
70. Sithole 2000.
71. EIU 2001.
72. Moore 2001b
73. Quoted in McGregor 2002.
74. Sachikonye 1996.
75. Dashwood 2000, p. 110.
76. Alexander 2000.
77. Mhone and Bond 2001, p. 19.
78. The February 2000 constitutional referendum asked voters to approve constitutional amendments that would, among other things, increase presidential power, and give the government free reign to seize white- owned farms. Although its defeat marked a setback for the government, President Mugabe has since proceeded without regard to legal sanctions.
79. According to the Suzman Foundation and others this election was stolen; see Johnson, 2000.
80. Moore 2001b. "Squatting" had been increasing across all tenure categories in Mashonaland according to Moyo 2000 (cited in McGregor 2001). Interestingly, the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform, a breakaway group of war veterans, decried the government's tactics of land invasion (Moore 2000).
81. GoZ 1997 cited in Dashwood 1999.
82. Declining rural support for ZANU-PF is well-chronicled in Johnson, October 2000 and International Crisis Group 2002.
83. Reno 2000.
84. Quoted in Nest 2001, p. 476.
85. Weinstein, 1999; Anonymous 2000.
86. Zimbabwe Defense Forces Commander Vitalis Zvinavashe quoted in Bond 2002, p.1. This was widely interpreted as a warning to former union leader Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC candidate, and his followers.
87. Bond 2002.
88. Jafari 2002.
89. EIU 2002, p. 1; McGregor 2002.
90. See for example, Rotberg 2000; Meredith 2002.
91. Abrahamson 2000, p. 147.
92. See Chabal and Daloz 1999.
93. Moore 2001, p. 256.
94. Strange 1996.
95. Mittelmann 2000.
96. Hibou 1999, p. 97.
97. See Carmody 2002.
98. Ake 1996.

99. This is in contrast to Van de Walle's (2001) argument that adjustment continues to fail because of its selective implementation, which nonetheless allows governments to continue to gain access to multi-lateral funding.
100. Notably, Dashwood 1996.
101. Robinson, 2001.
102. See Hibou 1999; Moore 2001b.
103. Despite the World Bank's new emphasis on "participation," civil society groups were excluded from the drafting of ZIMPREST (Dorman 2002).
104. Bond 2000.
105. "Canadian Firm Trims Investment in Zim," 2/7/02. Conversely, some South African companies, such as Impala Platinum Holdings, take a longer-term view and continue to invest (Swarns 2002).
106. EIU 2001.
107. Ibid.
108. "Tourism Receipts Plunge 42%," 2/7/02.
109. Hoogvelt 1997. See also, Evans 1997. The political consequences of global capitalism were not as big an issue when there were colonial states. This could be thought of as a fourth contradiction of capitalism in addition for the periodic tendency for the rate of profit to fall, the development of the working class and the tendency to undercut its own ecological basis. Mining capital has found ways around this (see Reno 1998).
110. In order to pay for essential imports in 2001 the government conducted trade deals with Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand and Vietnam and import finance from the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, Afreximbank, the African Preferential Trade Area and the People's Republic of China (Bond 2002).
111. EIU 2002a.
112. Anonymous 2000.
113. A survey conducted in the early 1990s revealed a substantial white ownership and senior management presence among manufacturers, however, recent data are not available. See Bonyongwe 1991.
114. The prospect was advanced in EIU 2001.
115. Bond 2002.
116. See ZCTU, Beyond ESAP 1996.
117. Yeros 2001.
118. Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Bratton and van de Walle 1997
119. A point raised in Latin America by Conaghan 1992.
120. Raftopolous 2001.
121. The MDC may attempt to cement this alliance through enforcing higher than market determined wages rates (Eddie Cross, cited in Bond 2001) as the ANC has done in South Africa.
122. Skalnes 1995.
123. Quoted in Bond 2001, p. 10. However Tsvangirai did go on to explain that what was important was for Zimbabwe to gradually work itself out of the IMF and World

Bank's grip. Whether embracing neoliberalism is the way to achieve this is open to debate.

124. The Insider, October 31, 2001.
125. See EIU 2001.
126. Bond 2000, p. 185.
127. See also Beza 2000.
128. Thompson 1985, p. 144.
129. For example, life expectancy may fall as low as 30 as a result of HIV/AIDS (Gregson et al. 1998 and Logie 1999, cited in Gordon 2001). This will discourage foreign investment. The looming famine in southern Africa also threatens future stability and social and political infrastructure.
130. UNDP/PRF/IDS 2000, quoted in Bond 2000, p. 186. ZANU-PF's slogan for the March 2002 elections suggested a "third chimurenga" was underway.
131. Brecher, et al. 2000, p. 135.
132. Stiglitz 1998; Fine et al 2001; see also Taylor and Nel 2002.
133. Mohan et al. 2000.
134. Monreal 1999.
135. Hettne, 2001. See also an excellent discussion by Tsie 2001.
136. See Crush and Rogerson 2001.
137. See Bourke 1996.

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Narratives on Land: State-Peasant Relations Over Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe

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Abstract: In the last few years, slogans have become more elaborate and fervent with regards to promises of delivering land to peasants in Zimbabwean communal areas. Conditions in communal areas suggest that peasants should be highly receptive to the slogans and the narratives from which they are drawn. But empirical data from a densely settled communal area challenges the universality of the slogans and exposes their irrelevance in the context of the realities of household assets, social processes, and production systems. We suggest political relations over land between peasants and political elites in the state have resulted in disengagement by the peasants.

Introduction

The government treats us like dogs. You know how a hunter treats his dogs? When the dogs catch the prey, the hunter chases the dogs away. Then he skins the animal, places the animal skin beyond the reach of the dogs lest the dogs eat it. After cooking the meat the dogs are not given anything. If there is left over meat or soup, the women are told to lock it in the kitchen so that the children can have it the following day. The hunter makes sure that the dogs do not get anything, even left over soup. He says if the dogs taste the meat, they will not hunt, instead they will steal. When the meat is finished, the hunter throws a piece of maize-meal porridge at the dogs and takes the dogs for another hunting episode. That is how the government treats us. During the war we were promised that we would live happily after attaining independence but tell me, is this good life? Where is the good life? I cannot buy any of its programmes.¹

The current narratives by the state suggests that the government acts in the interest of the peasants and speaks for them, but this metaphor of the hunter and the dog is one of many told by peasants – they illustrate the peasant view of current state narratives. Narratives have been described in the literature as a way of developing meaning and organizing experiences.² But

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a4.pdf>

these experiences are constantly being rethought and repositioned depending on who is narrating it. Narratives are powerful: they validate action, mobilise action, and define alternatives.³ We use this metaphor as a starting point to explore the multiple dimensions of state-peasant relations over land in Zimbabwe.

We explore state-peasant relations by examining slogans, rhetoric in the media, and events leading up to and following the spontaneous invasions of commercial farms near Svoswe and Nyamandhlovhu. We also present data collected between September 2001 and February 2002 from key interviews and focus group discussions in two study areas within a densely populated communal area in Southern Zimbabwe to explore in more detail how state narratives on land are being interpreted.⁴ Peasants who have experienced fast track land reform challenge the state narratives. We suggest that peasants from the study areas are disengaging from the state.

ASSESSING STATE-PEASANT RELATIONS

Research has suggested that political relations can be understood using the concepts of engagement and disengagement. Four forms are recognised.⁵ The first is state-sponsored engagement, where state elites try to regulate behaviour through authoritative means. The second is state-sponsored disengagement, referring to retrenchment of state elites who encounter limits to the reach of public authority. The third form is society-sponsored engagement, which refers to collective action by citizens, in this case by peasants attempting to gain control of state power. Finally, society-sponsored disengagement refers to actions by ordinary citizens to withdraw from the realms of state authority. The choice to engage or disengage in political action is conditioned by the actor's access to power.⁶ Citizens question their relations with the state and experience a sense of disenfranchisement under three conditions: when citizens believe the government is using its power against them or not helping them; when citizens find policies to be ineffective, inefficient or otherwise problematic; and when citizens do not feel part of government, feel ignored, or feel misunderstood by government.⁷

Many post-colonial states are weak, as they do not command legitimacy in the eyes of the population.⁸ In many countries, the state has yet to engage peasants in mutually advantageous situations.⁹ This has resulted in wholesale peasant disengagement from the state.¹⁰ For most part, the interactions between state and peasants have amounted to reciprocal disengagement rather than joint engagement. Often state-peasant relations are an ongoing struggle with many dimensions and which have a long-term historical origin.¹¹ However, state-peasant relations should not be viewed in overly combative terms because quite often either side seeks and finds ways of accommodation. Often, the state may dominate with willing acquiescence from the peasants. Similarly, peasants may assert their claims by staking non-negotiable demands and sticking to them.¹²

Land reform remains a central issue in the politics of Zimbabwe and a critical defining factor of relations between the state and the peasants. Communal areas have long been acknowledged as the stronghold of the ruling political party. However, recent events (e.g. the constitutional referendum, presidential and parliamentary elections) have reflected a growing withdrawal of peasants' support for the state. Peasants have become weary of politicians, and

have taken various actions to make their dissatisfaction known. We focus our analysis in this section on the rise in dissatisfaction over the land reform program and explore how relations between the state and peasants play out in the farm invasions.

Many communal areas are located in highly marginal areas of low agricultural productivity. These areas tend to be highly sensitive to fluctuations in environmental conditions. For example, cropping and livestock systems are highly susceptible to drought. Some communal areas have experienced successive crop failures, decline in livestock population, and lack of cash to purchase inputs. Generally, one can describe peasants as resource poor with limited opportunities to intensify production. These characteristics would suggest a communal population ready and to accept state narratives on land and to clamour for more productive land. Empirical results from the two study areas suggest otherwise.

FARM INVASIONS AND RISING DISSATISFACTION OVER LAND REFORM AMONG PEASANTS

We start our analysis of changing state-peasant relations over land with the spontaneous invasions of white commercial farms by impatient peasants around the country. We focus on the Svoswe and Nyamandhlovhu farm invasions. Media reports from July to September 1998 flag these invasions as 'landmark events' that accelerated or enhanced processes of disengagement between the state and the peasants. These invasions expose the growing rift between the state and the peasants, as illustrated by media statements cited below. Other invasions that followed the initial Svoswe/Nyamandhlovhu invasions indicate widespread disenchantment with the state and political elites.

Villagers from Svoswe communal land who forcibly occupied four commercial farms last week, yesterday demanded a written undertaking from government promising them resettlement on the farms in question before they can vacate the properties¹³

Unfulfilled promises by Zimbabwe's political leadership are beginning to backfire as some landless peasants forcibly occupy white owned commercial farms, threatening to plunge the long delayed resettlement programme into further disarray... firing the latest salvo on the government's resettlement policy are communal farmers in Nyamandhlovhu in Matebeleland North and those in Svoswe in Mashonaland East who have made clear that they have had enough of empty rhetoric about land redistribution¹⁴

It has taken us 18 years to be given land, the primary factor which forced us to go to (the independence) war... We have decided we will camp here until the government gives us land because we are tired of their empty promises¹⁵

Sixty Nyazura villagers disgruntled by what they perceive as the slow pace of land acquisition excise have followed in the footsteps of the Svoswe clan and resettled themselves at Beestkraal farm in Odzi. This is the fourth mass exodus by land hungry villagers who have taken the land resettlement programme into their own lands... They accused the government of letting them down twice...¹⁶

Impatient peasants, clearly tired of promises from the government have been moving onto commercial farms will-nilly in the past two months to try to force the government to act, particularly now that the next season is only two months away¹⁷

Initial comments made by key politicians were uncompromising and called for the state to 'reassert control' over the peasants:

People who have forcibly occupied commercial farms in Svoswe in Mashonaland east Province and in Nyamandhlovhu in Matebeleland North province must vacate the farms immediately... all these people are now squatters they must be removed forthwith¹⁸

They will be treated like any other people. If we allowed this kind of behaviour it will spread like veldt fire. The law will take its course if irregular settlers refuse to move back to their villages. Policy cannot be compromised¹⁹

President Mugabe yesterday re-emphasised the need for orderly land resettlement and warned that action will be taken against villagers who continued to invade farms. Comrade Mugabe said although the Government was committed to the resettlement programme it did not condone the invasion of farms. 'Government will be forced to take action against such people. We admit we have been slow in implementing the programme but I must tell you resettlement of the land hungry people is forthcoming'²⁰

There is no point in rushing the programme through. If we do so the country will go down and end up with sand and patches of grass here and there²¹

I am aware of some political leaders from this province who are actually encouraging people from the communal areas to invade commercial farms, This is very disturbing, because the government is still in the process of resettling people. These politicians must desist from doing so²²

However, faced with declining popularity, question about the allocation of multiple farms to the political elite, and a lack of financial reserves to implement the land reform program, political elites had no choice but to recast their statements in support of the farm invasions.²³ The statements supporting farm invasions showed a growing militancy, especially after events like the loss of the referendum on the proposed new constitution (February, 2000). The new elite narrative suggested that the peasants had a longstanding grievance against inequitable distribution of land between peasants and white farmers, not that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the resettlement programme or lack of transparency in disposal of acquired land. Thus, we find in the current state rhetoric by the state a new interpretation of the purpose for the original invasions.

To sustain the new narratives, the state had to invent peasants who would chant the slogans they were now creating. The peasants of the earlier invasions were chanting different slogans and blaming the state and political elites for failed promises. Thus in the later invasions, we see a gradual replacement of genuine peasants by 'manufactured' peasants comprising state and party-financed militias (unemployed youths, war veterans, displaced farm workers and party supporters) in order to promote systematic invasions throughout the country. The peaceful and spontaneous peasant invasions were transformed into violent and systematic "drive in and set up camp" invasions.²⁴ Thus media and other reports labelled these later invasions as "the war veterans' invasions" rather than as peasant invasions. The rhetoric in support of the 'new' invasions were now being described in one study thus:

As the government increasingly sloughs off its inclusionary/reconciliatory approach and adopts the militant 'radical chic' persona of the liberation group it was 20 years ago, the

situation has become increasingly polarised. The ruling party's current gangster chic rhetoric plays to populist sentiments but at the national expense²⁵

While the involvement of war veterans was necessary for legitimating the slogans drawn from the liberation war of two decades previous, the assumed good relations between war veterans and peasants were in question, just as during the independence struggle.²⁶

PEASANT VOICES ON FAST TRACK LAND REFORM

Some statements from respondents in the two study areas demonstrate a peasant wariness of promises and talk of fast track land reform. As in many communal lands, some people in these two study areas have applied for resettlement. Some have been waiting since 2000, when the government invited applications for land under the fast track resettlement 'program', while others claim that they have been waiting for the land since independence in 1980. None of the applicants have been resettled.

Some statements made below in the village discussions reflect the growing impatience with the pace of resettlement:

Why are they 'fast-tracking now? What has happened? Do they want to give each other more land before they retire? It is for the election. They think we don't know. We have seen this before. After the election they forget about us and we will be back to square one. I think they may then come and bulldoze people from the farms. I have seen it happen. Then they will start with yes sir, yes sir again and drink tea in the big houses (referring to the big houses on the commercial farms) while we suffer²⁷

The land issue is a smokescreen only, there is no land question there, and they are not serious about it²⁸

The conversation overheard among people attending a funeral ceremony in the study area also reveals the pessimism prevalent among the peasants:

Speaker 1. We must change the government gentlemen, 22 years of unfulfilled promises. Even if you are given the land now, you are already too old, what do you do with the land. We will not be able to work it because we are all old.

Speaker 2: But old man did you not get land? Don't say the government is bad and that it is not sensitive to your needs.

Speaker 1. Who said I was given land by the government? It never allocated me land. What I did was to forcibly occupy part of a commercial farm after waiting in vain for 22 solid years. (Discussion, 20-02-2001).

In general, most peasants do not believe that the majority of the farm invaders are genuine peasants. One respondent in the study site who actually participated in the invasions observed that these militias were not peasants.

Look at us here – do you see anyone missing, you know all of us, even the war veterans are here, so tell me who is there, who are they calling the peasant. Ah that war was finished a long time ago, now we must fight our children because they have not honoured their promises, they want to keep making us fight their battles for them, while they get all the rewards²⁹

In general, the peasants ridicule the new attempts by the state to deliver on unfulfilled promises. Some respondents stated that people are tired of lies and observe that, even if the government were to be serious in its intentions, there has been such a history of broken promises that local people would still doubt the narratives. One respondent described all the slogans as 'fiction for those that are well fed.'³⁰ The general observation made was that narratives full of promises could not be sustained easily, especially where hope has been replaced by mistrust.

PROBLEMATIC NOTIONS UNDERPINNING STATE NARRATIVES ON LAND

The state narrative is fashioned on the argument that landlessness exists in communal areas, that people are eager to move to new lands, and that productivity will improve after resettlement. Data presented from key interviews and focus group discussions questions these notions. There is no doubt that in both study areas people are keenly aware of the land question. Land is a popular subject in everyday interactions and negotiations.

Notion 1. That there is acute landlessness in communal areas that will be eased by resettlement

According to our data, 6.5% of the households in one study area lease out land but none do so in the second site. There is evidence of many arrangements over land between households, where exchanges, loans and even cash sales of land occur. This pattern is characteristic of other communal areas where there was similarly a high prevalence among households of land transactions. This suggests that the land shortage as perceived by the peasants needs to be conceptualised in relation to a diverse range of factors.³¹ While some households are land-hungry others have excess land. The land transactions are part of a complex of reciprocal relations or social capital, upon which many people.

Our interviews suggest that landlessness may indeed be a phenomenon of the younger generation (young adults in the 18-30 year age bracket) but given the opportunity, they are more interested in employment in industry and urban areas than being resettled for farming (see below).

Notion 2. Peasants are eager for land reform and will relocate to new areas

Evidence suggests that many peasants are not that interested in relocation because:

- ⊙ they are no longer attached to the lands of their forefathers
- ⊙ the potential new lands are of a similar productivity level to those that they presently have
- ⊙ chaos prevails in the fast-tracked lands
- ⊙ they fear losing social networks or power bases
- ⊙ young people do not desire a farming livelihood
- ⊙ household pressures preclude any major disturbances, such as a shift to a new locality.

The idea that peasants are prepared to relocate is therefore a problematic aspect of the state narrative. In most communal areas, as in the two study areas, the peasants have some experience of relocation. The two study areas are relatively new settlements, most people having arrived from Midlands in the early 1950s. But none of the respondents described the land question as requiring the appropriation or acquisition of the so-called 'lands of the forefathers'. Only 8% of individuals in the study areas are over 55 years and likely to remember their former areas. Furthermore, most acquired farms that are close to the two study areas are in marginal ecological zones with low agricultural potential.

Yes we want land but some of the land being given to people is not suitable; some of the farms are malaria areas, far off such that if one falls ill, no one will afford to visit them and some of the farms are not suitable for crop production³²

The manner in which land is being acquired under fast track land reform has made some peasants wary of the process. As the 'program' is fast-tracked, people believe there is no plan about who goes where. A respondent who claims to have visited the fast-tracked farms described the landscape as chaotic and unplanned (key interview 10-9-2001). Some of the comments indicate that the degree of lawlessness and chaos on some of the fast-tracked farms is so bad then could be described as squatter camps. There appear to be many doubts about whether people that already occupy fast-tracked lands will be given title to that land or whether there will be any security of tenure over claims already in place. Peasants refer to new settlers on fast-tracked lands as squatters because of the temporary nature of the settlement and land use around the settlements. In the past, squatters in communal areas other lands have been reviled and expelled.

Who wants to be called a squatter when you have a perfectly good home here? I have enough land that I am failing to cultivate. Why would I go? Let them go, but I won't go back to sleeping in caves and under plastics³³

Already there are cases (see next section) of people who have been expelled from settled areas, making potential settlers nervous about the long-term prospects of remaining on fast-tracked land.

Local traditional leaders relate stories of alien people being settled on their forefather's lands simply because they are war veterans. Even if it were possible unravel the complexity of who should move to where, this process would take much time and affect fast tracking. There is no indication that whole communities can be settled together, suggesting that resettled people would lose their current social networks, an important facet of survival in communal areas. Most respondents felt that if the people had to move to the new areas, entire villages should move together. One traditional leader states,

If the government says it will resettle us in Midlands where we came from (in 1952), we may consider moving out, only if people say they want to³⁴

However, for the moment reallocation on fast-tracked lands is controlled by war veterans. Relocation therefore implies a loss of control by existing leaders and disrespect for 'traditional' norms, rules and values. In general, there is still much respect for traditional leaders in the study areas. Given the above, traditional leaders are not sure they would remain in control if moved to the land of their forefathers, and would prefer to stay in their current locations.

Though there is support for resettling young people, many youth indicate that they would prefer jobs to farming. The general view was that the state should create jobs and opportunities outside of communal areas. One respondent stated during a group discussion,

If we wanted our children to become farmers like us why would we bother sending them to O or A level? To become a farmer like me do you have to have O levels?³⁵

Both study areas experience large outflow of young people from agriculture into handicraft, seasonal migration to South Africa, gold panning, etc. Local people argue that the limited availability of other options force them to stay in agriculture. Given a choice, most would pursue non-farm options whilst still maintaining some links to their communal area.

Both study areas have experienced high mortality to HIV/AIDS. In most cases, the active labour group is being affected, leaving orphaned children under the care of relations. In a number of cases these children are being left in the care of old people. As well as loss of labour, households have spent family income and assets for healthcare, leaving little capital for agricultural inputs. Some households have become destitute. Some respondents indicate that due to HIV/AIDS, they have also lost remitters and this has severely affected their agricultural activities. With these deaths, some land has been freed up for use and the extent of landlessness has declined. Most of the elderly we interviewed are reluctant to move to new lands. They say that they are too old. Further, many households have lost all their resources in supporting family members and relations and have no means to make agriculture viable in a new place. These factors lead us to question who is likely to go to the fast-tracked areas, as many of the intended beneficiaries remain unwilling.

Generally, peasants were hesitant about relocating to fast-tracked farms. The few who went (see next section) left their families, homes and other assets intact in the communal areas. Some families wanted to maintain two homesteads and felt no desire to give up their rights in communal lands. In some cases, people who have gone to the fast-tracked lands only did so to exploit the resources (wildlife and firewood) before moving back to the communal area.

Notion 3. Productivity will improve with moves to new lands

Most households in the study areas rely on income (cash and subsistence) from a diversity of sources, including dryland crop production (all households), gardening (84% of households), livestock production (78%), woodland activities (100%), wage or home industries (82%) and remittances/gifts (91%). Some of the wealthy households suggested, that agriculture in communal areas is rarely viable so one must be versatile and rely on other options. Yet in the current state narrative, there are implicit assumptions that peasants are farmers and wish to remain so. Past peasant experiences with resettlement indicate that resettlement on productive land is undeniably an option but is only feasible when associated with an adequate policy and technological environment to make the enterprise viable. Often, peasants who move to resettlement areas have found themselves isolated from the social networks that guarantee them the labour or technological resources needed to make production viable. Therefore, true poverty alleviation (e.g. lifting people above US\$1 a day) is not simply a matter of access to land.

Respondents also suggest that land quality is not the only issue. They refer to the experience of some peasants on irrigation schemes in the same district. For example, one respondent observed that if land quality were the main issue, people in these communal areas

would have moved out in large numbers when the government established nearby irrigation schemes in the late 1980s. The only two people to be resettled on the scheme maintained their homesteads in the study area and eventually abandoned the irrigation schemes. Accounts from people who have returned from irrigation schemes and other resettlement areas suggest that there is very little government support (e.g. infrastructure, inputs, credit) to start operations on new land. Further, people suspect that the government may pretend to offer them land for free but will eventually charge them, as happened in some irrigation schemes.

Some people are crying for virgin lands but they have failed to work on the land we allocated them here. Do you think they will be able to perform miracles if they are given land on the commercial farms? Yes for sure, soil fertility in the area has gone down, but it is due to continued cultivation over the years. It is the same story on the commercial farms. Without fertiliser you cannot harvest anything on those farms³⁶

PEASANT EXPERIENCES OF FAST TRACK RESETTLEMENT

Out of about two hundred households in the two study sites, only six people went to the fast-tracked lands. Firstly, such a low level of relocation will do nothing to ease landlessness. Secondly, most of the experiences with relocation were negative. The following cases are documented from those who left to resettle in the fast-tracked areas.

Case 1. An elderly farmer, who is considered to have sufficient land (he has more than 10 acres), joined the occupants and settled on a former game ranch about 100 km away from the study site. There he teamed up with others and started a lucrative enterprise selling poached game meat. They trapped the animals using snares and he sold the meat to his village at give-away prices (US\$ 1.5 per kg of roasted meat). He also sold fish poached from earth dams in the commercial farms. Meanwhile, his family remained in the study site, continuing with life as usual. Towards the end of 2001 the government chased away all the occupants of that farm because the farm had been de-listed, and he returned to the study site.

Case 2. A teacher at a nearby school, living in one of the villages in the study site, also went to the fast-tracked lands. His wife is an active member of the ruling party who was recently allocated a farm about 70 km away from the study site. The wife had applied for the land through party structures. When his wife got the land, the teacher thought of resigning from teaching so that he could venture into farming full-time. However, quick counselling from relatives saved the situation. His relatives told him that farming was very risky and at his age (in his forties) it would not be prudent to quit a job that had a constant cash income. The advice came after the teacher had already dismantled some of his houses and sent some of his property to the new farm in Triangle. He hired some young men to work on the new farm. He only went to the farm during weekends to supervise. Meanwhile, the teacher has applied for resettlement in his own name and has already been approved (though this is not certain). It had been going well at the farm in Triangle until a group of war veterans descended on the plot, stating that they suspected that the young men the teacher hired were supporters of the opposition party. They interrogated the young men about their relation to the plot owner, their political affiliation and that of the plot owners. When the war veterans heard that the husband of the plot owner was a teacher, they claimed that he was a member of the opposition who could not get land in

that part of the country. The war veterans then severely beat up the young men, after which they burnt all the belongings of the teacher's family, including clothes, chairs, blankets, pots and farming equipment. This happened even though the teacher's wife holds a key position in the women's league of the ruling party.

Case 3. A war veteran, from one of the study sites also went to occupy commercial farmland. He farms about 12 acres of land in the study area, slightly above average. In 2000, at the height of the farm invasions, he went to occupy a portion of a fertile farm in a nearby district, about 200 km away. He and other war veterans forced the farm owner off the farm. For a year, the war veteran stayed at the farm where he says he was made the base commander. He claimed that a pistol, given by the government, went with his appointment. When the cropping season came (2000/2001), he grew maize and cotton, which consumed more than US\$ 125 for inputs. The average cash income per household per year in the study site is about US\$300, so the input costs were sizeable. Meanwhile his entire family remained at his communal home where they continued to crop as usual. Rumour was rife that the war veteran had taken a second wife to assist him on the new farm. Before the crops were ripe, a political heavyweight in the district, also a businessman, evicted the war veterans from the farm. The businessman owns a farm adjacent to the invaded farm and claimed that he was leasing the farm to the former commercial farmer stating that if the land occupiers kept squatting on his farm it went against the government's black empowerment policy. In disgrace, the war veteran and others left the farm and returned home to join others in the familiar lands. "My brother, there we were tricked. I lost a lot of money. This is politics there is nothing we can do about it". Up to now, the war veteran has not talked about going to the farms again.

Case 4. The case of three brothers illustrate that getting land depends on whom you know. The brothers do not have enough land for farming in the study site. Both have families, but have less than two acres each even though their father was one of the early settlers in the area. The land of their late father was subdivided amongst the many brothers. One of their elder brothers works for the government as a Central Intelligence Officer far from the study site. In 2001, the CIO-employed brother invited the other two brothers to take up land that he had secured for them in a prime farming area. The two brothers rushed for the land, but left behind their families to keep the homesteads in the communal areas going. They are planning to bring the families after they have security of tenure and when they will not disrupt their children's school calendar. The brothers obviously got the farm as a result of political connections. However, the brothers' stay in the fast-tracked farm was recently dealt a heavy blow. The youngest brother in the family, meant to be heir to the lands in the study area passed away. This means that to keep the land in the family, one of the two brothers who went to the fast-tracked farms must come back to the study area.

Case 5. One of the farmers in the study area does not have land of his own and is forced each cropping season to lease land from other farmers in the area. He is married and about 40 years old. His parents, also living in the area, do have land but it is not enough to subdivide. In 2000, the farmer was encouraged, like many others, to occupy land on commercial farms. The process of applying for the land was costly, as he had to make several trips to the district capital to get application forms, get technical advice, get cash flow budget forms, and then submit the forms. He assumed that approval would be fast-tracked, as proclaimed by the government. This

was not to be the case. So in 2001, he travelled about 200 km to where some war veterans were 'legally' allocating land to landless peasants. He was allocated a piece of land on a commercial farm that had been 'acquired' by the government. He built some brick and thatch houses. He spent a couple of months on the fast-tracked land establishing his new homestead. In 2001, his wife went to a teaching college. There was now no one staying at the family's homestead in the communal land and the farmer started to look for a buyer for the homestead. But before he could find a buyer, the Government chased the farmers away from their new plots because they had not followed proper procedure in acquiring that land. The farmer came back home and started to renovate his dilapidated houses. Instead of waiting any longer, he has gone to the city in search of employment.

Case 6. This farmer has about three acres of land. He used to work in the sugar estates in Triangle, but returned to the study site after being retrenched during the drought of 1992. When he came home, he could not get a big piece of land. When people started invading commercial farms in 2000, this farmer joined and went to settle in the grazing area of another scheme established by Government in the late 1980s. The invaders claimed that the grazing area of the scheme was under-utilised. Some war veterans co-ordinated the occupation, charging each applicant US\$10. In 2001, the government sent riot police to chase away the invaders. This farmer has now gone to Bulawayo, looking for employment.

These stories challenge the state narrative on land. Some of the peasants whose stories are cited here argue that they (the peasants) should and must tell their own stories about land. They declare that the state narrative on land is a hoax and this was proven at their expense. Their reasons for returning to communal areas varied. These cases suggest that there will not be a surplus of farming land in the communal area, as the population outflow due to relocation is very limited.

REFLECTING ON THE REALITIES OF FAST TRACK RESETTLEMENT

In our introduction, we suggested that the state narrative on land does not truly articulate the stories of the peasants. Any narrative on land must have the concrete backing of a definite class. To push for land reform without a political class base is to initiate a vague process which will have no backing should vested interests resist the program.³⁷ While the early 'spontaneous' invasions by peasants were hailed as the unfolding of a genuinely people-centred story on land reform, the later invasions by war veterans were a politically-motivated story crafted by the state.

Peasants are now beginning to challenge this telling of their story by political elites and to describe state narratives as 'slogans of people who are well fed'. Relations of power are often interwoven with other kinds of relations.³⁸ There is a layering of relations between peasants, war veterans, business elites, political, elites and even commercial farmers who appeared at first glance to be the target of the invasions. Reactions by the state at various points expose relationships in transition. In the end, at the national level we see the replacement of peasants by the 'manufactured' peasants or war veterans, suggesting that the state has disengaged from the peasants. Peasants, by withdrawing from the invasions, have also substantially disengaged from the events and the discussions on the land issue. At the study sites, we saw the return of

the six households that got some fast-tracked land. Such withdrawal, if common to other communal areas, is likely to have far reaching implications for overall state-peasant relations and the legitimisation of the state's narrative on land.³⁹ Thus, it is possible to speak of what some studies have termed reciprocal or mutual disengagement.⁴⁰

Data from the study sites challenges the universality of implicit assumptions made about land and the reform process with regards to peasants. There is probably more local debate now than before about what constitutes the 'land question'. All indications suggest that peasants want the land question refocused. They challenge the key parameters underpinning the state's narrative on land. For example, landlessness may not be easily defined, and many households are unwilling or reluctant to move elsewhere.⁴¹ We found no peasant who has left the communal areas behind completely: the old don't want to leave, the young are finding other options, and those that left for the fast-tracked lands have returned. Why are so few people willing to go to the fast-tracked lands and leave the communal areas? We suggest that they have found out at their own cost that state slogans and narratives on land are just "fiction created by the political elites who are not hungry".

Actors weave innumerable relationships among themselves. These relationships have qualitative differences and can be grouped into special categories. Most importantly, they are experienced in daily life.⁴² There is still a need to challenge the notion that elites monopolise power. Scott, for example, presents a list of what he calls evidence for everyday forms of resistance.⁴³ These forms require little or no coordination and by making use of implicit understandings and informal networks, they typically avoid any form of direct confrontation with authority or elite norms. However, in the data presented here, although the peasant invasions conform to the type of unplanned, spontaneous events described as weapons of the weak, they in fact represent a confrontation with the state. The withdrawal of peasants from the invasions, while suggesting disengagement, highlights a deepening crisis of confidence towards the state. Thus, we suggest that peasants withdraw from the invasions because they are suddenly unsure of the extent of their 'room for manoeuvre' or the likely reaction of the state, which has in the past used systematic violence to stop dissent. But as suggested in some literature, political action is not entirely voluntaristic.⁴⁴ The choice to engage or disengage in political action is conditioned by the actor's perception of power. The key challenge today is to determine just how much political autonomy peasants have in Zimbabwe.

In the metaphor cited at the start, it is tempting to believe that the dog is powerless and passive. Peasants are not weak, nor passive, they are able to define their room for manoeuvre when necessary and challenge the monopolization of power by political elites.⁴⁵ Thus, some would argue that if peasants decide to organise, power can be aggregated beyond the reach of the state and be used as a counterbalance to excessive political centralisation.⁴⁶ The weak have weapons with which they challenge elites, define their own spaces for manoeuvre, and mould authority within the limits of their abilities.⁴⁷ In the Eastern Highlands in Zimbabwe, there are many accounts of resistance to the state by the Tangwena people.⁴⁸ Recent literature suggests that state-peasant relations over the last few years, and even during the liberation struggle, were far from harmonious.⁴⁹ Since independence, the state has wielded tremendous power over the peasants and monopolised the creation of narratives. To some degree, it has also perpetuated the myth that the state speaks with peasant voices. The wholesale resuscitation of

the liberation war narrative on land and its slogans forces us to reassess its meaning and interpretation by peasants in communal areas in Zimbabwe. Thus, we challenge the universality of these slogans and expose their irrelevance in the context of the realities of household assets, social processes and production systems in smallholder systems. We suggest that the indications of peasant disengagement with the state highlighted here will intensify as land reform progresses.

Our story of the hunter and the dog at the beginning of this paper seems at first glance to appropriately describe the relationship between peasants and the state. The state may tell the story about peasants and land, but they don't live it. Peasants tell their stories better.

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Notes:

1. Interview 21-2-2002.
2. Roe 1991.
3. Roe 1991.
4. Due to the high sensitivity of discussing land issue, many of these interviews were held in private and we promised anonymity to our respondents. Names of the study area and the district have been withheld to honour confidentiality agreements, especially given the current state-sponsored violence in the country.
5. Bratton 1994.
6. Bratton 1994.
7. King and Stivers 1998.
8. Healy and Robinson 1994.
9. Bratton 1994.
10. Bratton 1994; Moore 1998.
11. Moore 1998.
12. Bratton 1994.
13. Staff Reporter, *The Herald*, 24-06-1998. *The Herald* is a state run newspaper.
14. *The Financial Gazette*, 25-06-1998. *The Financial Gazette* is a privately owned newspaper.
15. Ibid.
16. Crime Reporter, *The Herald*, 01-07-1998.
17. Staff Reporter, *The Financial Gazette*, 02-09-1998.
18. Minister of Agriculture in an interview with *The Herald*, 19-06-1998.
19. Minister John Nkomo cited by Nyandima in *The Herald* 23-06-1998.
20. Agricultural Reporter, *The Herald*, 20-09-1998.
21. Ibid.
22. Governor Chanetsa cited by Staff Reporter, *The Herald*, 31-09-1998.
23. Moyo 1998.
24. Sibanda 2000; Chitiyo 2000.

25. Chitiyo 2000:2.
26. Ranger 1985; Krieger 1992.
27. Interview 19-02-2001.
28. Ibid.
29. Interview 10-09-2001.
30. "slogan i politics dzevakaguta".
31. Sithole 1999; Woomer and Scoones 2000.
32. Interview 02-01-2000.
33. Ibid. The label squatter has unfavourable connotations in communal areas where social groups and land use are relatively well defined.
34. Interview 07-02-2001.
35. Village Meeting, 01-2002.
36. Interview 19-02-2002.
37. Ranger 1993.
38. Villareal 1992.
39. In other studies conducted in the study area, researchers have argued that the study area is typical of large portions of communal areas in Zimbabwe.
40. Bratton 1994.
41. See also Sithole (1999), Dore (1994) and Woomer and Scoones (2002) on landlessness and land transactions.
42. Marquet, 1971.
43. Scott 1985.
44. Bratton 1994.
45. Scott 1995.
46. Bratton 1994.
47. Scott 1995; Villareal 1992.
48. Moore 1998.
49. Krieger 1992; Ranger 1993.

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The Experience of Resettled Farmers in Zimbabwe

SOPHIA CHIREMBA AND WILLIAM MASTERS

Abstract: This study assesses the relative productivity of smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe's land reform and resettlement programme. We use a panel of survey data collected in 1992, 1993, 1996, and 1997 from up to 400 resettled households, who in 1981-84 had been moved onto previously large-scale commercial farms in three distinct agro-ecological regions. A sub-sample of 166 households were surveyed in all four years, and for 1997 we have data from a comparable survey of 147 farmers in communal areas (CAS). Using these data, we ask whether and how the resettled farmers' productive efficiency might have converged to their area's efficiency frontier over time, and whether particular farmer characteristics or institutional interventions might have helped them to improve faster. Applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods to measure productive efficiency, we find that although individual farmers often moved towards higher efficiency levels, there was no trend towards the frontier, and farmers' improvements were not consistently correlated with receiving formal credit or extension services, having more experience or education, or using more farm equipment. In sum, despite the relatively large and uniform land area available to each farmer, they had widely varying productivity levels, not overcome by conventional farm services.

Introduction

With the advent of majority rule in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) adopted the goal of 'growth with equity'. New policies included bringing underutilized land into full production and reducing the inequality in land holdings.¹ The first phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Program (LRRP1) began in 1980, which by 1997 had redistributed 3.5 million hectares to 71,000 families from communal areas—well below the initial target of 8.3 million hectares and 162,000 families.² A second phase of resettlement (LRRP2) was begun in 1998, followed by an accelerated fast-track resettlement phase in June 2000, and then the announcement of an end to land redistribution in August 2002.³ Although it has been more than two decades since the start of Zimbabwe's resettlement experience, this massive socioeconomic change remains relatively unstudied.

The official government critique of resettlement a decade after its implementation views the program as a failure. The program "failed to have a positive impact on agricultural productivity and rural incomes".⁴ Von Blanckenburg concludes that in the first decade of land reform, the GoZ failed "sufficiently" to take care of productivity in the new resettlement sub-sector. Another opinion and perhaps a more widely shared view is that Zimbabwe's initial resettlement program was slow but remarkably successful by 'historical standards'.⁵

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a5.pdf>

Nonetheless, there remain considerable disparities between resettlement areas and communal areas, and within the resettlements. The Ministry of Lands admitted that “although a number of settlers are already achieving the recommended income targets, a group of farmers is emerging for whom the benefits of being resettled are very marginal”.⁶

Most studies of resettled farmers use the panel of surveys known as the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics project (or Kinsey data), which sampled some of the very first farmers to be resettled in the early 1980s. Analyses using these data have addressed productivity, asset accumulation, diversification, consumption smoothing, welfare indicators (mainly health and child nutrition), the effectiveness of relief and development assistance, evidence of structural adjustment impacts, gender dimensions, the role of government services, and access to and use of resources.⁷ In this study, we use the Kinsey dataset in a new way, to ask whether and why some resettled farmers are performing less well than others.

The paper first discusses agricultural land distribution in Zimbabwe and describes its resettlement programme. This sets the stage for our own analysis of resettled farmers’ experience. By using non-parametric efficiency measurement we compare each farmer to every other farmer in the survey, and quantify each farmer’s ‘distance’ from the ‘frontier’ of the most productive farmers in their area. With this approach, we test whether resettled farmers’ productivity is influenced by more farm equipment, credit availability, extension, education, or other support services such as membership in farmer organizations. The result is a quantitative test of whether and how resettled farmers can discover or be taught how best to farm in their new environment.

AGRICULTURE AND LAND DISTRIBUTION IN ZIMBABWE

Agricultural Systems

The dual agricultural system inherited from the colonial era divided Zimbabwe into two sectors: a large-scale commercial (LSC) sector controlled by white settlers from Europe, and a small-scale (SS) sector controlled by indigenous people. Small-scale farming was further subdivided into small-scale commercial (SSC) areas and communal areas (CAs), plus the later resettlement areas (RAs).

As in other countries, farmers with less land tend to use it more intensively, and Zimbabwe’s LSC farmers actually plough only a small fraction of potentially arable land. They typically run cattle on land that smallholders would have ploughed – resulting in well over half of the national beef herd being reared on relatively high-potential arable land.⁸ One source estimated the percentage of underutilized arable land in the LSC areas at about 40-50% in high potential agro-climatic regions I, II, and 85% in lower-potential region III.⁹ As shown in Table 1, the national-average cropping intensity of LSC farms was 4%, as compared to a cropping intensity of 11% in CAs and 8% in RAs. Current figures on cropping intensity could not be obtained to update these 1994 data. However, the total area in RAs has increased from 3.3 million ha as of 1994 to an estimated 7.3 million ha of mostly model A1 resettlement farms in 2002.¹⁰

TABLE 1. Land Use by Farming Area

	CA ^b	LSC ^c	RA ^d	SSC ^e	Total
<i>AVERAGES</i>					
Area per farm (ha/hh) ^a	18	2,500	38	125	-
Of which: area planted (ha)	2	103	3	7	-
Cropping intensity (%)	11	4	8	6	-
TOTALS					
Total Area (million ha)	(16.4) ^f 16.4	(15.5)10.3	(0)7.3	(1.4)1.4	35.4
Total Area (%)	46.3	29.1	20.6	4.0	100.0
Number of Farms ('000s)					

Source: Adapted from Masters, 1994; Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) of Zimbabwe, 2002; UNDP report, 2002.

^a hectares per household

^b Communal Areas

^c Large scale commercial farming areas comprising CFU and non-CFU farms, indigenous farmers' unions farm and large estates owned by multinationals.

^d Resettlement areas ^e Small scale commercial farming areas

^f 1980 figures are in brackets

Land Use and Production

LSC farms are highly mechanized with widespread use of irrigation and chemical spraying equipment as well as land preparation, planting and harvesting equipment. But these resources are concentrated on their best and most conveniently located land, while their other land is left to cattle.¹¹ Also, the LSC sector as a whole is more diversified than SS farming, including wildlife ranching as well as horticulture and many niche products, but individual LSC farmers tend to be more specialized than individual SS farmers.¹² Finally, LSC farms are much more market-oriented, contributing about 40% of market delivery of maize, cotton, groundnut, 90-100% of market delivery of wheat, soyabean, tobacco, coffee, tea and sugar cane, 80% of all commercial beef sales and virtually all milk deliveries to the Dairy Marketing Board; supplying about a third of the raw materials to local manufacturing; and, contributing about 50% of all export earnings via exports of tobacco, maize, cotton, beef, etc in the normal seasons.¹³ The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement reported in 1992 that the LSC Farms had provided 72% of the national production value of all major crops since 1983/84.¹⁴

Smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe generally engage in subsistence mixed farming. Livestock provides animal draught for tillage, transport, manure, milk, meat, some cash income, and a stock of wealth.¹⁵ Crop production provides most of the food for the household, which may also sell or buy some food.¹⁶ Land preparation is mostly by ox-drawn plough, some weeding is done by ox-drawn cultivator, and some transportation is by ox-drawn carts.¹⁷ Some SS farmers and few CA and RA farmers own or hire tractors and other mechanical equipment. There are several donor-funded equipment-hire schemes, which may have been underutilized because of their high costs outweighing the costs of animal draught cultivation.¹⁸ In the early 1990s, maize and cotton were reportedly the largest crops by market value, although large areas of land were also under sorghum, millets, groundnuts, and sunflowers.¹⁹ Maize is the dominant food crop, in part because the development of increasingly high-performance hybrid seeds since the 1960s displaced other food crops.

With majority rule in 1980, maize production by SS farmers grew rapidly, and the LSC sector turned increasingly towards exports, especially horticulture: by 1995, 1,600 LSC farmers were horticultural producers.²⁰ The land area under flowers, fruits and horticulture almost tripled from less than 4,000 hectares to almost 11,000 hectares of formally registered areas of production in 1993.²¹

Moyo categorizes five land use regimes that reflect the emerging values underlying Zimbabwe's land markets and demand: extensive and exotic land use zone (wildlife, forest and tourism), the wildlife buffer zone, the CA subsistence mixed farming, commercial wildlife/cattle ranching and commercial intensive cropping zone. The extensive and exotic land use zone comprises very large state-owned estates interspersed with LSC farms.²² The wildlife buffer zone borders large parks and LSC areas, which are gradually transforming existing CAs into community wildlife management zones. Besides wildlife, these areas produce maize, cotton, and various woodlands products. The CA subsistence mixed farming zone comprises CAs in natural regions III, IV, and V producing on a mixed farm basis and selling any surplus in good rainy seasons.²³ LSC farmers and some CAs dominate the commercial wildlife and cattle ranching zone. According to Moyo, 70% of the intensive cropping zone is LSC-owned with most commercial grain production, tobacco, and horticultural activities occurring in this zone. Incidentally, until 1995, there was little land redistribution in the area and most legal contests to compulsory acquisition took place despite underutilization of 50% of the arable land.²⁴ Because resettlement focused on lower-potential areas, Deininger et al. reported in 2000 that the redistribution efforts of 3.2 million hectares had no negative impact on LSC farm output. Since then, however, Zimbabwe's commercial agricultural production has been almost fully disrupted, contributing to collapse of the entire national economy.²⁵

Agro-Climatic Regions

Zimbabwe's agricultural areas have been classified into five broad agro-climatic or Natural Regions, in which the dominant natural factor conditioning agricultural production is rainfall (Table 2).

Table 2. Land Classification by Natural Region

Natural Region	Area extent (million ha)	% Total land area	Annual Rainfall (mm)	Agricultural Productivity
I	0.62	1.6	>1000	Suitable for dairy farming, forestry, tea, coffee, fruit, beef and maize production
II	7.31	18.8	750-1000	Suitable for intensive farming based on maize, tobacco, cotton and livestock.
III	6.85	17.6	650-800	Semi-intensive farming region. Severe mid-season dry spells are common. Suitable for livestock production, together with production of fodder crops and cash crops under good farm management.
IV	12.84	33.0	450-650	Semi-extensive region. Subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spell during the rainy season. Suitable for farming systems based on livestock and resistant fodder crops. Forestry, wildlife/tourism.
V	11.28	29.0	<450	Extensive farming region. Suitable for extensive cattle ranching or game ranching. Zambezi Valley is infested with tsetse flies. Forestry, wildlife/tourism.

Source: Adapted from Moyo (2000)

The skewed distribution of land between the different farming sub-sectors is evident from Table 3, as the commercial farmers have the majority of their land in the higher potential areas, while CAs and RAs are concentrated in the lower agro-potential regions IV and V. In the low-potential areas, normal rainfall levels are barely adequate for intensive crop production, irrigation development is limited, and in low-rainfall years such as 1982-84, 1986-87, 1991-92, 1994-95 and 2001-02 there are widespread crop failures.²⁶

Table 3. Land Distribution by Natural Region

Natural Region	Mean Annual Rainfall mm	Area ha	Total %	Communal & Resettlement ^a %	Commercial LSC & SSC ^b and Urban %	State DNPWM ^c Forest %

I	>1,000	7,050	1.8	19 (1)	64	17
II	750-1,000	58,750	15.0	21 (8)	77	1
III	650-1,000	72,900	18.6	39 (17)	52	9
IV	450-650	147,700	37.8	50 (45)	29	21
V	<450	104,500	26.7	46 (29)	36	18
Total	650	390,900	100.0	42 (100)	43	15

Source: Bratton (1994)

^a The figure in brackets gives the proportion of communal area located in that Natural Region.

^b Large-scale, Small-scale commercial and Urban.

^c Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management

THE LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME (LRRP)

Since 1980, three GoZ resettlement programs and one joint government-LSC program have been implemented. Since 1980, the GoZ acquired land only on a willing-buyer-willing seller basis. Later, compulsory acquisition was facilitated by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and subsequent amendments.

LRRP Phase One (1980-1997)

LRRP1 redistributed 3,498,440 million hectares to 71,000 families.²⁷ The progress of the program was much slower than anticipated. The GoZ had planned to resettle 8.3 million hectares on four resettlement models of varying sizes and land use. At the end of 1985, 2.46 million hectares had been acquired and 36,000 families were settled.²⁸ During the ten-year resettlement period 1981-1991, von Blanckenburg reports that resettlement averaged 4,800 farmers per year, only one third of the 1985 target. Slow progress was attributed by the Ministry of Lands to drought, financial constraints and problems of acquiring contiguous land adjacent to communal lands, as the willing buyer-willing seller approach meant that resettlements were scattered and therefore difficult to administer.²⁹ Land purchase and acquisition processes were cumbersome and expensive. There was also a lack of transparency in beneficiary selection.

LRRP Phase Two (1997-December 2004)

In the second phase of LRRP (LRRP2), the target was to acquire 5 million hectares between September 1998 and December 2004 using existing but improving government approaches.³⁰ Beneficiaries were to include the landless poor (to relieve congested communal areas), graduates of agricultural colleges, and individuals with established farming experience, and to other disadvantaged groups such as women. With several amendments to the statutory land policy instruments, additional acquisition procedures were identified after the first decade of LRRP. These included land designation or compulsory acquisition of land identified through screening of a given set of designation criteria, which included under-utilized land, land

contiguous to congested CAs, multiple farm ownership, derelict land, and absentee landowners.

The government sought donor support for the new plan at a widely publicized September 1998 conference. The World Bank agreed to support a two-year Inception Phase project, in which the government proposed to resettle as many families as possible on one million hectares. A UNDP 2002 interim report states that in the end, only 4,697 families were resettled on 145,000 hectares.³¹

Fast Track Resettlement Phase (July 2000-December 2001)

In 2000, acceleration of LRRP2 began in response to the relatively little progress made for the two-year period following the September 1998 donor conference. The GoZ resolved to redistribute the 5 million hectares target by December 2001. Methods of land acquisition, beneficiary selection and resettlement support were changed to a completely command-driven approach. New targets were to redistribute 9 million hectares and to cover 160,000 model A1 beneficiaries from the poor and 51,000 small to medium-scale 'indigenous' commercial farmers.³² As of mid-November 2001, about 160,000 families had been resettled on 3,074 previously large-scale commercial farms covering about 7.3 million hectares.³³

Resettlement Models and Beneficiary Selection

Four different models of resettlement were initially pursued in the various resettlement schemes implemented under LRRP. These were supplemented later by other variations.³⁴ The most successful and large part of LRRP has occurred under model A.³⁵ Model A was further elaborated into two categories, model A1, for accelerated intensive resettlement, and model A2, normal intensive resettlement. One of the GoZ's objectives for LRRP, the A1 model, is the decongestion of communal areas. It provides for farms that are relatively small but adequate to sustain a family and produce a surplus.³⁶ They can be either villagised or self-contained. For the former, the settlers are provided with three hectares of arable land and communal grazing. The self-contained farm is one contiguous area that could be used for crops and livestock. A settlement scheme may be composed of several such units but without a village structure.³⁷ The A2 model is aimed at providing small-scale commercial farms to applicants with experience in agriculture, preferably those trained to be master farmers.³⁸ Of the more than 71,000 families resettled up to late 1996, 93% were settled on model A schemes, fewer than 6% on Model B schemes, and just less than 1% on Model C schemes.³⁹ Model B was a general failure because of poor infrastructure, financing and management.⁴⁰ Although about 20,000 families are benefiting from additional grazing land made available under model D, these have generally not involved resettlement.⁴¹

The GoZ employed several criteria in selecting beneficiaries for post-independence resettlement as has been done by other governments such as Kenya, Indonesia and Malaysia.⁴² Resettlement took place after an applicant has successfully completed the steps required to determine eligibility. A2 model applicants must show evidence of access to enough capital to develop the farms into viable enterprises. Having demonstrated the ability to repay the cost of the farm, successful applicants are provided with 99-year leases with the option to purchase.⁴³ In

the last year, A2 applicants have been notified of their selection via print and broadcast media announcements.

Resettlement Support and Resources

LRRP1 beneficiaries were provided with start-up tillage services and inputs for half a hectare for each family.⁴⁴ This suggests that beneficiaries were either expected to provide their own inputs to cover the remainder of the cultivated portion of the five hectare plot or make alternative arrangements to secure inputs through financial institutions or public and private input supplier credit schemes. For purposes other than land purchase, the pre-existing credit system was used for a short trial period, but defaults caused by droughts kept many settlers outside the formal credit system for almost a decade.⁴⁵ The GoZ relaxed strict prohibitions against off-farm employment to enable settlers who had fallen out of the institutional credit net to meet their own funding needs. In the two-year action plan for LRRP2, the Inception Phase Framework Plan, the GOZ proposed that the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) would provide credit for development and working capital under its Farm Input Credit Scheme.⁴⁶ Further, the Resettlement Credit Scheme would be enhanced to provide loans in the first year of settlement and start-up grants to cover part of the initial production needs would be provided.⁴⁷ The UNDP reported that GoZ funds trickled down to settlers through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and through the Agricultural Development Bank (AGRIBANK). The Agricultural Development Assistance Fund (ADAF), a spin off from the commercialization of AFC in 1999, makes seasonal and investment loans with excellent recovery rate compared to AGRIBANK, whose clientele was predominantly large-scale farmers.⁴⁸ The UNDP also projected that ADAF could be an important institution for providing credit on a competitive basis to all small-scale farmers if it were to become independent.

Kinsey and Binswanger reported that in the early resettlement stages extension coverage was virtually universal, and helped resettled farmers make a major shift in production technology. Coverage has since returned to pre-resettlement levels.⁴⁹ Earlier resettlement was also plagued by inexperienced and untrained extension workers who brought nothing new to resettlement projects but instead tended to propagate CA-type farming practices.⁵⁰ Through the Inception Phase Framework Plan of 1999-2000, the GoZ pledged to deliver customized extension and training to meet the specific needs to beneficiaries. Training institutions were expected to range from government, private sector, non-governmental organizations, farmer organizations, local development associations, commodity organizations and parastatals.⁵¹ However, the UNDP found the capacity of the existing extension staff too limited to provide new settlers with the intensive advice required at the initial stages of development.

There are several motives why the GoZ chose this program instead of a more equitable and more efficient one such as the farm subdivision approach in Kenya following its independence.⁵² The GoZ imposed a crude approach of taking over whole farms and proceeding with slow, expensive and unproductive extension work to establish uniform lots of three or five hectares per family. As it happened, many politicians and military people obtained very low-cost leases to operate the purchased but not yet resettled farms, creating a strong constituency for having a very slow resettlement process that focused on taking over whole farms. The target

plot size was much larger than the land area typically ploughed by CA households, ensuring that those eventually resettled would have relatively high incomes – but also ensuring that the disparity between CAs and other farming areas would remain.

In addition, the implementation of LRRP has been marred by disruptive and controversial land occupations or invasions, noticeably more rampant since the gazetting of LSCF commercial farms in November 1997. The ‘land grab’ was sanctioned by the ruling party and backed by overnight ‘cooked up’ legislative instruments to overturn legal contests by white farmers.⁵³ Tension between stakeholders in the Zimbabwe program has been fueled by forced (and often-times) violent eviction of white farmers, displacement of thousands of farmworkers, the mushrooming of squatter camps of mainly war veterans, and settlement by elite beneficiaries who in many cases turn out to be tied to the ruling party.

THE PERFORMANCE OF RESETTLED FARMERS

The UNDP report states that despite the problems, early settlers, many of whom produced high-value crops such as tobacco, cotton and paprika as well as maize, in combination with livestock, earned higher incomes per family than in their previous occupations (often also farming) in CAs. With their initially very large land area relative to CA farmers, RA farmers were able to invest more thus further widening the income gap between them. Kinsey released evidence from the panel data set that real crop incomes in RAs more than doubled over the period 1982/83 and 1995/96.⁵⁴ Another research later by Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens show that there has been an impressive accumulation of capital assets.⁵⁵

The authors calculated gross revenues from crop production by multiplying the physical quantities reported by the households by the unit prices and the returns to agricultural tools and household labor increased three-fold and by about sixty percent respectively.⁵⁶ They found that the value of gross production increased about 460% between 1982/83 and 1995/96. Although household sizes increased significantly, they found the increase in per capita income of approximately 250% to be very impressive given that national-average per capita incomes had been stagnant since 1980.

In a follow-up analysis of the Kinsey 1999 study, Kinsey showed using the same data and additional information obtained from another survey round in 1999, that land reform beneficiaries cultivated 50% more land than non-beneficiaries, obtained four times as much in crop revenues, owned more livestock and had higher expenditures by 50 percent.⁵⁷ Using indicators of per-capita performance such as sales value of crops, hectares planted, remittances, livestock equivalents and expenditure, Kinsey showed that the resettled households earned twice as much from agriculture as did CA households, hence they were successful.

Most empirical work using this data has emphasized comparison indicators between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to make conclusions about the performance of resettled farmers. While it is important to discern if beneficiaries are actually better off than in their previous occupations, our work focuses on performance within resettlement schemes to detect the relative growth and development of beneficiaries within their sector.

Literature on this type of analysis seems limited to comparing performance between initial conditions at the start of the program (1982/83 in the case of the farmers in the panel dataset) to

a later period. A common theory shared by all researchers is that households 'learn by doing'. We use 1992 as the base year for comparison when it is presumed farmers, who are at least 10 year veterans of resettlement, are on a well-defined path of growth with the majority of them operating at relatively high levels of efficiencies each year.

Factors influencing the Performance of Resettled Farmers

Kinsey and Binswanger present a review of the performance resettlement programs in Kenya, Indonesia, Malaysia and Zimbabwe. They identify critical success factors from the experiences of farmers in these countries as age, education, family labor force, marital status, farming experience and skills, and capital assets. Using age as a selection criterion, those aged under 45 are generally more successful. In terms of education, the authors say there is strong evidence that better-educated settlers in these countries are more successful. Agricultural and economic performance has a strong positive correlation with the number of family members able to work.⁵⁸ It was generally found that married settlers outperform unmarried settlers. Farming experience and skills are strong predictors of good performance.⁵⁹ Interestingly, there is no consistent evidence in favor of selecting settlers who already have capital or assets, as settlers who have gone into schemes well equipped have not fared better than those with little. However, the tendency has been for capable settlers to accumulate capital and acquire assets remarkably quickly.⁶⁰

The Gunning et al. study examined possible effects on farm output of agricultural tools, household adult labor, land area used in crop production, the number of ox-teams owned by households, years of education of the household head and rainfall.⁶¹ The quantity of household labor was not a statistically significant factor on gross crop output. However, the impact of education was only significant and modest in 1995/96 and not significant in 1982/83. There was a significant relationship between gross crop output and rainfall. Changes in agricultural tools and land accounted for much of the change in gross crop income.

Owens, Hoddinott and Kinsey examined the impact of agricultural extension on farm production in resettlement areas of Zimbabwe. The same data provided statistical evidence that farm-level extension visits increased productivity even after controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farmer ability. However, their results from single-year cross-sectional study need to be treated with caution as they found variability in the parameter estimates across individual crop years, especially between drought and non-drought years.⁶² In a forthcoming publication, Owens, Hoddinott and Kinsey regress net crop income (net of input costs) on the real value of agricultural tools, pairs of trained oxen, available labor (measured by the number of adults 15-64), land used for crop production, visits by extension agents, average education of adults in the household, plot characteristics (soil type, slope, distance from home), distance to local markets, log rainfall and extension worker assessment of farmer ability.⁶³ Agricultural tools and trained oxen raise net crop incomes, though the latter is negligible in the drought year 1994/95. Owens et al. also found that having more land under crop increased output. With extension however, it was found that having one or two extension visits increased net crop incomes in the three non-drought years 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1995/96. For the drought year 1994/95, one or two visits had no or a negative effect on production. Farmers may have

received technical advice early and fertilized their crops anticipating early rains only to suffer losses due to the drought. Those who received three or more visits however, got additional advice in a later visit that advised them not to top-dress their crops and to plant additional plots of unfertilized crop following sporadic rains. These had higher levels of crop production. Households who reported no crop income had significantly lower levels of capital ownership, labor and cultivated land.

Previous research suggests that the performance of resettled farmers hinges on access and delivery of adequate resources such as initial seed and fertilizer, labor, equipment, extension services and training to support production. We investigate the impact of credit delivery, extension visits, seed, spray and manure on the efficiency levels of crop production using the same data set. In addition we look at farmer characteristics: farming experience-measured by the number of years that the household head has been farming, and also by the number of years the family has been resettled; educational background measured by the total number of years of school for household head; participation in farmer organizations; and, access to off-farm income. Finally, we investigate the location effect of the resettlement schemes by including dummy variables for the three different natural regions which were represented by three different resettlement schemes.

PROCEDURE

Data

The data for this study come from the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics project, a panel of surveys targeting resettled households beginning in 1982-1984. A household is a family unit allocated a 5-hectare plot of arable land under the model A resettlement scheme. These schemes were in three of Zimbabwe's natural regions. One scheme was randomly selected from each zone: Natural Region II – Mpfurudzi; Natural Region III – Sengezi (Wedza district); and Natural Region IV – Mutanda. Mpfurudzi Resettlement scheme is in Mashonaland Central, Sengezi resettlement scheme in Mashonaland East and Mutanda in Manicaland. The resulting panel of 400 households in 20 villages has been surveyed annually since 1983. In 1997, a set of 150 households in Communal Areas (CAs) from where the resettled families originated, was added for counterfactual comparison in evaluating resettlement performance.

TABLE 4 Efficiency of Resettled Farmers and Communal Farmers

	1992	1993	1996	1997	1997 ^(a)
Overall sample:	0.47	0.47	0.58	0.19	0.12
Average Efficiency	219	337	172	394	147
No. of Farmers	23(10.50)	35(10.39)	31(18.02)	18(4.57)	6(4.08)

Frontier Farmers (^b)	0.49	0.18	0.18	0.36	-
	166	166	166	166	-
Matched sample (^c)	17 (10.24)	6 (3.61)	6 (3.61)	16 (9.64)	-
Average Efficiency					
No. of Farmers					
Frontier Farmers (^b)					

(^a) Communal farmer set introduced in 1997

(^b) Figures outside brackets represent number of observations, whilst the figure in brackets is the percentage of total observations.

(^c) Matched sample contains households that had data available for all four years.

The households were surveyed each year. After data cleaning, we were left with years 1992, 1993, 1996 and 1997 with which we could perform our efficiency measurement. Cleaning the data yielded a subset of 166 households who were surveyed in all four of these years. The data were analyzed in a cross-sectional manner, separately for each year, to limit the influence of year-to-year weather or other shocks on relative productivity.

The households were highly dependent on crop output for their livelihood.⁶⁴ Almost all households planted maize and at least one of the following crops: cotton, tobacco, sunflowers, groundnuts, *nyimo* (bambara nuts), *rapoko* (finger millet), *mhunga* (small grains), and sorghum. Ninety nine percent of the farmers planted maize in 1990/91 through to 1995/96.⁶⁵

Model Framework

There are two stages to this analysis. First, a nonparametric technique was used to measure efficiency (or distance from the efficiency possibility frontier) on a farm-by-farm basis. Second, a tobit regression was used to test whether farmers' relative efficiency levels were correlated with other factors, such as credit or extension visits received.

Efficiency Measurement by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

DEA is a mathematical programming approach to construct a non-parametric frontier over cross-sectional data, and then measure efficiency relative to that frontier. The concept behind DEA is illustrated in Figure 2. The curve represents the efficiency frontier where the yields can be optimised for a given level of input X. In this model, we assume constant returns to scale.⁶⁶ We see that an efficient household at input level X, has maximum possible yield of Y*. Whilst an inefficient household operating below the frontier, at the same level of input X, produces only Y. The difference between the two represents technical inefficiency and the proportional expansion in output required for efficiency catch-up to frontier is the ratio OY*/OY.

Table 5. Average Household Efficiencies by Resettlement Scheme

	1992	1993	1996	1997
Mfurudzi	0.4873	0.4258	0.5355	0.1731
Sengezi	(0.5098) ^a	(0.1044)	(0.1083)	(0.3140)
Mutanda	0.4074	0.5076	0.6245	0.1237
	(0.5139)	(0.3578)	(0.3717)	(0.3605)
	0.4817	0.5567	0.7543	0.3615
	(0.4167)	(0.2891)	(0.2389)	(0.4618)

^a Figures in brackets are average efficiencies of households in the matched sample

The efficiency or distance measure calculated for each household is the reciprocal of the proportional expansion given. This measure falls within the range of 0 to 1 where the best or frontier households for the year take the value of 1, whilst the less efficient households take values lower than 1. For each household, a linear problem, as given, is solved to compute the optimal efficiency θ (the envelope), which denotes the reciprocal of the output-based distance ratio required for farmers to catch up to the frontier. The constraints are output and input-based as shown for a sample of I producers.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Max } \theta_z, \theta \\ &\text{subject to} \\ & \quad y^l \theta \leq z^k y^k \quad k=1,2,3,\dots,I \\ & \quad x^l \geq z^k x^k \\ & \quad z \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where x^l and y^l are the inputs and outputs of the household being evaluated and x^k and y^k are inputs and outputs of all farmers in the dataset, and z is an I by 1 intensity vector. At optimum, $\{\theta = 1, y^l \theta = z^k y^k, x^l = z^k x^k\}$, characterizes an efficient household. 67

The distance (efficiency score) was computed for households for individual years 1992, 1993, 1996 and 1997 using yield outputs of 5 major crops reported by each household. Three inputs, land, labor and fertilizer, were used together with the household aggregate crop yield variable to compute efficiencies. The incorporation of the land variable in this computation is an advantage of using DEA to measure efficiencies. By running linear programs, the land area constraint optimises output whilst maximizing the efficiency multiplier. This means given the same amount of land and labor, we are able to measure and compare the relative performance of farmers to an optimal level of performance within each year, unlike the methods used in the

previous studies we have reviewed. However, since we calculated efficiency frontier for each of the individual years, the land area does vary by year.

Since actual data of family labor was not available for certain years, household composition data for household members were transformed in total days worked per year based on age and sex. We calculated household members of both sexes between the age of 7 to above 65 using a gender-age group labor equivalence conversion scale as given by Johnson.⁶⁸

Total days worked per year for family and hired labor were available for 1994 and 1996. These data were compared with household composition to relate with the “real” days worked for each household. Household composition in 1992 and 1997 was multiplied by this coefficient to derive hired and family labor for these years. It was not possible to estimate this labor measure for communal households introduced in 1997 because household composition data was not available. Therefore, the efficiency measurements of the communal households lacked a labor variable. Acreage allocated to crops was used to calculate the total land used by the household for crop production. Fertilizer allocated to crops was aggregated to find the total fertilizer used by household.

A limitation with our model is the small number of the input variables included in the input vector. Other input data were categorical making it difficult to incorporate them into the efficiency measure. A more robust efficiency measure could probably be obtained with the inclusion of more input variables in the computations. However, we proceeded to analyse the efficiency measure further by regressing it on other non-continuous variables, which, apart from explaining variation in efficiency, to a certain extent corrected for the weakness of our efficiency model.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Efficiency gaps between households were explained using tobit regressions. The tobit regression model is used since the dependent variable is truncated at the high value. With the distance measure as the dependent variable, a regression model was estimated for each year with all available households, for available right-hand variables. Similar regressions were performed using the matched household set of the same 166 households each year.

RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Performance of Resettled Farmers

The relative production efficiency of resettled farmers was observed to fluctuate over the four years of data, with no significant trend over this time period. Using the unmatched sample for the largest sample size, the mean efficiencies were stagnant at 0.47 for 1992 and 1993, and increased to a high of 0.58 in 1996. Using 1992 or 1993 as the base year for comparison, this apparent catch-up of relatively low-productivity farmers to their high-productivity neighbors could help explain the Gunning et al. finding of improvement in average productivity over time. But looking only at the matched sample of 166 RA households that were observed in all four years, there was no such catch-up (Table 4). Clearly, there is no consistent trend in the variation of productivity among RA households.

Table 6. Coefficients of the factors related to efficiencies (Unmatched set)

Dependent variable: log {distance to efficiency frontier}				
Independent Variables	1992	1993	1996	1997
intercept	-2.0195** (4.7721)	-0.1293 (0.0683)	-0.4616 (0.2234)	-2.2927*** (9.3553)
No loan	0.0724 (0.0895)	0.1538*** (8.2964)	0.3433* (3.7518)	-1.8548 (2.6237)
With loan (base group)				
motorized vehicles (tractor, etc)	0.7489** (3.9253)	-0.1149 (0.1599)	0.6195 (2.5639)	1.4715** (4.6176)
2 trained oxen, plow & cart	1.3219*** (6.8722)	0.0031 (0.0001)	10.0890 (0.0000)	1.0699 (1.9730)
2 trained oxen & plow	0.6879** (4.0674)	-0.2105 (0.6240)	0.4903 (2.0395)	1.4653** (4.9470)
no oxen or plow, just bicycle		-0.3038 (1.3217)	0.3527 (1.0277)	1.2659* (3,6754)
no equipment (base group)	0.6770** (3.9705)			
one extension visit	0.0262 (0.0142)	0.0729 (0.3050)	-0.0014 (0.0000)	-0.4245 (1.5466)
twice visited	0.0832 (0.1315)	0.0862 (0.5091)		0.1486 (0.1832)
3 to 5 visits	-0.1448 (0.5532)	0.0449 (0.1305)	0.3495 (1.7180)	0.0246 (0.0053)
6 to 10 visits	-0.0670 (0.0841)	-0.0242 (0.0251)	0.1594 (0.4706)	-0.1059 (0.0688)
plus 10 visits (base group)			-0.5416* (2.9826)	
Years of farming experience of household head	0.0036 (0.1531)	-0.0109* (2.7808)	-0.0220* (3.6659)	----
School years of household head	0.0198 (0.5101)	-0.0170 (0.9727)	0.0170 (0.3693)	----
Resettlement experience (years)	0.0395 (0.6663)	-0.0249 (0.7908)	0.0082 (0.0237)	----
Share of land that is	-0.0004 (0.0189)	-0.0020 (1.5488)	0.0012 (0.3671)	0.0016 (0.6566)

manured				
NR II (Mfurudzi base group)	0.3056 (0.6005)	0.1942 (1.9067)	0.1423 (0.6075)	-0.6462*** (12.8667)
NR III (Sengezi base group)	0.2145 (0.8534)	0.2192 (2.3503)	0.2054 (1.1805)	-0.6984*** (8.9738)
NR IV (Mutanda base group)	-2.0195** (4.7721)	-0.1293 (0.0683)	-0.4616 (0.2234)	-2.2927*** (9.3553)
No off –farm income Off-farm income (base group)	----	-0.1487 (0.0616)	-0.8024* (2.7472)	0.0671 (0.2242)
Not in farmer organisation Member (base group)	-0.0583 (0.1737)	-0.1008 (1.5446)	-0.1211 (1.0100)	-0.2422** (2.9308)
Share of land under with certified seed	-0.0024 (0.1918)	-0.0009 (0.2521)	----	----
Share of land sprayed	0.0050 (1.9930)	-0.0041* (3.7221)	----	----
Sample size	117	221	79	290
Log likelihood	-128.4790	-196.5043	-52.6365	-478.2624

Notes: Variables are defined in the text.

Parameter estimates are computed by TOBIT regression in SAS with *Chi-Square* values in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***).

The empirical results in Table 4 also show that communal farmers are more diverse in their efficiency levels than resettled farmers, with an average efficiency level among the CA farmers of 0.12 compared to an average efficiency of 0.19 among the RA farmers. However, a crucial limitation with this result is that the efficiency scores for communal farmers lack information on labor input.

Dividing the households by resettlement schemes, again the matched and unmatched samples give different results, and there is no trend over time in the dispersion of productivity among farmers (Table 5). Clearly, these results do not support the idea that resettled farmers generally learned from each other and moved towards a common productivity frontier between 1992 and 1997. We are cautious, however, not to draw strong conclusions from this, due to the shortness of the period and the nature of the data. On the other hand, we can use differences in the relative productivity of individual farmers to ask what helped some to catch up with the

frontier, while others fell behind. Multicollinearity was not a problem with the independent variables, as no significant correlations were found between them. Furthermore, dummy variables incorporated in a pooled model did not reveal consistent household or year effects. Proceeding with year-by-year regressions, we find that no factors were consistently correlated with relative productivity. Regression results for the whole sample (Table 6) and the matched sample (Table 7) show occasional statistical significance for some variables, but none are robust across years or samples.

Table 7. Coefficients of the factors related to efficiencies (Matched set)

Dependent variable: log {distance to efficiency frontier}				
Independent Variables	1992	1993	1996	1997
intercept	-1.8061 (1.4343)	1.0943 (0.1961)	2.0942 (0.6073)	-2.7124*** (13.2512)
No loan	0.2026 (0.5996)	0.1218 (0.1866)	0.1281 (0.1061)	----
With loan (base group)				
motorized vehicles (tractor, etc)	0.9440** (5.6922)	-0.5601 (0.4905)	1.3444 (2.6469)	0.5150 (0.6747)
2 trained oxen, plow & cart	1.5278*** (9.3834)	0.4068 (0.1424)	2.1396* (3.2478)	0.6747 (0.8311)
2 trained oxen & plow	0.7336** (4.6310)	-0.4022 (0.3153)	0.5595 (0.6468)	0.5352 (0.7717)
no oxen or plow, just bicycle	0.7229** (4.2301)	-0.1084 (0.0230)	0.7229 (1.0031)	0.1542 (0.0621)
no equipment (base group)	-1.8061 (1.4343)	1.0943 (0.1961)	2.0942 (0.6073)	-2.7124*** (13.2512)
one extension visit	0.0282 (0.0138)	-0.0704 (0.0273)	-0.4062 (0.4191)	-0.4821 (1.1191)
twice visited	0.1620 (0.3943)	0.0948 (0.0573)	0.6392 (0.9426)	0.0837 (0.0342)
3 to 5 visits	-0.1182 (0.2846)	-0.0743 (0.0395)	0.2299 (0.1431)	0.2574 (0.2981)
6 to 10 visits	-0.1621 (0.3885)	-0.2331 (0.2354)	-0.6793 (0.9000)	-0.1974 (0.1545)
plus 10 visits (base group)				
Years of farming experience of household head	-0.0022 (0.0401)	-0.0196 (0.7880)	-0.0831*** (10.2890)	----
School years of household head	-0.0179 (0.3404)	0.0117 (0.0377)	-0.0020 (0.0014)	----
Resettlement experience (years)	0.0296 (0.0734)	-0.2367 (1.9250)	-0.1751 (1.1428)	----
Share of land that is manured	-0.0055* (2.9529)	-0.0014 (0.0697)	0.0014 (0.1097)	0.0030 (1.5801)
NR II (Mfurudzi base group)	0.5552 (2.0510)	1.2517*** (6.8598)	1.2329*** (8.3033)	1.0268*** (19.1675)
NR III (Sengezi base group)	0.2159 (0.5538)	0.0894 (0.0292)	-0.4276 (0.8983)	1.1255*** (9.4937)
NR IV (Mutanda base group)	-1.8061 (1.4343)	1.0943 (0.1961)	2.0942 (0.6073)	-2.7124*** (13.2512)
No off-farm income	----	0.1910 (0.6351)	-0.7907* (3.6096)	0.0432 (0.0651)
Off-farm income (base group)				
Not in farmer organisation	-0.0269 (0.0318)	-0.0269 (0.0113)	-0.8790*** (12.2269)	0.1706 (1.1460)
Member (base group)				
Share of land under with certified seed	-0.0015 (0.0560)	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0069 (0.0881)	----
Share of land sprayed	0.0040 (1.2488)	-0.0088 (1.3372)	-0.0053 (0.2987)	----
Log likelihood	-94.1313	-183.2921	-105.0482	-136.5540

Notes:

Variables are defined in the text.

Parameter estimates are computed by TOBIT regression in SAS with *Chi-Square* values in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The limited duration and nature of the available data makes it difficult to draw solid conclusions about the performance of resettled farmers, other than the persistence of large productivity differences among them – and the absence of consistent correlation between those differences and standard explanations of farm productivity. In the unusual context of Zimbabwe's resettlement schemes, we do not find generally higher relative efficiencies among

farmers who use more equipment, receive formal credit, have more visits from extension workers, have more education or experience, or are members of a farmer organization.

Since we find wide and persistent variation in productivity that cannot be explained by variation in government services, we conclude that the GoZ approach did not help farmers converge to locally appropriate best practices in these resettlement areas. Resettled families were given plots of identical size—but large differences in performance continued for more than a decade, throughout the period for which we have data. The Zimbabwean experience thus provides little positive guidance as to what should be done to help farmers discover best practices, but it does provide fresh evidence on the degree to which productivity differences can persist despite equalization of plot size across households.

Notes:

1. Adams and Howell, 2001
2. UNDP, 2002a
3. UNDP, 2002b
4. Government of Zimbabwe, 1993
5. Masters, 1994a
6. von Blanckenburg, 1994a
7. Kinsey, 1999
8. *ibid*
9. Deininger, van der Brink, Hoogeveen and Moyo, 2000
10. Masters, 1994b; UNDP, 2002c
11. Masters, 1994c
12. Moyo, 2000a
13. von Blanckenburg, 1994b
14. *ibid.*
15. Masters, 1994d
16. *ibid.*
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. *ibid.*
20. Moyo, 2000b
21. *ibid.*
22. *ibid.*
23. *ibid.*
24. Moyo, 2000c
25. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2002; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2003; Tony Hawkins, 2001
26. Thirtle et al., 1993a, 1993b; Masters, 1994e
27. GoZ, 1999a
28. von Blanckenburg, 1994c
29. UNDP, 2002d

30. GoZ, 1999b; UNDP, 2002e
31. UNDP, 2000f
32. *ibid*
33. *ibid*
34. von Blanckenburg, 1994d.
35. *ibid*; Kinsey, 1998a.
36. UNDP, 2002g
37. *ibid*.
38. *ibid*.
39. Kinsey, 1998b
40. Rukuni, 1994
41. Kinsey, 1998c.
42. Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993a
43. UNDP, 2002h
44. UNDP, 2002i
45. Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993b
46. GoZ, 1999c
47. *ibid*.
48. UNDP, 2002j
49. Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993d
50. Masters, 1994f; von Blanckenburg, 1994e; UNDP, 2002k ⁵¹ Parastatals are entities such as GMB that are partially owned by the government- privatization under ESAP (the economic structural adjustment programme) later replaced by ZIMPREST (Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation) in the last 1990s rendered most of the parastatals independent of government.
51. Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey, & Owens, 2000; Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993c; Masters, 1994g
52. The term 'land grab' has been increasingly used particularly in international media to define the aggressive land reform adopted by the GoZ post the September 1998 donor conference.
53. Kinsey, 1999
54. Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens, 2000
55. For example, agricultural tools included ox-drawn ploughs, ox-carts, cultivator/harrows, ox-planters, water carts, cotton sprayers, wheelbarrows, tractors and tractor implements, hoe, axes, spades, machetes and slashers
56. Kinsey, 2001
57. Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993d
58. *ibid*.
59. *ibid*.
60. Gunning, Hoddinott and Owens, 2000.
61. Owens, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001
62. Owens, Hoddinott, Kinsey, forthcoming publication made available by one of the authors, Bill Kinsey.

63. Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens, 1999
 64. *ibid.*
 65. Other papers have considered alternative sets of assumptions in which a variable returns to scale model is proposed.
 66. Lovell, 1993; Battese *et al.*, 1998
 67. Johnson, 1990: Conversion scale
 68. Labor class Age (years) Man-units Equivalent man-days/month
- | | | | |
|--------------|-------------|-----|------|
| Small child | Less than 7 | 0.0 | 0 |
| Large child | 7-14 | 0.4 | 10 |
| Male adult | 15-64 | 1.0 | 25 |
| Female adult | 15-64 | 0.8 | 20 |
| Male adult | 65 or more | 0.5 | 12.5 |
| Female adult | 65 or more | 0.5 | 12.5 |

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Opposition Politics in Independent Zimbabwe

LIISA LAAKSO

Abstract: Zimbabwe has implemented a multi-party system on a universal franchise for more than two decades. This era has witnessed consolidation of power into the hands of the ruling ZANU party and its leader Robert Mugabe, and a gradual evolution of political crises. All general elections have shown support for the opposition among the voters. However, the opposition has changed a lot. Between 1980 and 1987 there was a strong regional party, ZAPU, which transformed from a partner of the ruling party to repressed dissident. The second period after the unity between ZANU and ZAPU witnessed mobilisation in defence of multipartyism and against corruption, and the birth of a populist party ZUM. ZUM's disintegration was followed by massive electoral apathy in 1995. The third period started with civic organization for constitutional reform in 1997 and led to the emergence of the MDC, a wide coalition of interest groups united by their aim to seize ZANU from power. State responses to opposition politics help to clarify its unstable nature.

Introduction

Consolidation of the authoritarian power of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in independent Zimbabwe has not proceeded through the withering away of dissent. All general elections have witnessed support for other parties. But the parties and their support base have changed radically. On the one hand this reflects the government's different strategies to silence its critics. On the other hand it tells about changes in Zimbabwean society itself.

During the 1980s, the focus of the government was on the establishment of a one-party state. Although the idea was abandoned in 1990 and the multiparty system was retained, it was not until the general elections of 2000 and presidential elections of 2002 that there emerged an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), strong enough to challenge the position of the ruling party. Its base was largely the new generation of Zimbabweans whose opinion stemmed more from the experience of twenty years of ZANU rule than from the liberation war. Discontent with the policies of the ruling party was preceded by gradual evolution of economic crises. It was also expressed in mass mobilisation for a constitutional reform that brought various professional, civic and interest groups together.

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a6.pdf>

The aim of this paper is to examine opposition politics and the space available for it in independent Zimbabwe. For this end it is useful to distinguish between three periods. The first period, lasting from independence in 1980 to 1987, was characterised by the existence of a strong regional party, Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), whose position changed from that of a partner of ZANU to repressed dissident. The second period followed the merging of ZAPU into ZANU. Although *de facto* one-party system was created, this period also witnessed civil society mobilisation in defence of the multiparty system. A new populist opposition party, Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) emerged, but then disintegrated rapidly. Disillusionment and massive electoral apathy followed in 1995. The third and latest period started with civil society organization for constitutional reform in 1997 and led to the birth of the MDC. After an overview of the continuities and discontinuities of party politics during these periods, the prospects of opposition politics in Zimbabwe will be discussed.

1980-1987: REGIONAL DISSENT

Parties at Independence

ZANU and ZAPU had their origins in the liberation struggle against white minority rule in Rhodesia. The struggle was very much centred on the question of universal franchise and became radicalised through difficult confrontations with the Rhodesian restrictions on freedom of association and exclusionary constitutional policy. ZAPU was established under Nkomo's leadership in 1961 after its predecessor, the National Democratic Party, had been banned. After ZAPU was banned by the Rhodesian government in 1962, the movement split. A group of ZAPU executives established ZANU in 1963 as a protest against Nkomo's decision to set up a government in exile. The leader of ZANU was Ndabaningi Sithole and its secretary-general was Robert Mugabe.¹ As argued by Andre Astrow the purpose of these leaders was only to replace Nkomo. Thus there were no real political differences between the two organisations.²

In 1964 also ZANU was banned. The next year Rhodesia announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, which led to guerrilla war. In 1970, after denouncing violence in order to be released from detention, Sithole lost his position in ZANU to Mugabe and was left with his own faction of the movement. A year later a new moderate nationalist organisation, the United African National Council (UANC), was formed.

ZAPU and ZANU continued their armed struggle against the Rhodesian government. Throughout the struggle there were attempts to bring the two liberation parties together. In early 1978, ZANU detained tens of "dissidents" in its camps in Mozambique allegedly because of plotting to overthrow Mugabe. The dissidents had promoted a unity with ZAPU, which would have meant accepting Nkomo, the more senior nationalist figure, as the leader of the party.³ At the end of the liberation war ZANU and ZAPU were only loosely united under a coalition named the Patriotic Front (PF).

In 1978 the government tried to undercut the PF and started negotiations with the UANC's Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Sithole. This "internal settlement" introduced a new constitution for "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia". A complicated system of commissions ensured white control over important appointments in the administration, the judiciary, police and army. Thus Muzorewa,

who became the first African Prime Minister of the country, had only limited executive powers.
4

The war ended in 1979, but not as a military victory of the liberation armies. Instead a peace agreement was negotiated in London. It included the British proposal for a new constitution, which safeguarded settler privilege but also enfranchised the majority of the population in a meaningful way. The lower house of parliament had 100 seats, 20 of which were reserved for the whites for the first seven years. The constitution also stipulated that during the first ten years, amendments concerning the citizens' rights required a unanimous vote in parliament. It provided a multiparty system and the "willing-buyer and willing-seller" principle to protect the enormous land property of the settlers. This contradicted the socialist rhetoric of the PF. The PF had also advocated an executive presidency, but the British proposal of a ceremonial office was accepted. The PF probably expected that they could deal with unsuitable aspects of the constitution afterwards - as eventually happened.⁵

The peace agreement stipulated that the first government be appointed after general elections. Mugabe of ZANU, Nkomo of ZAPU and Muzorewa of the ruling UANC were all probably quite certain that they could win the elections. Sithole and his ZANU faction hoped to get enough support to be influential in a coalition, if none of the bigger parties gained an overall majority. The same can be said about James Chikerema's Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP).⁶ Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, contesting the white seats with his Rhodesian Front, perhaps expected that the common roll elections would bring an anti-Mugabe coalition to power. Instead of backing UANC, he urged black workers to vote for Nkomo's PF.

For Nkomo, the fact that ZANU decided to contest the elections without ZAPU was a bitter disappointment. Two nationalist parties meant that there were also two nationalist leaders contesting their popularity in the elections. To emphasise the importance of unity, ZAPU went to the polls as the PF. Before the elections ZANU released its detainees. Most of them remained ZANU members. But the leading figures joined Sithole's party, the PF, and the UANC.⁷

The parties had been born of splits among the nationalist leadership. Ethnic or regional differences, however defined, do not explain these splits, but they became important in the mobilisation of supporters. Leaders who were able to rely on a regionally defined constituency had the best chances of survival. However, instead of adopting an overtly ethnic character, the parties also recruited representatives of other groups into their high ranks - and accused other parties of tribalism. Ideologically, the UANC was regarded as the most conservative and ZANU the most radical party. But their manifestos all agreed upon the need for free education, as well as improvements in health service and housing. Even differences on the role of private capital were more of degree than of principle: all the parties called for a mixed economy.

Much of the UANC election material attacked Mugabe and Nkomo. Muzorewa warned the electorate of the dangers posed to Zimbabwe's traditional values by Marxism and communism. His major disadvantage was that he had failed to end the war and gain international recognition for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Besides, the Rhodesian Security Forces seemed to support the UANC, thus people identified it with white rule. This was not helped by UANC's support for the presence of South African troops in the country and a promise to expand of economic ties between Zimbabwe and apartheid South Africa.⁸

With his image as ‘Father Zimbabwe,’ Nkomo was presented by ZAPU as able to unite all races and tribes. His long experience as a trade union and nationalist leader was emphasised as well as his role in initiating the armed struggle.⁹ The PF promised to end the war and to bring reconciliation, prosperity and democracy to the people with no social, economic, religious, racial or tribal discrimination.¹⁰ Its stronghold was Matabeleland, although some of the senior party officials stood in Mashonaland constituencies. Nkomo contested in the Midlands, where the population was more mixed.

ZANU’s manifesto referred to the party as “revolutionary.” Yet it noted the historical and social realities of Zimbabwe, promising that private enterprise could continue.¹¹ Otherwise the party centred its campaign on the liberation struggle. Mugabe warned that if his party were excluded from the government, there would be no peace in Zimbabwe.¹² During the war ZANU and ZAPU had gained control over most of the country. During the elections, their respective forces, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe African People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA), were openly campaigning for their parties.¹³ Intimidation was most frequent in areas where both liberation parties had a presence, such as Victoria Province (Masvingo), parts of the Midlands, and parts of Manicaland.

In an election following a war, voters were probably particularly willing to support the winners. Yet ZANU’s overwhelming success surprised many. Its success reflected the party support base in Shona regions, the most populous in the country. Ethnicity proved to be even more important for voters’ mobilization than liberation army domination. The dividing line between ZANU and PF support followed almost exactly the division between the Shona and the Ndebele. In Matabeleland South, ZANLA had been successful during the last years of the war, but won no seats there (see table 1, Appendix I). The simple presence of military units after the war was not as important as ethnic loyalties in determining the voters’ choice.

ZAPU: From a Government to Oppressed Dissident

Mugabe formed the first independent government and invited ZAPU to join, but then allocated ZAPU only five of the total 36 cabinet seats. The most important was Nkomo’s appointment as minister of home affairs. But the following year he was transferred to minister without portfolio and ZANU’s Emmerson Mnangagwa became chairman of the Joint Command in charge of integrating the armed forces. Although Nkomo was finally allowed to oversee the integration, ZAPU’s position was weakened.¹⁴ The most remarkable reshuffle took place when arms were found on farms owned by Nkomo in February 1982. He was removed from the cabinet along with three other ZAPU ministers. Two days later the only remaining ZAPU minister resigned. In April, however, Mugabe appointed three ZAPU members to the cabinet.

Two ex-ZIPRA commanders, Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, were detained for conspiring to overthrow the government. This was followed by increased dissident activity in Matabeleland and Mugabe’s decision to send the notorious Fifth Brigade composed of ex-ZANLA personnel to the area. The Fifth Brigade committed serious atrocities against the civilian population.¹⁵ South African involvement in the conflict was significant – not least because the government could then regard ZAPU as an ally of South Africa that attempted to destabilise majority-ruled Zimbabwe. Nkomo left for Britain and soon the remaining ZAPU ministers were sacked. As argued by Christine Sylvester, “to] the government Nkomo was

simply a bad loser in the 1980 elections and was now stocking Shona-Ndebele animosities in order to get revenge.”¹⁶ The message sent to the Ndebele was that they should support ZANU if they wanted to be represented in the government.

However, Nkomo returned in August 1984. In the following elections in 1985, ZAPU nominated candidates to all constituencies to contest with ZANU.¹⁷ While Mugabe stated that his goal was to bring all Zimbabweans under ZANU, other parties advocated continuing the multiparty system. Mistrust towards the government characterised their campaign. In addition to Nkomo, who had spent a year out of the country, other leaders also felt they had been victimised by the government. Sithole had gone to the United States in 1983 and remained in self-imposed exile since the government alleged that he solicited arms abroad to overthrow the government. Muzorewa, then one of the UANC’s MPs in parliament, had spent nearly a year in detention, and was released only shortly before the elections.

ZAPU paid specific attention to security and human rights issues, referring indirectly to the conflict in Matabeleland. It advocated the abolishment of all security organs except the national army and the police. But it did not accuse the government of neglecting development programmes in Matabeleland, even though this was the popular perception.¹⁸ Perhaps the issue was too sensitive to be discussed and actually an asset to the ruling party. Issues of political economy did not raise very much attention. According to Sylvester, this showed that a one-party state would make no difference to the “pseudo-pluralism” of the party competition.¹⁹ ZAPU also suggested a political coalition with the opposition parties, but this did not lead any further than some UANC and ZAPU joint rallies.

ZANU youth and women conducted an aggressive home-to-home campaign asking for party cards. Just before the elections, the party condemned the violence and took its youth wing under control. However, violence erupted again after the election results were announced.²⁰ Although the level of intimidation cannot be measured in all its ramifications, the fact that there were several killings suggests that intimidation during these elections was no less important than during the 1980 elections.

Not surprisingly ZANU won the elections again. ZAPU’s support dropped, but people in Matabeleland did not abandon it in spite of state repression there. In fact, these elections polarised the political map of the country even further. Delimitation of constituencies was conducted for the first time before these elections and they were held on a majority system (in contrast to the 1980 provincial-level proportional system).²¹ This system was beneficial for ZANU(Sithole) which now got a seat in Sithole’s home area of Chipinge (Manicaland). Most of the constituencies, especially in the rural areas, were *de facto* one-party constituencies whether for ZANU, ZAPU or Sithole’s party. Only in cities was there pluralism in terms of more equal voter support between the winning and losing candidates.²²

One-party state in the making: Constitutional amendment and Unity Accord

After the 1985 elections Mugabe allotted no cabinet seats to ZAPU. The only option available for ZAPU leaders, if they wanted to become ministers, was to join the ruling party. The negotiations that later led to the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU started shortly thereafter. They were facilitated by a release of ZAPU prisoners, including Dabengwa. But in mid-1987 the government banned all ZAPU meetings, raided ZAPU offices in Bulawayo and detained some ZAPU officials. In September ZAPU was banned altogether and the six district

councils it dominated by it were dissolved.²³ Meanwhile, the white seats in parliament were abolished as the provisions of the constitution on unanimous voting expired. The 20 vacant seats were filled by ZANU, which had a majority in parliament acting as an electoral college. Subsequently, ZANU occupied 85 seats out of 100. Parliament soon passed an amendment to the constitution creating an executive presidency. After that the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU was concluded and the ruling party's majority rose to 99 out of 100 MPs. This was the parliament, which appointed Mugabe as the first executive president of Zimbabwe on 30 December 1987.

In the unity negotiations, there had never been a need to discuss political programmes. Symbolic issues, the logo and the name of the party were difficult to agree upon. To the disappointment of ZAPU, the final name remained ZANU(PF), the party's membership cards carried a portrait of Mugabe, and the new slogan was "Forward with unity, forward with President Mugabe". The 'new party' celebrated its 25th anniversary on August 6, 1988, the day when ZANU had split from ZAPU. However ZAPU leaders became members of the politburo and the central committee of the party as well as government ministers.²⁴ A completely new ministry was established for political affairs in order to facilitate the merger of the two parties. In practice, the distinction between the party and the state became unclear. For instance, the government soon demanded that all civil servants should become party members.

1988-1996: DEFENCE OF MULTIPARTYISM

New Space for Criticism and a New Opposition Party

The political implications of the Unity Accord were contradictory. The powers of the executive were increased. After the Senate was abolished, thirty non-constituency seats were introduced to parliament, whose membership increased to 150. These included 12 presidential appointees, 8 governors, and 10 chiefs, all of whom were supporters of the ruling party. But within the ruling party, ex-ZAPU cadres doubted the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a one-party state.²⁵ Outside the party, civil society had more space due to the fact that the war and security problems in Matabeleland were over.

A new kind of criticism against the government emerged. In 1988, former secretary general of ZANU and minister in the first independence government, Edgar Tekere, condemned the one-party state by making references to the events in the Soviet Union and to the changed views of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. He was expelled from the party. Simultaneously, news of the first corruption scandal, the so-called "Willowgate" involving senior party members, appeared in the government-controlled newspapers. Six cabinet ministers had to resign from office. In 1989, Tekere formed a new party ZUM, to contest the seats vacated by the 'Willowgate ministers.'²⁶ Facing the mobilising potential of ZUM's anti-corruption rhetoric, ZANU tried to get Tekere back into its ranks without success. There was even speculation that Eddison Zvobgo and Dabengwa, potential dissidents with a strong regional support in Masvingo and Matabeleland respectively, could join Tekere. Although the party did not disintegrate, the campaign period that preceded the 1990 parliamentary elections and the first presidential elections was "viciously contested."²⁷

ZANU nominated candidates for the parliamentary elections after primary elections, which were the first ones the party had ever held. Although apparently a step towards more transparent decision-making within the party, the primaries involved many irregularities and anomalies. Challenging leading ZANU figures was not allowed. If the party leadership was not happy with the selection, it simply declared the vote null.²⁸ As a result, a dozen ruling party members decided to contest the elections as independent candidates. Among these were some ex-ZAPU politicians, although most of the official ZANU candidates in Matabeleland were ex-ZAPU. Some ex-ZAPU members contested as ZUM candidates.

ZANU ran aggressive television commercials saying that to vote for ZANU was to choose life but to vote for the opposition was equal to death. ZUM was presented as a divisive and reactionary force supported by “Rhodesians” and South Africa. ZANU Youth and Women’s Leagues again conducted infamous door-to-door campaigns to harass suspected ZUM supporters. Threats of another war were common. Sylvester quotes farm workers: “If we vote for ZUM there will be war.... Even though we’re poor and the Government is corrupt, it’s better to be oppressed than to have another war.”²⁹ The government also made it clear that voting for ZUM would result in the discontinuation of food relief.³⁰

Still, the issue of establishing a one-party state was not openly put forward in the campaign. This probably was to please the ex-ZAPU critics of the one-party state.³¹ Development achievements were not emphasised as they had been in the previous elections, apparently because the post-independence economic boom was over. The party was advocating a socialist society and controlled prices, even though this contradicted the new principles of structural adjustment. It responded to the debate on corruption by presenting a leadership code that prohibited leaders from accepting or offering bribes.

In contrast to the previous elections, ZANU also had to respond to substantial criticism coming from outside the political parties. According to Patrick Quantin, the very fact that there was a new opposition party encouraged many interest groups to present their claims openly. In a peculiar sense, ZUM’s existence provided an opportunity for many (among them the white-dominated Commercial Farmers’ Union and the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries) to express their loyalty to the government, which, although apparently strengthening the position of the ruling party, also meant a new kind pressure for accountability.³² In this sense, political economy was starting to play a significant role in party politics.

Important developments took place in labour unions. After independence, the government had wanted to support one umbrella body of trade unions, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), although at that time there were also other organisations with greater membership.³³ The ZCTU soon became the strongest organisation, partly due to expanding public sector employment. It was very close to ZANU and was expected to be loyal to the government.³⁴ Under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, however, the ZCTU increased its autonomy at the end of the 1980’s. According to Tsvangirai, the turning point was his detention in 1989 after criticising the closure of the University of Zimbabwe and his eventual release after international pressure and a court order.³⁵ Although committed to socialism, the ZCTU supported the multiparty system.³⁶ Not surprisingly, Tsvangirai was warned by members of ZANU not to become “another Frederick Chiluba.”³⁷ In 1990, the ZCTU wanted to be as independent as possible from political parties.

ZUM suffered from last minute withdrawals and did not manage to register enough candidates to contest all constituencies. It contested 102 seats. The UANC contested 14 and Sithole's ZANU(Ndonga) 9 seats.³⁸ As many as 14 seats were unopposed and thus went to the ruling party without elections. In comparison with the earlier elections, the independents and the uncontested seats were new phenomena.³⁹

Much of ZUM's campaign was about Tekere's attacks against Mugabe. ZUM's election manifesto focused on the powers of the president, the deteriorating economy, and corruption. According to ZUM, the executive presidency was a threat to the independence of the judiciary, and even parliament had become accountable only to the president.⁴⁰

ZUM suffered from harassment, limited financial resources, and unequal access to the government-controlled media. Its attempts to hold public rallies were almost systematically rejected. Only in Manicaland, Tekere's home area, was ZUM able to conduct an overt campaign. Criticism against Zimbabwe's expensive involvement in the war in Mozambique was an important theme there.⁴¹ Gweru witnessed a vigorous ZUM campaign by Patrick Kombayi, the first black mayor and a businessman, who was also the most notable ex-ZANU political figure in the party after Tekere. ZANU Youths, joined by police and Central Intelligence Organization officers, intimidated Kombayi and his supporters. In the most serious incident, CIO officers shot and wounded Kombayi. Most of intimidation incidents victimised ZUM, but there was also intimidation of ZANU(Ndonga) supporters in Chipinge.

Given these circumstances, ZUM's 18 percent support in the parliamentary elections and Tekere's 17 percent support in the presidential elections were impressive (see tables 3 and 4, Appendix II). The majority first-past-the-post electoral system, apparent gerrymandering in the delimitation, and over-registration in safe ZANU areas proved unfair to ZUM. Since the first delimitation for the 1985 elections, the government had learned how to manipulate the electoral results through those means. Although ZUM's support was close to 50 percent in many urban constituencies, it was not able to win a single seat there. Its support in the two Manicaland constituencies where it won seats had a very regional basis.

Turnouts varied significantly. Matabeleland recorded very low participation and the number of spoilt ballot papers was exceptionally high, suggesting that former ZAPU supporters were not satisfied with the Unity Accord. One of the lowest turnouts was recorded in Lobengula, Nkomo's constituency. In Gweru, where ZUM's Kombayi was hospitalised after the shooting incident, the turnout was exceptionally low, reflecting a deep frustration. Some other urban constituencies, however, recorded the highest turnouts and narrowest margins for the ZANU winners. As much as the urban population voted for ZUM, they probably also voted against ZANU, or deliberately did not vote at all. When compared to the 1985 elections, urban apathy was a new and striking phenomenon. While the urban population did not support ZUM unambiguously, the party had been able to establish at least some structures to mobilise urban voters in a short time. But the lack of organisational infrastructure and access to media constrained its ability to penetrate the rural areas, except in Tekere's home region.⁴²

Jonathan Moyo, at that time a vocal critic of the government's repression of political liberties, gave the name "Voting for Democracy" to his book on the 1990 elections. According to him, the message of the 1990 elections was that Zimbabwean voters opposed the one-party state.⁴³ Tensions inside the government and between government and civil society had also

surfaced. Leaders with a strong regional following were probably more confident of their position in the party than ever before. In August, a dual vice-presidency was introduced and Nkomo was sworn in as vice-president to accompany vice-president Simon Muzenda from Masvingo. From the point of view of civil society, the Unity Accord and ZUM opened up some space for political pluralism and criticism. In this sense, the Zimbabwe joined the post Cold War 'wave of democratisation'.

Weakening of the Opposition and Factionalism Inside ZANU

The ZANU politburo abandoned the idea of one-party state in 1990. Only three years later, President Mugabe argued that opposition parties were "a stabilising factor" in political systems in Africa.⁴⁴ The deteriorating economy eroded the popularity of the ruling party in Zimbabwe, but instead of strengthening the opposition parties, it was civil society that provided channels for criticism. These included advocacy groups (e.g. the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, CCJP), interest groups, the business community, and the ZCTU. The unions, even those of the civil servants, became confident enough to organise strikes. But they saw the opposition parties as merely opportunists trying to get support of the labour movement without any deeper interest in workers' problems. Tsvangirai's opinion in 1995 was that most workers did not even bother to vote.⁴⁵

Indeed, the opposition was so weak by 1995 that parliamentary seats were not contested in 55 constituencies. Given that the 30 non-constituency MPs were secured ZANU seats, this meant that the ruling party was certain to get 85 out of 150 seats even before the polling started. ZUM had disintegrated soon after the 1990 elections largely due to Tekere's party leadership style. His decision to suspend some members after they had held elections for ZUM officials led to the formation of the Democratic Party (DP). Later Tekere merged ZUM with UANC and formed the United Parties (UP). This unity, however, survived only ten months.

ZANU(Ndonga) was also suffering from internal disputes after Sithole returned from the United States in 1992. The government accused him of having supported South Africa's attempt to destabilise Zimbabwe. He irritated the government further by praising RENAMO and UNITA for fighting for multiparty democracy. In 1993, the government decided to use the compulsory purchase powers under the new Land Acquisition Act to seize Sithole's farm near Harare and 4,000 families were brutally evicted.⁴⁶

In 1993, the Forum Party of Zimbabwe was created. Its leader was Enoch Dumbutshena, the first African Chief Justice of Zimbabwe. The party was labelled 'white and liberal', although it attracted also African middle class supporters, especially in Harare. But it failed to penetrate the rural areas and did not contest rural seats. In its election manifesto, the party demanded a ceremonial president and it was one of the first organisations calling for the convening of an all-party constitutional conference. Forum and ZANU(Ndonga) were the best organised opposition parties.⁴⁷ ZUM and UP (representing the old UANC) were the most vocal in the 1995 election boycott. They demanded a possibility to challenge the ruling party on a more equal basis and castigated ZANU(Ndonga) and the Forum for betraying them. After a few withdrawals in the beginning of April, Forum contested only 28 constituencies – still hoping to be able to form a formidable opposition with other parties. Kombayi was contesting this time as a Forum candidate, as was another veteran politician, James Chikerema.

Inside the ruling party, the primaries for the 1995 elections were hotly contested. Allegations of irregularities, vote-buying, and rigging were rampant. Only 62 of the nominated candidates were sitting MPs. Faction cleavages within the party, especially in Manicaland and Masvingo, became very open and reflected an intense struggle. As a consequence, the most significant (although not united) 'opposition' electoral group was that of 29 independents. The independents got significant support in Masvingo (see table 5, Appendix III), where the party was divided between supporters of Zvobgo and Muzenda.

The most noteworthy independent candidate, however, was Margaret Dongo, an ex-combatant and outspoken MP from Harare. Violent confrontations erupted in the Sunningdale suburb between her supporters and ZANU Youths supporting the official party candidate. According to the official election results, Dongo lost the elections. After irregularities had been found, the court ordered a re-election, which Dongo won. She was then expelled from ZANU and formed a new party, the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats.

The second presidential elections were held in 1996. The requirement that the candidate be at least forty years old prevented Dongo from contesting. As the most notable opposition figure in the country, she was only able to urge people to boycott the whole exercise. Sithole, whose party in 1995 had won two seats in Chipinge, was detained in the autumn 1995 and accused of an assassination attempt against Mugabe. However, he still decided to contest the elections. Another candidate challenging Mugabe again was Muzorewa. Thus both opponents were leaders of the past, and hardly able to mobilise even protest votes, which Tekere had done six years earlier. If the 1995 parliamentary elections were a non-event, the 1996 presidential elections were even more so (see table 6, appendix III). It was embarrassing for the government that the official turnout in the whole country was below 32 percent. While many rural areas saw turnouts of close to 60 percent, apathy was rampant in the cities. In Dongo's Harare South constituency, the turnout was only 9 percent.

After the elections, the relationship between trade unions and the government became very tense. Harare was rocked by workers' demonstrations and property was damaged or looted by rioters. A doctors' and nurses' dispute over the implementation of an agreed salary increase led to long-lasting strikes that the government dealt with by mass dismissals and the banning of demonstrations.⁴⁸ Radicalisation of the labour movement extended even to the commercial farms. In 1997, farm workers went collectively on strike for the first time in the history of Zimbabwe.⁴⁹

1997-2002: CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THE CHALLENGE OF MDC

Pressure to Reform the Constitution

In 1997, the pressure to check the powers of the president culminated in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) by a group of NGOs, including the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), the Legal Resources Foundation, ZimRights, and the ZCTU. Also, the war veterans mobilised outside the party structures. In autumn 1997, Mugabe personally promised compensation to the veterans. He was able to buy the loyalty of the veterans, but his relation to the trade union became even more antagonistic than before. The confrontation between the workers and the government

intensified during the ZCTU mass demonstrations of December 9, 1997. Tsvangirai was even beaten, probably by representatives of the War Veterans' Association. In January 1998, he became the first chair of the NCA.

Mugabe soon declared that his government regarded the ZCTU as an opposition political party. News stories about the government planning to de-register and ban the ZCTU began to appear.⁵⁰ The ZCTU started to organise provincial labour rallies, where the leadership of the organisation spoke to thousands of workers about its policy – a completely new thing in the history of the ZCTU. Strikingly, the rallies were organised in the same towns and very close to the timing of ZANU rallies. This led people to conclude that the two organisations had engaged in a contest about the size of their audiences to compare their popularity.⁵¹

The government did not want to co-operate with the NCA, but it could not ignore this new organization. Already in December 1997, the ZANU party conference called for constitutional reform.⁵² Finally, the government formed its own commission to draft a new constitution to be put to a public referendum. The NCA boycotted the government commission on the grounds that it was dependent on the president, who had the power to amend its proposal. Soon civic groups came to the conclusion that there was no other alternative than to contest elections for political offices in order to democratise the constitution. In September 1999, a new labour-based party, the MDC, was formed under the leadership of Tsvangirai.

When the government presented the proposed constitution for referendum in February 2000, the NCA and MDC stated to the public that more radical changes were needed to check the power of the president. To the surprise of the government, only 44 percent of the voters supported its proposal. For the first time, the government lost at the polling booths. The urban protest was hardly surprising, but rural reluctance to support the government reflected a very different pattern from past elections.

After this result, the MDC seemed to pose a real threat for the ruling party in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Even the white minority, which until then had largely supported ZANU or had not participated in party politics at all, openly supported the MDC. Also significant was also the international attention to the government's intolerance of the MDC.⁵³ MDC was a party emergent in an era when the donor community wanted to be seen as committed to the issues of good governance, human rights and democracy.

Elections in 2000 and 2002

Shortly after the referendum, a violent campaign led by the War Veterans' Association against the MDC supporters white farmers among them, was launched. Most of the intimidation took place in rural Mashonaland provinces, traditionally strong ruling party areas which the party could not afford to lose. By the same token, the land question became the most important electoral issue for the ZANU.

MDC also promised to promote "people driven land reform." In its manifesto the party promised to stand for democracy, political pluralism, accountable governance, equitable development policies and economic growth.⁵⁴ However, it is likely that a large part of the political mobilisation behind the MDC was simply anti-ZANU rather than for any specific political programme presented by the MDC.

In the 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU won 62 seats against the MDC's 57. ZANU(Ndonga) won its traditional seat in Chipinge (see table 7, appendix IV). ZANU's performance was best in Mashonaland. Participation in the elections was strong in the urban areas, while intimidation probably reduced participation in some rural areas. The most striking feature of the voting pattern was not overwhelming support for MDC in the cities, but the fact that ZANU got only two seats in Matabeleland provinces. Furthermore, the MDC won seven seats against ZANU's six in Manicaland. Matabeleland and Manicaland, which have occasionally been the strongholds of opposition parties, voted for the same opposition party for the first time. This must have been alarming to ZANU with its rhetoric of unity and the regional balancing of power among its leadership.

In contrast to the optimistic views of the international observers, violence continued and even intensified after elections.⁵⁵ Due to the extensive powers of the executive, the presidential elections in 2002 would mark the real battle over governmental power. Harassment organized by the War Veterans extended to the urban areas and industry. After a violent campaign period that again raised many concerns abroad, elections were arranged in March. A large number of voters in Harare were disenfranchised by the reduction of polling stations and Mugabe won the elections with safe margins (See table 8, appendix IV). Big cities and urban centres voted for Tsvangirai, but most rural constituencies voted overwhelmingly for Mugabe. However, in Matabeleland and Manicaland provinces the MDC again recorded strong support.

As had become a routine in Zimbabwe, the opposition attempted to challenge the result through the courts due to violence and irregularities in the voters' rolls. Also, ZCTU tried to protest the way the elections were arranged with a stay away campaign, but it failed to ensure workers' participation. Insecurity had made mass action increasingly difficult. As in early 1990s, the government again argued that civil servants should be loyal to the ruling party.

Since the election's aftermath, the MDC has been in difficult position. As a minority in the parliament, it has not been able to block new laws and regulations further constraining freedom of expression. On the other hand by maintaining their seats in the parliament, they have at least been able to raise some voice against government policy. Because MDC regards itself as the real winner of the 2000 and 2002 elections, any attempts of the leaders of the neighbouring countries or the Commonwealth to facilitate negotiations between the parties have been in vain.⁵⁶ For the MDC, participating in such negotiations would mean the same as recognising the victory of ZANU. Indeed, the history of ZANU has been about strategies to co-opt potential opposition rather than any attempts to share power.

Conclusions

Since 1980, the government has used almost all possible legal and illegal means to keep itself in power within the multiparty electoral system that was imposed upon it in the peace negotiations. Only one opposition party has survived: Sithole's small faction of the liberation movement has maintained one or two seats in Manicaland. Otherwise, opposition politics has shown few continuities in Zimbabwe. Four different parties have held the position of the second biggest party.

Regional differences in the support of the opposition over time are remarkable. ZAPU, perhaps more accurately a repressed junior party in the government than an opposition party,

was popular in Matabeleland in the first two elections. In 1990, a significant section of voters in Manicaland voted for ZUM, which had popularity in urban areas as well. In 1995, Masvingo proved to be the province of most intensive intra-ZANU cleavages, while Dongo was able to challenge the ruling party in Harare. In 2000 and 2002, the MDC received overwhelming support in the cities and Matabeleland, with very strong support in Manicaland. Throughout the independence period, the opposition has been almost negligible in rural Mashonaland. Yet even there, the elections in 2000 and 2002 showed support for the opposition. Rural one-partyism and urban pluralism have characterised the whole country in all elections, but it has also been a dynamic phenomenon, especially if voter apathy is regarded as opposition towards the ruling party.

Most important for the defence of multipartyism has been the evolving role of civil society. During the early 1990s, civil groups found the opening up of political space useful for bargaining with the government and ruling party. Towards the end of the decade, the deepening economic crisis mobilised these groups to criticise the government and attempt to transform the structures of power in the state.

A constitution providing checks and balances to the use of state power is the foundation on which a sustainable role for opposition politics can be built in Zimbabwe. In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, it is popular trust and support for constitutional order that can make democracies work, not discontent with the incumbents. In this sense, the challenge of resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe goes far beyond electoral competition between the parties, important as it is.

The MDC's focus beyond economic problems and ZANU mismanagement, on the legal and constitutional context of abuse of state power, is important. The organizational base of the MDC was not merely one of popular discontent with the executive, but an explicit agenda to democratise the state through a peaceful transition. Simultaneously, the MDC represents such a wide coalition of interests, including trade union, civic groups, white farmers and business community, that it is not easy to see its political profile after a possible transition.

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2. Astrow, Andre (1983) *Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* London: Zed Press.
3. Ibid
4. Hatchard, John (1993) *Individual Freedoms & State Security in the African Context: The Case of Zimbabwe*, Harare: Baobab Books.
5. Sylvester, Christine (1991) *Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, London: Dartmouth.
6. Chikerema had left the UANC and formed the Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) after Muzorewa had refused to appoint him to the cabinet of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Astrow 1983, 114). The National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ) and the National Democratic Union (NDU) were minor parties contesting, nevertheless, in all provinces. The United National Federal Party (UNFP) fought only in five provinces and United People's

- Association of Matabeleland (UPAM), which was contesting also the white elections, had candidates only in Matabeleland.
7. Rich, Tony (1982) "Legacies of the Past? The Results of the 1980 Election in Midlands Province" *Africa*, 52(3): 42–55.
 8. Gregory, Martyn (1980) "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: An Analysis of the 1980 Elections and an Assessment of the Prospects," *Occasional Paper*. (May, 1980), The South African Institute of International Affairs.
 9. Ibid
 10. PF (1980) *The Patriotic Front in Government: Election Manifesto 1980*, Lusaka: Patriotic Front (ZAPU).
 11. Rich 1982
 12. Gregory 1980
 13. These were gathered to the special Assembly Points in accordance with the peace agreement. See Freedom House (1980) "Report of the Freedom House Mission to observe the Common Roll Election in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) February 1980," New York: Freedom House.
 14. Astrow, 1983
 15. CCJP (1997) *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report of the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 to 1988*, Harare: CCJP, The Legal Resource Foundation.
 16. Sylvester, 1991, p. 76
 17. The other parties contesting the elections were the UANC, Sithole's ZANU, National Democratic Union (NDU) and the National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ). See ZIANA (1985) *Election Handbook, A Guide to the General Election of July 1985*. Harare: ZIANA.
 18. Lemon, Anthony (1988) "The Zimbabwe General Election of 1985," *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 26(1): 3–21.
 19. Sylvester, Christine (1986) "Zimbabwe's 1985 Elections: A Search For National Mythology," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24(2): 229–255.
 20. Ncube, Welshman (1991) "Constitutionalism, Democracy and Political Practice in Zimbabwe", in Mandaza, Ibbo & Sachikonye, Lloyd M. (eds.) *The One-Party State and Democracy*. Harare: SAPES Books.: 155–177.
 21. In 1980 the need to arrange the elections very quickly to end the war, had prevented the time-consuming voters' registration and delimitation exercise stipulated by the electoral law.
 22. Laakso, Liisa (2002a) "When elections are just a formality: Rural-urban dynamics in Zimbabwean dominant party elections" in Michael Cowen & L. Laakso (ed.) *Multiparty Elections in Africa*, James Currey, London, Palgrave, New York, 2001, 325 - 345.
 23. CCJP 1997
 24. Chiwewe, Willard A. (1989) "Unity Negotiations" in Banana," in Canaan S., (ed.) *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890–1990*. Harare: The College Press: 242–287.
 25. Sithole, Masipula (1997) "Zimbabwe's Eroding Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 8(1): 127–141.

26. Moyo, Jonathan (1992) *Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe*, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications. pp. 32 & 35
27. Makumbe, John (1991) "Zimbabwe Elections 1990: An Overview", University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Election Studies Project, Occasional Paper Series, 1(3), p. 1
28. Quantin, Patrick (1992) "The 1990 General Elections in Zimbabwe: Step Towards a One-Party State?" in Baynham, Simon ed. (1992) *Zimbabwe in Transition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell: 24–44.
29. Sylvester, C. (1990) "Unities and Disunities in Zimbabwe's 1990 elections," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28(3): 375-400.
30. Sachikonye, Lloyd (1990) "The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: A Post-Mortem," *Review of African Political Economy*, (48): 92 - 99.
31. Chan, Stephen with the assistance of Chanda L.J. Chingambo (1992) "Democracy in Southern Africa: The 1990 Elections in Zimbabwe and 1991 Elections in Zambia," *The Round Table* 322: 183–201.
32. Quantin 1992
33. Sachikonye, Lloyd (1995) "State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe" in Sachikonye (ed.) *Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements in Southern Africa*, Harare: SAPES Books: 129–161.
34. Already in 1982 Mugabe argued that "workers should stop strikes which were retarding development. You are now independent, so who are you striking for?" (*The Herald*, January 25, 1982).
35. Pillay, Devan (1991) "The ZCTU's 1990 Congress: exposing the capitalist reality beneath Zimbabwe's 'socialist' rhetoric," *SALB*, 15(5): 75–79.
36. Musarurwa, Albert (1991) "The Labour Movement and the One-Party State Debate" in Mandaza, Ibbo and Lloyd M. Sachikonye. (eds) *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*, Harare: SAPES Trust: 143–154.
37. President Chiluba of Zambia was a trade union leader before he successfully challenged Kenneth Kaunda in 1991. See Deve T. & Goncalves, F. (1994) "Whither the Opposition in Zimbabwe," *Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly*, 7(8): 9–11.
38. NDU contested three seats. There was also Zimbabwe Active People's Unity Party, which was established by some former members of ZAPU. It failed to propose any candidate. The party's abbreviation, ZAPU, was banned and the founder of the party was arrested (CCJP 1992, 220).
39. Quantin 1992
40. ZUM (1989) *The Manifesto (Towards a democratic Zimbabwe)*, Gweru: ZUM.
41. Masendeke, Anthony F.; Mafico, Muriel U. & Chitopo, Patson T. (1991) "Report on the 1990 General and Presidential Elections: Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces", University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Election Studies Project, Occasional Paper Series, 1(3).
42. Sachikonye 1990
43. Moyo 1992
44. *The Sunday Mail*, May 9, 1993

45. Laakso, Liisa (1996) "Relationship Between the State and Civil Society in the Zimbabwean Elections 1995", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 36(3): 218–234.
46. Auret, Michael (1994) *Churu Farm – A Chronicle of Despair*, Harare: CCJP.
47. Other parties contesting the election were the Zimbabwe Federal Party (ZFP), Zimbabwe Aristocrats and Zimbabwe Congress Party (ZCP).
48. *Horizon*, December 1996
49. *The Herald*, January 1, 1998
50. *Zimbabwe Independent*, March 13–19, 1998
51. *The Financial Gazette*, April 2, 1998; April 9, 1998
52. There were very critical views inside the party. In a debate on the constitution in parliament, the ZANU Masvingo province chairman said that Mugabe "must go". The party suspended him for two years.
53. Laakso, Liisa (2002b) "The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(3): 437-464.
54. MDC (2002) Manifesto <http://www.mdczimbabwe.com/aboutmdc.htm>.
55. Laakso 2002b
56. Tsvangirai, Morgan (2002) "President Morgan Tsvangirai addresses MDC parliamentarians", December 18, 2002, <<http://www.mdczimbabwe.com/currstmts.htm>>.

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War Veterans: Continuities between the Past and the Present

NORMA KRIGER

Abstract: This article makes the case for strong parallels in the collaborative relationship between veterans and the party in the first seven years of independence and in the extended election campaign period from February 2000 to the presidential election in March 2002. Just as the ruling party used ZANLA veterans to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in the first seven years of independence, so it used veterans alongside others, and especially youth, to try to preserve its power among these constituencies. The fast-track land resettlement program, like the earlier cooperative movement, provided valuable symbolic support for the party's revolutionary credentials but demonstrated the party's low commitment to achieving large-scale economic transformation. As in the first seven years, so in the post-2000 campaign period, veterans often had their own agendas, distinct from the party's, as they sought power and privilege, both of which were threatened by a change in regime. Whereas from 1980 to 1987, ZANLA veterans and the ruling party targeted the opposition party, ZAPU, and its former ZIPRA guerrillas, in the post-2000 campaign period the party and veterans colluded against the new political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Across both time periods, veterans and the party relied on liberation war appeals, violence, and intimidation to attain their distinct and overlapping objectives. Another parallel between the two time periods is in the political discourse about "authentic" and "fake" veterans.

Introduction

The emerging conventional wisdom is that guerrilla veterans' power was first visible in their violent 1997 protests against the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU(PF). Their subsequent extraction of sizeable lump-sum payments and monthly war service pensions is portrayed as the birth of a new alliance between the ruling party and veterans. This came to play a pivotal role in the parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns between 2000 and 2002.¹ In *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*, I examine the political dynamic between veterans and the ruling party in military integration and demobilization programs in the aftermath of the negotiated Lancaster House peace settlement.² A central argument of the study is that veterans and the ruling party were both collaborators and antagonists, often simultaneously. Each sought to build power and privilege through mutual manipulation of the other, through the use of violence and intimidation, and through legitimating appeals to their participation in the liberation war. The epilogue (the basis for this

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a7.pdf>

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paper) makes the case for strong parallels in the collaborative relationship between veterans and the party in the first seven years of independence as well as during the extended election campaign period from February 2000 to the presidential election in March 2002. In the epilogue, and elsewhere, I also argue that public debates about whether those involved in the post-2000 campaign violence and land invasions were 'real' war veterans ought to be understood as a continuation of a political discourse about 'authentic' and 'fake' veterans that has been used by veterans and the party since 1980.³

Despite the contextual differences between the founding years of independence and the post-2000 extended election campaign period, there was an underlying continuity in the collaboration and conflict between veterans and the ruling party across these time periods. I focus on their collusion. Just as the ruling party used Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) veterans to win electoral power among the rural majority in 1980 and then to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in the first seven years of independence, so it used veterans (ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army]) alongside others, and especially youth, to try to preserve its power among these constituencies. The land invasions, occupations, and fast-track land resettlement program, like the earlier cooperative movement, provided valuable symbolic support for the party's revolutionary credentials but demonstrated the party's low commitment to achieving large-scale economic transformation. As in the first seven years, in the post-2000 campaign period veterans often had their own agendas, distinct from the party's, as they sought power and privilege, both of which were threatened by a change in regime. Whereas ZANLA veterans and the ruling party targeted the opposition party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its former ZIPRA guerrillas from 1980 to 1987, in the post-2000 campaign period the party and veterans colluded against the new political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Across both time periods, veterans and the party relied on liberation war appeals, violence, and intimidation to attain their distinct and overlapping objectives.

WINNING RURAL SUPPORT

In the 1980 election campaign, ZANU(PF) and ZAPU concentrated on winning the crucial rural vote. Both used guerrillas to campaign but ZANU(PF) deployed ZANLA political commissars in the rural areas on an incomparably greater scale. To ensure their party won the election, thousands of ZANLA guerrillas were deliberately kept out of assembly camps in violation of the settlement. After the ceasefire, and thus also in violation of the settlement, ZANLA infiltrated thousands of its guerrillas from Mozambique into the country, most likely in an attempt to enable ZANLA guerrillas to assemble in the numbers the party had promised at Lancaster House.⁴ Joshua Nkomo claimed that ZANU(PF) killed a ZAPU candidate as well as eighteen to twenty party workers.⁵ The British election monitors' report claimed that in one-third of the rural areas the voters were not free to vote, chiefly because of ZANU(PF)/ZANLA violence and intimidation. The observers drew attention to the range of methods of ZANLA coercion and intimidation:

Whether or not they were acting on instructions of their political leaders...They extended from brutal 'disciplinary murders' as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform to generalized threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war if ZANU(PF)

failed to win the election to psychological pressure like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how individuals had voted and to the physical interdiction of attendance at meetings. The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of recent violence, made the threats of general retribution or a continuance of the war a potent weapon even in the hands of unarmed activists, since it was independent of the secrecy of the ballot.⁶

Focused chiefly on the violence of Rhodesian forces, the Commonwealth Observer Group's report failed to recognize the extent to which ZANLA violations of the settlement were orchestrated.⁷ Since ZANU(PF) won 57 of the 80 parliamentary seats - the other 20 seats were reserved for whites - these and other observers asserted that electoral violence and intimidation had not altered the election result which they therefore accepted as the legitimate expression of the voters' preferences.⁸ According to interviewees in 1992, ZANLA guerrillas who had campaigned in the 1980 election were later paid by their victorious party for their revolutionary contributions.

In the campaign for the parliamentary election between February and June 2000, ZANU(PF) and the veterans colluded in an organized campaign of violence and intimidation in the rural areas against all suspected MDC supporters, and especially African farm workers on white-owned commercial farms.⁹ Led by war veterans, land invasions (which began in late February 2000 and affected about one-third of the white commercial farms by June) were a deliberate attempt to place intimidating and often violent party campaigners close to their rural targets. Both party leaders and veterans claimed they were fighting a third *chimurenga* [liberation war] to consolidate and defend the war of liberation, and promised war and violence against MDC supporters and/or an MDC electoral victory. Between thirty-six and forty people died during the campaign period. The MDC won 57 out of 120 seats, though the ruling party retained a significant parliamentary majority because the constitution provides for another 30 seats for appointees, all ZANU(PF) supporters. MDC candidates continued their challenge of election results in thirty-eight constituencies on the grounds that ZANU(PF) violence and intimidation was a criminal offence in terms of the Electoral Act and had affected the result.¹⁰ The party allocated Z\$20 million to the war veterans association to pay veterans and youth for their participation in the parliamentary campaign. Individual party leaders and MPs also reportedly paid or promised to pay youth whom they hired to perform acts of violence against the opposition. The party used the state apparatus - the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the police, and the army - to provide transport and other logistical support to those involved in land invasions. In October 2000, the government offered amnesty to those who had committed politically motivated crimes between January 1 and July 31 2000, thus perpetuating a history of official impunity for party supporters who engaged in violence on behalf of the ruling party. Based on a list of names and affiliation of perpetrators of election violence in the parliamentary election campaign, 21% were identified as war veterans.¹¹

WINNING THE ARMY'S LOYALTY

At independence, the three major armed forces -- ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian forces--remained intact. The ruling party joined together ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas in order to build power over the Rhodesian forces and to retain the loyalty of the guerrillas who

expected to form the new army. Simultaneously, the ruling party also sought to assert ZANLA's power over ZIPRA. The three armies' leaders agreed that the guerrilla appointments to middle and junior management posts in the newly created battalions should be based on merit. But in November 1980, when ZIPRA seemed likely to win more of these command posts, the party ended merit-based battalion appointments because neither it nor ZANLA could tolerate an army in which the opposition would dominate.¹² In 1982, the party and ZANLA veterans colluded in a vicious attack on ZIPRA members in the army, especially those in command positions. Disappearances, detentions, arrests, torture, refusal to obey ZIPRA commanders or accept ZIPRA appointments were the order of the day.¹³ ZANLA veterans who took over ZIPRA positions benefited. ZANLA's greater war contribution was often invoked to justify their right to control the army. Impunity was provided in July 1982, when the government introduced the Emergency Powers Act (Security Forces Indemnity). This effectively reinstated the Smith regime's Indemnity and Compensation Act, which protected government officials and the security forces from prosecutions as long as they intended to serve the public interest.¹⁴ Though the Supreme Court struck down these regulations as unconstitutional in 1984, it had no practical effect for perpetrators or victims.¹⁵

The army was a critical resource in the party's strategy for retaining power after 2000. Both of the army's top leaders (themselves liberation war veterans), as well as many other veterans in the army, had vested interests in the party remaining in power. The army's leaders have enjoyed opportunities for patronage, including access to land and profits in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the army fought to defend that country's government until late 2002. These leaders authorized the use of their personnel, vehicles, planes, and allegedly arms to assist in the land invasions during the parliamentary and presidential campaigns.

After the MDC won all urban seats in the capital city of Harare in the June election, the police and the army attacked people in the surrounding high-density suburbs to punish them for voting for the MDC.¹⁶ The ruling party and army leaders took steps to respond to their anxieties about potential MDC loyalties in the army. In September 2000, Moven Mahachi, then Defense Minister, introduced legislation to create a reserve force composed of war veterans and to bring the war veterans association and related issues under the Defense Ministry.¹⁷ In May 2001, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) commander Constantine Chiwenga, a war veteran, reportedly toured army barracks to mobilize support for President Mugabe in the election. He is said to have advised soldiers that the army should never allow Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader and presidential contender, to govern Zimbabwe. He called the former trade union leader a 'deserter' of the 1970s liberation war -- in fact, Tsvangirai stayed in Zimbabwe during the war--and said no 'self-respecting' soldier should ever consider saluting him. To secure party loyalty, Chiwenga introduced a policy of promotions for all war veterans in the army, and banned war veterans from army retirement before the presidential election.¹⁸ At least two army officers filed papers in the High Court alleging that Chiwenga had removed them from the army because he believed they were MDC supporters.¹⁹ Mugabe promised every member of the uniformed services (including the army) a plot under the fast track resettlement scheme.²⁰ All war veterans, including those in the army, were given 25% increases in their monthly pensions from August 2001, backdated to January 2001.²¹ In August 2001 Didymus Mutasa, a senior party loyalist, warned for the second time in two months of a military coup, should

Tsvangirai win the presidential election.²² In January 2002, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, the Zimbabwe Defense Force commander, flanked by the heads of the uniformed services stated:

We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.²³

WINNING THE SUPPORT OF URBAN WORKERS

In the early years of independence, the ruling party pressed and persuaded the white-dominated private sector and the bureaucracy, which were both seen to be pro-Smith and pro-Muzorewa bastions, to employ demobilized guerrillas, and in particular those belonging to ZANLA. The ruling party wanted to place loyal cadres in bastions of pro-Muzorewa and pro-Smith support to build a power base. In 1980 and 1981, the party had dealt harshly with a number of workers' strikes, denouncing labor militancy as a threat to nationalism and to the gains of the nationalist struggle, and lambasting the labor movement for its marginal role in the liberation war.²⁴ In February 1981, the ruling party engineered the creation of a politically subservient federation of trade unions, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).²⁵ At the same time, it also introduced elected workers' committees. Formally, these committees were only intended to improve communication between workers and management. Workers' committees did not even have bargaining rights over pay and job grading.²⁶ Veterans, most of whom were unskilled workers, sought and obtained positions on the committees in order to enhance their power in the workplace. Other workers tended to defer to their liberation war credentials.²⁷ Veterans used the committees to address legitimate workers' grievances concerning racism, poor working conditions, and low salaries. They also wanted to see other liberation war veterans in management positions and resented working under African managers who had served the former regime.²⁸ They often retained their martial and revolutionary war names, which an ex-combatant has described as "deliberately derogatory, a statement of defiance or a challenge to the enemy."²⁹

Veterans and the ruling party colluded in at least two ways. Though the party was chiefly concerned with establishing control over the urban work force, its leaders frequently proclaimed a commitment to grand schemes to transform the nature of society and to empower workers through workers' participation.³⁰ This rhetoric encouraged the militant aspirations of the unskilled ex-combatants on the committees. The party also became involved in solving workplace disputes when ex-combatants on workers' committees marched the managers, against whom they had grievances, to party headquarters.³¹ The militancy of workers and the party intimidated management who had to learn to deal with a new power structure and its socialist pretensions.³² The entire exercise was infused with intimidation and occasional violence. Ultimately, the party withdrew support for veterans' activities in the workplace when it no longer deemed them expedient, leaving veterans with a sense of betrayal.³³

In April 2001, apparently with senior party backing, ZANU(PF)'s newly elected Harare provincial party executive, which included war veterans such as Stalin Mau Mau, Mike Moyo, Chris Pasipamire, and Chris Mutsvangwa, formed a committee to deal with labor disputes in its province. The labor committee included Pasipamire, the chair, and Joseph Chinotimba, the ZNLWVA's (Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran's Association) Harare Province chair. The goal was to win back the urban vote from the MDC (it won all the Harare and Bulawayo constituencies in the 2000 general election) by solving workers' grievances against employers and by promising workers that they would run the companies in the future. The party also sought to intimidate those companies believed to be MDC supporters and financiers into abandoning their MDC links.³⁴ In less than two months, the war veterans and their supporters had invaded about 200 mainly white-owned private companies (as well as foreign embassies, NGOs, and other organizations), chiefly in Harare and Bulawayo.³⁵ Executives and managers who resisted demands to pay exorbitant amounts of compensation to sacked workers or to reinstate them were forcibly marched to the provincial party headquarters where they were threatened and often tortured and beaten.³⁶ Veterans and their supporters often forced executives to hand over money.³⁷ The police rarely tried to stop these illegal activities or to charge those involved.³⁸ Nkosana Moyo, Minister of Industry and International Trade, publicly condemned the company invasions (two weeks later he resigned). Others, notably Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo (also national party chair) and ZANU(PF) Vice President Joseph Msika, voiced 'lukewarm' objections.³⁹ However, only after international pressures and threatened sanctions did government and party officials and ZNLWVA leaders (including Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi and Chinotimba) order the company invasions to stop, disband the labor committee, and call on the police to arrest 'rogue' elements for intimidation and extortion of money from company officials. These officials accused the 'rogue' elements of distorting party policy which was supposedly to use the labor committee merely to intercede in labor disputes through negotiations between employers and the Labour Ministry.⁴⁰ Hunzvi said of the accused, "These people want to tarnish the image of the Government and the war veterans and we do not tolerate that."⁴¹ Police arrested and charged thirty-six people, including war veterans. When Mike Moyo, a former vice-chair of the ZNLWVA Harare Province and the secretary for security in ZANU(PF)'s Harare province, was arrested on charges of extortion (he was later freed), he accused John Nkomo, the national party chair, and July Moyo, the Labour Minister, of ordering or sanctioning the company occupations. Moyo accused John Nkomo of protecting big people who were office bearers in the ruling party, and charged that Chinotimba and Hunzvi had benefited greatly from extortion and should be arrested.⁴² After a lull, company invasions resumed.⁴³ The party's active support for its new Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions, of which Chinotimba is the vice-president, suggests its continued desperate attempts to win urban support by any means. The new federation seeks to decimate the MDC-linked ZCTU.⁴⁴

WINNING THE LOYALTY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

At independence, supporters of the previous regime dominated the civil service. The ruling party's privileged recruitment and promotion of demobilized ZANLA veterans over ZIPRA

veterans and better-educated civilians was intended to provide patronage and ensure loyal cadres. The central government also instructed urban councils to hire veterans on their staff.⁴⁵ Where ZAPU controlled councils, ZIPRA combatants had an opportunity to benefit from party patronage. But in the 1980s, ZANLA veterans in the army and in the Fifth Brigade colluded with the party and sometimes tortured, killed, and attacked ZAPU leaders, local government councilors, and civil servants. After the Fifth Brigade's violence in 1983 and 1984, the CIO and ZANU(PF) party youth took over an orchestrated campaign of political violence against ZAPU leaders, councilors, council staff, and others such as ZIPRA guerrillas, to ensure the ruling party's victory in the 1985 local and parliamentary elections in ZAPU strongholds. Government repression did not make a dent in ZAPU's electoral support.⁴⁶ After ZAPU's successful performance in the July 1985 general elections, despite virtually every rural and urban ZAPU office outside Bulawayo having been closed or burned out, the government detained, among others, nearly 200 employees of the Bulawayo City Council: municipal police, ambulance drivers, garbage collectors, and some middle-level bureaucrats. Many were ex-ZIPRA combatants or ZAPU wartime organizers.⁴⁷

Especially in the wake of the parliamentary election of June 2000, the ruling party sought to ensure that the civil service and local authorities were staffed by ZANU(PF) loyalists. Government and party leaders (including cabinet ministers Border Gezi, Stan Mudenge, and Aeneas Chigwedere) and provincial governors threatened civil servants who did not support the party with loss of their jobs and even death. Police commissioner Augustine Chihuri declared publicly his support for the ruling party in January 2001.⁴⁸ ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans colluded with the party in purging, through threats and violence, suspected MDC supporters in the civil service and local authorities. These purges have included rural teachers and headmasters, rural and district council staff, district and provincial administrators, and senior police officers. Immediate beneficiaries of job openings included war veterans.⁴⁹ War veterans in the police force have been the major beneficiaries of promotions in a bid to guarantee party loyalty in the presidential election campaign. Disgruntled police officers alleged that many veterans who were promoted were illiterate and that professional officers were overlooked. The aim, they alleged, was for all police posts to be led by war veterans by the time the presidential election was held.⁵⁰

THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Government and party officials portrayed demobilized ex-combatants who joined the cooperative movement in the early 1980s as a revolutionary vanguard whose war credentials were well suited to collective enterprises. According to official rhetoric, cooperatives were a step toward either economic modernization or a socialist transformation, a goal of the liberation struggle.⁵¹ In fact, cooperatives were a vehicle to engage and to placate demobilized ZANLA ex-combatants and had symbolic value insofar as they provided concrete evidence of the party's revolutionary commitments. The party's disinterest in the development of ex-combatant cooperatives is evident from the minuscule provision of government resources to an allegedly high profile development program.⁵² Moreover, the party's partisan interests prevailed over any commitment to the development of cooperatives. From the outset, the ruling party was hostile to ZIPRA cooperatives and their NGO supporters and the security organs intimidated,

harassed, and often attacked ZIPRA cooperatives.⁵³ The ex-combatants had little interest in cooperatives other than as a source of income. Those who were advanced their demobilization funds to form cooperatives-- they had to purchase their own means of production-- often abused their funds.⁵⁴ Similarly, ex-combatants on state collectives, where the state owned the means of production, formed an elite who used their party links and war credentials to gain privileged access to government resources and dominate their fellow cooperators.⁵⁵ The cooperative movement was a high profile and symbolic regime campaign. At the same time, it was an opportunity to incorporate ex-combatants as party patrons and to build party power.

The ruling party supported land invasions and occupations after February 2000 as a long overdue pursuit of the liberation war goal of regaining the land from the whites, and as central to the third *chimurenga*. The second *chimurenga* had been fought for political independence, the third was a struggle for economic justice. "The economy is land, and land is the economy" served as the party's rallying cry in the parliamentary election campaign. The party praised war veterans for instigating spontaneous land invasions in February 2000 and for serving as the party's revolutionary conscience. Subsequent land invasions were orchestrated by the party and often led by war veterans.

But the land invasions had little to do with the party's rhetoric concerning development and equity. Rather, the party used land as a source of patronage to try to boost its waning power at a time when the depleted treasury limited other options. In July 2000, the party commenced its new fast-track resettlement program on land it had confiscated from mainly white farmers. The party's parliamentary manifesto promised that this resettlement would result in an agricultural bonanza. The Supreme Court, ruling unanimously on the unconstitutionality of fast-track resettlement in December 2000, found no coherent program of land reform. The Court argued that it was primarily ZANU(PF) supporters who were beneficiaries and suspected or acknowledged it was MDC farmers whose land was acquired.

The goals of such resettlement were clearly unattainable. The government, with army assistance, intended to move people onto the 4,700 farms (almost all white owned) it had listed for compulsory acquisition. The country had no resources to implement viable land reform. Inputs, infrastructure, and agricultural staff did not exist for such an ambitious undertaking. Foreign aid was unavailable. Under the cover of land reform, thousands of farm workers lost their jobs and white farmers lost their land for the benefit of chiefly ZANU(PF) supporters, regardless of whether they were even interested in farming. The failure of a significant number to take up their plots raised questions about their interest in farming and its viability under current conditions. Stories of war veterans (as well as others) selling land plots suggest that some veterans were using their central role in land occupations and land allocation committees to enhance their power and make money.⁵⁶

Conclusion

This paper has sought to make the case for the continuities in collaboration between the ruling party and ZANLA war veterans between 1980 and 1987 and between the ruling party and ZANLA and ZIPRA veterans since 2000. The party and the veterans are treated as unitary groups in order to demonstrate a political dynamic that has characterized their relationship. I have tried to highlight a remarkable consistency in their power-seeking agendas, their appeals

to the revolutionary liberation war, and their use of violence and intimidation. The ruling party and veterans have manipulated each other as they have pursued their distinct and overlapping agendas. This collaborative relationship has been interwoven with strong hostilities between the party and veterans. Conflict has been an important component of the relationship between the party and the veterans since 1980. Recent cases include veterans' complaints at the party conference in Chinhoyi in December 2002 that the ZNLWVA had been excluded from land committees, especially for the allocation of commercial farm plots, and that police had removed initial settlers (including veterans) to make way for new plot holders.⁵⁷ Muddled reports in early January 2003 suggest that war veterans in Bulawayo and Chitungwiza initiated food riots to protest their exclusion from a role in distributing grain and the opportunity to profit from this.⁵⁸

Looking to the future, the current environment of chronic material shortages seems likely to undermine the level at which the party has been able to sustain central control over politics. The party will find it increasingly difficult to concentrate adequate material and symbolic resources on the war veterans as it attempts to placate other critical constituencies, notably the army, the police, the bureaucracy, and the party's formal youth militia. There is a serious risk of growing fragmentation within the party and among war veterans, and the forging of competitive alliances of different groups of war veterans, party leaders, and groups in the army. Will the center remain strong or will it fracture? Will Zimbabwe continue to be distinguished from many other African states by a relatively powerful center or will it be increasingly susceptible to warlord-style politics? Mugabe's decision to take over the chairmanship of the ZNLWVA suggests that he would like to rein in and control the war veterans.⁵⁹

Notes:

1. Alexander and McGregor, 2001, p.514; Meredith, 2002. Meredith entitles chapter 8 "Enter the War Veterans," as if they entered the political arena for the first time in 1997.
2. Kriger, 2003, forthcoming.
3. Kriger, 2003a, forthcoming.
4. Rice, 1990, p.83, pp.200-1 claims that as many as two-thirds of ZANLA's 30,000 guerrillas entered Zimbabwe from Mozambique after the cease-fire. Rice, 1990, p.161 cites Emmerson Munangagwa's post-election claim that 9,000-10,000 guerrillas, or 40% of all ZANLA forces did not assemble. Renwick, 1997, p.86 estimates 7,000 did not assemble. On ZANU(PF)'s infiltration of women fighters as refugees after the ceasefire and the party's use of them in the election campaign, see Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, p.262.
5. Nkomo, 1984.
6. Report of the Election Commissioner, 1980, p.11.
7. Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980, p.31.
8. Report of the Election Commissioner, 1980; Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980; and all studies of the settlement's success, e.g. Rice, 1990.
9. This paragraph draws on ZHR NGO Forum, July 2001, especially pp.2-3, 6-7, 12, 14, 16-17, 33-36; ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, especially pp.40, 42-3. These reports contain

detailed statements by party leaders and veterans threatening violence and war against opposition supporters.

10. "Legal Chiefs Who Turn the Law to Mugabe's Advantage," *The Times* (UK), February 4, 2003 describes how the former High Court president, Judge Chidyausiku, and his successor, Judge Paddington Garwe, both ZANU(PF) loyalists, stalled MDC challenges to the election results and personally allocated judges to hear such cases. In the event, in the thirty-one months since the MDC filed the petitions, only 14 cases have been heard. The MDC won 6 cases and lost 8.
11. "Who Was Responsible?" Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, July 2001, pp.34-36.
12. Evans, 1992; "ZIPRA Not Disloyal – Nkomo", *The Herald*, November 17, 1980, p.1.
13. Alexander et al, 2000, p.189; Kriger, 2003, pp.133-8.
14. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, 1997, p.44.
15. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986, pp.6, 100-1.
16. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, August 2001, pp.3, 16-17, 23-24.
17. "Party Deplores War Vets Reserve Force," *Daily News*, October 2000.
18. "Army Commander Campaigns for Zanu PF," *Financial Gazette*, May 24, 2001.
19. "Army Officers Sue Chiwenga," *Daily News*, February 5, 2002.
20. "Mugabe Troops Will Carve Up White Farms," *The Times* (UK), August 16, 2001.
21. "Chinotimba Attacks General Mujuru," *Zimbabwe Standard*, August 5, 2001; "War Vets Demand 100 percent Bonus," *Zimbabwe Standard*, November 25, 2001.
22. "The High Price of Freedom," *Financial Gazette*, August 16, 2001.
23. "Army Backs Mugabe," *Daily News*, January 10, 2002.
24. Schiphorst, 2001, p.64, footnote 5; Saunders, 2001, pp.136-7; Moyo, 1992, p.23; Raftopoulos, 2001, p.13.
25. Schiphorst, 2001, pp.50-4, 64, 87, 223-4.
26. Schiphorst, 2001, pp.189-90, 224-6; Wood, 1988, p.292; Maphosa, 1992, p.17.
27. Schiphorst, 2001, pp.63-4, citing, *inter alia*, the Chief Industrial Relations Officer's remarks in 1984 about the submission of the ZCTU leadership to the party and the government; see also Maphosa, 1992, pp.19-20.
28. Kriger, 2003, p.166.
29. Pfukwa, 1998.
30. Schiphorst, 2001, p.200.
31. Kriger, 2003, pp.166-7.
32. Dean, 2001, p.2; Schiphorst, 2001, p.217.
33. Kriger, 2003, pp.173-7.
34. ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, p.10; "ZANU PF Split over Blitz on Firms," *Financial Gazette*, May 3, 2001; Dean, 2001, p.4.
35. "Trial of 'Rogue' Militants Gets Under Way," *The Star* (SA), May 21, 2001; "Move to Call off Mugabe's Thugs," *Daily Telegraph* (UK), May 17, 2001.
36. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, August 2001, p.10.
37. "Rogue War Vets Arrested over Alleged Extortion," *The Herald*, May 17, 2001.
38. Dean, 2001, p.1.

39. "ZANU PF Split over Blitz on Firms," *Financial Gazette*, May 3, 2001; "ZANU PF Bid to Steal Urban Vote Flops," *Financial Gazette*, May 24, 2001.
40. "Trial of 'Rogue' Militants Gets Under Way," *The Star* (SA), May 21, 2001; "Zim Labour Unit Dissolved as More Vets Held," *The Star* (SA), May 21, 2001.
41. "War Vets Support Fair Deals; Hunzvi," *Sunday Mail*, May 6, 2001.
42. "Arrest Hunzvi Says Moyo," *Zimbabwe Independent*, May 23, 2001; "Moyo Says Arrest Moyo," *Daily News*, May 22, 2001. For the arrests of other veterans, see "Blitz on Rogue War Veterans Nets Twenty," *The Herald*, May 18, 2001; "18 War Vets Facing Extortion Charges Remanded in Custody," *Daily News*, May 24, 2001.
43. For example, "Chinotimba in New Raids," *Zimbabwe Independent*, June 29, 2001; "War Vets Still Camped at Ruenya Granite," *Zimbabwe Independent*, June 8, 2001.
44. For example, "ZFTU 'Persuades' Factory Workers to Join its Ranks," *Zimbabwe Standard*, April 12, 2002.
45. Kriger, 2003, chapter 5.
46. Alexander et al, 2000, pp.216, 218, 224, 226-7.
47. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986, p.75, p.124.
48. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, August 2001, pp.17-18, 33, 40; "Chigwedere Says Ministry Will not Protect Teachers," *Daily News*, June 13, 2001; McGregor, 2002, p.34.
49. McGregor, 2002, pp.17, 29-31, 33-4.
50. "ZRP Promotes More than 300 War Veterans," *Daily News*, March 20, 2001.
51. Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997, pp.441-2; Mumbengegwi, 1984, p.49; 1988, p.156, p.160.
52. For evidence of government's small investment in training staff for cooperatives, see "Cash Boost for Demob Co-ops," *The Herald*, October 12, 1983, p.1; "The Successes and Failures of Zimbabwe's Co-ops," *Sunday News*, October 30, 1988, p.8.
53. Hoffman, c.1990, chapters 6 and 12.
54. Demobilisation Directorate. Team of Consultants' Final Report on the Three Months of the Extended Contract. Team Leader: J.W.Nyamunda. June 9 1983. ZP archives.
55. Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997, p.448. For a similar description of a state collective, see Chitsike, 1988, pp.114-5.
56. International Bar Association, 2001, chapter 7; Blair, 2002, chapter 9, especially pp.177, 179-84; Alexander, forthcoming.
57. "Confusion reigns over proposed land audit," *Zimbabwe Mirror*, December 24, 2002. It should be borne in mind that many ZNLWVA leaders, including those who were complaining, also benefited from the allocation of commercial farms.
58. For example, "Food riots point to turf wars," Comment from *ZWNNews*, January 11, 2003. This piece suggested that the 'real' war veterans were at loggerheads with the police and the party youth militia. Other articles suggested that militant youth were angry at being left out of the lucrative food distribution loop, e.g.see "Zimbabwe food riots 'caused by war veterans,'" *Daily Telegraph* (UK), January 6 2003.
59. "Mugabe set to step into Hunzvi's shoes as leader of war veterans," *Business Day* (SA), January 30, 2003.

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Crisis in the State and the Family: Violence Against Women in Zimbabwe¹

MARY JOHNSON OSIRIM

Abstract: Since the early 1990's, Zimbabwe has been enmeshed in a major economic crisis that has seriously eroded the status of women in that country. For the past three years, the economic crisis has been joined by a political crisis which marks the first major challenge to the Mugabe regime since independence. In addition to the very harsh toll that the economic and political problems have had on poor and low-income African women in particular, especially those involved in subsistence agriculture and the micro-enterprise sector, black women in Zimbabwe have also experienced an escalation in violence committed against them, by both individuals and the state. Such violence cannot be solely understood as physical abuse, but as a phenomenon that takes on a myriad of forms, including the economic and the psychological. Domestic violence and rape have deeply-rooted structural explanations in Zimbabwe linked to the long history of colonialism and white minority rule, political transition, economic crisis and adjustment, changes in expected gender roles for women and men, and the political crisis that emerged in the last few years. Under such circumstances, many men perceive that their power and position in the broader society, as well as within the home, have come into question and unfortunately, all too many men have directed their anger against women. In the midst of this crisis, though, two non-governmental organizations have attempted to address the issue of violence against women—the Musasa Project and the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network. Although the limited resources of these NGO's restrict what they can accomplish, they, unlike the state, are path breakers in the empowerment of poor and low-income women.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, domestic violence and rape have been major concerns of the feminist movement, particularly in the Northern Hemisphere. Wife beating and rape are significant violations of human rights around the globe despite the fact that The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations in 1979 and signed by over 160 nations. “CEDAW recognizes gender-based violence as a form of discrimination against women which impairs or nullifies women’s

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a8.pdf>

enjoyment of their human rights including their rights to life and to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."² While several international organizations, such as the UN, international conferences and many local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have begun to focus their attention on the incidence of violence against women in the South, little work has been done by social scientists within sub-Saharan Africa.³ The few studies that do exist suggest an increase in violence against women over the past decade.⁴ It is now estimated that a woman is raped in South Africa every 26 seconds and more than 20 women are assaulted daily by their spouses in Zimbabwe.⁵

This paper marks the beginning of an exploratory study to examine the increasing incidence of violence against women in contemporary Zimbabwe through a sociological lens. In a conference on "Gender, Justice and Development," at the University of Massachusetts (January, 1993) Peggy Antrobus then Director of DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) stated that there clearly seemed to be a relationship between the adoption of structural adjustment programs in the South and an increasing incidence of violence against many poor women in these societies, who were disproportionately carrying the burdens of adjustment. The critical importance of this issue was later emphasized in an international conference on "Gender and Development" in Harare, Zimbabwe (1999) where women ministers and leaders of NGOs in South Africa discussed the escalation of violence against women in that country, particularly since the transition to majority rule in 1994. The problem seems to have become more entrenched with the election and appointment of black women to positions in the legislature and the cabinet respectively.

Over the past three years in Zimbabwe, the state's campaign of violence against those perceived to be in the political opposition has also resulted in increased violence against women, especially during the seizure of large-scale farms in that country. From these examples, it would appear that the extra burdens that beset low-income women under structural adjustment and the improvement in the status of middle class women, as well as women's political and spatial location in a period of turmoil were somehow related to an increase in violence against women in southern Africa. How can we explain this? Are these reconcilable positions? What factors seem to be operative as explanatory variables in these cases?

To begin to answer these questions, this paper will explore what violence against women means in Zimbabwe and how this relates to the widely accepted definitions of this phenomenon that prevail in the North. Violence against women will be considered with reference to the structural problems in these societies such as economic crises in the region and political struggles linked to the consolidation of majority rule.

This paper will then proceed to investigate empirically the incidence of and factors related to violence against women in Zimbabwe. It will then examine the activities of the Musasa Project, a Zimbabwean NGO specifically focused on violence against women before briefly turning to some of the activities of the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network, an important vehicle in making the violence against poor women more visible. Although domestic violence and rape affect women in all races, ethnic groups and social classes, this paper will focus its attention on the impact of these problems on poor and low-income black Zimbabwean women.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE: WHAT FACTORS EXPLAIN THIS PHENOMENON IN ZIMBABWE?

In Zimbabwe, as well as in most societies, rape and domestic abuse are clear illustrations of some of the ways in which men exert control over women. I would argue, however, that in the case of Zimbabwe, the story is a far more complex one, due to the nature of colonialism and decades of white, minority rule in this and in other settler societies. In fact, the very definition of "violence against women" itself is far more complicated in these societies when one takes into account the nature of the economic crisis in southern Africa and the impact of globalization on the region. These are so acute that the impact on many poor and low-income women has been absolutely devastating. Moreover, these crises are occurring in states that essentially provide little or no safety net for the poor, who are very disproportionately women. In addition, Zimbabwe's independence and the transition to majority rule over 20 years ago, coupled with the economic crisis approximately 10 years later, have fundamentally challenged the prescribed gender roles for women and men. So, how do these realities in Zimbabwe help us understand a rising tide of violence against women in this society? What do they suggest about the questions we posed earlier regarding the causes for the increasing incidence of violence?

First, let us consider how the current economic crisis in Zimbabwe may have contributed to increasing economic violence against women by briefly exploring early post-independence economic and social history. During most of the 1980's, Zimbabwe experienced significant economic growth and substantially expanded the size of the state.⁶ Specifically, the state expanded social services, particularly in education and health care and appeared committed to fostering policies that promoted gender equality. Women and men both participated in the liberation war and the new government proclaimed that it intended to recognize this fact in its new policies. Therefore, one of the state's earliest efforts to advance the position of women was the creation of the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development and Women's Affairs in 1981. This agency was responsible for working to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and ensure their meaningful participation in all spheres of national development. The state also improved the legal status of women through the passage of the Legal Age of Majority Act, which changed women's position from that of legal minors to full citizens.⁷ As a result of these and other state actions, more women and girls enrolled in schools, occupied positions in the formal labor market, engaged in contracts, owned property, and attained credit in their own names.⁸ Further, women increased their participation in civil society through creating and sustaining local associations or NGOs to address their needs. The state's actions, combined with women's efforts, did foster greater legal equality and autonomy for some women in the first independence decade.

By the end of the 1980's, however, the Zimbabwean economy experienced decline as a result of lower prices for its primary products, balance of payments problems, drought, and continued regional destabilization by South Africa. By 1988-89, economic growth had already decreased markedly to 5% from a high of 11% at the beginning of the decade. At the end of the first independence decade, the national unemployment rate had increased to one million persons, or 50% of the potential labor force.⁹ In an effort to strengthen the economy, the

Zimbabwean state adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1990 with little discussion of this program outside of Mugabe's inner political circle.

The economic crisis and ESAP led to increased economic violence against women, especially for those at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. Economic violence can be defined as: property grabbing by male relatives of a deceased man, forced dependency, or neglect of a wife's material needs.¹⁰ From the over 150 intensive interviews that I conducted with women entrepreneurs during the past decade, it is clear that many of these women have experienced economic violence. How did this occur?

Under ESAP, the state retrenched over 40,000 workers, who were mostly men, from the civil service. In an effort to increase the profitability of their enterprises, medium and large-scale firms also engaged in major layoffs. In most cases, since men dominated formal sector employment, they experienced massive displacement in this period. While the state encouraged these retrenched men to begin new enterprises (in the informal sector if necessary) to sustain their families, many men found themselves contributing less and less to the upkeep of their families. They became increasingly dependent on the wages of their partners, the majority of whom relied on subsistence agriculture and/or informal sector work. Therefore, men's contributions to the family in this period of economic crisis declined and in many cases disappeared altogether.¹¹

Many women in the microenterprise sector discussed with me how they had to increase their overall contributions to family maintenance, especially the provision of food and payment of school fees due to their husbands' refusal or inability to increase their food allowances or because their husbands had left home. Some men left and sought job opportunities in other cities or across national borders (for example in South Africa or Botswana). They often began new relationships with other women in these "host" areas/countries. Many of these men effectively abandoned their first families and did not continue to support them financially, thus committing "economic" violence. The establishment of common-law unions or "maputo" marriages in host communities are intricately connected with the history of the region, since men were often forced to leave their homes to work in the mines and farms to meet their tax obligations to the colonial state.¹²

Failing to support one's wife and children also illustrates that these men are not fulfilling their expected gender roles. Another indicator of this phenomenon is the increasing percentage of female-headed households in Zimbabwe, currently about 31%. Households tend to become female-headed in Zimbabwe when a male partner/spouse leaves a relationship, as opposed to situations in which a woman never marries. Many low-income entrepreneurs, especially market traders, stated that their situations had worsened as the national economic crisis intensified. The Musasa Project, an NGO providing support to women who have been battered, estimated that 42% of the women receiving counseling services from 1988-1998 suffered from economic violence.¹³ Moreover, 50% of their clients are from poor and low-income populations.

In addition to the economic violence waged against low-income women in periods of economic crisis and adjustment, increasing numbers of women have also experienced physical violence. According to Green's study on violence against women in Africa, economic change may well be contributing to physical abuse.¹⁴ In Nigeria, for example, the economic crisis of the 1980's and 90's has made it very difficult for men to meet their responsibilities as heads of

households. Wives resent having to meet the increased financial burdens and this often leads to arguments with their husbands. Under these stressful conditions, it is not unusual for a man to abuse his wife.¹⁵ With respect to Zimbabwe, the economic crisis of the past decade has impacted heavily upon poor and low-income populations. Unemployment has escalated in the formal sector, especially for men. The expansion of primary, secondary, and tertiary education among black Zimbabweans in the 1980's outpaced the growth of formal sector jobs in the country. Many young Zimbabwean men who had increased expectations after the successes of the 1980's were unable to secure employment by the early 1990's in the midst of cutbacks in the state and private sectors. Thus, poor and low-income men have not been able to fulfill their traditional gender roles – responsibilities that include providing shelter and food for their families - in an atmosphere that appears to suggest greater rights and growing economic independence for women. Under these conditions, men are increasingly taking out their frustrations on their partners. There is a strong belief throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa that men should have total authority in the home, and many men feel it is acceptable to hit women.¹⁶

The economic crisis (which began in the late 80's) has meant that many poor, unemployed women have become even more economically dependent on men. The latter also experience the pressure of rising prices, economic uncertainty, and growing demands on their resources. The increasing stress from the economic situation, changing gender roles and expectations, coupled with the growing pressures in their households leads to an explosive situation in which some men lash out against their partners.

Zimbabwe has been mired in a long history of violence, especially with respect to the imposition and enforcement of white minority rule and the end of white hegemony. Within this context of state violence and the African resistance to the state, black women were also caught in the web of violence – in the public sphere, as well as within the home. During the 1930's, for example, at least one rape per month was reported to the native commissioner of Salisbury.¹⁷ In her work on the position of Shona women in the early/mid colonial period, Schmidt noted that men could beat their wives for what were considered major offenses without retribution from their communities, although wives might strike back:

If a Shona wife resisted her husband's authority by skimping on the food she prepared for him, failed to cook, or refused to sleep with him, she committed a serious offense that struck at the heart of the marriage contract. Under such circumstances, a man could beat his wife without social sanction....¹⁸

Schmidt's finding confirms earlier research by Holleman on Shona customary law. His work revealed that a husband can moderately punish/hit his wife if she refused to cook for him, clean the house, care for the children or have sexual relations with him.¹⁹

Other scholars examining the position of women in Zimbabwe have also indicated that women have experienced a long history of violence at the hands of men. Barnes noted that during the black nationalist struggles of the 1940's and 1950's, women were victimized by rape and other forms of violence.²⁰ Women were attacked in Salisbury during the general strike of 1948. One of the most significant cases of violence against women, however, was the attack and rape of women at Carter House in 1956, a hostel for women in Harare township. A boycott led by the Radical City Youth League resulted in the rape and assault of several women, when in the first days of the boycott, some black women residents of Carter House decided to ignore the

call to abandon public transportation and took a bus to town instead. Barnes described how this boycott against a major white-owned bus company in Harare illustrated a shift to a more confrontational style of resistance to the colonial state and resulted in violence:

A central event in the boycott was the attack and rape of women residents of Carter House, the new 156-bed hostel that was situated directly opposite the township's main bus terminus. (This began when) the bus in which the women were riding was stoned; the police fired tear gas. In the subsequent melee, food stalls were burned and bus shelters destroyed...and shops were looted...Perhaps five or as many as sixteen were raped in the assault on the hostel. The focus of male anger on these particular women illuminates some of the explosive undercurrents of urban gender relations in this period and the abandonment of the spirit of tolerance that prevailed briefly in the early 1950's...²¹

The rape of Carter House residents represents yet another example of African men lashing out against women in times of political unrest and transition, as well as their resistance to accepting changing gender roles for women. At the time of this attack, single, employed, black African women resided at the hostel. These women worked as shop attendants, domestics, and factory workers in Harare and were not dependent on men for their maintenance. They lived independently in a community of other women. During this period, a number of black women workers earned incomes that exceeded those of their black male counterparts and the women taking the bus during the boycott were seen as flaunting their independence and economic status. The living and working experiences of these women challenged traditional gender roles and certainly challenged black male hegemony in one of the only spheres in which they could exert some control – within the family and household. The residents of Carter House, then, were viewed as resisting male authority and defying their expected gender roles and thus, had to be punished and taught a lesson by men, who themselves were resisting the power of the state.

Zimbabwe subsequently fought a long, harsh and bitter liberation war in which women also participated. Sanday notes that where interpersonal violence has become an everyday occurrence and men are encouraged to be tough and aggressive, violence is often expressed sexually.²² Such actions were apparent in the liberation war, where not only did women and men witness much violence in fighting the Rhodesian army, but black Zimbabwean women also experienced harassment and violence from their comrades:

Leading army officials used to behave as though they were entitled to the marital services of women. Some sexist attitudes in war are also documented, including assigning significant tasks to men, and the humiliation felt by some males on saluting senior ranking female comrades. Cases are also reported where comrades in the struggle took other people's wives and used them for their own sexual gratification.²³

The injustices and violence experienced by women during the war, however, did not end with independence in 1980. While in the immediate post-independence years the Zimbabwean state was committed to advancing the position of women, the state has since been engaged in many public acts of violence against women. Among these are the beatings of women considered prostitutes in Harare at different times in the mid-1980's and 90's to rid the area of "unwanted elements" in periods when the state was preparing to host an international conference (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement).²⁴ Later, public demonstrations in

January 1998 by women who were disproportionately bearing the costs of economic crisis and adjustment were met with the violence of the army.

More recently, state-sanctioned violence that accompanied the 2002 pre-election campaign, the presidential elections, and the seizure of white-owned farms has taken an especially heavy toll on women and children. It is alleged that wives and daughters who sympathized with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) or who were connected to MDC supporters, as well as women farm workers were victimized by ZANU youth brigades. Although the youth brigades were particularly intent on silencing vocal opposition to the ruling party, who were disproportionately male, there was clearly a gendered dimension to their violence. Women believed to be associated with the opposition were not beaten, but were instead often raped or gang raped by members of the youth brigades and state functionaries.

In an article in the British Broadcasting Company's news and the French press, Frances Lovemore, a member of the Amani Trust (a Harare-based human rights group) remarked: "They (the militia) are raping on a mass scale."²⁵ Tony Reeler, director of the Trust also stated: "Girls were systematically taken and used and abused because of their families' political views...We're seeing an enormous prevalence of rape and enough cases to say it's being used by the state as a political tool."²⁶ The BBC and Sunday Telegraph further reported that rape camps exist in the rural areas, where women have been individually and/or gang raped by members of the youth brigades and the riot police.²⁷ Moreover, some children have witnessed the rapes and beatings of their mothers who lived and worked on farms taken over by the Zimbabwean ex-combatants. Therefore, public, state-sanctioned violence against women has become a reality in Zimbabwe today.

Although the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe occurred over 20 years ago, the establishment of the "new" state in conjunction with the economic crisis seems to have exacted a negative psychological toll on some men. Under the leadership of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF, blacks were elected to positions in the local and national legislature and appointed to cabinet posts, marking a major shift from the colonial regime. Black women held approximately 10-12% of all positions in parliament as well as positions in the cabinet, such as the Ministers of Cooperative and Community Development and Natural Resources and Tourism and some city council posts in the early post-independence period. This was quite remarkable given that black women's status was only changed from that of legal minors to full citizens in Zimbabwe in 1982. While these changes in the 1980's and 90's in many ways paled in significance to later changes in South Africa under majority rule (where about 30% of all parliamentary seats are today held by women), they still marked some shift in power.

For low-income black men, who were denied basic civil rights and economically marginalized under minority rule, the economic crisis and structural adjustment saw their status within households slipping away. The new higher status positions that some women were occupying in the state threatened male hegemony. Furthermore, that many of their wives, daughters and sisters were able to obtain positions in the informal economy and formal economy, were massive blows to male positions in the family and community. At the same time, many men were losing their positions in the formal economy with the retrenchment of tens of thousands of workers under structural adjustment. Poor and low-income black men could not fulfill their responsibilities as breadwinners. As the economic and political crises

became more entrenched, they saw little chance of regaining their positions. In general, then, black men, most especially those in the poor, low-income and lower-middle income strata saw the privilege that they enjoyed simply based on their gender significantly eroded with the advancement of women at both ends of the socio-economic hierarchy.

Thus, the history of colonialism and minority rule, political transition, and recent economic crisis and adjustment, have all contributed to an atmosphere of violence in Zimbabwe which partly manifests itself in the increasing rate of violence against women, particularly noted in statistics from 1995-1999 (see Table I below). Greater consciousness of violence against women as a major social problem in Zimbabwe and in southern Africa more generally, has also led to higher rates of reporting, although recent studies do suggest that rape and domestic abuse have been increasing in the region.²⁸

THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe's National Report to the Fourth World Conference on Women (held in Beijing in 1994) stated that domestic violence is the most prevalent form of violence against women, and that this works against a picture that a home is a safe place.²⁹ In 1997, the Zimbabwe Republic Police reported that everyday more than twenty women are physically assaulted by their spouses.³⁰ Further, "domestic violence accounts for more than 60% of the murder cases that go through the Harare courts."³¹ December Green, noting that Zimbabwe is one of the few countries to have collected data on wife beating, points out:

The government of Zimbabwe estimates that wife beating occurs in eight out of ten homes. The number of cases of wife beating reported in Harare alone jumped from 418 in 1988 to 5000 in 1990. The WILDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa) report found that one in three Zimbabwean females are physically assaulted, one in two are psychologically abused, and one in three are sexually abused. According to a Zimbabwean assistant commissioner, domestic violence accounts for more than 60 percent of the murder cases that go through the courts....³²

While it is unclear whether these figures represent an actual increase in wife battery or whether the mechanisms for reporting have improved, such an escalation in the number of cases—by more than tenfold in a two year period—warrants further study.

A major increase in the reported number of women beaten by their spouses occurred at the beginning of the economic crisis and the subsequent imposition of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in Zimbabwe. While it would certainly appear such that a massive escalation in the number of domestic abuse cases within the first year of the implementation of an adjustment program would be too immediate, the ESAP did result in major declines in the state budget for such vital services as education, health, transportation, and housing during the first year.³³ Within two years of the implementation of the adjustment program, it was estimated that 60-70% of the population had become very poor.³⁴ Thus, it is likely that relationships within many poor and low-income families were becoming increasingly strained as they struggled to provide for themselves.

The number of reported cases of rape also rises, particularly after 1990 with the economic crisis and the adoption of ESAP. The following statistics from the first few years of adjustment reveal this trend:

Table 1**Violence Against Women, 1987-1992**

Year	Number of Indecent Assaults	Number of Rapes
1987	554	2550
1988	535	2743
1989	563	2510
1990	598	2643
1991	609	2765
1992	611	3813

Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Central Statistics Office, 1994.

In reading such statistics, it is important to acknowledge that these numbers are only of cases that were reported. Many incidents of violence against women go unreported. Assault, rape, incest, and sexual harassment remain frequently unreported in Zimbabwe for several reasons. Often the person responsible for the crime is a relative, placing the woman in a serious quandary about reporting the crime. In a number of cases, the person is a partner or spouse who occupies the role of major breadwinner and the arrest of such a person might result in additional financial crisis within the home and family. Moreover, women may fear greater physical violence as well as the humiliation of having to testify in public about such intimate matters.³⁵

Studies on domestic violence and rape in Zimbabwe reveal an interesting pattern. In her work on violence against women, Alice Armstrong collected 200 case studies—170 of these were women who survived domestic violence and 30 were men who were survivors of violence by women or perpetrators of the violence. Her research maintains that violence in families starts with a slap and escalates into serious injuries as the years go by.³⁶ She documents the horrors of severe marital violence where wives are severely maimed or killed. Armstrong discusses patterns of "learned helplessness" which is documented in some of the earlier literature on domestic abuse in the US.³⁷ Some of Armstrong's major findings are:

- ⊙ Families and communities do not think that a 'mere slap' is wife-beating.
- ⊙ Women often don't try to get help and families don't intervene when a husband 'only slaps' his wife.
- ⊙ A 'mere slap' shows there are problems in the marriage and the couple needs help.
- ⊙ Help only comes after the violence gets much worse, and then it may be too late.
- ⊙ Half of wife-beaters interviewed thought they had the right to beat their wives, while only five percent of the women interviewed thought the husband had the right to hit them.
- ⊙ Consumption of alcohol was often involved in cases of domestic violence.[3⁸

It was quite interesting that in Armstrong's study, many men thought that wife beating was the "traditional" way of dealing with a misbehaving wife. Interviews with local leaders revealed that customary law forbids a husband to beat his wife, suggesting some disagreement with earlier studies on gender and customary law among the Shona. Previous studies indicated that if a woman did not fulfill her wifely duties, she could be hit.³⁹ This range of views point to the fact that customary law has been and continues to be negotiated between/among individuals and groups in Zimbabwe. Further, these examples illustrate how customary law among the Shona, the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe, might have varied significantly based on the local context. For example, for some Shona populations, it might have been acceptable to hit one's wife if she disobeyed a husband's command, while among the Shona in a different region, beating one's wife might have been viewed as acceptable. In the contemporary period, given the growing awareness that violence against women is wrong, Zimbabwean traditional leaders might be more likely to respond accordingly to a researcher's questions, despite the actual practices among the Shona. In general, in both the historical and contemporary periods, discussions with and facilitated by extended family members are largely regarded as an acceptable way to handle conflicts within the family according to custom.

Green notes that in a study by Chirume, Zimbabwean men were also not allowed to beat their wives with certain body parts or dangerous weapons:⁴⁰

According to Chirume, in Zimbabwe, a husband's use of fists and dangerous weapons against his wife is not acceptable. In such cases the community will generally tend to side with the victim. However, there is still sweeping support for less lethal versions of the custom. Chirume maintains that in Zimbabwe, it is widely believed that beatings must not be so frequent as to be a habit, but not too spaced lest the wife forget who is boss.⁴¹

A group of Zimbabwean women lawyers (WILDAF) found that nearly half (45.3%) of all murders of women in the country are committed by someone currently or formerly involved in an intimate relationship with them— a husband, a lover or an ex-husband.⁴² Most women who are killed by their husbands or partners are between the ages of 21 and 40, during these years men's control over women and their sexuality is at its peak. A survey in Harare and Bulawayo that explored the reasons for killing one's wife or partner in 249 cases concluded that this violence occurred because of the woman's alleged infidelity.⁴³ This is another vivid reminder of the power of patriarchal authority in controlling.

There are no laws in Zimbabwe that recognize marital rape, which frequently accompanies domestic abuse. Presently, there is also no specific law against domestic abuse. All cases of wife beating are handled under laws of "common assault." Fines for such crimes are often a very small sum that certainly do not deter such crimes. Although women who assaulted can apply for a peace order (restraining order) from the courts to keep the husband/partner away, these orders are only binding for 90 days (though they can be renewed). For the same reasons, however, that rape and domestic violence often go unreported, women seldom apply for these peace orders. They fear physical retribution and/or that they might lose the contributions of the male in their households and as a result their children will suffer.⁴⁴

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND HIV/AIDS

In the current HIV/AIDS pandemic, rape and marital rape are to be particularly feared, given the fact that one-third of the population is infected with the virus. As discussed by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM):

Women's exposure to violence increases their exposure to HIV/AIDS. Women can become infected as a result of sexual assault or coerced sex and the abrasions and tearing that can accompany these violations increases the chance of infection. Violence and fear of violence may intimidate women from trying to negotiate safer sex, discussing fidelity with partners or leaving risky relationships.⁴⁵

In fact, globally, the incidence of HIV/AIDS among women has increased with incredible speed. In 1997, 41% of infected adults were women. By 2001, this figure had increased to 49.8%.⁴⁶ The spread of HIV/AIDS is not random—it disproportionately affects women and adolescent girls who are socially, culturally, and economically more vulnerable. According to studies by UNIFEM in Zimbabwe, of those individuals who had “experienced a negative income shock due to HIV/AIDS, 77.6% of them were women.”⁴⁷

UNIFEM also found that young women in Zimbabwe were most likely to carry the major burdens of health care delivery for those with HIV/AIDS, to such an extent that they often had to discontinue their education to meet their responsibilities. HIV/AIDS is still a highly stigmatized disease in Zimbabwe and due to the worsening economic crisis, much of the economic and emotional support for patients has to come from relatives. Again, we see women primarily assuming these duties and carrying the weight of the disease— as either patients or workers caring for the sick at home.

AIDS can also mean a death sentence for many girl children and adolescents. First, many men assume that young girls are virgins and therefore do not carry the HIV virus. Second, as illustrated in recent news stories about South Africa and noted among researchers in Zimbabwe, some HIV positive men believe that having sex with a child/young girl can cure them of the disease. Thus, growing numbers of girls/young women are (and have been) in danger of rape and infection with the virus.

RESPONDING TO THE VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF NGOS AND THE STATE IN ZIMBABWE

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played the major role in responding to the epidemic of violence against women in Zimbabwe. These organizations have been important educational vehicles for increasing knowledge and access to information regarding violence against women in these societies.

This paper illustrates the role of NGOs by discussing the work of two NGOs: the Musasa Project and the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center. These NGOs are illustrative of how civil society can contribute to empowerment and social change.

THE MUSASA PROJECT

The Musasa Project (established in 1988) has worked to reduce violence against women by "making the general public aware of the illegality of domestic violence."⁴⁸ This organization is

the major NGO in the nation focused on the problem of spousal abuse. The organization provides one-on-one counseling services for women who have experienced violence. It also operates the only shelter in Zimbabwe (which can accommodate only 14 people). Officially, women can stay in this shelter for up to two weeks, although in some cases, women have stayed as long as three months. The organization aired a national television program for 13 weeks in 1994 titled, "Women/Madzimayi" which included the personal testimonies of women victimized by their partners. After a few months of realistically addressing the problems that confront many women in that society, the show was discontinued on the government-owned station. During its time on the air, however, it did bring to the public's attention the experiences of domestic violence endured by many lower class women. In this way, it served as an important vehicle of empowerment.

Musasa has been successful in creating partnerships with the police, hospitals, and government ministries. The Project has established sensitivity training programs for police departments to assist them in treating women who have been abused. The organization has been working with new recruits and trying to assist them in how to make initial assessments about domestic violence cases. The organization is also collaborating with the police force and the hospitals to prepare an overall needs assessment program.⁴⁹ The Musasa Project also aims to educate policy makers about domestic violence so they can institute gender sensitive policies. In recent years, Musasa has worked closely with women lawyers' associations, the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network, and the Ministries of Justice and Health to stop the violence against women. Given the problems of HIV/AIDS in the region and its linkage to domestic violence, the Musasa Project is currently incorporating an HIV/AIDS education component in all of its programs.⁵⁰

While there has been an increase in the number of reported domestic violence cases in the past decade, Musasa has also witnessed an increase in the number of patients that receive counseling. The number of counseling sessions has jumped from 995 in 1995 to 2781 in 1998.⁵¹ Although the group provides services to women from all social classes, over 50% of their clients have been lower class women.⁵²

Despite the comprehensive approach and level of commitment demonstrated by the staff of the Musasa Project, they are facing a very daunting task. Given the increasing economic crisis and a general climate of political problems, the state under ZANU is highly unlikely to address the issue of violence against women. This is the only organization in Zimbabwe focused on eradicating domestic violence. At this point, they are not a self-sustaining organization (dependent on US, British, Danish, and Dutch donors for their funding), but certainly one that is desperately needed in Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTER AND NETWORK

The Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network has also been a model program giving voice to the experiences of abused women. Created in 1990, it is the premier documentation center of women's issues and an umbrella organization for many other women's groups in the country.⁵³ While it has special programs focusing on gender training/research

and the conditions of rural women, it has also provided an outlet through its publications in which the voices of battered women can be heard.

One outstanding example of such efforts was the publication of *Zimbabwe Women's Voices* by the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network in 1995. This book was published in conjunction with the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the NGO Forum in Huairou, China. One of the major reasons for publication of this volume was to enable grassroots women's voices to be heard at the conference.⁵⁴ Included in the book were the stories of women who had experienced physical and economic abuse such as the following:

Things went wrong this year in June when my husband died. One of his sons who was married and stayed with his family nearby, took for himself the land left by his father and put it in his name. So I have no land left. My husband's relatives had suggested I become my husband's cousin's new wife. But he refused. I am now staying all alone in poverty, since my husband's brother could not take me as a wife, having one of his own...I now wish that I had got a better education and could have been working instead of going through so much pain. Right from my first husband who used to beat me up, my wish was to see my children through school, but where is the money now? If this suffering continues, I shall be forced to go back to my parents, maybe they will give me a piece of land for me to earn some money for my children's education.⁵⁵

In sharing such stories with women from around the globe at the NGO Forum on Women in Huairou, China in 1995, poor Zimbabwean women empowered themselves. They have told their stories which can provide important lessons for women and men in Zimbabwe, as well as in other nations. Furthermore, the book, *Zimbabwe Women's Voices* that included this and many other stories, was available to women and men in Zimbabwe to inform them of the harsh realities that many women face. In this process, women became important agents of social change, educating a broader public about the various types of violence present in society and the critical role of such acts in their lives. In turn, such knowledge about violence against women in Zimbabwe hopefully stimulated dialogue among women and men across class and ethnic lines about how the situation can be transformed. As a result of these efforts, poor and low-income Zimbabwean women enhanced both the development of civil society and their self-esteem.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that violence against women in Zimbabwe has clearly reached devastating proportions. Violence against women is becoming more intense and widespread in societies such as Zimbabwe that are currently in the midst of economic and political crises. NGO's such as the Musasa Project and The Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network have been important sources of empowerment for women and have contributed to the development of civil society. They are committed to the eradication of violence against women.

Notwithstanding the work of NGOs, the problem of violence against women calls for more concerted actions by the state. At the very least, the Zimbabwean state needs to move in the direction of South Africa with respect to legislation that fully criminalizes domestic abuse and

marital rape. The state needs to get further involved by providing adequate resources to stem the tide of violence and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The state also needs to combine these actions with anti-violence campaigns that demonstrate that it will no longer tolerate the rape, maiming, and murder of women. For such campaigns to be truly effective, they need to occur within a context in which the state aggressively promotes gender equality and addresses the deeply rooted structural inequalities that persist in the labor market.

Legislation and funding alone, however, will not change behavior. At a deeper level, the structural conditions that poor and low-income women experience in education and in the labor market must change to make it easier for them to leave violent relationships.

Notes:

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Gwendolyn Carter Lectures on Africa, "Zimbabwe in Transition: Resolving Land and Constitutional Crisis," at the University of Florida, Gainesville, March 21-23, 2002. The author wishes to thank participants in this conference for their helpful comments on the previous version of this paper. The author is also grateful for the research support and assistance provided by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars during the revisions of this paper. Finally, the author wishes to express her thanks to the US Department of Education's Title VI Program and the Bryn Mawr College Africa Fund for research grants that supported this project.
2. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 2001, p.11.
3. United Nations 1991; Human Rights Watch 1995.
4. Human Rights Watch 1995; Tichagwa and Maramba 1998; Muir 1999.
5. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998; Muir 1999.
6. Stoneman and Cliffe 1989.
7. Osirim 1998.
8. Made and Whande 1989; Osirim 1994.
9. Meldrum 1989.
10. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998.
11. Osirim 1994; 1998.
12. Magaisa 2001.
13. Musasa, 1998.
14. Green 1999
15. Kalu 1993; Green 1999.
16. Green 1999.
17. Salisbury was the name of the capital of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) during colonialism. With independence, the city was renamed Harare. For a discussion of rapes reported to the government in this city during colonialism, see Barnes 1999.
18. Schmidt 1992, p. 21.
19. Holleman 1952..
20. Barnes 1999.
21. Barnes 1999, pp. 144-145.

22. Sanday 1981.
23. Chigudu 1998, p. 19.
24. The state frequently referred to women who were in downtown Harare unescorted by men in the evenings as “prostitutes.” While some of these women were prostitutes, others might be entrepreneurs, such as hairdressers, whose businesses might not close until the evening. Moreover, the downtown streets were generally considered “off limits” - inappropriate areas for women alone or in the company of other women during the night. This idea stems from beliefs associated with urban culture in colonial Zimbabwe from the 1930’s – that prostitution was linked to a woman’s physical mobility and her independence. If a woman is moving around in the evenings downtown, she could only be looking for one thing. The state and society more generally considered women’s acceptable place to be home with their families engaged in domestic activities after sunset. For further discussion of this issue, see Barnes 1999.
25. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa>;
<http://www.aegis.com/NEWS/AFP/2002/AFO20867.html>.
26. Ibid.
27. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa>.
28. Human Rights Watch 1995; Tichagwa and Maramba 1998; Muir 1999; Green 1999.
29. Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives 1994.
30. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998.
31. Getecha and Chipika 1995, pp.120-121.
32. Green 1999, p.42.
33. Chakaodza 1993; Osirim 1995.
34. Kamidza 1994.
35. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998.
36. Armstrong 1998.
37. Walker 1979.
38. Armstrong 1998, pp 26, 34-45, 137.
39. Holleman 1952; Schmidt 1992.
40. Green 1999; Chirume 1989.
41. Green 1999, p. 36.
42. Watts, Osam and Win 1995.
43. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998.
44. Tichagwa and Maramba 1998
45. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 2001, p.9
46. http://www.unifem.org/index.php?f_page_pid=32
47. http://www.unifem.undp.org/human_rights/facts.html.
48. Interview with Thoko Ngwenya, 1999.
49. Osirim 2001.
50. Osirim 2001.
51. Musasa Project 1999.
52. Interview with Ms. Ngwenya 1999.
53. Osirim 2001.

54. Geteecha and Jesimen 1995.
55. Mercy Chishanu, Gteecha and Jesimen 1995, p. 58.

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Press and Politics in Zimbabwe

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Abstract: This paper provides a historical background to the development of the press in Zimbabwe and identifies the political, social and economic interventions that have shaped the editorial policies and directions of the press. The development of the press in Zimbabwe press, the paper suggests, can be categorized into three eras: colonial/nationalist (pre-1980); transitional (1980-1990) and post-transitional (1990-present). During each era, the press exhibited editorial policies and practices that reflected the ideological and socio-political environment of the country. In the colonial era, the press mirrored the settler-colonial ideology of the state and social polarization along racial lines. Its successor in the post-colonial transitional era depicted the revolutionary fervor of the emergent black political regime whose stated ideology of socialism regimented Zimbabweans under an authoritarian state. In a dramatic reversal from the nationalist campaign promises for a free press and free expression in an independent Zimbabwe, during this period the press was coerced to support the government. In this environment the message has been: *You are either with us or against us*. However a number of developments in the mid and late-1980s ushered in the post-transitional era. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent abandonment of a socialist rhetoric in favor of (at least on paper) a market economy and free enterprise by the Zimbabwe government, has given rise to a new generation, albeit a minority, of more assertive, independent publications and journalists.

Introduction

As the international community celebrated World Media Day on 3 May 2003, Zimbabweans observed the occasion with a carefully chosen theme: "the media we have is not the media we need." This summed up what Zimbabwean journalists in the independent media have gone through under the Mugabe regime. The theme also described the harsh economic and political realities the media are currently experiencing. The Zimbabwe government's onslaught against the independent press in Zimbabwe reached a new crescendo with the enactment of two laws: The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). The two laws, which are remarkably similar to laws passed by the colonial regime of Ian Smith, lend credence to the characterization of the Zimbabwe Government as a dictatorship, undemocratic and neo-colonialist. This goes against the grain of the spirit, letter, and intent of the independence struggle and the expectations of citizens when Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. For while the Zimbabwean

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Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and assembly as well as a multi-party democracy, both AIPPA (which ironically spells the word for “bad” in the Shona language) and POSA have become the legal smokescreen for undermining both freedom of expression and opposition politics in Zimbabwe. According to AIPPA, “Any published statement, which is intentionally, unreasonably, recklessly, maliciously or fraudulently false and either (1) threatens the interest of defense, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the state, public morality or public health or, (2) is injurious to the reputation, rights and freedoms of other persons, will be punished.” The Media Institute of Southern Africa argues that the law is too vague and gives limitless powers to the government-appointed Media and Information Council a regulatory regime that will act as an information policeman in style Zimbabwe. MISA concludes: “The law still remains dangerous and unacceptable since it calls for the accreditation of journalists and media houses. Restrictions on access to information remains and a great deal of power is granted to public officials and the MIC.”¹ Government appointed members of the Media and Information Commission (MIC) are tasked with licensing media practitioners. The author of this legislation, Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo, has argued that the legislation exists to protect Zimbabweans against western imperialist propaganda as well as to spearhead a new cultural revolution. Under a new broadcasting act, both personnel and content of the broadcast media must rigidly conform to the policies dictated by the Minister.

This blatant control of the press is a defining characteristic of the legacy of colonialism in the post-colonial state in Africa. The government of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF lend credence to the theories of the post-colonial state in Africa that were developed in the 1970s. The essence of such theories is that nationalist rulers who ascended to power upon independence were not drawn from the masses of the population but came from the elite class, a group whose interests were close to the colonialists whose political power they were assuming. This *nouveau riche* or *petit bourgeoisie* entered into alliances with the former colonial rulers who were now an economic elite composed of commercial farmers, industrialists, bankers, and investors upon whom the nationalist ruling elite depended for their sustenance. This ruling elite class has used the same instruments as their colonial predecessors to protect their interests; namely suppression of free speech, free press, and multi-party democracy. It is within this context that the press in Zimbabwe must be viewed and understood.

THE COLONIAL ERA

During the colonial era two types of press institutions emerged. Newspapers such as the *Rhodesia Herald* and the Bulawayo-based *Chronicle*, their sister weeklies the *Sunday Mail* and the *Sunday News*, as well as the *Financial Gazette*, were clearly aligned with the ideology and interests of the white ruling elite in Rhodesia. The journalistic ethos of the times was to promote European cultural standards while denigrating African culture and political agitation as the nemesis of western civilization and Christianity. Stories about Africans were largely, if not exclusively, negative and demeaning.

Yet alongside the colonial press there emerged a nationalist press exemplified by the *Daily News*, church publications such as *Moto (Fire)* and *Umbowo (Witness)* which provided a platform of expression for nationalist leaders in the sixties and seventies. *Moto* was published by the

Catholic Church and *Umbowo* by the United Methodist Church . The nationalist movements, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) each had its own publications based outside Rhodesia . The growth of the nationalist and church presses were a reaction to the injustice, racism, and exploitation that characterized settler colonialism. Predictably, the nationalist and church press never became part of the mainstream media in colonial Zimbabwe because of constant harassment by a regime that had very little tolerance for dissenting viewpoints.

INDEPENDENCE AND THE TRANSITION ERA

With independence in 1980, the bulk of the surviving nationalist press, especially those published externally, and some of the church publications ironically faded into oblivion while the hitherto colonial press switched its allegiance to a new ruling elite. Economic reasons were a major factor in the demise of the nationalist press. The nationalist press had served its purpose of agitating for independence and as such, there was no further need for it, especially if it could not survive financially on its own. It is also probable that if the nationalist press continued with its strong rhetoric of equal rights, justice, and land for all, the new government would become unpopular if it failed to meet these goals. After all, the era of transition from minority to majority rule was supposed to institutionalize equal protection and justice under the law for all, as well as an equitable distribution of goods and services to all citizens.

The post-colonial Zimbabwean state that emerged after 1980 was superimposed on a neo-colonial economic structure characterized by heavy dependence on South Africa following 15 years of sanctions against the Rhodesia state. This colonial structure had served the white settler community at the expense of the black masses. While white settler-colonialists had lost political power, they were still economically in control, a situation that exists to this day. Thus, the political independence represented in 1980 by the lowering of the Union Jack and the raising of the new Zimbabwe flag, amounted to symbolism for the masses which disguised an institutionalization of attempts towards a new alliance among the ruling black elite.

The transitional era was a period of new and uneasy alliances in a tripartite social and political formation that included the warring nationalist factions (ZANU and ZAPU) and the established white entrepreneurial elite. Each member of the trinity had resources that could be mobilized into either a protracted military or economic conflict. Each recognized the other's strength and hence the uneasy alliance. The role of the Zimbabwean state was largely to nurture and preserve this fragile alliance without letting any hostilities or quarrels escalate beyond its control. Government policy papers such as *Growth with Equity and Transformation, the Five Year National Development Plan*, as well as the *President's Directive on Black Advancement*, appeared to reflect an attempt by the government to redress the injustices and inequities of the colonial regime. Yet in reality, the state was preoccupied with securing and maintaining this tenuous alliance that over time perpetuated the marginalization of the masses who had borne the brunt of the war. With no nationalist press to express popular viewpoints, the transitional period saw the emergence of a neo-colonial press that contained most of the characteristics of its predecessor.

However, considering that the period immediately after 1980 was transitional, the press and government enjoyed a honeymoon with the public. During this period, it was hoped the press would restructure and reform its editorial policies to reflect the idealism of an independent nation. The same honeymoon was extended to the newly-installed black government. The then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe declared the first year of independence “the year of consolidating people’s power.” During this year, the mainstream press in Zimbabwe was still predominantly staffed by white editors and journalists. This was a legacy of colonialism when Zimbabweans who wanted to train as journalists had to leave the country to enroll at institutions in Zambia , Kenya , Cuba , Europe , the United States and the Soviet Union . Some of them heeded calls to return home.

The Zimbabwean government subsequently bought the majority of shares in Zimbabwe Newspapers, a company that owned all major newspapers in the country. The government then established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) whose stated role was to promote, through an independent board of non-government individuals, the interests of ordinary Zimbabweans in the national media. Ostensibly, government would not be involved in monitoring and mentoring the press. In reality, ZMMT would be subject to a systemic pattern of government attempts to control and influence the press.

At the end of 1980, the new government replaced all the white editors at Zimbabwe Newspapers. Farayi Munyuki became the first black editor of *The Herald*; Tommy Sithole, *The Chronicle*; the late Willy Musarurwa *The Sunday Mail*; and Bill Saidi *The Sunday News*. A government minister, Enos Nkala, did not mince his words when he said white editors were incapable of articulating and supporting a black government. This was in the aftermath of the artillery battle in Bulawayo between ZAPU’s armed wing, Zimbabwe Peoples’ Liberation Army (ZIPRA) and their ZANU counterparts, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, (ZANLA). In one of the greatest puzzles in government policy, the two fully armed forces had been based in two separate camps in a civilian suburb called Entumbane, pending their integration into the new Zimbabwe national armed forces. Nkala made no secret of government’s suspicion that the white editors may have given favorable coverage to the opposition ZAPU party and its ZIPRA military wing.

Government also created the Zimbabwe Institute of Mass Communication (ZIMCO) to train black journalists. ZIMCO was headed by a former editor of *Umbowo* and director of the Zambia-based Africa Literature Center , Ezekiel Makunike. White journalists were resigning *en masse*, especially after the replacement of white editors with blacks. This was, in a sense, a blessing in disguise for the government’s policy of indigenisation. However, the spate of resignations by white journalists did not leave much time for their immediate replacement. Zimbabwe did not have a great reservoir of black journalists. As a result, newsrooms were almost empty . The few black reporters had the impossible task of filling the papers’ editorial pages with news. With Zimbabwe ’s independence came an avalanche of events and developments, previously routinely ignored by the colonial press, begging for coverage. It was left to the small group of hastily recruited or trained black journalists, complemented by a few journalists from neighboring African countries, to meet the demands for coverage. Very often these journalists worked almost around the clock including weekends. They were poorly paid, and it took a considerable dedication on their part to stay in the profession.

Journalists based in the western region of Zimbabwe faced additional challenges when the simmering historical rivalries between ZANU and ZAPU exploded into open military conflict during the first year of independence. Rival militia groups for both parties engaged in armed fights in the middle of the city of Bulawayo, causing substantial disruptions to an endangered civilian life. The open conflicts later settled down to protracted guerrilla or dissident activities. The government responded with the deployment of the infamous North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade whose atrocities among the civilian population have been extensively documented by two Zimbabwean non-governmental organizations, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and the Legal Resources Foundation. The challenge for the journalists was the extent to which they could exercise the freedom of the press to cover, among other things, the military conflicts in the region. The dissident problem, coupled with ongoing political conflict with rival ZAPU, and apartheid South Africa's program of destabilizing neighboring black states, led the ruling ZANU party to consolidate its stranglehold on the press.

What then emerged in the early 1980s was a tame press headed by government-appointed editors. Most of these were committed to serving the interests of the ruling party of which they, with the exception of Willy Musarurwa (ZAPU), were card-carrying members. To his credit, Musarurwa tried to be less partisan and more professional. He had plans for regular coverage and analysis of rural issues and events. His editorial policy was that the greatest service the press could render to the government was to report both the positive and the negative. In reporting the negative and unfavorable stories, the press was merely drawing government's attention to problems that needed to be resolved before they got out of hand. But Musarurwa's editorial policy was a voice in the wilderness. It was quickly becoming apparent that the colonial press had not been transformed from serving the interests of the white colonial elite to those of the masses. Rather, it had merely undergone cosmetic changes and was now subservient to a newly-emergent coalition of black politicians who held political power and the white community who still maintained economic power. It is within the context of the political economy of the state that the Zimbabwean press can best be analyzed and understood.

This legacy of colonialism means the mainstream press in Zimbabwe is not significantly different from its counterparts across Africa. The Zimbabwean press has the same post-colonial institutional characteristics, namely: high urban orientation, predominant or almost exclusive use of a colonial language, very high foreign-oriented content, and an elite or semi-elite cadre of journalists/editors who were either trained in the West or whose local training was steeped in the western models of journalistic practices.

The colonial legacy in the press belies any pontifications of developmental journalism, with its stated focus on the masses as the underlying mission statement of the Zimbabwean press. Developmental journalism in the Zimbabwean context has been interpreted by government officials to mean that the press is a partner to government efforts to develop the nation. According to the ruling ZANU-PF political culture, criticism or opposition to the government or any of its policies must come from within the party. This notion of "democratic centrism," where criticisms are raised at the ruling party's central committee meetings, means that once disagreements have been harmonized and a compromise strategy adopted, there should be no further criticism from outside the party. Newspaper editors can represent the press in their capacity as members of the party, and if they have any complaints or concerns these must be

raised during the party meetings rather than in the editorial columns of papers. The former Zimbabwean Minister of Information, Witness Mangwende, once said:

There is no such thing as freedom of the press. The press is a structural component of the society whose interest it must reflect, promote and indeed defend. Therefore freedom of the press is only relative to a given social, economic and political circumstances you are in relation to the existence of others..²

Another top government official said government's role during the formative years of Zimbabwe's independence had been to decolonize the press institutions and ownership structure. He said instead of controlling and owning the press, government had opted for the creation of the Mass Media Trust to handle the press on behalf of the masses. Government had also set up institutions for training of media personnel (ZIMCO) and for receiving and disseminating news (Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency - ZIANA). The official said government expected the press to promote national unity, reconciliation, and to mentally decolonize Zimbabwe's people:

For a people who won their independence through sweat and blood it is imperative that they think and act like Africans as a reflection of their hard-won independence from colonial rule. In order for the mass media to play their role effectively it is important that the selection of editors and senior staff be acceptable to government. ³

Such policy pronouncements give government the final say in what freedom of the press and developmental journalism mean. While the political posturing repeatedly talks of publishing in the interests of the masses, government's role as the final determinant of what is in the public interest is evident. This type of journalism put reporters under the manipulative control of government officials. With an insatiable preference to be covered by TV, in addition to coverage by the print media, government officials on numerous occasions delayed giving speeches at rallies until the television crew arrived. This coerced support for the government challenged some editors' journalistic consciences. One editor in the mainstream press said he and his colleagues had decided to publish the truth no matter how much it may hurt. "Facts are facts. It is our responsibility to bring those facts to the public light."⁴ This commitment to objective and factual journalism, regardless of what the party dictated, led to some editors and journalists being forced to step down or transferred to non-journalistic jobs.

Notwithstanding efforts by a handful of journalists to assert their independence and professionalism, the press in Zimbabwe has historically developed as institutional partners with a coalition of business and government whose economic and political interests are generally articulated in the editorial columns of the press. This partnership spans colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. To the extent that the press is an instrument of this ruling elite coalition, the question of freedom of the press can only be addressed and assessed in the context of the extent to which the press articulates intra-factional rivalries. Thus, some of the controversial stories or editorials that give the appearance of a free press are in fact symptomatic of struggles among groups *within* the ruling elite. Few of the disputed issues have anything to do with improving the rural or urban masses' quality of life.

THE POST-TRANSITION ERA

By the late 1990s the Zimbabwean press had grown into three categories: the mainstream press owned by Zimbabwe Newspapers, rural newspapers owned by the ZMMT, and the independent press owned by the private sector. The mainstream press included *The Herald*, *The Chronicle*, *Sunday Mail*, *Sunday News* and *Mutare Post*. Rural and small town or peri-urban publications include *Kwayedza*, *People's Voice*, *Midweek News*, *High Density Mirror*, *Chaminuka News*, *Mashonaland Guardian*, *Gweru Times*, *Ilangalindosakusa*, and *Masvingo Provincial Star*. Private sector press included *The Zimbabwe Independent*, *Financial Gazette*, *Daily News*, *Sunday Standard*, *Horizon*, and *Mirror*.

By 1999, the Zimbabwe press had a combined circulation of about 600,000. Based on projections of people sharing newspapers, it is estimated that the total readership is about three million. For a population of 12 million, this readership level is still relatively low, representing only 25 percent of the total population. According to the 2002 Zimbabwe All Media Products Survey (ZAMPS), the *Daily News'* circulation has dropped to less than 70,000 from about 120,000 in 2000. The state-owned *Herald* fell even more. *The Daily News* had the highest readership of 30.6 percent of the total reading population, followed by the *Herald* with 28.9 percent and the state-owned *Chronicle* with 13.7 percent).⁵

The most serious challenge to the monopoly control and ownership of the mainstream press by Zimbabwe Newspapers was the emergence in 1998 of Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe, (ANZ) a consortium of local and foreign businesses. ANZ was set up with 60 percent of shareholding under the Africa Media Trust which is owned by British, South African, and New Zealand companies. ANZ launched a number of weeklies and one daily. Some of the weeklies that were launched by 1998 were the *Express*, the *Dispatch* and the *Mercury*. ANZ launched the *Daily News* in 1999. Prior to the emergence of the *Daily News*, Zimbabwe had only two daily newspapers, both state-owned. ANZ subsequently expanded to include two more weeklies: *The Daily News on Sunday* and *The Business Daily News*.

The Media Africa group which has shares in the *Daily News* also launched *The Weekend Tribune* and *The Business Tribune* in 2002. A fourth national daily, *The Daily Mirror*, which was short lived, was launched by the Southern African Printing and Publishing company (SAPPHO) to complement its sister weekly *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, which was renamed *Sunday Mirror*. The weekly *Financial Gazette* was eventually bought from businessman and former politician, Elias Rusike, by a local company, Octadew, led by Gideon Gono who is also the chief executive of the government-owned Jewel Bank.⁶

Another equally outspoken independent paper is the *Zimbabwe Independent*, which largely targeted the business community and other high or middle-income Zimbabweans. The paper's editorial policy is "to avoid thoughtless criticism of the government" but is determined to hold Zimbabwean leadership to account. "For too much has been lost, stolen or squandered in recent years and we are, as a society, immeasurably poor as a result."⁷ The paper's editors noted at its inception that the climate for fearless opposition paper was ideal in light of a public that does not want to see news doctored by editors who are scared of politicians.

Even the mainstream press tried to take advantage of this climate. The editor of *The Herald*, Tommy Sithole, unleashed a fiery editorial criticizing the way police had tear-gassed peaceful

demonstrations against food price increases. Describing the police as trigger happy and overzealous, Sithole's editorial comments took a swipe at misguided government reaction to the demonstrations. He was replaced not long after by self-confessed Stalinist Charles Chikerema, whose editorials in the *Sunday Mail* were an unrelenting campaigns against democratic reforms, human rights groups and the country's white minority. A party loyalist, Chikerema was anything but a journalist. He was then moved to the prestigious position of the editor-in-chief of the *Herald* but died of a heart attack in his office only a few weeks later. Another party stalwart, Bornwell Chakaodza, was appointed to replace him. Whatever efforts some editors of the mainstream press took to be more independent were nipped in the bud. However the situation was very different the *Daily News*, *Financial Gazette* and the *Independent*. The two weekly papers and the daily published exposes of corruption in government and fiscal mismanagement.

The government has tried to stifle this criticism by invoking an arsenal of laws, including Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities Act as well as the Official Secrets Acts, which are intended to make it a crime to receive unauthorized government documents or information. Appeals by the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists to repeal the draconian laws, some of which were inherited from the colonial regime, fell on deaf ears. Justice Minister Emmerson Munangagwa reportedly said "Unrestricted [press] freedom would lead to disorder and anarchy and would harm social and national interests." In another move, government assumed direct control of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust, effectively removing all the pretense that the Trust was an independent body run by ordinary citizens who were not directly associated with the government or ruling party.

While the bulk of Zimbabwean editors were socialized to be ideological handmaidens of the ruling coalition a good number of well trained journalists tried to exert their professionalism and journalistic independence. They inevitably suffered consequences for their actions. However, the fact that they tried at all to be independent signaled a new era in the growth and development of the press in independent Zimbabwe .

No matter how admirable such efforts towards editorial independence may have been, the Zimbabwean press has historically not been able to articulate, on any sustained basis, issues that are critical to the majority of the population. For instance, it took the Catholic Church and the Legal Resources Foundation to tell from the victims' point of view the story of the massacre of civilians in Matabeleland . The press' coverage of the atrocities was reduced to merely quoting bland Ministry of Information statements that blamed virtually every death, every injury, and every suffering in Matabeleland to dissidents. This in effect absolved the Fifth Brigade, whose notoriety was very much in evidence, from any responsibility for the atrocities. In this respect, the press was a remarkable likeness of its colonial predecessor.

Zimbabweans often do not see the mainstream media articulating dynamically issues that are of relevance to them. The bulk of the "news" in the state press tends to be stories that paint a consistently positive image of the country's leadership. Variations in this type of coverage largely revolve around intra fractional disputes among the ruling and urban elite. Some editors have historically tried to take a more assertive position towards editorial independence with disastrous consequences. A few examples:

- An editor criticized an opposition party, ZAPU that had recently entered into coalition with the ruling party, ZANUPF. He was transferred to a less prestigious position of heading a news agency.
- An editor who published a story about President Mugabe's secret marriage to his secretary was, together with the publisher, charged and convicted of libel (the high court later reversed the conviction)
- The most celebrated case was that of a newspaper, the *Chronicle* that revealed a car buying and selling racket involving government ministers and top officials. The story caused a national uproar, leading to the appointment of a commission of inquiry whose hearings, in a rare exercise of democracy, were held in public. Government officials were, much to their displeasure, subpoenaed and asked to testify in a public hearing.

But this tinkering with democracy was short lived. The well-known Sandura Commission of Inquiry, named after the judge who chaired it, was halted as it prepared another wave of public hearings. The editor of the paper that exposed the scandal was removed and transferred to a job that had been specifically created for him - public relations officer for the company's newspapers! President Mugabe has repeatedly attacked the press, singling out the independent press for "thriving on selling manufactured lies to the people in the name of freedom of the press." But the independent press was quick to respond, generally scoffing at such attacks as coming from a "press hater."⁸

Perhaps what in some ways distinguishes the Zimbabwean press in the 1990s from that of the early 1980s was the emergence of more assertive newspapers which are not part of the Zimbabwe Newspapers group. However, almost all folded for largely economic reasons. The *Daily News* had, until recently, weathered both economic and political storms, thanks to a major investment from a self-made Zimbabwean businessman, Strive Masiyiwa. Another surviving paper, the *Zimbabwe Independent*, and its sister paper *The Standard* stood out, like the *Daily News*, as a beacon of hope for a free press in Zimbabwe. By tackling major issues which other mainstream papers had only superficially handled, the *Daily News* and the *Independent* have blazed the way in the struggle for a free press. The *Financial Gazette*, while essentially business oriented, has found space in its editorial columns to publish articles and analyses of the country's socio-political and economic life. However, there is the possibility that in the long-term an independent press owned by businessmen will be unlikely to have a philanthropic agenda on behalf of the masses of Zimbabwe.

So while these papers have emerged as the leading independently owned press in Zimbabwe, they are still a far cry from the press that will articulate, on a sustained basis, issues of interest for the majority of the country's population. Currently, their opposition to Mugabe's dictatorship puts the independent press on the side of the oppressed masses. But history has shown that once this factor has been removed, the common purpose between the independent press and the masses is likely to be broken. Their orientation towards the business community means that while these papers sometimes have a no-holds-barred attitude in the way they criticize government, they tend to be more restrained in advocating workers' rights at the expense of business. The notion of freedom of the press is often confused with being consistently critical of the government, exposing corruption in government, or promoting

multiparty politics, etc. Freedom of the press is more dynamic than playing the role of a critic (or enthusiastic supporter) of the ruling party or government.

The cultural basis for a free press in Zimbabwe is that the press should be a *padare* or *enkundleni*, Shona and Ndebele terms which mean a gathering or forum for discussion and debates. A free press is a privilege extended to members of the journalistic community by the public in exchange for the public's right to know, to be informed and to be educated. The press has, first and foremost, an obligation to act as a disinterested gatherer and disseminator of information in the public interest. Disinterested means journalists represent society rather than an interest group or a political party. In that capacity, the journalist is tasked with supplying members of the public with the information and knowledge the public needs to make critical decisions about their lives. If, in the process of researching and gathering such information, the journalist sometimes ends up offending rulers or party officials, he must always be guided by what he perceives to be in the public interest. Public interest means both rural and urban-based citizens must have equitable access to and use of information. In the post-transitional era, Zimbabwe's press appears still very far from the notion of a free press that is determined and guided by the public's right to know. The Zimbabwean press has yet to define the term "public interest" and "the public's right to know."

While there is a steady dosage of rural information in the Zimbabwean press, this information does not amount to a substantive coverage of life in rural communities. There is no structure or pattern to the coverage of rural areas in a way that describes the impact of national development planning and strategies on the rural people. Rural stories still typically focus on isolated and fragmented narratives of drought, famine, or lack of basic services without the in-depth analyses that would place rural masses at the center of development policies. The present press reports tend to reduce rural masses to objects of pity requiring handouts from the urban elites. Rural masses are portrayed as victims of natural disasters, unable or unwilling to do more to help themselves, lacking in business skills to develop local industries, not savvy enough to take advantage of government programs aimed at uplifting their lot.

An issue-oriented strategy should provide a framework for the Zimbabwean press and its editorial policies. This demands that the press should not hedge on taking to task government bureaucrats on controversial issues, and should also not hesitate to publish positive stories like a major irrigation programs, or wildlife conservation efforts where proceeds are ploughed back into local development efforts.

Journalism in Zimbabwe has yet to be weaned from the western model to an authentic storytelling journalism. According to Father Traber, stories in Africa have a variety of social, cultural and political roles. They are part of the reality which people experience and about which people feel deeply. Storytelling represents the symbolic constitution of a community and its *raison d'être*. In such stories, the past is invoked to make sense of the present and provide a prospect for the future:

The mass media, on the other hand, contain fake stories, which is no story at all but parades as one. It is the pictorial or verbal story of cutting a ribbon (with a pair of scissors presented on a special cushion or tray); or of pressing a button, or of taking a salute, or of opening a seminar, or of climbing up the stairs of an

airplane and turning around and waving from the top. Nor is descending from the aircraft, let alone a genuine story. And the same is true of (a head of state) inspecting a guard of honor...Nothing really happens in these so-called news reports. And the same holds true for most politicians' speeches. Nothing at all happens after the minister says, 'thank you, ladies and gentlemen,' and everybody claps hands'...These are fake stories...and serve a certain purpose."⁹

That purpose, according to Noam Chomsky (1989), is to create 'necessary illusions.'¹⁰ People are told that everything, be it bus disasters, famine, floods, budget deficit, corruption, is being investigated by government; that government is on top of the situation and will take appropriate action at the appropriate time. Nothing happens despite all the assurances. Nothing happens after government ministers' promise in the glare of media publicity that government will give more land, agricultural inputs, jobs, education and an improved quality of life to all the citizens. Ultimately the press in Zimbabwe falls victim to being a propaganda machinery in the creation of necessary illusions necessary because ruling party elites need to create such illusions in order to stay in power. Yet in all fairness it must be stated that the new breed of independent journalists in Zimbabwe are blazing a trail towards press freedom. But they are doing so under very heavy and draconian legislation. These courageous journalists have taken more than their fair share of victimization and vilification. MISA reports that over 60 journalists were arrested in the past one year alone.¹¹ The printing press of the *Daily News* was bombed in an obvious bid to silence it. Copies of the *Daily News* are banned in rural areas. Some people found reading the *Daily News* have been beaten or tortured. Stacks of the *Daily News* papers have been burned by government militia thugs. The highpoint of this harassment was the eventual banning of the *Daily News*.

For the bulk of the Zimbabwean population living in rural areas, the national mainstream press has little, if any, influence on their lives. Even a constellation of peri-urban community newspapers have not had any demonstrable impact on the rural masses. This raises the question of whether Zimbabwe, and indeed the rest of Africa, can be said to have any mass media at all, considering the fact that most media circulation is largely confined to urban areas. Another potential problem has to do with the newspapers' circulation. The purchasing power of Zimbabweans has been on a steady decline. In 1997, then Minister of Local Government, John Nkomo, said 70 percent of Zimbabwe's urban population earn less than Z\$2,000 a month (about US\$50) and cannot afford a standard four-roomed house.¹² The situation in rural areas where people hardly have any disposable income is relatively worse. It seems unlikely that the press will have a significant increase in circulation any time soon. The rural press has only a slim chance of survival.

Conclusion

The post-transition era is steadily bringing new challenges for the press and politics in Zimbabwe. In an authoritarian environment where the state seeks control of information, the Internet and satellite broadcasting will slowly have a liberalizing effect. Zimbabwe is now networked to the world. The culture of democracy, a free press and freedom of expression

practiced elsewhere will continue to permeate mostly through the urban populations who can access this information. As the Internet generation grows in Zimbabwe there will be less reliance on the press as the sole source of information and knowledge. Yet there is often more reported information and knowledge about Zimbabwe outside than inside the country. Just as the European public in the 15th Century empowered themselves politically through access to mass produced literature (thanks to Gutenberg's printing press), the Zimbabwean public will gain empowering knowledge and information that will have the strong potential to force political reforms and information liberalization. In this post transition era, there are already signs of an empowered public, expressed through anti government demonstrations, open criticism of the government by the populace as well as an emboldened independent press. In the future, any new leadership will take over in a highly liberalized political and information environment and face a more empowered populace than ever before.

Notes:

1. AllAfrica News, 2003b
2. Mukasa 1990, 221
3. Mukasa 1990, 219-220
4. Mukasa 1990, 220
5. AllAfrica, 2003a
6. AllAfrica News, 2003a
7. *Mail and Guardian*, May 1, 1996
8. MISA, July 23, 1998
9. Traber 1988,121
10. Chomsky 1989
11. MISA, 2003
12. Insider 1997

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Globalizing Land and Food in Zimbabwe: Implications for Southern Africa

CAROL THOMPSON

Abstract: For political and economic crises as severe as Zimbabwe, domestic causes are central, but the conflict in Zimbabwe is not simply internal; it is regional and international and in that sense, it is a post (political) apartheid struggle. Taking an international perspective, this article delineates the context and the constraints on any government, labor or farm leaders in Zimbabwe, as they face enormous problems for land and economic reforms to provide food security. The first section gives the historical context of the current land transfers, analyzing that reliance on the market has not been the pattern of land reform in developing countries until the 1980s. Further, the study discusses how this market approach to land allocation and food production in Zimbabwe has been intensified by neoliberal policies, including both structural adjustment programs and recent international trade instruments. The conclusion analyzes alternative policies for food security which exist in the region, yet cautions that those policies conflict with dominant international agendas.

For political and economic crises as severe as Zimbabwe's, domestic causes are central. Yet the conflict in Zimbabwe is not simply internal, it is regional and international. In that sense, it is a post (political) apartheid struggle. Analyzing the international context of the crises is not to deny the importance of national policies necessary for the long term stability of Zimbabwe and of southern Africa. As the new Africa Union proposes, change must emerge from internal strengths and resources.¹ Taking an international perspective, however, delineates the context and the constraints on *any* government, labor, or farm leaders in Zimbabwe, as they face enormous problems for land and economic reforms.

Harsh as it was to eradicate political apartheid in southern Africa, involving many deaths and torture, those involved thought it would be relatively easy in comparison with eradicating economic apartheid. They knew that this struggle would be very long and very brutal. By focusing on the international, this analysis raises the question whether any elected government in Zimbabwe can implement reforms, without equally fundamental change in policies of dominant powers, such as the United States and Europe.

The first part of the paper reminds us of the historical context of the current land transfers, suggesting that the market approach to land reform (willing seller-willing buyer) is new. Reliance on the market for landed property transfers was not the pattern of land reform in developing countries until the 1980s. To summarize one example of the role of powerful

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a10.pdf>

international actors, the paper discusses how the US goal of land reform in developing countries over the past decades furthered US national interests. Today, the dominant US interest in relation to land transfers is to affirm the global market as the most efficient allocator. The study discusses how this market approach to land allocation and food production has been further intensified by recent trade instruments, such as the US Trade and Development Act (2000), the WTO (1995), and the EU/ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000).

For Zimbabwe, land hunger, along with the economic structural adjustment program (ESAP), intensified real hunger. Again, focusing on the international constraints for meaningful post (political) apartheid reforms in Zimbabwe, today and in the future, is not to minimize the role of domestic corruption and political patronage play in increasing inequality. Without addressing the persistence of economic apartheid in the region and inequalities of ESAP, however, the current debates remain ahistorical. Reliance on the market for development in a region still struggling to integrate hostile, violent parties and implement precarious peace accords (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola) abrogates basic neo-liberal economic theory. It is difficult to rely on the market as an efficient allocator even in a post-conflict zone (the rest of the region). Other threats to southern African food security are also discussed. The conclusion suggests alternative policies for regional food security.

International analysts frequently reiterate that the government of Zimbabwe has had 20 years to promote land reform, but only engaged seriously in 1998. They then write it off as an election ploy, during the first parliamentary elections in 2000 and then presidential elections in 2002. Land, however, will always be an election issue, no matter who runs, and not only in Zimbabwe, but in other southern African countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi, until the colonial legacies are fully confronted and rectified according to the demands of the people.

Part of the legacies is the unfulfilled commitments of the United States and United Kingdom. As the US Secretary of State, in 1976 Henry Kissinger promised ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) US\$ 1-1.5 billion to "facilitate economic transition," including land transfers, as part of the agreement to end guerrilla warfare.² To date, the United States government has delivered zero for land reform. The United Kingdom's role is almost the same, making promises and delivering very little. The Lancaster House constitution did not permit the Zimbabwean government to pursue any land reform that was not willing seller-willing buyer. The government could not even visit the vast estates, such as that of the Anglo-American Corporation, without permission of the owner of the land, to assess what was utilized or unutilized land. Therefore, how could it tax underutilized land in the 1980s--ask the corporation to self-assess?

Because much of the land was in the hands of those with close links to apartheid South Africa (in 2000, the Oppenheimers still owned 960,000 hectares in Zimbabwe), it would have been extremely dangerous to take land except on a willing seller basis. During the 1980s, apartheid commando raids came regularly, all the way to Harare. Zimbabwe was fully involved in assisting the Government of Mozambique in resisting apartheid-supported Renamo, in the Beira Corridor and elsewhere. Making policies to take land from even absentee owners would probably have provoked more commando raids, if not outright invasion. The attacks continued even after Nelson Mandela was released from prison and almost to the time of South African

elections. Therefore, international analysts should also discuss how Zimbabwe had only six years -- from 1994 until 2000 -- to approach land reform seriously, before the June 2000 parliamentary elections. As South Africans can attest, six years is not long for fundamental reforms.³

During the 1980s, however, land reform was quite successful, a fact also not well acknowledged during this current crisis. Although falling short of unrealistic targets, by 1990 the government had purchased and redistributed an impressive 3.3 million hectares to 52,000 families. Kinsey reports from a study of over fifteen years that resettled households doubled their cultivation; values of livestock, crop production and cereal stocks were all higher and more equitably distributed in resettlement areas than in neighboring communal lands.⁴ Potts reported a survey of adult landless migrants recently arrived in Harare in 1994 in which "the voices of the people...were loud in their praise for the program, which was perceived to deliver many benefits."⁵ During this time, large estates went to political cronies (estimates vary widely), but what was redistributed to needy farmers did increase quality of life. This relative success, however, probably increased expectations for land among Zimbabwean destitute. In addition, because of the willing seller-willing buyer requirement, seventy percent of the prime land was untouched.⁶

The strict requirement "willing seller-willing buyer" is quite new in the history of land reform, from the 1980s:

Perhaps no other policy issue is more susceptible to shifts in ideology and the balance of political power than the transfer of land property rights....Since the end of the Second World War, we have witnessed two contrasting shifts....The first occurred between the late 1940s and the early 1980s, which I call the decades of the poor peasants and the golden age of genuine land reform. During this period, leaders of most developing countries found it necessary -- after gaining independence -- to redress past wrong-doings, including colonial land tenure....Since the early 1980s, there has been a steady shift away from government-implemented redistributive land reform toward reliance on the formal credit market and on landed property transfer, freely negotiated in the open market.⁷

In another study of thirty countries, it appears that only two countries relied solely on markets for land reform in the twentieth century: the Republic of Ireland and Zimbabwe until 1997.⁸ Reallocating land following "willing seller-willing buyer" criteria is a new demand. A quick review of US policy toward land reform, to focus on one major international player, affirms that the market was a minimal factor.

For the famous land reform successes of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea -- still held out as a model to southern Africa-- an occupying force financed and enforced the reform. The US provided dollars in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea to purchase land, and the US army entered some estates to encourage the landlord to leave, when the foreign exchange allocation was insufficient. For Japan, General MacArthur sent a directive to the Imperial Japanese government to develop plans for a redistribution of land to tenants, with Allied headquarters supervising both the planning and the execution of the reform....the timing and thoroughness of the occupation's reforms gave it a peculiarly American quality....The Sino-American [in Taiwan] connection was never closer than in the execution of the vast land reform that preceded one of the most rapid and dramatic agrarian advances in modern history.⁹

Land to the tiller in Taiwan was also financed by the US, a policy used to reduce the power of indigenous feudal landlords by the newly occupying forces of Chiang Kai-Shek.

In South Korea, American responsibility for land reform was also direct. MacArthur's military government in Seoul, following policies similar to Tokyo's, issued "a series of ordinances equivalent to a 'home act' for Korea, fixing rents and setting up a 'land to the tiller' program. The US Army itself distributed land to 29 percent of the farm households in South Korea."¹⁰ Removal of feudal relations in South Korea provided livelihood to previous tenant farmers, and their new ability to sustain themselves was a major deterrent to the spread of communism from North Korea. The US foreign policy goal was to stop the spread of communism and land reform was but one instrument used.

In Central America, US policies toward land reform have been much more variable, while quite consistent in promoting US interests. As Theisenhusen points out, "At one time or another in Latin America, land reforms were meant to serve opaque and less frequently articulated ends: strengthen capitalism, neutralize *campesinos* as an oppositional political force, win votes, fend off extremist ideologies, provide an effective counterinsurgency tool, and foster social stability needed for a secure investment environment."¹¹ In El Salvador, for example, with the assistance of US advisors "to help pacify the rebellious countryside," twenty five percent of agricultural land was reallocated to tenant farmers. The second phase to reallocate another fifty five percent was never implemented, "due to opposition from the traditional oligarchy and changing US priorities."¹² One could summarize the US commitment to land reform in Central America as dependent upon whether it furthers US security and economic interests.¹³ Similar to southern Africa, recent US policy toward land reform in Latin America encourages market exchange, but "no evidence exists in contemporary Latin America of land market reforms that have fundamentally altered patterns of land ownership despite recent efforts."¹⁴

Remembering the history of land in the US is important as well. Because Native Americans would never have been "willing sellers," for as in Zimbabwe, land is not a commodity to them, it was stolen. Not just once but several times. For example, the Din (Navajo) are back on their indigenous land, but then had the misfortune of the US finding uranium on it. As that mineral became strategic for national security in the 1930s, the Din had their land exploited once again. Today, the National Congress of American Indians are trying to stop the proposed Arctic oil drilling. Tom Goldtooth of the Indigenous Environmental Network called the attempts to drill for oil "an act of colonial terrorism against a people [Gwich'in]." He asks for the public to "to stop this axis of evil -- oil industries and governments who work together expanding their oil frontier, destroying forests, wetlands, coastal plains."¹⁵ Since 1996, three hundred thousand Native Americans have joined in a class action suit against the US Secretary of the Interior for the mismanagement, over decades, of \$10 billion of royalties for natural resources on native-owned land.¹⁶ Native American land in the US has been stolen in more than one way, over centuries.

For the US as an international actor, policy toward land reform in other countries reflected US national interests, as perceived by the government at the time. The US intervened to implement reforms in Asia, to encourage starving peasants to turn from communism. But if the peasants wanted US corporate land, for example, in Guatemala and Nicaragua, the US responded violently -- with the same goals of protecting US interests. The national interest

today is to promote 'free' markets as the most efficient means of allocation. This policy, however, ignores vast inequalities between seller and potential buyer -- in ability to set prices, bargaining, access to credit -- as well as the tradition of communally owned land in much of southern Africa.

Because land reform involves the rich and powerful losing some of their resources, historically, land has most often been devalued or taken by direct confrontation and force.¹⁷ It would be highly desirable in this new century that southern Africa could find a new way. But the policy of "willing seller-willing buyer" cannot be the way in a post (political) apartheid region, mainly because the arithmetic does not add up: the governments simply do not have the funds and the international community has also not provided funds. At the famous land conference of 1998 in Harare, the international donors pledged \$17 million out of an estimated need of \$40 billion.¹⁸ In the discussion of land reform over the last decade, donor pledges have not come close to the \$40 billion estimated costs. Any government in Zimbabwe will also not have that amount of funds-nor will the equivalent needed be available in South Africa or Namibia.

Treating land as a market issue ignores that land involves systems of social and cultural relations that reflect heritage. Current land distribution within several countries of southern Africa is a legacy of apartheid, which makes it an equity issue -- in the fullest sense. It is also a development issue. The South African Charter on Land and Food Security, written by 73 South African NGOs is explicit: "...if land reform were left entirely to the market, little if any reform would take place...land reform policy must be driven by the principles of social justice and basic needs as opposed to market forces." The South African National Land Committee agreed, "the market is not a solution for a fair land distribution after apartheid.... markets are never truly free."¹⁹ Equity and development were two important goals to deter the spread of communism in rural South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Today, however, the goals have changed. For the powerful international players, such as the US, priority is given to an unfettered reign of the global market.

The amount estimated varies, but whatever is used, it is enormous. The latest estimated cost to the southern African region for eradicating political apartheid is \$115 billion, which is being paid for by southern Africans.²⁰ As the US is regularly reminded today by Europe, assisting Japan and Germany after 1945 was a way to rebuild, not only the war-torn economies but democracy. The US is told, this is an important lesson for Afghanistan. Doesn't the same apply to southern Africa? Why is it that the subjugated people of the region are required to pay the bills of white supremacists -- aided and abetted for many years by American and European corporations?

Not all of the debt of southern Africa is from apartheid, neither is all of it from corruption. After the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) debt relief from the IMF/WB, Mozambique is still paying twice in debt servicing what it spends on health care and Tanzania will be paying about 1.7 times annually (\$150 million).²¹ The other two of the four southern African countries eligible, Malawi and Zambia, face the same burden under HIPC. UNCTAD (2001) advocates:

The HIPC initiative continues to suffer from shortcomings, including...inadequate debt relief.... Consideration should be given to the suspension of debt payments by all African HIPCs without additional consequent interest obligations until final agreement is reached on debt

reduction, also to be extended subsequently to non-HIPC countries found eligible for debt relief.

A mystery for southern Africa is why it has been given this bitter post (political) apartheid fruit to swallow. Without writing off the debt, elections become an exercise. For the elected government must serve the interests of international finance, not of its own electorate. Having fought and died for access to education and primary health care, southern Africans instead are now paying the debt incurred to overcome apartheid. That kind of "victory" does not foster democracy, for the elected government has no ability to manage its economy.

Along with debt come economic structural adjustment programs (ESAP in Zimbabwe or SAPs in general). In 1990 when Zimbabwe signed on to the program, the number one government expenditure was education, defense number two, and health care three. The IMF required user fees for rural clinics and primary education in 1992, during the worst regional drought of the century.²² The impoverishment of Zimbabweans under ESAP is now well documented.

Perhaps the most graphic depiction of the harshness of structural adjustment comes not from the statistics but from the people themselves. In focus groups involving 675 participants in all eight provinces, the opinions are vivid. ESAP was described as a predatory animal, such as the lion or hyena "who targets unfit animals, which they first isolate from fit ones.... ESAP killed the happiness that came with independence." Participants also referred to ESAP as "...pests, grain weevils, which destroy what they did not assemble in the first place; pests therefore deserve to be destroyed. ESAP took away what the country had established through political independence (e.g. progressive education policies); it should thus be eliminated."²³

Zimbabwe recorded impressive achievements in decreasing crude death rates (from 10.1 to 6.1/1000) and infant mortality (from 86 to 61/1000 births) while improving life expectancy (55 to 59 years) and adult literacy.²⁴ Expenditures in health rose throughout the 1980s, reaching 3.1 percent of GDP in 1990 (The WHO recommends at least 2.5 percent of GDP be allocated to the health sector of developing countries.) The health delivery system was "turned on its head" with the majority of funds going to rural clinics and district, not urban, hospitals. Primary education was free and compulsory, with special emphasis for sending girls to school. From independence in 1980 until 1985, more children went to primary school, than during 90 years under the white minority rule of Southern Rhodesia.

Under ESAP, expenditures on health and education fell throughout the 1990s Real per capita recurrent expenditure by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, from 1991-1995, of about 40 percent, with recurrent expenditure on primary and secondary education declining by 30 percent.²⁵ By 1996, the health allocation of the budget was only 2.1 percent of GDP, at a time when the HIV/AIDS pandemic was devastating the young productive workers. Where the majority of the people seek health care (80 percent), the rural clinics and district hospitals received less than 49 percent of the public health budget.²⁶ The total education allocation declined from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1986/87 to 4.8 percent in 1999. The drop-out rate for girls is higher than for boys.²⁷

What is not so well documented is that ESAP encouraged the large scale commercial farmers (LSCF) to grow export crops for the global market and less food crops for the regional market.²⁸ Perhaps in macro-economic terms, the trade-off worked. The LSCF grew export crops (tobacco,

cotton, paprika, flowers and game meat) for export earnings while the smaller farmers increased their production of maize, sorghum and groundnuts. Yet drought (almost annually in some part of Natural Regions IV and V) and floods (1999) hit the small scale farmers the worst, reducing food security. Further, seeing good pasture go for game meat for overseas consumption or government preserves being sold to private (often foreign) tourist firms did not endear poor peasants with the ranchers and tourist operators.²⁹ UNCTAD has found that SAPs can hurt small scale farmers: "Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from structural handicaps that are impossible to remove or reduce through the standard policy reform programs. There are indications that some ingredients of reforms have actually aggravated constraints on the growth of smallholder production."³⁰

For most Zimbabweans, their identities are still linked to their home villages. Historically families survived colonialism (and the 1992, 2002 droughts) by having some members remain in rural areas and others work in town. During drought, the city-based relatives sent cash to the rural family. During periods of less employment, rural relatives provided food or work for the unemployed family members. ESAP brought not just a period of unemployment but a decade of misery. Relatives did not have enough land to sustain a household. The historical land hunger, and very real actual hunger, became worse as people tried to survive by selling commodities in informal markets.³¹ Even urban Zimbabweans still know how to grow food, as a quick glance in any township will demonstrate. The director of SeedCo estimated the maize production on minuscule urban plots would be about 50 tonnes/ha if the same labor intensity (constant vigilance) and inputs were used on a hectare plot.³² It is only in recent times that people in "born townships" (established in early 1920s) refuse to go home to the rural areas. Many Zimbabweans are genuinely land-hungry -- they know how to farm and desire small plots of land. Urbanization in Zimbabwe has not followed the US pattern of cutting all links with the rural community.

As is predicted by the theory, ESAP benefited the wealthy first, with the goal they would invest in growth in Zimbabwe. ESAP encourages production for the global market, not the regional or national, even for food security. Yet these two goals of structural adjustment do not take into consideration a post-conflict society, where factors of production are highly inequitably distributed. Benefiting the very few, who have already been historically advantaged, may not be conducive to political stability. 'Structurally adjusting' an economy in the post (political) apartheid era should probably begin with adjusting (transforming) the apartheid economic structures and relationships, not only as an issue of justice but as one of economic development. The market privileges the privileged, who can take advantage of new market 'opportunities.' El-Ghonemy sees the international insistence for market-based land reform as part of the same package with structural adjustment programs:

I have serious doubts with regard to a short-term land policy shift, because market-based reforms of land tenure arrangements are held in bondage by the present economic reforms and foreign debt crisis, and because countries are busy privatizing all economic activities.³³

The WTO and the USA Trade and Development Act (the old AGOA) further assist the privileged, by requiring "national treatment" of foreign firms. If a foreign corporation wants to buy land in Zimbabwe, the government is supposed to treat it equally to any Zimbabwean request. If a foreign corporation wants to sell seed or access the national gene bank, it is

supposed to be treated equally to SeedCo. Without prior transformation of apartheid economies in southern Africa, this requirement is unfair. Southern Africans know well the results of offshoring profits made from the natural resources of the region and their sweat -- not simply since the WTO was formed in 1995, but since the landing of van Riebeck. Southern Africa is well integrated into the global market but not as a partner, not even a junior partner. New trade instruments, such as the USA Trade and Development Act, are blocking even junior partnership status, for the governments cannot require joint ventures, but rather, must give equal rights to foreigners enriched from African soil -- while those who elected the government remain in poverty.

A major threat to food security, therefore, is loss of sovereignty over food production. By allowing the global market to determine production, an agriculturally rich country like Zimbabwe will produce flowers and fruit for Europe during its winter. Reducing subsidies for small scale farmers growing food (and raising interest rates) renders them vulnerable to the global market. Worse still, such decisions about agricultural production are ones neither the US nor the EU has been willing to relinquish to the global market. Before the WTO in 1989, for example, the US rate of farm subsidies stood at 25 percent, yet by 1999, it remained 24 percent. During the same period, EU supports were 44 percent of gross farm receipts in 1989 and 49 percent in 1999.³⁴

The first five years of the WTO was so disappointing that President William Clinton admitted just before leaving office (December 2000): "If the wealthiest countries ended our agricultural subsidies, leveling the playing field for the world's farmers, that alone would increase the income of developing countries by US\$20 billion a year." During the Clinton years, however, the US spent an average of US\$14 billion per year on farm support.³⁵ The 2002 Bush plan offers subsidies of \$15-17 billion per year over five years. It guarantees 80 percent of qualified farmers' income, no matter what they grow and offers further incentives for conservation.³⁶

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU is changing from a system of price supports to a system of direct aid to farmers. This approach being allowed under the Blue and Green boxes of the WTO.³⁷ However, it still highly distorts EU prices, undermining the development of value-added production in southern Africa. For dairy, cereal, beef, and sugar, EU prices will remain below world prices, allowing them to compete unfairly within SADC (Southern African Development Community) countries, or elsewhere, against southern African producers. For example, subsidies of EU-produced sugar makes their chocolate candy cheaper in South Africa than the domestically produced chocolate, in spite of the efficient South African sugar industry. There were almost no imports of chocolates in 1997 in South Africa, but by 2000, imports accounted for 11 percent of the chocolate market. In contrast, tariffs on the sugar content of value-added foods in the EU prohibit South Africa from competing in the EU market.³⁸ DanChurchAid found that about 46 percent of income from split peas of Danish farmers came from EU subsidies. Danish suppliers, therefore, could offer pre-cooked split peas at half the price of African growers' pulses.³⁹ By 2007-08, the chocolate and split pea stories will be similar for wheat, maize and barley. The threat is so serious that there has been a technical committee for wheat established under the SADC Trade Negotiating Forum. The after-taste is not sweet, but bitter, for once again southern Africa is required to do what the more powerful and more wealthy will not do in liberalizing agriculture.⁴⁰

Other international threats to food security in southern Africa include monoculture. At one time, over 3000 species were used as food by humans, but now we rely on about 30 staple crops.⁴¹ Yet there are 2000 indigenous food crops in Africa: sorghum, millets, bambara nuts, many tuber and root crops, fruits, marula, baobab. Botswana alone has 250 plants which are used specially as "famine food." Various kinds of African "spinach" (e.g., *amaranthus* spp = mchicha) are called the "poor man's meat" because they contain so much protein and lysine. Crops that are considered "marginal" provide a wealth of nutrition, such as pumpkin, of which one can eat the fruit, seeds, leaves, and flowers, for essential vitamins and oils. SADC is working on reviving indigenous plants as food, not willing to let monoculture take over. Dr. Marandu of the Tanzanian National Plant Genetic Resources Centre points argues, "Tanzania has about 150 food crops; we need to focus [research] on the so-called marginal food crops, such as bambara nuts, cucurbits (cucurbitaceae - gourds, squash), finger millet (makes excellent nutritious breakfast porridge)."⁴²

Any shift in choice of crops, to respond to an international market rather than a regional one, involves more than a simple substitution of one product for another. These processes are not socially or geographically neutral. Where traditional food crops are being displaced, so too are small-scale food producers:

The effect of substitution [to monoculture of a few crops on a large scale] is to undermine the livelihood of much of the rural population and to decrease the availability (and increase the price) of basic staples for the bulk of the population. This conversion process exacerbates the growing food and economic crises in developing market economies and will continue to do so unless effective policies are adopted to counteract this course.⁴³

It is up to Zimbabweans and southern Africans to decide how to encourage growing varied food crops, as well as how to maintain indigenous definitions of food -- inclusive of many more crops than those valued by the international market. Maintaining biodiversity in food production protects local food security.

Another long term threat to food security in southern Africa is the patenting of plants and seed, now practiced regularly in the US -- and being extended globally by the WTO. This approach allows the biotechnology corporations to devalue what they do not have -- biodiversity. Improving a plant variety in the field is not patentable, but "natural." This approach sets monopoly value on what corporations do have -- biotechnology. If a corporation inserts one gene (not to improve the plant variety, but to make it resistant to a pesticide), it can be patented. Southern Africa expertise about its plants -- for nutrition and medicine -- is so valued that the knowledge and bio-resources are being stolen by the wealthy. Zimbabwe has had to threaten more than one international law suit. Patenting of indigenous plants privatizes knowledge, and requires the original innovators to pay royalties for use of their own resources.

⁴⁴

Along with the patenting of plants is the planting of genetically modified seeds (GMOs) in southern Africa that are open-pollinated varieties. Every SADC country has signed the Biosafety Protocol, but national decisions about the use and proliferation of GMOs will soon be irrelevant. Open-pollinated varieties of GMOs are growing in northern Natal. Pollen from them could contaminate crops in Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The wind stops at no protest. It is strange that the international community, which is so upset about forced

seizure of land, has not mentioned forced seizure of seed. Open pollinated GMOs contaminating others' fields are as much a breach of property rights as farm invaders burning crops. The invader here is silent, but the results are just as devastating. It is very important to sanction violent farm invasions. Why is it not equally important to protest, and stop, GMO invasions of others' property?⁴⁵ Biotechnology may be the savior of the 21st century. What is not acceptable is the theft of plants and knowledge, either literally or by the destruction of indigenous crops by genetic pollution. The international standard of "GMO free" for global trade has been redefined, and "GMO free" labels now mean that 'only' 2 percent of the grain shipment is GMO. This change in definition is recognition that the corporations are defying others' property rights through contamination.

In the most profound sense, only peace in Angola and the DRC will bring food security for all in the region. War and chaos weaken a government and a region so they cannot demand fair prices for natural resources. Instability is profitable to the outsider who continues to receive the minerals. The wars in Angola and the DRC were not post-colonial or post-apartheid wars but rather were more similar to colonial wars. Foreign interests in the DRC, for example, are interested in obtaining coltan or lumber or apes for the cheapest possible price. They do not want to pay for labor or for replacing the lost resources. They do not want to pay taxes.⁴⁶ If all that can be erased by forced labor and by a few bribes, then the wars continue. The current history of the eastern Congo or Angola reads very much like *King Leopold's Ghost*, and like those times, some Africans are also profiting.⁴⁷ But the source of the exploitation is the insatiable appetite for corporate profits. Profit could be made on Congo lumber or Angolan diamonds fairly traded, but not so much in so short a time. Perhaps the next UN report will better expose the American and European firms who buy the plundered goods. Peace is a prerequisite for regional food security.

Current land seizures in Zimbabwe are condemned because they not only abrogate basic rights but because they threaten the whole region's food security. A broader perspective raises the issue as to whether long term regional food security is possible without land reform in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, especially if large estates occupying the best land in all three countries continue to produce for a global market and are allowed to off-shore profits. Further, it is not efficient to source food from thousands of miles away, when the region can easily be food self-sufficient and have enough land left over for cash crops. Finally, those who preach the efficiency and freedom of the market for agriculture do not practice free trade. What alternative policies are there for food security?

Land has not been entirely commodified in Zimbabwe and redistributed land will go partially into title deeds, but there will also be communal land and state land. A major study by United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) demonstrates the dire consequences of the simplistic "solution" of title deeds:

Available data indicate increasing inequalities, and *falling food production and average daily calorie consumption per person in most sub-Saharan African countries where ownership of communal lands has been privatized*. Empirical evidence also suggests that most of the buyers of land are politicians, senior government officials and urban land speculators, all of whom know the law and registration procedures, and have contacts with credit institutions and land surveyors (emphasis added).⁴⁸

This paper proposes that the current international demand of "willing seller-willing buyer" is not feasible, given apartheid debt. It has not been implemented far and wide across the world because it is too costly. For such a policy to be implemented, the international community would have to forgive Zimbabwean (and South African) debt and still provide funds for the land purchases. Otherwise, only the privileged will be able to acquire land. Presenting an elected government of Zimbabwe with only one option, and one that is not even remotely feasible, intensifies the conflict, instead of providing a solution.

Contrary to the principles of SAPs, the state will have to play a major role both in land reform and in food security for the foreseeable future. "Market forces" are very much that in southern Africa: forced markets. The US and the EU constantly criticize each other for not having free markets in food production because of increasing subsidies. As shown in statistics above, both are right. Perhaps a new policy approach could be that until and unless the two leading food exporters, US and EU, open their food production to global market forces, then southern Africa need not practice free trade in agricultural commodities, need not follow the demand for "national treatment" and need not respect patents on plants and seed. We could call for a moratorium on such provisions of the WTO, the USA Trade and Development Act and the Cotonou agreement.

In addition to questioning the internationally accepted approach to land reform and the internationally advocated total market liberalization, southern Africans challenge the policy that food security will be provided by trading a few commodities on the global market. One pillar of southern African food security is the production of grains for the regional market, stored for ready availability in times of crisis. SADC has been coordinating this effort since the 1984 drought. Another pillar, most often ignored by the North, is the production of biodiverse food crops by small scale farmers, including urban agriculture in countries like Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Time and again, when the first pillar has buckled, as in the drought of 1991/92 and in Zimbabwe today because of political oppression, it is the second one which keeps people alive. SADC officials and NGOs in the region are trying to strengthen this pillar.

SADC members have several projects which value indigenous knowledge of small scale food production -- from farmers' schools, farmer directed research projects, local seed banks and seed distribution, to alternatives to chemical fertilizers and pesticides.⁴⁹ To give just one example, small scale farmers directing research agendas has been successfully pursued in Tanzania, and the goal is expansion of this approach across the region by SADC/ICRISAT. In 1999/2000, farmers in Arusha and Kilimanjaro districts directed research requests to relevant Tanzanian research institutes. Thirty research projects reflected well the priorities of the small scale farmers: improved multipurpose trees, intercropping of maize/pigeonpeas (black-eyed peas), use of local resources as mineral supplements for livestock, integration of protein-rich fodder crops, improved vegetable varieties for lowland conditions, use of indigenous cover crops to improve maize yields, and screening of natural pesticides.⁵⁰

These and other farmer-directed projects operate on the principle that small-scale farms producing diverse crops provide more food security in southern Africa than international markets provisioned by industrial agriculture. This study is suggesting that this second pillar of food security may soon be toppled by international trade regimes and by patenting of

plants/seeds. Genetic pollution by GMOs also endangers locally developed strains of maize and soya.

Addressing the international context for the current Zimbabwe crisis does not minimize the importance of the domestic causes of the crisis. An international perspective does turn the focus to continuing constraints on change in Zimbabwe, even after internal political transformation. As discussed above, these constraints are severe and antithetical to the interests of the majority of the Zimbabwean people. As the international community engages to assist Zimbabweans in transforming their political and economic relations, that community is also responsible for addressing international exigencies which will impede any Zimbabwean political leaders in pursuing national interests for transfers of land, for multiple regional markets, and for regional food security. By ignoring the global constraints, international actors set up a situation in which it will be difficult for any elected government to rule. Alternative policies exist in the region, but they conflict with dominant international agendas. This source of crisis is as important to address as internal ones. The stakes are high, nothing less than the long-term viability of the political economies of Zimbabwe and southern Africa.

Notes:

1. Unemployment is over 60 percent and those living in poverty are 80 percent of the population. The drought of 2001-2002 brought severe hunger conditions to millions, especially harsh on those with no access to health care. Starvation, however, did not reach the levels predicted by international agencies, mainly because of assistance to the most destitute by their extended families. See Financial Gazette at www.allafrica.com for current updates.
2. New York Times, 5 May 1977.
3. VanZyl et al, pp. 730,737.
4. Kinsey 1999, 2000; Adams and Howell.
5. Potts, p.131.
6. Moyo 2000a, p. 36
7. El-Ghonemy, p. 1.
8. Moyo 2000a, p. 30.
9. Montgomery, p.117.
10. Montgomery, p.118; Ravenholt, p. 53.
11. Thiesenhusen, p. 172.
12. Barraclough, p. 32.
13. Brockett, pp. 198-99; Dorner, pp. 7-8; Schlesinger and Kinzer; Thiesenhusen, 1995.
14. Carter and Barham, p.1143.
15. Carrera; see Potter.
16. Associated. Press, 13 February 2002.
17. Geisler; Dorner.
18. The Farmer, Harare, 17 September 1998.
19. IFAD, p.43.
20. Modoerin and Wellmer.

21. Madakufambu, pp.123-24.
22. Thompson.
23. Nyathi and Makoni, p. 7.
24. Dhliwayo, p. 7 .
25. Dhliwayo, p. iii.
26. By 2000, the bankrupt government allocated even less of a declining overall budget to rural clinics, only 20 percent. Spending on preventive health care fell from its peak of 15 percent of the total health budget in the mid-1980s to 9.9 percent for 2001. By 2001, about 3000 Zimbabweans were dying of AIDS per week, in an estimated population of 11 million. (Rene Loewenson, "2001 Health Budget: Enough to make you sick," Herald, 21 November 2000.)
27. Dhliwayo,pp.6-7;Poverty Reduction Forum, p.36.
28. See Moyo 2000b for one of the few thorough studies.
29. Moyo 2000a, p. 8.
30. UNCTAD, 2000, p.61.
31. Chattopadhyay.
32. McCarter.
33. El-Ghonyem,p.21; see also Whiteside,pp.20-21; Acevedo,pp. 209-31.
34. Support rates are reported as producer support estimates, or PSE, which indicate annual subsidies -- from consumers through prices and from taxpayers through budgetary payments -- to support agricultural producers. The PSE is reported as a percent of gross farm receipts. (OECD, 2000).
35. Guardian Weekly, UK, 18-24 January 2001.
36. New York Times, 18 October and 2 November 2001.
37. The WTO allows exceptions to its resolution for no subsidies and no tariffs on agricultural products. The most renowned is the Green Box, which permits exceptions for environmental reasons. The Blue Box allows direct payments linked to factors of production but not to price or output volume. Given reforms in US agricultural policy, the Blue Box almost exclusively benefits the EU.
38. European Research Office, p.17; Goodison, p. 3.
39. European Research Office, p.23.
40. South African agriculture, for example, after rapid and extensive deregulation, has lower levels of subsidization than Australia or New Zealand, traditionally the lowest agricultural subsidizers in the world. Van Zyl et al., p. 737.
41. Nchimbi, p.83; Shackletons and Cousins.
42. Marandu.
43. Barkin, Batt, deWalt, p. 24.
44. Mushita and Thompson.
45. The Food and Allied Workers' Union (FAWU) in South Africa is demanding a ban on the production and sale of GMO foods. Business Report , Johannesburg, 28 January 2002.
46. United Nations, Security Council.
47. The Farmer (Harare, 4 September 2001) reports that the Zimbabwe army and ZANU business interests, under the name of the Congolese Society for the Exploitation of

Timber (SOCEBO), have a concession to log forests in a DRC area about ten times the size of Switzerland, raising about US\$150 million over three years. The concession is ostensibly to pay for Zimbabwe's defense of the DRC. The purchaser is African Hardwood Marketing of the UK and their potential buyers are the EU, especially France. Environmental groups, Global Witness and Friends of the Earth, are opposing the plans.

48. El-Ghonemy, p. iii.

49. Sithole; Marandu; Matowanyika.

50. SADC/ICRISAT, pp. 4-5.

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Africanists and Responsibility: Some Reflections

GUEST EDITOR: MARC EPPRECHT

Afro-pessimism is a widespread sentiment in the corporate media and in universities in the West. Even among those who research and teach African Studies, feelings of doubt about the value of our work and lack of confidence in the future are fairly commonplace. Gavin Kitching articulated such feelings in an article that outlined why he was depressed about Africa and African Studies.¹ This included, first, that “sub-Saharan Africa” has experienced steady economic decline and political failure for the past three decades and presumably will for the foreseeable future largely because its elites are “exploitative, selfish and corrupt.” Second, this failure cannot be explained by either earlier or current analytic models, especially in light of developmental successes by countries in Asia. Third, not knowing precisely what the problem is, it is impossible to know what to do. Finally, political paralysis is exacerbated by a sterile, accusatory polarization between “externalists” (who blame the wicked imperialists for the mess) and “internalists” (who fault African incompetence, culture, cupidity, etc.). Compounding the problem in this view is that pervasive European guilt prevents Europeans from saying what they truly believe. African dependency meanwhile supposedly enables Africans to avoid painful truths about themselves. This creates a situation where Africanist scholars are *de facto* complicit in perpetuating tyranny and criminally inept governance. Indeed, in a subsequent interview Dr. Kitching described as “imperialist” those Western scholars who do not forcefully denounce African elites.²

Dr. Kitching concludes by urging Africanists to berate Africans for their shortcomings:

The prime responsibility for making a decent future for Africa's people lies, has lain for at least 30 years, and from now on always will lie, on the shoulders of the continent's own governing elites. Simply to say that, to keep saying it, and to keep saying *why* it is true to any and all *African* people who will listen, this must be the predominant political objective of the Africanist profession at this historical juncture (emphasis in the original).

Kitching's polemic came to my attention at what is surely an important juncture for Africa and Africanists. In Canada, the federal government has just announced a large increase in development assistance and debt forgiveness even as the crisis in Zimbabwe severely tests African commitment to good governance and “peer review.” In the United States, President Bush has announced a multi-billion dollar commitment to the fight against AIDS in Africa while at the same time scuppering World Trade Organization negotiations on low-cost anti-retrovirals. A tentative peace accord is being reached in the DRC, while former developmental star Cte d'Ivoire deteriorates into vicious war.

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a11.pdf>

All in all, it seemed to me an opportune moment to ask friends and colleagues to reflect upon the existential questions that Dr. Kitching and other Afro-pessimists have raised. Under pressure of a tight deadline, the circle was small and in no way representative of Africanist opinion. I also invited several scholars from other areas afflicted by imperialism of various sorts to gain their perspective - a single Latin Americanist graciously agreed to comment.

The aim of what follows is clearly not to settle the big burning questions. Rather, it is simply to promote further reflection among those of us who continue to put their energy into trying to understand - and to communicate in a fair manner - why so much of Africa has failed to live up to its developmental potential. I hope as well that it prompts readers to question the extent of our responsibility as scholars in both contributing to this failure and to seeking ways out of it.

Notes:

1. G. Kitching, "Why I gave up African Studies," *Mots Pluriels* no. 16 (Dec. 2000)
2. Danny Postel, "Out of Africa: A pioneer of African studies explains why he left the field, and provokes a firestorm of debate within it," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 28 March, 2003. <http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i29/29a01601.htm>.

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At Issue

Eyes Wide Shut: Africanists and the Moral Problematics of Postcolonial Societies

TIMOTHY BURKE

I welcome the message of Gavin Kitching's article 'Why I Gave Up African Studies', because I think some of it is substantially true and important, despite the protests of some scholars, generally unsaid in either formal or informal writing by Africanists—though often said in unreported conversations between them.

Most substantially, I feel that Kitching's composite feeling of personal and scholarly frustration with the ways in which postcolonial Africa in general, and postcolonial African elites in particular, figure as objects of analysis is reasonably justified.

It is not true, as some scholars already have noted in response to Kitching, that Africanists are unconcerned with postcolonial African societies, or have failed to write about them. Anthropologists, political scientists and economists predominantly write about postcolonial societies, and even many works by historians (or humanistic work on African expressive genres) extends into the postcolonial era.

What Kitching suggests, however, is that the *problem* of postcolonial Africa is treated by the majority of scholars, especially anthropologists and historians, as an extension of or continuation of the *problem* of the colonial, that the moral and political challenge of postcolonial society is subordinated to or situated within a modernity whose character is largely causally attributed to colonial intervention. Postcolonial misrule is not commonly regarded as an analytic question which poses a distinctive set of issues, or which lies on one side of an important break or cleavage from the colonial. (Here I exempt political science and economics from this charge, since if anything they have the opposite problem, namely regarding the postcolonial era as *sui generis* or as merely one data point in a much larger ahistorical set that typically includes states from most or all of the developing world.)

The moral outrage, which suffused most Africanist historical and anthropological writing about the apartheid state, is largely absent when it comes to postcolonial African misrule. The genocide in Rwanda passed without anything even remotely resembling that outrage: it was left to a journalist, Philip Gourevitch, to write a clear (and intellectually satisfying) indictment.¹ Africanists have followed Gourevitch either by redirecting the force of causal explanation back

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a12.pdf>

to the colonial era or by insisting that the genocide was irremediably complex in ways that Gourevitch failed to appreciate.

Similarly, the disasters of high modernist state socialism in postcolonial Africa have fallen to a non-Africanist, James Scott, to explicate and condemn: there are few Africanist works that echo Scott's clarity about the follies of *ujaama* villages and similar high modernist and statist blunders.²

Colonialism in Africa, not to mention slavery in the Americas or the Holocaust in Europe, have stimulated a number of historical works of extraordinary elegance that struggle to understand suffering, injustice, tragedy, and oppression. Where are the comparable works about Amin's Uganda, Mobutu's Zaire or Banda's Malawi? To be sure, scholars have written about all three of those historical moments, but largely in a studiously detached and empiricist tone if they address the character of the regime and its civil society. Where is the work on the Zimbabwean government's violent rampage against its own people in the early 1980s? Only in 2000 did a work that addressed this episode centrally finally appear.³

It is not merely that Africanists do not write such work, or write it slowly, but that work which does exist is often ignored or marginalized as unsophisticated and unacademic. There are very good practical reasons why journalists and travellers like Gourevitch, Micaela Wrong, Peter Godwin and Martin Meredith are the first to write in plain but rhetorically powerful language about Rwanda or Zaire or Zimbabwe. What makes less sense is the thinly veiled hostility or carping nitpicking that such work occasions among Africanist scholars—that is, when they do not ignore it altogether. I have read several graduate student proposals in the past year dealing with Rwanda in which Gourevitch is not even cited, which seems markedly odd and not at all accidental to me.

Many historians and anthropologists dealing with such moments also do an end run around the moral problematics and focus instead on other issues like popular painting or millennial religious movements, as if the business of direct critique were either hopelessly unsophisticated or best left to someone else. This is not to knock such work in and of itself, because the kinds of monographs I am referring to, like Johannes Fabian's *Remembering the Present*, are extraordinary works of immense skill and intelligence, worthy by any rubric.⁴ But there exists alongside them a notable void, one that did not exist in the case of South Africa under the rule of apartheid.

It may be that we have all become more sagely tolerant of moral and political ambiguity since the fall of apartheid. Certainly I know that my own assessment of colonialism and apartheid's meaning has become vastly more complex and less easily rendered in tones of casual outrage and invective than it was at the start of my training as a graduate student. Moreover, some authors have offered powerful rejoinders to the desire to frame postcoloniality as a moral question. David Hecht and Maliqalim Simone's *Invisible Governance* is one of the most brilliant examples of this strategy, but it is not the only one.⁵ There is also a persuasive larger comparative literature that views moral judgments of this kind as a fundamental intellectual and political error, such as Michael Ignatieff's *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*.⁶ It is nevertheless hard to escape the sense that there is an intellectual double standard, that engaging postcolonial misrule is seen as accompanied by a strong imperative to dispassionate study when colonial misrule is not.

This goes beyond a sense that every work about postcolonial Africa needs to have an obligatory, tediously correct disclaimer in the introduction that the author thinks genocide or authoritarianism or corruption are Very Bad Things. What I think Kitching helps us to think about is that there are whole areas of scholarly investigation that are curiously, if not wholly, neglected by Africanists.

Certainly one of the most extraordinary, from my perspective, is the social history of African nationalism and nationalist organizations from the 1920s to the 1970s. Fred Cooper's work stands like a lonely beacon in this regard, magisterial and essential, but oddly unduplicated by the field at large, save for a handful of studies like Jean Allman's *Quills of the Porcupine* –and even some of the small handful of works that do exist in this vein are strikingly hagiographic, even sycophantic, towards African nationalism, such as Susan Geiger's *TANU Women*.⁷ Comparably, the ethnography of postcolonial states and state institutions like militaries, of the culture of bureaucracy and its circulations of power, is mostly unexplored. Achille Mbembe's extraordinary work on the postcolony is widely read, but there is relatively little work that can be placed alongside it, particularly more empirical work.⁸

Kitching's provocation helps to engender some other critical discussions. What I appreciated most of all about it, in fact, was its straightforward, honest coupling of personal reflection with intellectual dissatisfaction, because it seems to me that this is one of the most curious absences in formal Africanist work. Although we are supposedly at the high water mark of ethnographic reflexivity, the conversations that one hears about field experiences at a meeting of the African Studies Association do not typically sound much like the consciously and highly structured reflexive work of Paul Stoller or Alma Gottlieb.

I have many colleagues who are energized and enchanted by lengthy fieldwork stays in African communities, who live without blinders but who somehow seem able to attune themselves to the wavelength of everyday survivability that many ordinary people in African societies function within. It is here that questions of postcolonial misrule shrink into insignificance alongside the next drink of water, the next meal, the next beer, and alongside other urgent if more abstract questions of meaning and struggle vested in the household, the local community or the generalities of cultural life.

I equally know many colleagues who make what seem to me to be heroic efforts to maintain a level of deliberate cluelessness about their surroundings. During my first fieldwork in Zimbabwe in 1990-91, an American scholar working in the National Archives asked me if I knew why there was so much corn growing wild in the open spaces around Harare. When I informed her that it was because people were cultivating it, she replied in confusion that this couldn't be the case, because the municipal government was regularly burning these maize fields before the corn could be harvested, and that made no sense. More recently, when I was in Harare in 1997, a very accomplished and intellectually formidable scholar commented to me that the Mugabe government just needed some breathing room and patience and they could be trusted to resolve land issues justly in time. As a development expert with long experience in several parts of Africa noted to me in an email recently, sometimes "being with Africanists [is] a bit like living in Ceausescu's Romania. After a while, terms of reference that are not moored to global reality begin to seem like the norm".

It is no longer enough for me to just close my eyes and try to pretend that I am not seeing what I am clearly seeing. I can't pretend any longer that I don't find postcolonial Africa intensely depressing, both personally and politically. I can agree that Kitching overlooks what many of my colleagues know, namely, that postcolonial misrule exists in parallel with the intense fertility and richness of African life. Not everything or even most things in contemporary Africa come down to blood, shit and tears. People live their lives with joy and creativity and beauty, sometimes amidst suffering and sometimes perpendicular to it. It is important not to bow to the less satisfying, more superficial caricatures of some kinds of Afro-pessimism, whether they come from the *Washington Post*, Robert Kaplan or George Ayyitey. But it is equally important not to plug our ears and hum real loud in reaction to them. The news from Africa really is bad, most of the time.

One other concern that I think Kitching's article stimulates for me comes from some reflection about what the purpose of African Studies as practiced in the Anglo-American academy really is. For all that I am clearly endorsing the notion that we are called to critique, I also think that Africanists desperately need to shuck off the accumulated weight of the field's pious concern for rendering service to Africa and Africans. It is not our job to give back Africa its history, to heal Africa, to save Africa, to protect Africa. We do not owe Africa a usable past or a renovated present. We do not work for or on behalf of Africans. All of the rhetorical gestures in this direction, so firmly and pervasively encoded into Africanist writing, are little more than a transmogrification of the White Man's Burden.

We also do not *take* from Africa. Information is not an exhaustible resource, and knowledge not something that one mines from the ground. Our speech does not silence the speech of Africans by the mere fact of its existence. If the relationship between Anglo-American academics studying Africa and African academics working in African institutions of higher learning is massively asymmetrical in terms of scholarly output, that has to do with the imperiled nature of the African university — which is imperiled largely by the very postcolonial misrule that some Anglo-American scholars are slow to confront. Such an asymmetry is not an inevitable result of postcoloniality itself: South Asian scholars writing from South Asian universities have an entirely different relationship with their counterparts in Anglo-American academia. Moreover, as Mamadou Diouf observed in the issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education* devoted to the Kitching controversy, African intellectuals could mostly care less about what is being produced by Africanists in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom, so fears about the perceived domination of Africanist scholarship by Anglo-American scholars seem rather groundless.⁹

Isn't that as it should be? I am not saying there should be a total disconnect between the two academies, but it seems wholly positive to me that African intellectuals should be motivated by one set of problematics in their writing and thinking and Anglo-American academics by another. I am not writing and teaching about Africa for Africans, though I am delighted and educated by their readings of my work and avidly welcoming of any and all exchanges. I am writing and teaching about Africa for my students, my colleagues, my society.

The moral, political and intellectual frameworks which inform my execution of those responsibilities, are shaped in relation to my experiences in Africa and with the material substance of African history, but they are largely cogent and meaningful in my immediate

context. Where they are larger than that, it is not because I am subordinating my own concerns to some kind of altruistic desire to render service to Africans in the terms that I suppose they desire to be serviced, but because I see a larger, shared obligation to a global, universalizing ethics that binds all nations and peoples with equal force.

Notes:

1. Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda*. New York : Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
2. Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like A State*. New Haven, CT : Yale University Press.
3. Ranger, Terence, Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor. 2000. *Violence & memory: one hundred years in the "dark forests" of Matabeleland*. Portsmouth, NH : Heinemann.
4. Fabian, Johannes. 1996. *Remembering the present: painting and popular history in Zaire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
5. Hecht, David, A.M. Simone and Maliqalim Simone. 1994. *Invisible Governance: The Art of African Micro-Politics*. New York: Autonomedia.
6. Ignatieff, Michael. 2001. *Human Rights As Politics and Idolatry*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
7. Allman, Jean Marie. 1993. *The quills of the porcupine: Asante nationalism in an emergent Ghana*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Geiger, Susan. *TANU Women: gender and culture in the making of Tanganyikan nationalism, 1955-1965*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
8. Mbembe, Achille. 2001. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley : University of California Press
9. Postel, Danny. 28 March 2003. "Out of Africa: A pioneer of African studies explains why he left the field, and provokes a firestorm of debate within it." In *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. <http://chronicle.com/prm/weekly/v49/i29/29a01601.htm>

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At Issue

Academic Melancholy, Romantic Cynicism and The Road Not Taken

LISA McNEE

Depression, Gavin Kitching writes, made him abandon African Studies for more fruitful terrains. Afro-pessimism and other forms of depression related to on-going African crises beset many academics in the field, for they, like Kitching, wonder what value their efforts have when little seems to have changed for the better since they began their careers full of hope in the 1960s. Those heady days are over, Kitching writes, and cynicism has led him to do research in the Asia Pacific region, where development projects have met with greater success than in Africa.

For those of us who began our careers in the 1990s, our elders' cynicism carries both a warning ("you, too, must face Afro-pessimism") and a reminder that the Baby Boomers' perspective was perhaps from the onset overly idealistic, even naive. The unprecedented prosperity in the West in the aftermath of World War II probably fueled extreme idealism and hopefulness, as did the initial results of the Green Revolution. But we must remember that the Green Revolution depended on pesticides and herbicides whose harmful effects only became apparent years later. Those of us who remember the recession and stagflation of the 1970s, and who went into academia with the persistent fear that a degree would not lead to a job at all, obviously view our careers from a different perspective. Rather than assuming that our efforts could and would change the world, most of us simply hope that our work will have a positive impact somewhere, sometime, even if we do not see the effects personally.

As a scholar of literature and cultural studies, I had to face the issues that Kitching mentions before I even began my academic career. Almost every student of African literature I have met asks him or herself what good literature can do, when the continent has so many pressing needs. I have no pretensions that research on literature will feed the hungry; however, I sometimes ask myself whether resources given to scholars and students of literature shouldn't be diverted to feed the hungry. Yet Africans themselves clearly believe in the importance of the arts; whether oral or written, literature has a large and enthusiastic audience. Music, dance, the visual arts, fashion and other forms of aesthetic expression are vibrant and important on the continent, even in areas where people are hard-pressed to pay for necessities. Why do Africans

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a13.pdf>

believe the arts are important, when they may not have enough to pay the rent, fill prescriptions, or feed the baby? Although I have not done a study on the subject, my guess is that most Africans realize that life should mean more than bills and work.

Kitching is depressed because he feels ineffective. What of Africans, who must feel they are running as fast as they can to stay in the same place, or even fall behind in the race toward development? In spite of extremely difficult conditions, most Africans that I have met during my visits to the continent have impressed me as friendly, capable, and perseverant people. In the face of grinding poverty, they manage to find solutions to daily problems, and share what they have with others. One friend in Senegal was the sole earner in her family. She supported her aged father, her sister, her brother, her two children, a nephew, and a niece. Although the stress weighed on her, and she suffered from stomach ulcers because of it, she always managed to cheer others up and even gave her neighbor money on occasion if she had nothing to feed her children. I have great respect for adults like these who can give their children a sense of security by sparing them full knowledge of the difficulties the family faces. Her children could play and enjoy life, rather than worrying about money alone. This story is typical; moreover, she had fewer people to support than most salaried workers in Africa.

Kitching is depressed, but seems to be using the word depression loosely, rather than as a precise psychological term. What about the Africans whose plight he bewails? Mental illness does strike Africans, of course, and sometimes strikes in spectacular ways that are culturally specific. In Louga (Senegal) in 1993, one elderly mentally ill woman regularly came to my friend's house for food during the noon meal. She was almost naked most of the time, and received no health care at all. Although I shook hands with her and greeted her, no attempt to communicate reached her so far as I could tell. In fact, one could say that this woman's sole method of communication was to present herself naked; presenting one's nude buttocks to others' view is perhaps the ultimate insult in Senegal. The same year, in the same neighborhood, I saw a young woman tied down to a mule-drawn cart, screaming as her family took her to receive mental health care--whether traditional or western in nature I never learned. These are informal anecdotes culled from a year of intensive fieldwork on oral performance, rather than any knowledge of transcultural psychology, so I turned to an academic source to learn more. According to Nosisana Nama and Leslie Swartz, post-partum depression hits poor South African women three times as frequently as it does women in developed countries.¹ A brief scan of psychological bibliographies leaves no doubt that depression and other mental illnesses are widespread in Africa.

How, then, can we explain the cheerful, friendly attitudes that seem so typical of Africans even in the face of tragic, sometimes nightmarish circumstances? Although the arts are no panacea, I believe that the arts do help us to remain sane in a crazy world. I tell my students that literature and art by themselves cannot change the world in recognizable, direct ways; however, literature may spur readers to action, internal or external. And the world is so complicated, we may never be able to tell exactly what difference this or that work of art has made.

Depression has led Kitching to reaffirm the problematic argument of Octave Mannoni, who argued that the psychology of dependency made it impossible for colonized people to take responsibility for their own lives:² This fact is, to put it simply, that the most damaging legacy of

colonialism and imperialism in the world has not been the global economic structures and relations it has left behind nor the patterns of modern 'neo-imperialist' economic and cultural relations of which it was the undoubted historical forerunner. Rather its most damaging legacy has been the psychological Siamese twins of endemic guilt on the European side and endemic psychological dependence on the African side, legacies which make truth telling hard and the adult taking of responsibility even harder. Imperialism f*!#ed up the heads of so many people whom it touched - both colonialists and colonized (Frantz Fanon was absolutely and deeply right about that) and until that— ultimately depressing—legacy of its existence is finally killed, neither Africa nor African studies will be able to make real progress. It was that conclusion which led me—very sadly—to leave both behind (Kitching, paragraph 10).

Kitching seems to have forgotten that Fanon wrote *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952) in part as an angry reaction to Mannoni's work. Although it is true that colonialism has damaged the world on a psychological and spiritual level, as well as on a material level, putting aside the work of repairing that damage because it is depressing, frustrating and sometimes punishing is certainly no way of solving the problem.

Arrogance is often its own punishment, and Kitching's story, while heartfelt, proves this. His type of cynicism—the romantic reaction of the disappointed idealist—is a malady that we must heal, rather than a position worthy of its own school of thought. In outlining his reasons for abandoning African Studies, Kitching has chosen to use another term—cynicism—in the popular sense, rather than in a more historically precise way. Kitching and other Afro-pessimists could look to the Cynics of ancient Greece for another model. Diogenes, among others, argued that happiness can be gained only by pursuing virtue; since our desires are unending, all other pursuits or pleasures, according to these ancient philosophers, distract us from the highest goal: happiness. As Africanists, I think we all hope that Africa and Africans' lives will improve, perhaps in part due to our work. However, for our work to have a positive impact, we should try to cultivate the virtues that I have noted as typically African: friendly perseverance in the face of adversity, generosity, hope and a willingness to help others.

Notes:

1. Nosisana Nama & Leslie Swartz, "Ethical and Social Dilemmas in Community-based Controlled Trials in Situations of Poverty: A View from a South African Project," Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 12 (2002): 288.
2. Octave Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban :Psychology of Colonialism. London : Methuen, 1956.

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Beyond Blame?

CAROLE PEARCE

The rhetoric Africanist scholars bring to bear on their work is insupportable. There may be little or no good news on this vast continent, but it is hard to see where else there is good news today. Is scholarship about bringing good tidings? The attribution of blame in scholarship is an entirely new phenomenon which brings impossible methodological problems (particularly when those blamed are dead) and even more impossible policy recommendations. The search for blame creates a flawed methodology. If African studies are moribund, let us enrich the methodology and put Africans in the lead in Africanist studies.

Anger, anxiety and despair is what a lot of people feel when they look at Africa over the last 30 years. As scholars, our work should be compassionate but dispassionate. Other passions are inappropriate motives in scholarship. By reducing scholarly open-mindedness they decrease our chances of bringing genuine illumination to a phenomenon, the kind of illumination that Weber sought when instructing us to make the familiar seem strange and the strange, familiar. Blaming evades the whole problem. The quick fix, a search for a simple causal connection leading to an agent to be blamed, is contrary to the spirit of scholarship.

CONNECTIONS, MODELS AND BORROWING

Much ink has been spilt on the slave trade and colonialism but African history did not stop or start with these. Africans are not *tabula rasa*: they are agents with views, approaches and attitudes of their own. African states and peoples have interacted with each other and with Asian and Middle Eastern societies as well as with the west for century upon century. These interactions and influences are by no means limited to causal connections. There is the matter of models, advice and practical suggestions and borrowings, for instance. Unexpected cultural alliances and positive inspiration has developed from this, such as the link between the growth of jazz in America in the early 20th century and the glorious outpouring of township jazz at the same time in South Africa.

Consider, for example, the fact that the large-scale state-led appropriation of wealth in Africa in the last 20 years took place around the same time as anti-socialist models—Thatcherism and libertarianism—were developing and taking hold in Western institutions and in the last gasps of state authoritarianism in the USSR and Asia. This combined to destroy the trade unions and the models of viable welfare states. The destruction of welfarism preceded the intellectual credibility and political collapse of the Left in Europe. Blatant corruption was on the rise in the west. It was accompanied by a rise in corruption in the south. The trashing of ideas of

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civic virtue and the rise of corporatism took place at the same time that African states engaged with increasing energy in the destruction of the welfare of their own people and focused on material gain. While no-one would claim that the one caused the other the parallels are not coincidental.

CAUSALITY, AGENCY AND ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES

Let us not restrict ourselves to a monocausal model that stratifies groups (perhaps according to a simple Marxian formulae) and conceives of power relations flowing down the same route. We all know social action is not *caused* in this, or any other, way. It is reached through the interaction of sets of causes, influences, pressures, alliances, and outmanoeuvring. Strategies of resistance are available to both groups and individuals, including subversion and what Merton called “innovation”. It is possible in any circumstance to initiate action. What of the effect of discourse and narrative, either in face-to-face interaction or through the mass media, which creates or recreates reality, opening up or shutting down avenues for action? What of the multiplicity of sites of power? What of the power of bureaucratic state organization in societies that lack a history of formal organization?

In short, the methodological choice is not between thunderously top-down monocausal accounts or purely voluntaristic models. The choice is rich, though it should be principled, not promiscuously eclectic. We ignore at our scholarly peril structural factors and the effect of history, such as the complex effect of the iteration of, say, rules and procedures, leading, as chaos theory shows, to self-replication at greater and smaller topographical scales. Scholars of large-scale phenomena could and should also appropriate the general findings of specific small-scale and ethnographic studies. If we paint with too broad a brush—cross-continent comparisons or even inter-continental comparisons— we obscure the very detail that makes the picture clear. I am unconvinced that a comparison of societies can yield very much genuine understanding: United Nations databases are full of comparative statistics that tell us very little.

SELF-ENTRAPMENT AND THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION

In addition our methodologies should take into account the self-entrapment of peoples and the reasons for this self-entrapment. For the last 50 years leftist intellectuals have undermined any incipient trust in the west, in white people and in capitalism, let alone any notion of disinterested virtue. This has had three important consequences: firstly, it has justified the growth of (anti-white) racism within Africa. Secondly, it has contributed to a belief that, as “capital is theft”, the only way to acquire wealth is to steal, or, in more sophisticated terms, to jump on the gravy train. Thirdly, it has contributed to an overwhelming mistrust of western governments and institutions. The clear lesson, even before we start to trade, is that western capitalist states are the lying enemies of Africa: how then can Africans take their advice, let alone their pernicious medicine?

If the Left has played this role in shaping the self-entrapping attitudes of non-westerners towards the west, (as well as trapping itself in knee-jerk stereotypes) this is not to say that the Left has brought about these attitudes. I point instead to a darker reality: the ways in which the good intentions, high moral values and indignation and pity can contribute to the net. The most

cursory examination of well-intentioned policies reveals the ways in which unintended bad effects are embedded in the good and, sometimes, good effects are embedded in bad policies. Scholarship needs to be enriched with such considerations and the energies of scholars should be put into the task of understanding and interpreting reality, rather than rubber-stamping prejudice.

GLOBALIZATION

Africans are no more free agents than are non-Africans. Globalization has brought us all closer together, creating mirror-image societies, not just in different continents and societies, but in different parts of the same state. Globalization creates its obverse, fragmentation. Of all the recent catastrophes in countries on the African continent, only poverty was an issue before 1980. Nevertheless these catastrophes have been shared by countries outside Africa. There cannot be any doubt that globalization has affected us. But this is a less than causal statement. "Globalization" is a shorthand reference to an agentless, largely unwilled, multifaceted phenomenon that no one can stop or control. It is the logical consequence of what Weber so powerfully described as the iron cage of capitalism, from which no-one can flee.

WHAT DO AFRICANS SAY?

Africanist scholars bring their own imaginations into the task they set themselves. These imaginations are circumscribed, like those of non-Africans, by their political and ethical commitments and their knowledge. They do not need another barrier. One salient imaginary barrier that people draw around themselves or is drawn around them is "race." This high wall defines what is proper to either side. Africans are increasingly seeing themselves in racial terms, encouraged by essentialist generalizations about "African societies," the "African elite," "African culture." In turn, African societies are increasingly seen in racial terms as well. Scholars must use all their efforts to put an end to this (and that means starting off by avoiding generalizations about Africa). Such concepts are dangerous and damaging both to scholarship and to the self-respect of African people.

African scholars should be at the heart of African scholarship. Many intellectuals on the continent are stuck with rotten universities and demoralizingly low salaries. They do not have a proper place in the wider society, within or outside Africa, where their contribution is wanted or encouraged. There is an unbridgeable gap between town and gown. African studies should start by supporting African scholars, providing them with access to libraries through the Internet and massively publishing, critiquing and engaging with their work. Non-Africans should attend carefully to what they have to say and not refuse to listen through embarrassment or hurt. To start with, African scholars know (at least one) of the languages and the cultures, having been bathed in these from birth, and for this reason alone they should lead the research process. This is the only way for real scholarly illumination, texture, and density.

None of this solves the problem of Afro-pessimism. I believe it is not up to scholars to solve this problem. Pessimism, like blame, like optimism, has nothing to do with the task of understanding, describing and explaining reality.

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At Issue

Colonial and Post-colonial Latin America

DAVID SHEININ

A decade ago, the historian Forencia Mallon connected the relatively new field of subaltern studies to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until then, scholars working on Latin America had stressed class in their Marxist methodological approaches to the region. But now that the Soviet Union had fallen, Mallon argued, what were progressive Latin Americanists to do? The answer was the substitution of the new methodologies of the subaltern for the more restrictive class-based analyses as a basis for inquiry. Odder than the answer itself was the notion that, somehow, a teetering late Cold War Soviet Union had proved the inspiration for decades of Marxist analysis of Latin America – that without the Soviet Union, years of progressive scholarship now had to be rethought. Though she likely did not see it as such, Mallon's focus on the end of the Cold War as a point of departure for subaltern studies, was itself a comment on the sway of great power conflict and the intellectual climates it generated in shaping foreign discourses on Latin America. To be sure, Mallon was never an apologist for imperial rule; in fact her scholarship is anti-imperial in tenor and content. But, like other scholars formed in the 1960s and early 1970s, her analytical approach to Latin America was defined and redefined over time in intellectual climates shaped first and foremost outside the region, and in a manner that tended to place little emphasis on methodologies developed in Latin America itself. This is sometimes called imperialism.¹

Mallon's vision of the intersections of progressive scholarship on Latin America and the state of great power politics underscores an important similarity between Latin American Studies and African Studies outside of Latin America and Africa. Like many leading African studies specialists of Gavin Kitching's generation, non-Latin American Latin Americanists were profoundly influenced by Vietnam, the American Civil Rights movement, the Prague Spring, Paris 1968, and Ch Guevarra. These and other episodes that resonated internationally pushed the political center of academia in wealthy countries to the left. But while Latin Americanists and Africanists from wealthy countries believed they were helping to break the chains of imperialism, this was only true in part. To be sure, there was an anti-imperial component to political change in the academy. In the United States, for example, the creation of Latin American Studies and African Studies in the post-World War II period was closely tied to government financial backing for such programs that were meant by Washington policy makers

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<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3a15.pdf>

to support imperial objectives. By the 1970s, to the dismay of many in government, African Studies and Latin American studies in the United States were foci of anti-imperial thought. Writing and teaching in the Chile of Salvador Allende's great moment of democratic socialism, Andr Gunder Frank represented another example of the new anti-imperialism. Frank was as convinced as other non-Latin American (and some Latin American) dependentista scholars that dependency theory spoke to the Latin American colonial "reality." Their struggle was with imperialism, its agents among Latin American lites, and conservative non-Latin American scholars who still dominated the Latin America "area" in different disciplines in many countries. Chief among the latter was Oxford University's only Professor of Latin American history, D.C.M. Platt who argued vociferously at the time that structuralist analyses of empire and history were simply without foundation. Dependency theory was a model fought over outside Latin America.²

The model failed to nudge Latin America toward radical social and political change. While decrying imperialism, the model itself was an imperial imposition on societies whose problems could not be reduced to theories that were mathematically aesthetic, but weakly grounded in regional and national problems, and the ways in which subalterns and others shaped social change. This started to become painfully clear to some progressive Latin Americanists in the late 1970s, for example, when the Guatemalan military launched its genocidal war on aboriginal communities. Despite that United States imperialism in Guatemala clearly played a strong role in how and why the Guatemalan government went to war so ferociously against its own people, dependency theories and other foreign approaches of the time could not explain the violence, social breakdown, and intensity of ethnic conflict. The methodologies that had driven progressive non-Latin American scholarship were inadequate. Non-Latin American scholars began to understand Guatemala in the 1980s only when they started to set aside the imperial essentialisms of their progressive academic intellectual milieu.³ In the case of Guatemala, they were forced to do that by Rigoberta Mench and a host of other Guatemalans who demanded that the foreign academic community rethink everything from what constituted "human rights" to the place of aboriginal cultures in Latin American societies. Indeed, the 1980s marked the first time that Latin Americans figuratively took non-Latin American scholars by the scruff of the neck and shook them out of an imperial lethargy.

Gavin Kitching's self-conscious decision to "leave" Africa speaks to the imperialism inherent to how some scholars understood post-colonial societies. Mallon's reliance on the fall of the Soviet Union as a marker is odd. Kitching's decision to quit Africa rings of an unsatisfied child in the playground who decides to take his proverbial ball and go home. "I am shocked," Kitching states in response to an academic from Ghana who reacts cynically to the celebrations in 1980 at the founding of Zimbabwe. What was it about the African scholar's "drunken" comment that shocked Kitching? Why would he respond with "shock" to two words uttered in a bar, as though those words gave any insight at all into what his colleague was thinking? What business did Kitching have assessing another scholar's ideas on the basis of two words? Kitching entered African studies a decade earlier with rigid ideals about what post-colonialism should mean. The suggestion that African societies might not be so easily categorized "shocked" him. The impossible simplicity of what he anticipated prompted his departure from the field when historical change did not go his way.

Like many Latin Americanists, Kitching was a devotee of dependency theories which he describes as having informed his longstanding, crude assessment of why African leaders were corrupt and destructive – they were imperial agents. Kitching is, in the end, a product of the early methodologies to which he subscribed. Dependency demanded a rational clarity that simply made no sense. When he was certain he understood Africa's problems and prospects, he was fine – and able to dismiss what he describes as the drunken outburst of his colleague from Ghana. When there was no longer a certainty, he could no longer stand the field. Since when was it a prerequisite for inquiry in African studies or in any field that we have all the answers up front?

As a non-Africanist, I shudder just a little at how focused the responses to Kitching in this issue are on non-African thought and scholarship. Where are the Africans? One legacy of Kitching's blindered vision of Africa seems to be an absence of the analysis of African society by Africans. Where are the methodologies and approaches defined and explained first and foremost by African intellectual traditions? Here and in some other areas, there seem to be crucial differences between the intersection of ideals, politics, and scholarship in Latin America and in Africa. Most important, Kitching's experience and what it represents of a generation of foreign (non-African) scholars suggests a grimmer present and a more uncertain future for Africa than for Latin America. African scholarly and intellectual viewpoints and traditions are not front-and-center in this and in other debates. This may well reflect the difference between a continent in the disruptive long-term throes of dramatic poverty and violence, as opposed to Latin America, a region where people routinely think of Africa when they imagine what could be worse than what they have. In many regards, there is more cause for optimism about Latin America, not in the narrow terms of imperial versus independent cultural legacies but, rather, in regard to how little it really matters to Latin American scholars what the rest of us think. This difference may well locate our Latin America-related debates in a healthier context. Mallon abandoned an academic struggle that began with the Cuban Revolution, was punctuated by Allende's Chile, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the guerrilla struggle in El Salvador for a new methodological direction and new hope. Kitching simply left his field entirely. Kitching seems to think his departure makes a difference one way or the other. Without the certainty Kitching would require, I suspect that Mallon recognizes that subaltern studies never really took hold in any country (with the possible exception of Puerto Rico) with the lan that characterized the field over the past ten years in wealthy nations. And in the end, what she thinks won't change Latin America, nor should it.

There are other differences that explain, perhaps, the intensity of Kitching's exit as not unrelated to Africa's particular problems. During Kitching's adulthood, Africa underwent a transition from colonialism to post-colonialism. The transition was clear. It was sought after in many colonies, inspired in many cases by the same sorts of left politics that gripped students and others in many parts of the world. It was vigorously anti-imperial, a rich rejection of race-based colonial politics, and reflected common political experiences across new national borders in Africa. For the foreign scholars who looked to Africa, the links between their politics, their scholarship, and their optimism for a bright post-colonial future in Africa were self-evident. In Latin America at the same time, historical processes were more ambiguous as were the dedication to and political investment in historical change of most scholars.

In Africa, the transition was clearly one from colonialism to post-colonialism. In Latin America, there was no such clear dichotomy. In the way that colonialism was understood in Africa during the first half of the twentieth century, most Latin American nations had achieved their independence from colonial powers by 1830. This meant that by the time scholars and political leaders began to speak of a “post-colonial” Africa in the late twentieth century, the term post-colonial had no meaning at all in Latin America. Non-Latin American scholars had coined the term “national period” to describe the post 1820 period in the region. By the 1950s and 1960s, the break from Portugal and Spain was a distant historical memory with little political resonance for Latin Americans or for the foreign scholars that studied their societies. At the same time that Latin American nations had long since become “post-colonial,” they were also seen increasingly as essentially neo-colonial, opening a debate that had equivalents in Africa but that were overshadowed there by the confidence in post-colonial projects. Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and other “dependentistas” conceived of a new imperialism that was primarily American and that held up Latin American countries as colonies. Progressive foreign scholars had a more difficult time than their equivalents in Africa with the contradictions of the post-colonial or independent Latin American nations and conceptions of dependency and informal empire in the region. Paths to political and economic freedom were less certain, less clear than for the African nations that had thrown off the shackles of empire.

As in Africa, there were models for change. But whereas in Africa the examples of inspiring and lasting post-colonial struggle were many and became the path for a majority of nations struggling for change, in Latin America they remained isolated, less clearly a pragmatic or ideologically viable course -- according to foreign scholars on the left. The key examples in the Cold War period were the Cuban and Nicaraguan Revolutions. Each revolution inspired a new generation of Latin Americanists in many countries. Both account for a politicization of Latin American Studies and a strengthening of the academic left in many nations inside and outside of Latin America. They also produced heightened Cold War tensions that, in turn, made Margaret Randall, E. Bradford Burns, and some other Latin Americanists in the United States public foils for the Cold Warriors in the White House. The Cuban leadership saw their connection to African post-colonial struggles; Cuba became involved in protracted war for Angolan liberation that, despite appearances in the west at the time, left Soviet leaders furious with Cuba’s independent action in the war. The war also left deep social and cultural scars on Cuban society. The death toll among Cuban soldiers was enormous and had deeply negative repercussions on how Cubans viewed their government. But while Cuba identified with and maintained close ties to newly independent African countries, it remained an exception unlike its African equivalents. Most important, no other Latin American country was ever able to follow the Cuban anti-imperial lead. But in addition, despite Florencia Mallon’s investment in the Soviet model, and even as they backed Cuban progress on health care, education, literacy and in other areas, scholars on the left in Latin America and elsewhere often spoke freely about Cuban shortcomings. In looking at Cuba or Nicaragua, few progressive Latin Americanists wore rose colored glasses as brightly colored as those Kitching once wore.⁴

While the United States treated Nicaragua as a pariah state and a Soviet satellite, the Marxist model there was incomplete and, in the end, short-lived. Like Cuba and unlike the

African post-colonial projects, it became an exception that lacked the strength to overcome the colonial component of Latin America's late twentieth century reality. If anything, Latin Americanists in wealthy nations held few illusions of the sort Kitching harbored and were skeptical about the Sandinistas' prospects. Fidel Castro himself had warned Daniel Ortega to anticipate an American invasion. Nicaragua inspired the ominous invention of low intensity warfare that included Central American fighting forces working in part as proxies for United States aggression. There were other cases that were even more short-lived. Under Salvador Allende, scholars from all over the world came to Chile to help effect meaningful change. The longevity, ferocity, and liberal economics of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet that followed underscored the seeming impossibility of a true post-colonial model in Latin America. Even so, but to a lesser extent than among Africanists, foreign scholars remained invested politically, professionally, and ideologically in Latin America's destiny. When David Stoll challenged the autobiographical details of the region's most important human rights icon, Rigoberta Mench, most in the non-Latin American academic community rallied to her side. The US-centered Latin American Studies Association, the largest academic organization of Latin Americanists, regularly takes strong political positions in favor of human rights. But none of this represents an investment as strong or as clear as that of foreign Africanists and their investment in the post-colonial national projects in Africa.⁵

There is likely another factor in the relative distance – compared to Africa and Africanists -- between foreign Latin Americanists and socio-political change in the region they study. To a far greater extent than in Latin America, African universities are influenced by foreign scholars. While in a number of African countries, foreign Africanists hold teaching positions, in Latin America foreigners rarely hold such positions. Academic traditions in different countries that include a powerfully nationalistic concurso for teaching positions often make foreign appointments impossible. Scholarship in Africa is often influenced by leading investigators at key non-African universities. In Latin America, humanists and social scientists are often unaware of current important scholarship in North America or Europe. The methodologies, approaches, and themes of inquiry of Latin American scholars are often very different from what is at the focus of Latin America related inquiry outside of the region.

Finally, while problems of race in Latin America's past and present are every bit as significant as in Africa, they are less stark than the black versus white dichotomy exacerbated by decolonization as a process intimately tied to a rejection of white colonizers and white political cultures. In fact, in Guatemala, Peru, Panama, Brazil, and elsewhere, peoples of color have been organizing as never before over the past five years. Changes reflected in the rise of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, and the aboriginal political movements in Ecuador mark a dramatic seizure of Latin American polities by indigenous peoples who will likely have little time or patience for subaltern studies, depressed foreign academics, or cranky Canadian Latin Americanists.

Notes:

1. Florencia E. Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," American Historical Review, vol. 99, no. 5 (December 1994):

- 1491-1515; Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," American Historical Review, vol. 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1475-1490.
2. See D.C.M. Platt, Mickey Mouse Numbers in World History: The Short View (London: Macmillan, 1989); Andre Gunder Frank, Lumpenburguesa: lumpendesarrollo; dependencia, clase y politica en Latinoamrica (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Periferia, 1973); Rodolfo Puiggros, Andre Gunder Frank, and Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Polmica sobre los modos de produccion en Iberoamrica (Buenos Aires: Agrupacin Universitaria Nacional, 1974); Mark T. Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); James William Park, Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).
 3. See, for example, Diane M. Nelson, A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
 4. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
 5. Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta Mench Controversy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); David Stoll, Rigoberta Mench and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).

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At Issue

Why I Love African Studies

MARK EPPRECHT

There is much to be frustrated, heartbroken, and angry about in recent African history. The fact that scholars have sometimes been complicit by legitimizing abusive and corrupt elites on the continent is an undeniable part of this history that needs to be explored. Yet to compare the present unfavourably to the late colonial era in general terms based on select anecdotes is deeply misleading. For example, the United Nations Development Program has comparative statistics on the Human Development Index for 37 Africa countries south of the Sahara going back to 1975 (that is, a point just before the oil shocks started to whittle away the gains of the 1960s). They show slow but more or less steady improvement up to the year 2000 in all but one nation (Zambia). Other UN sources indicate improvements in child mortality rates, life expectancy and access to improved water supplies over 1960 even in some of the most ill-governed countries. In Sierra Leone life expectancy is now 39 years, the lowest in the world, to be sure, but it was only 32 years when the British took leave. In the meantime, people in Africa's most populous country (Nigeria) could expect to live an additional 14 years (or over a third) longer in 2000 compared to 1960. Continent-wide, smallpox has been eradicated, river blindness and polio are on the way out, and vaccines for malaria and HIV are in the pipeline. Fertility rates have declined, in part due to dramatic increases in the use of contraceptives but also in part due to gender and development efforts that have improved women's legal rights and female literacy.

Noting these achievements does not detract from the fact that some countries have experienced serious setbacks. There will almost certainly be further declines in life expectancy and other social indicators in the worst hit countries in the near future. Nonetheless, to paint a uniformly bleak picture or to fetishize disaster is to deny real gains in key areas of health, literacy, and even infrastructure. Consider as well some remarkable, peaceful transitions from dictatorship or oligarchy to democratic, constitutional rule – Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and more. These transitions are incomplete. That they are ongoing, however, is testified by the emergence of a vibrant civil society that includes outspoken feminist associations, gay and ethnic minority rights movements, and a relatively free (indeed, often startlingly bold by lame-stream North American standards) press. One can debate the merits and meaning of these successes, but simply to dismiss or to deny them in sweeping generalizations is hugely unfair. There is evidence to support the belief that hard

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work and good sense and close collaboration with African colleagues can make a difference for the better.

Dr. Kitching's observation of paralysis in African Studies also does not describe the situation as I have experienced it over the past decade or so. In my experience, Africanist academic journals are full of fascinating, sensitive, pertinent, new research. The conferences I attend are lively, colleagues are often highly politically motivated, and stodgy disciplinary and ivory tower boundaries are being torn down. Some of this new research is noticeably better than two or three decades ago, aware, for example, that women and children actually exist and that the environment, gender, and sexuality are important historical issues. In part, the richness of the new scholarship reflects the fact that there are now more Africans participating who forthrightly contest Western Africanists' intellectual hubris (or simply, pointedly ignore it in favour of more pressing concerns).

In common with many Afro-pessimists, Dr. Kitching also errs in presenting a falsely undifferentiated Africa to compare unfavourably to a similarly implicit unity in Asia. Aside from the terrible violence and exploitation that the so-called successes in Asia entailed, they surely owe at least as much to American geo-political obsessions as they do to the probity of their elites. Why then compare apples and oranges?

Speaking of which, who are these "elites" we should be excoriating? Was (British-military-educated) Idi Amin an elite? Can US-educated Kwame Nkrumah and US/Scot-trained Hastings Banda be lumped together with Samuel Doe and Amilcar Cabral? And while it is true that uber-thug Charles Taylor spent time in prison (in Boston) can we legitimately analyze his "elite-ness" as somehow analogous with that of fellow prison-alumnus, Nelson Mandela?

Another misleading analytic device common to Afro-pessimism is the construction of an implacable hostility between external and internal causes for Africa's problems. Having erected this false dichotomy, they then tend decisively to cast their vote in favour of the internalists. Yet Africanist scholars today normally see multiple, often rival external factors (governments, corporations, IFIs, NGOs, MNCs, and so on) interacting with multiple internal factors (class, gender, ethnicity, the physical environment, and so on) in dialectical fashion in differing contexts that change over time. They accept that African elites are responsible for the welfare of the population as a whole (and that more are acknowledging this now by allowing democratic elections and critical media than ever in the past). But they also recognize that African elites are enormously, often fatally constrained by pressure from outside. To suggest otherwise is self-flattering and self-deceiving to the main sources of that pressure in the West.

Tacitly exonerating the West for its role in African frustration is one thing. But Afro-pessimism is even more worrisome when it suggests abandoning African friends and colleagues who seek our help in their efforts to build a better society. They do not seek that help out of dependency on our brilliant ideas or our guilt to milk. Rather, Africans mostly welcome us as allies (indeed are remarkably patient with us) in part because of our ability to bear witness about Africa to students in the West, to politicians in the West, and to media in the West. This is potentially useful to their struggles. Indeed, Africans have ample reason to believe that without us to hold decision-makers in the West accountable for policies and interventions that further marginalize Africa, their struggles may simply disappear from the international political agenda or be betrayed by opportunistic politics in the West.

Here is just one recent example: many Americans might be gulled into believing that African struggles against HIV/AIDS are well-served by President George W. Bush's recent promise of \$15 billion toward their cause. In fact, as South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign has eloquently explained, Bush's "help" may significantly undermine their efforts.¹ By amplifying TAC's voice closer to the political centre of the world capitalist system, Africanists in the West can play a role in alerting concerned voters of this extremely dangerous turn. Perhaps that will motivate some to put their personal energy into throwing the rascals responsible for it out of office next time around (I call this Florida-optimism).

Let me conclude by recalling an astute observation made by a grumpy old white man long before African Studies even existed. Marx noted that the higher and middle rungs of society propagate and eagerly consume an "inversion" of reality that obscures from them an honest understanding of the state of the world. This inversion justifies their continued privilege at the expense of the working class. A clear perception of the violence inherent in capitalism can thus only come from the working class experience, a concept elaborated by Antonio Gramsci, by Walter Rodney and other African or Africa-based Africanists in the 1960s, by feminist standpoint theory in the 1970s and 80s, and by variations of subaltern and queer theory since the 1990s.

Building from this insight (that is, that people in much of Africa are struggling against levels of violence and degradation whose ultimate provenance is obscured by bourgeois inversions), we can appreciate African Studies for the window it opens to the world, and to ourselves. Drought has hit southern Africa hard this year, to give one example. Shall we merely point the finger at African peasants or at leaders like Robert Mugabe who have unquestionably exacerbated the famine that has ensued? Or shall we reflect on who is raising the surface temperature of the South Pacific and changing global climate patterns? If we do the latter, Africans' disproportionate suffering of some of the consequences of global climate change reveals to us the painful inequity of the global capitalist system. People in the West consume a hundred or more times the energy that an African does on average and that, by any objective standard of need, people in the West require for a healthy and happy life. Famine in Africa (aside from its intrinsic tragedy and the spur it provides to humanitarian generosity) can thus make us wonder why our environmental footprint in North America is so vastly, destructively inflated.

In other words, looking at the world through African eyes or through empirical data honestly gathered on the developmental trenches in Africa can provide us with lessons about ourselves here in the West, and about the real as opposed to idealized nature of globalization. We urgently need to learn these lessons. If, in the process of learning, Africanists can contribute to Africans' own efforts to turn things around, all the better.

And that is why I love African Studies.

Notes:

1. TAC Newsletter 29 January 2003 <http://www.tac.org.za/>

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At Issue

Jagged Fragments: Imperialism, Racism, Hurt, and Honesty

GAVIN KITCHING

I make no attempt in this 'reply' to write a smoothly integrated disquisition of any kind. I found that in reading all the responses to my original piece - not only the formal responses to it commissioned by the ASQ, but the many emails and letters I have received about it too - my mind simply would not, or could not, construct anything of that kind. Rather the responses, or perhaps my reactions to them, fell into discrete clumps or mounds around a particular issue. To each of these clumps I have a clear, or moderately clear, response that I wish to make. But I do not think that these responses sum to a single argument, or should be presented as one. Perhaps there is no single argument to be made here, so that even to pretend to make one is to fail to face the sheer complexity, difficulty, and pain of the questions my piece seems to have evoked in (at least some) people.

So...

STRIKING EQUIVOCATIONS¹

Pearce: "Much ink has been spilt on the slave trade and colonialism but African history did not stop or start with these. Africans are not *tabula rasa*: they are agents with views, approaches and attitudes of their own. African states and peoples have interacted with each other and with Asian and Middle Eastern societies as well as with the west for century upon century. These interactions and influences are by no means limited to causal connections...."

BUT

Pearce: "The destruction of welfarism preceded the intellectual credibility and political collapse of the left in Europe. Blatant corruption was on the rise in the west. It was accompanied by a rise in corruption in the south. The trashing of civic virtue and the rise of corporatism took place at the same time that African states engaged with increasing energy in the destruction of the

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welfare of their own people and focused on material gain. While no-one would claim that the one caused the other the parallels are not coincidental."

So what are they? Causal?

AND

Pearce: "Africans are increasingly seeing themselves in racial terms, encouraged by essentialist generalizations about 'African societies,' the 'African elite,' 'African culture.' In turn, African societies are increasingly seen in racial terms as well. Scholars must use all their efforts to put an end to this (and that means starting by avoiding generalizations about Africa). Such concepts are dangerous and damaging both to scholarship and to the self-respect of the African people."

BUT (next paragraph)

Pearce: "African scholars should be at the heart of African scholarship. Many intellectuals on the continent are stuck with rotten universities and demoralizing, low salaries. They do not have a proper place in the wider society, within or outside Africa, where their contribution is wanted or encouraged. There is an unbridgeable gap between town and gown."

These look like generalizations about Africa to me.

ALSO

Epprecht: "Another misleading analytic device common to Afro-pessimism is the construction of an implacable hostility between external and internal causes for Africa's problems. Having erected this false dichotomy, they then tend decisively to cast their vote in favour of the internalists. Yet Africanist scholars today normally see multiple, often external factors (governments, corporations, IFI's, NGOs, MNCs and so on) interacting with multiple internal factors (class gender ethnicity, the physical environment, and so on) in dialectical fashion in differing contexts that change over time."

BUT

Epprecht: "...they also recognize that African elites are enormously, often fatally constrained by pressure from outside. To suggest otherwise is self-flattering and self-deceiving to the main sources of that pressure in the West."

AND THUS

Epprecht: "Building from this insight (that is, that people in much of Africa are struggling against levels of violence and degradation whose ultimate provenance is obscured by bourgeois inversions) we can appreciate African Studies for the window it opens to the world, and to ourselves. Drought has hit southern Africa hard this year, to give one example. Shall we merely point the finger at African peasants or at leaders like Robert Mugabe who have unquestionably

exacerbated the famine that has ensued. Or shall we reflect on who is raising the surface temperature of the South Pacific and changing climate patterns? If we do the latter..."etc.

If you want to know where a person's explanatory heart is, note not the qualifications and disclaimers with which they begin, but the propositions with which they end their logical periods—where they put their last explanatory foot down, as it were.

EXPLANATION AND FORGIVENESS

But in any case, this is not really an issue about explanation. That is to misrecognize the problem, which is, as so often in the social sciences and humanities, at bottom philosophical. This is really an issue about what we are prepared to *forgive, excuse, or justify* because, or on the grounds, that we can explain it *in a particular way*. Let me take two examples. Neither of them are mine. They come from a recent article by Richard Joseph, published in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* in early July this year.

In Malawi, as the specter of drought appeared in 2002, it was discovered that the country's strategic maize reserves had been sold without authorization, and for personal benefit, by the very officials responsible for managing them. During a visit in March 2000 to the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, where I had taught two decades earlier, I looked across a barren area at what was once a thriving animal farm. It had been pilfered and mismanaged out of existence, a story that can be repeated *ad nauseam* across the continent.²

I currently have a favoured *explanation* for destructive African elite (excuse me) behaviour. This explanation, which is, admittedly, hardly very original or unique to me, suggests that in a world of massive global inequalities such elites have, with but few exceptions, and from almost the time of independence itself, been much more concerned to obtain western (and high western, at that) material standards of living and consumption for themselves, than to undertake the difficult, frustrating and self-disciplining long term governance task of effectively superintending the economic development of their countries and populations. What conventionally gets called 'corruption' (and nearly always amounts to looting the treasury in one way or another) was just a (very quickly) discovered short cut to providing for a few what would otherwise take decades, or even centuries, to even approximate for the many.

Now, once I have this particular explanatory bit between my teeth I can elaborate upon it in all sorts of ways. I can see these impatient material aspirations as *themselves* a product (and whether intended or not) of western political and cultural imperialism. I can expostulate on how the most typical colonial experience in Africa exposed African people to "capitalism as a mode of consumption" but not to "capitalism as a mode of production", so that they learned much more about the consumptionist fruits of capitalist enterprise than about the organizational or management requirements (and costs) of producing them (I can also bring in, at this point, the deep ethnic and other cleavages in the colonially created African states, which made the nationalistic commitments of many elites so thin and fragile). Thus, once people so exposed, and so weakly loyal to their 'nation', are put in charge of a governmental apparatus which apparently (*apparently* through the tax/aid/borrowing mechanism) produces money for consumption purposes without the need of any effort (save that required to attain "the political kingdom" whether by the ballot box or the gun), then you have an almost perfect recipe for the

kind of developmentally destructive behaviour manifested by African governing groups across a large part of the continent since the 1960s.³

So now I have a more or less elaborated *explanation* of that behaviour, and an *explanation*, moreover, which does not reduce it to some essential racial or cultural trait of the people in question, but brings in much wider factors, including factors having to do with 'us', 'the west', 'colonialism' etc. And let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that that explanation is true, absolutely true, as an account of why such destructive behaviour is widespread across the continent. Still *none* of that helps me with the issue of how I am to *judge* - morally judge - the actions of those people who sold off Malawi's maize reserves prior to a drought, or who pillaged the University of Ibadan's "once thriving" animal farm. And don't say "don't judge - just report" (which appears to be Carole Pearce's line, and if Tim Burke is right, a line favoured by at least some of the 'postcolonial' analysts of Africa, in a deeply ironical return to the old '*wertfrei*' postulates of positivism).⁴ And don't say it, not because it is 'methodologically *undesirable*' to so judge, but because it is epistemologically *impossible not* to do so. One of the things a long term engagement with the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein has taught me is that the activities we call "observing," "perceiving," and "describing" on the one hand and "judging" and "evaluating" on the other, are in fact deeply intertwined (and rightly and properly intertwined) in our lives. To explain why that is would take far, far more time and space than is available here, but a quick way to get the idea is just to reflect on such everyday expressions as "I could see that she was angry", or "the ceiling stretched high above us," or "the signs of massive inequality were everywhere," or "he looked at me furtively. I knew he was up to something."

So, in short, to 'know' that somebody - some specific individuals or groups of African people - sold off Malawi's maize reserves, or to 'know' that they flogged, or stole, animals and machinery that did not belong to them but to a public educational institution, and which were an integral part of the planned education of a body of their fellow citizens, is to know something *disgraceful* (morally disgraceful) about the people in question, and to know *that* is to know something as real and as positivistically indubitable about them as their height or weight or hair colour or gender or ethnic background. And the only way in which such actions would *not* be disgraceful would be if the people who undertook them did not (for some reason) *know* that they were. But does anybody pretend that *anyone* who has ruled or governed in any state in Africa since the 1960s did not (do not) know that such behaviour is wrong? Would they hide it if they did not? Would they bolt out of the country with the swag when the game is (for one reason or another) up, if they did not? Would they demand indemnification as the price of stepping down if they did not? No, of course not. These are modern-day men (and women). They know the rules by which public life and service is supposed to be governed in contemporary nation-states, and they break them, and break them massively. And that is wrong, and they know it is wrong, and it is wrong no matter why (no matter how we, or they, might *explain* their reasons or grounds for, or the background against which) they did it and do it. And economic development in Africa will be made very difficult, if not impossible, until they stop doing it. (Which does not mean that it *will* occur if they *do* stop doing it - i.e. it's a necessary but insufficient condition). So in short, explanation schmekulation (morally speaking).

OTHER ISSUES RAISED (VARIOUS)

(a) As I have said on a number of occasions, I half hoped that 'Why I Gave Up African Studies' would subside quietly into silence and oblivion. For that would have been (for me) the best sign that the field *had* really moved on, *had* really dealt with these issues, that they *were* really 'old hat.' And as a matter of fact, a couple of respondents to my piece (Chris Lowe and Patrick Wurster) did take this line, - but they were certainly in a minority by doing so.⁵ Their assurances however have to contend, not with me, but with Tim Burke's wonderful little bibliographical essay. Sensing, I suppose, that the charge of "Kitching's out of date" would be the one most easily brought in defense of African Studies, (as well as being the one to which I am most obviously vulnerable), he has presented, at any rate to my untutored eye, at least a powerful *prima facie* case that this charge *cannot* be substantiated by reference to the bulk of Africanist literature produced since the 1980s. More significantly, he has identified what I think is the single most common technique adopted by academics who wish to avoid making moral judgements with which, for other reasons (see further below) they do not wish to be identified - what he calls (variously) "a studiously detached and empiricist tone" or "heroic efforts to maintain a level of deliberate cluelessness about their surroundings." And, as he says, what really gives the moral game a way about this technique is that it would *not* be adopted, and often *was not/is not* adopted by the same scholars, when dealing with (for example) apartheid, or the slave trade, or colonialism in general. In Burke's words, "engaging postcolonial misrule is seen as accompanied by a strong imperative to dispassionate study when colonial misrule is not."

(b) But why? Why is it so "accompanied"? Compare this. According to a recent article by Rachel L. Swarns in the *New York Times*, the Afro-American activist group TransAfrica, and its president, Bill Fletcher, is in trouble with at least some of its erstwhile supporters, because it/he recently sent a public letter to Robert Mugabe, strongly criticizing a number of his regime's policies and actions.⁶ Commenting on the furor in and around his organization, Fletcher is reported to have said, *inter alia*, "When the enemy was evil white people in South Africa, that was easy. But when the enemy becomes someone who looks like us, we're very skittish about taking that on."

So there is 'skittishness' among (some) AfroAmericans and determined dispassion among (mainly white) academic Africanists. But driven by the same fundamental motive of course - fear of giving aid and comfort (or even apparent aid and comfort) to white racists.

Although I think that is all understandable (bloody *explanation* again!), it is no way to go, morally speaking (or even politically speaking). In the last fifteen years or so I have met and talked with a number of (now very elderly) people who were leaders and activists in the British and Australian Communist Parties. If there is one regret that they all share it was their failure to speak out about what so many of them knew - or at least suspected - was going on in the USSR in Stalin's time because of fear of playing into the hands of "bourgeois reactionaries" etc. For of course the only effect of their silence (or apologetics) in the longer term was that, such people looked even more pathetically bankrupt (in front of their friends as well as their enemies) when Russians, even Russian communists (like Kruschev) started saying what they had always explicitly denied or (furtively) avoided.

And it really is most notable, in that context, that the most eloquent, plainly spoken and unselfconsciously righteous condemnations of corrupt African regimes come from their principled (and brave) African opponents. Let us speak with them, not sullenly hide behind them, or try to dismiss what they tell us as 'mere anecdote' or 'not provenly typical' or something.

And finally,

(c) it became clear, in reading a number of responses to my piece, that a number of younger Africanists (as well as other people) had never heard of me or my work, or were (at best) working on hearsay or guesswork. Among the contributors to the ASQ, this seemed particularly true of David Sheinin, but is also true to some extent of Carole Pearce and Lisa McNee. This is in no way surprising, given that I have not been around the Africanist scene for 20 years, and that Sheinin is not even an Africanist. But if you don't know, it can be dangerous to guess, so let me just say:

- (1) I don't think I was ever "starry eyed" about African socialism, or if I was it did not last very long. In fact, I pride myself on having written one of the first sceptical evaluations of *Ujamaa* in Tanzania (for example) published in the West.⁷
- (2) My enthusiasm for dependency theory was equally brief. Indeed back there in the stone age, before subaltern studies was even heard of, I used to have something of a reputation as one of dependency theory's most eloquent critics.⁸
- (3) Also, I am, academically, a Marxist, but I have never been a communist or even a fellow traveller. My politics were, and still are, more or less solidly social democratic. In fact that was part of what attracted me to Nyerere's Tanzania.
- (4) I am surprised that Carole Pearce feels the need to remind me about globalization. It is, she says "the logical consequence of...the iron cage of capitalism from which no one can flee." I could not have put it better myself! (But have tried to in my recent book, *Seeking Social Justice Through Globalization: Escaping a Nationalist Perspective*, 2001.)
- (5) Equally, I was certainly *not* a "pioneer" of African Studies (whatever that is supposed to mean. Who was Ibn Khaldoun?) And the many who made this point were eminently justified in doing so.
- (6) However, those who read my article carefully will note that I said I was depressed about "what was happening *to* Africa" and by the state of African *studies*, when I left it. I never said that I was depressed by *Africa* or *African people* because that would have been the reverse of the truth. The years I spent in Africa as a young man were some of the happiest and most fulfilling of my entire life, and probably for much the same reasons that Lisa McNee finds doing field research on African arts and music so enriching still i.e. "the cheerful, friendly reactions that seem so typical of Africans even in the face of tragic, sometimes nightmarish circumstances." But I would go further than that. I would say that some of the people I met in rural East Africa

were among the most abundantly intelligent and life affirming human beings I have ever met in my life. But to reflect on that fact, and on the wealth of what I had learned from such people, was no antidote to my depression (yes, I speak figuratively, or in a common place rather than psychiatrically professional way here) about what was happening to such people, or about the failure of the academic field of which I was a part to remotely do them justice. On the contrary, reflection on the former merely deepened the latter.

There is much more I could say - about Mannoni and Fanon, about Wittgenstein (and why everybody should read him), about the way the problems we are discussing here interdigitate with problems in academic 'Black studies' programs in the USA and (to a lesser extent) in the UK- but I have more than exhausted my allotted wordage, so I will abstain.⁹ Instead I will simply end with a quotation from one of the intellectual heroes of my youth - the great American political sociologist and historian, Barrington Moore Jr.

"No matter what his unavoidable premises and predilections, any student of human affairs is bound sooner or later to come across evidence that is profoundly disturbing. Then he has the task of coming to terms with it honestly"¹⁰

This is an observation that I profoundly endorse, but it is also *more* than an observation. If I read Moore's remark aright, it also provides a philosophical *criterion* of what it is to be a *serious* "student of human affairs" (which Moore himself most certainly was), i.e. if, as such a 'student', you have *never*, in your entire career, come across facts which you find "profoundly disturbing" then you probably just ain't serious!

Notes:

1. Quotations from "At Issue" contributions by Carole Pearce and Marc Epprecht, in this edition of the African Studies Quarterly.
2. Richard A. Joseph, "Facing Africa's Predicament: Academe Needs to Play a Stronger Role" (<http://chronicle.com/weekly/v49/i26/26b00701.htm>) pp.8-9.
3. Jane Guyer made some very apposite observations along these lines in her e mail responses to my article, as did Ike Okonta in his contribution to the CHE's on-line 'colloquy' about it.
4. "Eyes Wide Shut: Africanists and the Moral Problematics of Postcolonial Societies". See below for some more comments on this piece.
5. Patrick Wurster in particular seems to think that the only theoretical tools around in African studies in my day were either 'modernization' or 'dependency'. That's funny, because I always thought of myself as arguing, even at the time, that that was precisely *not* the case. See, for example, my "'Politics, Method and Evidence in the 'Kenya Debate' in Bernstein and Campbell (eds) *Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa*" (Sage, 1985) pp.115-52.
6. Rachel L.Swains, "Criticism of a Hero Divides Blacks" at: <http://www.iht.com/articles/101932.html>.

7. In my *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective; Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization* (Methuen, 1982). Not quite the first, Goran Hyden got in a couple of years ahead of me.
8. In the book referenced at 7 above, and in the 'Kenya Debate' piece referenced at 5 above.
9. I received, and have read, a number of (mainly) thoughtful and troubled messages about these matters, which were also raised by a number of contributor's to the CHE's colloquy. I deeply regret that I have no space to comment upon them here.
10. Barrington Moore Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Penguin, 1969) p.522. On the same page one will find some very brief but profound remarks about the deep relationship between academic objectivity and personal honesty in the life of any scholar.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law. Penelope Andrews and Stephen Ellmann (eds.). Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001. 606 pp.

Few constitutions in the world have generated as much interest and controversy as South Africa's Interim and Final Constitutions. While it lasted, apartheid attained worldwide notoriety. Its anticlimactic ending was a momentous 'end of history' that generated global interest. With the end of apartheid, global attention shifted to the process of social engineering that would produce "a new South Africa," a just and equitable society. Thus, the constitution making process and some provisions of the constitutions (such as the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights) were no less harbingers of controversy. Expectedly, the Interim and Final constitutions, the processes, institutions, and innovative rights enshrined in them have generated extensive scholarly debate and spawned substantial literature.¹ But it would be misleading to think that apartheid alone stimulated and sustained the worldwide scholarly interest in South Africa's constitution. The constitution's groundbreaking Bill of Rights places it highly in the pantheon of superstar constitutions to the extent it is now widely regarded as "the most progressive Constitution in the world."²

In many respects, this book is an important, welcome addition to the growing literature on South African constitutions. As an effort to assemble "a particularly wide and cross-cutting set of views" (p.2), the book indeed offers wide-ranging, distinctive perspectives. By no means the account of "strangers," the book presents the reflections of politicians and academics, participants and keen observers. The authors include leaders of the negotiation process; those actively engaged in implementing the constitutions; and those variously involved with some of the institutions created by the constitutions. Thus, the book is largely the account of individuals whose efforts partly made the constitutions a reality or shaped (and perhaps still shaping) the institutional and normative regimes created by the constitutions.

Systematically divided into three parts, the book is a collection of twenty essays, including the excellent introductory chapter, which sets the tone for the rest of the book and admirably provides a detailed synopsis of the various chapters. The nine essays in the first part explore the constitution making process. It takes the reader through the difficult process of negotiation; highlighting in its stride the grand brinksmanship, horse-trading, and compromise leading to the agreements on the basic tenets of the constitutions. The first section ends with the account of that suspenseful period when the result of the negotiations was tabled for certification by the Constitutional Court with a historic mandate to determine the constitutionality of the constitution.

The book explores some of the very important rights protected by the constitution. The second part (six essays) focuses on some of the key rights, including, the rights to citizenship,

<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2-3reviews.pdf>

equality (especially of women), cultural freedom, free speech, and socioeconomic rights as well as the applicability of the Bill of Rights to private (non-state) actors. The essays in this part highlight the emerging challenges to make the hopes and promises of the constitution a sustainable reality. As one of the contributors, Penelope Andrews, underscored (p.348), simply enshrining rights in the Constitution does not automatically guarantee their enjoyment. Effective institutions are necessarily part of the equation.

The need to understand the protective structures designed to safeguard the rights protected by the constitutions is the focus of the third part. The four essays examine some of the important institutions created by the constitutions; namely, the federal features of the final constitution, the role of the constitutional court, of the lower courts and of the police, and the structure and functions of the Human Rights Commission. In addition to the historical overview, the essays provide a reasoned evaluation of these institutions' strengths and weaknesses and possible ways to strengthen them. Karthy Govender's piece (p. 571) on the work of the Human Rights Commission shares the legalistic pedigree of the United Nations-driven dominant conception of an ideal National Human Rights Commission which has a rather limited vision due to its heavy reliance on the formal powers of these commissions. This otherwise excellent analysis could have benefited from an enlarged, more holistic vision based not only on what the commission can do, but also on what can be done with it by civil society groups.³

Consistent with the editors' hopes, the book refreshingly sheds light on "the genesis of the new rights culture" (p. 18) in South Africa. Being the firsthand account of those involved in the process or with the institutions makes it all the more authoritative. It offers scholars and researchers a rare insight into the minds of some of those major players. While the book makes a candid attempt to identify the problems and challenges facing the realization of the "new rights culture," it shies away from taking up the challenge of interrogating the suitability of undue reliance on constitutional rights framework to transform the legacies of apartheid or to realize a just and equitable South Africa. Nor does it interrogate the double-edged nature of entrenched individual rights; to the extent some of these rights may work to preserve the fraudulent status quo of the apartheid legacy.⁴ However, the contributors understand the nature of constitutions as more of a work-in-progress than divine rules etched in stone. The editors rightly expect future interventions to respond to problems or exigencies the framers of the constitutions did not foresee (p.18).

One minor shortcoming of the book (not uncommon with most edited works) is that it is not arranged in numbered chapters. Instead of easy references to chapters, one is saddled with references to pages or titles where chapters would normally suffice. Nonetheless, the book remains a very important addition to the growing literature on South African constitutions. African and international human rights scholars, comparative constitutional law scholars and historians, political scientists, feminists, human rights advocates and researchers, and others interested in and intrigued by efforts to transform this former epitome of inhumanity into a just and equitable society for all its inhabitants, will find the book refreshingly valuable.

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Notes:

1. See, e.g., G. E. Devenish, *A Commentary on the South African Constitution*. Durban: Butterworths, 1998.
2. See Kristine Yigen, "Enforcing Social Justice: Economic and Social Rights in South Africa" *International Journal of Human Rights* 4, no.2, (2000) 13 at p. 21.
3. See generally, Obiora C. Okafor & Shedrack C. Agbakwa, "On Legalism, Popular Agency and 'Voices of Suffering': The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context" *Human Rights Quarterly*, 24, (2002), 662-720 (espousing the adoption of an enlarged, more holistic paradigm in assessing national human rights commissions to enhance their transformative potentials).
4. On this see, Makau wa Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002, p. 128-130.

Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974). Teresa Cruz E Silva. Basel, Switzerland: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 2001. Pp. 210.

This study presents an analysis of the role of the Swiss mission in the development of nationalism in southern Mozambique. Based on oral as well as written sources, the author interprets the relations between the Swiss Presbyterian mission, the colonial state and colonial subjects between 1930 and 1974. The oral sources consist of more than fifty interviews, including conversations with former missionaries of the Swiss Mission, and individual or group interviews with Mozambicans who went to school at the mission. Furthermore, the author consulted documents in archives in Maputo, Lausanne, and York as well as an impressive range of published works.

Teresa Cruz e Silva describes the founding of the Swiss mission in southern Mozambique by local evangelists. In 1880, seven years after the establishment of a station in Northern Transvaal by missionaries from Switzerland, a convert of Mozambican origin started preaching the gospel in his home area in Southern Mozambique. The fact that the mission was not, as in many other places in Africa, founded by European missionaries, but by local evangelists had important consequences. First, the Swiss mission was from the start strongly grounded in local society, a fact that exacerbated tensions between the mission and Portuguese authorities. Second, it contributed to early elite formation and African initiative in the religious sphere. This, in turn, led to conflicts between Swiss missionaries and local evangelists, as the missionaries feared too much African influence would entail a 'return to paganism'. Yet, the missionaries also saw the advantages of a strong local network and took to developing the training institutes that they deemed necessary to prepare evangelists and church elders for their task.

A major part of the book is devoted to the missionaries' role in education. The author rightly acknowledges the importance of education in a large number of areas. She describes the role of writing in the construction of ethnic identity, the conflicts over language policy between the colonial state and the missionaries and, the role of education in elite formation and political consciousness. The impact of the mission's youth groups, called *mintlawwa*, is especially stressed.

The *mintlawwa* groups fostered 'skills essential to the development of a critical understanding of social reality' (p. xvii). The songs and Biblical parables that were studied in the groups were interpreted as political messages by many of the students.

Many later nationalists acknowledged the role of the mission school and the *mintlawwa* groups in their political formation. As it is stated in one of the biographies of former mission school students: 'The Swiss missionaries had a kind of political and moral power. They taught us a certain number of things that were political...' (p. 160). Also in the biographical chapter on Eduardo Mondlane, the role the Swiss mission played in his life and political career becomes apparent.

The book is not without its flaws. A crucial point is the vagueness of some of the key concepts. It can be surmised that the author uses consciousness in the sense of awareness of Mozambique as a nation. She also seems to assume a relationship between such awareness and political activism against the colonial state. Yet, national consciousness and nationalism are not identical: the fact that some of Cruz's informants fought against colonialism, while others joined the Portuguese army already shows this. It also does not become clear how the consciousness of Mozambique as a nation relates to older forms of consciousness: the author assumes 'consciousness' to be a modern phenomenon. This conceptualisation could have led to an interesting contribution on the debates about modernity in Africa. Yet, the author refrains from discussing her definition of the terms used in the book.

The author emphasises the relations between anti-colonial resistance and the Swiss mission. Although she does not assume a direct relationship between the protestant missionaries and the anti-colonial movements, she stresses the importance of the Swiss mission in the formation of an elite. At times, her interpretation leads her to treat the evidence partially. Thus in the rebellion of 1894-1895 the missionary church was twice set on fire: once by the Tsonga rebels and once by the Portuguese army. Teresa Cruz e Silva gives an explanation for the Portuguese reaction, but does not discuss the Tsonga attack. Was the mission, despite the author's statements that the Tsonga differentiated between the mission and the state, associated with white rule? Another example of such partial interpretation is the explanation given for the fact that girls at the mission were trained 'to be good wives and mothers' (p. 167). This is seen as a concession to Tsonga traditions and not related to the conservatism of some of the Protestant missionaries. As the book seeks to explore the role of the Swiss mission in the development of a political elite that challenged an oppressive state, the Protestant missions are by and large interpreted as a progressive force.

This leads to the final point of this critique. There is a tendency in the book to discuss colonial Mozambique in three blocs: the Protestant churches, the state, and the Mozambican people. Yet, many studies have refined such a division and pointed out the internal tensions within 'the church', 'the state' and 'the people'.

Despite these flaws, the book is certainly worth reading. It gives us a fine example of the relations between Christian missions, literacy and elite formation. Using a wide range of sources, the author has managed to give us an overview of the history of the Swiss missions in Southern Mozambique. This history has led the author to discuss many important themes: the relations between protestant missions and the Portuguese colonial state, between education and

political activism, and between literacy and the construction of ethnic as well as national identity.

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Why Peacekeeping Fails. Dennis C. Jett. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 240 pp.

Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once described the United Nations as “the sandbox for the Third World.” This humorous image expresses the often petty, often peevish, and nearly always politically self-interested behavior of the member states which make up the United Nations. The continued viability and future role of the United Nations, in light of the global events following September 11, has been hotly debated in recent months, especially as United States-led coalitions are in the process of “nation-building” in both Afghanistan and Iraq without any significant role reserved for the UN. As these peace-building efforts proceed, the UN’s roles as the preeminent international debate forum, neutral mediator, peace enforcer and nation-builder are being seriously challenged. In the past, the most visible and controversial activities undertaken by the UN have been their wide-ranging peacekeeping operations (PKOs). These PKOs have been analyzed in detail, and the future success of such operations presciently predicted, in Jett’s book.

The book was originally written as a doctoral thesis, but the author adds his personal experiences as a foreign service officer in Africa and South America and as an Ambassador to Mozambique, to his in-depth academic research. The result is a coldly logical and cutting critique of the PKOs undertaken by the United Nations. Jett’s thesis is that modern PKOs typically fail because of the UN’s internal structure, the way the member states use the UN and the nature of modern global conflicts. He effectively uses the examples of two recent peacekeeping efforts in Mozambique and Angola to explain the inherent structural ailments within the UN, while also highlighting some unique contextual barriers to effective international peacekeeping. In the process, Jett navigates the reader through thick log-jams of the clumsy acronyms that are so prevalent in the UN, with names such as: MIPONU, UNPREDEP, and UNAVEM III. The book, while only 195 pages, is a slow march, but is extremely well researched and a sagacious and fair appraisal of the subject matter.

The book’s foreword alludes to what Jett sees as one of the deeper philosophical problems of the United Nations. This problem is its unwillingness to assign blame in global conflicts. The UN generally views conflicts through the lenses of materialism, meaning that conflicts are the result of poverty, and therefore not the result of human agency. Jett writes that, “if poverty is the cause of war, political leaders are absolved of the responsibility for starting conflicts or ending them.” As Jett correctly points out, “the more general poverty-causes-war theory is wrong” as it “ignores the issue of who is responsible for starting such conflicts,” which, he goes on to say, are caused by “leaders like Saddam Hussein who are unrestrained by democratic institutions.” It should be immediately obvious why this argument does not resonate among

many of the member states of the UN, a large number of whom are certainly not “restrained by democratic institutions” themselves.

The nature of global conflicts and therefore the nature of PKOs have also changed in recent years, from traditional interstate wars to complicated civil wars. In traditional wars, Jett argues, PKOs are typically more successful because the UN has to simply deploy their blue helmeted soldiers between the warring states. In modern conflicts, however, PKOs have been much less successful and have been asked to expand their roles from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping efforts involving democracy building and other lofty objectives.

Peacekeeping operations have often been rightly accused of merely being pusillanimous political cover for the Security Council members who are unwilling to fully commit to aggressive action to bring lasting peace. The PKOs on the ground, bound as they often are by weak mandates, cannot enforce their own decrees, pressure individual parties to comply or even avert atrocities. A tragic example of this was the infamous occasion in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in the summer of 1995, where peacekeepers, restrained by a weak mandate, stood helplessly as thousands of civilians were murdered in front of them, in what was supposed to be a “safe haven.”

Jett’s predictions for the future are equally pessimistic. The continued success of future PKOs, he argues, will require more political will on the part of the international community. The PKOs should only be attempted when the conditions are right, they should be fortified with a strong mandate and staffed with creative and politically savvy staffers. He is convinced, however, that there will continue to be a decline in the UN’s peacekeeping activities, that real reform will be unrealistic and that PKOs will continue to be misapplied and doomed to failure.

His predictions are proving sickeningly correct in the case of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the Ituri region of that enormous country, seven hundred UN peacekeepers, bound again by a weak mandate that makes them unable to protect civilians or even themselves, have had to impotently witness the on-going massacres. These peacekeepers, who are mostly Uruguayans, have themselves been targeted by the warring factions, who harbor no fear of reprisal from the international community and whose outrageous actions produce only embarrassed throat-clearing at the Security Council. The Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, whose country unabashedly supports one of the leading tribal factions in the Congo, sardonically describes the UN peacekeepers as “dangerous tourists.” The Ituri region is Srebrenica all over again.

Jett’s book is particularly interesting in the light of recent international events following the attacks on September 11, 2001. The Afghan and the Iraqi Wars have both been fought to the completion of major hostilities, and the process of nation-building has begun in both countries. This phase, which Jett and others have characterized as “peace building,” has traditionally been the phase in which the UN was the most successful. But these recent conflicts are unlike earlier ones, in that the UN as an organization wants to intervene to prove its relevance, but may be denied a significant role.

Perhaps Jett’s most prescient prediction is the increased use of “coalitions of the willing,” of the sort recently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. These international alliances fill the PKO vacuum by performing the jobs that have in the past been performed by the UN. It seems likely

that these new shifting coalitions and more established alliances such as NATO will continue to bypass the UN as long as the UN exists in its current structure.

Various remedies have been proposed to heal the ailing UN, ranging from the most outlandish to the merely cosmetic. As Jett writes, “the ways to improve peacekeeping are far easier to list than to implement effectively.” Much as he predicts, the UN will most likely remain in its current form and will continue to be politically timid, hopelessly bureaucratic and increasingly irrelevant. This continued course will only lead to further cooption by other international structures and to further pointless and counterproductive squabbling in the dirty mess of the sandbox.

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The Bang Bang Club: Snapshots From a Hidden War. Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva. (Foreword by Archbishop Desmond Tutu). New York: Basic Books, 2000. 253 pp.

South Africa was, for all intents and purposes, a war zone in the period from 1990 to 1994. So called “black-on-black” violence was in reality both a direct manifestation of apartheid and a phenomenon fomented by the South African state and its draconian security forces. It tore up the black townships and homelands that had served as the most blatant physical manifestation of the apartheid system. As the prospects for change within South Africa became inevitable, the white government and securocrats hoped to divide the masses that supported Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) coalition from the minority who followed Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

As with any war, on the scene, but literally behind the camera, were intrepid war reporters who were both part of, and yet separate from, the stories they covered. One group in particular gained fame for their swashbuckling, fearless, and profoundly influential photography from the frontlines of apartheid’s last stand. After a South African lifestyle magazine dubbed this small crew the “Bang Bang Club,” a name that referred to their experiences on the front lines where the “bang bang” (i.e. fighting) occurred, that nickname stuck. Although the membership of this club sometimes changed, there were four consistent members: Greg Marinovich, Joao Silva, Kevin Carter, and Ken Oosterbroek. They knew the lay of the land and where events were going to take place even before they happened. They took the best pictures. They showed the most drive and displayed the most bravado. Two of them lost their lives in events directly or indirectly related to their work in southern Africa’s most visible hot spot. In effect, the Bang Bang Club was the most exclusive clique in photojournalism in South Africa during a time when South Africa was the place to be.

The Bang Bang Club is a memoir cum history of these years of struggle. Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva, the two surviving consistent members of the club, have produced a valuable, insightful, and highly readable work that at different times inspires admiration, repulsion, sadness, awe and disgust. Although a work of both men, the book takes the voice and

perspective of Marinovich, who won the Pulitzer Prize for one of his pictures from the “Hostel Wars” in Thokoza, a township 16 kilometers southeast of Johannesburg that was the scene of some of the worst violence in the period of transition. This is an effective approach, as it allows Marinovich to introduce the story with one relatively fluid narrative line and memoirist’s voice while at the same time providing him with a somewhat more omniscient approach than works of this sort can ordinarily have.

Marinovich and Silva do not shrink from some of the more disquieting elements of their profession either. Indeed, the most effective sections of the book deal with the self-doubt that the men have when taking pictures while all around them atrocities are being committed. These feelings are especially acute when the men are thrust into situations where they can actually aid victims, protect unarmed people, or save the lives of their putative subjects. And oftentimes the men do take these steps – almost always after getting their shots. But sometimes they do not. One example of this that provides the centerpiece for the book comes after the deeply troubled but remarkably talented Kevin Carter takes a picture of a little girl in the Sudan (although the book’s center is the South African struggle, like all freelancers and especially war photographers, the Bang Bang Club sometimes found themselves in other parts of Africa and even in Bosnia and elsewhere). The girl is starving, curled up in the fetal position. In the picture, seemingly stalking the starving girl, is a vulture. The picture is stunning in its composition, and garnered Carter the Pulitzer Prize, the first for photography in the history of the *New York Times*. But almost immediately the question arose: what happened to the little girl? Did she live? And perhaps most important, what did Carter do to help her? This answer would haunt Kevin Carter for the remainder of his life. The little girl was no more than one hundred meters from a newly established relief station, yet Carter did not carry her to assure that she would get food. He would later promise people that she survived – that he had scared off the vulture, and that the aid station was close and she would have been fine. But why did he not just carry her there?

Not surprisingly, Marinovich and Silva do not answer beyond a shadow of doubt the question of the photographer’s role in the events that they depict. On numerous occasions this issue emerges, and each time the photographers respond differently, with duty to the job usually, but not always, coming first. This was part of their unwritten code. They were providing a service, often at great personal risk, and usually in such a way that inevitably made them enemies within the apartheid state and sometimes among the factions their photographs depicted. They were photographers first and foremost. Further, given what the group saw, it was almost impossible not to become calloused to atrocities around them to some degree, or at least to subvert everything to the job.

In the end, Kevin Carter ended up committing suicide, though not necessarily because of the uproar over his composition, which on the whole still garnered him great acclaim despite the implications that the picture raised. Instead, Carter was a tortured soul with a drug addiction and personal life he could not overcome. Marinovich and Silva depict Carter’s descent sensitively but unflinchingly.

Carter was not the first of the Bang Bang Club to die, however. That (dubious?) distinction fell to Ken Oosterbroek, the oldest member of the group, and the one who, early on, had the most success of the group. Competitive, handsome, tall, and imposing, Oosterbroek was the

mentor of the other three, most of all to Kevin Carter. On 18 April, 1994, a particularly intense fighting had broken out in Thokoza, and the newly formed but ill-conceived National Peacekeeping Force (NPF) was on the scene to try to restore order. Instead, the presence and actions of the NPF exacerbated things. In the midst of heavy crossfire, Oosterbroek and Marinovich both took gunshots. Oosterbroek died as a result of his injuries. Marinovich did not fully recover for more than a year and was unable to cover the South African election just days after the shootings.

These shootings, and Oosterbroek's death, are in many ways the heart and soul of this arresting book. In one of the most poignant details, we see how Joao Silva snaps pictures of his slain friend while others are carrying him off to find help. Silva, like the others, loved and admired his friend and he knew that Oosterbroek would have expected nothing less. Ambivalence settles over this event: Had Silva done the right thing? And again, what is the photographer's role in such a situation?

This is a moving book about an important time in South African history one that scholars are still just beginning to understand. Marinovich and Silva are not scholars and they do not attempt to present a scholarly work in the *Bang Bang Club* (which is in the process of being made into a motion picture). Yet this book is one that any student of Africa and especially South Africa, journalism, and photography will want to read. It is also a book that has received, and should continue to receive, wide popular readership. It is written in a straightforward, lucid, sometimes vivid prose. It evokes a range of emotions. Not surprisingly, it contains three sections of pictures that show both the work of the Bang Bang Club, as well as the club members in action. The two Pulitzer Prize photographs, Carter's in the Sudan and Marinovich's from the Hostel wars are shown, as are many others that won awards or acclaim. One wishes that there had been more of these pictures, but this is a desire born of admiration and interest, rather than a quibble or complaint.

This is a wonderful book. Hopefully, if Hollywood doesn't twist it up, it will make great a movie, although it is hard to see how Hollywood effects can add to the crisp prose and monumental photographs that the real-life Bang Bang Club provide in their memoir.

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The London Missionary Society in Southern Africa, 1799-1999: Historical Essays in Celebration of the Bicentenary of the LMS in Southern Africa. John de Gruchy, ed. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000. 229 pp.

As the title suggested, *The London Missionary Society in Southern Africa, 1799-1999: Historical Essays in Celebration of the Bicentenary of the LMS in Southern Africa* is a historical account of the Christian mission work of the London Missionary Society (LMS) in southern Africa for the past two hundred years (1799-1999). It is a recollection, reflection, and review of the lives of both

church ministries and political activities around several LMS missionaries whose mission fields included colonial centers of Cape Town, Grahamstown, Natal, and eastern Cape frontier.

John de Gruchy, the editor, is professor of Christian Studies and Director of Religion and Social Change in the University of Cape Town. In the introductory chapter, *Remembering a legacy*, he characterizes the purpose of this book as follows: “to reconstruct the LMS story as truthfully as possible... to give the reader a useful guide to the way in which the story of the LMS has been told and evaluated.” (4) This is exactly what this book is about.

In chapter two, *Looking back: 170 years of historical writing on the LMS in South Africa*, Christopher Saunders launches a broad chronological approach of interpreting both earlier literature and recent scholarship on the LMS in southern Africa. Then he concludes that some areas still need further research, for instance, less known LMS missionaries and less known missions stations.

In the next chapter, *The alleged political conservatism of Robert Moffat*, Steve de Gruchy agrees with the appraisal of Robert Moffat’s son on his father. Both a missionary and a government official, John Moffat said that political intervention on behalf of the natives had mostly ended in failure, but this frustration was not experienced by his father. (35)

The title of chapter four is *David Livingstone: the man behind the mask* in which Andrew Ross investigates the alleged incompetence of Livingstone as a leader of expeditions and discovers the fact that Livingstone was the second generation of a Gaelic family that immigrated to Scotland. Consequently, he suggests that further research into the family background and theological influences of Livingstone may bring new insights into Livingstone’s faith and life as a missionary.

In chapter five, *Cultivation, Christianity and colonialism: towards a new African genesis*, John L. Camaroff and Jean Comaroff writes about the mission garden as the master symbol of civilization and Britishness. Transformation of the land use means food production, an exemplary use of space, and also an icon of colonial evangelism. (63)

In the next chapter, *Jane and John Philip: partnership, usefulness & sexuality in the service of God*, Natasha Erlank examines the personal lives and roles of Jane and John Philip as a team utilizing gender analysis of history. Therefore, this essay suggests that the private sphere has impact on the public arena.

In chapter seven, *‘Working at the heart’: the London Missionary Society in the Cape Town, 1819-1844*, Helen Ludlow concludes that there were two distinct accomplishments by the LMS in Cape Town. First, it was the establishment of the Union Chapel, as an urban church for white worshipping settlers. Second, the mission work of LMS among ex-slaves and their children through the provision of educational opportunities in missions schools.

In the following chapter, *Congregations, Missionaries and Grahamstown Schism of 1842-3*, Robert Ross recounts the conflicts between the Rev. John Locke, the senior pastor and Nicholas Smit, a native South African, and the congregation of the Union Chapel. These conflicts reveal two relating issues: the relationship of the LMS missionary and the local congregation in terms of authority and the quest for self-expression and self-determination in the colored congregations.

In chapter nine, *Whose gospel? Conflict in the LMS in the early 1940s*, Elizabeth Elbourne examines the relationships of missionaries within the LMS and the LMS as a religious

institution with several African congregations in terms of church government, racial conflicts, and authority relations.

In chapter ten, *The standard of living question in nineteenth-century missions in KwaZulu-Natal*, Norman Etherington looks into the issues of inter-racial marriages between the missionaries and with native women, the issues of income inequality among the missionaries from different mission societies, and between the missionaries and the native assistants.

In the final chapter, *American missionaries and the making of African church in colonial Natal*, Les Switzer researches into the American Zulu Mission at various levels with concerns of white male domination, racial inequality, and independence, within white missionary circles, between white missionaries and African Christians, and within the African Christian community.

This book is recommended to those who are interested in learning more about mission studies in southern Africa. Although it does not claim to be a complete historical account of all the LMS missionaries and their activities in southern Africa, it has surely retold some significant stories of LMS mission-related and/or other activities for engaging discussions and interpretations. During this process of historical inquiry, certain themes are clarified and conceptualized, for example, distinct theologies of mission held by different missionaries, the Africanization of Christianity, and power struggles in terms of racism, classism, sexism, and local church autonomy.

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Proclaiming Political Pluralism: Churches and Political Transitions in Africa. Isaac Phiri. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 169 pp.

Proclaiming Political Pluralism: Churches and Political Transitions in Africa is one of the titles in the series of Religion in the Age of Transformation of Praeger Publishers. Isaac Phiri, the author, is the director of international training for Cook Communications and adjunct professor of social science at Regis University in Colorado.

The titles of the five chapters in the book are as follows: 1. Churches and the African Political Arena; 2. Churches and Political Transitions in Zambia; 3. Churches and Political Transitions in Zimbabwe; 4. Churches and Changes in South Africa; and 5. Proclaiming Politics of Peace and Love: A New Role for Churches in Pluralist Africa.

In the first chapter, Phiri reveals the purpose of this book as an exploration of the reasons and processes that the churches played in African transitions to plural politics in the 1990s. This book is significant in three distinct ways. First, it addresses the importance of Christian churches in African politics. Second, it provides a broad comparative perspective and analysis. Third, it evaluates the role of churches as an integral part of the larger society. Based on the framework of theoretical analysis on Cameroon researched by Jean Francois Bayart, Phiri develops three models of church-state relations: collaborative, complementary, and confrontational in three African countries, namely, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

However, he qualifies that in reality they are not mutually exclusive because they may exist simultaneously at different levels or in different segments of the collective Christian community at various points of time.

In chapter two, Phiri first established the historical importance of Christianity in Zambia with the fact that seventy-five percent of the country's ten million people are Christian. In the postcolonial era, Kenneth Kaunda's government maintained relative benevolence, therefore, defusing direct conflict with churches. When a wave of democracy was sweeping across Africa, Kaunda, who first resisted change, was willing to subject himself to the electoral process. When the state is more responsive to the demands of civil society, conflict with the churches is less likely to occur. Therefore, the church-state relation in Zambia is an example of the collaborative model.

The third chapter examines church-state relations in terms of state repression of political opposition in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) during the four following epochs: 1. The colonial period (1890-1965); 2. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence years (1965-1977); 3. The Muzorewa years (1977-1980); and 4. The Mugabe years (1980-1995). The masses expect the churches and church leaders to assume political roles as a substitutionary function. As soon as civil society is realized, church leaders who stay in the political arena and assume partisan positions lose their legitimacy. Therefore, church leaders have only transitory role in politics. Therefore, church-state relations in Zimbabwe is interpreted as complimentary.

In chapter four, the church-state relation in South Africa is regarded as confrontational because reaction against the repression of civil society is the primary explanation for the involvement of churches in political activities. Bishop Desmond Tutu and other black clergies in the South African Council of Churches (SACC) became the main opposition force to the state under the repressive system of apartheid.

In the final chapter, Phiri proposes a unique role for churches to play in Africa in the pluralist era. His suggestion is that churches should remain active and influence Africa's plural politics with peace and love through the press, radio, television, public rhetoric, peace education, peace and reconciliation conference, relief and development aid, and prayer.

This book affirms the political contribution of the Christian church as an important factor in terms of participatory stabilization and/or activism in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Phiri's idealism of promoting peace and love through the churches in Africa should be applauded. A bibliography with more than two hundred and twenty entries of books and articles following the five chapters is extensive. This will be a great resource for all who are interested in further studies in church-state relations in Africa in general and in the countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa in particular.

Alan L. Chan
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Understanding African Philosophy: A Cross Cultural Approach to Classical and Contemporary Issues. Richard Bell. New York: Routledge, 2002. 189 pp.

Understanding African Philosophy reflects on the pain and pleasure of understanding an “other culture”. In this effort, we see strands of history; anthropology, traditional sociology, literature and governance weaved together on a solid platform of philosophy. It is a reflective endeavor, which focuses on the problematic and the not-so-problematic aspects of African thought.

Using a contention-conclusion style, Bell presents key positions, arguments, authorities and temperaments concerning various issues in African philosophy. At the end of each issue, Bell draws his own conclusion. Consistently throughout the book, all contentions and conclusions point at one direction: understanding. Clearly, the entire publication is driven by the philosophy of understanding with an African slant.

With a Wittgenstenian instrument and phenomenological methodology, Bell argues that the African milieu must be seen as it is. He therefore asserts the need for an understanding of the African philosophical environment using five “reminder” parameters of aesthetics, universality, conversation, cross-culturalism and historical experientialism. According to Bell, African philosophy, which has a history, remains a subject of major modern concern for philosophers all over the world because it is an enterprise with untapped potentials and a plural content requiring attention, study and analysis, which cannot be left for African philosophers alone.

The first chapter deals with the socio-epistemological problems encountered by an outsider, who sets out to comprehend another culture. The chapter takes the position that seeing something as it is is the backbone of philosophy. All analyses and arguments for the understanding of another culture sit on this position. It is on that premise that Bell raises the issue of relativist and indeterminate nature of understanding itself, implying that understanding is a basic necessity of existence. Bell also examines Peter Winch’s postulation of ‘being in tune with others’ and uses it to debunk the argument that only Africans should write about African philosophy. He therefore calls for all to pay attention to others – to open ourselves and accommodate the categories in other things, which we seek to understand. In relation to that, Bell contends that after a thorough understanding of the nature of understanding itself, what must follow (in an attempt to understand another culture), is an aesthetic evaluation and acceptance of the peoples’ metaphysical thinking and the logic of their language. Therefore, in understanding African culture, an outsider must know the type of questions the people ask and the sort of answers they provide for such questions. It is only by this method that we can open up the ‘other culture’.

Chapter two examines the disputation between the old and younger generations of African philosophers. It argues that this disagreement is unnecessary because both generations draw from the same source, at least partly. Representing the older generation, ethnophilosophers (Placide Tempels and others) are presented as pluralistic and universal in their enterprise and lacking in reference to an African literary background. But Bell says that ethnophilosophy (like sage philosophy) is relevant in contemporary African philosophy because it provides written account of a hitherto oral tradition, thereby creating an identity pattern in African philosophy. On the other hand, Bell tells us that the younger generation of African philosophers are mainly

concerned with scientific criticism and surgical thinking – a temperament rooted in western tradition in philosophy. However, Bell merges all the generational characters in African philosophy with one word: dialogue. Whether old or new, Bell posits, African philosophers have a “voice” and all are in one conversation or the other. That is one thing that makes African philosophy universal without the generational bar.

Chapter three dissects African political philosophy, starting off with the concept of negritude. It exposes the role of the concept in creating and motivating the ideas of ‘African Humanism’ and ‘African Socialism’ especially during the period of colonial struggles. With recourse to history, this chapter explains the philosophical tendencies of Leopold Senghor and Kwame Nkrumah and presents them as the leading light in the assertion of African-ness. Bell’s presentation of post-colonial African thought shows a turning point in African political philosophy where the past is jettisoned and a new future sought to be carved out by a crop of philosophers. Their radical position views the colonial experience with contempt and therefore seeks to obliterate it altogether. However, Bell says that the African colonial experience speaks for itself whether we articulate it or not: “The post-colonial African reality is speaking, writing and artistically expressing a philosophy out of its encounters with European modernity. It is also speaking out its poverty, suffering, and affliction, and from its own rich heritage of humanistic dignity”.

In a medley, chapters four and five present and analyze the contributions of African philosophy to universal moral issues, the various ethical arguments in the African context and the significance of such arguments. In this endeavor, moral concepts such as justice, rights, truth, self respect, reconciliation, responsibility, etc are examined. Also, African values such as generosity, compassion, reciprocity, mutual sympathy, cooperation, solidarity, confession, and communal punishment are explained as powerful instruments in African thinking. In spite of all these, Bell noted that certain questions couldn’t be left unanswered. These are questions concerning the reality of poverty, disagreements, and afflictions. Bell says that the combination of these problems and the existence of African ethical values make the continent quite distinct and experientially difficult to comprehend. Once again, he calls for a two-way understanding of this fact by non-Africans who should feel the pulse and help heal the wound of the African condition.

Chapter six deals with the role played by oral narratives in African philosophy especially in ‘interface’ with western thinking. With reference to the village life, Bell says that African art, literature, music, dance, mode of governance (‘African democracy’) and philosophy take their roots in oral proverbs and stories about forebears. African oral narratives should not surprise any non-African because they stand for the engaging thoughts of the people while symbolizing the instrument of consultation, participation and reciprocation in traditional relationships.

Bell concludes that the African oral tradition, system of governance, values and experience have consummate philosophical significance for the human race and therefore, cannot be ignored.

No doubt, Richard Bell is quite contemporary in this book. In doing so however, he avoided some essential elements in the foundation of African philosophy: African myths and religions. Myths and religions are in the heart of the African; and they actually provided the background for ethnophilosophy, which Bell referred to in the first chapter of his book. For this

reason, it would be useful to read alongside Bells' book, Newell Booth's *African Religions: A Symposium*, and *African Philosophy* by E. A. Ruch and K. C. Anyanwu. Also, Bell raises new questions in African philosophy: whether understanding itself can be perfectly understood, whether seeing something as it is, is truly the backbone of philosophy, whether it is possible to transfer a cultural experience from an insider to an outsider without losing something, whether a non-African can be as well-positioned as the African in understanding and presenting the problems of African philosophy.

Understanding African Philosophy is a fluid, scholarly work with postmodern appeal to young researchers in African philosophy. It is one philosopher's clarion call for an understanding of a philosophy outside his own state of affairs. The appreciations for Bell's effort will linger for a long time.

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Media and Resistance Politics in Namibia: The Alternative Press in Namibia, 1960-1990.
Heuva, William. Basel, Switzerland: Schlettwein Publishing, 2001. 166 pp.

William Heuva's 2001 publication is part of The Basel Namibia Studies Series launched in 1997 by Schlettwein publishing. The objective of the series is "to make research results on Namibia accessible and known to a new generation of Namibian readers in particular and to the international research community in general." (p.ix). Heuva, a journalist by profession, presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the advent and development of the alternative press in Namibia. This historical extrapolation of the alternative press in Namibia focuses on the objectives, institutional character, economics, and ideology of the alternative press in Namibia prior to the attainment of political independence from the forces of imperialism and colonialism. The Namibian alternative press was a fragmented group as it addressed different issues affecting the colonized Namibians. This press was made up of early nationalist, community, labor, church, and student press.

The study provides an account of the emergence and use of the alternative means of mass communication by the Namibian people against the colonizers. The study also analyzed the major alternative press focusing on aims and objectives, content, language and messages transmitted and the context under which they emerged.

The first of four sections of the book explores the historical emergence, development, and aims of the alternative press as well as the roles of the intellectuals in establishing the alternative press. The author focuses on the nationalist, church, community and the progressive-independent press, explaining the major issues that affected the targeted groups. The nationalist press was a brainchild of the intellectuals emerging from the colonized bloc. *The South West News* was the dominant paper in this category and was used to champion the emerging Black Nationalism in Namibia. The introduction of liberation theology transformed

the church press as it began to challenge the dominant apartheid ideology. The political theology that emerged in the church press was opposed to the conservative values of the apartheid system. The community press communicated grassroots issues, especially community struggles against the apartheid system. The progressive-independent press voiced the aspirations of the colonized people at a national level. Even though the alternative press was fragmented, they managed to provide a voice against the entrenched apartheid system.

The second section dwells on the institutional character of the alternative press and examines the key themes of ownership, control and structure, journalistic practice and target audience and news source. The alternative press was owned and controlled by forces oppositional to the hegemonic block of the state. This created a leeway for the alternative press to unabashedly develop and advance the anti-apartheid discourse. The libertarian and democratic-participant theoretical perspectives characterized the alternative press. There was lack of clear-cut bureaucratic structure at most of these alternative presses and this entailed a collective responsibility among activists in the production and distribution of the press. The media activists in the alternative press practiced 'advocacy journalism': fair and balanced news presentation was not their main driving force due to their role in the struggle against apartheid system. In Heuva's words, these media activists were "functionaries of their people's hegemonic struggle... (hence) could not be neutral, impartial and objective in the process" (80). The news sources of most of these publications were leaders of the progressive movements and individual activists within these movements. Their targeted audience was a broader spectrum of the colonized people of Namibia.

The third and fourth sections focus on the political economy and the content and language of the private press respectively. Funding and distribution (and how they affected the content and distribution of the alternative press) were the major themes explored. While the mainstream press was profit-oriented and catered for the dominant elites, the alternative press was essentially not for profit and provided a platform to challenge the oppressive apartheid system. Financing of the alternative press was donor-centered since the inherent contents were not politically correct and thus did not attract advertising: what was omitted in the mainstream press found coverage in the alternative press.

Although Heuva deals with complex material regarding the alternative press as a site for resistance against the oppressive apartheid, his writing is concise and logical. His main thesis that the anti-apartheid presses were alternative in nature to the mainstream colonial press is well developed and well supported. The purpose of these alternative publications was to provide a counter narrative to the grand propaganda provided by the elites to justify the apartheid system. Thus the targeted oppositional readership was provided with alternative symbols and means of receiving and imparting information about the socio-cultural, economic and political reality under apartheid. This was from the prism of the oppressed, hence it was racially and class centered.

The study utilizes a theoretical framework that draws from critical cultural studies, the Latin American left press and the South African alternative press of the 1980s. What is common among these three approaches is that they "address the creation of symbols of resistance and alternative means of communication by dominated groups in society, in their struggle against the dominant bloc." (8). This framework provides us with tools to analyze the production and

circulation of the alternative messages that serve to counteract the status quo. The major thrust of this framework, as espoused by John Fiske, is that meaning is essentially contested and provides a site for struggle between the dominant bloc and the marginalized group in the society. The dominant group tries to 'naturalize' the meanings that advance their interests while the marginalized resist them.

The author employs indepth interview and document analysis for his data collection. The in-depth interviews were conducted with Namibian elites (intellectuals, editors and journalists) who worked for the alternative press. The document reviews supplemented the in-depth interviews in providing the history and context surrounding the emergence of the alternative press. Secondary materials in the form of books were utilized to support the interviews and documents reviewed. The author also used qualitative content analysis of the alternative press to assess the type of news articles and content that dominated these papers. Thus, the author had at his disposal a substantial array of data gathering techniques.

Heuva's study serves to successfully provide a comprehensive historical and analytical account of the advent and development of the alternative press in Namibia. His work is-and will be-of tremendous value to scholars and students of many disciplines such as media, cultural studies, history and anyone interested in the theoretical perspectives of alternative press as well as its origins, structure, role, and language in Namibia. Heuva's simple but effective language makes the book even more interesting to read.

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Workers, War and the Origins of Apartheid: Labour and Politics in South Africa, 1939-48. Peter Alexander. Ohio University Press, 2000. 214 pp.

In his book, *Workers, War and the Origins of Apartheid*, Peter Alexander illustrates the connection between race, organized labor and politics in South Africa. He explains how capitalism produced competition between workers, and thereby encouraged racial division, but at the same time forced workers to cooperate with each other. This work masterfully presents an alternative explanation of the link among labor, race, the political economy of South Africa, and the origins of apartheid.

The author begins by tracing the pre-war labor conditions, which established the basis of racial division of workers and excluded black workers from certain skills and positions. The racial division of the working class was reflected in, and probably boosted by, early industrial conflicts in 1913, 1914, and 1922. The war, however, and its impact on the economic growth, spurred the development of a new working class and heightened industrial conflict. The trust of Alexander's argument is that structural and demographic changes in wage labor gave rise to a high level of wartime industrial militancy characterized by strike actions. At the same time, the nature of trade union movement was shaped by the wartime economic growth, increase in membership and interracial cooperation. While fundamental changes occurred in the scale and

demographics of trade unions, the low level of mechanization, Alexander suggests imposed limits on the extent to which racism was undermined. The relationship between labor and industry was also shaped by the rift between factory owners—some who having introduced modern machinery wanted a “settled African population,” and others who operated with “large amounts of migrant labor” (p. 3). The agricultural sector was impacted as massive growth in the urban workforce ripped white farmers of adequate labor. These developments led to two important events: Many white farmers disillusioned with General Smut’s economic, policy switched their support to the National Party. In response to the emergence of a strong multiracial union movement in this period, General Smut suppressed African unions and attacked all workers, thereby alienating part of his white constituency.

Alexander traces the attempt by the Smuts government to manage the opposing forces (those that either favored neutrality or supported Germany and those who supported the war on the side of the British) that emerged in his government as a result of the war. In response to the high level of opposition to the war, Smuts collaborated with pro-war parties including labor unions, but he also used coercion, including internment of individuals regarded as “subversive” and suppression of militant strikes. The author persuasively questions the overwhelming view that the World War II was responsible for the rapid mechanization that provided employment for large numbers of blacks and semi-skilled workers and threatened white workers, forcing many to vote for the National Party in the 1948 elections. In contrast to the mechanization thesis, Alexander argues that the uneven character of capital formation and relatively slow rate of mechanization characterized the period—because growth in the sector was achieved through greater use of wage labor. He provides examples of the attempts, which were not very successful in checking labor militancy, made by the government to ameliorate the condition of poor workers.

Alexander proceeds with an analysis of the upsurge of labor militancy in 1942, focusing particularly upon interracial cooperation between African workers and others in Johannesburg and Durban; and the significant black challenge to white authority since the 1920s. The author shows that there was far more strike action during World War II than has been officially acknowledged. A new working class, sometimes organized into multiracial unions, won improved wages and softened racial prejudice among white workers. He argues that labor militancy in this period provoked the promulgation of War Measure 145, which, while providing avenue for some form of negotiation for black workers, inevitably made them subject to the “whims of officialdom (p. 53-54).

The book addresses the racial and industrial policy of Smuts, particularly the dilemma his government faced on whether to recognize African trade unions. Both blacks and the mining interest had different ideas of how to proceed, but Smuts’ recognition of African workers and their designation as “employees” marked steps through which Alexander analyzed the attitude of labor and capital in relation to African demands. He argues that the position of white labor in this question was complex, because neither white labor nor white capital was homogenous since both were subject to contradictory pressure, accounting for the greater sympathy which white labor showed for African workers. He argues that labor militancy continued as a result of the imposition of War Measure 145, resulting in more strikes than the previous year. Continuing African militancy, the effects of a strike by Durban engineers on South Africa’s war

effort, and the perception that the war had turned in favor of the allied forces led to a high level of industrial actions, weakened the case against strikes and hardened the attitude of employers.

Workers' actions in this period were defined not only by both race and gender. He argues that African union victories led to increases in membership, but membership could not be sustained as a result of unsuccessful strike actions and the difficulty of securing higher wages, causing the movement to enter into a decline. Nevertheless, the war years, Alexander argues, witnessed increases in racial toleration and equity and the challenge to white supremacy. The author traces the emergence of post war economic and social problems, a restless African workforce and the treatment of militant trade unionism on South Africa's economy. The government's response to mounting social and economic issues created further discontent that culminated in the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948. The institutionalization of apartheid, he argues, was a tragic defeat for all workers, white as well as black, and ended multiracial unionism.

Contradicting earlier accounts, Alexander concludes that wartime mechanization and black advancement into semi-skilled positions were limited and cannot explain subsequent support for apartheid. In his view, underdevelopment was a precondition both for apartheid's victory and for its initial success; at the same time it led to modernization and growth of a stronger, more homogenous proletariat which brought about its demise. Unlike previous studies of the labor movement in South Africa, this book attempts to treat labor in its totality, emphasizing the cooperation and interracial mixing that existed between different unions and centralized the importance of strikes. With extensive use of secondary and oral sources, this book is a significant revision of South African labor history and should be useful to those interested in labor and economic development in South Africa during and after the World War II.

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Money Struggles and City Life: Devaluation in Ibadan and Other Urban Centers in Southern Nigeria, 1986-1996. Jane Guyer, LaRay Denzer and Adigun Agbaje (eds.). Portsmouth NH: Heineman, 2002. 269 pp.

In the past decade, popular life in Africa has been explored in a number of monographs and edited volumes on African popular politics, culture and literature. In this book, editors and contributors further contribute to the understanding of everyday life in Africa by investigating popular economic life. Focusing on the city of Ibadan in particular and on southern Nigeria in general, the book's main aim is to contribute to an archive of knowledge on the popular economy during the years of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) from 1986 to 1996. Questioning standard interpretations of unequivocal economic decline and chaos during this period, the book also endeavors to be of comparative interest to non-Nigerian scholars and to contribute to the debate of Nigerian scholars cut off from western theorizing during the years of structural adjustment.

The book is divided into four parts, each of which includes at least two case studies. The first two parts concentrate on the popular economy of Ibadan and its hinterland. The four contributions of the first part focus on the city as a regional center of politics, administration and trade. In an excellent analysis of power politics in Ibadan, Agbaje investigates the complex relationship between local political networks and the city's inability to attract sustainable economic patronage by the federal government. Okafor discusses the negative impact of neoliberal local government reforms on public welfare, and Arimah convincingly argues that both the quality and quantity of housing available in the city has declined due to the currency devaluation associated with SAP. Isamah and Okunola's chapter describes the increase of child breadwinners throughout the city.

The second part of the book examines the way in which different occupational groups in and near Ibadan have dealt with the changes brought about by SAP. Among others, Denzer's study of the garment industry and Ikporukpo's investigation of the motor mechanic trade point towards an increase in the use of imported used goods due to increasing import prices. While this phenomenon has been associated with a relative decline of these industries, Guyer convincingly suggests that a commercialization of local food production in the Ibadan hinterland has led to more recycling of domestic used tractors and a consequent growth of mechanized farming. Sridhar et al. argue that the increased need for domestic recycling has also led to the establishment of local reprocessing industries. Meanwhile, other professions were affected in different ways: Adesina describes how the decline of the formal banking system gave rise to an expansion of the underground foreign exchange market, while Obukhova outlines increasing professionalism and emergent institutionalization among newspaper vendors in the informal economy.

The final two parts of the book deal with culture and international links and examine popular views on wealth and economies of international resources respectively. In a well-researched chapter on money-magic and ritual killing, Enwerem links the social and political economy in Nigeria to magical beliefs and ambivalence about wealth and social difference. Examining the artistically uncompromising and realistic depiction of poverty in contemporary Nigerian videos, Haynes suggests that it is linked to an increasing fear of economic destitution. Finally, Okonkwo explains the financial rationale for increased investment by Igbo mirants in houses in their home villages, and Klein investigates the bitter private recriminations that can be associated with local artists' access to the international market in artistic and cultural production. Klein's chapter also illustrates the potential ethical limits of small-scale studies of popular life: while it is very successful in giving an intimate description of artists' disputes over overseas contacts and money, its availability to the community of Erin-Osun will undoubtedly further complicate personal relationships.

Overall, the book gives an impressive insight into how people in different walks of life have continued to make a living and contribute to the growth and change of different economic sectors during a period when there was little in the way of a consciously formulated economic policy in Nigeria and macroeconomic indicators were either not available or inconclusive. Many chapters beautifully illustrate the adaptability and inventiveness of local responses to the effects of globalization and the increasing privatization of state resources by the military.

The inclusion of a number of maps and illustrations in addition to the often very useful tables would have improved the book's readability further, but the number of good to excellent chapters makes this book a valuable contribution to the understanding of popular economic life in Africa. Apart from those directly interested in southern Nigeria and its popular economy, individual chapters will certainly appeal to those interested in the postcolonial politics, 'informal sector' and 'development' studies, as well as to many economic and political sociologists of Africa.

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The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Douglas Johnson, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press 2003. 234 pp.

Drawing on his own research as one of the foremost historians on the Sudan, as well as first-hand experience working in the southern Sudan, Douglas Johnson has written a concise, accessible and authoritative guide to the civil wars that have plagued the country's modern history. First begun as a 1992 report commissioned for relief personnel engaged in the Sudan, Johnson has expanded and updated the work to include the events of the past decade in order to remedy "the institutional amnesia afflicting diplomats, journalists, and development, relief and human rights workers: anyone who has dipped into the current of the war with only a vague apprehension of its source".

Organized around a set of "historical factors" that he places at the root of Sudan's civil wars, the book provides an excellent comparative framework for analyzing one of the world's most intractable insurgencies. Foremost among the causes of the country's recurring wars is a durable political economy that sets the centralizing power of expansionist states against peripheral regions. Manifested in the transcendent practices of slave and cattle raiding and land displacement, Sudanic states have, since the 18th century, exploited and alienated peoples along the periphery, "creating groups of peoples with a lastingly ambiguous status in relation to the state". In other words, the history of contemporary conflicts predate colonial interventions and Britain's decision to grant independence to a united Sudan before inequalities between North and South – inequalities exacerbated by Britain's "Southern Policy" for administering the South – could be remedied. That the colonial period is so often the starting point for analyses of the country's war is indicative of what Johnson terms our historical "amnesia" in regards to the Sudan.

A theme that emerges later in the book, and is intrinsically related to exploitative modes of state consolidation, is the persistence of fragmentation among and between communities in both the South and North. Among the founding principles of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983 was the need to prevent the sorts of military factionalism that beset southern forces in the first civil war (1955/61-72). Johnson is at his best in discussing the

internecine SPLA split in 1991 and the still unresolved Nuer civil war. He also traces the fracturing of the “Northern Muslim consensus” as the North-South war has expanded into regions of the North – Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Red Sea – over the past decade as a result of Khartoum’s meddling in neighboring conflicts, and the government’s pursuit of a radical, exclusionary policy of Islamization at home and abroad. Also noteworthy given current preoccupations with so-called “resource wars” is Johnson’s analysis of the relationship between war economies and relief/development policy. He traces how “having captured the relief effort, Khartoum will continue to work for the subjugation of Southern labour and Southern resources”. Those contemplating peace as part of the Machakos peace process currently underway in Kenya should contemplate the effect of peace on the persistent pattern of the North’s commercial exploitation of the South.

It is clear that the author’s sympathies lie with southern resistance to Khartoum. In this respect, however, the book provides a useful counter to what Johnson correctly identifies as the predominant focus on the North in the historiography of the Sudan. *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars* is an immensely important contribution to the literature. It should be read by students of conflict, on the continent and elsewhere, as well as all those associated with relief, development and peacemaking in the Sudan.

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The African Stakes of the Congo War. John F. Clark (Ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 249 pp.

‘The African Stakes of the Congo War’ is an edited volume based on papers presented at a conference on ‘Conflict and Peace-Making in the Great Lakes Region’ held in the Ugandan capital, Entebbe in July 2000. The chapters have, however, been revised and updated to take recent developments in the Great Lakes conflict into account. Consequently, both the first (1996-1997) as well as the second (1998-) Congo war are covered.

The book is divided into thirteen chapters written by a mix of highly acclaimed Africanists along with a few junior but promising scholars. The reader is provided with an interesting account of the reasons behind the involvement of African states in what has been termed ‘African World War I’. Former Zaire (or what is today called the Democratic Republic of Congo) has indeed become the battlefield of a continental war. No less than a dozen African countries have at one point or another been military engaged in the war. An equally impressive number of Congolese and foreign rebel movements and armed factions of various kinds are adding confusion to an already extremely complex situation.

These armed forces and movements are not only combating each other but also targeting civilian populations, plundering the resources of the country and bringing destruction to what is left of the state’s social services. All this is inflicted to such an extent that one has termed the conflict ‘the most deadly war ever documented in Africa or anywhere in the world during the

past half-century.¹ And yet, with very few exceptions, events in the Congo hardly ever make the news. Not only is the conflict fought far from what is considered the centre of the political world, it is perhaps too complex a situation for the media to easily cover.

However, the last argument is no longer valid since the publication of 'The African Stakes of the Congo War'. The authors have, however, succeeded in making this complex history very accessible by explaining the motives of most African countries in the conflict, be it the major belligerent parties (Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda) or the principal driving forces behind peace initiatives (South Africa) as well as the rebel groups involved. The chapters are well documented and provide a number of keys to understanding and reading the events, which gives the reader plenty of background material.

The analysis of the motives of the various stakeholders is further contextualised in two introductory chapters; one on the current academic debate over order and disorder in postcolonial Africa and the other on the origins of the Congo War. Finally we are presented with three broadly lateral chapters on the proliferation of arms, the economic impact of the war, and the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons. As such 'The African Stakes of the Congo War' forms a coherent whole based on a judicious selection of the warring factions' motives for intervening in the conflict. Although the aim of the editor is clearly to cover the *African* stakes in the war, in order to present an over all picture it would have been interesting to broaden the analysis beyond the African stakeholders alone. Western states that likewise have a stake in the D.R.C. (such as Belgium, France, the UK and the USA), have also manoeuvred to protect their interests in the wider region. Similarly, since it is often argued that the current (low to medium intensity) war in the Congo is dragging on because of the economic motives of the parties involved, it would have been useful to extend the analysis of the economic impact of the war to the corporate world as another stakeholder in the conflict.

This notwithstanding, the book is certain to be of use to a broad spectrum of readers concerned with the analysis of conflict in general, be they academics, diplomats or journalists. But it will be of particular interest to all those eager to learn more about this forgotten war. In light of recent attempts to end the conflict, one may hope that a publication like this will contribute to a more effective peace negotiation process. We must not forget that more than three million people have already died as a result of the war and that the complexity of the situation has for too long hindered its effective resolution.

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Notes:

1. International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey* (April 2003).

Africa Since 1935 (General History of Africa. Volume 8). Ali. A. Mazrui ed. California: University of California Press 1999. 1072 pp.

Persons familiar with UNESCO's History of Africa series would welcome this final volume, which deals with Africa from 1935 to the 1990s. The years under consideration cover a crucial period in world history, particularly Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935), World War Two, anticolonial struggles and independence.

It is commendable that the thirty chapters are divided into seven sections with appropriate themes. One noteworthy feature is that the publication does not attempt to glorify Africa but instead offers an objective and coherent history of its people, institutions, economic conditions and political systems. For instance, chapter 13, "Industrial development and urban growth, 1935-80", acknowledges the causes and existence of squatter settlements in such areas as Lagos, Nairobi, and Algiers.

The wealth of relevant tables, statistics, plates, photographs, charts and maps add luster to the study of Africa's recent past. Undoubtedly, the book's diversity of information will appeal to persons in a broad range of fields including agriculture, economics, sociology, history, politics and geography. This stems from a multifaceted approach and multidisciplinary method which is based on a variety of sources as evident in the comprehensive bibliography.

In the 21st century, with the encompassing globalization, certain chapters such as "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration" and "Nation-building and Changing Political Structures," will be extremely relevant for Africa in the future. There are some interesting topics such as that pertaining to the African diaspora. Joseph Harris in "Africa and its Diaspora Since 1935" must be lauded for mentioning the contributions of the African diaspora in Latin America and South America. Previous scholars have tended to overwhelmingly focus on the African diaspora, in the United States or Caribbean.

There was need for more information on the horrendous impact of AIDS on the African continent. Apart from a brief mention, this volume remained surprisingly silent on diseases and health. Such an omission is unforgivable and the editor should have sensed the gravity of the issue and included a chapter on AIDS and diseases facing Africans, which could have examined strategies to curb the spread of these diseases as well as addressing the humanitarian efforts of international organizations.

On a daily basis, the glaring challenges such as desertification, poverty, diseases, deforestation and lack of political unity threaten millions of Africans. Undoubtedly, Africa has to solve its problems and be prepared for the technological revolution and globalization. The creativity and resilience of the Africans are assets which will serve them well in coping with an uncertain future. This volume allows us to appreciate not only Africa's burdens but the North-South divide and the schism between developing and underdeveloping countries. Despite minor shortcomings, the final volume in the series on the history of Africa is a testimony that Africa has a proud tradition of intellectual, cultural and political skills and achievements.

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