

Trop De Soleil Tue L'amour Et En Attendant Le Vote Des Bêtes Sauvages: Deux Extremes, Un Bilan Des Transitions Démocratiques En Afrique

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“Au bout de la patience, il y a le ciel. La nuit dure longtemps, mais le jour finit par arriver.”

—Ahmadou Kourouma

“Ce n’est pas parce que l’on a rendu l’âme qu’on est vraiment mort. On entame au contraire un long périple au cours duquel on traverse une forêt ténébreuse, pour émerger dans une clairière ensoleillée.”

—Mongo Beti

Résumé : Analysant le pouvoir et ses modes d’exercice dans deux romans de Beti et de Kourouma, la présente communication révèle un champ politique atomisé et dont les particules évoluent en champ libre. Cette transfiguration consacre la rupture entre les deux romans et les autres écrits des mêmes auteurs en même temps qu’elle scelle un rapprochement “inattendu” entre deux écrivains qui n’ont jamais eu la réputation d’être proches. *Trop de soleil tue l’amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* apparaissent dès lors comme un tournant dans la fiction africaine où, depuis la fin du XX^e siècle, nombre d’écrivains ont entrepris de réviser la perception du champ politique à la lumière de la nouvelle donne géopolitique induite par la chute du mur de Berlin.

Abstract: This article examines the exercise of power in two novels by Beti and Kourouma highlighting a highly fragmented political landscape whose tiny components act independently. This transfiguration marks a break between both novels and other works by the same authors, thus establishing an “unexpected” similarity between two writers who have never been considered as ideologically close. By reviewing the African political scene in the light of the new geo-strategic order ushered in by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, these novels are a turning point in African fiction writing.

La critique africaniste présente volontiers Mongo Beti et Ahmadou Kourouma comme deux irréductibles adversaires idéologiques. En fait, tandis que le dernier fait partie de ceux qu’on nomme “modérés,” le premier est, depuis toujours, taxé de “paranoïaque” et “d’incorrigible révolutionnaire.” Ceci explique au moins en partie que les instances impériales de légitimation déroulent quasiment le tapis rouge à chaque sortie du “sage.” En une vingtaine d’années d’écriture qui se décline pour le moment en six romans et une pièce de théâtre, Ahmadou Kourouma aura engrangé une dizaine de prix littéraires dont le prestigieux Renaudot 2001 avec *Allah n’est pas obligé* (Seuil, 2000). Par contre, en plus d’un demi-siècle de “dissidence,” une douzaine de romans, 3 essais, un Dictionnaire de la négritude (L’Harmattan, 1999), une revue littéraire et culturelle, *Peuples noirs Peuples Africains*, et plus d’un millier d’articles de revues et de journaux, l’auteur de *La France contre l’Afrique*. Retour au Cameroun (*La Découverte*,

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1993) n'a généralement eu droit qu'aux foudres de l'establishment tant dans son pays d'origine, le Cameroun, que dans son pays d'adoption, la France.¹

Les titres aussi bien que la structure de *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et de *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* semblent opposer davantage ces deux écrivains francophones des plus lus d'Afrique.² L'intitulé du troisième roman d'Amadou Kourouma qui fait d'emblée allusion à la politique et à la fable avec "le vote des bêtes sauvages," inscrit la problématique du pouvoir au cœur même du roman, tandis que, l'avant-dernier roman du Camerounais décédé récemment, rappelle plus la littérature de gare que n'importe quel autre genre, en affichant "soleil" et "amour" dans son titre. La technique de l'énonciation de *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* en fait par ailleurs un roman policier tandis que *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* se révèle comme un "donsomana, une parole, un genre littéraire dont le but est de célébrer les gestes des héros chasseurs et de toutes sortes de héros" (Vote, 31). Comme le définit son créateur.

Cependant, une lecture croisée révèle que les deux textes constituent un bilan assez critique des transitions démocratiques en cours sur le continent noir depuis la fin des années 80. La présente communication analyse comment, en dépit de divergences notables, Mongo Beti et Ahmadou Kourouma construisent une nouvelle "communauté de destin" à la notion même de pouvoir et de ses modes d'exercice dans la fiction romanesque africaine, à travers *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages*.

Un aperçu de l'écriture littéraire africaine des dix dernières années révèle que les bouleversements survenus dans le monde à la fin des années 80 sont de plus en plus présents dans la société politique de la fiction. Le statut du chef d'Etat ou de parti politique, le fonctionnement des auxiliaires "naturels" du pouvoir que sont les partis politiques, l'armée et la police sont plus que jamais sujets d'une nouvelle analyse, au même titre que la nouvelle donne politique et géostratégique induite par la chute du mur de Berlin et l'intervention du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale. Pourtant, du point de vue de la gestion du nouvel ordre politique, *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* semblent s'inscrire dans la mouvance traditionnelle du roman africain. En effet, tout comme *Le Zéhéros* n'est pas n'importe qui (Présence Africaine, 1986) de Williams Sassine, *Le Pleurez-rire* d'Henri Lopes (Présence Africaine, 1982) ou *L'Anté-peuple* (Seuil, 1983) de Sony Labou Tansi, les deux romans de Mongo Beti et d'Ahmadou Kourouma donnent à voir un personnel politique agrégé autour d'un chef qui se veut charismatique et tout-puissant comme *Baba Toura de Perpétue et l'habitude du malheur* (Buchet-Chastel, 1974) de Mongo Beti, *Messi Koï de Le Cercle des tropiques* (Présence Africaine, 1972) d'Alioum Fantouré ou *Sékou du Zéhéros* n'est pas n'importe qui. Mieux, les membres du parti vouent ici comme là-bas, un culte "indéfectible" au chef à qui ils doivent tout.

De plus, du point de vue de la vision que les deux romans ont de l'Afrique et des Africains, *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* sont aussi désespérants et désenchantés que les autres textes des Mongo Beti et Ahmadou Kourouma et ceux d'autres écrivains africains des années 70 à nos jours.³ *Le Pleurer-rire*, *L'Anté-peuple*, *Sous le pouvoir des Blakoros* I *Traites* (NEA, 1980) d'Amadou Koné, *Sahel ! Sanglante sécheresse* (Présence Africaine, 1981) de Mandé Alpha Diarra, aussi bien que *Les Soleils des indépendances* (Seuil, 1976), *Monnè outrages et défis* (Seuil, 1990) d'Ahmadou Kourouma ou alors *Perpétue et l'habitude du malheur* (Buchet-Chastel, 1974), *Remember Ruben* (UGE, 1974) de Mongo Beti, peignent indifféremment des dictateurs sanguinaires qui, aux lendemains des indépendances des Etats africains, ont accaparé le pouvoir, transformé leur pays en goulags et leurs

concitoyens en bagnards sans recours. Quant à la notion de biens publics/biens privés, elle connaît, ici comme ailleurs, la même confusion. Koyaga le protagoniste d'Ahmadou Kourouma et le "dictateur-président" de Mongo Beti vident aussi vite les caisses de l'Etat en compagnie de leurs familles et clans, pour organiser des agapes et autres gaspillages que Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé de *Le Pleurez-rire*, Sékou de *Le Zéhéros* n'est pas n'importe qui, Djigui de Monnè, outrages et défis ou alors Baba Toura de *Perpétue* et l'habitude du malheur.

Cependant, à l'analyse, *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* s'émancipent assez nettement aussi bien des écrits précédents de Mongo Beti et d'Ahmadou Kourouma que des autres textes africains de la période de référence. La dissidence politique était jadis le fait des opposants vivant dans la clandestinité à l'intérieur même du pays comme dans *Perpétue* et l'habitude du malheur et *Remember Ruben* ou alors celui des exilés des bords de la Seine ou d'ailleurs, comme dans *Le Zéhéros* n'est pas n'importe qui. Ici, la contestation s'organise à visage découvert à l'intérieur même du pays, au grand désarroi des tenants du pouvoir et surtout de l'ex-parti unique qui, du coup, se trouve menacé d'effondrement.

La divergence d'avec les régimes opérant en situation de monopole politique d'avant les années 90 est plus marquée encore. On se souvient que dans des textes comme *Indésirables* (L'Harmattan, 1990) de Roger Kaboré Bila ou *Affamez-les, ils vous adoreront* (L'Harmattan, 1992) d'Antoine N. Ruti, elle est le fait d'étudiants et de scolaires "égarés." Déjà, le titre assez étonnant et un tantinet provocateur donne le ton ironique ou plutôt "sarcastique" à *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* comme le dit Ahmadou Kourouma lui-même. En annonçant une comédie historique et politique, il induit d'emblée une concurrence politique au moins implicite, mais non moins menaçante pour la survie même du régime. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui semble justifier la promesse du griot-conteur à Koyaga: "Si d'aventure les hommes refusent de voter pour vous, les animaux sortiront de la brousse, se muniront de bulletins et vous plébisciteront" (Vote, 358). En attendant, la vérité du moment, du point de vue même de la formulation de l'intitulé du roman, indique que le pouvoir n'est plus tout à fait ce que "le potentat au totem Chacal du désert" (Vote, 241) aurait souhaité. La perte effective de ce pouvoir est d'ailleurs à l'origine même de ce que le "sora" (griot de chasseurs) appelle lui-même "le récit purificateur" (Vote, 10), c'est - à-dire tout le récit.

A première vue, le personnage de Mongo Beti ne semble pas, quant à lui, en situation de perdre son pouvoir. Toutefois, si la dépossession redoutée est attestée chez Kourouma, la question que l'on doit bien se poser à propos du "héros" de *Trop de soleil tue l'amour*, est celle de savoir si le Président a jamais effectivement détenu ledit pouvoir. Ou alors : est-il seulement conscient de ce qu'il ne l'exerce pas du tout ? L'édition de poche du roman de Mongo Beti (Julliard/Pocket, 2001) semble d'ailleurs faire plus qu'allusion à un personnage plutôt jouisseur. La "une" de couverture représente un portrait de Nègre aux yeux protégés par des lunettes de soleil et, en arrière plan, un policier et des femmes de la même race, sur fonds de cocotiers qui suggèrent une plage de mer chaude dont raffolent les touristes. Pour couronner le tout, le tableau porte sous la forme d'une légende cet extrait plus que suggestif du roman: "Comme souvent, entre l'homme et la femme, la matinée avait été un moment de complicité délicieuse, ponctuée d'effleurements..." Dès lors, le Cameroun de Zamakwé dont il sera question dans le roman semble ainsi un pays dirigé par un chef d'Etat en vacances. Dans l'un des rares moments consacrés au personnage, le narrateur qui le nomme tantôt "le président fainéant" tantôt "le président dictateur" dit justement de lui que "son rêve secret est de se reposer tout le temps" (Soleil, 127).

Bien plus, à l'image de Koyaga, le Président n'est jamais sujet du discours dans l'univers en déliquescence sur lequel il est supposé régner. En conséquence, tout comme son alter ego, le protagoniste vit une sorte de mort symbolique (Ne dit-on pas que partir c'est mourir un peu ?). Non seulement il ne semble ainsi détenir aucun des paramètres qui définissent traditionnellement le pouvoir, mais surtout, il est à peine présent dans l'histoire du pays qu'il croit à ses pieds. Le lecteur sait tout simplement que le président est "un dictateur, un homme sans classe ni envergure" (Soleil, 105) qui trône à la tête d'un Etat exsangue dont il a livré les fabuleuses richesses à la mafia des multinationales, moyennant prébendes. Son manque d'envergure intellectuelle en fait un parfait guignol qui se croit responsable d'un pays dont les moindres rouages lui échappent absolument, à commencer par la gestion de son propre parti dont il est pourtant officiellement le président.

En fait, même pendant la campagne électorale, moments privilégiés où même les plus médiocres s'essayent à la rhétorique, "le dictateur-président" est privé de parole. Sékou ou Bwakamabé na Sakkadé n'ont d'ailleurs jamais eu besoin de ces occasions pour parler pendant des heures et sans interruption à "leur" peuple.⁴ C'est dire combien puissante est la symbolique de la parole dans la conquête et la conservation de tout pouvoir. En politique plus qu'ailleurs, la fonction de la parole est, comme dirait Roland Barthes, "non seulement de communiquer ou d'exprimer, mais d'imposer un au-delà du langage." (Barthes, 7) Ce mutisme imposé ressemble à un retour de bâton en ce sens que, l'une des armes du Président comme des autres dictateurs que charrie la littérature africaine depuis les années 70, est justement la suppression du droit à la parole. A cet effet d'ailleurs, un personnage de Jean-Marie Pinto Komlanvi ironise justement: "On a toujours le droit de dire ce que l'on veut en Afrique, à condition de ne pas se faire entendre."⁵

Il n'est sans doute pas exagéré de penser que les séjours répétés à l'étranger du personnage constituent une sorte de quête du dictateur pour une solution à cette véritable impotence dont il souffre. En tout cas, le narrateur s'explique mal que dans "un pays constamment en proie aux convulsions sociales, ethniques et politiques, sous-développé de surcroît, le chef de l'Etat s'octroie six grandes semaines de villégiatures à l'étranger." (Soleil, 11) Koyaga connaît une situation similaire à celle du "héros" de Mongo Beti et essaie lui aussi d'y remédier, à sa manière. En effet, du statut de l'acteur de sa vie et de celle de ses compatriotes, "l'Homme au totem de Caïman" est réduit, pendant toute l'histoire, au rôle des plus passifs de témoin, de spectateur et surtout d'auditeur muet du récit de sa propre vie. Pire, le discours est proféré par un ensemble de narrateurs dont un fou qui se permet tout et de tout dire au chef rendu impuissant. Ce renversement de situation, sans doute plus que chez Mongo Beti, apparaît comme le sommet de l'humiliation pour un personnage qui a pensé et pense toujours d'ailleurs, avoir le droit de vie et de mort sur ses semblables. On se souvient pourtant combien le personnage de Djigui domine Monnè, outrages et défis, autant par sa présence dans le discours que par sa personnalité dans l'histoire et sa longévité au pouvoir (120 ans).

Sa cure cathartique, le protagoniste de Kourouma la recherche dans une drogue "traditionnelle" : la geste propitiatoire du griot des chasseurs qu'a prescrite un marabout, suite au songe d'une femme. Certes, au premier abord, le "voyage initiatique" du nouveau chef de l'Etat du Pays du Golfe a pour finalité de lui permettre de "s'enquérir de la périlleuse science de la dictature auprès des maîtres de l'autocratie." (Vote, 171) Mais il n'empêche que pendant les six veillées qui constituent la diégèse, le "héros" vit une situation dont les conséquences sont dévastatrices pour l'efficacité de son pouvoir. En fait, pour un leader, sans doute plus que tout autre homme politique, le contrôle de la gestion de la parole est une donnée fondamentale, voire essentielle: "Le discours, en apparence, a beau être peu de chose, précise à

cet effet Michel Foucault, les interdits qui le frappent révèlent très vite son rapport avec le désir et le pouvoir."⁶

En tout état de cause, les "héros" de Mongo Beti et d'Ahmadou Kourouma semblent soumis métaphoriquement par les narrateurs respectifs aux rites du châtiments réservé aux vaincus des pratiques magiques du donsomana : émasculés, les testicules enfoncés dans la bouche. Ces gestes magiques et répétitifs sont repris plusieurs fois et de manière rituelle dans le roman d'Ahmadou Kourouma. Le lecteur attentif sait justement combien sont liés le phallus et le pouvoir dans la fiction africaine.⁷ Le fait que les récits respectifs de *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* s'arrêtent alors qu'aucune histoire ne connaît encore son terme, semble suggérer que l'humiliation suprême n'est ainsi pas prête de s'arrêter et pourrait même devenir permanente et perpétuelle pour les protagonistes. "Tant que Koyaga n'aura pas récupéré le Coran et la météorite, rappelle le sora, commencera ou recommencera le donsomana purificateur." (Vote, 358)

Dans tous les cas, l'on remarque assez vite que, aussi bien chez "l'Indomptable" que chez "le Guerrier griot," le narrateur qui n'hésite pas à se démultiplier à la moindre occasion et à accorder ainsi l'instance de narration (et donc de parole) à des personnages souvent secondaires, aura magistralement refusé cette faculté aux responsables politiques de premier plan de la "République francophone d'Afrique" et du Pays du Golfe.⁸ Il n'y a dès lors plus de doute que l'exclusion et la marginalisation dont sont frappés leurs "héros" au paratextuel, participent d'une stratégie délibérée et consciente des deux écrivains. D'ailleurs, remarque avec pertinence Henri Godard,

Pour l'écrivain, l'adoption [d'un] discours, la place qu'il accorde aux autres et la lumière dans laquelle il les situe, sont autant de moyens de prendre parti. A leur niveau et dans leur ordre, ces options linguistiques ont une dimension idéologique.⁹

En attendant, aussi bien du point de vue de la situation énonciative que de celui même de la réalité diégétique, le lecteur note aisément, ici et là-bas, que ces personnages qui exercent une sorte de "non-pouvoir" ou plutôt de vacance de pouvoir, sont, en réalité des pantins que l'on ne peut même pas objectivement comparer aux "Grand Timonier," "Père de la nation," "Guide éclairé" et autres titres de rois d'opérette popularisés par la littérature africaine des années 70 à 90, bien que Koyaga se pose en héritier de Baba Toura ou de Messi Koï.¹⁰

En fait, chez Henri Lopés, chez Williams Sassine, chez Sony Labou Tansi ou même dans les autres textes de Mongo Beti et d'Ahmadou Kourouma, les dictateurs jouissent de l'efficacité du pouvoir. Il aurait ainsi suffi d'un seul geste de la part du président du parti unique pour que le sort tragique de Fama fût différent dans *Les Soleils des indépendances*. C'est une simple décision présidentielle qui fait emprisonner le "dernier et légitime descendant des princes Doumbouya du Horodougou," sans raison valable. Une autre le libère, des années plus tard, dans les mêmes conditions, en le gratifiant de billets de banque. On se souvient aussi que Baba Toura fait et défait la carrière d'Essola Wandelin, personnage de *Perpétue* et l'habitude du malheur. Or dans *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* tout comme dans *Trop de soleil tue l'amour*, la "démocratie" ou ce qui en tient lieu a perverti les paramètres qui permettent traditionnellement de définir le pouvoir, tandis que les "chefs" sont dépouillés des attributs réels et symboliques du pouvoir effectif par l'histoire ou par le sort. Du coup, ils exercent un pouvoir illusoire: et parfois, ils ne sont même pas conscients de la vacuité de ce prétendu pouvoir.

La donne diégétique des romans de Mongo Beti et d'Amadou Kourouma s'inscrit dans la même veine que les dispositifs paratextuels et énonciatifs évoqués plus haut. Contrairement à nombre d'écrits africains, la réalité effective du pouvoir est détenue aussi bien dans *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* que dans *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages*, par des groupuscules plutôt indépendants les uns des autres, mais unis à l'occasion pour le malheur du pays.

N'avez-vous pas remarqué? Chez nous, le chef de l'Etat fait dans l'évasion des capitaux, ministres et hauts fonctionnaires dans l'import-export et autres business pas toujours honnêtes, curés et évêques dans le maraboutisme, assureurs et banquiers dans l'extorsion de fonds comme les gangsters, les écolières dans la prostitution, leurs mamans dans le maquereautage, les toubibs dans le charlatanisme, les garagistes dans les voitures volées... (Soleil, 235)

L'atomisation régressive du pouvoir et des centres de décision qu'il convient de ne point confondre avec ce qui se passe dans *Perpétue* ou l'habitude du malheur ou dans *Monnè*, outrages et défis, est loin d'être participative de la division consciente du travail comme cela se doit dans toute société organisée. Elle pourrait même être perçue comme une conception toute spéciale du pouvoir. Mais à la vérité, Koyaga ou son alter ego, et à la différence personnage comme Fahati de *Le Récit du cirque...* de la vallée des Morts (Buchet-Chastel, 1975) d'Alioum Fantouré, sont tout simplement incapables de maîtriser l'organisation de leur "cour."

En fait, les partis au pouvoir, aussi bien dans leur fonctionnement que dans leurs méthodes, connaissent des innovations pertinentes par rapport à ceux en présence dans la plupart des romans africains. On vient de voir que le chef du parti tout-puissant est bel et bien mort ici. De plus, dans les deux romans, aucun président de parti ne connaît une présence comparable à celle des dictateurs de Sony Labou Tansi, de Williams Sassine, d'Henri Lopes, d'Alioum Fantouré ou même celle d'un personnage comme Djigui de *Monnè*, outrages et défis. Si Koyaga, par exemple, est présent en permanence dans l'histoire, c'est comme auditeur et non comme narrateur et donc acteur. Mieux, il est déchargé des attributs du pouvoir en même temps qu'il est totalement coupé des militants du parti, d'une part et de "ses sujets" du Pays du Golfe, d'autre part. Ses liens avec le parti et surtout avec le peuple, s'ils sont rétablis, seront sujets à la médiation du griot qui organise le *donsomana*. Bref, contrairement à celle de ses "prédécesseurs," la survie de "l'Homme au totem de Caïman" en tant qu'homme de pouvoir est ainsi soumise au bon vouloir d'un acteur qui n'est même pas un militant déclaré de sa formation politique.

Quant à lui, on vient de le dire, le "président-dictateur" de Mongo Beti est tout simplement "introuvable." Le récit en parle à l'occasion. Mais, il est aussi loin de l'histoire que du pays qu'il est censé diriger. Il ne participe aucunement à la vie de son parti que le narrateur se garde ici comme chez Ahmadou Kourouma de nommer. Par conséquent, il ne sait et ne peut jamais prendre la bonne décision au bon moment. Aussi embarrasse-t-il souvent les comparses qui dirigent par procuration la structure. Il en est ainsi de la date des élections qu'il renvoie sine die, sans doute de l'étranger et surtout, sans consulter ni même avertir ses partisans qui, non seulement voient leurs stratégies tomber, mais aussi, sont obligés de trouver des justificatifs alambiqués pour s'expliquer aux "partenaires" de l'Assistance Technique Française de campagne. En un mot, Mongo Beti et Ahmadou Kourouma substituent à l'irresponsabilité généralement reconnue aux dictateurs dans la fiction africaine une forme encore plus pernicieuse de manquement : la déresponsabilisation.

Bien qu'acéphales de fait, les partis politiques continuent, tant bien que mal, de fonctionner, même par procuration. Aussi bien chez Mongo Beti que chez Ahmadou Kourouma, ils gardent même des réflexes du parti unique : achat des consciences, répression ciblée, corruption, etc. On se rappelle à cet effet comment, suite au véritable lavage de cerveau qu'ils subirent du fait de...des compatriotes de Koyaga du fait de leur divergence idéologique avec le chef, ceux-ci durent opérer... "un virage à 180," ainsi que le rappelle ironiquement Bingo, le narrateur principal d'Ahmadou Kourouma.

Solennellement, ils entrent dans le bois sacré du parti unique, deviennent des initiés, les enfants, les adeptes du parti : eux, leurs parents, leurs progénitures, leurs parents, leurs amis, leurs connaissances, tous avec leurs chiens et leurs poulets. (Vote, 274)

Cette méthode qui, de l'avis du narrateur de Mongo Beti, est une marque déposée du président gabonais Omar Bongo (Soleil, 201), marche aussi assez bien avec les compatriotes d'Eddie. Ebénézer, le philosophe et idéologue attiré de l'ex-parti unique en démontre l'extrême efficacité à Georges Lamotte, son "Assistant Technique Français" :

Devine comment nous avons recruté [les opposants] au Comité exécutif national. D'office, je veux dire sans les consulter [...] Tu veux voir ce qu'est vraiment l'être humain, mon cher Georges ? Accule-le à la famine ; sortant aussitôt du bois, le loup se fait agneau, et le voilà couché à tes pieds. Quant on a la chance de tenir cette chose à la saveur divine qu'est le pouvoir, cette faculté miraculeuse de dompter les foules et les individus, de les plier à ses fantaisies, le laisser s'échapper, ça serait de la folie, quitte à utiliser toutes les ficelles, de la ruse à la guerre civile, et pourquoi pas le génocide. (Soleil, 210)

Cependant, il convient déjà de noter que, contrairement au Pleurer-rire ou au Zéhéros n'est pas n'importe qui ou même à Affamez-les, ils vous adoreront ou à Indésirables, la violence brute a cédé le pas ici à une forme plus pernicieuse encore, la violence "symbolique" au sens où la définit Pierre Bourdieu :

La violence symbolique est, précise Pierre Bourdieu, pour parler aussi simplement que possible, cette forme de violence qui s'exerce sur un agent avec sa complicité.[...] J'appelle méconnaissance le fait de reconnaître une violence qui s'exerce précisément dans la mesure où on la méconnaît comme violence ; c'est le fait d'accepter cet ensemble de présupposés fondamentaux, pré réflexifs, que les agents sociaux engagent par le simple fait de prendre le monde comme allant de soi, c'est-à-dire comme il est, et de le trouver naturel parce qu'ils lui appliquent les structures cognitives qui sont issues des structures mêmes de ce monde. [...]. C'est pourquoi, l'analyse de l'acceptation doxique du monde en raison de l'accord immédiat des structures objectives et des structures cognitives est le véritable fondement d'une théorie réaliste de la domination et de la politique" (Bonnevitz, 82-83).

Ainsi, " Plus de trente-cinq ans de dictatures en tout genre," remarque le narrateur de Mongo Beti, "ont forcément perverti les mœurs et les mentalités." (Soleil, 44) De plus, pour cause de FMI et de la chute du mur de Berlin, l'Occident semble plus regardant sur la forme de la "démocratie." L'avènement et le déploiement de l'opposition politique non-violente à l'intérieur même du pays constituent en fait l'une des particularités communes des deux textes. Chez Ahmadou Kourouma, le parti unique, sous la pression de la rue, légalise au pied levé l'opposition et publie d'autres textes en faveur des libertés.

A la Baule, commente le narrateur d'Ahmadou Kourouma, au cours du sommet des chefs d'Etat, le président Mitterrand a recommandé aux chefs des Etats africains de changer de politique, de cesser d'être des dictateurs pour devenir des démocrates angéliques. La France a utilisé cette déclaration comme prétexte et comme date pour arrêter de régler les émoluments des fonctionnaires des dictatures francophones dont les trésors publics sont en cessation de paiement. La France exige du dictateur qu'il signe au préalable un PAS avec le FMI. (Vote, 323)

Bien plus, chez Mongo Beti, l'histoire commence alors que l'opposition a déjà officiellement voix au chapitre. Elle est même, contrairement aux textes d'avant 90, une source de réelle inquiétude pour l'ex-parti unique qui n'est plus du tout sûr de gagner toutes les élections. "Le gouvernement a peur pour les élections qui viennent ; il veut s'assurer de la fidélité de ses partisans supposés. C'est notre boulot." (Soleil, 130), assure "l'expert" dépêché par Paris. Couplée avec la presse indépendante et plus généralement avec la société civile émergente, l'opposition semble faire plus que de la figuration sur l'échiquier politique local, comme le reconnaît en outre un cacique de l'ex-parti unique: "Les perspectives ne sont plus certaines depuis la fin de la guerre froide." (Soleil, 193) Dès lors, mettant en pratique les conseils du philosophe et de "l'Assistant Technique Français," le pouvoir en place ne lésine sur aucun moyen pour assurer la victoire, "à tout prix."

Le gouvernement appliquait une tactique qu'on peut appeler de l'édredon : il ne répondait à aucune accusation, dédaignait les interpellations, faisait la sourde oreille aux propositions de dialogues, s'en tenait aux rigueurs de la répression dès que les opposants faisaient mine de descendre dans la rue, tirant à l'occasion sans état d'âme sur la foule, ce qui avait le don de refroidir les enthousiasmes dans les rangs des contestataires. Le gouvernement ne s'embarrassait pas des finasseries dans les républiques africaines francophones. (Soleil, 180-181)

L'une des plus grandes et sans doute des plus pertinentes innovations communes à En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages et à Trop de soleil tue l'amour est "la définition" de la nouvelle opposition politique interne. Contrairement à Indésirables par exemple, celle-ci ne s'oppose jamais vraiment au parti au pouvoir qu'elle a vocation de combattre ; pas à combattre. L'on a remarqué que l'avènement de la démocratie dans la République du Golfe s'accompagne de l'émergence d'une société civile longtemps maintenue dans les fers par le parti unique. De plus, les déscolarisés et les autres laissés-pour-compte de la société s'organisent pour prendre désormais une part active à la gestion de la cité à travers une "Conférence Nationale Souveraine." Or, de par son organisation même et son mode de fonctionnement, ce forum emprunte paradoxalement l'essentiel de ses méthodes au parti unique décrié.

[Les délégués] n'avaient d'abord pensé qu'à eux, à leur confort. Ils étaient français, avaient le niveau de vie des développés. Ils se fixèrent, en tant que membres de l'assemblée provisoire, des indemnités d'Européens : soixante mille francs par jour. Dans un pays où le SMIG mensuel est plafonné à trente mille francs et la solde du soldat à vingt mille ! C'était scandaleux. Les moult prolongations de la Conférence nationale souveraine apparurent pour tous les citoyens comme de la combine, de la magouille pour continuer à se mouiller la barbe. (Vote, 344)

Cette trahison des élites, consécutive à celle des années 60 la "Conférence Nationale Souveraine" avait pour ambition originelle de corriger à défaut de réparer, désorienté à jamais un peuple qui, une fois de plus, avait rêvé des lendemains qui chantent. Ce dernier pressent dès lors que, aujourd'hui comme hier, il n'aura que ses yeux pour pleurer. Floué et déboussolé, le petit peuple de la République du Golfe se

tourne ainsi à nouveau vers Koyaga pourtant reconnu de tous comme l'auteur de tous ses malheurs, non pour lui demander des comptes, mais pour le louer, plus que par le passé!

Des centaines de déscolarisés affamés s'étaient rués vers les trottoirs des rues conduisant à la résidence privée du dictateur. A ces centaines s'étaient joints tous les chômeurs que les grèves et le désordre social avaient chassés de leur emploi. Une foule compacte qui faisait de chacune de vos sorties ou retours une manifestation de sympathie, une vraie fête. Les gens guettaient votre arrivée. Ils applaudissaient bruyamment et vous accueillait avec des slogans dès que votre cortège passait. (Vote, 345)

L'ancien combattant devenu président-dictateur retrouve ainsi, avec la complicité de ses compatriotes désignés pour le contrer, le lustre et la superbe dont il avait toujours rêvé depuis les campagnes d'Indochine et d'Algérie. On comprend dès lors pourquoi Madeleine Borgomano dit de *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* qu'il est un roman "plutôt désespérant."¹¹

Un désespoir similaire habite le petit peuple de Trop de soleil tue l'amour. Contre le pouvoir du "président fainéant" s'activent des intellectuels et une opposition partisane. Mais à l'analyse, les uns et les autres, comme dans *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages*, sont des individus peu recommandables, traîtres de fraîche date ou en latence. La dernière composante de l'opposition comprend ainsi essentiellement deux groupes. Ici évoluent des impatients de tous bords qui, dans l'attente qu'ils jugent trop longue dans la "dèche," s'engagent dans la voie de la contestation pour se faire vite remarquer et ainsi, se faire inviter plus tôt à la table. De l'autre côté, aussi "nuls" que leurs adversaires du pouvoir qu'ils sont supposés combattre, d'autres sont juste un peu plus malins pour se sauver assez tôt du bateau du parti unique qui prend de l'eau, se construire une virginité factice, et se faire une bonne conscience à peu de frais. Les journalistes de *Demain la Démocratie !* sont sans pitié:

C'est trop facile ; on sert la dictature à pieds baissés pendant des années, on prend soin durant ce temps de se remplir les poches en puisant dans les caisses de l'Etat. Quand on a amassé un pactole, on se proclame grand manitou opposant. (Soleil, 77)

Le narrateur qui se désigne systématiquement par "nous" semble, sous certaines conditions, pouvoir reconnaître quelque excuse à l'opposition partisane qui, ici comme ailleurs, a vocation d'accéder (pas à accéder) au pouvoir, même si les moyens ici sont des plus contestables. Mais la trahison la plus impardonnable, d'après le narrateur anonyme qui concède pourtant que "Là où le peuple a été trop longtemps tenu à l'écart des lumières du droit, le vice devient la norme, le tortueux la règle, l'arbitraire la vertu" (Soleil, 78), est celle des intellectuels. Alors qu'ailleurs elle anime les débats d'idées et maintient les esprits en éveil, dans le roman de Mongo Beti, cette classe est essentiellement constituée d'opportunistes en mal d'accumulation de biens matériels et d'honneurs. Nombre de ses cadres ne reculent ainsi devant rien pour arriver à leurs fins et "se faire une place au soleil" ou plutôt à table. Avocat "marron" vivant d'expédients et grand amateur de femmes et de vins, Eddie réussit ainsi à trouver même du bon dans la dictature. "A voir de près, affirme-t-il sans sourciller, la dictature, c'est pas pire, à condition de savoir s'en servir." (Soleil, 46)

Le portrait que l'habile philosophe peint de ces lamentables "lumières" en fait effectivement de pitoyables tarés:

Le président avait souhaité rallier à tout prix cette engeance stérile, pour la mouiller et la neutraliser. Il était convaincu que ça ne serait pas de la tarte, que l'exercice relevait de la haute voltige, tant les gens surestiment le sens de dignité de nos prétendus intellectuels. C'est faire beaucoup d'honneur à ces farceurs. Le tour vient d'être joué sans coup férir, tu as vu Georges ? Ils ont un peu crié, comme ça, pour la forme ; la provocation, c'est leur cinéma préféré. Mais ils se sont rués, comme tout un chacun, sur le buffet. Est-ce qu'il t'a semblé qu'ils étaient dégoûtés par mes délicieux sandwiches ? Que non, bien au contraire. C'est toujours un tort de se laisser impressionner par ces gens-là, sous prétexte qu'ils savent manier la plume ou déployer une fastueuse rhétorique. Ce sont des imposteurs, des clowns. (Soleil, 209)

Le régime qui, sous les conseils de son très machiavélique philosophe, ne doit reculer ni devant la guerre civile, ni devant le génocide pour rester au pouvoir, trouve ainsi un terreau idéal pour ses manœuvres de débauchage, d'achats de conscience ou de corruption.

Au bout du compte et au contraire de *Mor Zamba* ou *Ouragan Viet* de Remember Ruben, ou de *Fama* de Les Soleils des indépendances, ou même de *Camara Filamodou Massakoye* du *Le Zéhéros* n'est pas n'importe qui, de *Raogo* et *Wend-Kumi* de *Indésirables*, d'*Issa Koné* de *Les Mémoires d'Emilienne*, les opposants déclarés et les intellectuels de *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et de *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* contribuent ainsi paradoxalement, mais avec une égale efficacité, à faire de la démocratie nouvelle une farce macabre dont le peuple est le triste et innocent dindon. Les jugements des citoyens sur la dictature du parti unique et sur la démocratie ambiante ne semblent ainsi pas bien différents de ceux des populations de *Soba* (Monnè, outrages et défis) sur l'ancien et sur le nouveau régime :

Nous vîmes et comprîmes que le régime militaire et le régime civil étaient l'anus et la gueule de l'hyène mangeuse de charogne : ils se ressemblaient, exhalant tous les deux la même puanteur nauséabonde. (Monnè, 60)

Aux "génies du mal" généralement constatés dans les autres textes africains jusqu'à une date assez récente, on pourrait dire que *Trop de soleil tue l'amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* substituent des "génies" de la bêtise et de l'ignorance.

Les derniers oripeaux du pouvoir que *Mongo Beti* et *Ahmadou Kourouma* revisitent sont la police et la "coopération" française. Le rôle de la police et de "l'Assistance Technique Française" sont ici plus qu'originaux. Bien qu'aussi omniprésente ici que dans *Perpétue* ou même *Les Mémoires d'Emilienne*, la police parallèle ou officielle est loin de remplir les mêmes fonctions qu'ailleurs dans le roman africain. Dans un contexte comme celui des romans de *Mongo Beti* et d'*Ahmadou Kourouma*, ses missions auraient par exemple consisté, comme celles de *Inquisiteur Mille* de *Le Récit du cirque... de la vallée des Morts*, à sauver ou à tout le moins rétablir, "à tout prix" l'autorité ignorée ou bafouée des chefs rendus impotents.

Mais, à l'image des autres cercles du pouvoir en présence et contrairement aux textes évoqués plus haut, ce bras séculier de la dictature semi-autonomes comme des factions de n'importe quel groupe terroriste. Mieux, il travaille d'abord et essentiellement pour le compte exclusif de ses agents, en dépit des avantages faramineux que la "République francophone d'Afrique" de *Mongo Beti* par exemple lui accorde. Symbolisée par l'inspecteur Norbert et le commissaire Boundougou, ces véritables "caïds" (Soleil, 189) dont le plus grand "mérite" est de ne jamais faire d'enquêtes et de classer

systématiquement toutes les affaires à elle confiées, la police du “président fainéant” n’hésite pas à l’occasion, à mettre en danger l’existence même du régime.

Le bien nommé “Norbert, inspecteur amateur d’extras,” agent de police recruté sans qualification initiale et qui doit toutes ses promotions aux stages “bidons” organisés par sa hiérarchie complaisante, ne s’empêche par exemple pas de collaborer avec le journaliste indépendant Zamakwé contre les espèces sonnantes et trébuchantes, sans même s’en référer à ses bienfaiteurs hiérarchiques. Et de fait, il sert l’opposition déclarée contre laquelle il travaille officiellement pour le compte du pouvoir de cette “République Bananière.” Le serpent semble ainsi, pourrait-on conclure, comme dans le modèle narratif d’Ahmadou Kourouma, se mordre la queue ici: “planter la fin de la bête dans son commencement.” (Vote, 66) Des prédictions pessimistes du narrateur de Mongo Beti se révèlent finalement en deçà de la vérité ! “Après la privatisation controversée des banques, de l’eau, de l’électricité, il restait désormais celle de la police et de l’armée et même de l’Etat.” (Soleil, 127)

A l’image de cette police plus que dévoyée, “L’Assistance Technique” constituée ici comme ailleurs de barbouzes françaises et de mercenaires de toutes origines, n’est pas exclusivement au service des pouvoirs qui en rétribuent les agents. Pourtant, une tradition assez récurrente dans la fiction africaine francophone veut que l’Assistant Technique Français soit une barbouze chargée d’exécuter les basses besognes du régime impopulaire mis en place et porté à bout de bras par la France. On se souvient aisément des fonctions de Monsieur Gourdain auprès de Tonton Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé.

Pourtant, aussi bien par sa formation initiale que ses fonctions officielles, Georges Lamotte correspond tout à fait à cette engeance qui a toujours terrorisé l’opposition et les penseurs indépendants dans la fiction noire africaine, en même temps qu’elle a servi, au prix de mystifications et de mythifications d’individus sans envergure, à fabriquer de prétendus chefs charismatiques, “Pères de la nation” ubuesques et monstrueux comme Tonton Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé ou le Maréchal Nnikon Nniku. En effet, alors qu’il assume, comme il l’affirme sans ambiguïté à une prostituée, les fonctions de “journaliste d’une espèce particulière” auprès du régime (Soleil, 100), l’Assistant Technique Français donne de Georges Lamotte un portrait qui n’attirerait aucun recruteur raisonnable:

Dans ma famille, je n’ai jamais été considéré comme un brillant sujet, ni à l’école. Dans ma vie, j’ai fait un peu de tout et n’importe quoi, longtemps. Pour finir, un jour, je me suis réfugié dans l’enseignement : ils y accueillent toutes sortes de gens. Tel que vous me voyez, j’ai quinze ans d’instituteur à Wallis et Futuna, îles françaises du Pacifique, où personne ne voulait aller, bien entendu. C’est pour cela qu’ils ont bien voulu de moi, car je n’avais strictement aucune qualification. [...] Depuis, je joue les touristes. (Soleil, 158-159)

Georges Lamotte est ainsi recruté, comme le précise le philosophe du régime, pour sauvegarder les intérêts mutuels des deux pays. Sa traque plutôt subtile mais redoutablement efficace des opposants, de même que sa participation active à la campagne électorale aux côtés des agents du parti présidentiel, s’inscrit dans la logique de son “cahier de charge.”

Cependant, ses actions et ses attitudes dans d’autres situations sont loin de servir “exclusivement les excellentes relations que notre pays a toujours entretenues avec [la France] qui est pour nous un gage unique de stabilité et, par conséquent, de développement” (Soleil, 192), comme dirait Ebénézer. Ses rapports avec Nathalie, la nièce de son complice dans le vice, “une toute petite fille à qui on a volé son

enfance” (Soleil, 222), relèvent soit de la pédophilie, soit du détournement de mineurs. De même, sa participation à des orgies sexuelles qu’organise Ebénézer avec des femmes de toutes les races ne participe aucunement du statut officiel du “loyal serviteur de la coopération franco-africaine” (Soleil, 212) défini par le directeur local de l’ANDECONINI, les services secrets français. En compagnie d’Ebénézer et d’autres comparses, le prétendu serviteur loyal de la coopération française a ainsi constitué un cercle de vices très fermé dont les intérêts sont très loin de se confondre avec ceux de la France et de la “République bananière” d’Afrique ou même avec ceux de ses supérieurs hiérarchiques locaux. Tout comme la police locale donc, la “barbouzerie” française, et contrairement à celle relevée dans de nombreux textes africains francophones, connaît chez les deux écrivains, sans doute par effet d’osmose et de contamination, les mêmes tares que l’administration africaine décriée.

Ce rapide regard croisé aura permis d’identifier des convergences idéologiques chez Mongo Beti et Ahmadou Kourouma qui pendant plus de 30 ans d’écriture ne se sont, pour ainsi dire, jamais rencontrés.¹² Aussi bien par le discours que par l’histoire, *Trop de soleil tue l’amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* consacrent l’effondrement de la statue de Commandeur habituellement reconnue aux potentats des récits africains en général et même dans d’autres écrits de Mongo Beti et d’Ahmadou Kourouma. Ils lui substituent celle de “fainéants” et de “faibles.” Dans l’un et l’autre texte, les “chefs” de partis ou d’Etat ne peuvent même plus objectivement être tenus pour responsables des malheurs qui accablent les populations. Absents ou muselés mais toujours inconscients, ces derniers sont déresponsabilisés, agis plutôt qu’acteurs de l’histoire qu’ils subissent.

“L’indépendance” du chef par rapport aux auxiliaires du pouvoir que sont la police, la “coopération technique” et les partis politiques (pouvoir et opposition) induit une déliquescence du pouvoir lui-même et des centres de décision qui se trouvent dès lors divisés en groupuscules indépendants d’un pouvoir central inexistant. La démocratie (re)naissante en devient paradoxalement une immense farce qui permet aux dictateurs pourtant reconnus impotents d’organiser ou surtout de laisser organiser des simulacres d’élections qui consacrent leur séjour perpétuel au pouvoir.

Dès lors, *Trop de soleil tue l’amour* et *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages* apparaissent incontestablement comme des moments très importants et particulièrement significatifs dans les productions respectives de Mongo Beti et d’Ahmadou Kourouma. Les deux textes constituent des amorces très prometteuses du renouvellement de perception du pouvoir dans la fiction africaine en cette aube de troisième millénaire. On songera ainsi à des romans comme *Branle-bas en blanc et noir* (Julliard, 2000) de Mongo Beti, *Temps de Chien (Le Serpent à plumes, 2001)* de Patrice Nganang, *Les Petits-fils nègres de Vercingétorix (Le Serpent à plumes, 2002)* d’Alain Mabanckou et au recueil de nouvelles de Kangi Alem, *La gazelle s’agenouille pour pleurer (Acoria, 2000)*.

NOTES

¹ “40 ans d’écriture, 60 ans de dissidence,” tel est le sous-titre du numéro spécial de *Présence francophone* n° 42 consacré à Mongo Beti pour son soixantième anniversaire par une dizaine d’universitaires de tous horizons, sous la direction d’Ambroise Kom.

² Mongo Beti : *Trop de soleil tue l’amour*, Paris, Julliard, 1999. Nos citations renvoient à l’édition de

poche chez le même éditeur dans la collection “Pocket” en 2001. Nous l’indiquerons par (*Soleil*). Ahmadou Kourouma : *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages*, Paris, Seuil, 1998. Nos citations renvoient à la même édition et nous l’indiquerons par (*Vote*).

³ Le narrateur de Mongo Beti insiste sur une sorte de “malédiction” qui frapperait le continent. Le mot revient dans le texte comme un leitmotiv. On peut lire avec intérêt ce qu’en dit Bernard Mouralis : “Mongo Beti: *Trop de soleil tue l’amour*, Paris Julliard, 1999, 239 p.”, *Etudes littéraires africaines N° 7*, juin 1999, p. 48-50.

⁴ Sékou de *Le Zéhéros n’est pas n’importe qui* en est un modèle prototypique dans le roman africain d’expression française.

⁵ Komlanvi, Jean-Marie Pinto : *Les Mémoires d’Emilienne*, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1989, p 104.

⁶ Michel Foucault : *L’Ordre du discours*, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, p. 12.

⁷ Voir par exemple *Le Destin glorieux du Maréchal Nnikon Nniku. Prince qu’on sort de Tchicaya U Tam’Si* où le dictateur éponyme, pour s’assurer le loyalisme et renforcer l’ardeur de sa garde prétorienne, fait greffer aux soldats des grenades à la place des testicules.

⁸ Titre de l’avant-propos du numéro spécial de *Présence Francophone* consacré à Mongo Beti : *Mongo Beti, 40 ans d’écriture 60 ans de dissidence*, *Présence Francophone n° 42*, Sherbrooke, 1993, Université de Sherbrooke. Madeleine Borgamano: *Ahmadou Kourouma. Le “guerrier” griot*, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1998.

⁹ Godard, Henri, *Poétique de Céline*, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, p. 106.

¹⁰ Il se veut certes le “Père de la nation,” mais il ne tient déjà plus grand’chose des personnages évoqués plus haut, comme on vient de le voir.

¹¹ Borgamano, Madeleine, *Ahmadou Kourouma. Le “guerrier” griot*, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1998, p. 62.

¹² Dans une interview que le premier accorde à un journal parisien au début des années 90, il dit tout le mal qu’il pense de son collègue. Au journaliste qui lui demande de réagir face à quelques noms d’hommes de culture et intellectuels africains, il répond à propos d’Ahmadou Kourouma: “Je n’aime pas du tout. Je ne sais pas s’il est grand écrivain, mais je sais qu’il est illettré.” “Mongo Beti règle ses comptes,” *Jeune Afrique Economie n° 136*, octobre 1990, p. 106.

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Delimitation Of The Elastic Ilemi Triangle: Pastoral Conflicts and Official Indifference in the Horn Of Africa

NENE MBURU

ABSTRACT

This article observes that although scholars have addressed the problem of the inherited colonial boundaries in Africa, there are lacunae in our knowledge of the complexity of demarcating the Kenya-Sudan-Ethiopia tri-junctional point known as the Ilemi Triangle. Apart from being a gateway to an area of Sudan rich in unexplored oil reserves, Ilemi is only significant for its dry season pastures that support communities of different countries. By analyzing why, until recently, the Ilemi has been 'unwanted' and hence not economically developed by any regional government, the article aims to historically elucidate differences of perception and significance of the area between the authorities and the local herders. On the one hand, the forage-rich pastures of Ilemi have been the *casus belli* (cause for war) among transhumant communities of Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, and an enigma to colonial surveyors who could not determine their 'ownership' and extent. On the other hand, failure to administer the region in the last century reflects the lack of attractiveness to the authorities that have not agreed on security and grazing arrangements for the benefit of their respective nomadic populations. This article places the disputed 'triangle' of conflict into historical, anthropological, sociological and political context. The closing reflections assess the future of the dispute in view of the current initiative by the USA to end the 19-year-old civil war in Sudan and promote the country's relationship with her neighbors particularly Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. However, the author is cynical of attempts to enhance international security and political stability that do not embrace 'peoples of the periphery', such as the herders of Ilemi, into the economic, social, and political rhythm of the mainstream society.

INTRODUCTION

This article is about Ilemi, a triangular piece of land joining Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia described in some records as measuring 14,000 square kilometers and 10,320 square kilometers in others.¹ It lies north of the equator between latitude (deg min) 5 00N and longitude 35 30N and is variously defined as Ethiopia (claimed), Kenya (de facto), and, Sudan (claimed).² By analyzing why until now the Ilemi Triangle has been 'unwanted' hence not economically developed by any regional government the article aims to historically elucidate differences of perception and significance of the area between the authorities and the local herders.³ Ilemi is

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on the fringe of southern Sudan, which is rich in unexplored oil. Nevertheless, no explorations have been made in the contested territory partly due to insecurity from the 19-year civil war in southern Sudan and partly due to a hands-off attitude by each regional government. It lacks any infrastructure or modern facilities and is so insulated that its only reminder of the ‘outside world’ is a Kenyan frontier post. Even so, Ilemi is so precious that its dry-season pastures have been the focus of incessant conflicts among transhumant communities and an enigma to boundary surveyors who previously failed to determine its precise extent and breadth.

The article begins with a brief anthropological description of the transhumant communities of Ilemi before tracing the evolution of the problem. There follows a critical analysis of colonial meridians that slice through pastoral country and an attempt to understand the ‘hands-off’ policy by successive governments of the region. The conclusion reflects on the future of the dispute given the current national and international attempts to stabilize the region. My overall objective is to contribute to our understanding of African boundaries that are still in dispute for not respecting local opinion such as customary pastures for transhumant populations particularly where colonial surveyors failed to follow permanent terrain features.

Our search for understanding the dispute begins with colonial treaties and arbitrary boundaries. In particular, those delineating the 1907 boundary between Ethiopia and British East Africa not only undervalued the centrality of water and pasture to herders but the vagueness of the treaty also opened an opportunity for resource conflicts in one clause which states:

“The tribes occupying either side of the line shall have a right to use grazing grounds on the other side as in the past, but during their migrations it is understood that they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial authority. Free access to the wells is equally accorded to the tribes occupying either side of the line”.⁴

On the one hand, the ‘open frontier’ implied by the above clause invited resource conflicts among pastoral peoples of the newly created national identities during their transhumance and epicyclical movements to dry-season pastures and water. On the other hand, if the corresponding authorities enforced a ‘closed frontier’, communities that had previously grazed freely before the boundary was drawn would not honor the exclusion.

So far, no scholar has historically explored how the differences of perception and significance of Ilemi by various leaderships in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya have contributed to the low priority given to the delimitation and administration of the disputed territory during the colonial and post-colonial periods. This opinion is based on a review of relevant studies that have enriched our awareness on the subject. One is McEwen’s 1971 lucid historical examination of the processes undertaken to delineate and the technical difficulties experienced when demarcating boundaries in Africa.⁵ McEwen does not explain the ‘hands-off’ attitude by the regional authorities on the administration of Ilemi, particularly after the collapse of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in Sudan and the end of British colonial rule in Kenya and Uganda. Likewise, Taha’s analysis sheds light on the problem of demarcation where ethnic boundaries do not correspond with terrain features in the context of Sudan’s proposal to barter the Ilemi triangle with Ethiopia’s Baro (Beyrou) salient, which holds Kenya’s territorial claim to Ilemi in abeyance.⁶ Ngatia also gives a balanced analysis of the legal difficulties of delimiting the Kenya-Sudan boundary, particularly the problem of determining the extent of the pastures claimed in north Ilemi by the Turkana community of Kenya.⁷ Finally, in the discussion on the commendable work of Leslie Whitehouse, Elizabeth Watkins addresses the difficulties faced by

Kenyan Boundary Commissions and administrators serving in the inaccessible periphery of the state.⁸ The study decries the plight of the herders of the Ilemi Triangle, but it is a Kenyan perspective inasmuch as there is no explanation of the reluctance by Sudan and Ethiopia to resolve the territorial dispute. This paper focuses on the omission of previous scholars and places the evolution of the disputed territory into its historical, political, and anthropological context from 1907 to the present day. It interweaves ethnographical information with the political history of the four regional countries concerned because, here, colonial boundaries bear no relation to ethnic distinction.

ILEMI: PEOPLE AND PASTURES

The meaning of Ilemi, (also called, Ilembi, Ilembe/ Elemi) is difficult to ascertain except that it takes its name from a famous Anuak chief, a community living along Sudan's eastern border with Ethiopia. It is home for five ethno linguistic communities; the Turkana, Didinga, Toposa, Inyangatom, and Dassanech, who are members of the larger ethno cultural groups of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, but traditionally migrate to graze in the triangle.⁹ Whereas it is difficult to isolate ethnic groups of Africa using the criterion of linguistic typology alone, intermarriage and clan affinity in Ilemi create an additional problem for clear-cut delineation and analysis. This may explain why scholars, travellers, and administrators still refer to each community by several names.

The Turkana live in southern Sudan and northwestern Kenya where their subsistence is described as multi-resource nomadism which combines pastoralism, gathering, commerce, raiding, and fishing. The translation of their name as cave dweller suggests they originated from the caves on the Kenya-Uganda border.¹⁰ They are classified among the Eastern Nilotes.¹¹ Grass for their cattle is only available in northern Ilemi where they annually graze for eight to nine months. Their northwestern neighbors are the Didinga, who mainly live in the Equatorial Province of Southern Sudan and north eastern Uganda, but western Ilemi forms their dry-season pastures. Their traditional enemies are their Toposa neighbors in the northeast who migrated to Sudan's Equatorial province in 1780.¹² Recent anthropological research emphasises the close ethno historical connection between the Inyangatom and the Toposa, which suggests they were originally one people.¹³ The traditional pastures for the Didinga and Toposa are the better-drained higher grounds of northwestern Ilemi, but their hunting pushes further to the east of the triangle.¹⁴

The Inyangatom live in central and southeastern Sudan and southwestern Ethiopia.¹⁵ During the dry spell, they migrate southwards with their milch animals to the pastures of northern Ilemi. Being astride River Kibish and River Omo their womenfolk practice retreat cultivation when there is rich clayey soil left by flooding and have turned the riverside area into a breadbasket that supports the element of the community whose crop is not always reliable.¹⁶ Their neighbors are the Dassanech who mainly live in southwestern Ethiopia but about one third live in Kenya. Dassanech men raise cattle, around which many social systems are built, and women grow grain on the banks of River Kibish and River Omo. Their agricultural productivity is so eye-catching that early travellers describe them as uniquely hospitable people with plenty of food.¹⁷ During the dry season Inyangatom and Dassanech men graze their herds for long periods in eastern Ilemi.¹⁸

Ilemi qualifies as pastoral country par excellence characterized by hilly terrain, which provides good pasture for cattle grazing and open areas suitable for grazing camels and goats. Organized raiding is common but contrary to popular belief, limited browse and scarce water are not the only motives. It is important to elaborate this factor. During their transhumance, pastoral people cannot recognize invisible meridians, which formalize territorial jurisdiction of the modern state because for them borders constrict or expand for a reason.¹⁹ These reasons include a need to accommodate an increase in pastoral productivity, correspond with new demographic demands, and respond to ecological exigencies, or because of predation from more powerful neighbors. Long before the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 6th December 1907 was drawn, the Inyangatom, Didinga, Turkana, Toposa and Dassanech had traded and grazed in the Ilemi through intercommunity arrangements. Raiding was then a cultural institution that served several functions such as: a strategy for coping with natural disasters, political domination of neighbors through the monopoly of animal wealth, rite of passage for young warriors, and a means of regulating the quality of livestock. It was controlled by poly-tribal councils of elders, which were destroyed by colonial intrusion in the nineteenth century.²⁰ During precolonial rustlings, raiders of Ilemi used traditional weapons and guns they obtained from Ethiopian gunrunners and outlying trade centres such as Maji, where ammunition was so common it was used as local currency. Due to the lack of respectable control mechanisms contemporary raiding has lost its traditional altruism as modern firearms, politicization, and commercialization usually drive it today.²¹

GRAZING IN ILEMI TRIANGLE




Figure 1. Source: Public Records Office MPK1/359
N/B Some names have been realigned by the author.

EVOLUTION OF THE ILEMI DISPUTE

During the partition of Africa, there was no urgency to delimit the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda boundaries, as they were part of the British Empire. Ethiopia was independent and an understanding of its political developments at the time will shed light to the problem under consideration. The death of Tewodros II of Ethiopia occurred during a critical stage of the partitioning of Africa whereby Britain and Germany agreed on mapping out their territorial possessions in Eastern Africa.²² His successor, Emperor Menelik II, found his unification of Ethiopia hampered by European imperialism. In circulars sent to the imperial powers in 1891 and 1894 Menelik outlined the extent of his empire and in 1896 he resumed the expansion of the Amharic nation southwards in order to contain the northward expansion of the British sphere of influence.²³ Having better weapons than his predecessor, Menelik's policy was to consolidate remote areas by military conquest and establish garrisons and administrative outposts in the fashion of the competing European powers.²⁴ The territory claimed by Menelik included Lake Turkana which he called the Samburu Sea. He proposed his southern boundary with the British to run from the southern end of Lake Turkana due east to the Indian Ocean. Emperor Menelik based his territorial claim on slave raiding into peripheral lands that Ethiopia did not always police.²⁵ For instance, it is indisputable that he had previously conquered the Lake Turkana region but the Turkana had regained control and expanded northwards to the present day Kenya-Ethiopian border long before the colonization of Africa.²⁶ Britain disagreed with Menelik's proposal and insisted on running the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary along the meridian it had already agreed on with other European powers without consulting Ethiopia. However, logistical constraints prevented the Emperor or Britain from establishing administration on the ground to back their corresponding territorial claims.²⁷ Nevertheless, Britain delineated its territories to halt other Europeans' territorial ambitions and more specifically to curtail Emperor Menelik's claim to land Britain considered within its sphere of influence. Mr. Archibald Butter and Captain Philip Maud (Royal Engineers) surveyed Ethiopia's border with British East Africa in 1902-3 and marked the 'Maud line' which was recognized in 1907 as the *de facto* Kenya-Ethiopian border.²⁸ Addis Ababa renounced Britain's attempt to rectify this border through a survey by Major Charles Gwynn (Royal Engineers) in August 1908 for excluding Ethiopian surveyors.

Changes occurring in Ethiopia's political landscape at the time influenced the subject under consideration. Menelik II did not consider the domestic use of prisoners as constituting slavery, hence he continued slave raiding into the region of study where communities had displaced into for safety.²⁹ Therefore, Britain conducted military expeditions not only to secure its sovereignty but also to prevent the depopulation of Kenya and southern Sudan by slave traders.³⁰ Sudan welcomed Britain's punitive policing to halt Ethiopian slave raids. However, despite the security of Ilemi being essential to the security of Mongalla Province (Sudan), logistical constraints prevented Sudan from consolidating gains from British expeditions with the establishment of administration.

Considering Emperor Menelik II had been the architect of Ethiopia's political edifice his death slowed down the possibility of an early settlement of disputes on the southwestern borders of the Abyssinian (Amharic) Empire. In 1908, he appointed his grandson Lij Iyasu, age 11, to succeed him but he was dethroned in 1916 before he could be crowned.³¹ Whereas Menelik had been keen on any matters pertaining to Ethiopia's sovereignty, his successor could not fill his

shoes because he was too young, too naïve in international politics, and faced by a challenge to his legitimacy. Consequently, Kenya and Sudan did not hold meaningful discussions with Ethiopia on boundary rectification until after the crowning of Emperor Haile Selassie. At that time, discussions were possible because Haile Selassie tried to reduce the power previously vested on regional governors in order to centralize bureaucracy under his personal control.³²

Before the First World War, the need to redefine the borders of British territories in Africa raised several issues that were core to future border rectification between Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan in Ilemi. In this regard, the Uganda-Sudan Boundary Commission was formed in 1914 under Captain Kelly (Royal Engineers) and Mr. H.M. Tufnell and tasked to demarcate Uganda's borders.³³ Central issues included the determination of Turkana grazing grounds, Sudan was to gain access to Lake Turkana through a lozenge of land known as the Ilemi Appendix and its eastern border was to curve outwards to Ethiopia to bring the whole Kuku ethnic community into Sudan.³⁴ Similarly, Uganda wanted to extend its boundary northwards to include into Uganda the Sudanese Acholi. The Labor Patrol of 1918 was tasked to determine the feasibility of these issues. On the ground it found tribal dispositions and grazing limits were unfixed and impossible to verify due to their shape and limits being dependent on human recollection. Furthermore, they tended to vary in size depending on season and a community's ability to protect its economic and socio-political interests. Some ethnic groups claimed as their ancestral home areas they inhabited at the time of the patrol, pasturage they had lost through war or abandoned as unproductive, and also grounds whose possession was desirable for strategic considerations. After the Labor Patrol, Britain was reluctant to invest in troops and administration north of Lake Turkana due to logistical costs and anticipated casualties in case of a military clash with Ethiopian soldiers. Besides, the Turkana west of Lake Turkana increased raids on their neighbors to regain livestock the British had confiscated and to reclaim their dignity among their pastoral neighbors.³⁵

In the meantime the Uganda Order in Council (1902) transferred Uganda's Eastern Province (Rudolf Province) to British East African Protectorate (Kenya) thereby reducing Uganda to 2/3 of its size before this order.³⁶ The territory transferred from Uganda to Kenya included the area inhabited by the Turkana and vaguely encompassed the pastures of their Ngwatela section, whose inhabitants also lived in southern Sudan. Britain suggested that Ilemi should be excised from Sudan and incorporated into Uganda, or, the portion of Uganda's former Rudolph Province containing the triangle be ceded to southern Sudan.³⁷ If neither proposal was acceptable, Kenya and Uganda could alternate the garrisoning of Ilemi Triangle with one third of the financial burden being the responsibility of Sudan.³⁸ When Sudan turned down these proposals it became urgent for the Colony and Protectorate (Boundaries) Order in Council of 1926 to redefine Kenya's territorial limit with Sudan. Britain demanded the Turkana of the borderlands should displace further south into the hinterland of the Kenya colony to benefit from British protection but by so doing they lost their fertile pastures in Ilemi to the Inyangatom and the Dassanech. By late 1926, Britain had established its administration among the Turkana but their dry season pastures in Ilemi were declared a closed frontier where no protection was forthcoming from the colonizer.³⁹ After 1926, the Kenyan colonial authorities established an administrative boundary that did not coincide with the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1907 as a measure of accommodating Turkana's ancestral grazing area within Kenya.⁴⁰ The grazing areas in question include the physical features, which afford the Turkana natural protection from livestock rustlers of Ethiopia and Sudan. This arrangement was constrained by

a number of issues. As a start, a bigger portion of the Turkana's dry weather pastures lay to the north of the 1914 line which was the portion of Ilemi not falling under Kenyan administration. Additionally, some pastoral communities who would henceforth be under British dominion were nominal subjects of the Emperor of Ethiopia and only migrated to Ilemi for dry season grazing. To compound the problem, most Sudanese and Ethiopian rustlers used secure avenues of approach provided by hills in Sudan far north of the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary and rolled down on the Turkana tending livestock in the lower grounds.

After Britain disarmed the Turkana the traditional authority and local military equation were disrupted so much that combined forces of the Inyangatom and Dassanech frequently raided the Turkana in full view of the British frontier post in Lokitaung.⁴¹ Moreover the military imbalance attracted slave raids from Ethiopia despite Emperor Haile Selassie's pledge to end slavery, which had survived in the form of captives of cattle raids being used as unpaid domestic servants in Ethiopia.⁴² To be fair, Ethiopia's frontier policing had become too costly and impossible in inaccessible remote areas after European powers limited the quantity and quality of weapons entering the country.⁴³ Toward the end of 1929 Britain realized that its success in policing Kenya's northern frontier depended on Ethiopia's capability to do the same across the common border. For this reason it recommended to other European governments to lift the arms embargo previously imposed on Ethiopia.⁴⁴

Britain was determined to establish law and order in Ilemi provided Sudan contributed £10,000 annually toward the expenses of administering the territory starting from 1931.⁴⁵ It should be realized that setting up administration was not a simple case of constructing a fort and hoisting a flag. Where roads existed they were impermanent and often passed through rugged country making the movement for troops and supplies slow and dangerous. So, Kenya claimed from Sudan an additional sum of £5,000 annually for the construction of roads and administrative infrastructure in Ilemi. Apparently, Khartoum planned to bear the responsibility for the triangle and dispatched a reconnaissance patrol to the area in January 1931 to determine the suitability of its administration. It later abandoned the plan after realizing the immense logistical difficulties that could result if a military post was opened in the area. First, supplies would have to be transported along the Nile River, then through Sudan's southern Mongalla province and across a hostile country that had no roads. Secondly, constructing an administrative center next to the Ethiopians could have invited constant friction from armed border communities whom Addis Ababa did not control effectively.⁴⁶

Late in 1931, the administrators of Mongalla (Sudan) and Turkana (Kenya) agreed that the northern limits of Turkana pastures were within the area defined by the Red Line.⁴⁷ Sudan considered it legitimate and fair that the Inyangatom and Dassanech should similarly share the grazing in eastern Ilemi during the dry spell. As a measure of accommodating everybody, from August to September 1932 the Red Line was modified with a northeasterly extension of what came to be known as the Green Line.⁴⁸ This extension was to allow the Turkana to gain access to the pastures and water holes which they were to share with the Dassanech and Inyangatom when need arose. Later, Ethiopia was to interpret the area allowed to their Dassanech and Inyangatom for grazing purposes as constituting a formal cession of eastern Ilemi to Ethiopia and hastily constructed a border outpost at Namuruputh.

Several factors explain why the determination of Ilemi was constantly procrastinated during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Britain was aware of the imminent Italian invasion but did not

care about Ethiopia's territorial integrity as long as Italy did not jeopardize Britain's geo-strategic interests in Kenya, British Somaliland, the Nile valley and Egypt. Indeed Britain's realpolitik of the period is evident in the words of one official who said: 'We are the protectors of Egypt's rights in the Nile and that is the benefit we give her and the hold we have over her'.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1936 increased the urgency for Britain to define its borders in eastern Africa to curtail Italian irredentism.⁵⁰ For instance, after occupying Ethiopia in 1936, Italy laid claim to the Ilemi on the basis that the Ethiopian Dassanech were also indigenous residents of the triangle. On this premise their migration into the territory during the dry season was not based on *tradition amicale de transhumance*, the reciprocal grazing customs among pastoral nomads, but on *une droit de possession collective* which provided for inalienable right to their Ilemi ancestral home.⁵¹ Rather than consider taking immediate steps to safeguard the interests of the disarmed Turkana, and without the consent or consultation of other herders, the 1902 Maud Line (also 1907 boundary) was hurriedly confirmed as the Kenya-Ethiopia border to protect British interests from Italian territorial ambitions.⁵² Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to mark their common boundary using meridians because terrain features did not coincide with ethnic homelands. Britain suggested that Ethiopia should cede to Sudan the Baro (Beyrou) salient where British administration had been exercised on Ethiopian communities in exchange for an area southeast of Ilemi, which Sudan had never administered.⁵³ In Britain's quid pro quo proposal, Sudan would take 11,000 square miles of the Baro salient from Ethiopia in exchange for 6,000 square miles of eastern Ilemi that would be excised to Ethiopia.⁵⁴ As an assurance to Kenya that the territorial barter did not infringe on Turkana's grazing rights Khartoum promised to rectify the Kenya-Sudan boundary to reduce the avenues through which Sudanese and Ethiopia rustlers could attack the Turkana.⁵⁵ Such adjustments would also enclose within Kenya the customary pastures of the Turkana whose limit was close to Kenya during the wet season but due to reduced browse in the dry season, they stretched further north into Sudan. However, Sudan could only offer this rectification if Ethiopia accepted the Baro-Ilemi barter.

It was important to resolve the Baro exchange quickly because Emperor Menelik had leased the 2,000 meters River Omo frontage to the authorities in Khartoum on the assumption that Sudan would remain under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.⁵⁶ Still, Sudan wanted more in the territorial concession so that it could encompass within Sudan the entire Nuer and Anuak ethnic groups including their clans that lived in Ethiopia. Britain opposed the barter because it would make the Turkana boundary co-terminus with Ethiopia, which could deny Kenya automatic right of cross-border pursuits of livestock rustlers and increase its commitment for frontier security.⁵⁷ In view of the above predicament, Kenya reiterated its proposal of being responsible for the administration and security of the whole Ilemi Triangle at the expense of Sudan, which the latter declined because the financial burden worked out by Kenya, was not commensurate with the practical task of policing it.

In 1938, a joint Kenya-Sudan survey team established an administrative line that extended the Red Line in a northeasterly direction with the intention of accommodating within Kenya the hilly grounds in north Ilemi that afforded the Turkana natural protection from raiders of Sudan. Henceforth, the Red Line was variously known as the 'Wakefield Line' after the Sudan survey team leader or 'Provisional Administrative Boundary' to mark its purpose and conditionality. The Red Line now stretched the Ilemi eastwards to include more watering and protective terrain shared by all pastoral communities. It was regarded as a temporary measure in that

proper demarcation would take place during Sudan's exchange of eastern Ilemi with Ethiopia's Baro salient.

In July 1939, a raid by the Inyangatom and Dassanech in the unadministered part of Ilemi left 250 Turkana dead; the majority of them were unarmed women and children. After Italy conceded it did not have full control of the Dassanech and Inyangatom, Britain conducted a punitive raid with the Kings African Rifles (KAR) supported by the Royal Air Force who dropped 250-pound bombs north of Ilemi. The punitive expedition was a temporary solution whose repeat was unlikely due to prohibitive financial costs and the need to honor Italo-Abyssinian airspace. Britain and Italy agreed that future punitive patrols against pastoralists of Italian Abyssinia should be the responsibility of the Sudanese Defence Forces while Kenya and Italy held their frontiers intact to disarm raiders retreating across them. Italy refused to compensate Britain, arguing that the counter-raids on the Dassanech and Inyangatom were outside the category of tribal raids in that Britain had employed conventional forces. On 10 August 1939, Italy rejected the Sudanese offer of the Baro-Ilemi exchange on the grounds that the territory to be surrendered by Ethiopia was too large and no further discussions followed due to the outbreak of the Second World War.⁵⁸

IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The build up of British troops for invading Abyssinia was conducted in Lokitaung just south of the disputed territory. The 25th East African Brigade comprised of two battalions of the Kings African Rifles (KAR) with 550 Turkana *Askari* and support elements. It employed the Turkana as vanguard and flank scouts to upset any ambushes organized by the Dassanech who had been armed, trained, and deployed by Italy. A lasting impact of this war was not only in making pastoral enemies fight each other across indeterminate boundaries, but post-war resource conflicts in the contested pastures would henceforth employ tactics and weapons acquired from the world war.⁵⁹ After Italy was defeated in 1941, troops of the KAR remained in Ilemi for six months to consolidate their victory during which the Turkana anticipated the disarming of the Dassanech and Inyangatom. Policing the armed pastoral communities of no fixed habitat was difficult for the KAR, yet disarming them was unthinkable unless they were all permanently under one jurisdiction. For this reason, Britain decided to blockade west of River Omo to reduce Dassanech encroachment on pastures of eastern Ilemi. At the time this was the plausible proposition given that Egypt was suspicious of any closed frontier policy in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and without justification refused to accept any further rectification of Sudan's border with Kenya or Ethiopia.⁶⁰ In January 1942, Ethiopia demanded Britain honor the provisions of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1907 that provided for pastoral transhumance. In reality, the blockade contravened this treaty for being located inside Ethiopia's indisputable jurisdiction. Britain withdrew but insisted that grazing was permissible in their territory if the herders were unarmed and subject to British jurisdiction as provided for in the same clause.⁶¹ There followed an awkward impasse on the interpretation of the Anglo-Ethiopia Treaty of 1907, which increased the delay of determining the future of Ilemi. At the same time, British officials in Kenya and Sudan proposed a covert adjustment of the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary point using the original surveyors without the knowledge of Ethiopia. This 'cowboy' solution was later rejected after it leaked out.⁶² After the Second World War, there was talk of establishing Sudanese authority in the disputed territory with the understanding that the logistical difficulties

envisaged by Sudan were enormous but it did not mean the country could be relieved its territorial obligation under the international law.⁶³ Conflicts amongst pastoral nomads increased after the war because without any authorities in the area to regulate their use, boreholes drilled to supply water to British troops liberating Abyssinia from Fascist Italy became instant *casus belli* (cause for war). In 1944, Britain's Foreign Office established the 'Blue Line' to the west of the Red Line, which enlarged the Ilemi triangle. The Blue Line was used from 1947 in post-war correspondence pending further negotiations that would consider the settlement of all former Italian territories in Africa.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, on 10 May 1947, Ethiopian and Sudanese officials met to rectify their common boundary but were unable to agree on where the line should run to avoid splitting the Nuer and Anuak ethnic groups. Ethiopia proposed that in exchange for the Baro salient the common boundary should include in Ethiopia the Inyangatom and Dassanech grazing grounds.⁶⁵ Ethiopia also wanted the boundary to be rectified at the north end of Lake Turkana so that the whole River Omo remained in Ethiopia to protect the traditional fishing rights of Ethiopian ethnic groups. In 1950 Sudan unilaterally established the 'Sudanese Patrol Line', which is further to the west of the 'Blue Line'.

DIFFICULTIES OF INTERPRETING MERIDIANS

Eurocentric surveyors of the Ilemi Triangle ignored local opinion and often used impermanent objects and vague vocabulary to describe the border, which has been a source of technical difficulties to both administrators and the local herders. A few examples will elucidate this point. Along the Provisional Administrative Boundary (also known as Red Line or Wakefield Line) Border Point (BP) 6 is described as 'A prominent tree on the slope of the northwestern spur of Kalukwakerith'. BP 13 is 'a prominent cedar tree on the northeastern spur of Loreniatom. This tree is on a spur named Atalocholo'. BP 16 is 'a distinctive and blazed brown olive tree in the midst of the forest', and BP 17 is 'a lone tree marked with stones at its base on a bluff'.⁶⁶ Surveyors christened the largest water mass in the region as Lake Rudolf, which local pastoral people could not pronounce or relate to. A controversial lake which lies between Kenya and Ethiopia was renamed Lake Stefanie but the local Boran know it as Chulbi, it is Galte to the Arbore community, and Chow Bahar to several Ethiopian peoples. One essential border point is Namaruputh, which exists only in colonial records and maps yet no official or local inhabitant can today pinpoint its extent or breadth on the ground. The other contentious issue is that on the northern shore of Lake Turkana (previously Lake Rudolf) the border is constantly shifting due to deforestation and other human and ecological factors that cause the lake to recede. When the Kenya-Sudan boundary was drawn one prominent landmark was a large water mass known as the Sanderson Gulf, which has since dried up thereby opening dispute on the precise point of convergence of the Kenya-Sudan-Ethiopia border. It has been opined that by failing to visit specific points on the ground the Boundary Commissions could have been deceived by a mirage in demarcating the Sanderson Gulf.⁶⁷

Sudan has consistently argued that the delineation by the Maud Line of 1902-3, which leaves the triangle in Sudan, should be the basis of determining its boundary with Kenya. Alternatively, it could be based on the Uganda Gazette of 30 May 1914 which also leaves the Ilemi in Sudan by describing the Kenya-Sudan-Ethiopia tri-junctional border point as: 'A line beginning at a point, on the shore of the Sanderson Gulf, Lake Rudolf, due east...'⁶⁸ However, the Gazette does not say whether this line begins in the east, west, north, or south of the gulf.

The precision of the border here is important to Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan because it could determine the breadth of the Ilemi Appendix, which is a north-south narrow strip measuring about 150 miles by 200 miles. This proposed finger-like projection extending from Sudan due south was intended to give Sudanese and Ethiopian pastoralists access to the water of Lake Turkana. Sudan's future plan was to use its access to Lake Turkana to construct a railway line for transporting food to the lake then by water using boats to consumers of Kenya's hinterland.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the description of the border using indeterminate reference points on the ground makes it impossible for pastoral nomads to respect it and it would take disproportionate time and personnel to police it to prevent intercommunity violence.⁷⁰




Figure 2. This illustration is not a substitute for survey records.

OFFICIAL INDIFFERENCE

Britain's 'hands off' policy on the determination of the sovereignty of Ilemi to ensure peace among the herders cannot be isolated from its overall administrative policies after the Second World War and geo-strategic intentions for colonial possession in eastern Africa. In this respect, sympathy is expressed with the opinion that Britain would have resolved the Ilemi

dispute had its neighbor been France or Belgium and not Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.⁷¹ It is important to briefly review the attitude and arrangements for British military and civilian officers serving in colonial Kenya and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

British administrators received training in Oxford and Cambridge, which in theory prepared them for complicated security and administrative duties in the colonies.⁷² Others visited Yemen, Aden, and the Persian Gulf to gain experience of administering nomadic communities. Nevertheless, the British soldier-administrator found the complexity of Ilemi beyond any paradigm particularly after the outbreak of war with Italy in 1939. Furthermore, Turkana then part of Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD) was a 'Closed District' where movement was restricted and administrators forced to live unmarried which frustrated them.⁷³ Abortive punitive expeditions had indicated that the cost of developing the arid region could not be offset by taxes on the evasive pastoral nomads whose nationality was determined by ecological exigencies such as migration to reduce pressure on exhausted land or escape livestock diseases. Hence, most administrators working in Turkana district were out of touch with the pastoral rhythm of life and needs of the frontier at the grassroots level.⁷⁴ Albeit a generalization, Kenya's borderlands remained only important as a strategic buffer for future wars and to prevent pleuro-pneumonia, rinderpest and smallpox from spreading to the agricultural farmlands occupied by white settler farmers. Therefore, the authorities of Kenya saw Turkanaland and the Northern Frontier Districts as only suitable for the incarceration of political detainees such as Jomo Kenyatta and ignored serious problems of pastoral security and economic development.

Similarly, the authorities of Sudan did not evince genuine commitment to a resolution of the problem of administering the Ilemi Triangle. It is noted that during the adjustment of the Kenya-Uganda boundary in 1931 the Karamojong and Pokot pastoral nomads did not experience any serious problem of security or transhumance across the international boundary.⁷⁵ The Sudan-Kenya boundary was similarly between countries under Britain and running across pastoral country, so, why was there a problem of delimiting Ilemi? Unlike the Uganda-Kenya boundary the determination of Ilemi involved Ethiopia, a country proud of its history of political independence, and Egypt, which though incorporated in the administration of Sudan through the Anglo-Egyptian condominium was skeptical of any belated boundary adjustments by Britain. It may be deduced that Egypt also considered Sudan's unilateral attempt to rectify its borders as a surreptitious attempt to acquire some independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.⁷⁶ After the Second World War, Britain's attitude in Southern Sudan increased suspicion about its long-term intentions in eastern Africa, which delayed attempts to finalize demarcations along Sudan's border with Kenya. British administrators posted in southern Sudan lacked commitment and were succeeded by Barons who implemented the policy of separation before it was officially introduced. For example, British officials excluded southern Sudanese from decision-making arguing that, 'the ethnic diversity and comparative backwardness of southern tribes precludes the selection of suitable indigenous representatives'.⁷⁷ Due to a conspicuous north-south cleavage and post-war political uncertainty it was speculated that southern Sudan might split in the future and join Uganda. This suspicion was underpinned by Britain's lack of socioeconomic development of the south and its reliance on missionaries and philanthropist organizations to open the region for commerce and education.⁷⁸ Therefore post-colonial governments of Sudan inherited a legacy of negative attitudes that the Ilemi was troublesome, undesirable, and its economic development costly in

human and financial resources. Despite the importance of its pasture to various Sudanese peoples the territory was only suitable for exchange with Ethiopia's Baro salient.

Any rectification of regional boundaries after 1960 has tended to be half-hearted measures that evade the most important issue of the delimitation and administration of the disputed pastures. For example, Kenyan and Ethiopian officials met in 1964 to rectify the common boundary where Kenya surrendered Gaddaduma in exchange for Godoma and Namuruputh. Godoma has no strategic value to Kenya but Namuruputh, which lies at the tri-junctional Kenya-Sudan-Ethiopia point, is important for future negotiations with Sudan.⁷⁹ By conceding Namuruputh, Ethiopia erected an unnecessary obstacle to future negotiations for their Dassanech access to Lake Turkana while ignoring their grazing interests and traditional linkage to eastern Ilemi.⁸⁰ The haste in which Kenya and Ethiopia rushed through border agreements in the early 1960s should be seen against the backdrop of good rapport which existed between President Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie. Apart from friendship at a personal level, the two statesmen were influenced by superpower clientele competition of the period and shared threat perception from Somalia nationalism in Somali-inhabited enclaves of Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Ethiopia's Ogaden province.⁸¹ Nevertheless, Kenya's wisdom in surrendering Gaddaduma is difficult to ascertain considering boundary commissions had in the past emphasized the strategic importance of the wells as being technically too concentrated to be subdivided and too precious to go to either Kenya or Ethiopia.⁸² In July 1964, it was suggested that Kenya, Sudan and Uganda should rectify tripartite points on the boundary over western Ilemi to curb large scale organized rustlings and predatory expansion which were causing famine, indiscriminate bloodletting and ethnic displacements. Leslie Walters, Kenya's boundary consultant and representative in the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary rectification, surrendered his British citizenship in favor of a Kenyan one to enhance his acceptability by the Sudanese negotiators.⁸³ The meeting never took place. Meanwhile on 18 July 1972, an exchange of notes between Ethiopia and Sudan failed to settle the question of the Baro salient or make arrangements to stop banditry and establish peaceful coexistence among the pastoral people.⁸⁴ This exchange recognized that future discussions on the southern terminal point of the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary should include Kenya.

In recent times Ilemi has been sidelined by higher priorities in each country's security. For instance, in the post-independence era, Khartoum's focus has been the war with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and various offshoot factions. Over the same period Ethiopians have been also been preoccupied with civil war and external conflicts, such as the 1977-78 Ogaden War with Somalia, which was supported by the former USSR, the war for the liberation of Eritrea, the collapse of Mengistu's authoritarianism, and the current territorial disputes with Eritrea.

Kenya too has had different security priorities. After independence from Britain, Jomo Kenyatta's immediate frontier security commitment was in the former NFD where pan-Somalia nationalism tied Kenya to a four-year secessionist conflict known as the Shifta war, which was supported by the Republic of Somalia.⁸⁵ In August 1967, President Kenyatta tried to win the sympathy of Britain on the determination of the Kenya-Sudan boundary by proposing the recognition of the Red Line as the international Kenya-Sudan boundary.⁸⁶ On the same premise the straight line of 1914, which places the whole of the Ilemi Triangle within Sudan was to be treated as null and void by virtue of having been superseded by the modified Red Line.

Thereafter Kenya has not officially pursued the matter with Sudan although it maintains a police post in the area marked by the Red Line.⁸⁷

Without exonerating the former colonizer from blame for the uncertainty it planted in Ilemi Triangle, the current territorial claims by both Kenya and Sudan have credibility gaps. First, Kenya's claim that Sudan and Britain accepted the Red Line as the common border requires verification by documentary evidence. Be that as it may, Kenya would still experience difficulties explaining its unilateral demarcation of the Blue Line in 1944, which was adopted as the boundary in 1947, as this would constitute an encroachment on Sudanese territory. Similarly, unilateral border surveys by Sudan beg an explanation. Its demarcation of the Sudanese Patrol Line of 1950, which is west of the Blue Line, prohibits Kenyan and Ethiopian pastoralists from using pastures or water west of the line and henceforth authorities in Khartoum abandoned policing duties or economic development east of the line. This could imply a 'silent' territorial concession to Kenya and Ethiopia to resources east of the Sudan Patrol Line but the interpretation of such action under the international law is beyond the current investigation.

THE FUTURE OF THE ILEMI DISPUTE

The Ilemi triangle of conflict should be seen in the context of a wider problem affecting transhumant peoples of the region. Despite the current climate of good relations in the region each party to the dispute has either ignored the sovereignty of Ilemi or exploited the uncertainty for short-term political goals. For instance, Uganda may currently not stake any territorial claims to the triangle but its Didinga community needs the dry season pastures. The sovereignty of Ilemi has not featured in Uganda's current rapprochement with Sudan despite having been a safe haven for various insurgent movements such as the Lord's Resistance Army.⁸⁸ At present the threat of insurgency is so minimal that the priority for the authorities in Kampala is the disarming of the Karamojong ethnic group, which started in 2001. But the leaders may soon realize that the establishment of law and order today in southern Sudan generally and Ilemi in particular is crucial for Uganda's future security.

Ethiopia has allowed the problem to remain dormant and has been derelict in its responsibility of securing the needs of pastoral Dassanech. In the 1990s, the current Ethiopian government armed the Dassanech with new Kalashnikov automatics in recognition of their vulnerability from the Kenyan Turkana and Sudanese cattle thieves, but failed to seek a firm border settlement that could safeguard their grazing interests in the disputed Triangle.⁸⁹ Arming the Dassanech raises a number of issues. One, because they are the stakeholders for Ethiopia's territorial claim to eastern Ilemi, the current government turns a blind eye when they raid Kenya for livestock. The Kokai massacre of March 1997 when the Dassanech shot 47 Kenyan Boran lends weight to this perspective. The other possibility is that the community is being used as a strategic shield to Ethiopia's vulnerable southern flank. Emperor Menelik II armed and employed the community in this way in the nineteenth century and Italy did the same before the outbreak of the Second World War. Ethiopia's special relationship with the Dassanech does not advance the community's claim to Ilemi and it waters down the extant Kenya-Ethiopia mutual defense pact.

Arguably Sudan has more leverage over other disputants but it has not only abrogated its responsibility but also consistently destabilized the area controlled by the SPLA.⁹⁰ In the last

decade alone it is estimated the Toposa have received 50,000 firearms from the government excluding landmines.⁹¹ Overall it is estimated the government of Sudan has injected more than 250,000 firearms to border communities of southern Sudan to destabilize the SPLA.⁹² Sudan's action has made Ilemi more costly to administer and more 'unwanted' by any future government despite its significance to the lives of the local pastoral people.

Despite manning a frontier post in Ilemi today, Kenya's future linkage to the disputed territory is difficult to establish due to official secrecy and conspiracy theories. For instance, before President Moi came to power in 1978, maps of Kenya showed the contested area in dotted lines with the words 'provisional/administrative boundary'. After 1978, Kenyan maps omit the straight Maud Line and draw the triangle in a continuous line. By implication, the provisionality of Ilemi does not exist. This supports the claim that President Moi's government entered a covert deal with the government of Sudan, which ceded Ilemi to Kenya in exchange for halting military support for the SPLA through the Turkana ethnic community. The other theory is that the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) cut a deal with Moi's government in exchange for logistical support in the ongoing civil war and accommodation of its officials. Medical treatment of wounded combatants of the SPLA in Kenya and the presence of SPLM officials in Nairobi, Kenya's capital, support the latter view. Furthermore, for the last two decades President Moi has been arming the Turkana, leading to speculation that the firearms are for dominating the area claimed by Kenya. It is unthinkable that Moi's government could enjoy its current cordial relations with the antagonists of the Sudan civil war without secretly having given something in return. Regardless, it is worth remembering that promissory bargains that lack legislative mandate are unlikely to survive regime changes.

Finally, it is important to briefly comment on the significance of Ilemi after the events of 11 September 2001 in New York. In July and August 2002, the USA sponsored a series of talks in Machakos, Kenya, to end the war in southern Sudan.⁹³ With the future of oil supplies from the Middle East being uncertain, the USA now realizes the importance of stabilizing oil-rich southern Sudan.⁹⁴ So far the sovereignty of Ilemi has not featured in this consideration and it is inconceivable how enduring peace and international cooperation can be achieved without embracing the 'people of the periphery' in the economic social and political rhythm of the mainstream society.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Whereas colonial surveyors ignored local peoples in their demarcations, bilateral rectification of the international boundaries by regional governments in the post-colonial period have short-changed the pastoral nomads and failed to show a keen interest in resolving the dispute. The Kenya-Ethiopia boundary agreement, which bartered Gaddaduma wells for Godoma and Namuruputh, neither reinforced Kenya's claim to the contested territory nor confirm the extent of the customary pastures of the Turkana in the hills north of the disputed triangle. By excluding Sudan, the bilateral boundary negotiations restricted their achievements to an exchange of territories without long-term significance. Similarly, the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary rectification of 1972 fell short of a viable long-term solution inasmuch as it did not redefine where the boundary should run over the Baro salient. As Kenya did not participate in the exchange of notes, it was not possible to determine the location of the Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border north of Lake Turkana.

What is required is a tripartite boundary rectification in which Sudan barter Eastern Ilemi to Ethiopia in exchange for the Baro salient and Kenya extends its border northward to encompass the customary pastures of the Turkana. Khartoum should consider the determination of the legal regime in Ilemi an integral element of the peace initiative it is currently pursuing in the south and good neighbor image it is cultivating with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the international society. Likewise, Ethiopia and Kenya should consider the long-term welfare of their nomadic nationals herding in the disputed territory and prioritize their embracement into the economic and political life of the nation-state. In view of the prevailing ‘hands off’ attitude and chronic insulation of people of the periphery, have we not time-travelled to 6th December 1907, when the official perception of the significance of the disputed Ilemi Triangle contrasts with that of the local herders who constantly kill for its resourceful pastures?

NOTES

¹Kenya National Archives(KNA), Nairobi. DC/ISO/2/5/5 ‘The Kenya/Sudan boundary and the Ilemi Triangle’ in Isiolo District Reports. See illustration Fig 1. Also, consult, ‘Elemi triangle, World Statistics Atlases’ <http://worldatlas.brinkster.net/asp/terr>; and, ‘Appendix F: cross-reference list of geographical names’, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs>.

²Ibid.

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- ¹⁴ Fig. 1. Also consult, Blake, Gerald. *Imperial Boundary Making: The diary of Captain Kelly and the Sudan-Uganda Boundary Commission of 1913*. Oxford: British Academy, 1997, p.99.
- ¹⁵ Consult, Kurimoto, Esei. "Resonance of Age Systems in S-E Sudan." Kurimoto and Simonse, *Conflict Age & Power*, p. 48; Cmd. 9798 'Report on the administration of the Sudan for the year 1950-51' London: His Majesty's Stationery, 1956, p.659.
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- ¹⁷ Almagor, Uri. *Pastoral Partners Affinity and Bond Partnership Among the Dassanech of Southwest Ethiopia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978. Also consult, Austin, Major. *With MacDonal in Uganda*. London: Edward Arnold, 1903, p. 187-189.
- ¹⁸ Fig. 1.
- ¹⁹ The terms nomadism and transhumance may be applied to clear-cut forms of land use with distinct socioeconomic systems but in this analysis, nomadism will be assumed to include transhumance.
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Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II

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ABSTRACT

Morocco's King Hassan II died on 23 July 1999 and was succeeded by his son Muhammad VI. Much of the media coverage of Hassan II following his death portrayed him as a champion of democracy and human rights in the region. Was this really the case? Was Morocco under Hassan II becoming a more democratic and open society? This paper critically examines King Hassan's legacy, challenges and opportunities it poses for his heir Muhammad VI. The paper also discusses Morocco's prospects for democratic deepening under the new leader.

INTRODUCTION

On 23 July 1999, the royal palace of the Al'awid dynasty in Rabat, Morocco, announced the death of Hassan II, the 70-year-old monarch who ruled Morocco for 38 years. Since the ill health of the king had been known for years, many Moroccans and others had speculated over what his death and the ascendancy of his son Muhammad would mean for Morocco. It is too early to assess the transition of power in Morocco, but not too soon to reflect upon the record of Hassan II and the challenges facing his successor Muhammad VI. This paper examines with the legacy of King Hassan II in the areas of human rights and democracy and also attempts to assess the prospects for change under his successor Muhammad VI.

Under Hassan's leadership, Morocco played a key role in the Middle East peace process and was a staunch ally of the United States during the Cold War. It remained an ally of the United States in the post-Cold War period, so much so that the king sent troops as part of the Gulf War coalition against Saddam Hussein despite the fierce objections of the Moroccan people. While other Arab nations struggled with the increasing militancy of various Islamist groups, Hassan's Morocco gave the appearance of a stable nation. At his death, most Moroccan and foreign media reports of both Hassan's rule and his legacy were filled with praise for the King's leadership both at home and abroad. Many media accounts of the King's rule, glossed over his iron-fisted rule of Morocco. Instead they focused on the last ten years of his reign portraying him as a protector of human rights and a messenger of democracy.¹

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It has been argued by the United States and others, that in the last few years of Hassan's rule Morocco was becoming a more democratic and open society.² This article questions whether this is the case and evaluates what steps Morocco, under Hassan II, had taken to instill principles of democracy and the protection of civil liberties and human rights in society.

GOD, KING AND COUNTRY

Not unlike Turkey, Morocco has played a special role in the international arena as a border state. Geography and history have made both countries links between east and west. However, Morocco's role is a bit more complicated since it finds itself not only as a bridge between the Arab world and the Western world, but also as a bridge between Black Africa and Arab Africa. Historically, Morocco has had a long connection with sub-Saharan Africa. This includes the Almoravid dynasty's (1073-1147) controlled areas reaching from Andalusia to Senegal. It is from this era that the seeds of the current Western Sahara dispute emerge. The history of slavery, including the use of a sub-Saharan slave army unit by Mawlay Ismail (1672-1727) to subdue the greater Fes region and the Gnawa movement, which originated out of it, demonstrates another connection between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. Today Morocco serves as a conduit for many West Africans, on their way to Europe. Increasingly, however, many West Africans are remaining in Morocco. This is adding to Morocco's rich cultural fabric, but is also creating tensions in the troubled economy.

Under Hassan II, Morocco took its role as a bridge nation seriously. Hassan II was adept at playing to many sides. Domestically, he could co-opt members of various parties, squelch dissent, crush enemies, and still be regarded by many as a beloved monarch. On the international front, he could be a trusted Arab mediator in the Middle East conflict, while also gaining the support not only of Morocco's Jewish population, but also of many in the west. He was one of the first Arab leaders to extend an invitation for a visit to an Israeli head of government, Shimon Peres. He also signed an agreement with Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi (later rescinded after the goal of getting Libya to end its support of the POLISARIO was accomplished) while simultaneously courting both the United States and Europe. Hassan II's accomplishments can, in large part, be attributed to his position as the monarch of Morocco and to his position as *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful). The legitimacy of the Moroccan regime is predicated on the Sharifian principle which suggests Moroccan rulers be direct descendants of the Prophet. This creates what Waltz has called a psychological contract.³ The relationship between the king and his subjects was often described as paternal. Moreover, the fact that Al'awid kings have been able to claim descent from Muhammad have further endeared them in the hearts of Moroccans.

To be sure, the longevity of the Al'awid dynasty, one of the oldest in the world, contributed to Hassan's prestige as did a series of myths and symbols encouraged and often created by the monarchy to promote its own legitimacy. It was Ahmad al Mansur of the Sa'di dynasty (1548-1641), feeling vulnerable to the powers of both the sufi *shaykhs* (religious leaders) and the *tariqas* (brotherhoods), who seized the Prophet's birthday as a chance to increase the monarch's legitimacy and staged huge celebrations to which only the most important of the kingdom's citizens were invited.⁴ This became a tool to help maintain social order and to help publicize the Monarch's lineage from the Prophet and continues to function in this way. The candle parade in Sale marks the Prophet's birthday and includes floats, which use a variety of symbols to illustrate the trinity of the monarch's foundation: God, King and Country. Symbols supporting this idea are found throughout Morocco. Thus, the Prophet's birthday is a political tool to remind the citizens of Morocco not to challenge the integrity of the trinity. By linking himself to God, through the Prophet, the monarch ensures that challenges to his divine right to rule are indeed

challenges to God. Hassan II explained this to a reporter from *Newsweek* to whom he was displaying a gold-plated ceiling which contained a series of names: “Those are the names of my ancestors, every one of them dating back to the Prophet . . . Do you know what that means? That means I have legitimacy. I am both temporal and spiritual ruler of my people.”⁵

Further, the third element, country, has been elevated to this trinity so that no one will challenge Morocco’s territorial integrity, including its illegal seizure and occupation of the Western Sahara. The invasion of Western Sahara was meant to detract attention away from the internal growing dissent over Hassan II’s autocratic rule and symbolizes his attempt at populism. To challenge any of these three tenets invites arrest. This trinity has become so entrenched that even human rights groups within Morocco balk at discussing the Western Sahara as a self-determination or human rights issue.⁶ By making any challenge to the tripartite components of the monarch’s ruling strategy not only illegal, but also un-Islamic, the king’s legitimacy to rule is beyond question. Ironically many attribute Morocco’s ability to hold the Islamists at bay, despite the turmoil next door in Algeria,⁷ to the king’s position as commander of the faithful. It is this position that enabled the monarchy to retain stature and power under French colonialism (1912-1956) and to emerge as the symbol of nationalism during the struggle for independence. But it is also this position that has operated to stifle virtually all opposition over the years.

DEMOCRACY

For years Hassan II argued that Morocco was an open and democratic society.⁸ During all that time, the international community had raised questions about these assertions. The appointment, in February of 1998, of opposition leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi of the Socialist Union for Popular Forces (USFP) as Prime Minister was at first heralded by many as evidence that Morocco not only tolerated opposition, but was in fact a true democracy. There were those who were skeptical.⁹ The 1997 elections, which were judged an improvement over earlier elections by international monitoring agencies, may have left the impression that Morocco is moving toward democracy. Thus, international pressure on Morocco to democratize was lessened. However, these recent political developments must be read in the appropriate historical and political contexts.

Hassan’s flirtation with democracy began with the 1962 constitution. Yet, as Bendourou notes about the constitution of 1962 and those that followed it in 1970, 1972, and 1992, each was designed by the king and ratified by popular vote. Each confirms the preeminence of the monarchy and the subordination to it of all other political institutions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial.¹⁰ Under article 19 of the 1962 constitution, the king was designated as the commander of the faithful. The king was to be the spiritual link between his people and God. Thus the king is the final authority for each branch of government as well as for all things religious. Traditionally in Islamic societies almost every aspect of life, political and non-political, is guided by the Ko’ran, the Hadiths and other religious teachings. As a result of article 19, true constitutional monarchy was prevented. The king commented on the idea of a constitutional monarchy for Morocco in 1992:

Islam forbids me from implementing a constitutional monarchy in which I, the king, delegate all my powers and reign without governing . . . I can delegate power, but I do not have the right, on my own initiative, to abstain from my prerogatives, because they are also spiritual.¹¹

Instead of a democratic constitutional monarchy, many talk about a Hassanian democracy. This democracy allowed for multiple political parties as long as the king's position as leader of the country and the faith was not questioned.¹² Despite a Hassanian democracy and the public's apparent acceptance of the trinity concept, the Moroccan political scene has been marred by a state of emergency (1965-71), two failed military coups (1971 and 1972), corrupt elections, including vote-buying, rigid patron-client relationships, and administrative interference, media censorship, and the use of deadly force to crush true opposition.¹³ One of the most disturbing examples of the regime's intolerance of opposition was the 1965 riots in which hundreds of protesters were killed by government forces.¹⁴ The riots symbolized the growing rift between the monarchy and the opposition who were calling for an end to monarchical rule in Morocco. Opposition to the monarchy has boiled over into other riots as well in 1981, 1984, 1990, 1999, each effectively crushed by the security apparatus.

The monarch's preferred method of dealing with the opposition, however, has been through co-optation rather than naked force. The monarch is the largest landholder in Morocco, although it was illegal to talk about or question the royal family's assets. As such, the Monarch was able to dole out its acres, along with government contracts, to co-opt opposition members into the fold. Being in good graces with the monarch has meant wealth and being out of favor has been dangerous. When co-optation failed, the regime silenced opposition through a variety of techniques including arrests, torture, disappearances and murder.¹⁵ The punishment often extended beyond the dissenter to his/her family, as was demonstrated by the arrest and detention for almost 20 years of General Oufkir's family.¹⁶ General Oufkir allegedly was the man behind the 1972 failed coup attempt in which the king's plane was strafed. Official reports claimed Oufkir committed suicide, but questions remain about the general's death.¹⁷

The end of the cold war brought many political changes around the world. The failure of communism and the triumph of democracy put pressure on all authoritarian regimes to begin to democratize. To the king's credit, he appeared to recognize the changing tide of the international political scene and understood that his techniques employed to stifle the opposition were becoming internationally unacceptable.

As a result, the government-led *Mouvement de Contestation* (or the questioning of the system) was launched in 1995. This was an attempt by the administration to respond to outside demands for democracy and transparency and resulted in yet another constitution in 1996.¹⁸ This constitution was supported by the former opposition USFP, but was opposed by others including the Islamists and many Berber organizations. Prior to the 1996 constitution and the subsequent 1997 elections, the king's administration had a pattern of interfering with the political parties. This interference included preventing left and center left parties from participating, and arresting their leaders.¹⁹

The king had tried to keep a close watch on the Islamist organizations and parties within the state as well. His various attacks on them included harassment, censorship and arrests, including time in a psychological hospital for the leader of the main Islamist party, the Justice and Charity Party. The party's leader, Abd al Salam Yacine, was placed under house arrest after getting out of the hospital.²⁰ One change the *Mouvement de Contestation* brought was that it allowed for a very small role for the Islamists. Moderate Islamists gained 10 MP slots in the 1997 election. The defection in 2000 of two right-wing party members to the Islamic Party for Development and Justice allowed the party to form a parliamentary group in the lower house for the first time.²¹

The 1997 elections which began the new electoral cycle of the 1996 constitution included elections for the lower house of the bicameral legislature, the Majlis an-Nawwab, using a first-past-the-post system whereby the candidate with the most votes win. This contrasts with the proportional representation system, which provides for representation based on the percentage of votes received by each party. The upper house, Majlis al-Mustasharin, is elected by municipalities, trade unions, and professional organizations.²² The 1997 elections were generally considered an improvement over previous elections, yet there were still questions about its legitimacy, particularly in rural areas where patron-client relationships remained strong. The administrative interference in elections as well as other aspects of a civil society shore up a point made by a leading government critic Hassan Aourid, who believes that the Moroccan administration's true enemy is civil society.²³

One of the key Moroccan administrative figures who remained uninterested in democracy was the Interior Minister Driss Basri. He was in charge of the state security apparatus. Over the years, Basri and his vast network of patron-client relationships had proven too formidable to challenge. Despite the prevalence of the opposition USFP in the government, the king would continue to appoint both the Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Minister. Thus there are two political layers in Morocco, one where the actual power lies, and another where the political parties operate. This has created an illusion that has enabled the monarchy to give the impression that multi-party democracy is at work.²⁴ Retention of the right to appoint the interior and foreign ministers as well as retention of the right for final approval of all cabinet ministers suggests that the recently administered changes, including the *Mouvement de Contestation* and appointment of Youssoufi as Prime Minister, were part of Hassan II's tradition of a democracy shell game. This game has consisted of constitutional reforms, electoral reallocations, and the co-opting of the opposition, all of which continually thwarted any attempt at real reform. So the question now is whether Muhammad VI will initiate an era of real democracy or will he be unwilling or unable to break the cycle of power his father has set in motion?

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

A brief note about the economic environment in which Hassan's democracy functioned is relevant to this discussion. Morocco's attempt to democratize was less a result of Hassan II's sudden embrace of democratic principles than part of Morocco's campaign to become a member of the European Union (EU). Morocco submitted its application in July of 1987, but was turned down. Certainly the fact that Morocco is not in Europe played a role in the EU's decision, however the EU's critique of Morocco's application focused on 1) the general lack of democracy; 2) human rights abuses, including torture; 3) detention of political prisoners; 4) the use of the death penalty; and 5) occupation of the Western Sahara.²⁵ Still, Morocco continues to court Europe and is particularly interested in the Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, which proposes to create a free trade zone, with agricultural products excluded, in the Mediterranean area. The hurdles are many as northern Europe is interested in Moroccan agricultural products but unwilling to invest in the region, instead preferring Eastern Europe. Southern Europe by contrast is less interested in the competition for its products, but more interested in investing in Morocco, particularly investing money from the northern European countries.²⁶ Additionally, human rights and democratization concerns will figure into any attempt to include Morocco in the Mediterranean Initiative.

Economic integration is viewed by the monarch as key to Morocco's economic development. Morocco's economic problems are many and include a huge foreign debt, a growing population, two-thirds of

whom are under the age of 25, an unemployment rate conservatively estimated at 25 percent, and years of recurring drought. The education system is bursting at the seams in urban areas.²⁷ Complicating matters, the 1994 census revealed that for the first time in Morocco's history, its urban population outnumbered its rural population.²⁸ Additionally, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing and many Moroccans are fleeing to Europe in search of economic opportunities.

Morocco's increasingly desperate economic situation led it to adopt structural adjustment programs (SAP) from international financial institutions. (SAPs refer to loans granted to countries, which come with conditions, or conditionalities. These conditions typically include devaluation of local currency, reduction of government spending, privatization of state-owned enterprises and greater access to domestic markets for foreign corporations). As a result, some prices, such as gasoline, were liberalized and some subsidies were removed, while others were decreased. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), total government expenditures on both education and health decreased or remained static while the population continued to grow.²⁹

For example, from 1980 to 1990, the share of Morocco's gross domestic product (GDP) going for public consumption decreased from 19 to 17 percent.³⁰ While privatization efforts did sell off state assets worth \$390 million in 1994, it was questionable whether these efforts would go much further.³¹ Given that the royal family is the largest landowner and that the royal family's holding company, *Omnium Nord Africain*, controls so many Moroccan business enterprises, true privatization is unlikely. The tradition of using economic prizes, including land and government contracts, for supporters as well as to co-opt the opposition, has also hampered Morocco's ability to fully implement the SAPs. The black market, which may be as much as 50 percent of Morocco's economy, is estimated to be worth more than \$3 billion annually. The drug trade is estimated to be \$2 billion annually.³² Both of these have eased the effects of the SAPs somewhat, but they have also proven problematic as foreign investors balk at the government's inability to deal effectively with the black market and drug trade and at their apparent complicity in both. As the economy struggled under the SAP imposed conditions, Hassan II searched for ways to deflect criticism. In an odd twist, despite Hassan II's reluctance to allow opposition, he went on record asking the opposition to share responsibility for the economic and social measures that must be taken as part of the structural adjustment process.³³

Despite the adjustments to the economy, Morocco's debt did not decline and only a small portion of the urban population benefited and rural folks were certainly worse off due to the administration's inability or unwillingness to muster the necessary resources to deal with recurring droughts.³⁴ One result of this economic stagnation has been increased illegal migration to Europe via the Straits of Gibraltar.

Migration to Europe has been a way to release the economic and demographic pressures in Morocco, however, it has also proven to be problematic. European businesses desiring cheap immigrant labor have been encouraging the loosening of restrictions on immigration, particularly from North Africa. On the other hand, the success of various right wing anti-immigrant parties in several European countries (including France, Austria and Switzerland) and the increased violence against immigrants in European countries such as France, the favored destination of many Moroccans, has led to an unwillingness by Europeans to welcome continued immigration. Many Moroccan families have relatives in Europe and remittances back to Morocco are playing an increasingly important role in the Moroccan economy. Economic development of Morocco is seen as the key to preventing so much emigration. Each year dozens of Moroccans die attempting to illegally cross the Straits of Gibraltar.

The role of the drug trade in providing at least some economic development has not been missed by either the Europeans or the United States. The United States has been less concerned about the drug trade in Morocco and has given a wink and nod to Morocco regarding its alleged eradication programs. A drive along the main roads through the Rif areas allows the casual observer plenty of views of both large and small marijuana fields. Thus, United States-Moroccan realpolitik dictates drug policy.³⁵ By trying to both initiate democratic reforms and to liberalize its economy, the Moroccan monarchy has placed its population and its own survival in a precarious position. Removing or reducing the limited social safety net while allowing citizens to increasingly voice their opinions proves to be a difficult balance. With such a young population facing high unemployment rates and so little hope for a better future, many youths are in need of an outlet for expressing their frustrations. These frustrations are unlikely to be accommodated by the increasingly gerontocratic nature of most of the political parties in Morocco. While many Moroccans have fled to Europe, those who cannot flee are becoming increasingly politicized. Graduates with no job prospects have begun to form associations and have increasingly found appeal in the rhetoric of Islamists.³⁶ Therefore, true democracy that would allow for participation of all parties worries some leaders. Fear of an Algerian-type uprising such as that led by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) looms heavy on their minds. To some, democracy equals anarchy.³⁷ The danger according to Sivan is that the attempt at liberalization by burdening the excluded has unintentionally fueled radical Islamism . . . Now more than ever, the state-security apparatus has become the ultimate guarantee of the regime's survival.³⁸

HUMAN RIGHTS

One measure of Hassan's success at democratizing is Morocco's human rights record.³⁹ While the country's human rights record had improved in the years preceding Hassan's death, there were still many areas of concern.⁴⁰ Despite strong United States-Moroccan relations, the United States Department of State *Country Report for 1998* pointed out Morocco's questionable human rights record. It noted some improvement under the Youssoufi government, but also expressed concern over the use of torture and abuse of detainees by security forces, harsh prison conditions, illegal detention, faulty judicial procedural processes, a judiciary corrupted by the interior ministry, media censorship, restriction of demonstrations and child labor. Other areas of concern included restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion and movement, discrimination against women and the underreporting and under-investigating of domestic violence against women. And while there had been three years of no new cases of government-forced disappearances prior to 1998, there still were hundreds of unsolved cases dating back some twenty years. Some of the citizens who had been released were still being harassed by the security apparatus.⁴¹

Moroccan human rights groups struggled to both publicize the government's abuses and to put pressure on the administration of Hassan II to improve its human rights record. However, over the years, these human rights organizations have only had limited success. The impotence of domestic human rights organizations derives, in part, from their close ties to the various political parties in Morocco.⁴² One of the first human rights organizations, the *Association Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (AMDF), 1972, was linked with left wing political parties, and since the political left were themselves targets of the regime, the organization had very little room for maneuver. The emergence of a right wing affiliated human rights organization, *Ligue Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (LMDH), strained the legitimacy of the human rights movement because of the organization's unwillingness to denounce regime attacks

on members of the left. The legitimacy of both organizations was questionable given their initial unwillingness to deal with domestic issues, preferring instead to only issue communiqués about the plight of the Palestinians. Their unwillingness to question the occupation of the Western Sahara, to demand information on the disappeared Saharawis, and to fully articulate the human rights issues of women, raised questions about their own commitment to human rights as well as to their legitimacy.

Later, as the organizations became bolder, the unwillingness of Moroccan media to release any communiqués from the human rights groups about domestic human rights issues hindered the organizations' effectiveness.⁴³ In addition to being hurt by their connections to various political parties, internal human rights groups have struggled with the repressive environment in which they have tried to operate. One of the first independent human rights organization, the *Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (OMHD) emerged on the scene and their presence, along with Hassan II's attempt at recovering Morocco's image after its invasion of the Western Sahara, contributed to the 1979 ratification of both human rights covenants (the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* 1966), a significant though minor step. The question remained, however, whether the monarch really would protect the human rights to which he had just committed his nation. The answer turned out to be negative. In an attempt to be sure no group or movement remained outside his control for too long, the king established the *Concile Consultative des Droits l'Homme* (CCDH). The CCDH was to act as an advisor to the king on human rights; but more importantly, its role was to appease criticism from the outside by demonstrating the king's dedication to human rights.⁴⁴

Morocco's relationship with various external human rights organizations over the years was strained at best. The role of outside human rights groups and international pressure regarding Morocco's human rights record has been critical for the advancement of the human rights agenda in Morocco. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International (AI) had worked diligently to gain access to information about Morocco's political prisoners and those who had disappeared. Hassan's well-reported battles with AI left Morocco bruised on the world stage. The king's refusal to admit the existence of the notorious Tazmamart prison caused the regime much embarrassment when AI released its report about the abuses that had been occurring there. Later, the regime let it be known that the prison was closed and the king commented, "That chapter is closed. It was; it is no more."⁴⁵ In response to international pressure, apparently spurred on by AI, the regime released hundreds of political prisoners despite the king's repeated statements denying their existence. In 1993, as a result of the international pressure, Morocco ratified the *Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women*, the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment*, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* and the *Convention on the Rights of Migrants*, albeit with substantial reservations.⁴⁶

Additionally, the preamble to the 1996 constitution expressed Morocco's unreserved commitment to human rights 'as universally recognized.' Despite these recent improvements, AI noted in 1999 in an open letter to the King that there had been no accountability for those who had disappeared, including hundreds in the Western Sahara, and no investigations had been conducted into the torture and deaths of persons while in custody. Also, in 1999, AI noted that torture continued, as did the illegal detention of political prisoners. AI has called for those responsible to be brought to justice and the victims compensated.⁴⁷

The positive changes that occurred in the last years of Hassan's II's rule included the release of roughly 95 percent of all political prisoners, the signing of international human rights conventions, the acceptance of internationally promulgated human rights norms in the constitution and a rise in consciousness about human rights among Moroccans. There remained however, important officials, Basri, for example, who viewed the human rights movement as a threat to the state. For those in the human rights movement, exacting justice on those responsible for past human rights abuses continued to be an area of concern as did resolution of cases of the disappeared. This promised to be particularly difficult given that most of the perpetrators of human rights abuses remained in power.

WOMEN

Morocco, like many Islamic countries is wrestling with the challenges of modernity in the context of religious and cultural dictates. Nowhere is this more evident than in the struggle over issues of gender, specifically what role women should play in society and how best to integrate their concerns with the policies which govern the state. Certainly any discussion of human rights and democracy in Morocco must include a discussion of the status of one-half of its population, its women.

In Morocco, women are subject to secular law as well as religious law under the *Mudawwanah*, the Personal Status Code. The Moroccan government has fought off all Islamist attempts at influencing policy, except where it concerns women, instead allowing the *ulama* (Muslim religious leaders) enormous say over the fate of women. Moroccan human rights groups have been relatively silent on the issue of women's rights. While these groups have demanded a civil society with political equality, they have not challenged the dual legal system that women are forced to endure.⁴⁸

Many in Morocco, including academics, religious and political leaders, have tried to dismiss feminism as a Western or imperialist ideology, but as Naciri notes, this divests the women's movement of all legitimacy because this discourse implies that the demands made by the movement are not among the preoccupations of the overwhelming majority of women.⁴⁹ The women's movement in Morocco can be divided into two phases: the first was focused on literacy and social assistance for women and children, and the second, developed in the mid-1980s, focused on the re-evaluation of women's identity and status in society.⁵⁰ These are issues relevant to all women and the movement is driven by Moroccan women who want change, not exclusion. The concerns raised by the women's groups are more in line with Islamic teachings, especially those emerging out of Islam's golden age, than current *ulama* (Muslim religious leaders) are willing to admit.⁵¹

Moroccan women are increasingly organized in efforts to advocate their concerns. Recent changes are both evident and subtle. The visible changes include the increased activity since 1985 of women's organizations. The same year saw the opening of the first shelter for battered women. There now are three such shelters in Morocco where both psychological and legal advice is dispensed. The shelters are overwhelmed as women from every class in Moroccan society show up for assistance. Although the shelters have faced very little resistance, they have received no government funding.⁵² The biggest problem facing women, according to Miadi, a leading activist and Islamic legal expert, is illiteracy. According to UNICEF, in 2000 illiteracy rates for males fifteen and older was 38.1 percent while for females it was 63.9 percent. This problem is furthered by the disparity in access to education for girls. Women's rate of primary and secondary school attendance is abysmal. Yet, women represent the majority of graduates from institutions of higher education.⁵³ Increasingly, Moroccan society is relying on women to keep its economic sectors viable. Yet these same women face a variety of discriminatory

practices which hinder their full participation in economic and political life. Male religious authorities have argued that limiting women's access to public life protects women by protecting the traditional notions of segregated gender roles.⁵⁴ Perhaps a more fruitful way to assist women would be to demand equal pay for women and acceptable working conditions.

Hassan II recognized women's key role in the political arena when he said that it was women and intellectuals (apparently mutually exclusive categories) who were the bulwarks against the spread of the Islamist movement in Morocco.⁵⁵ Yet their acceptance in public life in Morocco remains dictated by the rules established by the men in power. As women increasingly enter into the public arena through the job market, changes are bound to occur. Some of these already are underway. Increasingly, women are putting off marriage until after the age of thirty, and as one young Moroccan woman told the author, "I have a job, a car, a house. What do I need a man around for, to tell me what to do?" In addition to delaying marriage, Morocco's divorce rate is a staggering fifty percent.⁵⁶ Also, it is no longer only men who are fleeing for the economic opportunities of Europe, women too have been emigrating. Their experiences abroad will no doubt alter their perceptions of their own culture, as will continued exposure to the world beyond Morocco's borders. The desire for this within Morocco is symbolized by the ubiquitous satellite dish, which offers Moroccan women a glimpse of the possibilities. These types of quiet changes do not usually make the front pages of the local press, but no doubt will have a long-term impact on Moroccan society. If Morocco becomes a democratic society with women continuing to outnumber men in voting, the new king will have to respond to the growing gender divide in Moroccan society.

THE WESTERN SAHARA

Again, no discussion of human rights and democracy in Morocco would be complete without a discussion of the Western Sahara. One point of contention between Hassan II and the international community had been the fate of the Western Sahara. As Spain (1973-74) prepared its former colony, Spanish Sahara, for independence, Hassan II was gearing up to take control of the phosphate-rich land. Despite having earlier advocated Saharan independence, the King sought international adjudication of Morocco's claim to the land.⁵⁷ The International Court of Justice, while acknowledging a historic connection between Morocco and Mauritania (another country making claims upon the Sahara), found that neither should have sovereignty over the area. The indigenous Saharawi population's demand for self-determination, via the political organization POLISARIO, was thwarted by Morocco.

Despite the International Court of Justice's ruling, Hassan II invaded the Western Sahara in 1975 in what the King called the Green March. Bringing more than 350,000 people including the military with him, the king occupied the area. Morocco's continued occupation is in violation of the court's ruling and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. Even the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), an organization not known for taking very controversial stands, expressed its displeasure with Morocco's actions by allowing the POLISARIO membership. Morocco's reaction was to withdraw from the organization.

Settlement negotiations are underway, but major stumbling blocks have yet to be removed. There is an agreement on the need for a referendum, but one key unsettled issue is who will be allowed to participate in that referendum. The 1991 ceasefire between the POLISARIO and Morocco has been monitored by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Saharan (MINURSO).

MINURSO has undertaken the task of identifying eligible participants for the referendum. The identification procedure provided for an appeal process. While the identification stage has been completed, the appeal process has stalled. Hassan II had argued that all Western Saharans be allowed to participate, including those who participated in or were descendants of those involved in the Green March. Additional debate has centered around the question of who among the Saharawis should be able to participate in the referendum. Many Saharawis have fled to neighboring countries since Morocco's invasion, while others have gone to Europe. Hassan II had argued that those Saharawis should not be eligible to participate in the referendum. When Hassan II died, the Western Sahara issue was still unresolved.

MUHAMMAD VI

The new monarch, therefore, has a full plate of challenges before him. In addition to attempting to fill his father's shoes and presiding over a developing country, Muhammad VI must demonstrate his skill at balancing the increasing demands for democratization and human rights protection with the established old guard's desire to maintain the status quo. Add to all of this, the referendum issue for the Western Sahara and Algeria's continued civil strife, and it becomes clear that the young monarch has little time to settle into the job.

Democratic political culture does not easily emerge out of a society socialized in the ways of monarchical rule. This raises certain questions. Can Morocco sustain a civil society? And will the monarchy be willing to both foster and allow its growth? More subtly, will the monarch be able to restrain the powers of the Minister of the Interior and will the USFP, itself just getting used to the reins of power, be willing to allow the kind of opposition necessary for a civil society? As Sivan notes, the obstacles to democracy are many and include the general acceptance of authority in Islam tradition.⁵⁸ School children are taught, for example, not to question their teachers, and memorization over critical thinking dominates pedagogy. The experience with democracy in Algeria has frightened many of the Moroccan ruling elite and has led to the perception that democracy equals anarchy. Also, the austere measures Morocco has implemented have only served to undermine people's faith in the system.⁵⁹ Muhammad VI is aware of the international pressure on Morocco to democratize and has said that:

“Morocco has a lot to do in terms of democracy. The daily practice of democracy evolves over time. Trying to apply a Western democratic system to countries of the Maghreb, the Middle East or the Gulf would be a mistake.... I have a lot of respect for counties where the practice of democracy is highly developed. I think however, that each country has to have its own specific features of democracy”.⁶⁰

What those specific features may be for Morocco is unclear. Regarding human rights, the new monarch is not off to an auspicious start. Muhammad VI allowed monitors to visit the notorious Tazmamart prison and has promised compensation for some of its victims. Toward that end, a commission has been set up to decide on issues of compensation for past victims of torture and kidnapping at the hands of the government.⁶¹ The commission's focus is on compensation rather than pursuing justice. The question of how Sahrawi's disappearances will be handled remains. Muhammad VI has released Yacine from house arrest and allowed some political exiles to return home. Yet, he faces an uphill battle, despite promises to improve Morocco's human rights record. The generals now control all intelligence, foreign and domestic, and his security forces have worked to thwart his attempts to improve Morocco's human

rights record.⁶² In December of 2000, peaceful demonstrators were beaten and arrested. Those arrested included Abderrahmane Benameur and other prominent members of the Moroccan Human Rights Association. Of his arrest Benameur said “[A]s everybody could see, the makhzen (the secretive royal court hierarchy believed to be behind most major decisions in Morocco) has returned to its old habits and repressive behavior.”⁶³ With regard to human rights the King has said, “[I]t would be wrong to say that Morocco has made a great leap forward.”⁶⁴

Initially human rights activists were cautiously optimistic about Muhammad’s rule, but recently they have expressed serious concerns about the presence of the old guard. Despite the replacement of Interior Minister Driss Basri in late 1999, many human rights activists are still concerned about the old guard’s influence. The present agenda of human rights organizations includes: reforming legislation, creation an independent judiciary, and human rights violations in connection to political prisoners which include kidnappings, torture, access to political rights, and passports, and extending freedom of expression.⁶⁵ The issue of rights for women, however, is not on their agenda. And despite rhetoric from the ruling Socialist party, women have been left out of government debate. According to the *La Ligue Democratique pour les Droits de la Femme* (the Democratic League for Women’s Rights, the LDDF) the Prime Minister omitted the plan of ‘Action for the Integration of Women in Development’ from the agenda of the Council of Ministers meeting on 28 October 1999. Unsurprisingly, much opposition has come from the Minister of Islamic Affaires.⁶⁶ Women’s development is a much-neglected aspect of Moroccan society and human rights groups and failure to address this issue will continue to threaten their own legitimacy.

Positive signs in Muhammad’s short reign include the accord reached between the Democratic Association of the Women of Morocco (ADF) and the government.⁶⁷ In addition, the new King has spoken about allowing women to preach in Morocco’s mosques and has appointed Aicha Belarbi ambassador to the EU, making her only the second woman ambassador.⁶⁸ In fact, for the September 2002 elections, the election law was changed to ensure that thirty seats in Parliament would be reserved for women. While reserving seats for women in the legislature has become a bit of a global trend, Morocco became the first Arab nation to set aside so many seats for women.⁶⁹ However Muhammad VI has not addressed the situation of child abuse and slavery, a worsening situation. In 1999, there were an estimated 10,000 homeless children in Casablanca alone. Tens of thousands of children are forced to work as prostitutes. The incidents of parents selling their children, particularly the girls, as servants has been increasing along with cases of sexual and physical abuse.⁷⁰

How much pressure domestic human rights organizations will be able to apply is questionable because of state restraints and internal problems within the organizations. These problems include a close affiliation with political parties and a top-heavy leadership. According to one insider, the organizations themselves need to both democratize and to modernize.⁷¹ With regard to the question of democratization, many Moroccans are optimistic that the reforms initiated by Hassan II and the continued international pressure will make democratization all but inevitable in Morocco. The key, many argue, is education.

According to one human rights activist, human rights will not improve without the eradication of poverty and the promotion of social justice, both of which are vital to democracy and the protection of human rights.⁷² Since his predecessor made no real attempt to deal with these issues, it remains to be seen how the new king will respond to these challenges.

The education sector is in serious trouble, particularly in rural areas. School attendance in rural areas is less than half that of urban areas, where school attendance is already low.⁷³ Illiteracy was a problem when Morocco became independent and continues to be widespread. Despite a 1963 law making primary education compulsory, there is no mechanism for its enforcement.⁷⁴ At the level of higher education there is a 50 percent dropout rate. Despite the low numbers of women in the primary and secondary levels, they tend to outnumber the males in higher education due to the low rate of male retention. While higher education is relatively free, getting into a college or university is very difficult because there are not enough slots for those applying. The curriculum in higher education is rigid. It tracks the students based on high school courses and does not employ an interdisciplinary curriculum. This rigidity in part explains the draw of the increasing number of private schools. There are forty in Casablanca alone. Many of these are adopting a Western approach to higher education and focus more on interdisciplinary training and on courses such as computers and management. However, tuition is unaffordable for the majority, and there currently exists no accreditation system for private schools to regulate quality.⁷⁵ Additionally, many students are pushing for more English language instruction as many believe the ability to speak English will become increasingly important if Morocco is to be a significant player in the arena of global capitalism. This has met with some resistance as French has traditionally been the language of instruction for higher education.

The new king has said that education and unemployment are key to his long term strategy for Morocco, but he was circumspect about how, for example, the new scholarships for deserving poor students to attend higher educational institutions would be funded. Regarding fiscal policies, he has spoken about the need for the government to be more prudent with public funds and urged Moroccans to pay their taxes in order to fund the treasury.⁷⁶ The king has set up a special fund to which citizens can donate money that will be used for poverty programs. This has met with very little success as middle class Moroccans struggle under difficult economic times.

Political liberalization, such as it has been, has gone hand in hand with economic liberalization. Many economic questions loom large on the horizon including Morocco's continued struggle with SAPs, the worldwide drop in phosphate prices (a major Moroccan export), ongoing droughts which have devastated parts of the rural economy, the emigration and resulting brain drain of Moroccans to Europe (the phrase many Moroccans use to sum up this situation is to call itself Spain's Mexico), the black market and drug trafficking. Additionally, Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara remains an economic and political handicap. The occupation of the Western Sahara has cost Morocco more than \$2 billion, with billions more having been spent on twenty years of warfare against the POLISARIO.⁷⁷ Since 1975, Morocco has spent roughly \$1 million per day on the Western Sahara.⁷⁸

Attempts to settle the referendum issue under the new king have not been successful. The United Nations continues to monitor the situation through MINURSO and has extended its mandate until 28 November 2001. The groundwork for undermining recent attempts at a solution seems to be underway. The July 2000 referendum was postponed as both sides continued to disagree over identification of eligible voters. In 1999, the Moroccan Foreign Minister said that thousands of eligible Moroccan votes have been left out of the pre-2000 referendum census. The Saharawis, too, argue that 48,000 of them have been left out as well.⁷⁹ Given Morocco's economic investment and its emotional connection to the Western Sahara, few doubt the outcome of the referendum. The only remaining question will then be what cost Morocco is willing to pay for its continued retention of the Western Sahara.

CONCLUSION

Morocco's attempt to overcome the human rights record of Hassan II, under his more liberal minded son will not be easy. While Hassan II was an adept politician and a player in the international arena, his success at maintaining relative stability in Morocco and his ability to thwart various challenges to his rule must be measured against the cost society was asked to bear for his accomplishments. With regard to observing human rights and instituting democracy, Hassan II moved reluctantly toward both, bowing to international pressure when expedient and ruling with an iron fist when he deemed necessary.

Will the recent economic reforms work? According to Barkey, if the benefits accruing to ruling elites outweigh the costs in terms of diminished control over economic and political decisions, then the reforms will work.⁸⁰ In addition to the many elites whose appetites need satiating, there are many exiles returning home in hopes that Muhammad VI's rule will provide an opportunity to rejoin the political elite. The ruling elite also includes the military from whose ranks came two coup attempts. They too have a vested interest in the gains made in the Western Sahara, and it is to them that the king would turn for civil order should the need arise. Thus the military bears watching.⁸¹

What then do we make of Barkey's statement? There is very little in Morocco's history to suggest that the ruling elite will accept a loss of control over economic and political decisions. The past history of SAPs in other countries suggests that the elite will be the main economic beneficiary and this may very well work to undermine the commitment of the regime to both democracy and human rights' protection. The international community's response to Morocco's actions will also be worth watching. Whatever may happen in Morocco, it is likely it will continue to be an ally of the United States.

The Clinton administration's devotion to the country was not without precedent. The United States has its oldest peace treaty (1787) with Morocco. Aside from Egypt, the largest recipient in Africa or Arab countries of United States aid has been Morocco. In return, Morocco has allowed the United States Navy to use its port facilities and has granted the United States Air Force refueling, overflight, and landing rights. This relationship extends to the area of intelligence and communications. Moroccan and United States authorities have worked closely together to monitor anti-Western or destabilizing regimes in Africa.⁸² Additionally, Morocco produces key resources, has been a useful negotiator in the Middle East peace talks, was an ally with the United States during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and is seen by many in Washington as a bulwark against Islamists. Given the events of September 11th 2001, this is an even more important relationship for Washington. Morocco's European neighbors must pay close attention to events in Morocco as anti-immigrant sentiment is rising in those countries receiving the bulk of Morocco's emigrés. Morocco's economic development is seen as the key to halting the flow of Moroccans into Europe.

Regionally, an opportunity has opened with the death of Hassan II for Morocco to improve its relationship with Algeria. Their joint border has been closed since 1994. This relationship with Algeria may well be contingent upon the outcome of the Western Sahara referendum. The settlement of the Western Sahara will impact Morocco's relationships with not only Algeria and the United Nations, but also with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), from which Morocco has been estranged since the organization's acceptance of the POLISARIO as the legitimate representatives of the Saharawis.

Muhammad VI's limited political experience has only begun to be tested. At present, there is little evidence to suggest that Muhammad VI will govern much differently than his father, but certainly the challenges he faces may force a rethinking of the palace's traditional approach to ruling.

NOTES

1. See for example, the *New York Times*, 29 July 1999, p. 1, *The Boston Globe*, 29 July 1999, p. A17, *The Daily Telegraph* (London) July 26, 1999, p. 23, *L'opinion* (Morocco) 26 July 1999.
2. See for example, the *United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices-Morocco*, 1998, found at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report
3. Waltz, Susan. *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
4. Ibid.
5. Gupte, Pranay. The Blood of the Prophet Found at http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/wa/ov3705_1.htm. 1999.
6. Nouaydi, Abdelazia July 1999. Member of the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights. Personal communication.
7. Algeria's movement toward democracy was thwarted when polling indicated that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would likely win December 1991 elections. To prevent this, the Algerian military took control of the government and a state of civil war followed which has left over 20,000 dead.
8. This paper does not attempt to address the question of what is the proper definition of democracy, but rather employs a definition of democracy which looks at elections, government institutions, government interference in free association and party independence, and government response to opposition.
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12. Bendourou 1996.
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15. See Amnesty International Reports and United States Department of State, Country Reports, 1998, *United State Department of State Country Report: Morocco 1998*. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998, for examples.

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 21. Panafrican News Agency. Islamic Party Creates Parliamentary Group. 11 October 1999.
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 24. Nouaydi 1999.
 25. Dawson, Carl. The Social and Economic Development of Morocco. Paper presented at the University of Pittsburgh, 21 June 1999.
 26. Ibid.
 27. Of Morocco's 2.5 million girls of primary school age, over half live in rural areas. Yet a mere 27% of rural girls are enrolled in primary school. Additionally, only half of rural boys are enrolled while in urban areas enrollment rates are over 90%. These rural and urban inequities especially affect rural women and girls whose illiteracy rate is 89%. (1994 Moroccan census.) USAID statistics found at <http://usembassy-morocco.org.ma/Services/usaid/educat.htm>
 28. Gregory 1999.
 29. *International Monetary Fund*. IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/42, Morocco: Statistical Appendix, Washington, D.C., April 1998.
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 31. Barkey 1995.
 32. Dawson 1999.
 33. Leveau, Remy. Morocco at the Crossroads. *Mediterranean Politics* 2 (2), 1997, p. 110.
 34. Brand, Laurie A. *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998.
 35. In personal communications with the author, a U.S. embassy official acknowledged the enormous economic role of the drug trade in Morocco. When asked about how this squares with U.S. official drug policy, the official retreated and said he had not seen any drugs in Morocco.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Sivan 1997 p.113.

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38. Ibid.
39. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between human rights and democracy please see *Democratization and the Protection of Human Rights: Challenges and Contradictions*, Patricia J. Campbell and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, eds. Praeger Publishers, 1998.
40. For the purposes of this paper, human rights refers to civil and political rights. For more information regarding this, please see the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 1966.
41. United States Department of State, Country Reports, 1998,. *United State Department of State Country Report: Morocco 1998*. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.
42. Nouadyi 1999 and Waltz 1995.
43. Waltz 1995.
44. Nouaydi 1999.
45. Waltz 1995, p. 212.
46. Ibid.
47. Amnesty International. Open Letter to his Majesty King Mohammed VI of Morocco, August 8. Found at http://www.africanews...Morocco/stories/19990804_feat1.html, 1999.
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49. Naciri 1998.
50. Naciri 1998, p. 7.
51. The golden age refers to a 400-year period beginning in the mid-9th century when Islamic culture began to emerge as a dominant force in learning and the arts. Women's conditions improved in many countries as Islam spread across the Middle East, North Africa and Asia.
52. Zineb Miadi, Former director of center for battered women and expert on Islamic law. Interviewed 30 July 1999.
53. It is worth noting here that a very tiny portion of Moroccans attend post-secondary educational institutions. Entrance exams are difficult. This helps keep the number of qualified students attending university to a minimum, thus preventing an overburdened higher education system.
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55. Naciri 1998, p. 18.
56. Brand 1998.
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 79. *Panafrican News Agency* Morocco Appoints New Co-ordinator for U.N. Mission. 30 September 1999.
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On The Subject Of Kings And Queens: “Traditional” African Leadership And The Diasporal Imagination

AL-YASHA ILHAAM WILLIAMS¹

Then you will die indeed, Chila Kintasi! Your own mouth pronounced judgment. Die and deliver the land from the abominations of drunkenness and gluttony. (She used a bunch of soft feather [sic] attached on a bamboo stick on the Fon [King]. The Fon begins to reel until he collapses.) Die! Chila Kintasi. Die, Fon! So that we may think. The people need your death to think. Die! Die! Die!... The only men left in the land are the women. And they do not want any more Fons....

—Kwengong, from Bole Butake’s play *And Palm Wine Will Flow*

The ‘historical conditions’ must of course not be imagined (nor will they be so constructed) as mysterious Powers (in the background); on the contrary, they are created and maintained by men (and will in due course be altered by them): it is the actions taking place before us that allow us to see what they are.

—Bertolt Brecht, from “A Short Organum for the Theater”

INTRODUCTION

These two excerpts show that the role of leadership is a highly contested and tenuous space. Cameroonian playwright Bole Butake’s *And Palm Wine Will Flow* presents a dramatic representation of women who challenge a corrupt leadership and rethink the distribution of authority, while German playwright Bertolt Brecht’s essay “A Short Organum for the Theater” suggests that power in societal institutions is maintained or changed by its citizens.

Drawing illustrations from Cameroon’s history especially its colonization by Germany, the following discussion of “kings and queens” explores some of the conventions (of what I interchangeably call) “traditional”, “pre-colonial” and/or “hereditary” African leadership and authority systems and its influence on the construction of a Diasporal “imagination”. I use the term “traditional” not to invoke a philosophical binary with “modern” or “modernism” but to denote indigenous forms of African cultural group identity formation and nation-state governance that predate substantial European colonial influence, which is to say, pre- late 18th and early 20th century. This is then contrasted with the “modern” African nation-state which retains vestiges of European colonialism in land redistribution, amalgamated cultural/linguistic groupings and, as I argue, political structure. For example, on this account, the cultural groupings and leadership of the “traditional” nation-state of Yoruba had a different arrangement than the “modern” nation-state of Nigeria, which fuses Yoruba with other “traditional” nation-states by retaining British land delineations and governmental procedures.

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My argument is inspired by Benedict Anderson's analysis of nationalism that suggests that "imagination" plays a role in any conception of leadership, identity, boundary or ideology that delineates a nation and that literature is often instrumental in creating these notions of group identity.² I use the term imagination to argue that the emphasis on regal power typifying African American conceptions of traditional African leadership and society are not based entirely on historical or archeological facts about African nations.

The Diasporal imagination has been constructed by contrasting the contemporary poverty and political upheaval faced by many contemporary African nations, such that the stable, rich, respected and powerful kingdoms of old seem to represent the best of times. I argue that, specifically, the concept of "kings and queens" is based on a largely romantic nostalgia that, for the purposes of recovering a lost African identity and dignity, ultimately serves no valuable end for Africans in the Diaspora. I will also propose that the democratic aspects of traditional leadership and authority systems were instrumental in mediating the autocracy of the kingdom but were deeply undermined by colonialism, but are now diminished in contemporary understandings of traditional governance in the Diaspora.

DIASPORAL IMAGINATION

In the African Diaspora, literary forms such as slave narratives, rap songs, cultural theologies and sociological research often posit hierarchical leadership as redemption of African heritage. The perception of dynastic Kemet as the world's greatest civilization, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I as a messianic figure or the extensive chiefdoms of the Asante and Yoruba as representative of traditional African culture reverberates in Afrocentric scholarly discourse and in religious communities on New World soil.

On some accounts, it would seem integral to the reconstruction of African identity to recreate systems of hierarchical governance. The importance of royalty and status of various forms can be found, for example, in a press announcement of the Ausar Auset Society for the 25th Anniversary King's Day Ceremony. The announcement describes the invited guests as "Kings, Queen Mothers, diplomats, members of the entertainment world, business community and a host of international community leaders from around the African Diasporan World..."³

Similar ideas of reclaiming and teaching lost African royal heritage and culture can be found, for example, in the Yoruba faith-based Oyotunji Village in South Carolina. This New World Yoruba community is led by Oba Osejeman Ofuntola Adefunmi, who claims leadership through initiation to the priesthood of Obatala, Ifa, and receipt of the "sword of the state" by the reigning Ooni of Ife His Majesty Okunade Sijuwade Olubuse II. The community replicates a hierarchy of kings, queens, chiefs and priests with the sanction of the contemporary Yoruba leadership in Nigeria. According to Adefunmi, "the emphasis is on the resurrection of Afrikan culture and traditions... We have devoted ourselves to the rehabilitation of the Afrikan American people who had suffered most grievously during the Slave Trade..."⁴

The Diasporal interest in "kings and queens" builds upon the idea that the denied legacy of royalty is among the many injustices of the transatlantic slave trade. The precept that chattel slavery usurped the rightful dominion of would-be kings and queens is among the earliest African American literary themes. For example, in the 1789 narrative of Olaudah Equiano, the "kidnapped prince" employs tenacity and wit to become educated and worldly while in bondage,

and later writing and publishing his life story.⁵ While Equiano argues that slavery is completely unjust, it is clear that it is his inherent sense of place that gives him the will and ability to overcome his imposed degradation. In this and other slave narratives the middle passage and continuous dispersal of African American families during slavery results in a “social death” due to the destruction of traditional lineages and familial structures, thus creating an environment of emotional tension.⁶

The destruction of kinship groups and the lineages inscribed therein has remained a popular theme in African American literature, often reflected in arguments and discourses of leadership, the family and/or work and gender roles. Many discussions of poverty and youth violence revisit the destruction of the family unit and point to a lack of a powerful father figure or patriarch as a leading concern. Reprising these themes in hip hop, a discourse especially concerned with wealth, power and domination, many songs and personas are built around the rise to power of a king(pin) from poverty and oppression. A recent rap song by Nas ascribes both the strength and frustration of African American manhood as the result of the “blood of a slave” coursing through the “heart of a king.”⁷

TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

It’s no surprise that kingly authority would be posited as the ideal for a scattered and oppressed people. It would seem to provide Diasporal culture with a foundation toward the establishment of its cohesive identity and connection to Africa. But a philosophical analysis, by Godfrey Tangwa, of the political structure and stability of pre-colonial African kingdoms, some relatively large such as Ghana, Songhai, Benin, Bornu, and Sokoto, and others relatively small such as Nso’, Bafut, Kom reveals a combination of leadership strategies, including the important role of democratic processes in traditional governance.⁸ Tangwa for example, argues that traditional African leadership and authority systems might be understood somewhat paradoxically as the “harmonious marriage between autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy.” Specific formal practices (which vary between cultures) positioned the citizenry is to authorize, critique and sanction the ascension of their ruler, his/her continued reign and the selection and ascension of his/her successor.⁹

These procedures are also described by Michael Tabuwe Aletum as “the exercise of democracy in traditional institutions... [through] checks and balances” imposed by citizenry participation in the transition and maintenance of leadership.¹⁰ As an example he describes the Bafut kingdom, of Bamenda, Cameroon, where “when the new ruler has been installed, he is presented to the Bafut population for ‘stoning.’”¹¹ The ceremonial stoning may consist of tiny, harmless pebbles in the case of an approved and respected new leader, or of large, injurious rocks hurled so as to maim, chase off or kill the undesired incumbent. In either case it reminds the new ruler what could happen if his rule became illegitimate. However, if the leader survived the coronation, dethronement after the fact was unlikely. Robert and Pat Ritzenthaler note that “[t]he stoning indicates that this is the last chance the people have to treat as mortal the man they are elevating to the chieftainship. From this time onward he becomes a king and a god.”¹²

The choice of a leader was politically charged and if contestation arose, many traditional African cultures employed ritual checks and balances for resolving conflicts, especially those relating to succession issues. Some offices had categorical requirements of gender or age that narrowed the competition. In some cases certain responsibilities fell to the eldest male or youngest female, or

choices could be made between several people of approximately the same age. A prescribed inheritance pattern that connected certain classes or families is sometimes required. For example, Tangwa describes a particular strategy where the leader is chosen from a committee comprised of distinct gender and class representatives.¹³

There were also checks and balances among traditional administrators. While some top offices were lifetime appointments, other titles were graded whereby one could enter the kingdom in one administrative capacity but might hope, with time and good assessments, to be promoted. Chieftaincies could be graded according to status and population size as first, second, and third class, for example. These grades were also politically important and dependent on their level of rank and popularity, chiefs could have lesser or greater influence on community life and resources.¹⁴

Noble status in pre-colonial African society thus often depended upon both, the fact of birth and some form of community approval. To use a familiar philosophical turn of phrase, both are necessary and neither is sufficient in isolation. Other ritual acts and elements, such as ceremonial objects with an established protocol for usage (for example, stools, palaces, caps, cups, etc.) could not be wielded at the King's whim. The ritual objects were psychologically invested with ancestral power thus inhibiting their abuse. Aletum notes again, "[I]f the transfer of power in the above societies [did] not follow the customs and traditions dictated by the ancestors, the usurper after sitting on the ancestral stool suffer[ed] a serious mishap such as sterility, madness or even death. This also [was] true for a rightful chief going against the decision taken by the people while at the same time drinking from the ancestral cup to which he swore allegiance to the people."¹⁵

The reign of a particular king, however loved or despised, was never more significant than the endurance of the kingdom itself. Iterating Brutus's declaration of loving Rome more than a wayward Caesar, Tangwa observes that when the ruler was perceived to be a political liability, "[i]n some traditional African Kingdoms the King/Queen could even be quietly executed or asked to voluntarily drink poison if his/her continued reign was considered dangerous for the survival and/or well-being of the Kingdom."¹⁶ Auxiliary authorities, often of a highly respected religious and/or elder status (for e.g., the Queen-Mother, traditional councils, healers, shamans and secret societies) bestowed and/or removed kingship and continually advised the King in roles that mediated the autocracy of the kingdom;

For while the King or Queen generally appeared very powerful (especially from outside) and his/her word could frequently condemn anyone to death, s/he was, nevertheless, subject to very strict control, not only by means of taboos but from institutions and personalities of very high moral authority and integrity whose main preoccupation was protection and safeguarding of the Kingdom as distinguished from the King, the interests of the ordinary person, the land, the ancestors and the unborn.¹⁷

The distinction between the role of kings and queens before, during and after colonialism is important and goes toward the broader issue of the appeal of kingly authority in the Diaspora imagination. In a philosophically-motivated account of African cultural identity giving specific attention to "traditional" and "modern" conceptions of authority in Ghana, Kwame Anthony Appiah has contended that the subordination of Asantehene to colonial authority was not as

extreme as the colonial experience might have suggested.¹⁸ Appiah further demonstrates the persistence of African traditional authority during and after colonialism.

Appiah also contends that in some cases what might appear as the persistence of the King's authority *despite* colonialism might be a result *of* colonialism, such that colonialism tipped the scale of autocracy and democracy in favor of the King.¹⁹ The democratic aspects of traditional leadership was weakened by the colonial process, and kings and queens did not generally allow the lay citizen's interests to take priority in the national response to colonial invasion. Thus, if the King did not suffer much diminishment during colonialism (according to Appiah), a number of his subjects clearly did.

Tangwa argues that in contrast to the balance of authority and democracy exhibited in traditional African leadership, "[i]t is the various colonial administrations which introduced pure dictatorships, that is, dictatorships without any checks and balances, in Africa...."²⁰ As a case in point, Tangwa analyses the conditions that led to the surrender of the Nso' to German colonial occupation. In a story that seems relatively typical, an existing rivalry with the Bamum Kingdom (historically, "ancestral brothers of the Nso'") was intensified and exploited by the Germans to their advantage, such that Bamum allies participated in the German attack and won a victory over the Nso' that Germany's prior intimidation tactics alone had not produced.²¹ Captain Houtmann Glauning received notice of surrender from the Fon of Nso', Sëëm II, on June 6, 1906, marking the formal transition in the region from traditional to colonial rule, at which point many citizens of the Nso' state were conscripted for plantation work and ivory poaching. Sëëm II died not long after, but under his successors the Nso' kingdom continued to operate alongside German colonial authority. Paul Mzeka's history of the Nso' kingdom notes that during this time, Nso' leadership took a notably different form. While exercising less control of the nation's resources, the Fon, paradoxically, ruled with more brutal intensity than before. "Pre-German survivors in Nso' insist that coercive use of authority in certain areas of Nso' culture was imitated from the German colonial administration, which used physical force as an instrument of administration."²²

"Physical force" as the means by which African leaders exerted their authority was apparently exceptional before colonialism. Potentially highly exploitative practices such as polygamy and taxation were possible because of citizen deference to kingly authority and via specific ceremonial procedures and limitations. Little coercion was needed in the average case. But new authoritarian demands, such as the widespread seizure and redistribution of land and forced manual labor with minimal compensation, were apparently different matters.

Over the course of Cameroon's colonial experience, German leaders gradually began influencing the chain of command. Harry Rudin's dissertation on German colonial policy in Cameroon notes that "by decree of 1913 no chief was to be removed from his post and no native was to be appointed chief except with the consent of the governor."²³ This policy and others suggest that traditional governance structures were co-opted, becoming sanctioned by and collaborating with colonists in acquiring power and profits at the expense of an increasingly burdened citizenry. Leading up to the decree, "[i]n 1909 Governor Satz instructed local officials to show proper respect for native chieftains and warned administrators against whipping chieftains or in other ways weakening their authority over tribesmen."²⁴ In return for "proper respect," the chieftains maintained sufficient local authority to carry out "the responsibility of collecting taxes in the colony when taxation of natives was adopted as a regular policy, their compensation being 5 to

10 percent of the amounts collected.”²⁵ The taxation policy compelled people toward plantations where work conditions yielded little money and an “appalling death rate.”²⁶

Certainly at this point it becomes important to ask, to what extent did African leadership remain “traditional,” as colonial forces seemed to determine leadership positions and domestic authority structures. It also appears that the presence of more vicious (and thus more effective) rulers impressed traditional leaders to emulate their ways and means. Some actively sought out the religion and culture of their colonizers in order to assimilate and partake in the power to which they had been subjugated. One example regarding colonial religion comes from Sultan Njoya of Bamum, who changed his religion from traditional animism to Islam as a result of a nearby Fulani triumph, then to Christianity following the German invasion, then back to Islam after the Treaty of Versailles. One could argue that he consistently followed the animist belief in gods of different names, powers and properties, by choosing the most powerful god of the day, but in the end he declared allegiance to Islam. It is said that the Sultan resented giving up alcohol consumption as a Muslim and polygamy as a Christian, and thus synthesized elements of (or vacillated between) the two monotheistic religions.²⁷

It is deeply ironic that Diasporal Imagination would valorize the aspect of traditional leadership that seems in some cases to have been empowered by slavery and colonialism at the expense of democratic processes and the popular citizenry. Most of these contemporary notions of African royalty, reference a conception of African antiquity rather than the actual state of affairs.

At this point in time, the advantages (or prospects) of traditional governance on the continent are varied and dubious for nobles as well as their subjects. In contemporary Cameroon I have seen malnourished Bafut royals in rags, and Queens who perform traditional dances for tourists asking for a second round of tips (as the first round goes to the Fon). As to the visible economic disparity and depravation among the children, each of the Fon’s wives is expected to be self-supporting.²⁸ However, each receives a minimal stipend from the Fon on behalf of her children, but to which she apparently contributes.

In general, these days’ advantages of any traditional role probably lie in relation or connection to the ruling party government. Reciprocally, some politicians contend that the chances of being chosen for traditional leadership might be improved if one has held ministerial or other government offices.²⁹ I would also venture that in general, traditional leaders from areas that have resisted western capitalism, urbanization or territorial encroachment, do not speak colonial languages such as French or English, and/or do not participate in national elections (such as the Baka, the indigene and most economically oppressed group in Cameroon) are less likely to influence the government and their “subjects” may continue to face problems of poverty and neglect.

CONCLUSION

This brief account of traditional African leadership and its contemporary role in the African Diaspora is by no means historically or conceptually exhaustive, nor are examples from Cameroon meant to be completely representative. I mean only to provide enough detail to argue that firstly traditional leadership was not just the authority of “kings and queens,” as construed in contemporary Diasporal Imaginations, but was rather composed of queen-mothers and councils, secret societies and mystics, rituals and ceremonies, rules and doctrines, and subject-citizens.

Further I have argued that, hereditary leadership is a problematic model to utilize for the empowerment of Africans of the Diaspora today.

In conclusion, an analysis of power and psychological orientation “towards reconciliation in the motherland” must consider as problematic the “recovery” and reclaiming African authority in the form of hereditary and hierarchical power by emphasizing dynastic cultures, creating hierarchical religious structures or seeking the approval of present-day traditional rulers on the continent.³⁰ Since most practitioners of African religions in the United States, especially the titled and elder ones, are themselves “first generation” converts, it remains to be seen what will come of their attempts to forge a royal lineage.³¹ But, if as I have argued, hereditary authority is socially constructed, then it is necessary to take into critical account the social processes that created and maintain these institutions.

Further, if it is the case that traditional African leadership as such was never without control or accountability to the masses, and that colonialism affected a dictatorial modality that encouraged the exploitation of the masses, popular interest today should reexamine the principles upon which claims to royalty, rule and privileges are supported. This in turn will require a reconsideration of the fascination, in the Diasporal Imagination, with a history of Africa that displays grandeur and power wielded by the few over the many, as well as the questioning of the hierarchies replicated in New World religious practices. On this account, perhaps African redemption is to be found not in the “return to royalty” but to the democracy which makes a respected leadership possible.³²

NOTES

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² Anderson, Benedict, 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Books.

³ The Ausar Auset Society is an organization providing spiritual training based on cultural expressions indigenous to Africa. 25th Anniversary King's Day Ceremony, URL <http://interchange.org/nsagislist/NL08109812.html>

⁴ See URL http://www.geocities.com/roots_n_rooted/oyotunji2.html.

⁵ Equiano, Olaudah, 1969. First publication in 1789. [*The Interesting Narrative of] The Life of Olaudah Equiano [or Gustavus Vassa, the African.]* With an introduction by Paul Edwards. London: Dawsons.

⁶ Patterson, Orlando, 1990. *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

⁷ Nas , 2001 “Stillmatic (the Intro.)” *Stillmatic*. New York: Sony.

- ⁸ Tangwa, Godfrey, 1998. "Democracy and Development in Africa: Putting the Horse Before the Cart." *Road Companion to Democracy and Meritocracy*. Bellingham, WA: Kola Tree Press, p. 2.
- ⁹ Tangwa, p. 2.
- ¹⁰ Aletum, Tabuwe Michael, 2001. *Political Sociology*. Yaounde, Cameroon: Patoh Publishers, p. 209.
- ¹¹ Aletum, p. 209.
- ¹² Aletum, *op cit*, Ritzenthaler, Robert and Ritzenthaler, Pat, 1964. *Cameroon's Village: An ethnography of the Bafut*. Milwaukee, WI: North American Press, p. 73.
- ¹³ Tangwa, (1998) p. 6. "The King (Fon) of Nso', who by original consensus, was always selected by a committee headed by the leader of one of the strands comprising the Kingdom from among the male offspring of a female of another distinct strand (the *mmntar* or free commoner class) and a male of yet another strand (the acknowledged royal *wonto'* or princes class), had very extensive powers which were, however, considered as held in trust and subject to several putative controls."
- ¹⁴ Teku Tanyi Teku, Ph.D. candidate in psychology at University of Ibadan, Nigeria, discussion with the author, June 24, 2002.
- ¹⁵ Aletum, p. 206.
- ¹⁶ Tangwa, (1998), p. 3.
- ¹⁷ Tangwa, p.2.
- ¹⁸ Appiah, K. Anthony, 1993. *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. London: Oxford University Press.
- ¹⁹ Tangwa, p. 2.
- ²⁰ Tangwa, p. 8.
- ²¹ Tangwa, p. 7.
- ²² Tangwa, *op cit*. See Mzeka, N. Paul, 1990. *Four Fons Nso': Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Kingship in the Western Grassfields*. Bamenda, Cameroon: The Spider Publishing Enterprise, p. 77.
- ²³ Rudin, Harry R., 1938. *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914; a case study in modern imperialism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 213.
- ²⁴ Rudin, p. 213.
- ²⁵ Rudin, p. 214.
- ²⁶ Rudin, p. 327.
- ²⁷ From a lecture tour at the Bamum Palace. See also Geary, Christraud M., 1983. *Things of the Palace: a catalogue of the Bamum Palace in Foumban (Cameroon.)* Weisbaden: F. Steiner Verlag.
- ²⁸ Teku, interview with author.

²⁹ This is the current claim of an opposition party leader in Fouban who contends that he is the rightful heir of the Bamum Sultanate and was usurped because the contender was a minister of the ruling party.

³⁰ Landau, Jennifer and Moore, David Chioni, "Towards Reconciliation in the Motherland: Race, Class, Nationality, Gender and the Complexities of American Student Presence at the University of Ghana, Legon." *Frontiers: the Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad* [Fall 2001: 25]

³¹ Oba Adefunmi is noted as the first African American to receive the priesthood and *babalawo* ranking in the Lukumi tradition in Cuba and the first to obtain recognition from the Ooni in Nigeria.

³² Phrase from the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem.

Ethnicity and Burundi's Refugees

TONY WATERS

LeMarchand, Rene (1995). *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. Wilson/Cambridge University Press.

Malkki, Liisa (1995). *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sommers, Marc (2001). *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Clandestine Identities from Burundi

These three books are about people who share a description of themselves as “Burundians,” or “Hutu,” or “Tutsi,” or any number of other identities from Burundi. But as each book makes clear, the ethnic designation an individual uses is only part of the story because what is also significant is who you consider “not Burundian,” or “not Hutu” or “not Tutsi.” Depending on the group of “Burundians” the question is asked of, you get different answers, often in the form of what Liisa Malkki calls “mythico-histories” about who are “we,” and who are “they.” In other words, there is a broad range of response to this question depending on where, of whom, and when the question is asked, despite the fact that each question is likely to be rooted in mythologized claims asserting a “pure” Burundian identity. For example, inside Burundi as described by Lemarchand, the social world has been divided (at different times and contexts) into Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and Ganwa, Rwandan and Burundian, Highlander and Lowlander, and northerner and southerner. Among the Burundian communities in Tanzania, divisions have emerged between Hutu and Ha, Burundian and Tanzanian, and a number of other permutations. For example, in the remote Tanzanian refugee camp where Malkki studied, the answer is that there are Tanzanians, Hutu, and a “remembered” Tutsi, while in Kigoma town nearer Burundi, the “we” is vaguely “Burundian,” and the “they” is remarkably unclear. Finally, Marc Sommers, writing of clandestine Burundian communities in Dar Es Salaam, writes of divisions a putative origin in the Burundian highlands and lowlands.

An important element in all three books is that often there is an explicitly hidden or clandestine story, which Burundians relate to each other and interested outsiders. In three of the locations, (i.e., Dar Es Salaam, Mishamo refugee settlement in Tanzania, and in Burundi itself), the story is in fact “explicitly clandestine,” in the sense that the oral accounts they give of themselves are different from the written public history. Indeed the pattern of the three mythico-histories, presented by LeMarchand, Malkki, and Sommers is consistent. The Hutu protagonists have stories emphasizing how they lead their lives in the context of Tutsi (or Ha, or Tanzanian) dominance. Only one group, described by Malkki, the Burundian refugees in Kigoma town, did

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not have such a story, and in fact identified with the Tanzanians. This paradox—clandestine identities everywhere except Kigoma—is important and a focus of what follows.

SHIFTING REFUGEE IDENTITIES AND BURUNDIAN REFUGEES

From the perspective of sociology, one way to tie together these meticulous ethnographies/histories is a broader theoretical context for understanding ethnic identity, and ethnic inequality. Since all three books explicitly emphasize the role that storytelling plays in defining group boundaries, I will use this opportunity to place the story of Burundi in the context of what Max Weber wrote about “ethnic communities believ[ing] in blood relationships, and exclud[ing] exogamous marriage and social intercourse. Such a caste situation is part of the phenomenon of ‘pariah’ peoples and is found all over the world.” (1946:189-90)

Weber emphasized that stories define and re-enforce systems of ethnic stratification, particularly when focused by ascribed occupations such as those found in caste systems. Burundi provides a good example of this: Hutu are believed to be farmers, and the Tutsi are believed to be rulers and cattle-herders. In describing their relative positions, Weber says that such pariah groups emphasize the glories of the coming future while dominant groups emphasize the glories of the past, and both create stories and culture to reproduce their particular view (1946:189-90). The battle songs of the United States’ Civil War illustrate this point nicely: the Southern anthem “Dixie” emphasizes the glories of the dominant slave-owning planter caste, while the music of the dominated/pariah slaves emphasized the future religious redemption in songs like “Swing Low Sweet Chariot,” or even “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.” According to Weber, to be maintained as plausible the status groups need to continue being the specific bearer of such conventions associated with that status (1946:191). In other words for the group to persist, the convention must also persist; if it does not the status will disappear and the principles preventing exogamous marriage will ultimately dissipate.

I know that in many ways, this point sounds “academic” and “theoretical” but it is an important one for policy-makers seeking to establish peace between dominant and subordinate status groups like Hutu and Tutsi. How refugees come to view themselves, whether as a pariah group or not, matters for what type of future they envision for themselves. Who refugees define as the “other,” and what they define as “home,” affects efforts to have refugees return to their country of origin or resettle as immigrants. Repeatedly in the history of Burundi and Burundian refugees (as well as others), the kaleidoscope on these two issues has shifted, as the saliency of one ethnic identity or the other thickens and thins.

BURUNDI'S HISTORY

From Ganwa King to Colonial Rule

Modern ethnic typologies in both Burundi and Rwanda typically focus on primordial stories defining Hutu and Tutsi as a dichotomy, with an occasional nod to the one percent of the population that is “aboriginal” Twa. A figure indicating that 85 percent or so of the population is Hutu and 14 percent is Tutsi is often used in modern documents. Such simplified typologies admittedly reflect the mythico-histories Burundians tell about themselves and are common in the popular press and policy-making documents. Nevertheless, volumes have been written in

response, discrediting this approach. LeMarchand in particular has been among those who aggressively affirm the central point that it is “beliefs” about ancestry that are important, not actual bloodlines.

Rene LeMarchand has been watching Burundi long enough to remember that the “Tutsi” were not always the ruling caste in Burundi. As he writes, until the 1960s at least three identities were relevant in the context of political power: the Tutsi who were powerful in the context of the church and Belgian colonial state, farming Hutu, and the princely “*Ganwa*” who actually ruled in Burundi. As Weber described, each had a story to tell about itself, justifying its role in the semi-feudal society that existed before Burundi was occupied by the Germans in the 1890s. The stereotypes formed included a princely, tall, and regal *Ganwa*, who ruled from the royal capital in up-country Gitega; the equally tall and willowy Tutsi who were herders and recent immigrants; and the shorter stockier Hutu clans who were farmers and more ancient arrivals. Powerless, the “pygmoid” Twa were considered to be aboriginal inhabitants specializing in hunting and forest crafts.

LeMarchand tells the story of how each group saw each other without resorting to cliché about primeval origins and notes that the rigid opposition focused on today between Hutu and Tutsi did not emerge in Burundi until the 1960s, irrespective of what modern Hutu or Tutsi nationalists may recall. His point is well-taken; it is the story told which is important for understanding contemporary Burundian society. It is not the positivistic history told by academics, but the stories Burundians tell each other which define and stratify.

From Colonial to Independent Burundi

Burundi has had a violent history since the 19th century, rooted in a combination of stern rule by princely *Ganwa*, disease epidemics, and the taxation policies of the colonial powers Germany (1890-1916) and Belgium (1916-1961). As is well-known, the Belgians favored the Tutsi, having bought into the “Hamitic myth” that the Tutsi were born to rule, while the Hutu were born to farm. This “history” has been adapted by both Hutu and Tutsi nationalists to suit their own purposes. For example, in 1985-86, Hutu from the refugee settlement in Mishamo in Tanzania explained to Malkki that the Tutsi took advantage of the situation to consolidate their power under the Belgians:

“...At the time of the arrival of the Belgians, the Tutsi employed the malignness...of telling the Belgians that the Hutu are accustomed to cultivating—by that token, therefore they should be taught agriculture...Even today, the Hutu [in Burundi] will tell you that “me, I am accustomed to cultivate.” (p. 134)

No matter the salience in Mishamo in 1985-86, from a positivistic viewpoint such mythico-history in fact simplifies colonial history. Peasant revolt against combined Belgian/*Ganwa* taxation regimes were frequent, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s. Differently from the stories told in Mishamo, LeMarchand tells how revolts were rooted in regional identities and not along the Tutsi-Hutu dichotomy as is the current focus; focus was instead on *Ganwa* in their role as chiefs and princes.

Be that as it may, LeMarchand notes that the development of the stories and fears occurred in the context of *Ganwa* families, whose authority was gradually eroded by emergent Tutsi clans jockeying for positions in the new colonial bureaucracy, starting about 1930. The result was that

while the *Ganwa* continued to rule both as the king and also as appointed chiefs, the Tutsi began to staff elements of the colonial state.

This led to the paradoxical situation that as independence drew near in 1961, the one truly popular national figure was the *Ganwa* son of the King, Prince Louis Rwagasore. Rwagasore was a charismatic figure, able to mobilize the forces for independence including the Hutu masses against the Belgian rulers. Indeed, with the support of the Hutu masses, he won election as Prime Minister shortly before independence in 1961. However, Rwagasore was assassinated in a plot organized by a Belgian-supported rival to the throne a few months later. As LeMarchand writes, it was only after this event that what was a three-way focus on power shifted to the two-way ethnic competition that still characterizes political maneuvering in Burundi today (LeMarchand 1996:53-56).

Independent Burundi, 1961-72

Ethnic segregation in post-colonial Burundi rigidified during the 1960s as members of Tutsi clans came to dominate provincial leadership, pushing aside both *Ganwa* and the few Hutu who held authority. LeMarchand documents this process well in a series of tables that illustrate how Tutsi clans came to dominate administrative posts across a period of about 40 years from the 1920s through the 1960s.

After independence, discrete events punctuated the shift to Tutsi domination over the levers of power offered by the new post-colonial state. After Rwagasore's assassination in 1961, an unsuccessful coup organized by Hutu officials in 1965 led to the assassination of the prime minister and some tens of thousands of Hutu refugees fleeing to neighboring countries. The coup plotters and many higher level Hutu were executed, and most high level Hutu were excluded from the government. In July 1966, the *Ganwa* king abdicated in favor of his son, who in turn was deposed and exiled in a republican coup led by Tutsi officers that November.

The Tutsi-dominated military faction from the southern province of Bururi then seized control of the cabinet at the expense of not only Hutu and *Ganwa*, but also the powerful Tutsi faction from northern Muramvya. In 1969, accusations of coup-plotting were leveled and the Hutu elite were again targeted with 100 being executed and all Hutu eliminated from the military. By 1972, the Bururi faction had turned its attention to the Muramvya Tutsi, who in a series of show-trials received severe sentences, contributing to the fears of the government.

In the context of the increasing competition between Tutsi groups, in April 1972, expatriate Hutu invaded from Tanzania and killed some 10,000 Tutsi along the shore of Lake Tanganyika in the southern tip of the country. The *Ganwa* King, who had briefly returned from exile, was also killed by the Tutsi-dominated military. The response by the Tutsi-dominated army was brutal enough that LeMarchand considers it the first genocide in the Great Lakes Region. Over 100,000 Hutu were massacred and several hundred thousand fled to neighboring countries, primarily Tanzania, between 1972 and 1974.

FLIGHT AND FOREST RESETTLEMENT

Eastern movement from Burundi into Tanzania's Kigoma Region was common in the past; beginning in the 1600s, most of Kigoma Region was settled by migrants from what is today

Burundi in a punctuated series of population movements. Linguistically, Kigoma's Ha language is mutually intelligible with modern Kirundi and Buha was traditionally ruled by a Tusi dynasty calling itself Ntare, the same name the kings of Burundi used. However, in 1972-74, the Tanzania-Burundi border took on new dimensions as approximately 150,000 Burundians fled to Tanzania, heading toward areas along the forested border, the lakeshore of Lake Tanganyika, and into Kigoma Township. Over the next months tens of thousands of those who survived, often with the assistance of Tanzanian villagers, were resettled in two inland refugee settlements, Ulyankulu and Katumba, with financial assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Tens of thousands of others remained in both rural areas of Kigoma Region and the urban areas of Kigoma.

In 1978-79, 30,000 of the Hutu refugees moved to a sparsely-settled corner of western Tanzania, Mishamo, where the UNHCR arranged for three years of food rations, hoes, and land with which to re-build their lives as farmers. This they did. But as Liisa Malkki found while living there in 1985-86, they also re-built an ethnic identity. This identity focused on a defiantly revanchist "Hutu" identity (rather than "Burundian"), rooted in claims of forced subordination to both the absent Tutsi and the Tanzanian officialdom who distributed passes and retained political power in Mishamo. The Hutu of Mishamo dreamed of an eventual return to Burundi, rooted in the future-focused belief that "the last will be first," a situation taken advantage of by a political party formed in Mishamo, PALIPEHUTU, whose goal was the expulsion of the Tutsi from Burundi to be replaced by an explicitly Hutu government. An important element sustaining such belief was the view that any Hutu returning to Burundi would be immediately killed by the Tutsi government.

As Malkki elegantly describes with "story panels," this new revanchist Hutu identity, radicalized in an isolated situation where the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy included the element of subordination, was remembered, reproduced, and rigidified, even though there were few if any Tutsi present. The stories she heard were Br'er Rabbit-style, focusing on eventual redemption of a subordinated group more clever than their powerful opponents. The protagonists Malkki describes though were not only the absent Tutsi, but the Tanzanian officials who dominated the camp and controlled movements in and out. The accounts Malkki collected from the Hutu reflected this persistent subordination in both Burundi and Tanzania. According to her informants:

[In Burundi] There were two categories of school—one for the children of the Tutsi chiefs, another for the Hutu children. The Hutu were taught—are preprepared for agriculture, and the Tutsi are prepared to govern. It is like this today in Burundi. The Tanzanians also have schools for themselves where they learn—how is it called?—the social rights—for example, the politics of the country. For the Hutu it is the métiers like mechanics, construction, and carpentry. These are their chosen schools for us, the technical schools... (p. 133)

Flight and Urban Resettlement

At an extreme opposite of the politicized Hutu identity Malkki found in remote Mishamo is the apolitical "Burundian" identity she found in Kigoma town. Arriving in Kigoma after her time in Mishamo, she expected to find a similarly politicized group of Hutu terrified of a forced return to Tutsi-dominated Burundi, focused on a military re-conquest of the homeland, and sympathetic to

PALIPEHUTU. After all, they were all presumably “Hutu” with similar grievances when they left Burundi in 1972-73.

To Malkki’s surprise, over the previous 12 years in Kigoma town a different identity, a more general “Burundian” one had emerged. In the urban setting, there were no mythico-historical tales around which to tell the story of the “Hutu.” Instead, she found people seeking assimilation as Tanzanian by acquiring markers as Muslims, speaking Swahili, cards as members in the Tanzanian CCM party, marrying Tanzanians, and self-identifying as Tanzanian Ha, rather than Burundian. A few were even able to obtain official papers to legitimize their status in Tanzania. Others even took the overnight boat to Burundi to visit relatives there, a trip considered impossibly dangerous by their cousins living in Mishamo.

Thus, Malkki draws an important contrast: in Mishamo, people describe themselves as militantly Hutu and refugees, believing it impossible to return to Burundi except by force. In Kigoma, their cousins, brothers, and sisters, have yet another attitude and are attempting to blend into the Tanzanian milieu. The contrast is stark: refugees in a difficult urban milieu, “melt” into a local background, while refugees re-established in a remote (and also difficult) forest settlement pull inward socially and create a revanchist movement seeking a violent return to Burundi.

The strength of Malkki’s chapters about the Hutu refugees in Mishamo and how they viewed their status as refugees is in documenting the consistent narrative they tell about themselves. The absence of such a story in Kigoma made the application of such a technique difficult and for this reason her descriptions of the “refugees” in Kigoma are brief, as would be expected from a group for which there is no narrative about identity, hidden or otherwise. But it is also for this reason that the story from Kigoma is important; it shows how Burundians in different circumstances respond differently to their status as refugees.

SECONDARY MIGRATION AND URBAN RESIDENCE

Understanding the pulls and pushes of Burundian urban life is most intimately seen in Marc Sommers’ ethnography of Burundian refugees in Dar Es Salaam. Sommers has a talent for moving beyond the politics of the refugees and telling the story of individuals, in this case young men who work and live in two tailor shops. In doing this, he does not confront the reader with the politicized narrative that Malkki found in Mishamo, but the stories that individual tell about what they think and do. As Sommers’ subtitle indicates, his focus is on “fear.” In the case of the refugees in Dar Es Salaam in the early 1990s, this fear reflects the dangers of being “illegal immigrants” in Dar Es Salaam; most Burundians living in Dar Es Salaam were in violation of Tanzanian immigration laws. The Burundian refugees that Sommers describes had moved out of the settlements of Katumba and Ulyankulu, and re-established themselves in the rapidly growing Dar Es Salaam of the 1990s.

In Sommers’ book, Dar Es Salaam is nicknamed the Swahili “Bongoland” (brain-land) due to the claims of the refugees Sommers interviewed, who said that they need to always think in order to survive. Dar Es Salaam, like many African cities, is populated by millions, including the Burundian refugees he interviewed, living semi-legally in interstitial areas. Sommers describes individuals with personalities and dreams who are members of overlapping family groups and friendship networks, which can loosely be described as “ethnic.” But their relationships also reflect the normal shift and flow of very human relationships and friendships (Sommers’ story

about teaching a young Burundian man to drive is particularly interesting, though not directly relevant to this review).

As in Burundi and Mishamo, the refugees in Dar Es Salaam fear the clever manipulations of an unseen “other.” By the time the refugees reach Dar Es Salaam, they are fearing not only the Tutsi, who none of the young men have personal experience with, but also a range of others viewed as outsiders and whom can be avoided only through guile. Within the Burundian community, there is a wariness between highland Hutu (Banyaraguru) and lakeside Hutu (Imbo) and most importantly, there is a wariness of the Tanzanian authorities. As with many residents of urban Africa, the Burundians are subject to periodic round-ups and are always ready to slip a bribe in anticipation of deportation. They believe that it is only by being more clever than powerful Tanzanian officials, and by carefully observing signs that they are permitted to survive as *watu wa chinichini* (little people) in “bongoland.”

A particular strength of Sommers’ book is the focus he places on the role that the Pentecostal Church plays in the reproduction of Burundian identity in Dar Es Salaam. Pentecostalism is an important social force in central Africa, particularly among Burundian refugees (as well as Rwandans), who respond to its prophetic messages of eventual triumph of the poor and rejected. As Malkki notes in passing, it was important in Mishamo and I have seen its importance among Burundians living in Kigoma. Sommers persistently pursues this issue and evaluates the meanings that the Pentecostal revival with its emphasis on future redemption of the powerless has on the traumatized populations of Burundi, whether in Burundi itself or in Tanzania.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF BURUNDIAN IDENTITY

All three of these books about Burundians discuss clandestine narratives which Burundians use to describe the situation in their own country and in Tanzania, and for this reason liberally cite James Scott’s books about “hidden transcripts.” Hidden in the three books however, is also a broader story about ethnic change in the context of a caste system, which is best seen while stringing the books together and especially by paying attention to Malkki’s example of Kigoma, where there was no strong mythico-history, clandestine, or otherwise.

Thus, at times, ethnicity is “thick” or “rigidified” in a manner which can lead to further revanchist movements and ethnic confrontation. Ethnic Hutu nationalists took advantage of this situation in Mishamo, with one result being that that population was radicalized enough to provide the core element for PALIPEHUTU and violent militias, which helped organized the invasion of Burundi in the 1990s. This is not a product of particular events, but of the circumstances in which Hutu refugees established mythico-histories while exiled to a remote forested area.

But at other times however, the same ethnicity is thin, malleable, and even dissipates. Thus, despite the fact that it was more or less random who became a “Mishamo Hutu refugee” and who remained in Kigoma to become a reluctant Burundian within 13 years after flight, two distinct identities had emerged. Along the same lines, the division between lowland and upland Hutu, which Sommers reported from Dar Es Salaam, also achieved a saliency not found in Kigoma. Alternatively, other salient identities, even those for which people fought and died, can dissipate and are no longer relevant in the context of modern Burundi. The *Ganwa*, who have seemingly disappeared from today’s narrative about Burundian ethnic competition, are of course the most

obvious example of this although it is worth noting that the Hutu of Kigoma, discussed at length by Malkki, must have passed through a similar process of “thinning” ethnicity during the brief period they were separated from the parts of their family sent to Mishamo. For that matter, the more obscure (to us today) regional identities, which focused violent mobilization by Burundians in the 1920s and 1930s in response to colonial taxation policies, have also lost their saliency.

Resettlement affects the contours of such imagined communities and with it the mythico-histories. For this reason, the stories that people tell about themselves and use to define the group are important to listen to. Who does the group define as the “other?” How do they describe their own position, vis a vis, this other? And most importantly, what groups and people are left out in the self-definition?

The sum of these mythico-histories, reflects what Weber describes as “ethnic coexistences [which] condition a mutual repulsion and disdain but allow each ethnic community to consider its own honor as the highest one.” But what the examples from Burundi indicate is that this disdain is neither inherent, nor necessarily persistent. It responds to resettlement policies and circumstances, in patterned ways.

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South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid, edited by Les Switzer and Mohamed Adhikari, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000. 472 pp.

The dissident voices are dead. Dozens of newspapers and magazines were vitally important in bringing about change in apartheid South Africa, but hardly any of them have survived into the post-apartheid era. The collection of articles in this publication focus on the variety of print media that emerged in a struggle against an authoritarian regime, but many of which have since lost their role in contemporary discussions on society and politics.

The texts are weighed towards the description of the politics and the struggle that shaped the fate of the newspapers. They convey vibrant images of the creativity of the media, the journalists and the editors in times of harassment, and as a result, less emphasis is put on argument and analysis. The analysis of the alternative press invites us to focus on the relationship between the political struggle and the media. It revolves around the ways in which the political struggle overshadowed the existence and dynamics of the press. This is different from an analysis of the popular press. For instance, with the popular press authors tend to focus on issues of culture, on assessing readers' attitudes in the consumption process, or on the media's use of illustrations. The analysis of the alternative press follows its own route and pursues the agenda of an established historiographic tradition.

The articles are based on the meticulous study of primary material. Most of the authors are familiar with a body of newspapers that relate to each other. They handle material from one main newspaper, its predecessors or successors, as well as from newspapers belonging to the same group of publishers. Mohamed Adhikari, writing about *South* regarding its "determination to break with the compliant reporting of institutionalised journalism" (p. 338), is the only author who, in addition, conducted interviews with former journalists and editors. These interviews help unfold an argument that takes his analysis beyond the interpretation into empirical analyses. The interviews add an extra-institutional perception that rescues the message of the article from the former clutches of apartheid. Keyan Tomaselli, dealing with "ambiguities in alternative discourse" (p. 378), eschews the dominant patterns of media analysis through the adoption of a comparative approach. He contrasts the *Sowetan*, a newspaper with a market-oriented approach, with *New Nation*, which was never in a position to survive on the market, and concludes that the laws of the market caused the end of the latter publication.

Some of the articles focus on the circumstances of the papers' production, and their continuous struggle for subsequent issues. Reminiscences turn some of the pieces into excellent reading. James Zug resurrects of the 1960s, the "fourth and final decade graced by the ink and newsprint of the *Guardian*" (p. 129). The majority of articles render overviews of the development and dynamics of the newspaper(s). Against this background, Peter Limb's contribution, which deals with representations of the labouring classes, takes up a special focus on class issues. He argues that the ANC spurred journalists' attention towards African workers' rights, and with the disbandment of the party in the 1960s, the topic itself dissolved in the press.

In general, however, there is only a subdued effort in the articles to provide provocative insights into issues of gender, generation, or theories of media representation in the humanities. In their article on representing blackness in the Black Consciousness Movement, Mbulelo Vizikhungo Mzamane and David R. Howarth mention that the movement was "blind to some aspects of power relations, such as gender" (p. 203). One actually wonders whether this blindness must be perpetuated by current research trends. Certainly, and once again, the overarching burden of the struggle is felt through the texts. This may also explain the neglect of readerships and their impact on the survival of the various print media in the analyses. With the exception of circulation numbers, readers remain fundamentally ignored. Evidently, most of the media adopted a "sender-approach". So do the authors who describe the intentions, achievements and dynamics of the media. Ineke van Kessel, assessing *Grassroots'* ambitions to "POEM: Popularize, Organize, Educate, and Mobilize" (p. 284), stresses that "while communication between mainstream newspapers and their publics is largely a one-way street, community newspapers aspired to interact with their readership and to help shape, rather than only report, events" (p. 283). The neglect of readers in contemporary analyses is therefore amazing.

It is interesting to see that so many people from outside South Africa contributed to the collection of articles in this volume. In fact, the study of South Africa's alternative press was not an exclusively South African issue. The articles, usually mention countries outside South Africa in connection with funding. Jeremy Seekings reminds his readers of the UDF media's strategy to "liaise with ... overseas media" (p. 233). George Claasen includes a reference to the *Suid-Afrikaan* procuring funding from Germany (p. 415). Franz Krüger argues that the drying up of overseas donor funds caused the end of several independent media projects after the end of apartheid (p. 271, p. 274). Christopher Merrett and Christopher Saunders refer to the *Weekly Mail's* temporary collaboration with the British *Guardian* (p. 478). These are reminders that the alternative press, so much a social movement in South Africa, resonated on the international scale.

Les Switzer has compiled an array of articles explaining the important role of the resistance press in South Africa. The use of illustrations is a great benefit. They give a feel of the time and of the conditions under which journalists and editors worked. The book shows that scholars and practitioners from various backgrounds can collaborate on a project that reflects and combines different styles of writing, thematic foci, and professional careers. The book has an almost reference-like character, and it is of use to anyone interested in the history of the alternative press in South Africa as well as the driving forces and motivations that lend themselves to the production of the alternative press.

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Apartheid No More: Case Studies of Southern African Universities in the Process of Transformation. by Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberley Lenease King. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 2001, 173 pp.

Apartheid No More brings together eight in-depth case studies of various institutions of higher learning in South Africa and Namibia. These chapters meticulously analyze the state of university and technical education in these two democracies. Uncompromising in their historicisation, these essays explore the challenges facing contemporary Southern Africa. In their introduction, Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberley Lenease King declare: “[w]hile there is a general consensus that the current system of education is inherently discriminatory, there are fervent debates concerning how to create a new system of education” (p. xix). The essays in this volume fearlessly approach the task of unpacking South African transformation politics. The authors address questions including how the new national legislation impacts higher-level education and on who should be the stakeholders. What does transformation mean for universities in South Africa? How does it relate to access for Black students? In what ways do access, curriculum planning and retention of incoming students relate?

The authors explore the contradictions that arise when such an appraisal is carried out. The case studies span the variety of universities in Southern Africa to reveal both patterns and revelations. Nicole Norfles, Rodney K Hopson and Sonjai Amar Reynolds unveil overwhelming similarities between the fates of Historically Disadvantaged Institutions (HDIs). These three chapters, without diminishing the magnitude of the challenges facing Black institutions nonetheless point to initiatives, which attempt to address these difficulties. Their evaluations bring together developments and highlight what could be established to enable these institutions to compete more equitably in a post-apartheid Southern Africa. Norfles, whose chapter focuses on the University of Zululand, as well as the multi-campus Vista University, cautiously celebrates the significant decreased financial burdens for applicants to institutions in the KwaZulu-Natal province. In addition, the author stresses the need to develop retention strategies for incoming students. Reynolds analyzes the successes of partnership programmes for staff and development between academic staff at Black Technikons in South Africa and faculty from Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in the United States. Together these chapters highlight the importance of responsive transformative initiatives targeted at both the students and the teaching communities of these institutions. As Hopson notes, if “the role of universities in research evaluation, information transfer, and technological development are vital to socioeconomic progress and growth” (p. 134), then “institutions of higher learning will need to produce creative and technological brainpower to liberate their people from poverty, disease, socioeconomic disparity, and ignorance in order to reap the full benefits of the emerging democratic state” (p. 135). Although his chapter focuses specifically on the Namibian context, his findings are equally appropriate to the South African situation.

The remainder of the essays in the collection address various dimensions in the transformation politics of Historically Advantaged Institutions (HAI) of both liberal and conservative Afrikaner moulds. In relation to these, the chapters pose detailed questions about the connections between access and transformation while placing these very categories under scrutiny. Can transformation be achieved simply by increasing the number of Black students and staff? How do institutional processes adapt to the requirements of the new era? Doria Daniels' interviews the Black academic staff at the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) reveal the gradations which exist even at a campus which has prioritised increasing Black staff numbers. Daniels' nuanced study cautions against short-sighted solutions and reveals that growing numbers, notwithstanding participation at this university, still involves negotiating for or hiring Black academic staff.

Ann E. Austin's and Mabokela's chapters explore the ambiguities of the transformation process at two other Afrikaans universities: Port Elizabeth (UPE) and Stellenbosch respectively. Austin argues that the triumphs of the UPE situation lie in its chosen path of moderate negotiation rather than revolutionary transformation. Her exposition suggests that the successes lie more in the commitment to negotiation than in the demonstration of extensive change to the demographic make-up of that institution. Mabokela shows the intimate relationship between the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism and education system structures in South Africa. She cuts to the core of the arguments for exclusive Afrikaans-medium instruction at Stellenbosch to reveal what they are really about. The central contestations are the battle for accessible language versus the maintenance of Afrikaans at the expense of most Black students' academic abilities. It is therefore characteristically fitting that the university most resistant to transformation should also defend the supremacy of Afrikaans medium tuition and its racist legacy.

The essays by King and Rochelle L Woods focus on the liberal University of the Witwatersrand (Wits). Both demonstrate the existence of chasms between the university's claimed legacy of oppositional politics and its practices. Revealing its politics to be far more conservative, King argues "the strategies implemented in pursuit of transformation were adopted in a haphazard manner as the institution struggled to reconcile its 'liberal' image with its 'conservative' reality" (p. 88). Indeed, her research into historical documents regarding this university's relationship to the apartheid state casts doubt on the appropriacy of its claimed legacy. This historic discrepancy is in tune with current experiences of Black students at Wits, as Woods demonstrates. Her study exposes both the pervasiveness of different kinds of racism and reveals that every-day racism is rife and repetitive. Analysing different materials, King and Woods concur on their findings that the Wits' image and practices are very different.

Read together these excellent case studies offer varied research which traverses different aspects of South African tertiary institutions. What emerges is a broad image which assists in the generation of theory while suggesting achievable ways out of the quagmire. The collection's contribution is to the fields of African studies, history, sociology, race and ethnic studies, as well as to various fields in education studies. Mabokela and King's text will be equally valuable to policy makers, who will also find the concluding exploration of policy implications prudent.

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Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? by Lyn S. Graybill. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002, 231 pp.

Since coming into existence in 1995, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has given rise to a large number of publications. Consequently, it has become fairly difficult to come up with an innovative piece of writing. It is therefore understandable that this publication on the TRC does not really provide a lot of new information. Graybill's book is no different in this respect, however this volume does provide a very comprehensive overview of the available knowledge on the Commission.

The book starts off by addressing the issues surrounding the setting up of the Commission. In particular, the TRC is compared to other truth commissions, while its unique features and its organisational structures are highlighted. The author continues with two chapters on Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. Some information is given about the lives of these men under apartheid, about their attitudes of reconciliation and about their roles in the TRC process. In chapters 4 and 5 Graybill discusses the concepts of forgiveness and amnesty. In chapter 4 the claim of the TRC that perpetrators would confess and victims would forgive is questioned and chapter 5 deals with some controversial aspects of the amnesty process. Chapter 6 is called 'Storytelling' and it gives the reader more information about the psychological functions testifying has had for some of the victims. Further on, in chapter 7, the experiences of women before the TRC are examined by relying on a couple of illustrative testimonies. Chapter 8 discusses the so-called 'innocent bystanders' and their relation to the TRC. These 'innocent bystanders' are the ordinary white South Africans who did not actively commit gross human rights violations, but who still benefited from the politics of apartheid. More specifically, attention is paid to the health hearings and the business hearings, two of the institutional hearings that the TRC organised in order to confront the issue of these 'innocent bystanders' with their past. The book continues discussing two other institutional hearings in greater detail: the media hearings (discussed in chapter 9) and the faith community hearings (chapter 10). Graybill states that these hearings deserve special attention because those sectors of society have always had wide repercussions on the whole of South African society. In two concluding chapters the author tries to throw light on the future of South Africa and she tries to find out whether the South African TRC is a workable model that can be adopted by other countries.

Throughout this book Graybill clearly devotes a lot of attention to certain specific aspects. Central in her work is on the religious aspect of the TRC. She also spends time to discuss how the USA has perceived the TRC process.

Graybill does an excellent job in dealing with a lot of information. A lot of facts and figures are given and at the end of the book we find a very extensive bibliography, a chronology, a glossary and a list of acronyms. In addition, the reflections of Graybill are supplemented by quotations from often well-known academics and writers who have also worked on the TRC. Graybill has definitely done an outstanding job this work. Graybill does not limit herself to the mere TRC process. Instead, she tries to understand why the Commission came into being and also addresses the post-TRC era. With respect to this latter topic, Graybill often refers to the responsibilities of the present government. She is mostly critical about the government, especially when discussing the possibilities of a second amnesty, the HIV/AIDS controversy, the current day media freedom, the realization of the reparations recommended by the TRC

and the government's commitment to social justice. Graybill is also disappointed about the sacrifices of the whites and their positive involvement in the building of a new South Africa.

For as much material as the author covers, she also leaves out a lot of unanswered questions, especially in the last chapter and in the afterword. Graybill asks which solution holds the most promise for countries moving through a democratic transition: to pardon or to punish? She does not come up with an answer to this question, nor with answers to the other questions posed – is the basis of the TRC religion found in African traditions?; Does individual healing lead to national healing?; and has the TRC actually been effective in reconciling South Africans? These questions have been asked over and over again and by reiterating them once more Graybill puts a touch of repetitiveness into her book. Finally, the author makes some statements that seem rather simplistic, for example when claiming that black South Africans embrace forgiveness because they follow Mandela's example, that there is a general lack of bitterness by blacks or that Mandela and Tutu were crucial for the reconciliation process.

One finishes this book with the rather unsatisfactory feeling that the TRC has opened up more questions than it has solved. Graybill argues that in general, the TRC was a positive achievement, although she clearly shows that every single aspect of the TRC has positive as well as negative features. In sum, this book is very readable and that the profusion of information is definitely a great merit of the author.

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Can We Talk. by Shimmer Chinodya. Heinemann, 2000. 154 pp.

Shimmer Chinodya like so many African writers is a person of many talents and professions. Aside from writing five novels, winning the Commonwealth Prize for *Harvest of Thorns* (1990), receiving a Caine nomination for *Can We Talk* (2000), and authoring several children's books, he has taught creative writing at St. Lawrence University in New York (1995-1997), written and edited films, and worked in the Ministry of Education in Zimbabwe. His most recent collection of short stories, *Can We Talk*, a coming of age anthology, is a carefully crafted synthesis of writing about young people. Nuanced, graceful, and imaginative, Chinodya leads readers into conversations about issues of politics, gender, class, religion, and kinship. His strength lies in the direct, seemingly unedited experiences he chooses to discuss: a child's confusion, a boy's fear of death, an adolescent's humiliation, and a student's fear of intimacy. As Chinodya writes about slightly older males, his focus moves on to a suitor's awkwardness, a bureaucrat's womanizing, an alienated son's neglect of family, and an artist's apology to his wife for his self-indulgence.

Among these stories are examples of many different storytelling techniques. Chinodya's writing craft changes as much as do the stories themselves. From the short, face-paced, jerky phrases which reflect the child-like perceptions in "Hoffman Street" to the epistolary form of a selfish, lonely artist-husband in "Can We Talk," Chinodya experiments with language. Refreshingly without artifice, he reminds readers of the value of direct communication and that we are ultimately social beings. As the artist learns, "Whatever it is inside me—love, lust, hatred, imagination—it needs to be shared because there is too much of it for me or for me and you alone" (143). Moreover, developing social awareness involves learning "about tenderness and imagination and simplicity and about how we are wasting our lives in squabbling and silence and competition" (144). These sorts of insights suggest that Chinodya has something valuable to discuss with readers, particularly if they participate in his lively conversations.

The potential audience for this text is as varied as are the stories. For sociologists, anthropologists, and historians many of these stories offer fictional accounts of contemporary realities about gender, class, and ethnicity. "Among the Dead" is not only a story about funeral rites but a comment on the racial divide between a white teacher and his precocious black student and is embedded in a broader discussion of Zimbabwean geography, history, and politics. For botanists or political scientists, other stories have disciplinary currency. "The Man Who Hanged Himself" is full of indigenous social practices in the Matroko Bush, where Mapostori gather, pafa trees grow, and a man has hanged himself. For Africanists interested in preserving language, Chinodya writes in a style that requires readers to confront non-English. Most stories are told artfully with Shona words sprinkled throughout. Appropriately, the author has provided a glossary of Shona words. On the one hand, mature and learned readers may find Chinodya's fiction beneficial for his knowledge and appreciation of Zimbabwe's history, society and culture.

On the other hand, younger audiences may enjoy Chinodya's fiction for his creative perceptions and his careful representation of Zimbabwe's youth, particularly males.

Before concluding this review, a word must be said about three stories that merit special attention: "Going to See Mr B.V.," "Bramson," and "Strays." Each of these stories deals with social class issues, which suggests the author's deep concern for humane interaction among individuals, and represents an appeal for reducing social stratification and tension. "Going to See Mr. B.V." is a story about the humiliation that pride of class and ethnicity can stir up. "Bramson" is a cautionary tale of rejecting older kin and trusting strangers. And, "Strays," perhaps Chinodya's best story, examines how humans treat their animals, whether an African, European, or African suburban dog. He describes their difference brilliantly,

The average African dog is a creature to be killed, scolded, and have missiles thrown at it—an inconvenient extra mouth that threaten precious supplies in seasons of drought . . . (82)

A European dog is more than a dog. (And European—even in these post-colonial times—is understood to mean white people as well as that small but resolute class of blacks who have padded their way up the social ladder with wads of money). . . it is a member of the family with a personality, name, a kennel, a veterinary-aid card, and, of course, a budget." (83).

A suburban African dog in an aspiring, middle-class household is something between the two. While it probably benefits from the example of its white neighbors, it remains a household appendage. (83)

A bitter social critique, Chinodya is able to comment on the inability of the dog, Sango, and his owner, Sam, to admit that they need friendship and love. Both of them, alienated, constrained, and suspicious, see themselves chased into self-destruction. Unable to come to terms with their environment, Sam, like the dog, is a stray, out of place in his own home. Readers will find the commentary on dogs, indicative of Chinodya's best insights.

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Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986-97. by Heike Behrend. Oxford: James Curry, 1999. 210 pp.

The aim of Heike Behrend's work is to present a history of the Ugandan rebel movement and its organization under its charismatic leader Alice Auma. Translated from German, Behrend explains how Alice, under the possession of a Christian spirit named Lakwena, raises the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF). The author does this through field interviews with former members of the HSMF. Through them we are given a clear picture of the HSMF's battle tactics, beliefs, organization and its unique position as an Acholi 'nation.'

The field interviews, which constitutes the backbone of the book, gives readers a fresh perspective that allows us to separate the HSMF from among the plethora of Ugandan rebel movements. The HSMF was the most ideologically oriented of all the rebel organizations seeking to overthrow the Museveni government. The ideological development of the movement is highlighted by the author, as she describes how a combination of Christian and local animist beliefs, and a focus on the preservation of nature and the cleansing of the Acholi nation allowed Alice to recruit members from a wide spectrum of the Acholi.

The rise of the movement is closely tied to the Acholi's self-image. The author presents a view of the Acholi as besieged from all corners, ranging from internal problems to external military pressures. Lakwena, through Alice, offered the troubled Acholi salvation as God's chosen people. Giving allegiance to Lakwena enabled the Acholi to not only redeem themselves, but to also begin their war to "liberate" the world from sin. The movement gained momentum and won several crucial battles, putting it on the way to taking Kampala. It is here though, that the flaws inherent in the HSMF battle tactics such as their reliance on magic and bullet proof potions are exposed as the movement's advance is checked. The HSMF never adopted Western guerilla tactics and instead continued to blame their defeats on their remaining sinfulness, rather than on their military inadequacies.

Destroyed and repulsed, the group imploded as Alice and some of her followers fled across the border to Kenya. The remaining HSMF soldiers either returned to their previous lives or integrated themselves into successor movements, such as the existing Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). According to Behrend, Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, attempted to keep the remnants of the HSMF alive. Nonetheless, Kony soon made it clear that religious beliefs were not the primary focus of his movement. Lacking Alice's Lakwena and unique religious fervor, many former HSMF members deserted the LRA, while others merely abandoned their beliefs in order to remain with the LR. The LRA, unlike the HSMF, remains active in Uganda and Sudan.

In conclusion, Behrend has written a well-researched account of the HSMF. Without a doubt, it is exhaustive in its narration of the group's leaders, tactics and religious dogma. The book is a must for those studying Uganda's rebel groups and contemporary Ugandan society. Particularly, those within the policy and intelligence community will find a unique insight into what motivates these types of rebel movements.

Ian Martinez

Zones of Conflict in Africa, edited by George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Ida Rousseau Mukenge. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 174 pp.

The editors seemed to have struggled to produce this modest volume, which grew out of a conference at Morehouse College several years ago. They wrote five of the nine chapters; Kieh himself produced four, three of which were not conference-related. Co-editor Mukenge wrote a five-page introduction summarizing the papers but adding little value. Organizationally, Kieh's first three chapters lay out theories, contexts, and patterns and trends regarding civil conflicts in Africa, followed by five case studies (Great Lakes, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Zambia). The edited volume is essentially a primer, an overview for the uninitiated rather than a critical analysis for specialists.

Zones of Conflict is modest in intent, scope, and results. Kieh's initial chapters seek to establish a framework for analyzing conflict and its resolution, specifically *civil conflict*, defined as "disagreement between domestic actors – government and private groups – over issues" of all kinds (p. 3). Hence interstate conflicts and those between substate actors are excluded, and violence is viewed as a means rather than a distinct type of conflict. Kieh's treatment of theories, contexts, and patterns is brief and basic, without reference to sophisticated models or empirical research.

The five case studies provide a sampling of geographically dispersed and typologically varied conflict settings. Despite Kieh's effort to structure the analysis of conflict, the several authors' approaches and assessments are different. For Musifiky Mwanasali, the interrelated Great Lakes conflicts derive from the failures of political leadership, and their resolution will reside in community-based initiatives rather than diplomatic and military maneuvering. In Liberia, according to Augustine Konneh, economic and political inequalities rather than ethnic or tribal divisions explain the scourge of coups and civil war since 1980; hence national reconstruction requires both political and economic strategies. Military misrule in Nigeria has been a disaster not only for the country but also for the military itself, and Pita Ogaba Agbese is skeptical that the current government can break the pattern (a chapter twice the length of the others). Kieh's analysis of the causes of the Somali civil war and the impact of conflict resolution efforts concludes with eight prescriptions for ending this protracted crisis. Finally, Julius Ihonvbere sees Zambia as a "typical example of the problems, even failure, of the liberal democratic enterprise in a distorted, underdeveloped, dependent, vulnerable, and crisis-ridden political economy", and stipulates seven specific remedies of his own.

These five case studies represent both political conflicts (Nigeria and Zambia) and armed conflicts (Great Lakes, Liberia, and Somalia). However, it is not clear whether they illustrate the five conflict patterns identified by Kieh (secessionist, struggle over state power, democratization, ethnic, and mixed), nor do all the authors employ these terms. Indeed, each case study takes a singular approach with little or no reference to Kieh's framework. Each chapter can stand on its own merits, but the book would have been more coherent and integrated if the contributors had conformed their approaches. Such consistency would also have put the utility of Kieh's overall framework to the test. Even allowing for such disparate treatments and recognizing Kieh's

already substantial input to the book, he or his co-editor could have enhanced its value with a concluding chapter to pull things back together.

Lastly, it should be noted that the case studies concentrate mainly on the underlying roots, proximate causes, and evolution of their respective crises. By contrast, recommendations for effective resolution are disappointingly brief. The authors who did prescribe specific courses of action chose simply to assert them, without elaborating or evaluating their prospects for success against the underlying conditions they are intended to alter. All things considered, this volume will be most useful to upper level undergraduate or graduate students in courses on conflict management or African politics rather than to specialists in these fields.

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Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach, by Hameso Y. Seyoum
London: TSC Publications. 1997. 120 pp.

Despite its resilient reality, ethnicity and "tribalism" have not received adequate scholarly commentary in academic discourses in Africa. Nonetheless, Africa still remains a continent dotted with conflicts of various forms, often with ethnic overtones. The result has had a devastating impact on the political and socio-economic development of the continent. In the book under review, Hameso Seyoum attempts a systematic analysis of ethnicity in Africa since the pre-colonial period arguing that emerging nation states must directly confront the issue of ethnicity, irrespective of its negative connotations, in order to realise their development agendas. The author is very clear that Africa cannot afford to treat ethnicity as a side issue or wish it away, because it will continue to remain a factor that plagues the continent.

The book is divided into five chapters plus the conclusion. Chapter one provides a detailed overview of most of the issues raised in the book. Seyoum rightly argues that the immediate post-colonial African state made nation building incumbent upon erasing ethnicity and, as a result, real nations were superseded by non-nations and their histories, cultures and languages were regarded as tribal, backward, and therefore, irrelevant to development. The fact that nations were formed on the basis of ethnicity passed unheard. Developmentalists and political practitioners saw ethnicity as inimical to modern statehood and explosive to national unity. However, despite these attempts, ethnicity has remained apparent and substantially relevant. It even continues to exist beyond African "forests" and precisely in Europe and elsewhere. The author thus dismisses the modernisation and Marxian conceptions of ethnicity as inadequate and argues for the adoption of an African perspective that treats ethnicity as a form of African identity. To prove his case, Seyoum provides nine case studies (Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi) and demonstrates that these countries have suffered decades of misrule and conflicts due to an inadequate understanding of ethnicity and the management of ethnic relations.

In Chapter Five, which is the most critical aspect of the book, the author examines the positive aspects of ethnicity. He observes that properly guided, politicised ethnicity can serve various objectives, such as mobilising resources to do away with oppressive rule and assisting in economic development. In countries like Ethiopia, Liberia, and Somalia, ethnicity has proved a potent weapon for sorting out the vagaries of personal rule although not without lamentable repercussions. According to the author postcolonial African states must cautiously respond to ethnic demands by equitably distributing national resources in order to ensure economic and social justice. He warns that states which tend to ignore or fail to accommodate ethnic claims are almost certainly doomed to political instability and perhaps collapse.

This book makes a substantial contribution to the positive understanding of ethnicity. However, it has minimal but glaring setbacks resulting from too brief of an analysis of several critical issues. For example, the section on the African perspective to understanding ethnicity is too brief to be clearly understood and rather one may wonder what exactly the author meant when likening ethnicity to African identity at a time when the whole concept of "African Identity" is

being re-examined. The same applies to the external environment of ethnicity. One may ask to what extent structural adjustment programmes have exacerbated the salience and resilience of ethnicity in Africa? The case studies are too brief, particularly the case of Sudan. These are some of the weakest aspects of an otherwise excellent book. Despite these weaknesses, the book does justice to any reader with an interest on the topic of ethnicity in Africa. It measures up favourably with the vast literature emerging on the subject.

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