

A COMPARISON OF
LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE PARTY
LEADERSHIP IN CALI, COLOMBIA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the much-neglected aspects in the study of political parties has been the subject of party hierarchies, including their organization, membership, recruitment patterns, and the relationships within a hierarchy and between different hierarchical levels of a particular party. Some of these themes have been considered by Samuel J. Eldersveld in his book Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), and helped provide some orientation for the author of this paper. However, Eldersveld's study of Democratic and Republican hierarchical organizations in Wayne County (Detroit, Michigan) dealt with hierarchical patterns considerably different from those encountered in Cali, Colombia. To start with, the number of hierarchical levels found in Cali and Colombia is far smaller than that of Detroit and Michigan; and the objectives of this author were only partially identical with those of the Wayne County study.

Obviously, an initial problem was to determine the scope of the politically relevant phenomena to be sought. Following an initial period during which the author enhanced his knowledge of the Colombian political system, it was decided that the following factors would be most pertinent to his objectives: (1) recruitment factors, also comprising political socialization and promotion; (2) role factors, including the extent of an individual leader's roles and the degree of boundary maintenance

between the roles of one leader and another within the same directorio (directorate, hierarchical organization), and between the roles of the Cali municipal directorates and their corresponding departmental directorates, utilizing somewhat of a structural-functional approach; (3) political communication, including channels from the national to the departmental to the municipal directorates; and (4) non-mechanical, attitudinal factors such as opinion concerning one's own directorate and the overall hierarchical relationship, and the ideological orientation of the leaders.

Since the terms "role" and "ideology" may lend themselves to some confusion, a definition of the author's use of these concepts is in order. The authors of Explorations in Role Analysis examine three categories into which definitions of the term role might be placed: (1) definitions of role which either equate it with or define it to include normative culture patterns; (2) the treating of a role as an individual's definition of his situation with reference to his and others' social positions; (3) definitions which deal with role as the behavior of actors occupying social positions. With regard to this final category, the authors observe that 'A role defined in this way does not refer to normative patterns for what actors should do, nor to an actor's orientation to his situation, but to what actors actually do as position occupants.'"¹ The author uses the term role in this latter sense.

With respect to ideology, Robert Dahl defines the term as "A set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines . . ."² The authors of The American Voter comment that "An ideology may be seen as a particularly elaborate, close-woven, and far-ranging structure of attitudes . . . We

expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order as narrowly defined--social and economic relationships, and even matters of religion, education, and the like."³ Finally, Eldersveld, whose study served as an inspiration to the author's, seems to relate ideological differences between party leaders to differences in attitude regarding "significant policy matters." Hence, "In determining ideological direction at all leadership levels, we used in our interviews a series of questions touching on significant policy matters."⁴ The author's use of the term ideology relates to all three of these definitions. References to the traditional Liberal and Conservative mystique illustrate Dahl's definition of the term. Many of the questions asked in the survey dealt precisely with social, economic, religious, and educational questions, to fit the definition of The American Voter. And the Eldersveld "significant policy" orientation was also employed by the author.

Furthermore, the author was concerned with degree of ideological motivation; that is, how greatly was the leadership of each faction motivated by the traditional ideology of their overall party as opposed to more pragmatic considerations. Eldersveld distinguishes between the direction of ideology as opposed to the saliency of ideology. Direction is defined as "particular or patterned attitudes toward public policy questions," whereas saliency concerns "the extent to which [party leaders] think in terms of party ideology, and the importance they attach to attitude differences in political perception."⁵ The author operationalized the concept of ideology to deal with both direction and saliency.

The instruments utilized to obtain this information were a 52-question questionnaire and three of the Purdue Master Attitude Scales (Remmers Scales) to measure attitudes toward vocation (of political leader), defined groups, and proposed social actions, respectively. Seven defined groups were studied. These included (1) large landowners, (2) big businessmen, (3) labor union leaders, (4) the upper-class in general, (5) the middle-class in general, (6) the lower-class in general, and (7) military leaders. Six social actions were selected for study. These included (1) the expropriation without any compensation of agricultural lands not utilized by their owners; (2) greater taxation of the wealthy to allow for more state aid to the poor in order to redistribute the wealth; (3) stronger action against Communists; (4) restriction of Protestant missionary activity; (5) ending the teaching of religion in the public schools; (6) changing the current unitary government to a federal government.

Another initial problem was to determine the size of the sample. Since the aim was to limit the study to the Cali municipal directorates and the Cali members of the departmental (provincial) directorates, it was roughly determined that a potential of slightly over 100 hierarchical leaders existed if the interview schedule were confined to the active members of each directorate. The fact that some of the inactive principales (regular members) had had their duties taken over by suplentes (substitutes) led the author to include several active suplentes in the study.

A random sample quickly proved unfeasible due to the limited universe, including the fact that the active members of no municipal or departmental hierarchical organization exceeded twenty. Communication with some members of these directorates appeared impossible and others either directly refused to be interviewed or did so indirectly by continually failing to agree on a time for the interview or neglecting to arrive for a fixed appointment. Over one-third of the leaders finally interviewed had failed to keep their initial appointment. Nonetheless, the author succeeded in interviewing at least 50 per cent of the active members of each directorate and close to 70 per cent of the potential overall number;⁶ and he has found no reason to believe that a representative sample was not attained in all cases. The author estimated the total universe of active members to be 103.

The universe encompassed the three factions of the Liberal party and the three factions of the Conservative party. The three Liberal factions included the Oficialistas, who represented the Liberal party in the Frente Nacional (National Front) coalition government; the Movimiento de Renovación y Revitalización Liberal, a breakaway movement from the Oficialistas, occupying the role of a critical supporter of the Frente Nacional within the boundaries of the coalition; and the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL), which had been shifting from the role of an opponent of the Frente Nacional to that of a very cautious supporter, but remaining outside the coalition by choice.

The Liberal division was further complicated by a sub-factionalism within the Oficialista faction between the forces of Francisco (Pacho) Eladio Ramírez (Pacholadistas) and those of Gustavo Balcázar Monzón

(Balcarcistas). This division is confined to the department of Valle del Cauca (Cauca Valley), and thus is local in nature. The Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal--the full title given above is normally shortened in this manner--is likewise unique to the Valle department. On the other hand, the MRL has presented the most complex example of Liberal sub-factionalism. The original movement and mainstream, the more moderate línea blanda (soft line), had been undermined by a somewhat more extreme línea dura (hard line), the much more extreme MRL del Pueblo (People's MRL), and some ephemeral MRL independent currents.

By the beginning of 1967 the steady decline of MRL electoral fortunes had reduced some of its complexity through the apparent organizational disintegration of all but the línea blanda and the more clandestine, Communist-oriented MRL del Pueblo, whose leaders refused to grant interviews on the grounds that they would be aiding the "imperialistic" designs of the U.S. government by contributing to its knowledge of Colombian leftists. (They specifically referred to Project Simpático, the U.S. Defense Department's Colombian counterpart of its Project Camelot in Chile, as the factor responsible for their uncooperative position.) Nonetheless, the MRL del Pueblo was far less a bonafide Liberal faction than the Alianza Nacional Popular (Anapo) was a bonafide Conservative faction so the author's research goals suffered no setback.

The Conservative division was also split into three factions, but was much less complicated in the sense that local factionalism patterned the overall national division and that no organized sub-factionalism was apparent. Conservative factions included the Unionistas, the Conservative partner in the Frente Nacional, the Independientes (Lauro-Alzatistas), and Anapo.

Both latter factions were in opposition to the Frente Nacional. The Unionista hierarchy did include a small number of followers of César Tulio Delgado (Cesartulistas), a group which had earlier broken away to form a rival Unionista faction; but the lack of favorable electoral results induced a reassimilation and the apparent demise of this sub-faction. (Cesartulismo was a local phenomenon.) Likewise, the combination of followers of the late Laureano Gómez and the late Gilberto Alzate Avendaño in the Independiente faction has not been accompanied by a structural sub-factionalism such as the Pachueladista-Balcarcista division within Liberal Oficialismo. In the latter case the provisions of parity and alternation apply in the pattern of the Frente Nacional so that hierarchical positions are equally distributed between the two groups, and the role of president of the local municipal and departmental directorates is alternated between Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas.

Considering that the Colombian political system is characterized by such a high degree of factionalism, specifically in the case of the Cauca Valley, the author oriented his study toward three levels of comparison of Liberal and Conservative party leadership in the departmental capital of Cali. The first level was to analyze the responses found within a single hierarchical directorate to determine the presence or absence of similarity regarding the politically relevant phenomena encompassed by this study. The second level was to study the responses found among the factions of each of the two overall parties to determine the degree of Conservative and Liberal uniformity. Finally, the third level was destined to compare the overall Conservative and Liberal parties to ascertain their similarities and contrasts.

While it is true that a two-party system has traditionally operated in Colombia, its present form seems to be more complex, even though factionalism is no stranger to Colombian politics. The Frente Nacional seems to have produced two simultaneous two-party systems: the coalition itself as opposed to the non-participants in the Frente Nacional government, and the traditional Conservative-Liberal split. However, the coalition's opponents lack any unity or common purpose beyond their opposition to the government. [And the Conservative-Liberal division is found more at the attitudinal level than at the practical level today.] (Nonetheless, this does have implications for the future. Background information preparatory to the field work indicated some negative attitude toward the coalition on the part of some of the Liberal partners and, to a lesser extent, their Conservative counterparts. This, perhaps, is because the Frente Nacional candidate for the next presidential term, in accordance with the constitutional provision of alternation, is to be a Conservative, plus the fact that the Conservatives have been the minority party in recent Colombian history.)

The reunification of the factions into single Liberal and Conservative parties might cause the rapid dissolution of the Frente Nacional coalition. Subsequent to the author's survey, Liberal party union was achieved and the Unionistas and Independientes were discussing a settlement of their differences. A lengthy continuation of the Frente Nacional might result in the disappearance of the traditional two-party system.

[Although apparently significant differences existed between the Liberals and Conservatives in the past, these distinctions seem to have declined in recent years to the point where the labels "Conservative" and

"Liberal" are less reliable indicators of an individual's ideological position.) Whereas this trend seemed to be well developed prior to the period of the violencia and the Frente Nacional established in its aftermath, the coalition of Conservatives and Liberals which resulted from the 1957 pact may have accentuated this inclination. In any event, a basic aim of this study was to test a possible lack of essential differences between the two parties when each is taken as a whole.

On the other hand, the creation of the Frente Nacional seems to have greatly accentuated the traditional tendencies toward factionalism found in the Liberal and Conservative parties. The coalition experiment, by restricting all political offices to members of these two parties, has probably impelled individuals and movements with political aspirations into the ranks of the two traditional parties. Due in part to this possible phenomenon, but not neglecting the fact that, historically, some factionalism has been due to ideological reasons, the author began with the hypothesis that ideological homogeneity was not to be found within either party and that certain factions within the ranks of each would exhibit a greater degree of ideological orientation than other factions.

The author also hypothesized that the most ideologically motivated factions would be precisely those which were not in the mainstream of either of the two overall parties and that where significant ideological differences existed, they would be found in a comparison of the minority factions of the Liberal party with those of the Conservative party. This could be partially due to the apparent fact that the discouragement of third party activity has impelled most politically motivated liberal or radical ideologues, who might have rejected both traditional parties under

different circumstances, to join the ranks of the Liberals, whereas conservative or reactionary ideologues have apparently been much more inclined toward the Conservative side. Moreover, the very participation of the Liberal Oficialistas and Conservative Unionistas in a coalition suggests some ideological sacrifice on both sides, leading the author to hypothesize that these ideologues would be more inclined toward other factions within each party. (The categorizing of Anapo as a Conservative party faction weakens this chain of hypotheses; but the growing disassociation of Anapo from its role as a faction and toward the position of a true thirdparty may obviate the appearance of a troublesome anomaly.)

The presence of two long-institutionalized parties in Colombia provided a fertile field for the author's objectives and was a major reason for the choice of that country. The interesting patterns of factionalism found in Cali allowed for greater scope and depth of analysis of the two parties, thus justifying the choice of that locality. Moreover, Cali is one of Colombia's major cities--third in population behind Bogotá and Medellín--and is the capital of the Cauca Valley, Colombia's foremost agricultural region and rapidly becoming one of its principal industrial centers. The Cauca Valley, which stretches from Popayán to Cartago, is Colombia's third largest department behind Cundinamarca (Bogotá) and Antioquia (Medellín).

An additional factor which must be emphasized has been Cali's extremely rapid population growth rate, which has only recently begun to decline after reaching a height of 8.8 per cent per year.⁷ Cali was founded by Spaniards in 1536 and "remained a sleepy provincial town for almost 400 years." The opening of the Panama Canal gave impulse to its first important spurt

of growth due to its proximity to the port of Buenaventura. Between 1912--two years prior to the opening of the canal--and 1918, Cali jumped in size from 27,700 to 45,500.⁸ The 1938 census reported a population of 101,883; the 1951 census total was 284,186; and that of 1964 had climbed to 637,929.⁹ The previously referred to 8.8 per cent annual increase included a natural growth of 3.5 per cent and a migration of 5.3 per cent, the latter basically the result of the violencia in Valle and surrounding areas.¹⁰

Since the 1964 census revealed Valle to have a population of 1,733,053, Cali's population equalled 36.81 per cent of the departmental total.¹¹ Valle's increase since 1938, though impressive, was proportionately smaller than that of its capital city, the departmental total changing from 613,230 in 1938, to 1,106,927 in 1951, to the present figure. The country as a whole increased in population between 1938-1951-1964 from 8,701,816 to 11,548,172 to 17,482,420, a growth rate less than that of Valle department. In comparison with Cali and Valle, Colombia's two largest cities and their respective departments had the following population in 1964: Bogotá, 1,697,311, as opposed to Cundinamarca's overall total of 2,817,436; and Medellín, 772,887, as opposed to Antioquia's 2,477,299.¹² In the last half decade, Cali's rapid population increase appears to have slowed down considerably as the apparent result of a great decline in the violencia. Although it is by far the largest city in Valle, the department boasts a number of other sizable municipios. These include Palmira, 140,889, Buenaventura 96,708, Tuluá 80,394, Buga 75,898, and Cartago 65,403.¹³

In addition to the previously mentioned advantages in choosing Cali, it also boasted a benefit inherent to all departmental capitals: the presence of both a municipal and departmental directorate. However,

a structural separation of the two directorates was not the case for all the factions in Cali. Both the Conservative Unionistas and Liberal Oficialistas had separate municipal and departmental directorates with distinct membership. The other four factions, on the other hand, either had greatly overlapping membership between the municipal and departmental levels, or presented cases where the directorios municipales (which will be referred to as DMs from now on), and the directorios departamentales (DDs from now on), were not both currently active. Consequently, this further divisional breakdown between the DM and DD was undertaken only in the cases of the Oficialistas and Unionistas. Nonetheless, some valuable data were obtained from these two examples, providing a fourth level of comparison of Liberal and Conservative party leadership. In all, a total of seventy-one interviews was attained, broken down as follows: Unionista DM, twelve, DD, seven; Oficialista DM, six, DD, ten; Independientes, nine; Anapo, nine; Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal, eleven; MRL, seven.

The author had devised a questionnaire prior to his September 1966 arrival in Cali, but subsequently made some minor revisions as the result of further background and discussions with fellow members of the academic staff, both those from the United States and Colombians, at Cali's Universidad del Valle. Some aid was also received in translating the two instruments from the original English to Spanish. The author personally administered each interview, a policy deemed necessary due to the presence of a sizable number of open-end questions in the questionnaire. In accordance with a widely accepted procedure, the interviewer handed the interviewee a copy of the questionnaire and asked him to follow each question while the former read it aloud. All codifying was done by the

interviewer, who endeavored to avoid influencing answers by maintaining a constant wording for each question and confining necessary explanation to a simple clarification of the original wording. The average interview required approximately one hour and twenty minutes, with extremes of forty minutes and three hours. Only three interviews required a second visit for completion. To minimize the possibility of collaboration, interviews were given to one individual at a time, and, whenever possible, only the interviewer and interviewee were present. Furthermore, the interviewee was not permitted to retain his copy of the questionnaire as a measure to prevent premature exposure and influencing of future interviewees.

In all, the author spent ten months in Cali and wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to the Rockefeller Foundation for the grant that made this research possible.

Notes

¹ Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 14.

² Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 20.

³ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 111.

⁴ Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 184.

⁵ Ibid., p. 196.

⁶ Some of the active members were also members of the national congress and were residing in Bogotá. Although the author spent some time in Bogotá, he was unable to arrange interviews with all of these leaders. Similarly, some hierarchical leaders residing in Cali could not, in a few cases, be reached, or, more often, directly or indirectly refused to grant interviews.

⁷ Pat M. Holt, Colombia Today--And Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 164.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Cali en Cifras (Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE], 1965), p. 3.

¹⁰ Holt, op. cit.

¹¹ XIII Censo Nacional de Población (Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE], 1965), p. 2.

¹² Ibid.; and Censo de Población 1951 Departamento Valle del Cauca (Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE], 1959), p. 8.

¹³ XIII Censo Nacional de Población, p. 23.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Colombia, with the exception of Uruguay, is unique in Latin America today in that it has a functioning two-party system--currently modified and inspired by the Frente Nacional coalition--based on institutionalized parties which are hangovers from the nineteenth century. Like Uruguay's Blancos and Colorados, Colombia's Conservatives and Liberals grew out of post-independence strife and division into two groups.

Ben G. Burnett observes that the decade of revolt against Spain (1811-1821) was characterized by a situation where "poorly organized political groups were primarily concerned with replacing Spanish colonial institutions." Subsequently, this factionalism gave way as "doctrinal differences began to divide men into two political camps" between 1821 and the 1840's. During this latter decade, the traditional two-party system became established.¹

Concomitant with the struggle against Spain, an internal battle occurred. Antonio Nariño, head of the government of Cundinamarca, organized the Partido Centralista and aimed to establish the authority of Cundinamarca over all the provinces in the campaign against the Spaniards. In reaction to this, the Partido Federalista was formed, setting as its major goal the election of a congress to determine the future political system of Colombia. It successfully backed Camilo Torres for president in 1812, a result which Nariño met with force, and civil war

ensued. The Centralistas appeared to be an incipient Conservative party and the Federalistas a rudimentary Liberal counterpart. Nonetheless, leaders of the former were encountered in the ranks of the Liberal party and Federalista heads were later discovered among Conservative ranks.²

Once Simón Bolívar assumed the leadership of the struggle against the motherland and the war grew more intense, the two fledgling parties ceased to exist as both sides extended their support to Bolívar. However, the highly autocratic and militaristic nature of the resulting Bolívar government produced a reaction on the part of the followers of Francisco de Paula Santander, who assumed the role that the Federalistas had played. The Bolivarianos called for order, while the Santanderistas called for individual liberty, and these positions became cornerstones for the future Conservative and Liberal parties. The precursors of the Conservative party governed until 1831, beginning a rapid disintegration with the death of Bolívar in 1830. This period was followed by the presidency of Santander from 1832 to 1837. From that point until 1861, control of government shifted back and forth between parties which, by the 1840's, were known as Conservative and Liberal. In 1861 the Liberals emerged as the dominant party, holding power until 1884, at which time the Conservatives gained a control which was not relinquished until 1930. Another shift put the Liberals in power until 1946, followed by a reversal which brought forth Conservative government until 1953.

Ironically, the factionalism which has traditionally plagued both parties was responsible for these shifts in power. In 1884 Liberal President Rafael Núñez went to the extreme of abandoning his divided party to assume the role of Conservative president. In 1930, a more

united Liberal party emerged victorious as the result of Conservative disunity. And in 1946 the minority Conservative party returned to power on the basis of Mariano Ospina Pérez's 565,939-vote plurality, while Liberal voters wasted 800,000 votes, dividing them between Gabriel Turbay, 441,199 and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 358,957.³ In 1953 the military staged a rare coup d'état, ushering in a four-year period of likewise rare dictatorship for Colombia, under the government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. In 1957 the armed forces repeated their earlier act, and the stage was set for the Frente Nacional.

Behind this traditional two-party rivalry, one finds an ideological basis of division at least as old as the parties themselves which, perhaps, helps explain the longevity of the Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia. Hubert Herring refers to two major subjects of dispute in the history of Colombia: centralism vs. federalism, and the status of the Catholic Church. He observes that Colombia's difficult geography fostered a regionalism which, in turn, helped spawn the centralism-federalism dispute. "The nation's formidable geography created a land of city-states not unlike the pattern of medieval Spain . . . Living for years in pocketed isolation from one another, each region developed its local pride, way of life, and even its variation of the common tongue." The result was civil wars. Herring notes that ten constitutions were promulgated during the nineteenth century, six favoring strong centralization, four, regional autonomy. Not until Núñez imposed his control over the warring regions in the 1880's did national unity become somewhat of a reality.⁴

Herring adds the following interpretation:

The Conservatives, self-appointed custodians of order, have stood for highly centralized government and the perpetuation of traditional class and clerical privileges, and they have opposed extension of the voting rights of the people. The Liberals have stressed states' rights, universal suffrage, and complete separation of Church and State. In no other Latin American republic except Mexico has the Church-state imbroglio been more angry and obstinate.⁵

Referring to the fanaticism of Colombian Catholics, he remarks that they are "perhaps spiritually more akin to their colleagues in Spain than those in any other Latin American republic . . ."⁶

impairing
Ideological divisions notwithstanding the factionalism which has impaired the structural unity of both parties has likewise undermined their ideological homogeneity. One of Colombia's most progressive presidents, Alfonso López Pumarejo, was at the point of resigning his Liberal presidency due to the opposition of more conservative Liberals to his programs to counter the Great Depression. One author compared López's land, tax, labor, and other reforms to the New Deal in the United States.⁷ López's spiritual successor, Gaitán, similarly activated the opposition of the traditionalist wing of the party, and the result was the self-defeating dual candidacy, Gaitán vs. Turbay, which brought victory to the Conservatives in 1946. On the other hand, the Conservatives have been divided for two decades between the more doctrinaire, authoritarian followers of Laureano Gómez and those of Mariano Ospina Pérez.

In spite of both inter-party and intra-party rivalries, Colombia has experienced prolonged periods of stability together with very infrequent military supplantment of the government in power, a departure from the general Latin American rule. During this century, such stability prevailed from the end of the Thousand Days' War in 1903 to the

tragic "Bogotazo" of 1948, when the assassination of Gaitán ushered in a savage and lengthy wave of bloodletting. Burnett refers to those forty-five years as a period when "Colombia enjoyed almost unparalleled stability. Elections were usually free and devoid of coercion. Two major changes of power were accomplished (in 1930 and 1946) with surprising ease."⁸ However, there were instances when the opposition party, viewing its chances pessimistically, refrained from participating in elections. The Conservatives abstained from the congressional elections of 1935 and 1937 and the presidential elections of 1934 and 1938. And the Liberals, in the aftermath of the "Bogotazo," boycotted the 1951 congressional election and the 1950 presidential election. Voting rights were restricted as illiterates were barred from the polls until the enactments of 1936 and 1945, and women were unable to vote until the 1957 plebiscite which established the Frente Nacional.

One can infer from previous statements that the history of frequent dictatorship common to most Latin American countries has likewise been absent from the Colombian political system. Burnett observes that "Periods of dictatorship are rare and brief in Colombian history. Indeed, once Simón Bolívar left the political scene, Colombia experienced a total of less than five years of clear dictatorship in the central government to the end of the last century."⁹

This tradition suffered a rude blow with the assassination of Gaitán, the hero of the Liberal masses. Although no proof of a conspiracy has ever been established, the immediate Liberal reaction was to blame the Conservatives for the deed, and the ensuing Liberal-Conservative struggle assumed the character of a religious war. The violencia had begun, and

with it a corrosion of conditions propitious to a stable democracy. Gómez won the presidency in 1950 by default, in the face of a Liberal boycott; and the highly autocratic rule of this doctrinaire Conservative further exacerbated the situation. As Guillermo Salamanca recalls, the Liberals denied all legitimacy to Gómez, fighting him "tooth and nail" and welcoming the military coup on June 13, 1953.¹⁰

To characterize this coup as a typical Latin American golpe de estado would be erroneous. In the first place, it was out of tune with Colombian tradition, and, secondly, it was not undertaken on behalf of an opposition political group against the party in power. Furthermore, the armed forces deposed their own representative, General Rojas Pinilla, after he had deviated considerably from the democratic path and had manifested the desire to continue in power in violation of the earlier-announced caretaker role of his military junta and its promise of a quick return to democratic institutions.

The Rojas Pinilla dictatorship, however, was in harmony with some of the more brutal examples found in Latin American history. Herring asserts that this four-year reign was "one of the most savage, venal, and altogether incompetent administrations in the history of the nation," featuring rule by "decree and terror. Rojas was a sadist whose police murdered and looted," while strong censorship was placed over the press.¹¹ In the manner of Perón, Rojas decreed a law of desacato whereby anyone who manifested disrespect for the president could be fined or jailed.

Nonetheless, Vernon Fluharty notes that Rojas' government was reformist and socio-economically progressive, claiming that "Rojas has turned the clock forward on social achievement."¹² Indeed, the unusually high price

of coffee allowed for a fairly favorable economic situation during this period. Fluharty portrays the increasingly united opposition of the Liberals and Conservatives against Rojas as a union of "the oligarchs of both parties against a popular-based movement," attributing to "El General" the role of champion of the masses who came to power "as a result of the inability of the traditional parties to cope with a long-smouldering social revolution."¹³ Rojas has been endeavoring to further establish this image today through his Anapo party.

Ironically, while military coups and dictatorial governments have been somewhat anomalous in general Colombian history, the recent decade of violencia was not out of place with Colombian traditions. Notably, two other periods of bloody civil war preceded this latest example: that of the 1870's, when an estimated 80,000 people lost their lives; and the 1899-1903 Thousand Days' War, which allegedly claimed 100,000 victims. The newest violencia, however, overshadowed its predecessors in destructiveness, most estimates claiming at least 150,000 killed. Indeed, the military intervention in 1953 and the final solution offered by the Frente Nacional have been accredited with preventing an even higher death toll.

Bernardo Gaitán Mahecha observes two cycles in the last violencia. The first began in 1948 and ended with the 1953 military coup. With the installation of the military junta, "interest was lost in fighting in the fields to be replaced by the political game in high places of power." There was a public laying down of arms, and Rojas decreed a general amnesty for political crimes. From that time on, those who continued armed action became known as bandits. Gaitán Mahecha adds that, "If the violencia of the first cycle represented opposition to the government or

support of it, that of the second cycle is confronting the whole society"¹⁴

Robert Williamson claims that conflicting norms in Colombian society produced anomic conditions which help explain the violencia. "Bogotá and other cities have encroached on what was once an untrampled landscape. The campesino finds his values in confusion." In effect, after the initial upheaval in Bogotá, order was soon restored in that capital and other major cities; and the brunt of the violencia was felt in rural Colombia. The involvement of traditional cultural factors in the strife was also illustrated by Williamson:

It is significant that the Caribbean or coastal area with its more varied ethnic background and more permissive sexual norms as well as less rigid Catholicism was not especially affected by violence. On the other hand, the more Hispanic central area was less adjusted to changing needs.

He further notes that the regions near Ecuador were also spared much violence, but for a different reason. There, a "stabilized culture pattern" existed; even the few Liberals were pro-clerical.¹⁵ The Cauca Valley, on the other hand, was one of the regions most affected by the violencia, a factor which produced the huge wave of migration into Cali.

Whereas internecine civil war has not been alien to Colombian tradition, neither has the convivencia solution to assuage conflicts between the two parties and to unite them in common action. In 1854, Conservatives and Liberals joined hands to topple the dictatorial Melo government and restore legality. In 1885, the Nuñista Liberals and the Conservatives united to end the federalist anarchy, enacting the 1886 constitution, which continues in effect today. In 1910, the republican union was formed, made up of Conservatives and Liberals; it overthrew the dictatorship of

General Rafael Reyes and restored a state of legality. During the consecutive presidencies of Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo and Conservative Ospina Pérez just prior to the assassination of Gaitán, each executive decided that his difficult relationship with congress could be countered only by inviting leaders from both parties into his cabinet.

Thus, the united Liberal-Conservative effort against Rojas Pinilla and their continued collaboration in forming the Frente Nacional had their precedents, although nothing to the extreme of this coalition had previously been attempted. The Frente Nacional was the product of two accords reached by Liberal leader Lleras Camargo and Conservative leader Gómez in Spain in 1956 and 1957. The first agreement, the Pact of Benidorm, was a pledge of party cooperation against the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship and in favor of re-establishing freedom and constitutional guarantees. The subsequent Declaration of Sitges laid down the principles of the Frente Nacional, which was adopted in 1958. The two pillars of this coalition were paridad and alternación. Complete parity was to be established between the two parties for all national, departmental, and municipal posts. Thus, both houses of congress would be composed of 50 per cent Liberals and 50 per cent Conservatives, regardless of the popular vote distribution and to the exclusion of all parties not calling themselves Conservative or Liberal. The net effect was to further stimulate factionalism, a result that might well have been predicted.

Similarly, the presidency was to be alternated, with a Conservative serving the first four-year term followed by a Liberal then another Conservative, for a total of twelve years. However, the impasse resulting from Gómez's unwillingness to accept the candidacy of more moderate

Conservative Guillermo León Valencia led to the candidacy of Liberal Lleras Camargo. The duration of the Frente Nacional was later extended to sixteen years to give equal time to both parties, the scheduled date of termination being set for 1974. A plebiscite was held at the end of 1957, and the Frente Nacional was ratified by an overwhelming vote. Clearly, peace meant more to the people than the traditional two-party competition.

Notes

¹ Ben G. Burnett, "The Recent Colombia Party System: Its Organization and Procedures," unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of California at Los Angeles, 1955), p. 1.

² Ibid., pp. 2-3.

³ Ibid., p. 121.

⁴ Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 499-500.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Cole Blasier, "Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca Valley," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VIII (July, 1966), 387.

⁸ Burnett, op. cit., p. 163.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Guillermo Salamanca, Los Partidos en Colombia (Bogotá, 1957).

¹¹ Herring, op. cit., pp. 519-520.

¹² Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957); p. 316.

¹³ Ibid., p. 311.

¹⁴ Bernardo Gaitán Mahecha, Misión Histórica del Frente Nacional (Bogotá: Editorial Revista Colombiana, 1966), pp. 33-34.

¹⁵ Robert C. Williamson, "Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (March, 1965), 35-36.

CHAPTER III

ELECTORAL BACKGROUND

Colombia is a unitary state divided into departments and municipios. The number of departments has recently risen above twenty--aided by the division of existing departments--and, in addition, there are remote, but vast, territories of rain forest and llanos (plains) categorized as intendencias or comisarías. These latter two administrative divisions are directly responsible to the central government. The municipio, on the other hand, consists of a city or town and its surrounding area. Some municipios include sub-units known as corregimientos or veredas (hamlets or villages).

The power of the central government is compounded by the fact that the executive head of each department, the governor, serves as the agent of the president. The latter appoints him to an indefinite term of office and can remove him at will. The only requirement is that the gubernatorial posts be distributed equally among Conservatives and Liberals in accordance with the parity provision of the Frente Nacional. The principal role of the governor is to serve as a link between local and central government and to coordinate to some degree the activities of the municipios within his department. This control is exercised through decrees, resolutions, and orders to municipio concejos (councils) and mayors, as well as by approval of all municipio acts. The major legislative body of the department, the assembly, has very limited authority. In the first place, its legislation must be in harmony with that of the

national congress; and secondly, the governor enjoys the right of absolute veto.¹

The executive power of the municipio, on the other hand, is vested in the alcalde (mayor), who is appointed by the governor for a one-year term, with probable reappointments. As noted by one source, "He has a dual role, to serve as chief of the municipal administration and as agent of the central government. He is, in effect, the immediate agent of the governor." Strict control over the municipios is exercised by the central government in administrative, financial, and judicial areas. The governor must approve all actions of the municipal council and mayor and may revise those he regards as unconstitutional or illegal. Possessing power similar to that of the president over the governor, the latter may dismiss the mayor at any time. The mayor's power over the council, however, is quite formidable, since he can veto its resolution on the basis of unconstitutionality or illegality. The council, for its part, has *jurisdiction over* competence over public works, such as construction and maintenance of roads, water mains, aqueducts and public buildings other than schools, public education matters, establishment of municipal courts and prisons, and public welfare and health measures.²

Thus, we see that the locus of power in the departments and municipios is mainly centered in the non-elective, appointive executive branches, while the popularly elected assemblies and councils lack significant strength. Relationship between the president and the national congress, however, is not so one-sided.

All four legislative bodies at the three administrative levels are popularly elected. Senators serve a four-year term, while representatives,

deputies (in the assembly), and councilmen are elected for two years. Representation in the senate, house, and assembly is based on a department's population, while that of the municipal councils is based on the population of the municipio. Members of the former three bodies are elected at large in each department, and the same pattern prevails for the election of concejales (councilmen) within a municipio. Furthermore, there is no requirement that a candidate for any of these offices be a resident of the department or municipio where he seeks election, which means that a party can run its lists in the departments where the best chances of success are seemingly to be found. Hence, MRL leader Alfonso López Michelsen headed his party's senatorial list in Valle in 1962 and gained election to the senate.

Beyond this point, candidates for the senate or house could also present their candidacy for the assembly, the council, or both, and take office at all three levels if elected. Thus, López Michelsen headed MRL lists for the senate, assembly, and council in the same 1962 election. Furthermore, at the assembly and council levels, a candidate may run for the same post, simultaneously, in different departments or municipios as the case may be. Again using López Michelsen as our example, we observe that he was elected to nine departmental assemblies in 1962 and to ten in the 1964 elections. The object of such tactics was to use the name of the MRL leader to win seats for the faction in districts where lists headed by lesser figures might have had less chance to triumph. In each case, however, López was paired with a different suplente, and the latter assumed the role of de facto principal if the list won enough votes for at least the top man to win a seat.³

The list system in Colombia operates in the following manner. Once the total vote is determined, a proportional representation formula is applied in all races in which more than two seats are at stake. Then the principle of parity comes into play as the total number of seats is divided evenly between Liberals and Conservatives. Next, the electoral quotient is determined, separately for each overall party, by dividing a party's vote by the total number of seats to which it is entitled. Finally, each faction receives a percentage of seats corresponding to its portion of the vote. Should an extra seat remain, the faction with the largest number of residual votes receives it. Members of a particular list receive seats according to their position on the list. Hence, if a faction wins three seats, the first three names on the list receive them. Each faction provides its own ballots. Unlike the case for many other countries with proportional representation, Colombia does not have a multi-party system. However, such a development is presently impeded by the Frente Nacional system. Furthermore, the high degree of factionalism partially offsets the lack of a multi-party system.

The partisan composition of Colombia's legislative bodies thus determined, the geographical distribution has been established in the following manner. Each department has been entitled to one senator for every 190,000 inhabitants and one for each fraction over 95,000. The number of representatives has been based on one per 90,000 population or fraction over 45,000. The size of an assembly, on the other hand, has been determined by the ratio of one deputy per 40,000 population or fraction over 20,000.⁴ However, the size of these legislative bodies has been frozen to curtail unwieldiness, so these ratios no longer

prevail. Valle's quota has been ten senators, twenty representatives, and twenty-eight deputies.

Municipal councils, on the other hand, vary from six to sixteen, the first number corresponding to municipios with less than 5,000 inhabitants, the second corresponding to those exceeding 50,000.⁵ Hence, Cali has a council comprising sixteen members. (In order to maintain the principle of parity between Conservatives and Liberals, the size of each legislative body must be an even, rather than an odd, number.)

Principales at all legislative levels, of course, are matched by an equal number of suplentes.

As to the basis of voting strength for the two overall parties, unfortunately, voting statistics do not enable us to detect partisan divisions on the basis of socio-economic class. However, urban-rural differences in the vote are very pronounced, with the Liberal strength in the cities and the Conservative strength in the smaller towns. More specifically, Robert Dix relates Liberal strength to the "more commercialized, industrialized, and less traditional sections of the country," and Conservative strength to the "socially and economically traditionalist areas of the country." Using the March 1962 elections as his example, Dix finds that the overall Liberal margin of 295,567 votes in the eleven municipios where the vote total surpassed 25,000 votes more than accounts for the nationwide Liberal majority of 281,239. In each of the eleven municipios, the Liberals outpolled the Conservatives, by margins greater than two to one in all but two of the municipios.⁶ We will soon see the importance of large Liberal majorities in Cali in offsetting overall Conservative strength (often majorities) in the remainder of Valle.

As to the regional basis of strength for the two overall parties, the Conservatives traditionally have been strongest in Antioquia, while the Liberals have enjoyed their greatest strength in Cundinamarca, especially in Bogotá. Burnett observes that the large majority of Colombian departments historically have been overwhelmingly controlled by one party or the other. However, six have been somewhat competitive throughout the years, and Valle is included in this number. In effect, Valle and the contiguous department of Cauca had manifested the greatest degree of party competition prior to the Frente Nacional experiment. Table 1 shows the voting percentages of the two parties in Valle in the presidential elections between 1930 and the beginning of the Frente Nacional in which both parties participated, and the percentage in seven municipio elections during this period.

While the presidential elections showed a fair amount of competitiveness--even the 1930 and 1946 Liberal margins were small by Colombian standards of overwhelming defeat--all seven municipio elections were dominated by the Liberals. However, Burnett points out that even these wide margins are deceptive when one compares Liberal-Conservative differences in other departments with the Valle patterns.⁷ With the advent of the Frente Nacional and its blunting of the Liberal-Conservative rivalry, the voting gap between the two overall parties has diminished considerably in several departments. Presently, the national strength of the Liberals and Conservatives is quite even, with the Liberals holding a slight edge. However, the Oficialistas hold a tremendous edge over the Unionistas. The Liberals are strongest in the Caribbean coastal

TABLE 1

PRE-FRENTE NACIONAL VOTING STRENGTH
OF THE PARTIES IN VALLE

| Year | Presidential Election | | Municipal Election | |
|------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | Liberals | Conservatives | Liberals | Conservatives |
| 1930 | 59.6 | 40.1 | | |
| 1935 | | | 65.7 | 34.2 |
| 1937 | | | 65.3 | 34.6 |
| 1939 | | | 67.7 | 32.2 |
| 1941 | | | 63.0 | 36.9 |
| 1942 | 49.6 | 50.4 | | |
| 1943 | | | 60.7 | 39.2 |
| 1945 | | | 61.7 | 38.2 |
| 1946 | 59.6 | 40.3 | | |
| 1947 | | | 62.3 | 37.6 |

regions and the cities, while the Conservatives have their main strength in the rural regions. The urban and rural population of Colombia is about evenly divided, but a considerably larger percentage of urban citizens vote.

The first election connected with the present Frente Nacional system was the 1957 plebiscite. Table 2 compares the voting results in Cali with those of Valle as a whole and the national total. The percentage voting affirmative--this is, in favor of adopting the Frente Nacional--in Cali was overwhelming (99 per cent of the votes cast), greater than that of Valle (98 per cent) and that of the nation as a whole (95 per cent). Only in two departments, Santander and Boyacá, was there a sizable percentage of negative votes, about 25 per cent in both cases. The figures in the table suggest an overwhelming desire for peace above any purely partisan consideration. Moreover, some 72 per cent of the potential voters in both Valle and the nation voted in that election, a percentage which surpasses that for any other election in recent Colombian history.⁸

Subsequent elections, however, in addition to revealing less voter interest, also manifest some interesting deviations in Cali and Valle from overall national patterns. But these deviations were slow to develop as was the profound decline in voting totals. To illustrate these points, the following tables compare the Cali, Valle, and national vote in elections for president and representatives between 1958 and 1966. Since elections for all legislative bodies take place at the same time, the figures corresponding to any one are highly representative for all others. Hence, the figures for senatorial elections, which take place every four years rather than every two, and assembly elections have not

TABLE 2

1957 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION

| | Affirmative | Negative | Blank | Total |
|--------|-------------|----------|--------|-----------|
| Cali | 171,676 | 499 | 699 | 172,844 |
| Valle | 494,427 | 5,704 | 3,705 | 503,836 |
| Nation | 4,169,294 | 206,864 | 20,738 | 4,397,090 |

been included. The Cali municipal council results, however, are included on account of some interesting sub-factionalism and their usefulness in relation to our study of the party hierarchies in Cali.

A comparison of the 1958 election results, the first under the Frente Nacional system, is offered in Table 3. In accordance with the terms of the coalition, the mainstreams of the Conservative party joined the Liberals in supporting the presidential candidacy of Liberal Lleras Camargo. However, an anti-Frente Nacional sector of the Conservatives, led by Jorge Leyva, refused to support a Liberal and ran their own leader. Cali proved to be considerably more pro-Liberal than Valle and the nation as a whole. Lleras Camargo received approximately 94 per cent of the total presidential vote in Cali as compared to 76 per cent in Valle and 80 per cent for the entire nation. A comparison of the voting for representatives at the three levels indicates that Cali's deviation from departmental and national norms in the presidential contest, which followed the legislative elections by two months, was due much more to a pro-Liberal sentiment than to support for the Frente Nacional. Had the case been otherwise, the degree of deviation would have been less in the legislative vote. However, the Liberals received 74 per cent of the total vote in Cali for the house of representatives as opposed to 59 per cent in Valle and 58 per cent for the nation. Thus, at the time of the 1958 elections, Valle leaned only slightly toward the Liberals, barely more than the national average, while Cali was strongly pro-Liberal.

A comparison of factional breakdowns shows further differences between voting in Cali and in its overall department. Some 76 per cent of the Conservative vote in Valle went to the rightist Laureanistas, as

TABLE 3

1958 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION

| | Conservatives | | | | Total |
|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
| | Leyvistas | Laureanistas | Valencistas | Alzatistas | |
| Cali | | | | | |
| Pres. | 5,670 | | | | 5,670 |
| Repr. | | 16,156 | 11,654 | 1,043 | 28,853 |
| Mun. | | 16,133 | 11,257 | 990 | 28,380 |
| Valle | | | | | |
| Pres. | 79,380 | | | | 79,380 |
| Repr. | | 120,963 | 21,393 | 15,191 | 157,547 |
| National | | | | | |
| Prés. | 614,861 | | | | 614,861 |
| Repr. | | 952,364 | 317,627 | 285,217 | 1,556,273 |

| | Liberals | | | Overall Total |
|-----------------|---------------|------------|-----------|---------------|
| | Officialistas | Dissidents | Total | |
| Cali | | | | |
| Pres. | 102,925 | | 102,925 | 109,427* |
| Repr. | 84,622 | 645 | 85,267 | 114,248 |
| Mun. | 66,974 | 19,109** | 85,861 | 114,241 |
| Valle | | | | |
| Pres. | 265,402 | | 265,402 | 347,004 |
| Repr. | 230,467 | 658 | 231,125 | 389,029 |
| National | | | | |
| Pres. | 2,482,948 | | 2,482,948 | 3,108,567 |
| Repr. | 2,102,001 | 28,078 | 2,132,741 | 3,693,939 |

* This and other totals include some null, blank, and other votes.

** Another dissident list received 778 votes but represented no important Liberal sector and was thus omitted.

opposed to the more moderate Valencistas (linked with the Ospinistas), and mainly personalistic Alzatistas. In Cali, on the other hand, the Laureanista figure was limited to 56 per cent, fairly in line with the national proportion of 61 per cent. This would seem to indicate that even the Conservatives in Cali were moderate in comparison with those in the surrounding department. The Alzatista vote in Cali was less than 4 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent for Valle and 18 per cent for the nation.

On the Liberal side, factionalism in the races for representative was negligible at all three levels as Liberals were strongly united behind the Oficialista lists. However, in the Cali municipio elections, a significant split in voting did occur. Alfonso Barberena, who was to head the MRL list in the 1960 municipio elections, led a dissident list which captured 23 per cent of the combined Liberal vote. This was the earliest indication of the fact that Cali Liberals were not solidly behind the Frente Nacional. It will be noted that, otherwise, the municipio voting followed the pattern for representatives very closely.⁹ Approximately 58 per cent of potential Colombian voters voted for president in 1958 and 69 per cent voted for representatives, a decline from the 72 per cent who had voted in the plebiscite.¹⁰ (The presidential vote in all three elections which have taken place since the beginning of the Frente Nacional has been considerably below that for the legislative contests, perhaps due to a combination of unwillingness to vote in a non-competitive election and the reluctance of some Liberals and Conservatives to vote for a man from the other party, coalition candidate or not.)

A change in the pattern of factionalism developed after the 1958 elections, including the formation of a front between Gilberto Alzate Avendaño and Ospina Pérez against Gómez, and the organization of the MRL as a nationally operative Liberal faction. The effect of this new factional pattern on the 1960 vote is illustrated in Table 4. The most significant outcome of those elections was the defeat of the Laureanistas at the hands of the Ospinista-Alzatista front. The latter then replaced the former as the Conservative partner in the Frente Nacional. Notably the Laureanistas, directly opposite from the 1958 elections, fared better in Cali than in Valle or the nation. In fact, they actually increased their percentage of the Conservative vote from 56 per cent to 58 per cent, while in Valle they fell from 76 per cent to 34 per cent, and nationally from 61 per cent to 42 per cent.

Significantly, the vote total was down considerably from the 1958 figure. Over 28,000 Conservative votes were cast in Cali in 1958 as opposed to slightly over 15,000 in 1960. Nor did the Liberals benefit from this decline. Their total sank from 85,000 to 49,000. In fact, the total number of votes cast for representative in 1960 was only 57 per cent of the 1958 figure, a more severe drop than those recorded in Valle and the nation, where the respective figures were 71 per cent and 68 per cent. Moreover, only 58 per cent of potential voters voted in this election, nationally.¹¹ These figures suggest a growing disillusionment with the Frente Nacional, especially in Cali and Valle, where Anapo and MRL strengths were to become very pronounced in subsequent elections. Indicative of this were the 34 per cent and 30 per cent totals

TABLE 4

1960 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION*

| Conservatives | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|
| | Ospinistas-Alzatistas | Laureanistas | Leyvistas | Total |
| Cali | | | | |
| Repr. | 6,075 | 8,834 | 417 | 15,326 |
| Mun. | 5,931 | 9,250** | 378 | 15,559 |
| Valle | | | | |
| Repr. | 73,840 | 39,414 | 2,100 | 115,354 |
| Natl. | | | | |
| Repr. | 560,000 | 445,000 | 50,000 | 1,059,370 |
| Liberals | | | | |
| | Oficialistas | MRL | Total | Overall Total |
| Cali | | | | |
| Repr. | 32,909 | 16,711 | 49,620 | 64,946 |
| Mun. | 32,894 | 16,746 | 49,640 | 65,199 |
| Valle | | | | |
| Repr. | 112,355 | 48,054 | 160,409 | 276,318 |
| Natl. | | | | |
| Repr. | 1,180,000 | 295,000 | 1,478,403 | 2,542,651 |

* The national figures for factional breakdown are rounded off.

**This figure includes two sub-factions of Laureanistas.

of the combined Liberal vote captured by the MRL in Cali and Valle respectively, as opposed to its 20 per cent national total.¹²

A change in the factional pattern for both parties in the 1962 elections is illustrated in Table 5. On the Conservative side, the Ospinista-Alzatista front became known as the Unionistas, while the more doctrinaire Laureanistas fittingly took on the name Doctrinarios. Anapo became a new factional addition, and the rightist Leyva waged another personal campaign against the Frente Nacional, gathering some 12 per cent of the total presidential vote. (Leyva had no independent faction in the legislative contests.) On the Liberal side, a formal factional split among the Oficialistas took place in Cali and Valle--a purely local phenomenon--with the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas running separate lists. Sub-factionalism also occurred in the ranks of the MRL, a more radical "hard" line sector splitting off from the more "soft" line main current. This development was national in scope, but official national figures list only the total MRL vote without providing the breakdown.

The 1962 presidential election manifested greater complexity than its 1958 predecessor. In the 1958 campaign, the Liberals were solidly behind Lleras Camargo, and the only Conservative opposition to this Liberal candidate came from Leyva. In 1962, however, Guillermo León Valencia was unable to count on the solidarity of all fellow Conservatives and was confronted with the candidacy of Leyva plus that of Rojas Pinilla. In addition, a strong Liberal vote came out for López Michelsen, a total quite close to the Conservative vote for Leyva in 1958. This suggests that a sizable percentage of Liberals were no more willing to vote for

TABLE 5

1962 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION

| Conservatives | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------------|--------|--------------|---------|-----------|---------------|
| | Unionistas | | Doctrinarios | Anapo | Leyvistas | Total |
| Cali | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 50,770 | | | 2,573 | 5,814 | 59,157 |
| Repr. | 12,769 | | 10,435 | 5,408 | | 28,612 |
| Mun. | 12,222 | | 9,381 | 5,385 | | 29,288 |
| Valle | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 143,195 | | | 14,839 | 27,235 | 185,269 |
| Repr. | 71,811 | | 38,563 | 25,191 | | 135,565 |
| Natl. | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 1,636,081 | | | 54,562 | 308,912 | 1,999,635 |
| Repr. | 794,688 | | 487,733 | 115,587 | | 1,402,786 |
| Liberals | | | | | | |
| | Oficialistas | | MRL | | Total | Overall Total |
| | Pach. | Balc. | Blanda | Dura | | |
| Cali | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | 24,499 | | 24,499 | 84,006 |
| Repr. | 21,303 | 21,030 | 11,524 | 10,440 | 65,583 | 94,195 |
| Mun. | 20,544 | 19,321 | 11,025 | 10,378 | 63,330 | 92,618 |
| Valle | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | 94,203 | | 94,203 | 280,416 |
| Repr. | 36,368 | 53,140 | 62,691 | 22,039 | 176,091 | 311,691 |
| Natl. | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | 625,630 | | 625,630 | 2,634,840 |
| Repr. | 1,081,103 | | 601,926 | | 1,685,531 | 3,090,203 |

a Conservative president than a similar number of Conservative counterparts were willing to vote for a Liberal chief executive. These votes, however, amounted to nothing more than protest votes since the Frente Nacional provisions would not have allowed a Conservative to become president in 1958 nor a Liberal in 1962 regardless of vote totals. In fact, the official 1962 returns list only the totals for Valencia and Leyva, while those for López Michelsen and Rojas Pinilla are under the category of null votes because the former was a Liberal and the latter lost his political rights when he was overthrown in 1957. Nonetheless, the MRL leader received 29 per cent of the total vote in Cali, 34 per cent in Valle, and 24 per cent in the nation. Rojas, however, received weak support.

The strong showing of the MRL and Anapo in Valle is better exemplified by the returns for the house of representatives. The MRL received 34 per cent of the Liberal vote in Cali and a considerably higher 48 per cent in Valle, as opposed to the national percentage of 36 per cent. Omitting the vote in Cali, the MRL actually received 57 per cent of the total Liberal vote in the remainder of Valle. The relative weakness of the MRL in Cali as opposed to the rest of the department may find an explanation by a comparison of overall Liberal strength in the two areas. Liberals captured 70 per cent of the total vote in Cali but only 51 per cent of the vote in the outlying department. This Liberal domination of Cali might suggest a more effective party organization and greater esprit de corps which work against deviant Liberal voting than would be the case for the rest of Valle, where Conservative strength was almost equal to that of the Liberals. Due to its strength outside of Cali, the MRL received more votes in Valle than in any other department, thus establishing

this area as one of its principal strongholds. Of some interest is the fact that the hard line MRL sub-faction nearly equalled the soft line in voting strength in Cali, while it proved much weaker in the overall department.

On the Conservative side, Anapo, competing in its first election, drew relatively strong support in Cali and Valle, with 19 and 18 per cent of the vote respectively. Anapo, like the MRL, was on its way to establishing some of its greatest strength in Valle. The faction now called Unionista continued its advantage over the newly named Doctrinarios. Indeed, Laureanista support fell from the 58 per cent of the 1960 elections to 36 per cent in Cali, from 34 to 28 per cent in Valle, and from 42 to 35 per cent nationally. Significantly, this gap was filled mainly by Anapo rather than the Unionistas, who amassed 45, 53, and 57 per cent of the Conservative vote in Cali, Valle, and the nation respectively.¹³

The total vote increased sharply from 1960, though failing to reach the 1958 figure. This increase was due to a large growth in the number of eligible voters, since the percentage of the potential electorate who voted remained at 57 per cent, the figure for 1960.¹⁴ Thus, a fairly high degree of abstention prevailed. Of perhaps greater importance was the growing anti-Frente Nacional vote. In the races for representative, the pro-Frente Nacional forces--the Oficialistas and Unionistas--won only 58 per cent of the vote in Cali, 52 per cent in Valle, and 61 per cent in the nation. Excluding Cali, the anti-Frente Nacional factions received a majority in the remainder of Valle. These percentages were almost identical with those for the presidential election, which is to say that Valencia barely won a majority of the total Valle vote and owed

even this to his support in Cali. The Cali municipio elections closely patterned those for representative except for the fact that Conservatives ran five different lists and Liberals ran eight. These additional lists in all cases received very little support.

A probable further weakening of Frente Nacional strength in the 1964 congressional elections was avoided by the formation of a front between the Unionistas and Doctrinarios. Nonetheless, Anapo's gains were formidable as Table 6 illustrates, and resulted in an increase from six to twenty-eight seats in the house of representatives. In Cali, Anapo drew almost 49 per cent of the Conservative vote, while it collected 45 per cent in Valle as a whole. Its national total was only 27 per cent, but this still represented a sharp upswing from the 8 per cent two years previously. Anapo's 50,000 votes in Valle were second only to the 54,248 it received in the much more highly populated Cundinamarca. Perhaps due to this large Anapista vote, the Conservatives received more votes in Valle than the Liberals for the first time since the beginning of the Frente Nacional. However, the Liberals continued to hold a 58 per cent majority in Cali, nevertheless, a decline from the 70 per cent of 1962.

A sharp drop in vote totals occurred, one far more detrimental to Liberals than to Conservatives in Cali and Valle alike. In the capital city, the Conservative vote total was only some 5,000 below that of 1962, while the Liberals lost 33,000 votes. In the overall department, the Conservative decline was 25,000, while the Liberals lost 70,000 votes. This phenomenon might be attributable to far greater Liberal apathy or to a sizable percentage of Liberals voting for Anapo, even though that party ran only Conservative lists in Valle. (Anapo ran Liberal lists,

TABLE 6

1964 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION

| | Frente Nacionalistas | | Conservatives | | Total |
|-------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|
| | Oficial | Cesartulistas | Anapo | | |
| Cali | | | | | |
| Repr. | 8,903 | 2,983 | 11,235 | | 23,124 |
| Mun. | 9,007 | 2,807 | 10,569 | | 22,912 |
| Valle | | | | | |
| Repr. | 51,908 | 7,551 | 50,186 | | 110,818 |
| Natl. | | | | | |
| Repr. | 794,000 | | 293,183 | | 1,095,465 |
| | Oficialistas | Liberals | | Total | Overall Total |
| | | MRL Blanda | Dura | | |
| Cali | | | | | |
| Repr. | 24,787 | 3,341 | 4,681 | 32,809 | 56,339 |
| Mun. | 24,519 | 3,957 | 4,592 | 33,068 | 55,980 |
| Valle | | | | | |
| Repr. | 59,711 | 33,717 | 12,854 | 106,282 | 218,504 |
| Natl. | | | | | |
| Repr. | 738,437 | 284,952 | 96,895 | 1,157,998 | 2,261,190 |

along with its Conservative ones, in a few departments, collecting 16,495 votes with them as opposed to the 293,183 votes it amassed with its Conservative lists.) Nationally, the same pattern occurred, although the difference between Liberal and Conservative losses was less acute. The Liberal vote total fell by 527,533, while that of the Conservatives dropped 307,321. The Liberals continued to hold a majority in Colombia, but it was reduced to a precarious 62,000 votes.

Another example of uniquely Valle sub-factionalism occurred in the 1964 elections. César Tulio Delgado headed a list of his newly formed, highly personalistic Movimiento de Restauración Conservadora, a group which continued to pledge its allegiance to the Frente Nacional. The voting returns were not very favorable for the Cesartulistas. At the same time, the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas formed a common directorate and ran united lists, thus eliminating that structural sub-factionalism on the Liberal side. However, two tiny splinter groups calling themselves Frente Nacionalistas did run separate lists. Likewise, two equally weakly supported splinters from the MRL soft line ran separately from the recognized soft line list. Even greater factionalism, as is traditionally the case, occurred in the Cali municipio elections. However, of the five Conservative and six Liberal lists, only those which received a sizable vote in the congressional elections attained one at the municipio level. The municipio elections, by their very localized nature, seem to more easily lend themselves to the intervention of ephemeral personalistic cliques which in many cases do not even qualify as true sub-factions.

On the Liberal side, the MRL fell slightly from its 1962 total in Valle of 48 per cent of the combined Liberal vote to 44 per cent, reflecting

its national decline from 36 to 33 per cent. However, in Cali, it slid from 34 to 24 per cent. Clearly, the MRL was never able to effectively counter the strength of the Oficialista organization in Cali, and now it was beginning to lose its hold in regions where it had made inroads. Again, the hard line of the MRL showed better in Cali vis-à-vis the soft line than in Valle, actually attaining a larger vote. The línea blanda was far stronger than the línea dura nationally.¹⁵ Similar to the case for the Liberal party as a whole, it is difficult to ascertain whether the MRL was falling victim to growing apathy or to a switch in factional allegiance. Apathy was definitely on the increase in Colombia as only 36 per cent of eligible voters bothered to vote in 1964.¹⁶

The 1966 elections, as Table 7 illustrates, produced another upswing in the total number of votes cast, similar to that of 1962, the previous presidential election year. However, this can in part be attributed to an increase in eligible voters. Nonetheless, the fact that the Frente Nacional presidential candidacy now pertained to a Liberal impelled considerably more Liberals to vote, as attested to by the Cali election figures, and the growing appeal of Anapo probably converted a sizable amount of apathy into anti-Frente Nacional voting. The Liberal vote in Cali more than doubled the 1964 total, while the local Conservative vote, low to begin with, gained a considerably smaller 50 per cent. Nationally, Liberal gains were not much greater than those of the Conservatives, the former increasing by 32 per cent while the latter augmented 26 per cent. Significantly, the vote in Valle with Cali omitted revealed an increase of just 21 per cent for the Liberals and less than 2 per cent for the Conservatives. In like manner, the overall vote total in Cali increased

TABLE 7

1966 VOTING RESULTS IN CALI, VALLE, AND THE NATION*

| | Unionistas | | Conservatives | | | Total | Overall** |
|-------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Oficial | Cesartulistas | Independientes | Anapo | Total | | |
| Cali | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | | | 33,456 | 33,456 | |
| Sen. | 6,115 | 3,760 | 6,919 | | 18,700 | 35,734 | |
| Mun. | 6,443 | 3,423 | 6,971 | | 18,606 | 35,795 | |
| Valle | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | | | 101,354 | 101,354 | |
| Sen. | 30,365 | 5,481 | 27,441 | | 61,007 | 124,741 | |
| Natl. | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | | | | | 730,000 | 730,000** | |
| Sen. | 472,876 | | 339,809 | | 474,489 | 1,379,704 | |
| | Oficialistas | | Liberals | | | Total | Overall** |
| | Oficial | Revitalización | MRL Blanda Dura | Pueblo | Total | | |
| Cali | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 85,724 | | | | 85,724 | 120,043 | |
| Sen. | 42,935 | 12,429 | 4,526 | 2,539 | 4,888 | 67,227 | 103,154 |
| Mun. | 42,878 | 11,849 | 4,572 | 2,523 | 4,812 | 66,773 | 102,568 |
| Valle | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 184,772 | | | | 184,772 | 287,910 | |
| Sen. | 87,084 | 25,862 | 20,302 | 13,648 | 9,058 | 155,984 | 281,413 |
| Natl. | | | | | | | |
| Pres. | 1,850,000 | | | | 1,850,000 | 2,600,000 | |
| Sen. | 1,120,394 | | 367,457 | | 1,529,490 | 2,917,864 | |

* A comparison of the senatorial vote is used due to more complete national data.

**The presidential election figures are rounded off.

***Again, totals in this table and others include some null, blank, and other votes.

83 per cent, in the nation, 29 per cent, and in outlying Valle, only 10 per cent. Due to the overwhelming Liberal vote in Cali, the Liberals once again gained the majority in Valle; but, significantly, the Conservatives received slightly more votes than the Liberals in the rest of the department.

Furthermore, none of the Liberal gains were beneficial to the MRL, which was now truly declining at all three levels. The MRL share of the Liberal vote slid from 24 to 18 per cent in Cali, 44 to 28 per cent in Valle, and 33 to 24 per cent nationally. However, a new Liberal faction, the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal, arose in Valle, claiming that it needed "renovation" and "revitalization." In their first participation in an election, the Revitalización Liberals attained 22 per cent of the Frente Nacional Liberal vote and 18 per cent of the total Liberal vote in Cali as opposed to respective figures of 23 per cent and 17 per cent for Valle as a whole. While these figures qualify this new group as a significant Liberal party faction, they do not seem highly impressive when compared to the faltering MRL which showed much greater strength in its electoral encounter. Meanwhile, sub-factionalism in the ranks of the MRL was continuing to grow, with the Communist-oriented MRL del Pueblo eating into the strength of the soft and hard lines. Significantly, the most radical of MRL tendencies again gained a plurality in Cali, indicating that MRL voters in the capital city were more inclined toward extremism than those in the overall department.

The Frente Nacional Conservatives in Cali again manifested greater electoral vulnerability than their Liberal counterparts. The short-lived Ospinista-Laureanista front had split, the Laureanistas taking the Alzatistas

with them to form the Conservative Independientes. And the Cesartulistas further weakened the Ospinistas by vying with them for what remained of the Conservative Frente Nacional vote. As it was, the combined Ospinista-Cesartulista vote equalled another 19 per cent of the Conservative total. The Independientes accounted for another 19 per cent of the Conservative output, while Anapo, which again ran only Conservative lists in Valle, amassed 52 per cent of the Conservative vote. This pattern was closely followed in the overall department, the Unionistas collecting 29 per cent of the Conservative total as opposed to 22 per cent for the Independientes and 49 per cent for Anapo. Nationally, the anti-Frente Nacional feeling was not as extensive, the Unionistas nearly equalling Anapo's vote total, both with 34 per cent of the total Conservative vote. The Independientes secured 25 per cent of this vote total. Anapo added slightly to its overall total by running Liberal lists in seven departments, but their combined value was only 13,791 votes.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 1966 elections was the fact that the proportion of the anti-Frente Nacional vote continued to rise, in spite of the decline of the MRL. The breakaway of the Lauro-Alzatistas ipso facto contributed to this, but the growing strength of Anapo appears to have greater transcendental importance, both for the future of the Frente Nacional and that of the Colombian political system. Anapo now had accumulated 36 of the 190 seats in the house and 18 of the 109 in the senate. This reduced the vote of the Frente Nacional coalition to 58 per cent in the house and 63 per cent in the senate, thus further removing the coalition from the necessary two-thirds majority to pass major legislation. The resulting legislative stalemate had induced President Valencia

to declare a state of siege in 1965 whereby he could legislate by decree, and President Lleras Restrepo has maintained the use of this instrument.

Of further significance is the fact that the anti-Frente Nacional proportion decreased in Cali and Valle at the same time it rose sharply in the overall nation. In comparison with 1962, prior to the Ospinista-Laureanista alliance, the share of the total vote for the Frente Nacional forces increased from 58 to 63 per cent in Cali, from 52 to 53 per cent in Valle, while it decreased from 61 to 55 per cent nationally. The tremendous Liberal surge in Cali and the sharp downturn of the MRL in the overall department account for these differences. The municipio elections in Cali followed the same patterns already described except for the fact that the Conservatives and Liberals each ran six lists, none of any importance that was not included in the senatorial summary.

The May 1966 presidential election further attested to the Liberal orientation of Cali. In the nation as a whole, there was a 12 per cent higher turnout for the March congressional elections than the subsequent presidential elections, and, in like manner, turnout was 6 per cent higher in outlying Valle. Such a result hardly seems extraordinary since the legislative elections were highly competitive whereas the presidential balloting gave more the appearance of an act of ratification than a competitive contest. Nonetheless, the vote in Cali was 16 per cent higher for the presidential election than for the congressional elections, clearly a sign of Liberal solidarity behind Lleras Restrepo. The 730,000 votes for Anapo presidential candidate José Jaramillo are difficult to evaluate considering that he was the only opponent of Lleras. One cannot ascertain what the figure might have been had Leyva once again presented his candidacy.¹⁷

An evaluation of the elections which have occurred since the initiation of the Frente Nacional brings out several conclusions. Most notable are the divergent voting patterns between Cali and Valle. The former is overwhelmingly Liberal; yet the Liberals are, apparently, more easily given to apathy than the Conservatives unless they are particularly inspired to vote. Furthermore, the official Liberal organization in Cali seems highly invulnerable to threats from other Liberal factions. Valle, on the other hand, exemplifies a far greater degree of both inter-factional and inter-party competition, especially when one omits the results of Cali. The MRL made considerable, though temporary, inroads into Oficialista strength, threatening to make the latter a minority Liberal faction if the trend continued; and the Conservatives twice outpolled the Liberals in outlying Valle, failing the other three times by some 4,000, 11,000 and 17,000 votes respectively. With regard to the elements of the Conservative party, the Cali and Valle patterns have been fairly similar. In both cases, the two traditional factions have been faltering in the face of serious and steady Anapo gains, this department being a major stronghold of Anapo. A strong tendency toward sub-factionalism is also a notable characteristic of the political party process in Cali and Valle. The competition between the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas, the formation of the new Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal, and Cesartulismo are indicative of such an inclination.

Notes

¹ See Samuel Humes and Eileen M. Martin, "Colombia," in The Structure of Local Governments Throughout the World (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 351-355.

² Ibid.

³ See Organización y Estadísticas Electorales Marzo y Mayo de 1962 (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 1962); and Organización y Estadísticas Electorales Marzo 15 de 1964 (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 1965).

⁴ See Constitución Política de la República de Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial Voluntad, 1966), pp. 108, 1945.

⁵ See 3,000,000 de Colombianos Cedulados (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 1958), p. 37.

⁶ Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 242-243.

⁷ Ben G. Burnett, "The Recent Colombian Party System: Its Organization and Procedures" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955), pp. 103-111.

⁸ See 3,000,000 de Colombianos, pp. 1-3; and Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964, pp. 136-137.

⁹ See ibid.; and Records of the Registraduría Municipal del Estado Civil de Cali (all municipio electoral data are taken from these records).

¹⁰ See Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964, pp. 136-137.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See El Sufragio y la Identificación Ciudadana en Colombia 1959 a 1961, II (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 1962), pp. 49, 82.

¹³ See Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo y Mayo de 1962.

¹⁴ See Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964, pp. 136-137.

¹⁵ Ibid., book in general.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 136-137.

¹⁷ See Records of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil in Bogotá; and Records of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil de Cali.

CHAPTER IV

HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION

The hierarchical organization of the Liberal and Conservative parties traditionally has been quite similar and follows a pattern which dates back to the nineteenth century. The national party organization occupies the hierarchical apex with a national convention on top and a subordinate national directorate. In practice, however, the unwieldiness of the numerically large conventions has produced de facto control by the national directorate. (Recent conventions have had as many as 1,000 delegates.) The parties normally hold conventions every two years, chiefly for the purpose of choosing the national directorates, handling matters dealing with hierarchical relationships, adopting a party platform, nominating the party's presidential candidate if it is to run one, and treating budgetary affairs.

The recent Liberal convention exemplifies the wide range of delegates, all with a voice and a vote: (a) Liberal ex-presidents; (b) current Liberal senators and representatives; (c) members of the National Liberal Directorate; (d) members of the party's central political committee; (e) the secretary general of the party; (f) two men and two women delegates from each departmental directorate, including the president of the directorate; (g) the directors of Liberal newspapers; (h) Liberal ex-ministers; (i) Liberal ex-governors; (j) Liberal ex-mayors of Bogotá; (k) ten delegates chosen by each department, plus an extra delegate for each 10,000 votes

above 100,000 attained by the Liberals in the department in the last parliamentary election; (l) the current Liberal presidents or vice presidents of the departmental assemblies; (m) a delegate from each departmental federation of workers; (n) ten delegates from the Central de Trabajadores Colombianos (CTC); (o) ten delegates from the Unión de Trabajadores Colombianos (UTC); (p) the Liberal presidents of the past departmental comités bipartidistas (bipartisan committee to coordinate the Liberal-Conservative Frente Nacional campaigns); (q) the national coordinators of affiliated associations, electoral affairs, labor affairs, youth groups, and women's groups; (r) the presidents of university professional and youth organizations; (s) the Liberal departmental coordinators; (t) the presidents of affiliated associations; (u) the party treasurer; (v) the party's electoral court witnesses; (w) the members of the Fondo Liberal (which handles the funds of the party).¹

The national directorates of the parties, which may vary in membership from as few as one to as many as ten, are elected by the national convention for a two-year term and are eligible for re-election. Invariably, they are established party leaders with long records of service in important positions. The national directorate has control over the party headquarters, serves as coordinator and sometimes disciplinarian of lower hierarchical levels, handles general propaganda and financing, determines when national conventions are to be held, and often appoints the members of the departmental directorates (DDs). However, some conventions specifically require that DDs be chosen by departmental conventions. Nonetheless, this function is normally performed by the DN, often for reasons of expediency. The Conservatives differ from the Liberals

somewhat on this point in that the former have delegated to Valle, Antioquia, and Caldas the rank of federated department, which means that they are autonomous from the DN to the point where their DDs are always elected by departmental conventions.

The Conservative practice of decentralization in the form of federated departments seems quite ironical since they have always been considered as the strongly hierarchical party and would be much more expected to have a stronger hierarchical, centralized control than the Liberals should any differences exist in the organization of the two. Dix accents this hierarchical orientation by observing that "Order and hierarchy are . . . key words in the lexicon of the Colombian Conservative. His emphasis is on a strong central authority, a strong executive arm, and on firm measures in dealing with popular disturbances or threats to the status quo. He is also likely to stress the claims of discipline and hierarchy . . ."² Indeed, the Conservative hierarchical tradition did hold true within the hierarchical organizations in Cali, based on statements by both Conservative and Liberal leaders (see Chapter XI).

The degree of Conservative party decentralization in its overall organization seems worthy of further comment since the pyramidal image of a true hierarchy seems to be impaired in the case of the three federated departments. One might wonder whether an upward deference system between the three DDs involved and the DN is present in spite of the departmental autonomy, or whether the theory of "stratarchy," often applied to U.S. political party organizations, might not be somewhat applicable in this case. Eldersveld observes that stratarchy departs from hierarchy in that it characterizes the "proliferation of the ruling

group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise." It signifies a power pattern between the poles of "unity of command" and a "general dilution of power throughout the structure." Thus, a "strata command" would operate with a "varying, but considerable degree of, independence."³ Unfortunately, data on party financing and how dependent the departmental strata are upon the national strata for their funds are unavailable, so we cannot effectively introduce this factor to serve as a point of analysis.

Below the national level in hierarchical rank stands the departmental level, with its respective convention and directorate. Similar to the DN at the national level, the DD has de facto predominance over the convention since it decides whether or not to convoke one and since the DD has an indirect control over the convention delegates due to the fact that it appoints the members of the municipio directorates (DMs), and the latter often decide on the delegates to the convention. This implicit chain of control would seemingly work to the advantage of the incumbent DD members in cases where the departmental convention elected the new DDs. Departmental conventions are normally convoked every two years, and the term for DDs is likewise two years. Representation of delegates at these conventions is by municipio, and size of delegation is dependent on the number of votes the overall party received in the municipio in the last assembly elections (for example, one delegate for each 1,000 votes).

The functions of the departmental convention and directorate are similar to those of their national counterparts for their jurisdiction.

The convention is responsible for the election of delegates to the national convention and, in some cases, the election of DD members. It also draws up departmental platforms and chooses party candidates. The DD, on the other hand, coordinates party election campaigns (propaganda and financing), serves as a liaison between the DN and the DMs of its department, and maintains vigilance over the DMs, including control over their funds.

At the municipio level, the DM overshadows the municipal conventions to an even greater degree than the analogous pattern at the departmental and national levels. The DM dominates the municipal convention, and the latter chooses the municipio's delegates to the departmental convention. This is virtually the extent of the role of the municipal convention. The DMs are appointed for two-year periods by the DDs, and their roles within their jurisdiction somewhat parallel those of the DDs. They nominate candidates for the city councils and organize and carry out activities related to national, departmental, and municipio electoral campaigns within their municipio. The number of members of the DMs, like that of the DDs and DNs, is not fixed and can vary greatly from one faction to another and from one term to another. Below the level of DM, a more informal sub-hierarchy exists, consisting of comités de barrio. These are virtually confined to the barrios populares (lower-class districts) of large municipios and are often led in caudillo style by a local leader who has affiliated with a particular faction and is known as a capitán de barrio. In some cases, a comité de barrio consists of little more than the efforts of its capitán. At none of the hierarchical or sub-hierarchical levels of any faction is financial remuneration offered.

Aside from these more or less general patterns, there are some important differences in the hierarchical patterns of the various political groups in Cali. As one might expect, the Liberal Officialistas and Conservative Unionistas, as the largest groups, adhere most closely to the organizational norms described above. The Officialistas have three well-defined hierarchical levels, the DN, DD, and DM, and an apparent deference pattern from one level to its immediate superior. The DN has been appointing the DDs, which, in turn, choose the DM members. (However, a recent Liberal convention has stressed that the DDs should henceforth be elected by departmental conventions.) Liberal conventions are held with fair regularity, but gaps greater than two years do occur, in which case the terms of current directorate members are simply extended for another two-year period. The theoretical responsibility of the conventions to elect the DD and DMs has been regularly eluded. The convention, once in session, has simply conferred authority on the DN or DD, as the case may be, to appoint the members of the immediately inferior hierarchical level. For all three levels of organization, each principal has a suplente to attend meetings when he is unable to do so. In practice, however, the periodically scheduled reunions of the DD and DM in Cali are poorly attended except during the few months prior to an election. Unlike the case for some other factions, there is no overlap in DD and DM membership in the departmental capital, the DD having fourteen members and the DM ten in the beginning of 1967.

A unique feature of the Oficialista DD and DM in Cali is their coalition character. The Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas, once divided

into separate directorios, were currently united and practicing a Frente Nacional form of parity. The membership of the two directorates was evenly divided between the two groups, and the officer positions (president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer), were being alternated to give equal weight to each side. However, no fixed terms were involved. Changes normally depended on the attitude of the members of the two groups toward the status quo.

Similarly, the Unionistas have three well-defined directorios. However, they traditionally have one individual who is member of both the DD and DM to serve as a liaison between the two bodies. The DD currently had some fourteen principales, while the DM number stood at thirteen. The municipio hierarchy is chosen by the DD, but the latter, due to the fact that Valle is one of the federated departments, is chosen by the departmental convention rather than by the DN. Unionista conventions, like those of the Oficialistas, are held with regularity. Nothing akin to the Pacholadista-Balcarcista division is to be found within the Unionista hierarchy in Cali, but both the DM and DD currently included followers of César Tulio Delgado. However, they have had to denounce any further divisionist tactics to retain their membership.

The Unionista DM differs from that of the Oficialistas in that the entire mesa directiva (officer group) comes up for renewal each two months, and changes in the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer can occur with some frequency. The post of president actually follows a pattern of rotation among the membership. The Unionistas are plagued with the same problem as the Oficialistas in that attendance at weekly or bi-weekly meetings is small; and the suplente who corresponds to each

principal often fails to be a reliable substitute. One significant feature of the Conservatives is that the Unionistas and Independientes share the same party treasury, having joint control over the Fondo Conservador, both at the national and departmental levels. This is apparently the only activity in which the two factions work together with some harmony.

The order found in the Oficialista and Unionista hierarchies in Cali was absent from the organizations of the other factions. On the Liberal side, the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal had such extensive DD and DM overlap that for all practical purposes, the role of the latter was obviated. All of the leading members in the Cali DM also belonged to the Valle DD, thus the DD total of twenty-one members and DM total of fifteen were deceptive. Nonetheless, the two directorates had separate meetings, the DM meeting once a week and the DD on the average of once a month. The attendance at Revitalización hierarchical meetings appeared to be much more regular than that for the Oficialistas and Unionistas, perhaps because this faction had been in existence for only three years and its apparent sense of mission was greater. The two directorates had been renewed once since the founding of the faction--the changes in membership were very slight--and further renewals were scheduled at two-year intervals.

The oficialismo of the Revitalización movement extended to the point of giving strong support to the Frente Nacional, but not to the point where the Liberal DN--the Valle-confined movement, of course, lacked its own DN--had a voice in choosing the movement's hierarchy. Their own departmental convention chose the DD, and the latter named the DM members.

However, the Revitalización faction was currently in a dilemma due to a resolution passed at the February 1967 Liberal national convention which required that all factions supporting the Frente Nacional in any given department or municipio form a single Liberal directorate. The movement was both fearful of losing its identity and of being declared outcasts by the Liberal party. However, it was cautiously beginning to indicate a willingness to comply with the convention requirement provided that it could be guaranteed equal representation with the Pachaeladistas and Balcarcistas.

The MRL was the weakest and most disunited of the Liberal factions in Cali. Subsequent to the 1966 election losses, only the original MRL movement, the soft line, manifested any signs of continued organization, and even this was barely functioning. Hierarchical meetings were irregular, many members had already abandoned the faction, and there was no MRL headquarters to be found in either Cali or Bogotá. Moreover, the dearth of active members was increasingly obliterating the boundaries between the DD and local DM. A top MRL leader informed the author that the seven MRL interviews he had obtained included all of the currently active members of the Cali hierarchy, although half of the, theoretically, twenty-seven DD members were Caleños and the local DM supposedly numbered twelve. Terms for all three levels of the hierarchy were for two years, with a national convention naming the DN, departmental conventions naming the DDs, and the latter naming the DMs. To provide an example of the extent of MRL decline, the major theme of the January 1967 MRL national convention was whether or not to dissolve the MRL.

On the Conservative side, the Independientes manifested much of the disorganization found in the MRL, although their problems appeared to be far less acute. Of their three hierarchical levels, only the DDs were currently operative. Following their voting losses, principally to Anapo, in the 1966 elections, the DN became dormant. In its place, the party's junta interparlamentaria assumed de facto leadership. This body included all Independiente members of the senate and house of representatives, and its rule was destined to terminate once a national convention was convened and a new DN elected. The Valle DMs, on the other hand, were intentionally inactive as a protest to an allegedly unfavorable relationship with the DD, which was said to be denying DMs any local autonomy. In fact, only six of the twenty members of the Cali DM continued to consider themselves as members of the hierarchy.

Even in the case of the DD, activity was at a low level, the Valle delegation of the junta interparlamentaria having assumed many normally DD functions. Approximately half of the fourteen member DD, some seven of whom were from Cali, had disassociated themselves from the faction. Independiente DD, since Valle is a federated department for the Conservatives, are chosen by departmental conventions, and the DDs, in turn, elect DM members, all of which is theoretically done at two-year intervals. However, the faction was becoming less regular in holding conventions. The combination of Laureanistas and Alzatistas is somewhat analogous to the Oficialistas' Pachueladista-Balcarcista union. However, the former appear to have blended together to a greater extent and do not maintain a rigid balance of forces.

Anapo, too, has suffered some of the problems of disunity within its hierarchy and desertion of organizational leaders which have beset the Independientes and the MRL. However, the apparent cause differs. Far from suffering electoral defeats, Anapo's vote has moved steadily upward. But the underlying ideological heterogeneity of the members of the hierarchy, which remained below the surface as long as Anapo continued to lack a defined ideology, was now threatening to split the movement apart as the true Conservatives were beginning to realize that Anapo's mass-oriented radicalism was not in harmony with the norms of the Conservative party. Hence, the Conservative character of Anapo was decreasing in two ways: a more pronounced non-Conservative ideology was becoming more evident, and the proportion of true Conservatives in Anapo ranks was dwindling.

Until recently, the Anapo hierarchy in Valle was, apparently, highly organized behind the leadership of Hernando Olano Cruz. His death in 1966, however, left a leadership struggle in its wake. The DD and DM in Cali were virtually fused due to an extensive overlap in membership, and meetings were irregular. A unique factor of Anapo has been its lack of directorate presidents, as well as its leadership by comandos ejecutivos. At the municipio level, the executive command consisted of three members, while the DD command included all Valle members of the national congress, and the DN command featured the troika pattern of the DMs. Nonetheless, de facto leadership of Anapo appeared to be firmly in the hands of Rojas Pinilla, currently not a member of the DN. The DN is chosen by the national convention, the DD membership is chosen by

the DN, and the DMs are appointed by the DDs. The Valle DD currently had some twenty members, while the Cali DM totalled fifteen.

A further organization of hierarchical character is the Comité Bipartidista, which serves to coordinate the Liberal and Conservative partners of the Frente Nacional into a common coalition policy. This committee is active only during the time of election campaigns but has a watchdog role during the interim. The Comité Bipartidista Nacional normally has thirty members, while the Comité Bipartidista Departamental, which has no municipal counterpart, also numbers around thirty. However, most of this latter group, at least, were titular functionaries, with only a minority engaged in active roles.

Notes

¹El Tiempo, January 27, 1967, pp. 1, 27.

²Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 233.

³Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 9.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND ADVANCEMENT

The responses to the questionnaire revealed two principal factors related to political recruitment: the strength of ideology as a component in the political socialization process and an inducement to actual political participation; and the self-initiative of the recruit in his own recruitment. Table 8 is the first of a series of tables which illustrate these points and various other factors related to the recruitment of party faithful into the ranks of the hierarchical organizations.

For all eight hierarchical groups involved, ideological reasons played a greater role than any of the other alternatives in interesting the future political leader in politics. In fact, for the Oficialista DM, Revitalización, the MRL, and Anapo, ideology was given a stronger codification than all the other alternatives combined. This result suggests that the initial political socialization prior to the actual recruitment was principally linked to an ideological awareness. The results for Liberals and Conservatives were very similar, with greater differences between factions than between the two overall parties. Next to ideology, example or influence of family was the second most important factor in producing an interest in politics. The Oficialista DD and the Independiente samples gave greatest weight to this influence. Again, the two overall parties were closer than some factions within each party. In like manner, desire to be a leader ranked third for both Liberals and

TABLE 8

FACTORS PRODUCING INTEREST IN POLITICS AMONG PARTY LEADERS*

| | Liberal Party Leaders | | | | Total*** | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-------|-------|----------|-----|
| | Oficialistas** | Revitalización | MRL | | | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Example or influence of family | 5 | 34 | 15 | 12 | 66 | |
| Example or influence of friends | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 17 | |
| Ideological reasons | 35 | 43 | 63 | 40 | 181 | |
| Business reasons | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | |
| Interest in social contacts | 10 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 31 | |
| Desire to be a leader | 10 | 4 | 20 | 0 | 34 | |
| | Conservative Party Leaders | | | | | |
| | Unionistas | Indep. | Anapo | Total | Overall | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Example or influence of family | 16 | 12 | 34 | 16 | 78 | 144 |
| Example or influence of friends | 16 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 30 | 47 |
| Ideological reasons | 64 | 34 | 38 | 50 | 186 | 367 |
| Business reasons | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 9 |
| Interest in social contacts | 9 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 21 | 52 |
| Desire to be a leader | 18 | 24 | 20 | 10 | 72 | 106 |

* N = 103, n = 71 (N = total potential universe, n = total number of cases in sample.)

**DM and DD are used as abbreviations for municipal and departmental directorates in all tables.

***The figures are derived from a scoring system based on six points--since there were six alternatives--for each alternative codified first in priority by a leader, five for those codified second, and so on down to one point for those codified sixth in cases where all six alternatives were codified. The same system prevails for some future tables, as indicated.

Conservatives, although the latter gave it considerably more weight as a factor. Interest in social contacts, example or influence of friends, and business reasons followed in that order for the Liberals, while example or influence of friends, interest in social contacts, and business reasons was the order given by Conservatives.

These responses indicate a blending of factors serving the socialization process. Significantly, this process appears to begin fairly early in life and to be somewhat narrowly channeled (through the family), since the influence of friends was far less important than that of the family. Furthermore, the attraction of material gains as an inducement to initial interest in politics was negligible. Business reasons ranked a distant last behind such non-material benefits as the desire to be a leader and interest in social contacts.

This pattern continues to prevail when we move from the initial socialization process to political recruitment itself (Table 9). Ideology is again manifested as the primary motivator and the others relatively secondary, the responses of Liberals again resembling those of Conservatives. In like manner, the influence of the family carries over from the socialization process to the recruitment process as the second most important factor, although its relative strength declines somewhat due to responses of leaders of Anapo, Revitalización, and MRL. The fact that these three movements were only recently founded explains the decline because the importance of family influence actually gains slightly for the other five groups.

TABLE 9

FACTORS LEADING TO POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF PARTY LEADERS*

| | Liberal Party Leaders | | | | Total** | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-------|-------|---------|-----|
| | Oficialistas | Revitalización | MRL | | | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Example or influence of family | 10 | 32 | 5 | 5 | 52 | |
| Example or influence of friends | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | |
| Ideological reasons | 36 | 46 | 63 | 42 | 187 | |
| Business reasons | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | |
| Interest in social contacts | 5 | 10 | 21 | 10 | 46 | |
| Desire to be a leader | 9 | 0 | 21 | 6 | 36 | |
| | Conservative Party Leaders | | | | | |
| | Unionistas | Indep. | Anapo | Total | Overall | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Example or influence of family | 21 | 23 | 33 | 2 | 79 | 131 |
| Example or influence of friends | 10 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 25 | 35 |
| Ideological reasons | 65 | 38 | 45 | 46 | 194 | 381 |
| Business reasons | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 9 |
| Interest in social contacts | 14 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 33 | 79 |
| Desire to be a leader | 19 | 18 | 20 | 11 | 68 | 104 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

**The point system referred to in Table 8 is used.

Significantly, the desire for social contacts increases at this stage, apparently because recruitment offers more channels for this than the initial phase of socialization. Nonetheless, the importance of the desire for a leadership role fails to grow in spite of the apparent fact that actual recruitment would be the necessary stepping stone to such opportunities. Although caudillismo is by no means absent from the hierarchical organizations, the desire to play a dominant political role does not seem to be highly prevalent. Also of some significance is the declining role of the already weak influence of friends as a factor. This strongly suggests a high degree of self-initiative, on the part of the hierarchical leader in his own recruitment. Again, business reasons were virtually no factor at all, making it evident that political participation is not considered a road to financial gain. Conservatives and Liberals once more manifested similar orientations, allowing little basis for comparison.

Further evidence of self-initiative in recruitment is manifest in Table 10. In the eight groups sampled, the number of leaders who took the initiative to begin working for their party far outweighed those who were invited to do so. Only eleven of the seventy-one leaders sampled had actually been invited to undertake work on behalf of their party. This self-recruitment appears to occur with great frequency at the university level, when a student joins a partisan movement, exerts sufficient effort, and reveals adequate ability to become a student leader. A high position in the student hierarchy, the Comando de Juventudes, may gain the student membership in the DMs or even the DDs of some of the factions, notably the Unionistas. Likewise, in the case of the sub-hierarchical comités

TABLE 10
 SELF-INITIATIVE IN RECRUITMENT*

| | | Invited | Took Initiative |
|----------------|----|---------|-----------------|
| Officialistas | DM | 0 | 6 |
| | DD | 2 | 8 |
| Revitalización | | 1 | 10 |
| MRL | | 1 | 6 |
| Unionistas | DM | 3 | 9 |
| | DD | 1 | 6 |
| Independientes | | 2 | 7 |
| Anapo | | 1 | 8 |
| Overall | | 11 | 60 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

de barrio, recruitment seems to be principally through self-initiative, with a local caudillo-type emerging, identifying himself with a determined political group, and inter-acting with that group. However, such leaders may emerge as the result of active campaigning in the barrios populares by the political groups.

In spite of the very high degree of self-initiative, the molding influences of the family should not be disregarded. Tables 11 and 12 reveal the apparent influence which the family example provides. A large majority of each Liberal party sample had fathers who had been affiliated with the Liberal party and, in like manner, every Conservative party sample weighed heavily in favor of those with Conservative fathers. Of the seventy-one cases, only ten were deviant in that Liberals had Conservative fathers or Conservatives had Liberal fathers. Four of the five deviant Liberal cases were from the two recently created factions, the Revitalización movement (3) and the MRL (1), perhaps a significant fact. A political leader whose father supported the other party might have undergone a less effective socialization process than one who maintained the allegiance of his father; and the result might be a greater instability of allegiance to the point where a first generation Liberal, for example, might show a greater readiness to join a minority Liberal faction rather than the mainstream of the party. Moreover, an individual willing to break with family tradition might be more attracted to radical or reformist parties which are dissatisfied with the status quo, which could explain the attraction of the non-Oficialista Liberals for renegade Conservatives and that of Anapo for renegade Liberals. Indeed, three of the five deviant Conservative cases were from Anapo. However, Anapo's

TABLE 11
FATHER'S POLITICAL AFFILIATION*

| | | Conservative | Liberal | Deviant Cases |
|----------------|----|--------------|---------|---------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 6 | 0 |
| | DD | 1 | 9 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 3 | 8 | 3 |
| MRL | | 1 | 6 | 1 |
| Unionistas | DM | 11 | 1 | 1 |
| | DD | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| Independientes | | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Overall | | 37 | 34 | 10 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

TABLE 12
 FATHERS ACTIVE IN POLITICS*

| | | Active | Inactive |
|----------------|----|--------|--------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 4 |
| | DD | 4 | 6 |
| Revitalización | | 4 | 7 |
| MRL | | 4 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 6 | 6 |
| | DD | 4 | 3 |
| Independientes | | 3 | 6 |
| Anapo | | 3 | 6 |
| Overall | | 30 | 41 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

loose links with the overall Conservative party might make it less anathema for a Liberal to join that movement than for a Conservative to join any Liberal faction.

Of perhaps greater significance as a socialization and recruitment factor is the percentage of the sample who had fathers who were active in politics. Some 41 per cent of the Liberals, fourteen out of thirty-four, and 43 per cent of the Conservatives, sixteen out of thirty-seven, had fathers who had served in official partisan roles. In the two Oficialista DM cases, the fathers had been councilmen in two fairly small towns; in the four DD cases, two of the fathers had also served as small town councilmen, while one had been a deputy in a Valle assembly, and the other had held posts in two different DMs; in the four Revitalización cases, two of the fathers had been DD leaders (one in the Conservative party hierarchy), three had been DM leaders, one had been a deputy, two had been councilmen, one had served as a mayor, and one had been a Conservative caudillo in the Thousand Days' War; in the four MRL cases, three of the fathers had served in non-Cali DMs, two had served as councilmen in towns other than Cali, one had served as a deputy in a Valle town, and one had held the post of chief of state in the Thousand Days' War, in addition to having served on the Supreme Court of Justice.

On the Conservative side, four of the six politically active fathers in the Oficialista DM had occupied official hierarchical posts, including one in the DN, one in the DD, and two in DMs, two had been senators, two had been representatives, one had served as a deputy, and two had been councilmen; in the DD, three of the four politically active

fathers had been rural caudillos, one having served in the DM of a small Valle municipio, and the fourth was currently a strong national figure of the Unionistas, serving in the DN and having exercised the posts of senator, representative, and mayor of Cali; in the three Independiente cases, all three fathers had served in DDs, one having been a DD president, two had served in DMs, and one had been a city councilman; in the three Anapo cases, one father had been a deputy and a councilman, another a DM leader and a councilman, and the third a DM president.

The step from the initial socialization process to recruitment into an official party hierarchy normally has not been immediate. In most cases, as exemplified by Table 13, such advancement, apparently, has been the result of active partisan effort and close identification with one's party. Notably, nine of the twelve leaders who had not worked for their party prior to joining a hierarchy belonged to the three recently created factions, Anapo, Revitalización, and MRL, which were impelled to select some organizational leaders simply to come into existence, thus ignoring the period of service in lesser roles which the more mature, institutionalized factions could afford to require.

Most pre-hierarchical roles, however, were highly general in nature and involved the performing of whatever tasks were useful to the party, particularly during the periods of electoral campaigns. The Oficialista DM leaders mainly alluded to activity in aiding party leaders in whatever needed to be done, basically propaganda distribution and agitation among the masses. DD leaders gave similar responses, one specifically claiming that he "did all work assigned me by the directorates." Stress was placed

TABLE 13

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION PRIOR TO JOINING DIRECTORATE*

| | | Participation | Non-Participation |
|----------------|----|---------------|-------------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 6 | 0 |
| | DD | 10 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 8 | 3 |
| MRL | | 6 | 1 |
| Unionistas | DM | 10 | 2 |
| | DD | 7 | 0 |
| Independientes | | 8 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 4 | 5 |
| Overall | | 59 | 12 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

on efforts in the barrios populares, including organization of the important comités de barrio, mass meetings, conferences, ideological indoctrination, and proselytism. Revitalización responses resembled those of the Oficialistas. However, two Revitalización leaders specifically referred to their roles as heads of comités de barrio--in fact, both were currently living in lower-class barrios--and this, combined with the fact that one was currently holding a DD post while continuing to serve as a comité de barrio leader, perhaps suggests a more extensive effort by the Movimiento to strengthen its communications with the masses than was the case for the Oficialistas. Another Revitalización leader had been a member of the comando femenino of the Liberal party. MRL leaders, too, described general activist roles as party militants spreading propaganda during campaigns. One, however, referred to his activity as a member of the Comando Juventud Liberal.

The Conservative factions also stressed the generality, rather than the specificity, of their pre-hierarchical party roles. Unionista DM leaders placed some accent on their propaganda, organizational, and social service work in Cali's working-class barrios. DD leaders likewise referred to their duties as very general, doing whatever the party needed, especially during campaigns. Independiente leaders similarly alluded to their pre-hierarchical roles in general terms, describing themselves in such terms as "militants," "propagandists," and "proselytizers." Anapista responses were of the same order, but more stress was made concerning their relationship with the lower-class masses, a position notably in harmony with Anapo's orientation as the movement of the masses. In summary, regardless of the

highly general character and weak structure of pre-hierarchical roles, the importance of rendering lower level activity as a stepping stone to the official hierarchy cannot be gainsaid.

Nonetheless, once the party worker attains membership in the hierarchy, he does not appear to hold this membership for a very prolonged period. Only eight of the leaders, as Table 14 denotes, had been serving in their directorates for more than ten years. (Length of tenure did not closely relate to the top leadership positions within the hierarchies.) The apparently high turnover in the directorates cannot be explained by advancement to superior levels in the hierarchy because this was true only in a minority of cases. Were this the case, tenure would probably have been greater in the Oficialista and Unionista DDs than in the respective DM since advancement from the DM to the DD is easier than from the DD to the DN, and this was not so. Perhaps the self-declared ideological zeal of the leader begins to wane in relation to the dissatisfactions encountered in this role (an aspect which will be given further consideration later), with the result that he refrains from seeking re-election to the directorate or is rejected for re-election at the subsequent convention for inadequate role performance.

Due to the recent creation of three of the factions, only the figures for the Oficialistas, Unionistas, and Independientes allow for a meaningful comparison, and the briefness of tenure is universally manifest. The extreme is reached by the Unionista DM, where ten of the twelve leaders had been serving less than five years and nobody had served more than ten. Significantly, the Unionistas had the youngest directorates in terms of average age, another topic which will be treated in greater depth. The

TABLE 14
 LENGTH OF MEMBERSHIP IN DIRECTORATE*

| | | 0-1 | 1-5 | 5-10 | 10-20 | 20-plus (years) |
|----------------|----|-----|-----|------|-------|-----------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | DD | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MRL | | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 4 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| | DD | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall | | 7 | 36 | 20 | 4 | 4 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

brevity of tenure notwithstanding, from the time a leader first joins his directorate, he apparently renders continuous, uninterrupted service until his tenure terminates. Only four of the leaders admitted to having ceased working for their party at any time since they were first elected to their directorates.

So far, the aspects regarding recruitment for all the factions of both overall parties have been notably similar in terms of the leadership response. The following section examines some personal characteristics of the leaders sampled in this study, including such factors as length of residence in Cali, age, education, occupation outside of politics, and socio-economic class. Since Cali owes a great share of its growth to migration, it perhaps should not appear unusual that only twenty-seven of the leaders as shown in Table 15, were born in the capital of Valle. However, an additional nineteen had lived at least twenty years in Cali, and only eight had lived less than ten. This suggests that recruitment to political party hierarchies in Cali has not included many recent migrants even though some of the city's heaviest migration occurred during the past decade. Again, the responses were fairly uniform among the eight samples. However, the Independientes exhibited a notably greater preponderance of leaders born in Cali. Since this faction has often been considered as the most representative of upper-class interests and the most inclined toward the preservation of the status quo, perhaps it is significant that an abnormally high percentage come from families which have been long established in Cali.

The fairly young age of most of the hierarchical leaders seems to be in harmony with the short tenure referred to earlier. As Table 16

TABLE 15
 LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN CALI*

| | Born in Cali | 1-5 | 5-10 | 10-20 | 20-30 | 30-plus (years) | |
|----------------|--------------|-----|------|-------|-------|-----------------|---|
| Oficialistas | DM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| | DD | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| MRL | | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Unionistas | DM | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | DD | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| Overall | | 27 | 2 | 6 | 14 | 14 | 5 |

*Three members of the overall sample were currently living outside of Cali.

N = 103, n = 68.

TABLE 16

AGE*

| | | 20-30 | 30-40 | 40-50 | 50-60 | 60-plus (years) |
|----------------|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| | DD | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| MRL | | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 4 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | DD | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |

illustrates, thirty-nine of the leaders had not yet reached their fortieth birthday, and only thirteen were over fifty. The factional breakdown in this case, however, reveals some significant differences between different samples. On the Liberal side, the Oficialista DM and DD samples revealed very similar age patterns, but taken as a whole, only 19 per cent of the Oficialistas were below forty years of age, considerably below the overall percentage of 55 per cent. On the other hand, 55 per cent of the Revitalización sample and 57 per cent of the MRL sample fell in this category. Perhaps this difference is due to a greater idealism and radicalism on the part of the latter two groups since this would tend to attract younger people in all probability, given equal opportunity for youth to enter all factional hierarchies. More likely, however, this equality was non-existent, the youthful Liberals attracted to Revitalización and MRL encountering greater opportunity for hierarchical recruitment since the recent creation of those factions had obviated the presence of a monopolizing "old guard" to serve as an obstacle.

However, this does not follow for the Conservatives. The faction most likely to have had the lowest percentage of young people in its hierarchy if degree of institutionalization is the key factor, the Unionistas, had by far the highest percentage, 79 per cent, of any Liberal or Conservative faction. Indeed, the Unionistas are looked upon by young Liberals as a faction which places few obstacles in the paths of youth toward recruitment and advancement up the hierarchy. The other purely Conservative faction, the Independientes, likewise manifested an open recruitment in terms of age, with 67 per cent of their sample under forty years of age. Anapo's percentage in this category was 55 per cent.

Again, there were notable differences among the factions with regard to average educational level (Table 17). Overall, some 59 per cent of the hierarchical leaders had college degrees, 76 per cent in law. All three Oficialista DM leaders in this category had law degrees, as did five of the six DD leaders, all five Revitalización leaders, three of the six MRL leaders, four of the seven Unionista DM leaders, all five DD leaders, five of the seven Independiente leaders, and two of the three Anapo leaders. One Oficialista DD leader had received his degree in medicine; three MRL leaders boasted degrees in civil engineering, architecture, and art respectively; three Unionista DM leaders had graduated in civil engineering (in two cases) and economics; two Independientes had completed degrees in medicine; and one Anapista likewise had completed his studies in medicine. Using the Oficialistas and Unionistas for comparison, one notes that a slightly higher percentage of the DD samples had college degrees than their DM counterparts. This, perhaps, indicates that recruitment into the DDs is more selective, hence, less "open accordion," to use Eldersveld's term, than into the DMs.

A comparison of Liberals and Conservatives, however, reveals no difference between the overall parties, 59 per cent on each side having obtained college degrees. The most pronounced differences are found in a comparison of the factions within each party. For the Liberals, 86 per cent of the MRL sample were college graduates as opposed to 56 per cent of the Oficialistas and only 45 per cent of the Revitalización movement. However, due to the great disintegration of the MRL directorates, this figure might not be representative of the hierarchy that was chosen

TABLE 17
EDUCATION*

| | College Degree | Non-College Degree |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Oficialistas DM | 3 | 3 |
| DD | 6 | 4 |
| Revitalización | 5 | 6 |
| MRL | 6 | 1 |
| Unionistas DM | 7 | 5 |
| DD | 5 | 2 |
| Independientes | 7 | 2 |
| Anapo | 3 | 6 |
| Overall | 42 | 29 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

at the last convention where elections took place. Otherwise, one might be led to believe that the MRL has been very selective in its recruitment to the point where members of the lower class, who would very unlikely have attained degrees in higher education, were largely excluded from organizational leadership roles in spite of the fact that the faction has continuously stressed its ties with the masses. The Revitalización movement, which has also asserted its links with those at the bottom of the socio-economic scale, appears to have oriented its recruitment to harmonize with this orientation. Subsequent data will help substantiate the hypothesis that the Revitalización's abnormally high percentage of non-college graduates reflects an abnormally high percentage of lower- or lower middle-class leaders. On the other hand, the percentage of non-college graduates in the ranks of the Oficialistas seems to indicate that the barriers to recruitment for young aspirants do not entail an overall exclusiveness in the party's selection process.

Conservative factional figures have, perhaps, more significance than those of the Liberals due to the great contrast between the Independientes and Anapo. Some 78 per cent of the Independiente sample had college degrees as opposed to 33 per cent of the Anapistas. This, perhaps, could be explained by different orientations in recruitment, the Anapo hierarchy being considerably more open accordion. The two factions are considered by many to be at opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to the six factions in this study. Anapo is the most forceful, unceasing, and demagogic in espousing its ties with the masses to the exclusion of all "oligarchical" elements; and the Independientes are the most identified with the status quo, due in part to their intimate and

unyielding association with the Catholic Church. Regardless of orientation, perhaps Anapo would find it easier to recruit from the lower-class than the Independientes. The Unionistas, with 63 per cent of their leadership sample lacking college degrees, appeared to have a moderately open accordion recruitment, a position in harmony with the opportunities they had been giving to the younger activists of the faction.

All but four of the hierarchical leaders in this study, college graduates and non-college graduates alike, currently worked in occupations apart from their political roles. (One Oficialista, one Unionista, one Independiente and one Anapista claimed that they devoted full-time to political work on behalf of their party.) This, of course, was to have been expected considering that no remuneration was received for their roles as organizational leaders. Thus, work in the directorates was only part-time, even for the top officers of each DD and DM. The Oficialista DM hierarchy included three practicing lawyers, a public accountant, a landowner (retired businessman), and an employee of a working class housing bureau. When they first became active in politics, two of the lawyers had already begun practicing, one was still a student, and the other three were involved in small business enterprises.

The DD included three practicing lawyers, a lawyer who had ceased his practice to devote full-time to politics, a physician, an industrial manager, three small businessmen, and a social worker. When they first became active in politics, all were engaged in much the same jobs that they were currently holding. None referred to any activity as a student, which further accents an apparently greater opportunity for student leaders to advance in the Conservative ranks than in the Liberal organization,

perhaps due to a better-developed student movement on the Conservative side. For the Revitalización movement, five leaders were currently practicing lawyers, two were small businessmen, one a journalist, one a caretaker of an office building, one a typist, and one a housewife. At the time they first entered politics, three of the lawyers were still students, one was a university rector, while the other had already begun his practice. The position of the remaining six differed little from their current situation. On the other hand, three MRL leaders were practicing lawyers, one a civil engineer, one an architect, one a president of a working-class housing bureau, and one an accountant. When they initially became active in politics, all had already begun these careers with the exception of the architect, who was still a student, and the housing bureau president, who was then a commercial artist.

For the Conservative factions, three leaders of the Unionista DM were practicing lawyers, one managed a real estate and insurance firm, two were civil engineers, one was an accountant, one an architect, one an optometrist, one a social worker, and two were still students. When they first became active in politics, six were students, two were lawyers, one was an engineer, one was a businessman, and one was a newly appointed mayor. The DD included four practicing lawyers, a member of the cabinet of the departmental government, a businessman, and a government employee. When they were first recruited into political roles, three were still students, one was a high school teacher, two were businessmen, and one was a government employee. Again, the active political roles of the Unionista hierarchy as students is in contrast with the, apparently, much less active ones of the Oficialista hierarchy.

In the case of the Independientes, four were currently practicing lawyers, one a lawyer who had forsaken active practice to devote full-time to political activities, two were physicians, one a high school teacher, and one a journalist. When they first became active in politics, five were students, one a physician, one a lawyer, another a teacher, and the other a businessman. Thus, the relatively high degree of political recruitment of students found in the ranks of the Unionistas has been common to the two true factions of the Conservative party in general. On the other hand, two Anapistas were currently practicing lawyers, one a physician, two small businessmen, one an accountant, one a nurse, another a housewife, and the other confined his labors to political activities. When they initially became active in politics, two were still students, two were lawyers, one a physician, one an accountant, one a nurse, one a farmer, and one a dressmaker.

In summary, most of these occupations for the eight samples in general seem to denote individuals with a middle-class, rather than an upper-class, background. Indeed, most of the leaders who were involved in business careers appeared to be small businessmen and not men of sizable wealth. Additional queries concerning this point evoked responses to the effect that the upper-class generally eschewed direct participation as members of the party hierarchical organizations. Nonetheless, although the upper-class might have been numerically small in representation, some of the top leaders in Cali pertained to that socio-economic level. The newly chosen president of the Unionista DD, Rodrigo Lloreda, is a case in point.

Because of the possible sensitivity involved, no direct approach was attempted to determine a leader's position on the socio-economic scale. Rather, each was asked the district of Cali where he resided; and since Cali is divided into more than fifty barrios, most considerably homogeneous in a socio-economic sense, this approach apparently yielded meaningful results. The author was immensely aided by a study which had recently been carried out by Cali's Oficina de Planeación Municipal that ranked the barrios in six categories, on the basis of their socio-economic level. The lowest category, six, was classified as tuquerio (slum); category five was clase obrera (working-class); four was clase media obrera (lower middle-class); three was clase media (middle-class); two was clase media alta (upper middle-class); and one was clase alta (upper-class).¹ This provided the basis for Table 18.

An examination of the overall results reveals that 25 per cent of the party leaders sampled resided in barrios classified as upper-class, while another 40 per cent lived in barrios considered upper middle-class, 66 per cent living in these combined areas. These figures, of course, give a somewhat different impression of socio-economic level than the occupation data. One possible explanation is that the sample was asked only the types of non-political activity in which they were involved, not their total sources of income. Subsequent to interviews, the author discovered that one of the practicing lawyers and a practicing physician owned sizable extensions of land which yielded handsome dividends, information that the questionnaire was not equipped to obtain. Nonetheless, the overall mean of 2.40 indicates that the average hierarchical leader was middle- to upper-middle class; thus, the implication given

TABLE 18
RESIDENCE IN CALI*

| | | Barrio Category | | | | | | Average |
|----------------|----|-----------------|----|---|---|---|---|---------|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2.50 |
| | DD | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1.80 |
| Revitalización | | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2.73 |
| MRL | | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2.71 |
| Unionistas | DM | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2.67 |
| | DD | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2.50** |
| Independientes | | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.55 |
| Anapo | | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3.00** |
| Overall | | 17 | 27 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 2.40 |

*N = 103, n = 67.

**One Unionista DD leader was currently living outside of Cali; two Anapo leaders were living outside of Cali, and one listed a barrio which could not be located in the Oficina de Planeación study.

by occupation does not appear to be highly incompatible with the area of residence scale.

Again, there was no difference in the results for Liberals and Conservatives. The average of 2.40 prevailed for both overall parties. Factional contrasts, however, were once more of great significance. In the case of both the Oficialistas and the Unionistas, the DD leaders lived in wealthier barrios than their DM counterparts. This was especially true for the Liberals, which seems to indicate a greater selectivity in recruitment the higher the hierarchical level. The contrast between the two Unionista levels was too slight to warrant such an assumption. However, the greater socio-economic level of the Oficialistas, in terms of barrio, than the Unionistas--the Oficialista DM average was equal to that of the Unionista DD--seems to be another reflection of more restricted recruitment on the part of the Oficialistas. All but one of the Oficialista DD sample lived in barrios classified as upper- or upper middle-class. In contrast, the Revitalización and MRL leaderships were relatively less upper-class in character, an organizational makeup in harmony with their association with the masses.

On the Conservative side, the contrast between the Independientes and Anapo represented the polarized extremes for all eight groups in the study. Every Independiente in the sample lived in the two highest categories of barrios, whereas Anapo's average was exactly middle-class. These results are in accordance with the images that the author has already begun to draw of these two political groups. One conclusion emerges from these data on barrio of residence. All of the Liberal and Conservative factions have been controlled, at least numerically, by

those who live in at least middle-class neighborhoods. Hence, even those parties which most associate themselves with the masses are by no means dominated by working-class leadership. Recruitment continues to favor middle- and upper-class partisans, although differences in degree, sometimes considerable, do exist, as the data have demonstrate.

Nonetheless, the fact that all eight samples except the Independientes had hierarchical representation from lower middle-class or lower-class barrios seems to indicate fairly open accordion recruitment. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell draw a dichotomy between traditional political systems, which "tend to recruit into political roles on the basis of particularistic and ascriptive criteria," and modern political systems, which strongly take into account "ability and performance."² On the basis of Table 13, which manifests that the vast majority of hierarchical leaders participated in political activity on behalf of their party prior to attaining hierarchical rank, we may assume some semblance of a merit system for all the political groups in their recruitment process. Moreover, the middle-class character of the leaders illustrated in Table 18 would appear to deny any extensive recruitment based on ascriptive criteria, although the Independientes might be the least modern in this sense.

With regard to strong adherence to the principles of a merit system, apart from open accordion considerations, both the Independientes and Unionistas appeared to be less traditionalistic than the Oficialistas. It will be recalled from our discussion of Table 16 that the Oficialistas seemed to be neglecting ability and performance criteria by placing obstacles in the path of recruitment and advancement for youthful aspirants,

hence, preserving the control of older leaders. (The hierarchies of both the Unionistas and Independientes, on the other hand, were numerically dominated by men under forty years of age.) Furthermore, a check of Unionista, Independiente, and Oficialista DD leaders, the only three factions for which this effort was feasible, revealed that among the Unionistas, five of the seven had served in the DMs prior to being advanced to the DDs; among the Independientes, a similar five out of seven had served first in the DMs; but among the Oficialistas, only three out of ten had served in the DMs. These figures would appear to indicate that the two Conservative factions, in general, place a higher premium upon proven ability and performance than their Oficialista counterparts. (This does not imply that the top leadership posts within any hierarchy are awarded on merit or on any particular basis.)

The role of women in the hierarchical organizations also merits some attention. In no case did women constitute more than 20 or 25 per cent of the membership of any directorate. One possible explanation is the fact that women were given the right to vote only as recently as the 1957 Frente Nacional plebiscite and that the parties have been slow to adapt their recruitment practices to a relatively new situation. The major role of women continues to be in the comandos femeninos of the factions.

One further aspect of recruitment also deserves discussion. There is some evidence which suggests that several of the directorates in Cali, especially the DDs, have members whose names are included solely for prestige reasons but who perform no actual duties nor are they expected to do so. This would include either leading citizens or top party legislators, although the latter may in some cases apply pressure to have

their names included in the hierarchical membership. For example, one member of the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal DD refused to be interviewed, declaring that he played absolutely no role in the movement, but had been approached by the faction's leaders who simply requested that he allow his name to be included in their directorate to enhance its prestige, making it clear that they expected no active contributions on his part. The extent of such recruitment is difficult to determine, although the prestige element of no directorate appeared to comprise much more than a small minority.

A major difficulty remains that of determining what percentage of a faction's legislators is included in the hierarchical membership solely for reasons of prestige or for pressure exerted. In many cases, the legislator is as active in the party organization as his legislative role permits him to be, but this conscientiousness does not seem to be universal. Most DD presidents were currently senators, a very demanding double role if one bears in mind the permanent session of the national congress due to the state of siege. More about the dual hierarchical-legislative role follows in the next chapter.

In contrast to the top party legislators, the ranking executives at both the departmental and municipal levels do not appear to have much rank within their parties. Neither the departmental governor nor the mayor of Cali belonged to the Oficialista directorates, and queries as to their party roles revealed that their influence upon the hierarchical organizations was not great. On the other hand, the president of the country has tremendous influence upon the DN of his party and quite often has emerged from DN ranks to become a presidential candidate. The

fact that the Colombian government is strongly unitarian and the governors and mayors are mere appointees who can be removed from office at any time may serve as an explanation for their apparent lack of influence within the directorates.

As the figures in Table 19 manifest, the large majority of partisans recruited into the two hierarchical levels desire to move upward in the hierarchy. The 75 per cent of the overall sample in this category seems to contrast with the low longevity of hierarchical leaders illustrated in Table 14. Perhaps the explanation is that movement upward in the hierarchies is normally difficult, and the failure to gain promotion leads to the abandonment of one's current hierarchical role. Indeed, only one hierarchy exists at each geographical level--municipio, department, and overall nation--so the next step upward for a DM leader would be his party's DD. However, the competition would become keener, not solely in the number of aspirants, but also in the smaller allotment of positions to people from Cali. DM and DD organizations are normally close to the same size in membership, but while the former is composed solely of Caleños, the latter includes leaders from the various major cities in the department, only about 50 per cent of whom live in Cali.

Advancement from a DD to a DN would be still more difficult due to the same reasons given above. This is compounded by the fact that DN membership is generally the smallest of the three, with rarely over ten members, and normally not over five. Nonetheless, figures for the Oficialistas and Unionistas reveal that a higher percentage of DD leaders (82 per cent) than DM leaders (67 per cent) aspired to hierarchical advancement. Differences between Liberals and Conservatives do not appear

TABLE 19
 DESIRE TO ADVANCE IN HIERARCHY*

| | Interested | Non-Interested |
|----------------|------------|----------------|
| DM | 4 | 2 |
| Oficialistas | | |
| DD | 8 | 2 |
| Revitalización | 10 | 1 |
| MRL | 5 | 2 |
| DM | 8 | 4 |
| Unionistas | | |
| DD | 6 | 1 |
| Independientes | 5 | 4 |
| Anapo | 7 | 2 |
| Overall | 53 | 18 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

to be important except in the case of the Independientes, where only 55 per cent manifested an interest in superior hierarchical rank. Perhaps the current decline of that organization accounted for the relative lack of motivation. Nonetheless, such motivation was not absent from the ranks of MRL leaders even though that faction's degree of disintegration appeared to be the greatest of all.

Further comment seems in order to analyze why a greater percentage of DD leaders than DM leaders desired promotion to a superior hierarchical level. Significantly, Eldersveld's survey to determine party career aspiration produced similar results in that 67 per cent of Wayne County district chairmen aspired to a more responsible job in their party, as opposed to 64 per cent of executive board members and 57 per cent of precinct leaders.³ Eldersveld explains his results by characterizing party career aspiration as "often merely a political manifestation, in a special context, of a socialized orientation. Just as 'power begets power,' activity breeds more activity, and mobility triggers an aspiration for more mobility."⁴ One might add some further explanation. Assuming the existence of a merit system to the point that the DD generally comprises leaders of greater proven ability and performance than the DM, it might follow that the most productive leaders are the most expectant of political rewards and aspire to greater prizes as just desserts. On the other hand, the less productive leaders might repress any aspirations for hierarchical advancement, realizing that such goals would be illusory in the light of their (lack of) achievement. From another standpoint, aspiration and production might go hand in hand, with the former serving as a catalyst for the latter, and production, in turn, serving as a major vehicle to promotion.

Significantly, most hierarchical leaders claimed that in order to be promoted, they would have to work harder on a more permanent basis. This is indicative of the part-time character of the hierarchical role. Full-time, intense effort would involve an intolerable financial strain for most of the leaders. Oficialista DM leaders also alluded to the need to present better ideas to the group and show oneself to be a leader. For the DD, the only two non-aspirants to higher position were a top leader who was in his 60's and another high-ranking member whose important role as an industrialist limited his available time. The remaining eight echoed the DM in asserting the need to sacrifice private activities in order to become more active on a more permanent basis in politics. Also accented was the advisability of manifesting one's dedication and capability to assume a top leadership role in order to cultivate a following among fellow DD members. One went so far as to say that the best way to get ahead would be to try to divide the faction by gaining a personalistic following, something which has not been unheard of in Valle. One of the two leaders who denied any aspiration to a higher position claimed that had he harbored such intentions he would "fight my way up." Two of the aspirants asserted that the best way to advance is to show accomplishments in aiding the community. The Revitalización leadership, on the other hand, went beyond the responses given by the Oficialistas, many stressing the need to work more with the masses, "studying their problems and being loyal to them." Some MRL leaders added a further outlook, noting the need to place the party and its ideology above personal interests to increase the number of MRL supporters. The problem then would be to make certain that the higher leadership recognized such achievements. One

MRL leader observed that "The party chooses" who is to lead; "it's out of my hands."

Conservative responses followed a pattern very similar to that of the Liberals. The Unionista DM consensus was that one had to sacrifice private affairs to more extensive party activity, entailing economic sacrifice. Such activity would enable an aspirant to acquire the abilities necessary to be a top party leader and would give him greater opportunity to manifest his capacity for leadership, especially if he could show that his efforts were aiding the fortunes of the faction, particularly vote-wise. Along this line, one leader referred to the benefit in establishing greater contact with the DN. Another leader referred to one's success as a candidate for a legislative post as the best key to hierarchical advancement, commenting that "Votes are what gives one a name and strength." (This subject will receive further consideration in the following chapter.) Reference was again made to establishing a greater contact with the masses, primarily through social services. In like manner, it was generally agreed among the DD leadership that the surest way to advance in the hierarchy is to work harder and devote more time to party activity, often at the expense of private affairs, expanding one's geographical base of support to gain the support of the different groups which operate within the party, manifesting at the same time one's ability to be a high-ranking party leader. One of the top leaders, who had for a long time been one of the Conservative party's most powerful figures even on the national level, claimed that the surest path for hierarchical advancement is to win a high-level legislative post.

In the case of the Independientes, relatively few of whom aspired to higher position, more intense and permanent activity was again the most repeated response. Likewise, the importance of developing leadership qualities and making this known to the top national and departmental leaders was stressed. With regard to Anapo, the only two leaders who denied interest in hierarchical advancement included one who contended that he had already attained national importance by serving on the DN, while the other caustically remarked that he "would have to lick the boots of the top chief" in order to advance. The Anapista aspirants claimed that advancement was the result of greater effort and better preparation for a leadership role. Not unlike some previously referred to responses, two Anapistas alluded to the benefit of becoming a member of the national congress as a major key to advancement in the hierarchy, one of the two--currently a congressman--stressing the importance of distinguishing oneself in congressional debates.

Further comment seems in order concerning instances when good personal connections apparently aided hierarchical leaders to advance to top positions. Top Oficialista leader Gustavo Balcázar married the daughter of Mariano Ramos, at that time a high-ranking Valle Liberal; and this step apparently gave Balcázar's political fortunes a tremendous boost. On the other hand, Revitalización top leader Carlos Holmes Trujillo was once the golden boy of Pacho Eladio Ramírez, who seemed to be grooming him as his successor in the Pachoeladista wing of Oficialismo. This boost served as a stepping stone for Trujillo to leave the recognized Oficialista ranks and form the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal. On the Conservative side, young Rodrigo Lloreda, still in his twenties,

recently had been chosen to succeed long-time kinsman Hernando Navia Varón as president of the Unionista DD. His father was Alvaro Lloreda, member of the Unionista DN and publisher of Cali's major newspaper, El País, a major mouthpiece of Unionismo. Nonetheless, such an appointment might be considered as a victory for Conservative youth.

The barriers to recruitment imposed upon Liberal youth have produced various types of reaction. The author conversed with a Liberal student leader shortly before the latter had a personal meeting with Oficialista DD president Ramírez. The young Liberal had been promised earlier that he would very shortly be added to the DD membership, and he expected confirmation of his appointment that very evening. The result was an ambiguous delay in spite of the fact that his encounter with Ramírez was the culmination of pressure put on the hierarchy by Liberal youth. Another reaction to this Oficialista intransigence was the foundation of the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal by young lawyers who associated the traditionalism of the official Liberal party with the "old guard" leadership.

The most recent Liberal revolt, which may turn out to be the most important for the Liberal party, has been the recent foundation of the La Ceja movement, an endeavor which has produced a spiritual union of young Liberals that encompasses all three Valle factions. The La Ceja "encuentros" (get togethers) at different cities around the country to discuss an ideological rebirth of the Liberal party and counter the fusion of Liberals and Conservatives in the Frente Nacional had been amassing increasing Liberal support. One observer has referred to this insurgent movement as "simply . . . a discontentment with the

subordinate force that the young people of the party have been," and characterizes them as "liberal ideologues."⁵ Much of the credit for the creation of the La Ceja movement goes to Fabio Lozano Simonelli, who for eight years had been endeavoring to consolidate a nation-wide insurgent movement opposed to the position of those who had been in control of the Liberal party. A major aim of the group was to win a post for the Liberal youth in the DN. However, Lozano notes, "Each time that one of these efforts took place, there appeared a man of prestige, an old leader, who had as his mission the frustration of the plans" of those most likely to bring about a renovation of the Liberal party.⁶

Tired of failing in these efforts to work within the official Liberal organization, the young Liberals went ahead and created the La Ceja movement, which had continued to limit itself to the role of a spiritual union rather than forming a new faction motivated by electoral considerations. (The movement, perhaps, had shown some restraint in its insurgency due to a widespread belief among Liberals that President Lleras himself was fairly progressive and did not represent the views of the party old guard.) The Cejistas, under the current leadership of Hernando Agudelo Villa, seemed to share the belief that the Liberal party was declining and that it would be necessary to give it an autonomous program, apart from that of the Conservatives in the Frente Nacional, in order to regain its prestige. To verify this decline, Lozano contended that "Phenomena like abstention or the growth of indoctrinary forces such as Anapo cannot but be connected with the lack of aggressiveness of the Liberal party. The supporters of the Frente Nacional within liberalism

have no understanding of the fact that loyalty with the Conservatives, while the system subsists, leads us to fuse our ideologies . . ."

Lozano asserted his continued support for the Frente Nacional, but called upon Liberals to develop an independent program of their own, apart from that of their Conservative partners.⁷

Notes

¹Distribución de la Población por Barrios, Areas y Densidades - N° Edificios y Manzanas - 1,964 (Cali: Oficina de Planeación Municipal - Sección Estadística, 1964).

²Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 48.

³Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 145.

⁴Ibid., p. 148.

⁵Elkim Mesa, "Te - Político," El País, November 20, 1966, p. 5.

⁶"Tremendo Fracaso" (interview with Fabio Lozano Simonelli), Cromos (No. 2564), November 21, 1966, pp. 26-30.

⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

ROLES OF HIERARCHICAL LEADERS

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the roles of hierarchical leaders was the dual hierarchical-legislative role found in a large number of cases. Table 20 shows both current and previous activity in the role of legislator at one or more of the different governmental levels. For the overall sample, 42 per cent were currently members of legislatures, and 39 per cent, including some of the current members, had previously served in legislative bodies. On the other hand, only 39 per cent had never performed the role of legislator. Significantly, the fact that more hierarchical leaders were currently legislators than those who had previously served in the legislative branch but had since ceased this activity indicates the dual nature of these roles. Rather than one of these two roles simply serving as a stepping stone to the other and then abandoned, a legislator-hierarch often emerges, exemplifying the simultaneous embodiment of legislative and organizational roles.

A comparison of the various factions produces results which, in general, seem compatible with the earlier conclusions. Only one Oficialista leader had never belonged to a legislative body, a fact which appears in harmony with the faction's more selective recruitment pattern. On the other hand, twelve Unionistas had never served as legislator, which seems to reflect the group's more open recruitment, especially in the case of youth. Moreover, for Oficialistas and Unionistas alike, the

TABLE 20
 LEGISLATIVE ROLE OF HIERARCHICAL LEADERS*

| | | Current | Previous | Never |
|----------------|----|---------|----------|-------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| | DD | 9 | 6 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 1 | 2** | 8 |
| MRL | | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| | DD | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Independientes | | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| Anapo | | 6 | 5 | 1 |
| Overall | | 30 | 28 | 28 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

**These posts were held in the overall Liberal party since the Revitalización movement was recently founded.

higher percentage of DD leaders than DM leaders currently performing this dual role suggests a somewhat hierarchical inter-relationship between the role of organizational leader and the role of legislator. While participation in the DM may be a stepping stone to legislative candidacy, inclusion in the DD may quite often demand previous status such as being a member of the national congress, hence a reverse process. This latter phenomenon may be intensified by the greater competition for DD positions, councilmen and deputies apparently faced with a disadvantage vis-à-vis senators and representatives, who command a higher status.

Apparently, a leader's previous role as a legislator has less value as a stepping stone to the DD than his current one, since the latter commands considerably more status. In any event, the legislative role is not normally abandoned for the hierarchical role, although electoral defeat produces this result. The prevalence of the dual role was also found to be high in the Anapo sample, perhaps in part a reflection of the group's rising electoral fortunes. On the other hand, the much lower degree of dual role found among the Independientes might have been a result of their declining voting strength. This explanation could, perhaps, serve equally for Revitalización and MRL results. The former movement, of course, did not owe its relatively low percentage of the Liberal vote to any decline in its stature but, rather, to its very recent foundation.

To add further complexity to the dual role phenomenon, many of the legislators were currently serving in more than one legislative

role simultaneously. In some cases, municipal, departmental, and national legislative posts were held concurrently, while in others, the role of councilman in as many as five city councils was exercised by a single leader.¹ Table 21 provides the legislative role breakdown for each of the samples involved. Significantly, the few (three) DM leaders who were currently legislators for the Oficialistas or Unionistas were all councilmen or deputies, with nobody serving in the national congress. On the other hand, 40 per cent of the Oficialista DD cases involved representatives or senators. Overall, 68 per cent of the cases of present legislators were councilmen or deputies, whereas 74 per cent of the cases of past legislators involved these two offices. Hence, competition for hierarchical posts had not reached the degree where senators and representatives were more predominant in number than councilmen and deputies, assuming that an unbridled competition would have led to victories for those with the most status, the senators and representatives.

Many national level legislators apparently failed to seek hierarchical membership, perhaps due to the burden of such a dual role. Indeed, one must consider the implications involved here. A congressman is faced with the permanent, year-round session of his house. This would allow him only the week-ends and short recesses for his hierarchical activity. Furthermore, he most likely has a non-political profession he is attempting to practice. (Note the data in Chapter V which revealed that only four of the leaders sampled lacked current non-political jobs.) Thus, a triple, rather than a dual, role is involved

TABLE 21
NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE ROLE*

| | | Present | | | | Past | | | |
|----------------|----|---------|----|---|-----|------|----|----|---|
| | | C | D | R | S** | C | D | R | S |
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| | DD | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| MRL | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | DD | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Overall | | 15 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 20 | 17 | 11 | 2 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

** C = councilman, D = deputy, R = representative, S = senator.

in these cases; and the least economically productive role, that of hierarchical leader, seems to be the one that is most sacrificed in the form of poor attendance at meetings and only sporadic activity. On the other hand, the author became aware of several cases where senators and representatives had decided to skip a week of congressional sessions in Bogotá in favor of remaining in Cali and bolstering their law practice. In such cases, the suplente often replaces the principal during the latter's absence.

To add further complexity to what has been characterized as a triple role with multiple legislative sub-roles in many cases, the Revitalización movement and Anapo had greatly overlapping DMs and DDs, thus providing for multiple hierarchical sub-roles in diverse official capacities. Six of the eleven Revitalización members sampled revealed membership in both the DD and DM; three of the remaining five served solely in the DM, while the other two were confined to the DD. One Revitalización leader had a further leadership role in that he was the head of the group's comando de barrios for the northeast section of Cali, encompassing eleven barrios populares. Ironically, he served in the DD but not in the DM; hence, he was located at the poles but not at the midpoint, a fact which suggests very little boundary maintenance between the DD and DM, considering that the role of barrio leader would theoretically correspond to a member of the Cali DM rather than the Valle DD. Moreover, the dual hierarchical membership of such a large percentage of the movement's leaders seemingly would have eliminated the possibility of such boundary maintenance. Prior to having joined the

Revitalización movement, two of the leaders had served in the Cauca DD of the Oficialistas, and another had been a member of the Oficialista DM in Cali. In the case of Anapo, seven of the nine leaders sampled pertained to both the DD and DM, and the other two belonged to only the DM. One leader also had membership in the DN. In the past, two Anapo leaders had served in the hierarchies of the Conservative party.

Moving away from the legislative roles of hierarchical leaders to their roles within the organizational directorates, we will first consider their awareness of certain factors regarding the electorate in Cali.

As Table 22 illustrates, the political leaders, in general, claimed to be well informed with respect to certain factors concerning Cali voters. Some 72 per cent of the overall sample affirmed that they had considerable knowledge about the percentage of voters who voted for their overall party during the most recent elections, while only 7 per cent admitted ignorance on this point. An even greater 87 per cent asserted their ability to closely identify the percentage of voters who voted for their particular faction, as opposed to only 4 per cent who had no idea. However, the degree of knowledge declined with respect to the socio-economic makeup of those who vote for one's faction. Yet, 56 per cent affirmed that they could closely describe this socio-economic composition, whereas 30 per cent admitted that they could not make such distinctions at all. Finally, 86 per cent claimed that they possessed actual lists of the important supporters of their faction, as opposed to 11 per cent who had no such lists.

TABLE 22
 INFORMATION ABOUT CALI VOTERS*

| | | Yes | | | | Somewhat | | | | No | | | |
|----------------|----|-----|----|----|-----|----------|---|----|---|----|---|----|---|
| | | P | G | S | L** | P | G | S | L | P | G | S | L |
| Oficialistas | DM | 3 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| | DD | 8 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 7 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 |
| MRL | | 4 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 8 | 9 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| | DD | 5 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Independientes | | 9 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Overall | | 51 | 62 | 40 | 61 | 15 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 21 | 8 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

**The letter P refers to percentage of total vote going to one's overall party (Liberal or Conservative); the letter G refers to percentage going to one's particular faction; the letter S refers to the socio-economic groups which vote for one's particular faction; and the letter L refers to lists of important supporters of one's particular faction.

These results suggest a widespread awareness within the directorate rather than a situation where only a minority, perhaps the top leaders, were well informed. Moreover, very little difference was to be found in the results of the different factions. However, differences were to be found, once again, in a comparison of Oficialista and Unionista DDs with their respective DMs. For the Oficialistas, 80 per cent of the responses were "yes" for the DD sample, while only 54 per cent of the DM responses were "yes." In like manner, 82 per cent of the Unionista DD responses were "yes," as opposed to 69 per cent of the DM sample. These figures suggest a qualitative difference in the performance of the role of information gatherer between the two hierarchical levels; and this conclusion appears to be compatible with the, apparently, greater selectivity found in DD recruitment. This difference may be considered more significant if we bear in mind that the DD leaders must be concerned with the entire department, whereas their DM counterparts deal solely with Cali.

The fact that 56 per cent of the overall sample thought that they had a good idea as to their faction's socio-economic base of support may need further clarification given the fact that the Liberals and Conservatives are both multi-class parties. Dix observes that both parties have been coalitions of regional oligarchies and that in spite of Liberal opposition to Conservative traditionalism through the decades, "This should not be taken to imply that most Liberals wished to undermine elite domination of Colombian society." He then knowledgeably adds that the Liberal-Conservative rivalry was "primarily within the elite itself," and, hence, "The Liberals did not seek to destroy the patterns of social

and economic power . . . but rather to partake of their benefits."² Unfortunately, neither census nor electoral statistics allow us to determine differences in socio-economic class support for the two parties. However, urban-rural differences in vote (illustrated in Chapter III) may provide the explanation why most of our sample claimed a knowledge as to their faction's base of socio-economic support.

Another phenomenon concerning the roles of hierarchical leaders is the non-differentiated character of hierarchical activity. The directorates have virtually no functional division of labor among the leadership. Rather, each leader dedicates himself to no particular role; he simply engages in, perhaps, the entire spectrum of politically relevant roles, often assuming them impulsively as the need for their fulfillment becomes apparent. In response to a question concerning the type of work rendered by leaders during the most recent election campaign, the very general, non-specific nature of organizational leadership roles became clear. (Perhaps the multi-faceted character of hierarchical leadership accounts for the widespread awareness of such politically relevant phenomena as party and factional voting percentages, if we can accept the veracity of the figures in Table 22.

Among the Oficialista DM sample, the following responses were obtained. One leader said that he participated in party-sponsored conferences (in the sense of lectures, discussions), and helped orient the various campaign activities at the directorate meetings. Another stressed his activities as a general propagandist and speech maker. Another claimed that he had organized meetings, public gatherings,

speeches, conferences, and comités de barrio. Another declared that she was mostly concerned with attracting and convincing people to vote. A fifth leader simply remarked that his campaign activity was very limited, while the remaining DM leader told of his role as a fund collector, the most specific role of those mentioned.

Most Oficialista DD responses followed this pattern, as frequent mention was made of general propaganda activity by means of speech making to public gatherings, mainly in the barrios populares, and through the press and radio. Some accented their wide geographical scope-- throughout the department, orienting the DMs and providing necessary economic aid--whereas others stressed efforts in Cali's barrios and relationship with the comités de barrio. This would suggest an overlapping of DD and DM functions in Cali, and perhaps some usurpation of what are theoretically DM roles, as one of the DM samples claimed. Three of the DD members referred to their role as fund raisers, one of them also having served as a transportation coordinator. Another alluded to her role of trying to obtain jobs for followers in need of them.

In like manner, the majority of the Revitalización sample stressed the general nature of their activities, mentioning trips to municipios throughout Valle and propaganda campaigns in the local barrios populares. Two specifically referred to their efforts as propagandists through the press and radio. The MRL leadership also described their activities in such a manner, accenting general propaganda effort, including "ideological organization," "agitation," "directing and orienting mass

rallies," and visits around the department to organize and coordinate the activities of DMs. In particular, one leader mentioned his role as a fund collector, while another accented the transporting of voters to the polls.

The responses of the Conservative factions were in strong harmony with those of the Liberals. Unionista DM leaders described the general nature of their campaign activities, referring in many cases to their work in distributing propaganda in Cali's barrios. In conjunction with this, some described their roles in coordinating the programs of the comités de barrio. Others accented their economic role as party fund collectors. The DD leaders similarly revealed the general, varied nature of their activities in most cases. Some accented the trips they made throughout the department, while others noted the attention they gave to the barrios within Cali. In like manner, the general Independiente response alluded to travels around the department to coordinate local efforts with departmental and national programs and to help with campaign financing. Four of the nine specifically referred to their role in collecting and utilizing campaign funds. Indeed, most pictured themselves more as overall coordinators than as active propagandists such as speech makers. Finally, Anapo leaders, too, described a variety of campaign activities, mainly involving the proselytizing and mobilizing of the masses in the barrios. The Anapistas, like the other groups, made evident the importance of the comités de barrio as effective links between the hierarchy and the masses.

In summary, only the roles of fund collector and transportation coordinator seem to stand out in specificity as opposed to the more general, less structured campaign roles mentioned in the majority of cases. Activity appeared to be divided among the leadership of a directorate by sharing all the campaign effort to be carried out without regard to a boundary maintenance between roles, such as confining some leaders to speech making, others to written propaganda, others to fund raising, others to fund distribution, others to transportation coordination, etc. Even those who accented their roles as fund raisers or transportation coordinators added that they were also involved in other general propaganda activities. Moreover, none of the leaders in the overall sample alluded to the existence of a conscious and fixed geographical distribution of labor.

On the other hand, the very high degree of duplication of roles is indicated by the responses found in Table 23 to the question as to whether the leader had actually partaken in the specific activity of registering new voters (which was used as an example to test the hypothesis that such duplication was widespread and universal among the different samples). The results show that 59 of the 71 leaders, or 83 per cent, affirmed their participation in voting registration efforts. Moreover, for each of the eight samples, the percentage of participants was over 70 per cent (100 per cent in the case of Anapo). The leaders were also questioned as to the exact nature of their efforts to promote voter registration, and the results were as follows. The majority of the overall sample commented that their activity was confined to the barrios populares, and nobody made reference to voting registration programs in the middle or upper-class barrios.

TABLE 23
PARTICIPATION IN VOTING REGISTRATION*

| | Yes | No |
|-----------------|-----|----|
| Oficialistas DM | 5 | 1 |
| DD | 9 | 1 |
| Revitalización | 8 | 3 |
| MRL | 6 | 1 |
| Unionistas DM | 10 | 2 |
| DD | 5 | 2 |
| Independientes | 7 | 2 |
| Anapo | 9 | 0 |
| Overall | 59 | 12 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

The general Oficialista DM response was that their voting registration activities were closely linked with proselytizing efforts. Individuals were approached, convinced of the benefits of voting (sometimes taken directly to group headquarters for indoctrination), and then transported to official registration centers. DD leaders observed that their activity was often undertaken in conjunction with the comités de barrio, to "influence" and "convince" those without valid cédulas (identification cards given to Colombian citizens who have reached twenty-one years of age, provided they go to the respective municipal registry to obtain them; migrants from other departments must get Valle cédulas), to obtain them. (A valid cédula is equivalent to voting registration.) Some of the leaders noted that Liberal followers were taken to the party headquarters and given a Liberal party membership card as a further inducement to encourage them to become active voters; and as a final step, arrangements were made to take them to registration centers if this was required. (It must be stressed that the percentage of voters for each faction who were registered party members was very small.)

In harmony with the Oficialistas, most of the Revitalización leaders outlined their steps in voting registration campaigns as, first, canvassing the barrios populares, taking censuses to determine potential voters who lacked cédulas; then making efforts to convince those found to lack them to register, explaining what steps were necessary and arranging for them to get to the registration centers. One of the Revitalización leaders declared that his party worked to register all Liberals, even those who did not support their movement.

Another leader accented the importance of learning the problems of each individual and then taking steps to aid him as part of the Revitalización approach. However, since this type of orientation must have its material limits, perhaps the major benefit is a psychological gratification. The movement also offered membership cards to individuals who became followers, which might also provide some psychological satisfaction. In like manner, MRL leaders, in general, mentioned special campaigns where propaganda was diffused in conjunction with efforts to convince those without a cédula to go to registration centers. One leader noted that the distribution of membership cards with Alfonso López Michelsen's photo "thrills" MRL supporters.

Again, the Conservative faction responses closely patterned those of the Liberals. Unionista DM leaders stressed that the bulk of attention was given to the lower-class barrios where written and spoken propaganda were utilized to convince the slum dwellers of the goodness of Conservative programs and the benefits of voting. The importance of personal visits was accented, as was the effort to encounter and attract the many new residents in Cali as the result of the recent heavy migration. With regard to the DD, some of the leaders noted that their voting registration efforts were permanent in nature, with efforts such as sending emissaries to the poor barrios to take censuses to determine who was not registered. Then, persuasion was utilized to accent the importance of voting, while at the same time they attempted to proselytize by elaborating upon Conservative programs. One Unionista, like his Revitalización counterpart, observed that the best way to obtain results was to do something concrete for the potential

voter, especially in the field of economic aid. Once won over, the emissaries would take the individual to the registration office. Interested individuals were, at times, also taken to Unionista headquarters as part of a get-acquainted program.

Independientes, too, stressed the importance of personal visits to the barrios populares, and the taking of surveys to determine those lacking a cédula but in sympathy with the Conservative party. Again, the act of doing personal favors for individuals as a main step toward winning their support was mentioned. Finally, the Anapista leaders echoed the steps of campaigns in the barrios, censuses to determine those lacking cédulas, and efforts to achieve the actual registration. However, in contrast to responses from the other factions, Anapistas affirmed that strong efforts were undertaken to win over opposition elements, an important consideration in view of the fact that one of Anapo's major expressed aims was to divorce the masses from the "oligarchical" control of the opposition parties.

The fact that political mobilization efforts and election campaign activity itself are overwhelmingly directed toward the barrios populares, at least as far as contact above the purely person to person level is concerned, seems rather puzzling. As a basis for explanation, one might point to the fact that upper- or middle-class individuals are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class individuals, from the "spectator" activity of voting to the various levels of non-spectator, "gladiatorial" activity.³ Hence, it would appear logical that greater effort be directed toward the lower-class than toward

other social classes, particularly if one's main goal is simply to induce a non-voter to vote. Lester Milbrath shows us that voting is directly proportional to a group's sense of political efficacy, the greater the feeling of efficacy, the higher the voting turnout. He then adds that the lower-class, in general, is least likely to feel efficacious about political action. However, he goes on to offer us some relevant information by noting that "persons who were personally contacted by a canvasser were more likely to feel efficacious than those not so contacted."⁴ (Some of these conclusions are based mostly on data gathered in the United States, but we might reasonably assume that they are by no means unique to the U.S. political culture.)

Thus, by relating the voting act to a sense of efficacy, and a sense of efficacy, providing it is originally low or non-existent, to personal contact, we can better appreciate the concentration of hierarchical leadership efforts on the lower-class. By placing further accent on the apparent fact that all factions except Anapo waste little effort in attempting to convert supporters of the other overall party, we gain further insight into the rationale behind the narrowly channelled (in terms of social class) voting mobilization campaigns. Dix reflects upon "The absence of a substantial number of voters who will switch their support from one party to the other" and refers to Colombia's two-party system as one "composed of two irreconcilable blocs . . ."⁵

Given this well-established pattern, recruitment in the established territory of the rival party might be highly unfruitful. Thus, we might conclude that a lower sense of efficacy, perhaps related to a low

degree of political consciousness, makes the lower-class least inclined to vote.

Since party loyalty in its tenacious intensity seems tantamount to a secular religion, the job of Liberals would be to seek out and mobilize Liberal non-voters, and the job of Conservatives would be to locate and mobilize Conservative non-voters, analogous to the role of a priest in seeking out Catholics and convincing them to attend Church. The rivalry would be among Liberal factions for the Liberal vote and Conservative factions for the Conservative vote, the center of activity being the barrios populares, where the need for mobilization is greatest. (Table 34 in Chapter VII illustrates that during election campaigns, the hierarchical leaders consider it most important to direct their propaganda toward groups which have supported their party previously, and of virtually equal importance, the general goal of increasing the total vote in the election. Of considerably less importance is the directing of propaganda toward groups which have not previously backed one's party.) Anapo's deviant orientation, in that its major goal is to divorce the masses of both parties from the "oligarchical" leadership, if successful might break the traditional pattern of two irreconcilable blocs. Proof of such a change would be Anapo's ability to win a substantial percentage of the total vote even after it gained a universal image of a truly third party.

Apparently, a sizable majority of hierarchical leaders carry out many of their organizational activities during the interim periods between electoral campaigns. Sixty-nine per cent of the overall sample claimed that their faction did, indeed, function actively when an election

was not close at hand. In contrast to this, 27 per cent claimed that their faction was only somewhat involved in non-campaign activity, while a minute 4 per cent claimed that such involvement on the part of their faction was nil. (Table 24.) Of some interest is the unanimous consensus among both the Revitalización and Anapo leaders that their respective groups were active during non-campaign periods. This is a further indication of the relative dynamism of the two factions who appeared to be the most active in their efforts to change status quo situations. In contrast, the leadership of the organizationally weak Independientes affirmed that their faction's non-campaign activity was slight or, in one case, non-existent, only two of the leaders (22 per cent) giving "yes" answers. On the other hand, the mass-oriented, anti-status quo MRL had 71 per cent of its responses in the "yes" category, while the corresponding Unionista DM figure was 83 per cent. Both Oficialista factions and the Unionista DD had "yes" responses ranging between 43 and 60 per cent. Significantly, the Unionista DM appeared to be more active than the DD during non-campaign periods, while the reverse might have been true for the Oficialistas.

Among six varieties of non-campaign political activity, the most important for the overall sample, in general, were social services to the community and conferences (such as speeches to groups and discussion sessions). Significantly, social services imply a lower-class orientation, and material, as opposed to psychological, benefits. Of considerably less importance were debates, the distribution of propaganda, and political demonstrations (such as street rallies). Social

TABLE 24
 FACTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN NON-CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY*

| | | Yes | Somewhat | No |
|----------------|----|-----|----------|----|
| Oficialistas | DM | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| | DD | 6 | 4 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| MRL | | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| | DD | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 2 | 6 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall | | 49 | 19 | 3 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

functions (such as fiestas) ranked last in order of importance. (Table 25.) The results for each faction, for the most part, conformed quite closely to the general pattern. One notable exception was the proclaimed importance of demonstrations in the case of Anapo. The Anapista leadership considered this activity to be the most important non-campaign function of the six for their movement. Indeed, the most impressive demonstration in terms of crowd size and tumultuous clamor, witnessed by the author during his ten months in Cali was an Anapista gathering in the main plaza, Plaza Cayzedo, where General Rojas Pinilla harangued a crowd of some 500 to 1,000 people, mostly lower-class in appearance.

Some violence occurred, which is not uncommon at Rojista rallies, when the police attempted to confiscate fireworks which Rojas' followers intended to discharge. The forcefulness of the Anapistas won the day, and a noisy barrage of skyrockets followed. The demonstrators circled the plaza in trucks, while others remained standing in the plaza itself. Both groups carried anti-Frente Nacional signs which also attacked the oligarchical control of the country. In one large truck, raggedy, mostly Negro, children appeared, shouting Rojista slogans but grinning as though they were having a good time. One might surmise that since Anapo makes strenuous efforts to associate itself with the most downtrodden masses, perhaps it purposely recruited the most needy looking elements to be found in order to strengthen the image it has wished to create.

When asked to describe their individual roles in their faction's non-campaign activities, the lack of a functional distribution of roles

TABLE 25
NON-CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF FACTIONS*

| | | Dem. | SF | SS | Prop. | Deb. | Conf.** |
|----------------|----|------|----|-----|-------|------|---------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 9 | 9 | 25 | 18 | 14 | 24 |
| | DD | 16 | 10 | 49 | 15 | 25 | 54 |
| Revitalización | | 23 | 19 | 40 | 22 | 26 | 39 |
| MRL | | 8 | 3 | 23 | 15 | 28 | 25 |
| Unionistas | DM | 13 | 20 | 56 | 21 | 16 | 50 |
| | DD | 2 | 17 | 31 | 3 | 6 | 31 |
| Independientes | | 20 | 4 | 32 | 12 | 15 | 24 |
| Anapo | | 39 | 13 | 38 | 25 | 21 | 32 |
| Overall | | 130 | 95 | 294 | 131 | 151 | 279 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

**Dem. stands for demonstrations; SF stands for social functions; SS stands for social services; Prop. stands for propaganda campaigns; Deb. stands for debates; and Conf. stands for conferences (in the sense of lectures, discussions). The figures are derived from the scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8.

evident by the responses concerning actual campaign activity once again stood out. Most members of the Oficialista DM sample described their non-campaign roles in fairly general terms, though with some emphasis on social services and conferences. The comment by one leader that she did "whatever they assign me" neatly illustrates the situation. DD responses remained in harmony, with one leader alluding to the "varied, non-fixed" nature of his tasks. Some reference to the coordination of DM activities was made, and one physician mentioned his services to followers in the barrios. Again, most Revitalización responses referred to roles as participants and orienters of the six activities in general. In like manner, the MRL leaders mainly alluded to their participation in all activities, including the leadership and coordination of them. Social services and debates were mentioned most.

The Conservative responses continued the Liberal trend. Most Unionista DM leaders alluded to their participation in any activity which the group was currently promoting, and specific reference was made to social services and conferences in the barrios populares. Their DD counterparts, too, placed the accent on their carrying out any of the activities necessary at the time, again bringing social services and conferences to the foreground. One leader remarked that social services were set up to satisfy the problems of individual partisans. With regard to the Independientes, although most of the nine leaders sampled claimed that the faction engaged in little activity between campaigns (and one claimed that it was completely inactive), all but two asserted that they themselves helped organize, orient, and participate in such activities as social services, conferences, debates, and propa-

ganda efforts. In contrast to the preceding responses, most of the Anapistas sampled were more specific with regard to their non-campaign activities. In addition to mentioning their roles in conferences and general social service activities, several Anapistas alluded to specific efforts toward obtaining jobs and economic aid for Anapo supporters. Another departure from the commentary of the other groups was the reference made to roles in demonstrations. The other five factions apparently confine this latter role, to a much greater extent, to the election campaigns.

In spite of the responses by Liberals and Conservatives alike concerning their involvement in non-campaign activities, such efforts appeared to be quite sporadic, in general. One indication of this was the poor attendance at most directorate meetings witnessed by the author. This was especially noticeable at Oficialista and Unionista meetings, where there was some complaining on the part of those in attendance that too few hierarchical leaders were carrying the load while the others were not participating at all. One Oficialista DD reunion had to be called off completely when just two leaders attended.

Considering that a great deal of attention has been given to the roles of hierarchical leaders, it is only fitting that some effort be made to ascertain their attitude toward the vocation of political leader. According to the results found in Table 26, the average attitude for the eight samples (7.09) was only mildly favorable. This might have been predicted, given the short longevity of hierarchical leaders brought to light earlier. And one must also keep in mind the fact that there is

TABLE 26

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VOCATION OF POLITICAL LEADER*

| | Score** |
|-----------------|---------|
| Officialista DM | 6.43 |
| DD | 7.79 |
| Revitalización | 7.07 |
| MRL | 7.11 |
| Unionistas DM | 6.75 |
| DD | 6.41 |
| Independientes | 6.93 |
| Anapo | 8.23 |
| Overall Average | 7.09 |

*N - 103, n = 71.

**The instrument used was a Purdue Master Attitude Scale adopted by the author with the permission of the editor of the scale, H. H. Remmers. The scale includes seventeen statements, ranging from most favorable attitude to least favorable attitude in descending order from statement 1 to statement 17. The scale is valid and reliable for any vocation, the author, of course, utilizing it for the vocation of political leader. Each statement has its own scale value, ranging from 10.3 (statement 1) to 1.0 (statement 17). The 6.0 of statement 9 is the indifference point. Scores above 6.0 indicate a favorable attitude, scores below 6.0 an unfavorable attitude. The respondent codified only those statements with which he agreed. The median scale value of the statements endorsed is the attitude score. The complete scale and scale value chart are included in the Appendix.

no pay for this job. The author had hypothesized that the two DD samples would manifest a more favorable attitude than their DM counterparts, and, indeed, this held true for the Oficialistas. The contrast was such that the DD had the second highest score of any sample, while the DM had the second lowest score.

The reverse held true for the Unionistas, the DD, in fact, achieving the lowest score for any sample. Nonetheless, the DM score was relatively low also. The Liberal factions, in general, had more favorable attitudes than the Conservative factions, with the exception of Anapo. Only the Anapistas exhibited a strongly favorable attitude toward their role as political leader. And this result seems to be in harmony with the highly apparent zeal and sense of mission of the Anapo leadership. More than any of the other political groups, the Anapistas appear to have a cause, and one that seems incompatible with the status quo. (Recent steps on the part of the Revitalización movement and the MRL toward a reconciliation and reunification with the Oficialistas, which will be considered later, help support this contention.)

Notes

¹Since residence requirements are non-existent, a candidate's faction may run his name in as many lists as it wishes at the departmental and municipio levels, a freedom restricted at the national level, where only one seat in congress is allowed an individual. However, a principal would be physically incapable of rendering continual activity in each of five or more legislative posts. But in each case, he has a different suplente to serve as his substitute; and the suplentes perform the lion's share of the role in such highly multiple-role cases. (Recall the case of López Michelsen's multiple legislative role illustrated in Chapter III. López was simultaneously elected to ten different departmental assemblies in 1964.)

²Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 246-247.

³See Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 116-117.

⁴Ibid., pp. 56-58.

⁵Dix, op. cit., p. 223.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP

In Chapter VI, reference was made to the apparently poor boundary maintenance between the Cali DM and the DD of both the Revitalización movement and Anapo due to the great overlap of membership. However, boundary maintenance for all of the Liberal and Conservative factions appeared to be weak for another reason: the location of the DD and DM in the same city and, moreover, in the very same headquarters. When asked to describe the differences between the Valle DD and Cali DM in their respective hierarchies, most leaders alluded to the simple jurisdictional distinction, but added statements to the effect that the roles of the two organizational levels were intermingled.

Among the Oficialista DM leaders, in addition to stressing the jurisdictional differences between their directorate and the DD, further elaboration was offered regarding how the Cali DM compares with other Valle DMs in its relationship with the DD. One leader claimed that the other Valle DMs had more autonomy than Cali's since the DD takes over some normal DM functions in the departmental capital. Moreover, he observed that the Cali DM had no independent treasury, depending on DD funds, whereas the other Valle DMs had their own treasuries, a factor contributing to a more limited autonomy for the local DM. In contrast to this, another DM leader contended that no functional differences existed between the Cali DM and DD that "We work together." In effect, it appears that a two-edged sword relationship exists. The DM has

enjoyed both a closer relationship with and a greater vulnerability to the DD. Significantly, three of the DD members admitted that the DM in Cali had far less autonomy than other Valle DMs, one asserting that the Cali DM "means nothing" since the DD was involved in all of its functions. Another noted that the two hierarchical levels in Cali were "practically fused together," giving the DD "great strength in running the DM."

In the case of the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal, the general response was that virtually no functional differences between the DD and DM existed, basically due to the overlapping membership. One leader commented that the two levels "both act together without a difference." (The DD, nonetheless, chose the DM.) Another leader declared that the two hierarchical levels were overshadowed by Revitalización founder and DD president Carlos Holmes Trujillo. However, other leaders claimed that this was not the case. For the MRL, most of the leaders simply noted the hierarchical difference, in jurisdiction, between the DD and DM, while stressing that the two directorates worked together.

On the Conservative side, the general Unionista DM response was that the functions of their directorate and that of the DD were much alike. In addition, comments were made as to the role of the DM in Cali in comparison to that of the other Valle DMs, and here some contradictory opinion was offered. One leader claimed that the Cali DM, due to the fact that Cali is the seat of the DD, did not enjoy the autonomy of other DMs in handling purely municipio affairs, that the

DD itself had taken over many of those functions in Cali and was tempting to limit DM activity there. However, two other leaders took an opposite position, contending that the presence of the two directorates in the same location allowed the local DM to have a much closer working relationship with the DD and actually participate in more activities than other DMs.

Again, a situation akin to a two-edged sword seems evident. The local DM must be on its guard not to offend the DD, which could take reprisals at its whim; but it can take advantage of its close relationship with the DD to enhance its position in spite of the vulnerability to its autonomy. The DD leaders, on the other hand, noted the subordinate role of the DMs, contending that DD appointment of DM membership rendered the latter the instruments of the former. However, two of the leaders observed that the DMs enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy in practice. Another DD leader affirmed that the DD members were of a greater intellectual level than their DM counterparts. As to functional differences, the commentary made it appear that both levels of the hierarchy carry out more or less the same function, with differences being primarily in scope.

Among the Independiente leadership, most responses expressed the organizing and coordinating role of the DD in "directing and giving orientation" to the DMs, making certain that they carried out their duties. This role as coordinator is exemplified by the comment of one DD member that "We fix policy, while the municipal directorates carry out." However, the relationship between the two hierarchical levels had not been harmonious, and the Independientes currently had

inoperative DMs throughout the nation. One DD leader placed the blame for this upon the DMs, contending that most of their leaders wanted the prestige of being on a DM, but had never intended to do any work, thus producing a friction between the DD and the DMs. A DM leader, on the other hand, blamed the DD for completely undermining the DMs, denying them economic aid and stripping them of their functions, due to the personal ambitions of the "professional politicians" (the ranking caudillos) of the DD. This disheartened DM members throughout Colombia, causing most of them to resign (including the large majority of the twenty in Cali).

In the case of Anapo, several of the Anapista leaders made reference to the difference between theory and practice concerning the DD-DM relationship. Theoretically, renewal of directorates takes place at fixed periods, but in fact these changes often did not occur. Furthermore, there was supposedly a hierarchical difference between the two directorates, like there has been for Unionistas and Independientes, but the tremendous overlap in membership of the two organizations in Cali had admittedly obviated this possibility and had fused the two levels. The comment of one Anapo leader that there was too much personalistic rule exercised by the Rojas family--father, son-in-law, and daughter--seemed particularly significant in the light of the movement's already well-established personalistic image. "The party works through its leaders, not through its directorates," he declared.

Given the tremendous overlap of some of the DMs and DDs in membership, and a similar overlap of others with regard to actual roles, the principle of hierarchy and deference patterns might be impaired (just

as the federated departments policy of the Unionistas and Independientes discussed in Chapter IV has undermined the hierarchical pyramidal image.) Obviously, Cali DM leaders who are also Valle DD hierarchs channel no upward deference toward the DD. Moreover, the apparent association of DD leaders with most of the top leadership roles in the DM would seemingly obviate deference patterns altogether between the DMs and DDs featuring extensive membership overlap. Any such deference would perhaps be intra-hierarchical level rather than inter-level, with the lower echelon of DM leadership paying deference to the higher DM echelon.

With regard to the pronounced overlap of DM and DD roles (referring solely to the Cali DMs), the poor boundary maintenance which undermines a defined structural-functional relationship again weakens the image of hierarchy. If DD leaders perform roles identical to those of their DM counterparts within the same geographical confines (Cali), then in practice the two levels become functionally identical as far as Cali is concerned. We saw the lack of role specificity among the leaders of the particular directorates in Chapter VI; now we witness the absence of a specificity of role patterns between the directorates themselves (again with reference solely to Cali). We might be tempted to assert that hierarchy again gives way to stratarchy in consonance with our example of the Conservative federated departments. However, from the comments of many DM leaders, a proliferation of the ruling group and a diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise in the sense of lower hierarchical levels assuming more important leadership roles which were normally associated with superior levels has not occurred in this case. Rather, in direct contrast, it

appears that the superior level has expanded its prerogatives at the expense of the inferior level, the DD sharing in DM roles in Cali, while the outlying Valle DMs appear to have much more of a monopoly over local (municipio) prerogatives.

In spite of the poor boundary maintenance of roles between the DMs and DD, the overall superiority of the respective DD with regard to a closer relationship with its DN is indicated by the Oficialista and Unionista figures in Table 27. For the Oficialistas, communication between both the DD and Cali DM, on the one hand, and the DN appeared good. Seventy per cent of the DD leaders claimed that they were in permanent contact with Oficialista DN leaders, while the remaining 30 per cent had such contact during electoral campaigns. DM responses were divided equally between permanent contact and campaign contact. Of relative significance, not one Oficialista of either directorate said that this contact was seldom or never.

With regard to the Unionistas; on the other hand, 50 per cent of the DM leaders considered their contact with the Unionista DN to be seldom or never, as opposed to 29 per cent (both in the "seldom" category) for the DD. Evidently, on the basis of these figures, intra-hierarchical communications were more extensive for the Oficialistas than for the Unionistas, to the point where the Oficialista DM contact with the national level appeared to be somewhat greater than that of the Unionista DM. This (the explanation) could be the effect of the autonomous status of Valle, whereby the Conservative party organization of this department has been theoretically autonomous of the party's national

TABLE 27
CONTACT WITH NATIONAL LEVEL LEADERS*

| | | Permanent | Campaigns | Seldom | Never |
|----------------|----|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | DD | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | 2 | 6 | 1 | 2 |
| MRL | | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| | DD | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Independientes | | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Anapo | | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall | | 32 | 26 | 9 | 4 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

organization. Another explanation might be a more rigid adherence to the principle of hierarchy within the ranks of the Unionistas, departmental autonomy notwithstanding. As we shall see later, Conservatives (both Unionistas and Independientes) claim that their party is characterized by a respect for order, authority, and hierarchy, while Liberals, in general, assert that their party is characterized by a high degree of internal democracy.

The responses for the remaining samples reveal some points of interest. On the Liberal side, the Revitalización leaders manifested a much less permanent contact than the Oficialistas with the DN they both share in common. This suggests that the "official" Oficialistas have maintained closer ties with the DN than their renegade counterparts; or it may indicate that channels of communication from the Revitalización movement to the DN have been more limited (with perhaps a very few leaders serving as contacts). In contrast to the Revitalización leaders, 71 per cent of the MRL sample affirmed their permanent contact with their respective national level leaders (although the remaining 29 per cent characterized their contact as seldom). Considering that the MRL had been well along in the process of disintegration, perhaps the remaining organization had become more close knit, or perhaps those who were staying with the ship had been among the most influential MRL leaders from the start.

In the case of the Independientes and Anapo, fairly extensive contact with the respective national leadership was asserted, especially for the latter. Anapo's high degree of non-campaign activity might

help explain its, apparently, relatively high degree of political communication between the local and national level leadership. In summary, 45 per cent of the combined overall sample affirmed a permanent contact with national level leadership, while only 18 per cent admitted to little or no such contact. These figures suggest that contact between the local party organizations and their national counterparts has, in general, been steady, year-round, and fairly broadly channelled.

The good intra-hierarchical communications notwithstanding such contact did not lead most of the leaders in the sample to believe that they exercised any significant influence upon national party policy (Table 28). Seventy-three per cent declared that their influence was no greater than "some," 63 per cent of this group (47 per cent of the entire overall sample) admitting that their influence was very little. On the other hand, only 8 per cent considered their influence to be "a lot." As was to have been expected, the two strictly DD samples claimed a greater influence than the two strictly DM samples. For the Oficialista DM, 83 per cent placed themselves in the lower two categories of influence, while 40 per cent of the DD leaders located themselves in the upper two categories of influence, 75 per cent of this latter group contending that they had considerable influence over national Oficialista policy.

In like manner, 83 per cent of the Unionista DM sample qualified their influence as very little or some, whereas 57 per cent of their DD counterparts asserted an influence of quite a bit or a lot. Hence, the superior hierarchical level of the DDs does seem to translate in an overall superior conception of one's effect upon his group's national

TABLE 28
 INFLUENCE UPON NATIONAL PARTY POLICY*

| | | Very Little | Some | Quite a bit | A Lot |
|----------------|----|-----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| | DD | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Revitalización | | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| MRL | | <u>2</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> |
| Unionistas | DM | <u>14</u> 7 | <u>11</u> 3 | <u>4</u> 2 | <u>5</u> 0 |
| | DD | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| Anapo | | <u>6</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Overall | | <u>19</u> 33 | <u>8</u> 19 | <u>9</u> 13 | <u>1</u> 6 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

policy. Nonetheless, responses were not uniform among the leadership of each directorate. Some of the DM leaders considered their influence to be "quite a bit," while a number of DD leaders, correspondingly, categorized their influence as very little. This might suggest that one's inclusion in a particular level of the hierarchy does not necessarily determine the range of his influence upon national party policy.

In the case of the Revitalización leadership, 73 per cent declared that they had very little influence upon national Oficialista policy, and another 18 per cent claimed only some influence, a result which might have been predicted from their relatively low degree of contact with national level leaders illustrated in Table 27. Conversely, the high degree of permanent contact between local and national MRL leaders was accompanied by a relatively high conception of influence on the part of local MRL leaders. Forty-three per cent ranked their influence in the top two categories, mainly in the top category itself. In contrast to this, the high degree of contact between local and national leaders of the Independientes and Anapo did not translate into a high conception of influence on the part of either local leadership. Seventy-eight per cent of each group placed themselves in the lower two categories.

The organizational chaos of the Independientes and the strong, personalistic, and caudillista national leadership of Anapo may help explain these latter results. Considering that only a de facto (parliamentary) national leadership exists for the Independientes and a power struggle has been in progress (which will be considered later),

a local leader might be more hard pressed to determine his personal influence upon national Independiente policy. As for Anapo, the author calls to mind the statement made by a local Anapo leader earlier in this chapter concerning the weakness of the directorates. In conclusion, one might surmise that the fairly pessimistic conception of the overall local leadership in evaluating their influence upon national party policy might help account for the low longevity of both DD and DM leaders.

The low evaluation of their influence at the national level was accompanied by the majority opinion that the DD leaders should have more influence in directing party policy at the top hierarchical level. Furthermore, a sizable percentage, though not the majority, likewise felt that the DM leaders should enjoy more influence upon departmental policy. A comparison of Table 29 and Table 30 reveals that 59 per cent of the overall sample favored greater influence for the DD in national circles, whereas 44 per cent supported an enhanced influence for the DM in departmental circles. Curiously, the two DM samples were slightly more solidly behind an improvement in DD influence than they were for an improvement in their own influence.

These results may mean that discontent with over-centralization at the national level was the overriding factor. (The Conservative system of federated departments may counter this centralization in one sense by allowing autonomy to a few departmental party organizations. However, by the same token, this procedure could make the national party organization more autonomous from the influence of the federated departments, including Valle.) The DD leaders, as expected,

TABLE 29

ATTITUDE TOWARD DD INFLUENCE UPON NATIONAL POLICY

| | | More | Less | Okay |
|----------------|----|------|------|------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| | DD | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| Revitalización | | 8 | 0 | 3 |
| MRL | | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 8 | 0 | 4 |
| | DD | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| Independientes | | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| Overall | | 42 | 1 | 28 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

TABLE 30

ATTITUDE TOWARD DM INFLUENCE UPON DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

| | | More | Less | Okay |
|----------------|----|------|------|------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | DD | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| Revitalización | | 5 | 0 | 6 |
| MRL | | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| | DD | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| Independientes | | 5 | 0 | 4 |
| Anapo | | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| Overall | | 31 | 0 | 40 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

were more concerned with the need for enhancing their influence vis-à-vis the DN than with strengthening the influence of the DMs vis-à-vis themselves (the DDs). Nonetheless 40 per cent of the Oficialista DD sample and 29 per cent of the Unionista DD sample admitted the need for greater DM influence upon departmental policy. Significantly, only one leader of the entire seventy-one called for less influence by a hierarchical level upon its immediate superior.

With regard to the remaining factions, the Revitalización leaders manifested more discontentment with the DD status quo than with the DM status quo. Since the Revitalización DD-DM overlap was such that most of the sample belonged to both directorates, this result seems easily explained. However, it might also be a product of the pessimistic conception of influence upon the DN manifested by Revitalización leaders in Table 28. The less pessimistic MRL leadership was, accordingly, less dissatisfied with the DD status quo than their Revitalización counterparts. Fifty-seven per cent of the MRL sample favored greater DD influence, as opposed to 73 per cent of the Revitalización sample. The MRL leaders exhibited the same degree of discontentment with the status quo of their DM.

The Independientes manifested the greatest dissatisfaction with the influence of their DD, 78 per cent contending that its role in national circles should be enhanced. This result reveals an impatience with the power struggle, organizational disintegration, and general drifting of the party, with a lack of well-defined goals. Discontentment with DM influence was less widespread. Finally, the results for Anapo appear to have considerable significance. Seventy-eight per cent of

the Anapistas declared their support for the DD status quo, while 89 per cent backed the DM status quo. This appears to strengthen Anapo's image as a highly disciplined party with organizational leaders who are dedicated to Rojas Pinilla and are prepared to accept the roles determined for them by the clique which seems to control Anapo. A comparison of Tables 27 through 31 shows that local Anapo leaders have had extensive contact with national party leaders, have had a low opinion of their influence upon those leaders, but have not been inclined to challenge the organizational status quo.

Although most of the leaders declared that their respective directorates were entitled to greater influence within the current jurisdiction of their immediate hierarchical superiors, most also found fault with their own directorates and recommended changes. On the Liberal side, four of the six Oficialista DM leaders called for changes in their DM organization. Principally, a greater and more permanent activity on the part of the entire group was sought, together with a better distribution of labor. One leader called for a reorganization along functional lines to distribute the labor and to make connections with the barrios populares more effective. Another advised electing people with more prestige to the DM.

In like manner, eight of the ten DD leaders recommended changes in their directorate, aimed mainly at improving the quality of the membership and expanding activity to a year-round basis. One leader cynically remarked that members should be compelled to be as active permanently as they have been at the time of elections to renew the directorate membership. Another called for economic compensation of

TABLE 31
PROGRAM IN PAST ELECTION CAMPAIGN*

| | | Well Defined | Not Well Defined |
|----------------|----|--------------|------------------|
| Officialistas | DM | 5 | 1 |
| | DD | 8 | 2 |
| Revitalización | | 10 | 1 |
| MRL | | 4 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 8 | 3 |
| | DD | 6 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 6 | 3 |
| Anapo | | 8 | 1 |
| Overall | | 55 | 15 |

*One Unionista DM leader would not answer because he was not active in the organization at that time. N = 103, n = 70.

the hierarchy so that competent people might participate in the organization without suffering economic sacrifice. In conjunction with more permanent activity, two leaders wanted greater contact with the Liberal masses in the form of more extensive social activity to benefit needy Liberals. Finally, another departmental hierarch helped corroborate the impression that advancement for youth in the Liberal party was difficult by calling for "a renewal of values, giving the young people an opportunity to direct the party's policies."

Revitalización leaders, too, in spite of their reformist mission to cure the alleged ills of the Oficialistas, found fault with their directorates in virtually the same proportion as the Oficialistas. Seven of the renovators contended that their organization itself needed renovating, including the ejection of leaders who labored solely for personal interests or failed to work at all; a reduction in the size of the hierarchy and a functional division of labor to improve general operations; and a greater social welfare orientation. Three leaders, however, attacked a lack of internal democracy in the Revitalización organization, accompanied by a strong personal control exercised by Trujillo and a small elite surrounding him. In fact, the Oficialistas referred to this competing faction as the "Holmistas," a label which most Revitalización leaders appeared to reject.

In the case of the MRL, all seven leaders recommended changes in their respective directorates, a unanimity perhaps inspired by the movement's great electoral reverses in the past election and subsequent hierarchical decay. Two MRL leaders stressed the need for more internal discipline, better organization, and more unity in effort; one called

for an improved planning of MRL programs and greater effort in carrying them out; one sought a functional division of labor; another wanted more members in the directorate; another advocated the end of all DD-DM membership overlap and the proscription of the dual role of legislator and hierarchical leader; and the seventh leader spoke of making hierarchical membership more representative, "with people of all levels of society and all main occupations" included in it.

For the Unionistas, most recommendations for change on the part of the DM leaders--and only two would not recommend changes--referred to the need to place the DM on a basis of more permanent, year-round activity and to renovate the organization to exclude people not willing to work or interested only in personal fortune. Reference was also made to the need to give youth a greater leadership role by weakening the hold of the "old guard." Some of the leaders spoke in favor of the popular election of at least the DMs, and one called for making them more autonomous of the DD. Another leader advocated a functional distribution of roles by establishing functional committees which would encompass the spectrum of the faction's activities.

While two of their seven DD counterparts would recommend no changes in the departmental organization, the other five, in general, alluded to the need for greater work on the part of the members, more non-political, mainly social service, activity on a permanent basis, and the awarding of leadership posts on the basis of merit; that is, the quantity and quality of activity rendered by a leader. One called for a reduction of the number of people on the directorate to increase the possibilities of good internal discipline and more effective work.

One wanted to divorce hierarchical from legislative activities, asserting that departmental directorate members should not be allowed to run as candidates for legislative posts. On the other hand, another leader contended that all members of the departmental hierarchy should be people who aspired to legislative or public administration posts in the future; hence, the valuable orientation provided by membership in the hierarchy would be limited to those who would utilize it in influential positions at a later date.

The Independientes' position, on the other hand, was somewhat analogous to that of the MRL in that the entire sample favored changes in their directorate due, perhaps, to the faction's decline at the polls and its current organizational disarray. The nine leaders principally accented the need for more activity on the part of the members on a year-round basis, with functional distribution of labor. Some criticized top leadership going to those who had the best connections rather than to those who had earned such promotion through merit. Three leaders spoke in favor of a more just election of the directorates, two calling for popular vote.

The majority of Anapistas, six of the nine, again in contrast to the other groups, would recommend no changes in their directorates. This position might find its explanation in terms of the electoral successes of the movement, or perhaps it simply reflects an acceptance of Anapo as the personal instrument of its caudillo, Rojas Pinilla, whereby the directorates need not have any true significance. One of the three leaders who called for change wanted greater consultation

of the directorates by the top national leaders; the second objected to the unwieldiness of the departmental directorate due to its large number of members; and the third complained about the large percentage of incompetent people, "lacking intellectual ability," who made up the directorates.

In summary, seven recommendations for change in their respective directorates stood out for the overall sample in general: (1) a more intensive activity on the part of each hierarchical leader; (2) permanent, year-round activity for all; (3) a more equitable distribution of labor; (4) a functional distribution of labor; (5) more competent and self-sacrificing--without purely personal ambitions--people on the directorate; (6) the awarding of the top leadership posts on the basis of merit rather than on personal connections and influence; (7) a more democratic election of the directorate membership.

On the other hand, considerably fewer leaders expressed recommendations for change in their group's overall hierarchy. Three Oficialista DM leaders commented to the effect that people who worked solely for their own interests should be replaced by those loyal to the collectivity, and that the hierarchy should be decentralized to lessen the control of the DN. The five DD leaders who recommended change sought diverse goals. One wanted the directorates of all three hierarchical levels chosen either by popular election in the district or by district conventions; a second called for the rejuvenation of the DN to bring in more energetic people; a third wanted economic compensation for the members of the DN, DD, and DM alike in order to improve the quality of the membership; a fourth wanted the directorates

reoriented to a functional basis; whereas the fifth called for changing the top leadership for people who could reunite the overall Liberal party.

Two of the four Revitalización leaders who recommended overall hierarchical change called for decentralization, while a third advised a greater functional division of labor, and the fourth sought more internal democracy. The MRL unanimity in recommending change for one's own directorate declined to four out of seven when it came to the question of overall hierarchical reform. Two of the four leaders called for a pluralistic leadership to replace the current caudillo control (an obvious blast at Alfonso López Michelsen); a third recommended that leadership posts be granted on the basis of achievement and adherence to MRL ideology; while the fourth wanted the hierarchy to take the attitudes of the masses more into account.

On the Conservative side, half of the twelve DM Unionistas would recommend no overall hierarchical changes. Perhaps this greater reluctance to speak in favor of overall reform than reform solely within their own directorate could be understood by the comment of one Unionista that the present hierarchical configuration was acceptable "because our traditional principles are to respect hierarchy." As for the six who did recommend general hierarchical change, most alluded to the need to compel leaders on all three levels to work harder, to renovate the directorates to purge non-progressive members (especially the DD and DN), and to establish a more permanent activity on the part of the different hierarchical levels. On the other hand,

the same five DD leaders who recommended change for their own directorate advised overall hierarchical reform. Three referred to the need to weaken the power of the "old guard," to provide the different social classes within the party with a greater role, and to allow a more rapid advancement for capable younger leaders. Another leader called for a greater coordination of the three hierarchical levels on a more frequent basis, while the fifth noted the need for the popular election of municipal directorates to end their domination by the departmental directorate. In one instance, a leader also spoke on behalf of a broadened role for the national directorate.

Meanwhile, the Independiente unanimity for the previous question declined like that of the MRL. The five who continued to recommend change sought better organization by re-establishing operative directorates, especially the DN, and selecting competent people to serve on them. Finally, only two of the nine Anapista leaders would recommend overall hierarchical change, a reluctance perhaps explained by the possible reasons offered for the previous question. Both men in the minority significantly alluded to an undue personalistic control on the part of Rojas Pinilla, his daughter, and his son-in-law at the expense of the overall hierarchy.

In summary, eight recommendations for overall hierarchical reform were offered by the local organizational leadership, although the frequency of these recommendations was less than that for the reform of one's own directorate. Suggestions for change included a call for: (1) year-round activity at all hierarchical levels; (2) more intensive

activity; (3) a functional distribution of labor; (4) more competent and self-sacrificing people; (5) a more democratic election of the overall hierarchy; (6) an ending of old guard control; (7) a termination of personalistic control at the national level; (8) and a decentralization to lessen DN control. Thus, where reform directed at the overall hierarchy deviated from those aimed solely at one's particular directorate, the accent was mainly placed on a desire to democratize the overall hierarchical relationship by strengthening the roles of the two local levels and improving the quality of the national level leadership.

Election Campaigns

The intra-hierarchical relationship during election campaigns reflects another aspect of political communication. The figures in Table 31 manifest that the leaders whose factions had fared best in the past election were the most inclined to claim that they had a well-defined program in Cali and Valle during the election campaign itself. Overall, 79 per cent of the leaders made this claim. The combined DD-DM total for the *Oficialistas* was 81 per cent, while the corresponding figure for the *Unionistas* was 78 per cent. Anapo, which had made the greatest gains in the past election, fittingly had a total of 89 per cent who contended that the movement had a well-defined program. The 91 per cent for the *Revitalización* leaders was even higher, but perhaps could be explained by the euphoria of a movement which had established itself as an important Valle Liberal faction in its first electoral effort, in spite of its minority vote.

On the other hand, only 67 per cent of the Independientes and 57 per cent of the MRL leaders considered their faction's program to have been well defined. One further note of explanation seems in order. The Oficialista and Unionista percentages were similar even though the former had conserved its earlier (1964) share of the total Liberal vote, whereas the latter had lost Conservative territory to Anapo. However, the Unionistas had closely attached themselves to the Frente Nacional programs and coalition candidate Lleras Restrepo, and were apparently evaluating their program on the basis of the overall Frente Nacional campaign.

Oficialista DM leaders were informed about their group's election campaign program by means of direct contact with the DN or through the DD. Some mentioned personal visits by top national leaders as a principal channel of information. The role of a major local newspaper in the organization and publicizing of the Valle and Cali campaigns, which was considered of great importance by many Unionistas and Independientes, was absent in the case of the Liberals, who lack an El País or Occidente. The general DM consensus as to the strategy of the program was that it was aimed principally at the barrios populares and was based on the socio-economic programs of the Frente de Transformación Nacional (FTN). (Candidate Lleras Restrepo added the word "Transformation" to the coalition label in order to give the impression of a dynamic process toward greater socio-economic development.) As was to have been expected, the Liberals associated the programs more with Lleras Restrepo personally than the Unionistas, who linked them to the FTN in general.

Oficialista DD leaders, for their part, mainly stressed that their program was national in scope, designed by the DN and especially by presidential candidate Lleras Restrepo, and executed by all the departments. Communication was principally by radio, primarily through Lleras' speeches, and personal reunions with DN leaders. In contrast to the Unionistas and Independientes, many of whom stressed the autonomy of their DD in designing its own program within certain guidelines, no Oficialista alluded to any departmental autonomy in constructing or adapting the Liberal program. This phenomenon might have been due to the Conservatives' federated department organization to which the more centralized Liberals had nothing comparable. The campaign strategy was to accent the benefits of the FTN, and propaganda was directed with greatest intensity at the lower-classes, who were told that the programs would improve their overall situation.

In contrast to the Oficialistas, and in harmony with Unionista and Independiente positions, four Revitalización leaders asserted that they helped make their program. Furthermore, there was no mention of direct communications or personal encounters with the DN hierarchy of the Liberal party, a fact which suggests, once more, a closer relationship between the Oficialista DD and the DN than between the Revitalización DD and the DN, even though the Revitalización movement also called itself Oficialista and openly supported Lleras. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that the Pachueladista-Balcarcista faction and the Revitalización faction were competing with one another for the Liberal vote, and the former consistently had proven its strength in

the Liberal-dominated city of Cali and department of Valle, whereas the latter had yet to test itself in an election. Furthermore, the long-established top leadership of the former probably had acquired more intimate personal ties with the DN.

Moreover, the very goal of the movement to revitalize the doctrines and leadership of the Liberal party, whereas the Pachoe-ladistas and Balcarcistas seemed to lack such impetus, might have made the DN somewhat wary of this neophyte group. The fact that the February Liberal convention produced the resolution that only one directorate could represent Oficialismo in any municipio or department (for DD), left the Liberal position on splinter groups quite clear. According to two other Revitalización leaders, the main source of communication as to what the group's program would be was top leader Trujillo. One simply declared that "Carlos Holmes Trujillo spoke about what the party program would be at meetings." This would indicate a greater degree of personalism than some other leaders would admit, a matter which will receive further attention later. Two other leaders referred to the role of the DD in designing the program, while the remaining leaders noted the importance of the news media as a vehicle of communication.

To further reveal a lack of complete harmony between the Revitalización movement and the Liberal DN, not one Revitalización leader mentioned the FTN or Lleras specifically when asked to define the strategy and mechanics of the group's campaign programs. Rather, four asserted that the movement's orientation was to campaign against the old guard and the ideological stagnation of the Liberal party, calling

for 'a change generation' with more leadership participation by the party's youth, and a 'revitalization' and 'renovation' of liberalism. One alluded to the movement's close association with the figure of the late radical Liberal leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, claiming that the group based its campaign orientation 'behind the banners of Gaitán' to mobilize the masses who idolized him. Most of the remaining leaders also contended that the campaign was primarily oriented toward attracting the vote of the lower-class by defending their interests and giving them a political consciousness so that they would vote according to their own objective interests. Finally, one leader asserted that the principal campaign goal of the Revitalización movement was to put Trujillo in the senate to manifest his abilities and what the movement represented, an aim which suggests that the group felt a strong need for publicity at the national level.

The bare majority of MRL leaders who proclaimed that their faction had a well-defined program locally in the last election campaign mentioned personal contacts with MRL DN leaders and the newspapers as the major vehicles in communicating the program to them. One claimed that he had a role in formulating the program. As to the strategy of the program, it was described as reformist, but as too negative in orientation, too directed toward attacking the FTN rather than stressing that the MRL offered viable alternatives.

On the Conservative side, most Unionista DM leaders mentioned communications with the DN and the DD for purposes of diffusing the faction's program downward in the hierarchy. This included personal

visits from top national leaders and joint meetings with the DD. Some referred to the important role of the Conservative press in manifesting the Unionista program. Indeed, mention was made of joint meetings with the management of El País (Cali's principal newspaper and an outspoken organ of the Unionistas, its publisher being Alvaro Lloreda, a member of the DN) in actually formulating the Unionista program for Valle. Two leaders noted the DM role in planning the program, and mentioned their personal participation in this activity. According to DM leaders, their campaign program was based on the divulgation of FTN programs and matching their qualities against the programs of the opposition, mainly Anapo. In fact, the program was carried out in conjunction with the Oficialistas, and was to some extent formulated by the Comité Bipartidista. Ironically, the opposition against which the campaign was directed was almost purely Conservative, Anapo and the Independientes. Also accented were the Unionista efforts to make fullest use of all news media available to them, especially El País, which has a circulation that extends throughout Valle and to many of the major cities in Colombia. It was made clear that most campaign efforts were directed toward the barrios populares.

Among their DD counterparts, the general response was that the DN directly informed the DD as to the national program; but the traditionally strong personalistic role of the presidential candidate in determining the program allowed Lleras Restrepo to play a dominant role in formulating the platform due to the Frente Nacional coalition. However, the fact that Valle is one of the Conservatives' federated departments allowed the local DD to formulate its own program (though

in accordance with the general FN guidelines), and some of the DD leaders, accordingly, accented their roles in the formulation of the faction's program for Valle. The campaign strategy was to cover Valle's 42 municipios and coordinate activities with the local Unionista leadership. One leader commented on the aim of watching over local leaders to make certain that they were carrying out their duties and to try to satisfy their requests for aid. The major goal was to produce a higher partisan turnout by accenting the FTN programs and justifying them in terms of Conservative ideology.

The Independientes, in describing their intra-hierarchical communication pattern for the diffusion of the election campaign program, primarily alluded to the DD's high degree of autonomy in formulating its own program, and their personal role in developing it. Nonetheless, they noted their consultation with the national leadership in Bogotá. Trips to the national capital and local visits by national leaders were major means of communication, as were the news media open to the Independientes, especially Occidente, Cali's other major newspaper, which served the Independientes in the same manner that El País served the Unionistas, as a self-proclaimed organ of the faction. (Among Cali's minor newspapers, El Crisol took upon itself the role of Oficialista spokesman; but its tiny circulation drew comments from Liberals that its role on behalf of Liberalismo was insignificant.) Most of the Independiente leaders admitted that their program was negatively oriented, attacking Lleras as one who was imposed on the Conservatives by the Liberals and who would not represent Conservative interests. Many blamed this strategy for the faction's poor showing,

just as the MRL leaders had done in their case. The loss of Conservative party identity and the weakening of its ideology as a result of its being submerged in the FTN were also accentuated. As to the extent of a positive orientation, vague references were made to stressing the need for social reforms, directing efforts mainly at the barrios populares.

In the case of Anapo, only one of the leaders claimed that he had a role in preparing the movement's program, another indication of the great centralization of Anapo in the hands of General Rojas Pinilla and his ostensibly close-knit group. Most local leaders alluded to communications from the top national leadership by means of visits and, also of great importance, written materials, including periodicals such as Alianza Nacional and Somatén, which were distributed throughout the nation. This gave Anapo's major written vehicle of publicity an even greater geographical scope than the Unionista and Independientes' respective newspapers (although the latter two factions had other newspapers at their service in other Colombian cities). With regard to Anapista strategy, the consensus was that the program had been strongly oriented toward the masses and was socio-economic in character, designed to show that Anapo was more in harmony with the aspirations of the lower-class than the other factions.

The fact that the overall electoral campaign strategy itself directs efforts toward the barrios populares echoes the conclusions reached in Chapter VI. Indeed, concern with the mobilization of the middle- and upper-classes seems far lower in degree than the evident preoccupation over the lower-class. Perhaps the fact that candidate

Lleras Restrepo had initiated the FTN to provide the connotation of a socio-economic "transformation" impelled the various factions of both parties to orient their respective campaigns so strongly toward the working-class. Hence, while the very nature of the Lleras-led Frente Nacional campaign was to mobilize the masses behind the coalition banner by convincing them that his election would mean true socio-economic reforms, the reaction of the opposition was to assure the masses that the FTN was nothing more than a new slogan for the same status quo. In either case, the center of attraction and struggle was the barrios populares.

Most of the factions merely elaborated upon their own campaign orientation to describe what they considered to be the most important issues in the past election campaign. The Oficialista DM leaders declared that the most important themes were the FTN programs and explaining what they represented. Again, however, some leaders referred to these programs as offerings of the Liberal party rather than the FTN coalition as a whole, thus denying the partnership with the Unionistas, in effect. This went a step further than simply associating the programs with Lleras Restrepo. One leader mentioned the preservation of peace as another important theme, recalling the many years of bloody Liberal vs. Conservative strife. With regard to the most pressing current problems, most of the leaders referred to economic problems and the need for the FTN to produce results.

To an even greater extent than their DM counterparts, DD leaders, who also claimed that the FTN programs and new orientation were last campaign's most important themes, alluded to the FTN as "the president's

socio-economic programs" rather than those of the Oficialista-Unionista coalition, which might corroborate Conservative allegations of Liberal sectarianism (to be discussed later), or simply indicate the tremendous personal role of the presidential candidate in shaping the coalition's programs. As for the major current issue, most observed the need to carry out the socio-economic programs of the FTN to alleviate the current economic crisis. Related to this, two of the leaders stressed the need for constitutional reform to strengthen the president's ability to carry out FTN programs.

Similar to the Oficialistas, especially the DD, the Revitalización leaders spoke more of "Lleras' programs" than overall coalition programs. Six of the eleven contended that support for Lleras and these programs was the major issue of the past campaign. The remaining five, however, asserted that the renovation of the traditionalistic Liberal party leadership, especially in Valle, to promote what one called an "ideological and practical renovation of the Liberal party" was the most pressing issue, Lleras and the FTN notwithstanding. (This again reflects the different orientations of the Oficialistas and the Revitalización movement.) Those who called for such a renovation noted that this remained the country's most pressing need, whereas most of the other group observed that the top issue at the time was the FTN's ability to fulfill its promises and cope with the difficult socio-economic situation.

Contrary to the positions of the Oficialista and Revitalización leaders, no MRL leader proclaimed that the FTN or Lleras' program were the major theme, in a positive sense, in the past election campaign.

Rather, most spoke of economic problems, such as agrarian reform, housing, education, changes in foreign policy (to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Communist countries), a better distribution of wealth, the participation of the masses in government, and social welfare measures in general. However, three referred to the Frente Nacional in a negative sense, alluding to the need to end the two-thirds voting rule, parity, and presidential alternation.

One leader noted the MRL opposition to Lleras' candidacy on the grounds that he had many obligations to the ruling class which would prevent him from making progressive reforms. But he admitted that this opposition had turned out to be erroneous because Lleras was promoting good reforms which could cost him the support of the right-wing of his party. Five of the seven leaders declared that the issues of greatest importance had remained the same up to the time of the interview. However, the other two made highly significant comments which help explain the growing MRL interest and effort in seeking a reunification with the Oficialistas. One said that the major current issue was to support the government in its policies "which are nationalistic and positive," while the other contended that the MRL lacked a major issue and even a *raison d'etre*. "Lleras took over all our themes, so we're in abeyance," he admitted.

In contrast to the Liberals, a large portion of Unionistas regarded the most important issue in the last election campaign as that of preserving the peace of the nation against the revival of the violencia, although, in general, they likewise referred to support for

the FTN (but mainly as the best way to achieve the goal of peace). DM leaders placed the question of peace above the need for socio-economic reforms, though they also gave stress to the importance of these programs. Also mentioned was the need to support the principle of alternation and parity, in the light of their benefits to the Conservative party. DM leaders thought the principal current issue to be an effective confrontation of Colombia's generally unfavorable economic situation through a more vigorous application of the FTN programs.

Their DD counterparts, in general, claimed that the most important issue in the past electoral campaign was the degree of support to give to the FTN and candidate Lleras, with the goals of bringing about the economic advancement of the masses and a greater strengthening of peace in Colombia. The DD accent on peace was somewhat less than that of the DM. The most important current matters were considered to be the collaboration with the government to carry out the FTN programs, and to an increasingly important degree, to make certain that the Liberal party would honor the principle of alternation so that a Conservative would take over the presidency in 1970, ideally with a reunified Conservative party to give full strength and support to the candidate. Clearly, Conservative suspicions of Liberal intentions indicated some unsteadiness in the Frente Nacional.

Independientes, in contrast, were almost united in proclaiming that the main issue in the past election campaign was the imposition of the candidacy of Lleras without consulting Conservatives, in violation

of the Frente Nacional. With regard to the present, much importance was given to the question of uniting the party before the next election and giving full support to a commonly accepted candidate. Many references were also made to the question of whether or not to give President Lleras and his programs support. Many Independientes seemed to fear that their implacable opposition to Lleras could result in another electoral defeat if his program won him strong popular support.

Similar to the Independientes, Anapistas claimed that the major issue in the last campaign was opposition to the Frente Nacional, although the former singled out presidential candidate Lleras for attack, whereas Anapo condemned the system itself. Independientes, in general, left the impression that their opposition was not so much to the system and was not implacable, but that they did not believe that the Unionistas were representing the Conservative party well in the coalition. (Some sour grapes seemed to have been involved. The Independientes, apparently, have never reconciled themselves to their minority status within the Conservative party after their ex-leader Laureano Gómez had represented the Conservatives in the founding of the Frente Nacional, only to lose this representation to Mariano Ospina Pérez and the predecessors of today's Unionistas two years later.)

On the other hand, Anapo's opposition to the Frente Nacional went considerably further, with comments that it was a "fraud" upon the masses on the part of the oligarchy, and that it was "completely out of tune with the needs of the masses." Hence, in the case of Anapo, opposition featured a class-based orientation, whereas this was not so for the Independientes, at least not on the surface. Most

Anapistas agreed that the principal issue at present was exposing the FTN to the masses as something that would not "transform" their situation.

The 1966 elections turned out favorably for some of the factions and unfavorably for others, as we have already seen. And to a great extent, the leaders' conception of their respective faction's change in electoral strength was in harmony with the actual voting change (Table 32). However, there were notable instances when factors other than pure voting figures induced responses which had more complex explanations. In conformity with the Oficialista Liberal majority in Cali and Valle, and with the decline of the MRL in the previous election, all but one DM leader affirmed that the voting strength of his faction had become more favorable (the lone dissenter claiming that no change had occurred in this strength).

In explaining this favorable turn, most claimed that the renovation of the Frente Nacional by Lleras Restrepo, renaming the coalition the FTN, had aided Oficialista fortunes because the masses had become convinced that they would now benefit from the coalition's programs. One leader, however, approached the question from a negative standpoint, contending that the Oficialistas benefited due to the "disenchantment of those who were previously our opponents and were with the MRL." Another leader frankly remarked that it was "difficult to say" why the situation had become more favorable for his group.

The DD, which was uniformly of the opinion that Oficialista electoral strength had increased, placed great stress on the importance of giving a new impetus to the coalition behind the leadership of

TABLE 32
CHANGE IN ELECTORAL STRENGTH*

| | | Increased | Decreased | Unchanged |
|----------------|----|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| | DD | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Revitalización | | - | - | - |
| MRL | | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 11 | 1 | 0 |
| | DD | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Independientes | | 0 | 8 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 8 | 0 | 1 |

* N = 103, n = 60. The newly created Revitalización movement had competed in only one election, 1966.

candidate Lleras, further accenting socio-economic programs, and, thus, winning greater support from the masses. Whereas Unionistas who claimed a more favorable turn for their group gave participation in the FTN as the major explanation, Oficialistas appeared somewhat more sectarian in attributing their improved status to the actions of their own group, and specifically Lleras, in modernizing the FN (converting it into the FTN), by giving better orientation to its programs. One leader linked the electoral gains to a recently improved relationship with the group's followers, especially in getting them jobs and giving them aid. As was the case for the DM, one DD member referred to the negative side, asserting that Oficialista successes had been due to "the disorganization of the opposition and a public belief that the opposition leaders would not fulfill their promises . . ." There were no results for the Revitalización movement, of course, since the 1966 election was its maiden electoral effort.

The MRL provided the major example of responses which were not in harmony with actual voting figures. In spite of its great decline at the polls, three MRL leaders contended that the situation had become more favorable for the MRL, even in an electoral sense, because President Lleras had incorporated major MRL programs into the FTN. Hence, the result was that the movement's programs had been adopted if not the movement's leaders themselves. They argued that the constant impulse given to these programs by the MRL had created a pressure which compelled the government to act favorably. Had a leftist faction of the Liberal party not been in existence to apply such pressure to the Liberal mainstream, the reforms, in the opinion of the MRL leaders,

would still have been awaiting their adoption. Thus Lleras' programs represented a success for the MRL, since having its programs adopted was the group's major goal.

Whether this was pure rationalization or a genuine belief, the MRL had seriously begun to debate its own dissolution on the alleged basis of its having served its purpose. Nonetheless, one finds it difficult to believe that its sharp voting decline, rather than the adoption of its programs, was not the major reason for the growing defection of MRL leaders. Significantly, however, this support for the FTN indicates that the MRL mainstream (the línea blanda) did not have the extreme leftist orientation depicted by some Conservatives and even some Liberals (which will be discussed later). Of the four MRL leaders who admitted that the movement's situation had become less favorable as the result of the past elections, three claimed that personal ambitions on the part of some MRL leaders were the major cause of this decline, producing a somewhat anarchical situation with the consequence that the group was unable to make a united effort.

Again, a comparison between the MRL and the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal may be in order. The former, apparently, had been losing its reformist zeal, and this growing stagnation was opening the door to the corrupting effects of a disproportionate degree of personal ambition as opposed to the overall welfare of the movement. The latter, having been in existence for three years rather than close to a decade, had not yet lost its zeal; no Revitalización leader asserted that Lleras had changed things to such a degree that the faction's *raison d'être* had

terminated. A secondary reason given by the MRL leaders who claimed that their group's fortunes had declined was that the MRL's lack of access to the most important propaganda media, plus the opposition's distortion of the MRL position, calling it extreme leftist, had taken their toll.

On the Conservative side, all but one of the Unionista DM leaders declared that the change in voting support for their faction had been favorable, many offering participation in the FTN as the major explanation for this gain. However, this comment was usually accompanied by the qualifier that FTN programs were in harmony with the best traditions of Conservative ideology and, hence, represented no sacrifice of principles. In fact, some claimed that the powerful role given the president and the increased state intervention in private affairs were actually more in tune with Conservative than Liberal ideology and, hence, represented an ideological gain for Conservatives (a point to be discussed at length later). The strong personalistic role of the president within the FTN framework was evidenced by two responses to the effect that Unionista gains were due to support for Lleras and "his" FTN programs. Again, minority opinion was advanced that Unionista gains were due not so much to the positive qualities of their programs or those of the FTN, but, rather, to a negative reaction to the Independientes. Another response attributed Unionista gains to the fact that they were scheduled to have the presidency in 1970. The one leader who claimed that the electoral position of the group had become less favorable referred to the bad economic situation as the reason for Unionista losses vis-à-vis Anapo.

Unionistas' DD opinion conflicted with that of the DM in that the majority considered Unionismo's electoral strength to have decreased. Those who claimed an unfavorable electoral change alluded to a different factor in each case. One mentioned the fact that the Unionistas had been compelled to support the candidacy of a Liberal for president, which left a bad aftertaste among Conservative voters; two others noted internal divisions within the Conservative party as a whole, one accentuating their ideological causes while the other stressed personalistic causes; and the fourth referred to the unfavorable economic situation of the country. The three who contended that the change had been favorable mentioned the determined Unionista support for the Frente Nacional as the main explanation for the faction's gains, declaring that the Unionistas were thus able to take some credit for the FTN. One added that Unionista fortunes were also aided by the fact that they were to have the presidency in 1970. These conflicting opinions regarding changes in the electoral strength of the Unionistas could, perhaps, be explained by the fact that their gain was one relative to Independientes, whose loss of electoral support nationally represented a negative gain for the Unionistas, their principal rivals for the Conservative banner (given the steady withdrawal of Anapo from Conservatismo).

On the other hand, the Independientes' conception of an unfavorable change in their voting strength was based on election results vis-à-vis both Anapo and the Unionistas. (They had been reduced from the role of

partner in a reunification with the Ospinistas in 1964 to the role of weakest of the three Conservative factions in 1966.) To explain this unfavorable change, most leaders referred to the negative character of the Independiente campaign and its lack of positive alternatives to the FTN they were opposing, due to poor organization. Others, however, claimed that their campaign did have positive qualities, but they were not effectively presented to the voters because of a mainly unfavorable press and the relative dearth of campaign funds in comparison with the Unionista and Liberal opposition. Specifically, one Independiente alluded to the "intervention by the great economic forces of the country which put at the disposal of our opponents in the political contest their great economic and financial capabilities" as the factor which convinced voters to "stick with the forces representing power and money rather than with those of us who sustain the need to make a change in the orientation of the country." Such a position was indicative of an interesting phenomenon. Many Unionistas, Independientes, and Oficialistas alike often referred to the leadership of the main opposition as oligarchical-controlled and status quo-oriented, while they spoke of themselves as forward looking.

Anapista leaders, for their part, saw Anapo gains as the result of a discontentment with the Frente Nacional due to its lack of accomplishments and a corresponding lack of progress for the masses. They also believed that Anapo was more in harmony with the interests of the clase popular and would strive to promote the welfare of the masses. The comment by one Anapista that "We offered advanced social programs to correct the great defects of the Frente Nacional" more or less sums up

the general response. One leader compared the unfavorable economic situation at the current time with the relatively better situation under Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship, claiming that memories of this were beneficial to Anapismo.

During the past electoral campaign, all of the factions were dependent on campaign aid from non-hierarchical leaders, from lower level gladiators. As the figures in Table 33 illustrate, campaign aid from non-hierarchical leaders was fairly evenly distributed among the four activities included rather than concentrated in a specific activity. However, the assistance of sub-hierarchical activists in the areas of direct contact with known followers of the overall party or faction and distribution of written and spoken propaganda were of relatively greater importance than aid in transporting followers to the polls and aid with social functions on behalf of the faction to attract more voters. Variation among the factions did occur with regard to the declared length of the election campaign, and highly conflicting declarations could even be found in the responses of the leaders of a particular directorate. This was true because no fixed durations are set for election campaigns in Colombia. With the termination of one election, factions, to varying degrees, begin preparations for the succeeding election, two years hence. Thus, a leader could sometimes only estimate as to when his faction's campaign actually began.

The figure for Anapo was indicative of the group's zeal in comparison with its competitors. An average of Anapista responses shows Anapo's campaign to have begun 19.2 months prior to the past election, seven months earlier than that of any other faction. On the other hand,

TABLE 33
CAMPAIGN AID FROM NON-HIERARCHICAL LEADERS*

| | | None | DC | SF | T | DP | % | Length (Months)** |
|----------------|----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-------------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 22 | 63 | 8.7 |
| | DD | 0 | 38 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 53 | 12.0 |
| Revitalización | | 15 | 23 | 19 | 24 | 26 | 39 | 10.7 |
| MRL | | 5 | 23 | 14 | 17 | 18 | 61 | 4.7 |
| Unionistas | DM | 0 | 34 | 32 | 27 | 28 | 42 | 7.9 |
| | DD | 0 | 22 | 15 | 19 | 22 | 54 | 9.3 |
| Independientes | | 5 | 26 | 24 | 19 | 26 | 44 | 12.4 |
| Anapo | | 0 | 27 | 23 | 33 | 36 | 61 | 19.2 |
| Overall* | | 25 | 211 | 172 | 186 | 206 | 52 | 10.6 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

**The last two figures in the overall column are averages rather than totals. DC stands for direct contact; SF stands for social functions; T stands for transportation; DP stands for distribution of propaganda; % stands for the percentage of the total campaign that such aid was given; length stands for the duration in months, of the campaign. The remaining figures are derived from the scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8.

the MRL campaign would have begun only 4.7 months prior to the election, judging by the responses of the MRL leaders. Corresponding figures showed the DD campaign efforts to have commenced somewhat earlier than the DM efforts. The Independientes, apparently, got off to an early start in spite of their unfavorable results. Overall figures manifest that on the average, campaign aid from non-hierarchical leaders was extended during half the duration of the campaign, ranging from 39 per cent for the Revitalización movement to 63 per cent for the Oficialista DM. Indeed, Revitalización leaders remarked that aid received from sub-hierarchical activists was small due to the movement's recent creation and its inability to develop a chain of activists outside of the official hierarchy in such a short time.

Similarly, the pattern for the different factions was fairly uniform with regard to general targets of communication among the electorate during the campaign (Table 34). Most important for the directorates was to direct their propaganda toward the groups which had supported their faction or overall party previously. (Again, the Revitalización movement's recent creation obviated the possibility of their inclusion on this point.) However, of nearly equal importance for the overall sample was the goal of increasing the total vote (due to the high abstention rate in recent elections). Of considerably less importance was the directing of propaganda toward groups which had not previously backed their faction. And registering new voters was last in priority, perhaps since most adults have already obtained their cédulas.

TABLE 34
 COMMUNICATION AIMED AT THE ELECTORATE*

| | S | Non-S | IV | IR** |
|-----------------|-----|-------|-----|------|
| Oficialistas DM | 17 | 12 | 19 | 9 |
| Oficialistas DD | 28 | 18 | 29 | 15 |
| Revitalización | - | - | - | - |
| MRL | 20 | 5 | 11 | 7 |
| Unionistas DM | 28 | 21 | 33 | 23 |
| Unionistas DD | 22 | 17 | 20 | 9 |
| Independientes | 28 | 9 | 26 | 8 |
| Anapo | 26 | 23 | 26 | 12 |
| Overall | 169 | 105 | 164 | 83 |

* N = 103, n = 71

**S stands for supporters; Non-S stands for non-supporters; IV stands for increasing the total vote; IR stands for increasing the registration of voters. The scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8 was used.

This pattern presents an important insight into the apparent mechanics of the factions. Many leaders observed that it was, indeed, more important to increase the overall vote than to direct efforts at non-supporters due to the fact that a large percentage of moral supporters had been abstaining from voting. Conservatives, who depend greatly on the rural vote, voiced particular concern over the high rate of abstention among campesinos, claiming that they would have been the majority party if rural non-voting had not exceeded the urban rate. Anapo leaders declared that their strategy was to concentrate their efforts on the lower-class sectors of the electorate, while, at the same time, splitting the Conservative and Liberal parties in two by divorcing their lower-class supporters from the "oligarchies" in control of the mainstreams of the two parties.

CHAPTER VIII

HIERARCHICAL LINKS WITH KEY INDIVIDUALS IN CALI POLITICS

Beyond the abstract categories of supporters and non-supporters of a party or faction, an attempt was made to determine the existence of key individuals in Cali politics, the association of such key individuals with particular interest groups, and the links between the hierarchical leaders and the key individuals. Accordingly, the overall sample was asked whether they believed that one or two key individuals, or perhaps a small group, had considerable influence in the political life of the Cali area, and, if so, whether these key individuals were leaders of labor unions, business organizations, agricultural interests, the Church, the military, or the press. If the presence of key individuals was declared, but they could not be associated with any of the above interests, the hierarchical leader was asked why he considered the individual to be important. Finally, he was asked whether he had approached the key individual during the past election campaign to seek aid in his own political activities.

Ninety-two per cent of the overall sample expressed their belief that a few key individuals had considerable influence in the politics of Cali (Table 35); and 77 per cent of this group proclaimed that these individuals were associated with at least one of the groups listed (Table 36). However, only 40 per cent admitted that they had

TABLE 35

BELIEF IN INFLUENCE OF KEY INDIVIDUALS IN CALI POLITICS*

| | Yes | No |
|------------------|-----|----|
| Officialistas DM | 6 | 0 |
| DD | 9 | 1 |
| Revitalización | 9 | 2 |
| MRL | 7 | 0 |
| Unionistas DM | 11 | 1 |
| DD | 6 | 1 |
| Independientes | 9 | 0 |
| Anapo | 8 | 1 |
| Overall | 65 | 6 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

TABLE 36
 ASSOCIATION OF KEY INDIVIDUALS WITH OTHER GROUPS*

| | | Yes | No | Lab | Bus | Land | Chch | Mil | Prs** |
|----------------|----|-----|----|-----|-----|------|------|-----|-------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| | DD | 5 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 17 | 1 | 20 |
| Revitalización | | 7 | 2 | 14 | 9 | 21 | 12 | 5 | 23 |
| MRL | | 7 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 15 | 10 | 8 | 21 |
| Unionistas | DM | 10 | 1 | 21 | 30 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 36 |
| | DD | 4 | 2 | 13 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 0 | 6 |
| Independientes | | 8 | 1 | 13 | 15 | 27 | 16 | 1 | 36 |
| Anapo | | 7 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 34 | 13 | 30 |
| Overall | | 50 | 15 | 87 | 100 | 111 | 110 | 28 | 178 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

**The yes and no figures are the actual frequency, whereas the group association figures are based on the scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8.

sought aid from these key individuals during the past election (Table 37). Significantly, the key individuals were considered to be more closely associated with the press than with any of the other groups. However, only four of the eight samples actually placed the key individual-press association in first place. Business leaders were ranked first in two cases, and Church leaders were ranked first in the remaining two cases. Furthermore, there were no clear patterns to distinguish one faction or one party from another. For example, Unionista DM leaders made absolutely no association between key individuals and the Church, whereas their DD counterparts found the Church to be the group most closely linked to the key individuals. Similarly, the press, business, labor, and landowners were ranked very high by some of the factions and very low by others. Only with regard to the military was there an overall consensus. (The fact that virtually no association was made between key individuals and military leaders manifests the peculiar situation of the military in Colombia. Its fairly consistent non-involvement in politics seems to explain the responses of the sample.)

The lack of uniform responses for the different factions suggests that no faction was so closely attached to a particular interest group or coalition of interest groups within one segment of society, that all of its hierarchical leaders would have a similar conception as to who were the key individuals in the political life of Cali, and what were the major interest groups with which they were associated. Apparently, each response was personal and intuitive, a phenomenon which

TABLE 37
 ASSOCIATION OF HIERARCHICAL LEADERS
 WITH KEY INDIVIDUALS*

| | | Yes | No | Non-Applicable** |
|----------------|----|-----|----|------------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| | DD | 3 | 6 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 1 | 8 | 2 |
| MRL: | | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 5 | 6 | 1 |
| | DD | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 6 | 3 | 0 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 6 | 1 |
| Overall | | 26 | 39 | 6 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

**The Non-Applicables were those who rejected the key individuals theory.

would indicate that each of the groups offered as alternatives, with the exception of the military, had some important influence upon Caleño politics, but not to the extent that it completely overshadowed the influence of the remaining groups. Significantly, the three factions which most vociferously stressed their ties to the masses and opposition to the oligarchy, Anapo, Revitalización, and MRL, showed themselves to have the weakest association with key individuals. Only 21 per cent of those three samples admitted any association with key individuals, as opposed to a combined 51 per cent for the remaining five samples.

The lack of a consensus as to key individuals and, indirectly, politically predominant interest groups may find some explanation in Dix's comments regarding the "ineffectiveness of the parties as aggregators of group interests." He observes that "Despite substantial overlap between officers of organized groups and the leadership of the parties, there is little effort to accommodate and adjust within the framework of the parties the claims on the political system of the various interest associations." A highly important effect of this situation is that "interest groups turn directly to government with claims unprocessed through the filter of the parties."¹

This apparent inability of the political parties in Colombia to serve as effective aggregators of disparate interest group claims and demands may have dysfunctional consequences for the Colombian political system. With no intermediate "gatekeepers" between the interest groups and the decision-makers in government, each overall interest

group becomes its own gatekeeper; and, as David Easton warns, "Where the gatekeepers are widely distributed . . . there will be greater danger of input overload . . ." ² Such an overflow of claims and demands upon the decision-makers, in turn, could gravely impair their ability to provide the minimum output essential to political stability. Perhaps the growing strength of Anapo is the result of such a dysfunctional input-output process.

In spite of the lack of consensus among the hierarchical leaders to enable us to pinpoint key individuals and interest groups in Cali politics, an elite control of the Cauca Valley does seem apparent, although, as the author has asserted, this elite does not appear to be homogeneous. Cole Blasier observes that "Political power is still concentrated in the hands of agricultural and industrial property owners," and adds that some belief existed that a half-dozen men were running the region. He lists the following as "strong leaders": a leading industrial figure, Manuel Carvajal; the head of the CVC (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca, a type of TVA), Bernardo Garcés; the editors of El País and Occidente; the Governor; the Bishop; and top sugar producers. ³ It may be of some significance that none of these positions correspond to labor or the military, the two groups with the lowest scores in Table 36; whereas the top scoring groups, press, landowners, church, and business, are all represented in Blasier's list of strong leaders.

However, many of the hierarchical leaders claimed that the politically influential elite, the key individuals, were not linked

to the interest groups. Fifteen of the 65 leaders who believed the key individuals did, indeed, exist contended that the various local and regional party caudillos were the "individuos claves," and that these individuals were powerful in their own right due to their caudillo position vis-à-vis their political groups; and that any interest group connections they might have had beyond this point were irrelevant. Obviously, these elements were not united in a particular interest group with interactions directed toward determined goals. Furthermore, the control exercised by the caudillos would seemingly be of a highly political, rather than economical, nature; and economic power would not be a factor explaining this political predominance.

The Cauca Valley has been a highly important agricultural area for centuries. Prior to the present century, huge cattle latifundia dominated the area, and the owners ran their great estates from Popayán, a then important city south of Valle, in patriarchal fashion.⁴ However, a steady shift to farming began in the twentieth century, with sugar cane, cacao, and tobacco standing out in importance. Nonetheless, the food production has not sufficed to provide a good diet for all, and hunger and malnutrition have affected many of Valle's inhabitants. Blasier notes that this situation has been "largely responsible for peasant resentment of the ruling groups and the peasants' alienation from the existing political and social system." The problem, he adds, is compounded by the fact that much of the land has been "worked inefficiently or little at all. The land is held for speculative purposes, often operated at a loss, the major source of income being

capital gains on sales, which have seldom been taxed. The owners are able to maintain the living standards to which they are accustomed by following the traditional antiquated management methods." Eighty per cent of the land was held in large plots, 20 per cent in small mini-fundia--less than ten hectares--and only 2 per cent in medium size properties.⁵

Blasier further observes that a 1961 land reform law "was passed by a government dominated by large agricultural and industrial interests," and that the Colombian Institute of Land Reform (INCORA) was established to put the law into effect. However, it was following the wishes of large agricultural interests and had been giving greater emphasis to the colonization of new lands. The landed interests, according to Blasier, "have fought the land reform legislation tooth and nail."⁶ The Independientes have commonly been considered the staunchest defenders of the large landowners, and one observer has stressed their opposition to the application of agrarian reform on the basis that it would destroy large property used for cattle raising.⁷ On the other hand, the peasantry remains unorganized, except for the sugar workers, who "resemble industrial labor more than peasants."⁸

Recently, industry has taken its place alongside agriculture in importance in the Cauca Valley. Blasier notes the great growth and industrial development of Cali in the past two decades, referring to it as "the most rapidly developing urban and industrial center in Colombia." However, he contends that "Despite rapid industrialization and . . . social developments . . . political power in the Valley is

still closely tied to agricultural interests. In the first place, much of the new industry is owned and controlled by outsiders, that is, persons who are less likely and less able to participate in the local political process.⁹ Indeed, U.S. ownership has been quite predominant. Pat M. Holt observes that there are more than 100 U.S. business firms in Cali.¹⁰ Blasier comments that:

Some strong evidence on the national scene in support of what might be termed industry's under-representation in politics may be found in comparing the tax burdens of the agricultural and industrial sectors. According to an analysis of taxes paid in 1959, the industrial sector paid 37 per cent of direct taxes, and agriculture paid only 14 per cent even though the contributions to the net private product were almost reversed with industry contributing about 11 per cent, and agriculture 42 per cent.¹¹

Labor has also begun to emerge as a force in recent years. Trade unionism made its first major advances under the first López administration (1934-38), when the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) was organized. Controlled by Communists and anarcho-syndicalist groups, its growth was rapid. With López's resignation from his second presidential term in 1945, organized labor found its most powerful spokesman in the figure of Gaitán. With the latter's assassination in 1948, the unions became more divided and have lacked a common spokesman. Blasier observes that:

The labor movement in the Valley . . . has had only limited political impact. In recent years the largest and most influential unions have not sought radical changes in the social structure but have concentrated their efforts on collective bargaining and organization. These efforts have achieved success because the earnings and working conditions of organized labor in the Valley have improved materially in recent years and most managers have been forced to keep alert and responsive to their employees' demands.¹²

The labor split in Valle has, apparently, weakened the potential strength of the labor movement. The major unions in Valle are: (1) UTRAVAL (Unión de Trabajadores del Valle), which is affiliated with the Church-oriented Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC). Its position has been progressive Catholic, but opponents have criticized it for being too conservative and too greatly dominated by the employers. It has 65 affiliated unions and claims to have 70,000 members in Valle department (a claim Holt considered inflated);¹³ (2) FESTRALVA (Federación de Sindicatos Democráticos del Valle), a left-of-center group established in 1961 by the CTC.⁴ It is more radical and militant than UTRAVAL, but remains strongly anti-Communist. FESTRALVA was founded after the CTC ousted its former Valle affiliate on the grounds of Communist infiltration, and the new federation immediately embarked on a campaign to recapture unions from Communist control. Its total membership is 108,000. Both the CTC and UTC are members of the AFL-CIO-affiliated ORIT (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores); (3) FEDETRAV (Federación de Trabajadores del Valle), the union expelled in 1961 by the CTC. It claims some 40,000 members and is Communist-infiltrated. It is more radical than UTRAVAL or FESTRALVA; (4) Federación de Sindicatos Libres, a gathering of seventeen of Colombia's most militantly radical unions. Its leaders have expressed solidarity with Fidel Castro and have attacked U.S. "imperialism."¹⁴ Holt notes that labor militancy is associated with the high degree of unemployment in Cali, which he had estimated to be perhaps as high as 50 per cent of the labor force. In 1963, the Municipal Planning Office

estimated unemployment to be 35 per cent of the total labor force.¹⁵ However, it would appear that such inordinately high figures must also include underemployment.

The political influence of the press, considered great by the hierarchical leaders, has, perhaps, been enhanced by the close association between many newspapers and particular factions. (Radio stations, too, are in many cases affiliated with political groups.) It has already been mentioned that El País and Occidente are self-proclaimed organs of the Unionistas and Independientes respectively. And the tiny, uninfluential El Crisol openly declares its services in behalf of the Oficialistas. Nor is this phenomenon peculiar to the Cauca Valley. In Bogotá, for example, the three major newspapers, El Tiempo, El Espectador, and El Siglo, are respectively affiliated with the Liberal party, in the first two cases, and the Independientes. Moreover, the fact that the publishers of El País and Occidente were both currently senators and top national leaders for their respective factions further accents the very intimate relationship between the daily newspapers and the political groups.

The influence of the Catholic Church also must not be gainsaid. Colombia is commonly considered as the most Catholic country in Latin America and second only to Spain on the world scene. Blasier comments that:

The Church is influential not so much because of overt political activities, which are little or nil, but because it is one organization which reaches deeply into all sectors of society in the Valle. Politicians and businessmen, to take two examples, hesitate to take openly anti-clerical positions, not, perhaps, because of specific sanctions imposed by the clergy itself, but because of a variety of social and other penalties imposed for failure to conform.¹⁶

It is during a time of crisis that the Church's political influence becomes apparent. Holt observes that immediately after the Bogotazo of 1948, "Segments of the Catholic clergy, who had long disliked Liberals, took advantage of the situation to discriminate against Colombian Catholics who had Liberal views. In some parishes a Liberal could not have a Church wedding or--what he was more likely to need--a Church funeral. High Church officials publicly disapproved of these actions, but to little avail." Referring to the repressive measures of the Ospina Pérez government as the 1950 elections approached, Holt notes that "In some areas, individuals needed a pass from the local priest to move freely, and few Liberals, it is said, got passes."¹⁷ The Church continues to bear the label of pro-Conservative.

In contrast, the political role of the Colombian military appears to be small. Contrary to the situation in many Latin American countries, the trend in Colombia has been steadily away from military preponderance. From Bolívar to the administration of Obaldía (1854-55), of thirteen chief executives only one was not a general. However, two-thirds of the eighteen presidents in office during the remainder of the century were civilians. Burnett observes that the Colombian military has been politically neutral and has obeyed the dictates of its commander-in-chief, the president. "The president has usually refrained from abusing this neutrality and refused to employ the military as his partisan coercive arm."¹⁸

However, Ospina Pérez did violate this implicit code in the 1949 presidential campaign in order to promote the candidacy of Laureano

Gómez. He allegedly ordered the armed forces to confiscate the cédulas of Liberals in rural areas; and when the Liberal-controlled congress initiated impeachment proceedings against him, Ospina used the army to forcibly dissolve it. Rojas Pinilla's supplantment of the Gómez government was the first time in eighty-seven years that the military had undertaken such an action. However, civilians generally favored this move as necessary in view of the violencia.¹⁹ One imponderable has been the influence which Rojas Pinilla, and through him Anapo, still has over sectors of the Colombian army. Some of the Anapo hierarchical leaders broadly implied and even declared that Anapo has considerable support among some elements of the armed forces, and that the movement considers the support to be of some importance, though this was left vague. One Anapo leader claimed that next to the lower-class masses in general, the group's main support comes from the military.

Notes

¹Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 329.

²David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 90.

³Cole Blasier, "Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca Valley," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VIII (July, 1966), 409.

⁴Ben G. Burnett, "The Recent Colombian Party System: Its Organization and Procedures" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955), p. 109.

⁵Blasier, op. cit., pp. 388-391.

⁶ibid.

⁷Elkim Mesa, "Té - Político," El País, December 14, 1966, p. 5.

⁸Blasier, op. cit., pp. 393-394.

⁹ibid., pp. 395-398.

¹⁰Pat M. Holt, Colombia Today--And Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 171.

¹¹Blasier, op. cit., pp. 397-398.

¹²ibid.

¹³Holt, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

¹⁴ibid., pp. 170-171.

¹⁵ibid., p. 166.

¹⁶Blasier, op. cit., p. 406.

¹⁷Holt, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁸Burnett, op. cit., pp. 164-166.

¹⁹ibid.

CHAPTER IX

IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION AND MOTIVATION OF LEADERS

In this chapter we are especially concerned with the saliency of ideology; that is, "the extent to which [party leaders] think in terms of party ideology, and the importance they attach to attitude differences in political perceptions."¹ The hierarchical leaders manifested themselves to be highly ideologically oriented and motivated. It will be recalled from Chapter V that ideological reasons were given as the overwhelming factor producing an initial interest in politics on the part of the leader (Table 8), and that they were also given as the overwhelming factor leading to actual political recruitment (Table 9). However, the self-proclaimed attraction of ideology continues beyond this point and maintains its strong influence over the earlier recruit after he has attained a position as a formal hierarchical leader. Indeed, the ideological mystique of the Liberal and Conservative parties, which will be considered in detail in Chapters X and XI, appears to form an integral part of their overall weltanschauung.

When asked which aspect of their role as political leader they considered of greater importance, to preserve the ideology and doctrines of their overall party or to do everything possible to augment the vote of their faction, 76 per cent of the overall sample chose the first alternative (Table 38). However, some notable differences among the

TABLE 38
 PRESERVING IDEOLOGY VS. AUGMENTING VOTE*

| | | Preserve Ideology | Augment Vote |
|----------------|----|-------------------|--------------|
| Officialistas | DM | 5 | 1 |
| | DD | 9 | 1 |
| Revitalización | | 6 | 5 |
| MRL | | 7 | 0 |
| Unionistas | DM | 9 | 3 |
| | DD | 6 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 5 | 3 |
| Anapo | | 6 | 3 |
| Overall | | 53 | 17 |

*N = 103, n = 70. One Independiente was unable to choose between the two alternatives.

factions resulted. As opposed to 88 per cent of the Oficialistas on the side of ideology, only 55 per cent of the Revitalización leaders chose the preservation of ideology over an increase in factional vote, in spite of the Revitalización motto that it aimed to achieve an ideological renovation and revitalization of the overall Liberal party. Thus, it appears that the Revitalización movement may be less ideologically inclined than its propaganda would indicate. However, as political outs, they, pragmatically, might be more concerned with augmenting their vote total, while the political ins, the Oficialistas, would like to think of themselves as being true to the Liberal mystique above all. Significantly, the MRL leaders manifested themselves as true party ideologues by unanimously opting to preserve party ideology, in spite of their sharply declining vote total.

Similarly, the Unionistas were strongly on the side of preserving party ideology (79 per cent), while the Independientes and Anapo revealed a greater split between the two alternatives (63 and 67 per cent respectively). The Independientes, with perhaps an even greater stress on ideology than the Revitalización leaders, had condemned the Unionistas for having abandoned the Conservative mystique. Nonetheless, their declining vote fortunes had weakened even their ideological armor. Anapo, of course, is not a true heir of the Conservative mystique and, itself, fails to have more than an inchoate ideology. In summary, however, the fact remains that each sample gave greater weight to preserving party ideology than to augmenting factional vote.

In like manner, ideological satisfaction easily ranked first among the satisfactions and benefits received by the factional leaders (Table 39). This held true for each of the eight samples, which again manifests the universality of ideological orientation. Second among satisfactions and benefits was political advancement in the group's organizational hierarchy sooner or later. Such an imagined benefit has been illusory, as the author illustrated in Chapter V, in view of the low longevity of hierarchical leaders. Nonetheless, three-fourths of the leaders expressed the desire to advance in the hierarchy, as illustrated in the same chapter (Table 19). Significantly, political advancement as a candidate for legislative office sooner or later ranked third among satisfactions and benefits. This further accents the inter-relationship between the hierarchical role and the legislative role. Implicitly, a legislative role was viewed by many as a reward for services in the party organization.

Below this level, prestige ranked fourth among the alternatives, an indication that many leaders considered their hierarchical role to enhance their overall image. Sense of power ranked fifth, but only among the Revitalización leaders did it figure as a major satisfaction. The founding of the movement by young lawyers disgruntled with old guard control of the Oficialistas may explain such a conscious desire for power. Social advancement ranked a weak sixth, which suggests that prestige does not translate into either upward mobility on the social scale or an enhancement of one's overall social life. Of great importance is the fact that only one leader codified economic advancement as a satisfaction or benefit derived from the role of hierarchical

TABLE 39

SATISFACTIONS AND BENEFITS RECEIVED AS PARTY LEADER*

| | Liberals | | | | Total | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|----|----------------|-------|-------|---------|
| | Oficialistas DM | DD | Revitalización | MRL | | |
| Prestige | 0 | 31 | 20 | 7 | 58 | |
| Social Advancement | 7 | 21 | 0 | 16 | 44 | |
| Economic Advancement | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Advancement as a Candidate | 16 | 26 | 25 | 19 | 86 | |
| Advancement in Hierarchy | 15 | 36 | 39 | 19 | 109 | |
| Sense of Power | 0 | 7 | 39 | 0 | 46 | |
| Ideological Satisfaction | 29 | 46 | 63 | 54 | 192 | |
| None | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 24 | |
| | Conservatives | | | | Total | Overall |
| | Unionistas DM | DD | Indep. | Anapo | | |
| Prestige | 49 | 16 | 11 | 19 | 95 | 153 |
| Social Advancement | 6 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 19 | 63 |
| Economic Advancement | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Advancement as a Candidate | 30 | 12 | 42 | 27 | 111 | 197 |
| Advancement in Hierarchy | 54 | 30 | 35 | 39 | 158 | 267 |
| Sense of Power | 14 | 7 | 12 | 13 | 46 | 92 |
| Ideological Satisfaction | 72 | 42 | 58 | 70 | 242 | 434 |
| None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

leader. Indeed, this is explained by the lack of material compensation for this role. Only three leaders found no satisfactions or benefits at all in their role as party leader.

The strength of the ideological mystique was further revealed when the leaders were asked to choose which among four aspects of their overall political role they would most miss if they were compelled to leave politics (Table 40). Eighty-nine per cent of the responses were the opportunity to work for ideological ideals; 10 per cent pointed to the role of leader; and 1 per cent placed top value on social benefits. Nobody attached prime importance to economic benefits. Again, one must infer that the social and economic benefits accrued through the role of organizational leader are, at most, very limited. Similar to the results of Table 38, the self-proclaimed ideological purists, the Revitalización movement and the Independientes, manifested the greatest percentage of deviant responses from the norm of upholding ideology above all.

The substitution of obligation to the community for ideological inclinations (Table 41) produced results which suggest that the hierarchical leaders are, roughly, as consciously motivated by an obligation to the community as they are by an obligation to uphold party ideology; or at least they are as anxious to give that impression in both cases. If these are genuine motivations, one might infer that ideology is interpreted by the leaders in the active, dynamic sense: the application of party programs to the problems of the community at large. However, obligation to the community connotes a

TABLE 40

ASPECT OF POLITICAL ROLE WHICH WOULD BE MOST MISSED*

| | Oficialistas | | Liberals | | MRL | Total |
|---|--------------|----|----------------|-------|-------|---------|
| | DM | DD | Revitalización | | | |
| Social Benefits | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 |
| Economic Benefits | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 |
| Role of Leader | 0 | 0 | 3 | | 0 | 3 |
| Opportunity to Work for Ideological Ideals | 6 | 10 | 8 | | 7 | 31 |
| | Unionistas | | Conservatives | | Total | Overall |
| | DM | DD | Indep. | Anapo | | |
| Social Benefits | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Economic Benefits | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Role of Leader | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| Opportunity to Work for Ideological Ideals | 11 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 31 | 62 |

* N = 103, n = 70.

TABLE 41

REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN HIERARCHICAL LEADERSHIP*

| | Liberals | | | | Total | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----|--------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| | Oficialistas | | Revitalización MRL | Total | | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Traditional Ties with Party | 24 | 22 | 26 | 15 | 87 | |
| Family Reasons | 3 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 13 | |
| Business Contacts | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| Work is Good and Respectable | 5 | 5 | 19 | 4 | 33 | |
| Obligation to Community | 32 | 58 | 46 | 42 | 178 | |
| Serves as Bridge to Higher Post | 4 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 16 | |
| | Conservatives | | | | Overall | |
| | Unionistas | | Indep. | Anapo | | Total |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Traditional Ties with Party | 47 | 27 | 38 | 19 | 131 | 218 |
| Family Reasons | 11 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 37 | 133 |
| Business Contacts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Work is Good and Respectable | 4 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 47 |
| Obligation to Community | 64 | 37 | 39 | 54 | 194 | 372 |
| Serves as Bridge to Higher Post | 6 | 14 | 18 | 10 | 48 | 64 |

* N = 103, n = 71. The scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8 was utilized.

solidarity with the masses. Hence, Anapo's relatively low ideological score in Table 38 translates into one of the highest community obligation scores in Table 41. The Anapo obligation to community score of 54 was equal to 58 per cent of the entire quantitative response regarding the reasons why the Anapista leaders were participating in the hierarchical leadership of their movement. This percentage was exceeded only by the MRL's 64 per cent and the Oficialista DDs 58 per cent.

On the other hand, the community obligation percentages for the Independientes and Revitalización movement, 34 and 42 per cent respectively, ranked lowest along with the Unionista DD's 42 per cent. Significantly, traditional ties with party ranked second for every faction in reasons for participation. This, coupled with the weak score for bridge to a higher post, reflects once again the image of altruism in which the leaders present themselves. In Chapter V (Table 19), 75 per cent of the leaders expressed the desire to advance in their respective hierarchies. Yet, their current role was not looked upon as primordially a stepping stone to greater heights. The virtually nil score for business contacts again reveals the dearth of economic advantages to be derived from organizational leadership.

Departing from the leader's assessment of his own attributes, motivations, and orientations, we see that the leader values highly an ideological commitment on the part of those who seek to represent his faction or overall party as president of the country or as a legislator (Tables 42 and 43). The overall sample voiced a strong preference for a candidate who defended the doctrines and ideology

TABLE 42
 ATTRIBUTES PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES SHOULD HAVE*

| | | Vote Increaser | Ideol. Defender | Organiz. Worker |
|----------------|----|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Officialistas | DM | 0 | 11 | 6 |
| | DD | 1 | 19 | 10 |
| Revitalización | | 7 | 17 | 8 |
| MRL | | 4 | 14 | 2 |
| Unionistas | DM | 5 | 21 | 10 |
| | DD | 1 | 13 | 6 |
| Independientes | | 4 | 16 | 7 |
| Anapo | | 4 | 17 | 6 |
| Overall | | 26 | 128 | 55 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

TABLE 43
 ATTRIBUTES PARTY LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES SHOULD HAVE*

| | | Vote Increaser | Ideol. Defender | Organiz. Worker |
|---------------|----|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | DM | 1 | 7 | 9 |
| Other/Unknown | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | DM | 8 | 21 | 8 |
| Other/Unknown | | | | |
| | DM | 6 | 10 | 8 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

of his party over one who had worked in the party organization or one who would be most likely to increase the party's number and percentage of votes. Once more, altruism appears to stand out, albeit vicariously in this instance. Moreover, the second choice, for the organizational worker, indicates a sense of solidarity as opposed to pure electoral practicality--seeking the candidate most likely to have voter appeal. This pattern more or less prevailed for all eight samples.

Some difference resulted between the preferred presidential candidate and the preferred legislative candidate. Although the defender of party ideology was again the candidate strongly preferred by the hierarchical leaders, this preference weakened slightly to the benefit of the other two attributes. This suggests that the organizational leaders are, above all, concerned that the man seeking the highest office in the land be true to the party ideology. A comparison of Oficialista DM figures in Table 42 and Table 43 reveals this point most clearly. The DM leaders were nearly uniformly behind the ideological defender for presidential candidate; yet, they came out more strongly for the organizational worker for legislative candidate. Only the MRL maintained a unanimity behind the ideological defender for both candidacies, which again manifests the MRL's relatively high ideological orientation. Indeed, the MRL has revealed the highest ideological score in each of the first six tables in this chapter.

The leaders were then asked to declare whether voters, in general, knew their own interests and voted in accordance with them (Table 44).

TABLE 44

DO VOTERS KNOW AND VOTE THEIR OWN INTERESTS?*

| | | Yes | No |
|----------------|----|-----|----|
| Oficialistas | DM | 2 | 4 |
| | DD | 4 | 6 |
| Revitalización | | 6 | 5 |
| MRL | | 2 | 5 |
| Unionistas | DM | 3 | 9 |
| | DD | 2 | 5 |
| Independientes | | 2 | 6 |
| Anapo | | 6 | 3 |
| Overall | | 27 | 43 |

* N = 103, n = 70.

One Independiente leader was unable to answer.

It was hypothesized that a majority would say no. The negatives were then asked what they thought the effect upon the political situation would be if most voters were aware of their own interests and voted accordingly. The ideological content and orientation of these open-end responses would then be evaluated to determine whether the subjectively professed high ideological orientation of the leaders would produce well-defined ideological responses. The no responses outnumbered the yes responses for six of the eight samples. Significantly, Anapo had the greatest percentage of yes answers, a phenomenon perhaps explained by the movement's close association with the masses plus the growing voting strength of Anapo. Hence, Anapistas seemed to imply that the masses were aware of their interests and were voting accordingly. On the other hand, the MRL, which has likewise claimed a strong relationship with the masses, implied by its negatively weighted responses that the masses did not know their own interests in view of the declining MRL vote.

In prophesying the effect of a situation where voters voted in accordance with their own interests, most of the responses were of a non-analytical character, unbecoming to the self-proclaimed ideological orientation of the leaders. In the case of the Oficialista DM leaders, the general response among the four who claimed voter ignorance was simply that greater voter consciousness would mean a greater turnout at the polls and more votes for the Liberal party. In like manner, of the six Oficialista DD negatives, four merely affirmed that the vote for the Liberal party would increase if voters

gained a political consciousness, declaring that their party would be "tremendously preponderant" and have an "extraordinary majority." For the remaining two, respectively, voting in general would increase, and better men of greater ability and desire to work would be elected to legislatures, replacing the many today who are incapable.

In contrast, some of the Revitalización leaders did reveal an ideological orientation. Two of the five negatives simply asserted that more informed voting would bring out a greater turnout; and another was unable to make a prediction. However, the remaining two contended that the parties would be compelled to modernize their socio-economic programs in the face of greater voter awareness. Unlike the Oficialistas, no Revitalización leader predicted an automatic gain for his faction as the result of a greater voter consciousness of interests. With regard to the MRL, its exceptionally high ideological orientation did not result in an ideologically based analysis. Two of the five negatives saw the Liberal party in general and one the MRL benefiting as the product of a greater consciousness of interests, while a fourth declared that better men would be elected. Only one offered an overtly ideologically oriented response, proclaiming that new movements like the MRL, "which are more in tune with the needs of the masses," would receive more votes.

For the Conservative factions, on the other hand, reference to the need for an adaptation of party programs to the interests of a newly awakened electorate was somewhat more frequent, often taking the form of self-criticism of the *modus operandi* of one's own group.

However, most references to ideology were oblique, and responses totally devoid of overt ideological orientation did by no means cease to appear. Of the nine Unionista DM negatives, four simply declared that the Unionistas would benefit from greater voter awareness, while a fifth claimed that the Frente Nacional, in general, would benefit at the expense of both extremes. A sixth contended that the voters would force the reunification of both the Conservative and Liberal parties, while the remaining three affirmed that people would be more selective in their voting, paying more attention to party programs and electing more capable people to office.

Three of the five DD negatives asserted that the political groups would be compelled to exercise greater care in choosing their candidates and renovating their programs to give them greater appeal to the masses, strongly implying that even their own faction ran many candidates who lacked good qualifications, and had programs which were not in the best interests of the masses. The other two simply replied that support for the FTN and the Unionistas, in particular, would grow. In like manner, five of the six Independiente negatives made reference to a greater vote turnout and greater rationality in voting. One, however, manifested an inordinately overt ideological position in his claim that voting would become more anti-Communist. In contrast, the three Anapo negatives merely declared that the masses would further increase their support for Anapo, which would result in the triumph of the masses and the disappearance of both the Liberal and Conservative parties.

In summary, one notes a qualitative difference between the overall Liberal and Conservative parties, especially when one compares the Liberal mainstreams, the Oficialistas, with the traditional Conservatives, the Unionistas and Independientes. The Conservatives, by declaring that voters who were aware of their interests would become more rational, which would compel the political groups to revamp their programs and improve the quality of their leadership, were engaging in some indirect self-criticism. The Oficialistas, however, did not refer to any steps necessary on their part to win over these voters. The latter simply had to become conscious of their own interests for the Liberals to make a large gain. In this position, one detects a feeling of self-satisfaction, even in the absence of overt ideological or programmatic references.

Next, attempts were made to determine specific ideological differences among the different factions and overall parties. Some hypotheses were established in accordance with the traditional mystique of the parties. Hence, it was hypothesized that Conservatives would be more in favor of a stable dictatorship as opposed to an unstable democracy than Liberals; and that Anapo, given its caudillo leadership by an ex-dictator, would be the faction most in favor of a stable dictatorship. (Party mystique will be considered in depth in Chapters X and XI.) Overall, 69 per cent preferred the unstable democracy to the stable dictatorship (Table 45). However, distinctions among the factions were very notable. The Oficialistas and MRL leaders were almost unanimous in upholding the Liberal tradition of opposition to

TABLE 45

STABLE DICTATORSHIP OVER UNSTABLE DEMOCRACY*

| | Yes | No |
|------------------|-----|----|
| Officialistas DM | 0 | 6 |
| DD | 1 | 9 |
| Revitalización | 4 | 7 |
| MRL | 0 | 7 |
| Unionistas DM | 4 | 8 |
| DD | 3 | 4 |
| Independientes | 3 | 6 |
| Anapo | 7 | 2 |
| Overall | 22 | 49 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

all dictatorship. On the other hand, 36 per cent of the Revitalización leaders departed from Liberal party ideology by choosing the stable dictatorship. In harmony with the hypothesis, a much higher percentage of Conservatives than Liberals chose the stable dictatorship over the unstable democracy. Thirty-seven per cent of the Unionista leaders and 33 per cent of the Independiente leaders favored the stable dictatorship.

Finally, the hypothesis held true for Anapo, where 77 per cent of the hierarchical leaders sampled preferred a stable dictatorship. Thus, it would appear that Anapo is considerably more dictatorially oriented than any of the other Conservative or Liberal factions. Further comment must be made regarding the Conservative responses, however. The overall Conservative party traditionally has been oriented toward respect for authority and hierarchy, and a strong executive power. Liberals have attacked this Conservative tradition (see Chapter XI), for being inimical to individual freedom and democratic government, pointing indeed, to the wake of dictatorial governments that the Conservative party has left in its path. Nonetheless, the Unionista and Independiente majorities in favor of an unstable democracy suggest a shift in the Conservative position more toward that of Liberals.

To further test the general hypothesis that Conservatives would lean more toward strong government and Liberals would be more prone toward weak government, the organizational leaders were asked whether they believed that the president, and in general the executive power,

in comparison with the legislative and judicial branches, wielded too much power, not enough power, or just the right amount of power (Table 46). This was considered to be a good test for attachment to ideological mystique since the traditionally weak executive Liberals currently had a strong executive of their own in the presidential office. Firm, unswerving adherence to traditional party ideology would have meant a greater percentage of Liberals than Conservatives claiming that (Liberal) President Lleras Restrepo was wielding too much power. In fact, this was precisely the result obtained if we discount the Anapo figures on the grounds that the Rojistas have never fully shared the Conservative mystique.

No Unionista or Independiente declared that the Liberal president was overly powerful. For that matter, neither did any Oficialista. However, 68 per cent of the two Conservative factions asserted that the president lacked enough power, as opposed to only 38 per cent of the Oficialistas who expressed themselves in this manner. Apparently, ideological tradition was definitely a factor in producing such otherwise surprising responses. Similarly, only 39 per cent of the combined Revitalización-MRL total claimed that the president should have more power. In fact, 22 per cent of this group, two leaders from each faction, contended that the president wielded too much power. Since the Revitalización movement was not an opposition faction, such responses appear to have significance. Obversely, the support for the president's power by the opposition Independientes likewise appears to be an ideological manifestation. In contrast, the 44 per cent of the Anapo sample who claimed that the president exercised too much power

TABLE 46

ATTITUDE TOWARD POWER OF PRESIDENT*

| | | Too Much | Not Enough | Just Right |
|----------------|----|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| | DD | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Revitalización | | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| MRL | | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Unionistas | DM | 4 0 | 13 9 | 7 3 |
| | DD | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| Independientes | | 0 | 5 | 4 |
| Anapo | | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Overall | | <u>4</u> 8 | <u>20</u> 33 | <u>13</u> 30 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

seemed to be making a completely non-ideologically oriented response, one simply dictated by their opposition to the government in power.

The hypothesis was then tested that the Conservatives would be more in favor of a strong national government than the Liberals, due to the traditional Conservative position of centralization as opposed to the Liberal position of decentralized government. However, a Colombian colleague warned the author at an early stage that such a hypothesis might prove inaccurate due to recent changes in the Conservative attitude toward over-centralization of power. Indeed, he pointed to the federated (semi-autonomous) departments in the hierarchical organization of both the Unionistas and Independientes to substantiate this point. A Conservative partisan himself, he declared that "We are closer to Liberal doctrine than the Liberals on the question of centralization of power."

In fact, both overall parties appeared to have abandoned their traditional doctrines. Sixty-five per cent of the Conservatives (61 per cent without Anapo) affirmed that the national government wielded too much power, while only 38 per cent of the Liberals shared this opinion (Table 47). Furthermore, 16 per cent of the Liberals claimed that the national government should have greater power, as opposed to no such response from any Conservative other than Anapistas. The explanation for this change from traditional positions might lie in the socio-economic evolution during the course of the past century. The Manchester Liberal became more of a social welfare Liberal; hence, changing his position from laissez-faire to pro-government intervention.

TABLE 47
ATTITUDE TOWARD POWER OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT*

| | | Too Much | Not Enough | Just Right |
|----------------|----|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Officialistas | DM | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | DD | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Revitalización | | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| MRL | | $\frac{3}{15}$ | $\frac{0}{6}$ | $\frac{4}{15}$ |
| Unionistas | DM | 9 | 0 | 3 |
| | DD | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| Independientes | | 5 | 0 | 4 |
| Anapo | | $\frac{7}{37}$ | $\frac{2}{8}$ | $\frac{0}{26}$ |
| Overall | | 37 | 8 | 26 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

The Conservative reaction was then to counteract what it considered overzealous action on the part of the national government.

Next, the hypothesis was tested that the traditional Conservative adherence to the principles of authority and hierarchy would result in a fairly favorable attitude toward enforced party discipline; whereas traditional Liberal support for the principle of freedom to dissent would produce an overall Liberal response in opposition to enforced party discipline. The hypothesis was substantiated to the point that Liberal opposition to such discipline was greater than Conservative opposition. Nonetheless, a majority of Liberals, too, favored sanctions against members of the city council, departmental assembly, or national congress who failed to vote in accordance with the established position of their party (Table 48). Only among the Oficialistas was there greater opposition to than support for sanctions (56 per cent opposed). Overall, 56 per cent of the Liberal leaders favored sanctions to enforce party discipline, a result which suggests a weakening of the Liberal doctrine of the right to dissent within party ranks.

On the other hand, 86 per cent of the Conservative leaders (82 per cent without Anapo) spoke in favor of sanctions, which indicates the continued adherence on the part of Conservative leaders, in general, to the traditional party doctrine of respect for authority and hierarchy. The uniform voice of Anapo in favor of sanctions was indeed reflective of actual group practice. In December 1966, four Anapista representatives were immediately ousted from the movement for voting against

TABLE 48

ATTITUDE TOWARD ENFORCED PARTY DISCIPLINE*

| | | In Favor | Opposed |
|----------------|----|----------|---------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 3 | 3 |
| | DD | 4 | 6 |
| Revitalización | | 7 | 4 |
| MRL | | 6 | 1 |
| Unionistas | DM | 9 | 3 |
| | DD | 6 | 1 |
| Independientes | | 8 | 1 |
| Anapo | | 9 | 0 |
| Overall | | 52 | 19 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

established Anapo policy. In the aftermath of their deviant votes, they were beaten on the floor of congress by fellow Anapo members using fists and straps, and, reportedly, they were even threatened with death.² One Anapista leader later defended the expulsion of mavericks to the author, claiming that since the movement places so much weight on its programs and their effect on the masses, discipline in its ranks is imperative to present a solid position to the masses. Anarchy would weaken Anapo's attraction.

Attitude toward the Frente Nacional was next examined on the basis that a coalition government was detrimental to the doctrinary position of both overall parties (Table 49). It was hypothesized that both parties would have majorities in favor of terminating the Frente Nacional on schedule in 1974. However, the Liberals being the majority party in Colombia, the author believed that a somewhat higher percentage of Conservatives would opt to continue the coalition beyond its scheduled termination date. The author did not expect any Conservative, other than Anapistas, to call for the immediate abolition of the coalition, considering that the Conservatives have their final turn at the coalition presidency yet to come. These hypotheses were validated only to the point that the predicted differences between the two overall parties held true in a general sense. However, 63 per cent of the Unionistas favored the continuation of the coalition, as opposed to only 19 per cent of their Oficialista partners (including the Revitalización movement).

TABLE 49
ATTITUDE TOWARD FRENTE NACIONAL*

| | | Abolish | Continue | End on Time |
|----------------|----|---------|----------|-------------|
| Oficialistas | DM | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | DD | 2 | 1 | 7 |
| Revitalización | | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| MRL | | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| Unionistas | DM | 1 | 9 | 2 |
| | DD | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| Independientes | | 0 | 3 | 6 |
| Anapo | | 7 | 0 | 2 |
| Overall | | 14 | 20 | 37 |

Handwritten annotations in the table:
 - A horizontal line is drawn under the MRL row.
 - A horizontal line is drawn under the Anapo row.
 - A horizontal line is drawn under the Overall row.
 - Next to the 'Continue' value for Unionistas DM (9), there is a handwritten note "519%".
 - Next to the 'Continue' value for Overall (20), there is a handwritten note "1563%".
 - Next to the 'End on Time' value for Unionistas DM (2), there is a handwritten note "23".

* N = 103, n = 71.

The Conservative majority in favor of continuation was not expected. Either ideological considerations were being sacrificed to practical (voting) considerations, in contrast to declared positions in Table 38, or, more likely, the Unionistas in the first place did not find the Oficialistas to be ideologically incompatible as partners. Apparently, the socio-economic orientations of the Liberal and Conservative mainstreams do not differ widely from one another. (This is a principal argument of Anapo.) Overall, 54 per cent of the true Conservatives (excluding Anapo) favored continuation, as opposed to just 15 per cent of the Liberals. On the other hand, 18 per cent of the Liberals favored the immediate abolition of the coalition, as opposed to 4 per cent of the true Conservatives. Although no MRL leader desired continuation, 33 per cent of the Independiente leaders favored this move, which suggests that Conservatives, in general, consider themselves to be electorally inferior to the Liberals at present and during the foreseeable future. Anapo's 77 per cent majority in favor of immediate abolition was predictable in view of the group's implacable opposition to the Frente Nacional.

The Unionistas' main mouthpiece, El País, offered an important explanation for Unionista support of the Frente Nacional. The editorial declared that "The Frente Nacional has undoubtedly succeeded in bringing about a situation where 'the country is above the parties.' The results of our friendship with liberalism have been so pleasing to all that we Conservatives have no nostalgias or suspicions," even though suspicions did exist at first. The editorial added that the

Unionistas were still concerned with preserving Conservative doctrine, but that any sacrifices they might have made were minute compared to those made by the Liberals, who had rejected the principle of weak executive and strong parliament, exemplified by the fact that President Lleras Restrepo had been making many efforts to strengthen the role of the president while weakening that of congress, including the use of his state of siege powers. El País noted that the Liberals had dropped these past trappings "to enter the orbit of a strong presidential regime, protector of order and demanding of the respect of legitimate hierarchies. President Lleras Restrepo himself, in his thought and his action, very much resembles the old hidalgos of traditionalism, order, and authority."³

Nonetheless, the Liberal leaders were no more inclined than the Conservatives to declare that the compromise resulting from the Frente Nacional coalition had caused an impairment in the doctrines and ideology of the two major parties. Both groups ranked ideological impairment as the third most important effect caused by the Frente Nacional (Table 50). However, all factions did list it as a major effect, which indicates that the ideological orientation of the two overall parties has suffered. The fact that a large majority of the Unionistas and one-third of the Independientes favored the continuation of the Frente Nacional suggests that some other value had taken precedence over the preservation of party ideology. The question was, purposely, negatively oriented; that is, all the effects listed were negative ones. However, the alternative "other" was included to allow for spontaneous responses regarding other effects.

TABLE 50
 PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF FRENTE NACIONAL*

| | Oficialistas | | Liberals | | | Total** |
|---|-------------------------|----|----------------|-------|-------|---------|
| | DM | DD | Revitalización | MRL | | |
| | Increase in Personalism | 18 | 16 | 24 | 16 | |
| Increase in Factionalism | 25 | 48 | 45 | 28 | 146 | |
| Decrease in Popular Support of Parties | 20 | 42 | 40 | 31 | 133 | |
| Ideological Impairment | 18 | 35 | 46 | 25 | 124 | |
| No Effects of Consequence | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Other | 0 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 16 | |
| | | | Conservatives | | | |
| | Unionistas | | Indep. | Anapo | Total | Overall |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Increase in Personalism | 16 | 7 | 28 | 24 | 75 | 149 |
| Increase in Factionalism | 41 | 36 | 41 | 42 | 160 | 306 |
| Decrease in Popular Support of Parties | 36 | 22 | 37 | 44 | 139 | 272 |
| Ideological Impairment | 32 | 24 | 24 | 42 | 122 | 246 |
| No Effects of Consequence | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| Other | 18 | 12 | 18 | 0 | 48 | 64 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

**The scoring system explained in Chapter V, Table 8 was utilized.

Indeed, a fairly sizable Conservative codification of this alternative, three times as great a score as that of the Liberals, resulted; and in each of these cases except one, the same positive effect was stressed: the benefit of peace and diminishing hatred between the two parties. Thus, the benefit of peace, apparently, was considered by a fair proportion of Conservatives to be worth the ideological impairment which had taken place. In the remaining case of Conservative codification of "other," the leader (an Independiente) referred to a negative effect: the loss of party mystique. All Liberal codifications of this alternative pointed to the positive effect of peace and diminishing inter-party hatred. Both overall parties were in agreement that the principal effect of the Frente Nacional was to promote greater factionalism within each of the two parties, and that the second major effect was a decrease in the popular support for the Conservatives and Liberals. An increase in personalism was thought to be a less important effect of the Frente Nacional. Significantly, only one leader claimed that the coalition had produced no effects of consequence.

To further ascertain specific ideological differences among the different factions and overall parties, two additional Purdue Master Attitude Scales were employed: one to measure attitude toward seven defined groups; and the other to measure attitude toward six proposed social actions. A description of the Master Attitude Scales and scoring is given in Chapter VI, Table 26. Hence, no further description will be offered at this point. With regard to attitudes toward particular groups, the author hypothesized that the Independientes would be

the most favorable toward big landowners, while they and the Unionistas would have the most favorable attitude toward these landowners, businessmen, and the upper-class, whereas Anapo would have the least favorable attitude toward these three groups. On the other hand, the author believed that Liberals would be more friendly toward labor union leaders than Conservatives. Since the major unions are not highly radical, and Anapo does not control them, the author did not expect a highly favorable Anapista attitude toward the labor leaders. However, he did expect a highly favorable attitude on the part of the Anapo leaders toward the lower-class in general. The author also expected a fairly favorable opinion of the middle-class and the military from all the factional leaders. Since the armed forces have been relatively apolitical and rarely have executed a golpe de estado, no reason was believed to exist for animosity toward this group.

The results bore out many of these hypotheses (Table 51). The Independientes had by far the most favorable attitude toward big landowners, perhaps substantiating the widespread belief that they are the most traditional of Conservatives and, hence, most oriented toward the landed interests. On the other hand, the Unionistas proved to be no more pro-landowner than the Oficialistas, a result which suggests that the two Frente Nacional partners are not as far apart as their traditional party orientations would indicate. The Revitalización and MRL leaders, however, had less favorable attitudes toward landowners, which may indicate that they are somewhat more radical

TABLE 51

ATTITUDE TOWARD SEVEN DEFINED GROUPS*

Now diff. factions of gov. think about

Liberals

| | Oficialistas DM | DD | Revitalización | MRL | Average** |
|---------------------|--------------------|------|----------------|------|-----------|
| Big Landowners | 6.05 | 6.76 | 5.89 | 5.31 | 6.00 |
| Big Businessmen | 6.83 | 6.56 | 6.51 | 5.71 | 6.40 |
| Labor Union Leaders | 7.37 | 6.97 | 7.49 | 6.42 | 7.06 |
| Upper-Class | 6.50 | 7.39 | 6.38 | 6.51 | 6.70 |
| Middle-Class | 7.96 | 8.04 | 8.23 | 7.39 | 7.91 |
| Lower-Class | 7.28 | 7.50 | 8.06 | 7.76 | 7.65 |
| Military Leaders | 6.44 | 7.42 | 7.36 | 6.36 | 6.90 |

Conservatives

| | Unionistas DM | DD | Indep. | Anapo | Average | Overall Average |
|---------------------|------------------|------|--------|-------|---------|-----------------|
| Big Landowners | 6.14 | 6.57 | 7.58 | 4.88 | 6.30 | 6.15 |
| Big Businessmen | 6.86 | 7.27 | 6.93 | 5.83 | 6.72 | 6.56 |
| Labor Union Leaders | 5.95 | 6.97 | 6.07 | 4.73 | 5.93 | 6.50 |
| Upper-Class | 7.27 | 7.41 | 7.83 | 5.32 | 6.96 | 6.83 |
| Middle-Class | 8.08 | 8.30 | 8.38 | 7.86 | 8.16 | 8.03 |
| Lower-Class | 7.22 | 7.90 | 6.69 | 7.42 | 7.31 | 7.48 |
| Military Leaders | 6.54 | 7.93 | 7.24 | 6.68 | 7.10 | 7.00 |

*N = 103, n = 71.

**See Chapter VI, Table 26 for scoring system.

than the Oficialistas. Anapo, true to prediction, was least favorably inclined toward the landowning class. The Oficialistas were slightly less favorable toward big businessmen than the Unionistas and Independientes; but the Oficialista DD and Revitalización leaders were somewhat notably less favorable toward this group. Anapo and the MRL again had the least favorable attitudes; but this time the MRL was more negative.

Liberals proved to be more friendly toward labor union leaders than Conservatives, and Anapo had the least favorable attitude. Significantly, the MRL was the Liberal faction least favorable to the union leaders, perhaps for the same reason hypothesized above for Anapo's expected negativeness. Again, Conservatives were more favorable toward the upper-class, and Anapo was least favorable. The MRL was no less favorably inclined than the Oficialista DM leaders, which suggests that any MRL radicalism was limited. The author was surprised that Anapo's attitude toward the lower-class was somewhat below the overall average. This could indicate that Anapo has been using the masses to enhance its voting position, deceiving the latter as to the solidarity of the Rojistas with the lower-class. True to the hypothesis, Liberals and Conservatives alike expressed fairly favorable attitudes regarding the middle-class and the military. The middle-class, in fact, evoked the most favorable responses from both of the overall parties.

In summary, the results indicate that the overall parties have not completely abandoned their ideological orientations. However, the fact that the Unionistas appeared less traditional than the Independientes, and the Oficialistas appeared less radical than the MRL

and Revitalización movement (based on attitudes toward landowners, businessmen, labor leaders, and upper-class), helps to explain their expressed compatibility in the Frente Nacional coalition.

With regard to attitudes toward proposed social actions, the author hypothesized that Anapo, the MRL, and, perhaps, the Revitalización movement would have the most favorable attitude toward the expropriation of agricultural lands not utilized by their owners without compensation. He expected the same factions to be most in favor of greater taxation of the wealthy to allow for more state aid, in order to redistribute the wealth. On the other hand, he hypothesized that the Unionistas and, especially, the Independientes would be most in favor of stronger action against Communists and restriction of Protestant missionary activities. Finally, he believed that the Liberals would be considerably more in favor of putting an end to the mandatory teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools than the Conservatives.

The results were not entirely favorable to the hypotheses (Table 52). Conservatives were considerably more in favor of uncompensated expropriation and more state aid through greater taxation of the wealthy than the Liberals. Moreover, Anapo and the MRL were among the least favorably inclined toward these actions. Perhaps Conservatives were more inclined toward the first measure since the nature of the action might necessitate a strong, authoritarian government in power, which would be contrary to Liberal tradition. In like manner, the greater state intervention implied by the second measure would be more in harmony with Conservative tradition than with Liberal tradition.

TABLE 52

ATTITUDE TOWARD SIX PROPOSED SOCIAL ACTIONS*

| | Liberals | | | | Average** | |
|--|---------------|----------------|-------|---------|--------------------|------|
| | Oficialistas | Revitalización | MRL | | | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Uncompensated Expropriation of Lands | 6.06 | 7.37 | 6.83 | 7.41 | 6.92 | |
| More State Aid to Poor Taxation | 7.80 | 8.86 | 8.80 | 7.44 | 8.23 | |
| Stronger Action Against Communists | 6.11 | 8.18 | 6.52 | 3.33 | 6.04 | |
| End Religious Teaching in Public Schools | 4.88 | 4.07 | 5.68 | 5.79 | 5.11 | |
| Restrict Protestant Missionary Activity | 3.02 | 3.49 | 3.88 | 3.28 | 3.42 | |
| Change Government from Unitary to Federal | 6.30 | 5.94 | 7.60 | 6.66 | 6.63 | |
| | Conservatives | | | | Overall Average | |
| | Unionistas | Indep. | Anapo | Average | | |
| | DM | DD | | | | |
| Uncompensated Expropriation of Lands | 7.80 | 7.74 | 6.64 | 7.81 | 7.50 | 7.21 |
| More State Aid to Poor Taxation | 8.75 | 8.66 | 8.41 | 8.23 | 8.51 | 8.37 |
| Stronger Action Against Communists | 7.23 | 7.37 | 7.95 | 7.23 | 7.45 | 6.74 |
| End Religious Teaching in Public Schools | 3.79 | 3.94 | 3.47 | 4.56 | 3.94 | 4.52 |
| Restrict Protestant Missionary Activity | 3.74 | 3.36 | 4.76 | 4.03 | 3.97 | 3.70 |
| Change Government from Unitary to Federal | 6.80 | 5.71 | 5.04 | 7.46 | 6.25 | 6.44 |

* N - 103, n = 71.

**See Chapter VI, Table 26 for scoring system.

Nonetheless, what seems to be the important point is that the Conservatives were manifesting themselves as more progressive in a socio-economic sense than the Liberals, even though they appeared to be more spiritually aligned with upper-class groups as derived from the attitudinal scores in Table 51.

A possible explanation for this apparent anomaly is offered by another observer of the Colombian political system, James Payne. Payne stresses that party label is no guide to individual attitudes toward reform programs due to the fact that political leaders in general endeavor to evoke a reformist image to strengthen their appeal among lower-class elements. Payne discovered in his own survey of Oficialistas, Unionistas, and Independientes that "they were, regardless of party, overwhelmingly in favor of more government construction of housing . . .," and "moderately in favor of more governmental control of private industry and more legal protection of trade unions."⁴ Given this orientation, one might face difficulties in separating the sincere from the insincere reformists. Perhaps Table 51 serves as a more accurate guide to ideological inclinations in a socio-economic sense than Table 52.

Moreover, the recruitment of factional leadership from a variety of socio-economic classes might further explain the highly reformist-oriented responses. Even if we were to dismiss the Conservative party or both overall parties as basically traditionalistic and non-reformist in character and inclined to socialize new recruits to accept traditionalistic, non-reformist standards, we must be careful not to exaggerate

the effectiveness of party socialization in completely neutralizing earlier class-oriented socialization carried out by the family and peer groups. Almond and Powell warn that,

The recruitment function cannot be fully separated from the socialization function. Recruitment from particular aristocratic strata, from nonaristocratic strata, from slaves, and from foreign populations brings into political roles people with different propensities, interests, values, and attitudes. The background of those who are recruited into political roles is bound to have some impact on their performance of these roles, no matter how thoroughly they are socialized into new values, attitudes, and skills once they have taken over their offices.⁵

Turning once more in Table 52, this time true to the hypothesis, the Liberals, in harmony with their tradition of tolerance, were much less favorably inclined toward stronger action against Communists than the Conservatives. The MRL, the Liberal faction most accused of Communist orientation, had by far the most unfavorable attitude on this proposed action. However, the Oficialista DD leaders departed from Liberal tradition by strongly favoring action against Communists. Similarly, Conservatives were somewhat more favorable toward a restriction of Protestant missionary activity than Liberals. However, their attitude was also unfavorable to such an action, which indicates that the Conservatives have greatly abandoned their traditional, non-tolerant Catholic position. The most traditional Conservative faction, the Independientes, voiced the most favorable attitude toward such a restriction. Again according to hypothesis, Liberals were much more in favor of ending compulsory teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools. However, their overall position was still somewhat unfavorable to such a move, which, in turn, indicates that the Liberals have mellowed considerably on their anti-Church position. Significantly, the

Revitalización and MRL leaders were more in favor of such a move than the Oficialistas, and the Independientes were the most opposed to this action, a further basis for the assertion that these factions come closest to representing ideological purism for their respective parties.

Finally, Liberals were more favorable to a change from unitary to federal government than Conservatives. This was to be expected from the Liberal tradition of decentralization as opposed to the Conservative one of centralization. However, the more critical Conservative attitude toward the power of the national government (Table 47) might have led one to believe that the Conservatives would be more in favor of federal government. Nonetheless, the relative proximity of the positions of the two overall parties--indeed, the Unionistas were more in favor of federalism than the Oficialistas--and the fact that the scores were near the indifference point in attitude, is a further indication that the two overall parties have abandoned their traditional, extremist positions on the question of centralization. Again, we have the pattern where the Independientes are at one extreme and the Revitalización and MRL are at the other, discounting Anapo. This further substantiates the conclusion for Table 51 that the Oficialistas and Unionistas are the most compatible for an inter-party coalition.

Notes

¹Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 196.

²See El Tiempo, December 17, 1966, pp. 1, 26.

³"Ratificación Presidencialista," El País, January 17, 1967, p. 4.

⁴James L. Payne, "The Oligarchy Muddle," a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, September, 1967, pp. 16-17.

⁵Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 48.

CHAPTER X

COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF FACTIONS WITHIN EACH OVERALL PARTY

In harmony with results which have manifested greater differences among factions within each party than between the two overall parties, the hierarchical leaders were asked their opinion as to whether important differences existed among the factions of their overall party. It was hypothesized that the factions most dissatisfied with the Frente Nacional system, that is, all except the Oficialistas and Unionistas, would give the highest percentage of "yes" answers. Indeed, this proved to be the case, as illustrated in Table 53. Whereas 69 per cent of the Oficialistas claimed that no important differences existed between themselves and the other Liberal factions, and 58 per cent of the Unionistas saw little to differentiate themselves from the remaining Conservative factions, a combined total of 89 per cent of the other four samples alleged the presence of such differences within their overall party. This included 91 per cent for the Revitalización movement, 71 per cent for the MRL, 89 per cent for the Independientes, and 100 per cent for Anapo. Significantly, Unionistas found differences only between their faction and Anapo; none between themselves and the Independientes. In contrast, two Independientes declared that their faction differed substantially from the Unionistas. Overall, 63 per cent of the total sample asserted the presence of important differences among the factions of their overall party.

TABLE 53
 IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AMONG FACTIONS
 WITHIN LEADER'S OVERALL PARTY

| | Yes | No |
|-----------------|-----|----|
| Oficialistas DM | 3 | 3 |
| Oficialistas DD | 2 | 8 |
| Revitalización | 10 | 1 |
| MRL | 5 | 2 |
| Unionistas DM | 4 | 8 |
| Unionistas DD | 4 | 3 |
| Independientes | 8 | 1 |
| Anapo | 9 | 0 |
| Overall | 45 | 26 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

Among the Oficialista DM leaders who found important differences one contended that the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas differed from the Revitalización movement in that the latter served only as the personalistic instrument of Carlos Holmes Trujillo and had little popular support. All three saw important differences between the Oficialistas and Revitalización movement on the one hand, and the MRL, which they described respectively as "semi-Communist," calling for a "revolutionary policy in conjunction with Communist elements," and simply "extremists." This somewhat unfair labelling of the MRL seems to reveal a traditionalistic, somewhat conservative position on the part of these three Oficialistas. Of interest is the fact that none of the mixed Pachueladista-Balcarcista sample saw any differences between their two sub-factions.

In contrast to the divided opinion among the DM sample, none of the Oficialista DD leaders admitted any important differences between the Oficialistas and the MRL. The two leaders who did observe important differences within the overall Liberal movement alluded to distinctions among the three sectors associated with the Frente Nacional. One, a Balcarcista, asserted that the Pachueladista and Revitalización leaders worked to obtain secondary public jobs for their friends, while the Balcarcistas were not guilty of this. The other, a Pachueladista, contended that Pachueladismo adhered to traditional Liberal ideology by allowing full internal liberty and democracy, while Balcázar and Trujillo tightly controlled their followings without allowing internal democracy.

The Revitalización leaders, in contrast, overwhelmingly referred to the Oficialistas--making no distinction between Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas--as a personalistic group led by the caudillos who lacked an ideological orientation; hence, serving as an old guard. They were further depicted as a "closed clique, a closed political machine," wanting power solely as a means to obtain public posts for their followers, working "just for bureaucratic spoils." Due to such a self-centered orientation, the Oficialistas, according to most of the Revitalización sample, had divorced themselves from the masses and desperately needed "renovation" of leadership and "revitalization" of ideology. The Movimiento de Renovación y Revitalización Liberal, in contrast, was created as a result of this dissatisfaction with the Oficialistas and had taken upon itself the task of modernizing the party. According to its leaders, the Revitalización movement wants a "return to ideology," the same goal that the Independientes proclaim for the Conservative party. However, this similarity does not appear to go beneath the surface since the Independientes seem to be much more faithful to the traditional doctrines of their party than the Movimiento is to traditional Liberal doctrine. Rather, the latter has taken advantage of the eclectic nature of Liberal party ideology in recent decades and of its own self-proclaimed attachment to the inspiration of Gaitán to affirm its role as ideological standard bearer of the Liberal party.

In effect, the Independientes have aimed to unite the Conservative party behind an orientation which was accepted by the party as a whole in the past, whereas the Revitalización's announced purpose is to unite

the Liberal party behind a radical orientation which has never before been accepted by the overall Liberal party (as was well illustrated by the schism in Liberal ranks when the radically oriented Gaitán made his bid for party leadership in the 1940's). Moreover, some responses of Revitalización leaders were somewhat akin to those of Anapistas in that both groups accented their identification with the lower-class, shunning the image of a multi-class, or catch-all, party. Some leaders claimed that the movement was "non-extreme left," but "somewhat socialistic," associating itself with the La Ceja spiritual union of the Liberal avant-garde (see Chapter V). Others proclaimed that "We want close and permanent ties with the masses," and seek power in order to "change the social structures of the country." The youth of the Revitalización leadership in comparison to the older leadership of the Oficialistas was also stressed, a point which was quite valid.

An apparently good test to compare the degree of radicalism of the Revitalización leaders was to analyze their responses as to the differences between their Movimiento and the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal, an effort which produced a split opinion. Sixty per cent of the leaders declared that the two movements were fairly similar, expressing the sentiment of one who claimed that "We and they are very close doctrinally," since both groups orient their programs to favor the masses and derive their support from the masses. The comment was also made that the MRL was likewise connected with the La Ceja movement and favored a replacement of the Liberal old guard with the younger generation.

However, it was pointed out that, in spite of the similarity in programs, the MRL did not support the Frente Nacional whereas the Revitalización movement did, a situation which has now changed with the unification of the Oficialistas and the MRL. (Nonetheless, the highly critical posture of the Revitalización leaders toward the status quo and toward the Liberal party itself implied a somewhat less embracing and more critical position toward the Frente Nacional than that of the Oficialistas. To justify the support for President Lleras Restrepo while condemning the old guard leadership of the party, one Revitalización leader observed that Lleras belonged to the old generation but had the ideals of the new one.)

Those who saw little difference between the two movements nonetheless pointed out that theirs was a movement which was growing, while the MRL was declining, plagued by internal divisions and ineffective leadership. The fact must be stressed, however, that the MRL revealed a formidable growth in voting strength in the initial years following its founding, only to begin an abrupt downfall. It will be interesting to follow the fortunes of the Revitalización movement if it does not definitively become reincorporated into a unified hierarchy with the Pachaeladistas and Balcarcistas.

With regard to the 40 per cent of Revitalización leaders who proclaimed important differences between their movement and the MRL, they characterized the latter as having "extreme leftist tendencies," being "demagogic," and "favoring violence and revolution." One claimed that MRL radicalism was simply negative, lacking a positive program.

Hence, there was no consensus among Revitalización leaders as to what the MRL represented and how close its position was to theirs. Perhaps the divisions within the overall MRL (línea blanda, línea dura, and Communist-oriented MRL del Pueblo), help explain this lack of consensus. If one considers solely the mainstream of the faction, the línea blanda, he would probably not find Alfonso López Michelsen and his faction to be greatly different from Carlos Holmes Trujillo and his faction. However, when the other groups that have also called themselves MRL, especially the MRL del Pueblo, are taken into consideration, then a very pronounced difference is indeed apparent.

The MRL leaders, on the other hand, were in accord with the Revitalización leaders and in disaccord with the Oficialistas in that the majority of MRL leaders sampled declared the existence of important differences among Liberal factions. Similar to the general Revitalización response, MRL leaders characterized the Oficialistas as "old guard" and themselves as reformist and somewhat socialistic. Specifically, the Oficialistas were portrayed as "traditionalistic," "bourgeois" forces who represented a "commercial-industrial-landowning" elite, and who differed little from the Conservatives; whereas the MRL represented the "new," "progressive," and "revolutionary" forces and was essentially a "leftist movement" seeking to "drink in the fountain of modern socialism." On the other hand, one of the MRL leaders observed that the only major difference between the MRL and the Oficialistas was simply that the former opposed Liberal-Conservative parity within the Frente Nacional whereas the latter supported it.

With regard to the 29 per cent of the MRL sample who asserted the absence of any important differences among Liberal factions, the claim was made that the Oficialistas, by adopting MRL programs, "have moved toward us," thus terminating basic differences. In addition, one of the leaders who had proclaimed the existence of fundamental differences admitted that they were decreasing because "Lleras is modernizing the party with many MRL programs." As for the MRL attitude toward the Revitalización movement, most acknowledged that the latter had some progressive leaders within its ranks, while others declared that it was basically a personalistic offshoot of Oficialismo. Perhaps due to its recent appearance in the political system and its confinement to Valle department, most of the MRL leaders did not regard the Revitalización movement as an important Liberal current.

On the Conservative side, the fact that the Unionista position was roughly analogous to that of the Oficialistas, in that the majority found no important differences among Conservative factions, was somewhat surprising. Anapo had appeared to have departed sufficiently from the Conservative track that important differences should have been detected. Nonetheless, the implication was that most Unionistas considered Anapo to be, basically, a bonafide Conservative faction, even though they might have disagreed with its methods and leaders. One DM leader, for example, simply dismissed Anapo as "The violent ones within our ranks, personalistic, attempting to bring back Rojas Pinilla, but essentially Conservative . . ." The 33 per cent of the DM sample who did encounter important differences contended that Anapo was not really Conservative since it lacked an ideology and was the

antithesis of democracy, favoring a dictatorship accompanied by the abolition of all other political parties, and, according to one respondent, calling for a class struggle.

Among the DD leadership, those who asserted the absence of important differences among the three Conservative factions claimed that the only apparent distinctions were either tactical, in the leadership's manner of directing the faction, or of a personalistic nature. Those who saw differences (vis-à-vis Anapo) basically doubted that Anapo was truly a bonafide Conservative group, considering its departure from Conservative traditions. Reference was made to its extremism, although there was no agreement as to what the Anapistas represented, one Unionista leader declaring that "They are somewhat socialist, fascist, and Marxist." A further difference was that "We believe in democratic government whereas they favor dictatorial, de facto government to be achieved by violent means."

With regard to the Independientes, the two who found differences between their faction and the Unionistas claimed that they had continued to represent the traditions of the Conservative party whereas the Unionistas had largely abandoned them due in great part to their "compromising, unconditional" association with the Liberal party in the Frente Nacional. Specifically, they labelled the Unionistas as personalistic, followers of the traditional Liberal doctrine of laissez-faire, and pragmatic to the point where they accommodated themselves to ephemeral situations, thus sacrificing Conservative doctrine. Again, the allusion is made that the purism of the Independientes places them more in tune

with the socio-economic problems of the country, a conclusion derived from the position that the Liberal party still supports laissez-faire and that the Unionistas become their allies in this by dint of the coalition government. One might infer that the Independientes have been so convinced that they have remained true to Conservative party doctrines that they hold contemporary Liberals responsible for traditional Liberal doctrine regardless of how they act in practice.

Nonetheless, it is, perhaps, more significant that seven Independientes found no important differences between their faction and the Unionistas than the fact that two did find such contrasts. Given the Independiente claims that they have represented pure, undiluted Conservative ideology as opposed to the more compromising position of the Unionistas, it seems somewhat surprising that the majority of Independiente leaders did not proceed to confirm the existence of important differences between themselves and the Unionistas. Perhaps behind their facade of ideological sanctity, most Independientes believe that personalistic ambitions and rivalries rather than diverse ideological orientations have produced disunion between the two Conservative factions. (The author continues to believe that the Independientes are more conservative in position than the Unionistas, in the sense of being more rightist, just as he believes that the MRL and the Revitalización movements are somewhat more leftist than the Oficialistas. However, he does not believe that the ideological gap between the Unionistas and Independientes is greater than that between the Oficialistas and the MRL; and the MRL finally reunited with the Oficialistas, which implies a lack of important differences between their two factions.)

On the other hand, Independientes found much the same differences with Anapo as the Unionistas, and were much more unanimous in reading Anapo out of the Conservative party. Reference was made to Anapo's deviation from the tenets of Conservatism, specifically to its demagogic, non-democratic, caudillistic orientation, and its readiness to use violence to achieve its ends. Among those who claimed that Anapo did have an ideology--some contended that it did not--there was no consensus as to what the Anapistas represented. According to one Independiente, the movement "represents the extreme right of our party," while others asserted that it was "socialistic," "a tool of the Communists," preaching revolution, and calling for a class struggle. Another contended that it represented anarchy. Independientes, in general, pointed out that Conservative doctrine stands for harmony among social classes and respect for established authority; and Anapo was the antithesis of this.

Anapo, as was to be expected, differed significantly from both the Unionistas and Independientes in the eyes of its leaders. On the other hand, the Unionistas and Independientes were seen as representing the same interests: the oligarchy. Some 50 per cent of the Anapo sample frankly admitted that their group was calling itself Conservative only to gain legality in accordance with the terms of the Frente Nacional system, and was moving away from even this position by running more Liberal lists. The remaining Anapistas, however, resolutely affirmed that Anapo was a bonafide branch of the Conservative party, representing its avant-garde. Specifically, the consensus among the sample was

that their movement was lower-class oriented, endeavoring to win the allegiance of the "clases populares" of both the Conservatives and Liberals, whereas the Unionistas and Independientes were run by the oligarchy for the benefit of the powerful against the weak. A minority of those interviewed alluded to a radical, perhaps socialistic, orientation of their group by referring to its opposition to the "capitalist oligarchies." Nonetheless, even these leaders admitted the Conservative roots of the movement, commenting that "Anapo is a rebel from the Conservative party." Another major difference between Anapo and the other two groups was seen to be the nationalistic character of their movement, including its steadfast opposition to all imperialism and its demand that Colombia establish trade and diplomatic relations with all nations, under the banner of an "independent" foreign policy.

The hierarchical leaders of Liberal factions were not asked to compare their respective groups with the La Ceja movement because of the latter's non-structured, spiritual quality and the fact that it encompassed members of existing Liberal factions. However, a commentary on the La Ceja Liberals by the Colombian Communist party in their magazine, Documentos Políticos, seems worthy of note. The Communists observe that the Liberal party has been divided into two wings during recent decades due to its multi-class character, but that a tacit compromise had been reached between them. However, the formation of the Frente Nacional coalition inevitably produced a new split, with the MRL taking the side of the masses rather than the ruling class elements of the Liberal party. Meanwhile, the Liberal Oficialistas

"became more and more conservative, compromised to an ever greater degree the progressive traditions of Uribe, López and Gaitán." The pact of Sitges between the two leaders, Alberto Lleras Camargo and Laureano Gómez, who represented the bourgeoisie and big landowning elements of their parties was destined to protect the interests of such status quo elements.¹

The formation of the La Ceja movement was described by the Communist writer as a new split in the Liberal party "to modify that [conservative] path of their party," and an effort to overcome the "ideological aridness" which was currently the state of Liberalismo in Colombia. La Ceja leader Hernando Agudelo Villa was characterized by the Communists as neither a "defender of the status quo nor a revolutionary," but simply a reformist who believed in constant progress without revolution.² The formation of the La Ceja movement by Liberals to give an ideological impulse to their party had produced some reaction among similarly oriented Conservatives. They, too, were considering the holding of "encuentros" (see Chapter V) to renovate Conservatismo by providing it with a modern program to unite its factions, and by a wholesale revision of party leadership ranks.³

A further difference in orientation among Liberal factions seems worthy of comment, although it was not mentioned by any Liberal sampled (although Conservatives made reference to it). This involved a temporary deviation on the part of the Pachaeladistas from the norms of the Frente Nacional by refusing to support the Unionista nominee for the post of controller of Valle department, although the principle of alternation dictated such support by all Liberals within the ranks of Oficialismo.

The Unionista DD condemned this Pachoeladista departure from Frente Nacional guidelines and sent a communiqué to the Unionista DN leadership so that it might express the grievance to the Oficialista DN.

The local DD stressed that

The Conservative Directorate of the Cauca Valley expresses its protest for the disloyal conduct exercised by a sector of the Oficialista Liberals in the Departmental Assembly, pertaining to the current policy oriented by . . . Francisco Eladio Ramírez and Eduardo Buenaventura Lalinde . . . The Directorate, in denouncing these acts, considers that the policy of the Frente Nacional and of the government of Transformation has suffered in the Cauca Valley a serious impact . . .⁴

The DD, in contrast, accented its appreciation for the good behavior of the factions led by Balcázar and Trujillo, "which represents an authentic policy of solidarity with the Frente de Transformación Nacional."⁵ The deviant Pachoeladista votes caused the Unionista candidate to lack the necessary two-thirds majority to be elected controller in the December 1966 election. The Pachoeladista position was one factor which explained Conservative fears that the Liberals might sabotage the coalition agreement by failing to support a Conservative candidate for the presidency in the 1970 elections, a matter which will be treated in the following chapter.

The degree of personalistic leadership is another basis for comparing factions within each overall party. On the Conservative side, the figure of Mariano Ospina Pérez easily seems to eclipse any local Unionista leader. In fact, the Unionistas, both locally and nationally, are often referred to as the Ospinistas. In like manner, the charisma of General Rojas Pinilla justifies the label of Rojistas for Anapo. Similarly, the Independientes appeared to be lacking a

star of great magnitude on the local scene in spite of the national prominence of Cornelio Reyes. However, the faction had been missing a commonly accepted national figure to unify and orient the followers of the late Laureano Gómez and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño. The caudillo's son, Alvaro Gómez, has been a pretender to the throne; thus, the Independientes have been called Alvaristas at times. However, the power struggle has continued, and the Independientes have continued to drift almost aimlessly.

With regard to the Liberals, the MRL pattern has been similar to that of the Conservative factions in that López Michelsen's personalistic rule has far overshadowed any local personage. In contrast to this, the remaining Liberal factions have featured local caudillo predominance. The very labels of "Pacholadistas" and "Balcarcistas," employed by the members of these factions themselves, attest to the dominance of Ramírez and Balcázar over their respective sub-factions. The situation seemed somewhat more complex in the case of the Revitalización movement. Trujillo was undoubtedly the factional leader, but Revitalización hierarchical leaders were split in their opinions as to whether the movement was basically the tool of a caudillo (Trujillo) or primarily an institutionalized organization based on programs over personalities. It appeared that those who opposed Trujillo's strong rule or did not even admit to its existence were those with the most influence in the movement and the most capable of providing alternate leadership roles. Liberals from other factions considered Trujillo to be a caudillo and referred to the faction as the Holmistas-- after Trujillo's middle name. (Holmes is not one of his apellidos.)

The author does not use the label Holmistas due to the fact that many Revitalización organizational leaders do not accept this tag.

Of perhaps equal complexity has been the Revitalización position vis-à-vis the Frente Nacional. While they professed support for the coalition and President Lleras Restrepo, some remarked that it was becoming increasingly difficult to support the president since some of his recent programs, notably a substantial boost in utility rates, had been detrimental to the masses. No Pachueladista or Balcarcista leader voiced such a position. Furthermore, Revitalización leaders seemed uncertain of the Oficialista DN's attitude toward their faction as opposed to the original (Pachueladista-Balcarcista) Oficialista faction. Some commented that the DN manifested favoritism to the original faction during the 1966 congressional elections. One source observed that Revitalización leaders "have expressed at various times their opposition to [Libardo] Lozano Guerrero," the Liberal governor of Valle, for his failure to appoint any Revitalización people to cabinet posts, even though they had won three deputyships, one senatorial post, and two seats in the lower house of congress. On the other hand, only "old caciques" were given positions in the Valle cabinet.⁶ Since the governor must answer to the president for his actions, the rebuff seemed to reflect DN policy.

MRL opposition to the Frente Nacional was adamant and developed out of López Michelsen's discontentment, which inspired him to create a new faction of the Liberal party as a reaction to the coalition. López observed in 1958 that the Frente Nacional was created by the old guard of both parties to bolster their political control by excluding

all possible opposition elements in order not to lose control of the internal direction of their respective parties. He characterized the coalition as "The most monstrous verification of the government monopoly that the heads of the Frente Nacional intend to exercise on the pretext of guaranteeing to the Republic its democratic recovery." López feared that an old guard monopoly would reign for the entire sixteen years, closing the door to other Liberals and Conservatives. On the positive side, López admitted that the Frente Nacional might serve to educate Colombians to tolerate the opposition, and thus promote a stability which would lessen hatred and advance peace in Colombia.⁷ Nonetheless, López continued to believe that the majority Liberals should not alternate the presidency with the minority Conservatives, who, in their own right, could not win a free election.⁸

More recently, Juan José Turbay, another leading MRL figure, asserted the continued opposition to the Frente Nacional on the part of the MRL. "We estimated at that time [1957], and we continue to believe at the present time that the system of the Frente Nacional carries with it the slow and progressive conservatization of the Liberal party By extending its existence . . . we are certain that such an event would compromise the existence of Liberalism" The MRL, he claimed, "fights to return to the party its autonomy; to preserve it from the political hybridism of the single party The perspective of an eventual extension in the life of the Frente Nacional justifies the persistence of a Liberal opposition, the inconformity of a left-wing of the party"⁹ When López Michelsen ran for the presidency in

1962, he attacked the Frente Nacional for its failure to improve Colombia's underdeveloped economy and for the government's use of armed force in suppressing popular unrest. Kenneth F. Johnson observes that the MRL advocated "going it alone" economically, without foreign aid. Moreover, it called for state ownership of natural resources and rejection of Alliance for Progress aid. While the MRL blamed both the Frente Nacional and the United States for Colombia's socio-economic backwardness, it praised Cuba for promoting an energetic housing program for the lower-class. Finally, the MRL favored closer relations between Colombia and the Communist world.¹⁰

However, the MRL position seemed to undergo a substantial change following the faction's decline in the March 1966 congressional elections and Lleras Restrepo's assumption of the presidency in August of that year. This is illustrated by a comparison of Turbay's comments cited above, which were made in February and May, 1966, with later observations made by him the following December. The MRL spokesman now claimed that the faction's unbending commitment to Liberal ideology and criticism of the conservative position of the Frente Nacional had been rewarded. While the MRL had remained firm in its position, the Frente Nacional had become more progressive, due to Lleras Restrepo's new orientation. Hence, the MRL had won a victory. MRL inspiration and pressure according to Turbay, had removed the Liberal party from its status quo rut. "The MRL has partially attained its aim: to induce Liberalism to remain a leftist force . . ."¹¹

Among the new programs for which the MRL claimed credit were the president's imposition of exchange controls, his campaign to end the

two-thirds voting rule, his establishing trade and diplomatic relations with Communist countries, his efforts to implement the agrarian reform law, and his programs of greater state intervention in the country's economy. Indeed, a radical such as Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda asserted that the contribution of the MRL since the implementation of the Frente Nacional system had been important since it "closed the dikes to avoid a complete reactionary turn in the Liberal party, outlining the need to renew the fight for the original ideals."¹² Nonetheless, the Oficialistas by no means had come to represent the MRL position of 1962. The faction appeared to foresee no future for itself and seemed to be paving the way for reunification with the Oficialistas into a united Liberal party while trying to salvage some prestige.

In spite of the strong opposition role of the MRL prior to the time that Lleras Restrepo took office, the Oficialistas did not sever relations with the minority faction. In fact, President Lleras, prior to promulgating his programs, actually invited the MRL to participate in discussions where some give and take could occur. Lleras allegedly stressed to the MRL leadership that they would not have to support Frente Nacional policies for Liberal party union to take place.¹³ The Liberal newspaper El Espectador referred to the MRL as the loyal opposition within the Liberal party. "Without adhering to the Frente Nacional system, which they have repudiated in many essential aspects, the members of the MRL, nonetheless, continue to form part of a great party which tolerates and even stimulates divergences of opinion . . ."¹⁴ The culmination of the MRL's relaxation of opposition toward the Frente Nacional and Oficialista overtures to the MRL was the reunification of

the Liberal party on August 11, 1967. The moribund línea dura, represented by its leader, Ramiro Andrade, also included itself in this union.

Meanwhile, the Revitalización movement was beginning to consider a possible reconciliation with the Ramírez-Balcázar directorate. This new orientation was perhaps directed by the rule passed at the Liberal national convention in February, 1967, whereby only one Liberal directorate would be recognized by the Liberal (Oficialista) DN in any one department or municipio. Hence, the Revitalización movement seemed compelled to reunite with the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas or face exclusion from Oficialismo. On the surface, neither alternative seemed attractive to the movement. If they rejoined their "old guard" enemies, they risked losing their identity as a reformist movement committed to fight against the ills they claimed beset their local Liberal competitors. On the other hand, the price of continued independence was the breaking of links between their movement and President Lleras, an undesired consequence given their open support for the president and the political benefits accrued from their association with Oficialismo and their inclusion in the Frente Nacional system.

Their choice for reunification was first indicated in mid-May, when Trujillo formulated a proposal to Ramírez and Balcázar stipulating Revitalización conditions for a unified directorate with the latter two groups. The major point was that Revitalización wanted equal representation on the departmental directorate and municipal directorates with the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas. Trujillo defended this demand by

declaring that three-way equality was "absolutely necessary because the preponderance of any one of the groups would eventually lead to the renewal of the internal struggle on the part of the group which feels most favored. A balance, on the other hand, eliminates that possibility" Secondly, Trujillo requested that the representatives of the three factions in a unified directorate not serve as factional leaders but, rather, as spokesmen of the Liberal party as a whole, a situation which would inhibit the existence of conflicting alliances within the directorate itself. Finally, Trujillo stressed that this united directorate must "commit itself to the joint defense of the programs and achievements of the [Frente de] Transformación Nacional and carry out a campaign of ideological agitation and intense and modern organization of the masses, the goal of which would be to rescue the mystique of the Liberal party" ¹⁵

The final step to total unification of the Liberal party took place on October 1, 1967, during a special Liberal departmental convention in Cali, when a united directorate was formed, including Pachueladistas, Balcarcistas, MRL leaders, and Revitalización leaders. The problem of representation was resolved by basing it on the proportion of the total Liberal vote obtained by each group in the 1966 congressional elections. Hence, the Pachueladistas and Balcarcistas received seven of the twelve DD seats to divide between themselves, four going to the Ramírez group and three to that of Balcázar. The MRL received three seats, and the Revitalización movement, two. Ramírez, Balcázar, and Trujillo were naturally included in the list of DD members.

Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, Liberal DN president, and López Michelsen presided over the convention, and the former described it as a shining example of democratic procedure. Referring to the fact that the 300 delegates to the departmental convention were the Liberal councilmen from the Valle municipios, Espinosa Valderrama implied that this was an example of local communities participating in major decision-making.¹⁶

The author was informed, however, that such was not the case. Rather, the 300 delegates sat on their hands for twelve hours while all the political activity actually took place behind the scenes. If this was truly the case, the prevalence of caudillo control seems evident, regardless of the democratic trappings utilized to convey a different image. Hence, the result of the Liberal union might be a coalition of caudillos in control of the overall party rather than one caudillo in control of a particular faction. However, a jockeying for power among ambitious caudillos might well result. In fact, some Conservatives had begun to express fears that López Michelsen, who currently was involved in an extensive speech-making campaign, might eventually become the dominant figure in the Liberal party.

The reunification of the Liberal party had strong implications for the still divided Conservative party. Looking ahead to the 1970 presidential elections, Conservatives continued to lack a strong candidate for their turn in office under the alternation. One observer noted the serious nature of the situation by warning

that Anapo might launch the candidacy of Rojas Pinilla and that Guillermo León Valencia might run for another term in office with the support of the Independientes.¹⁷ Both would be eligible by running as Conservatives, and the effect upon the Frente Nacional could be deleterious, especially if the demagogic Anapo leader emerged triumphant. An apparent barrier to Conservative union seemed to be that both the Unionistas and Independientes desired a reunification only if their respective faction could dictate the terms. The spirit of compromise within Liberal ranks which brought the Oficialistas and MRL together appeared to be absent among Conservatives. The Independientes, presumably, were seeking a union which would not mean simply the engulfment of their movement by the stronger Unionistas. The latter, on the other hand, had given indications that their idea of party union would mean little more than adding the Independientes to their ranks as mere subalterns.

Perhaps the different traditions of the Liberal and Conservative parties may serve to explain their different results in attaining party union. The Liberals have prided themselves on their spirit of compromise and respect for freedom to dissent, while the Conservatives have boasted of their respect for hierarchy and authority, characteristics which might not facilitate a compromise. On the other hand, the Conservatives did reunite when Conservative Valencia was in the presidency (dividing again over support for the candidacy of Lleras Restrepo). In like manner, Liberal union, for the first time since the Frente Nacional began, came about when a Liberal president was in office. Perhaps the perquisites obtained from strengthening the president's position by joining one's faction to his were the overriding factor in both cases.

A further difficulty in achieving a union between the Unionistas and Independientes was a split between a soft line and a hard line within the Independiente leadership. Occidente publisher Alvaro Caicedo publicly declared that "My greatest aspiration is to see conservatism united," and that he wanted to "reestablish the dynamics of the Frente Nacional" Accordingly, he called on Independientes to abandon their implacable opposition to Lleras' reform programs, a position which gave the Conservative faction an image of opposition to socio-economic progress.¹⁸ In contrast to this, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado and Cornelio Reyes seemed strongly opposed to any working relationship with President Lleras. Gómez, according to one source, wielded great influence over the actions of Independiente senators and representatives, hence, blocking a change in the negative vote on Lleras' programs.¹⁹ Of great significance is the fact that Caicedo and Reyes are both from Cali. Hence, the national division of the Independientes was closely reflected by the local division.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to Conservative union has been the leadership of Ospina Pérez over the Unionistas. This arch-enemy of the late Laureano Gómez seems unacceptable to the Independientes as overall Conservative leader. In a move which seemed destined to strain further the relations between the Unionistas and Independientes, the former were beginning to call for the union of the party behind the candidacy of Ospina Pérez for the 1970 presidency. To counter this move, Independientes introduced a bill in congress whereby no ex-president would be eligible for the presidency, a step which would eliminate Ospina from consideration. However, this also would prevent Valencia from running again, and the Independientes had been championing

his cause during this period. Perhaps Ospina will have to withdraw from the political scene before old wounds will heal to the point necessary to produce a durable reunification of the Conservative party. Among other things, the Independientes have accused the "Ospinistas" of selling the Conservatives' birthright by unconditionally subordinating themselves to President Lleras.

However, one must bear in mind that only two of the Independientes interviewed by the author claimed that important differences existed between their faction and the Unionistas. This may indicate that the followers of Laureano Gómez have become more moderate in recent years. Hubert Herring distinguishes the moderate Conservatives of the early 1950's from the extremist Laureanistas, observing that "Laureano Gómez personified the clerical-authoritarian tradition of Spain. Contemptuous of democracy, he was an open admirer of Hitler in the early years and a devoted friend of Franco."²⁰ (It will be recalled that 67 per cent of the Independiente sample favored the unstable democracy over the stable dictatorship.)

A valuable interpretation of this change was provided by one of the Independiente interviewees. A self-proclaimed Laureanista from birth, due to family orientation, he contended that Laureanismo lost its ideological orientation when Laureano Gómez died and his son, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, assumed the leadership of the group. Laureano, according to the Independiente, was a great and powerful caudillo, "and this led us to believe that he was the incarnation of the Conservative." This proved to be counterproducing because a highly personalistic, caudillo orientation was firmly established, and Gómez's successors

have lacked his qualities of being "ideologically pure" and "non-opportunistic." The Laureanistas believed that Laureano's son would continue these policies; but he betrayed them by making the Conservative faction opportunistic for the first time, most importantly, allying it with Anapo and the MRL to form a front against the Frente Nacional. He characterized such an alliance as most blatant opportunism, at the sacrifice of principles, considering that Rojas Pinilla was "our worst enemy," due in the first place to the fact that he was the one who overthrew President Laureano Gómez; and since the MRL was "Communist-oriented" and a "tool" of the official Communists.

This new position of the faction in the hands of Alvaro Gómez disillusioned all true Laureanistas. "We can no longer speak with moral authority" As a result, many Laureanistas became politically inactive because they were no longer inclined to associate with the new orientation of their group. The Laureanistas' alliance with the Alzaticistas to form the Independiente faction in 1964 was seen as the beginning of the decline, a "completely opportunistic" move and departure from tradition since Laureano Gómez and Gilberto Alzate Avendano were bitter enemies. The death of these two men brought their followers into a "false union." According to this traditional Laureanista, Alzaticismo had always been totally opportunistic and had lacked a popular base of support to follow its leaders. Hence, the Alzaticistas had first parasited off the Ospinistas, when those two factions were united, and were currently parasites off the Laureanistas. The interviewee noted that one indication of the loss of ideology of the new Laureanistas was

their purely negative program in the 1966 congressional elections, simply to inspire hatred against Lleras Restrepo and the Frente Nacional. The principal consequence of this change from traditional Laureanista policy was the erasure of all important differences among the Laureanistas, Alzatistas, and Ospinistas. The Laureanista concluded with the remark that "We are now guilty of all the criticisms we made of the Ospinistas."

In June 1967, a new periodical, El Insurgente, appeared on the newsstands to express the dissatisfaction of the traditional Laureanistas. The editors characterized themselves as representatives of the "purest" Laureanistas and called for a revitalization of the Conservative party. Hence, this breakaway group from the Independientes perhaps has been more truly a counterpart of the Movimiento de Revitalización Liberal than the Independientes themselves, with the difference that the Liberal revitalization movement was pulling the party in a somewhat more radical direction, while the insurgent Laureanistas, not organized into a political movement, appeared to be pulling in a reactionary direction. Whereas the Independientes had been contending that the Unionistas had forsaken traditional party doctrine for opportunistic reasons, the editors of El Insurgente, in like manner, asserted that the Independientes had abandoned pure party doctrine, having betrayed what Laureano Gómez had exemplified. The editors commented that "Those who have control over the fate of what is poorly called Independentismo are out of focus"; and they urged the convocation of a convention of "old and new Laureanistas" to renovate the party hierarchy with "the doctrine that the Caudillo left us and which we have abandoned . . ." ²¹

A final point to be made regarding the possible reunification of the Conservative party is the extreme unlikelihood that Anapo would include itself in such a union, even if invited. Although most Anapistas had their roots in the Conservative party, Anapo has drifted so far away from the Conservative banner that a reconciliation appears unlikely. In fact, one might well expect a three-party system to develop in Colombia once the Liberal-Conservative monopoly is ended by the termination of the Frente Nacional (unless they opt to continue this unique coalition to preserve their monopoly).

Originally, common belief seemed to be that Anapo was merely another Conservative faction, with ultimate loyalty to the Conservative party. Even as late as the beginning of 1967, the then Valle Unionista DD president, Hernando Navia Varón, in calling for the reunification of the Conservative party, declared: "Ospinistas, Valencistas, Laureanistas, Alzatistas, Anapistas, Alvaristas, Leyvistas, Social Cristianos, we should all be and call ourselves Conservatives without personalistic or groupist labels."²² Shortly before this time, Rojas Pinilla and his daughter María Eugenia had made their initial declarations that Anapo was, in effect, a new political party. Moreover, Anapo leaders referred to both Conservative and Liberal governments under the Frente Nacional with the same scorn, a fact illustrated by Anapo secretary-general Alvaro Ramos Murillo's allusion to the government of Valencia "with its bundle of errors, clumsy actions, and senseless moves . . ." which Lleras Restrepo was continuing in the same manner.²³

The enigma of Rojas Pinilla seemed to be of greatest concern to many true Conservatives, including the editors of El País. The Unionista newspaper on different occasions stressed the different orientations of Rojas and fellow Anapo leader José Jaramillo Giraldo, the Anapista candidate for the 1962 presidential election. After making reference to Jaramillo's alleged radical inclinations, El País concluded that "Above all, Conservatives who still follow General Rojas Pinilla are disillusioned by the leftist character being taken on by Anapo, whose intellectual director today is the crypto-Communist leader Jaramillo Giraldo."²⁴ On another occasion, the Unionista mouthpiece claimed that the high position within Anapo ranks given to Jaramillo and fellow "extremist" Jorge Zalamea "naturally has displeased those who continued to believe in the conservatism of the General . . ."²⁵ Moreover, a top Anapista leader in Cali, Elías Salazar García, was quoted as having remarked that "I am a socialist after thirty years of fighting to get out of conservatism." However, he added that Rojas Pinilla continued to be a Conservative. Furthermore, when Salazar was asked how he would be able to return to congress in the next elections--he was serving as a representative--if he claimed that he belonged to neither of the two traditional parties, he retorted that "I will swear that I am a Conservative, but for electoral reasons."²⁶ More recently, an Anapista interviewed by the author maintained that Rojas had become more of a socialist, having deviated from his former conservatism.

On the other hand, some Anapista interviewees defined the movement's socialism as a rightist socialism, one oriented toward the

position of Francisco Franco. This would imply that the still ill-defined movement might eventually evolve into a fascist party rather than a Communist one as implied by El País. In effect, such ideological confusion seemed to be the product of the great heterogeneity within the ranks of the Anapo hierarchy. Indeed, El País continually published accounts of the exodus from Anapo of true Conservatives who had finally realized that the movement was drifting further away from conservatism. On the other hand, El Tiempo, the Liberal Bogotá newspaper, ran stories on the exodus of Liberals from Anapo ranks. In January, 1967, twenty Liberals from the department of Huila who had joined Anapo prior to the 1966 elections announced their return to the Liberal party. They allegedly joined Anapo due to fuzzy thinking on their part; and they now claimed that they were "deceived by that movement which in the end turned out to be clearly conservative and backward . . ."²⁷ Thus, Anapo presented such a puzzle that it appeared Communist-oriented to many Conservatives, reactionary to many Liberals, and a wide variety of things to Anapistas themselves.

Regardless of the great diversity of opinion concerning the ideological position of Anapo, an observer might logically conclude that the advent of an Anapo government could have a pronounced effect upon the Colombian political system. Its highly demagogic character notwithstanding, the radical nature of recent Anapo platforms cannot be gainsaid. To illustrate:

The Alianza Nacional Popular united the liberal and conservative people to take power and put it in the service of the rejected classes. [Anapo came forth] as a natural reaction of the working masses of the two traditional parties against the working of the

political leaders and liberal and conservative capitalists united together, and as a necessary response to the urgent need to renovate the country under the slogan that the common good must prevail over the private good. The profound crisis in which Colombia finds itself in all fields and the most alarming aspect of which is denationalization through the reign of personalism, has no remedy while the oligarchic system of the Frente Nacional continues in power The Frente Nacional united the liberal oligarchies and conservative plutocracies, thus creating a single party, with its own interests, which exercises power in an exclusive and hegemonic manner. In opposition to this total privilege, Alianza Nacional Popular seeks the Colombian people, whether they call themselves conservative, liberal, or without a party, unite and struggle against the common enemy which is the exploitation of the powerful and its consequences of misery, impossibility of educating one's children, illness, lack of housing, capitalist violence While the plutocratic caste controls the State apparatus, maintains its hegemony with the utilization of repressive means such as political violence, coercion, and bribery, it is morally and logically legal to struggle against its empire with the use of all the elements of force with which one disposes. As it is not presumable that this caste will strip itself of its privileges in an act of generosity, that it will permit itself to be defeated by electoral means, it is necessary to prepare the people to insurrect against the reigning iniquity by means of an insurrectional action. This action must contemplate from sabotage, worker and peasant agitation, street fighting, and individual resistance to general strike and uprising.²⁸

Notes

¹José Arizala, "El Partido Liberal y su Porvenir," Documentos Políticos, No. 64 (December, 1966), pp. 120-123.

²ibid.

³See Elkim Mesa, "Té-Político," El País, November 28, 1966, p. 5.

⁴See El País, December 3, 1966, p. 1.

⁵ibid.

⁶Javier Ayala, "Se Plantea División Liberal en el Valle," El Siglo, October 19, 1966, p. 3.

⁷Alfonso López Michelsen, Colombia en la Hora Cero (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963), pp. 185-186, 190.

⁸John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 296.

⁹Juan José Turbay, "Nueva Estrategia del M.R.L.: Marchar Separados y Combatir Unidos," Acción Liberal, No. 4 (May-June 1966), pp. 63-64; and Fabio Lozano Simonelli and Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza (a debate), "Es Posible la Transformación Dentro del Frente Nacional?," Acción Liberal, No. 3 (February-March 1966), pp. 32-34.

¹⁰Kenneth F. Johnson, "Political Radicalism in Colombia: Electoral Dynamics of 1962 and 1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VII (January 1965), 19-21.

¹¹Juan José Turbay (interview), "Acuerdos Políticos para la Reforma Constitucional Propicia el MRL," Contrapunto, I (December 12, 1966), 10-12.

¹²Orlando Fals Borda, La Subversión en Colombia (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1967), p. 205.

¹³Víctor Mosquera Chau (interview), "Lucha Libre entre Partidos antes de que Termine el F.N.," Cromos, No. 2566 (December 5, 1966), p. 34.

¹⁴"Pangloss," El Espectador, January 16, 1967, p. 2.

¹⁵Occidente, May 21, 1967, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁶El Tiempo, October 2, 1967, pp. 1, 7.

- ¹⁷Elkim Mesa, "Te - Político," El País, January 10, 1967, p. 5.
- ¹⁸Alvaro H. Caicedo (interview), "Mi Máxima Aspiración es la Unión Conservadora," Occidente, December 7, 1966, pp. 3, 23.
- ¹⁹"Tragos Amargos en Coctail de Alvaro H. Caicedo," Contrapunto, December 5, 1966, pp. 4-5.
- ²⁰Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 518.
- ²¹"Insistimos, Convención," El Insurgente, June 1967, p. 4.
- ²²El País, January 3, 1967, pp. 1, 18.
- ²³Alvaro Ramos Murillo, "Lieras Da un Paso Adelante y Dos Atrás," Contrapunto, I (December 5, 1966), 7.
- ²⁴El País, April 30, 1967, pp. 1, 18.
- ²⁵"El País Político," El País, January 15, 1967.
- ²⁶El País, November 24, 1966, p. 5.
- ²⁷El Tiempo, January 8, 1967, p. 2.
- ²⁸Elvira Mendoza, "Nuevos Partidos Políticos en Colombia," Acción Liberal, No. 3 (February-March, 1966), pp. 61-62.

CHAPTER XI

COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF THE TWO OVERALL PARTIES

The hierarchical leaders were then asked to provide a critical evaluation of their overall party as it compared with the other overall party, including the presence or absence of important differences between the two overall parties, the characteristics of their overall party they liked and disliked and the characteristics of the other overall party they liked and disliked. In this manner, the author hoped to gauge the influence of traditional party mystique upon the orientation of the leader in evaluating the two overall parties. It was hypothesized that a leader's value system in these evaluations would be determined greatly by his (presumed) close association with his party's traditional ideology, and his (presumed) negative attitude toward the ideology of the traditional opposition party. Such positive and negative attitudes were considered (by the author) to be the effect of political socialization, a composite of both the pre- and post-recruitment stages.

Presumably, an orientation based on party mystique would have inclined an overwhelming majority of the entire sample to declare that important differences did, indeed, exist between the two overall parties, unless, of course, they believed that their overall party, as opposed to their faction, had abandoned its traditions. As Table 54 illustrates,

TABLE 54

IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO OVERALL PARTIES*

| | | Yes | No |
|----------------|----|-----|----|
| Oficialistas | DM | 6 | 0 |
| | DD | 7 | 3 |
| Revitalización | | 7 | 4 |
| MRL | | 3 | 4 |
| Unionistas | DM | 6 | 6 |
| | DD | 3 | 4 |
| Independientes | | 3 | 6 |
| Anapo | | 2 | 7 |
| Overall | | 37 | 34 |

* N = 103, n = 71.

a far greater percentage of Liberals than Conservatives affirmed the existence of important differences between the overall Liberal and Conservative parties. Sixty-eight per cent of the Liberals acknowledged such differences as opposed to only 38 per cent of the Conservatives. A further breakdown reveals that the non-Frente Nacional factions were much more inclined to deny the presence of important differences than the actual participants in the coalition. Only 33 per cent of the Independientes and 22 per cent of the Anapistas found differences as opposed to 47 per cent of the Unionistas. In like manner, only 43 per cent of the MRL leaders admitted important differences as opposed to 81 per cent of the Oficialistas and 64 per cent of the Revitalización leaders.

On the basis of earlier data, the responses of the non-Frente Nacional factions might well have been predicted. Anapo considers both overall parties to represent the oligarchy against the masses; the Independientes contend that the Unionistas have betrayed Conservative traditions in exchange for harmony with the Liberals; and the MRL claims that the Oficialistas have sacrificed Liberal ideology for the sake of the Frente Nacional. On the other hand, the fact that the very factions that were participating in the coalition government were the ones which saw the least similarity between the Liberal and Conservative parties seems somewhat ironical. Perhaps their close relationship itself has made them prone to asserting their separate identity to defend themselves both to their supporters among the electorate and to their own activists. Furthermore, they have been placed in the role of standard-bearer for their respective overall

party, a function which may imply a sense of responsibility for accentuating the traditional values of one's own party as opposed to those of the traditional competitor.

The fact that Liberals were much more conscious of important differences than Conservatives seems worthy of comment. Apparently, the Liberal party has always considered itself to be more progressive, less status quo-oriented than the Conservative party and either continues to believe or, at least, wants to believe that this difference has not dissipated. On the other hand, Conservatives seem to feel that they have become less rigid, less linked with status quo elites, and, hence, basically a multi-class party like the Liberals.

In harmony with the author's hypothesis, the differences expressed by the leaders in comparing the two overall parties were strongly based on the contrasting traditional mystiques. Accordingly, the Oficialista DM sample generally pointed to the Catholic Church orientation of the Conservatives, plus their dictatorial inclination (restricting the rights of the individual), especially when they occupied power. In contrast, these Liberals saw their party as being more respectful of individual rights, allowing for a "greater freedom of action," and having governments based on law and more progressive in socio-economic policy than the Conservatives. Conceivably, the tenacious hold of the Independientes to Conservative party doctrine in their attacks upon the Unionistas might have influenced this Liberal opinion since the latter might have been thinking more of the Independientes than the Unionistas when they asserted that the two overall parties were basically different.

In like manner, the Oficialista DD leaders stressed Liberal respect for individual freedom in comparison to Conservative discipline; and Liberal efforts to promote social welfare measures as opposed to Conservative satisfaction with the status quo. Regarding the first point, comments were made that the Liberals were "open, free, democratic," and "calling for individual freedom above all"; whereas the Conservatives "call for order," "demand more discipline," and are "dogmatic." As to social orientation, Oficialista DD leaders characterized the Liberals as a "party of the people," aiming to achieve a "better life for the working class," believing in the "permanence of social evolution of the people," and calling for state intervention to aid the masses, based on the orientation that private property must serve a social function. One leader claimed that Liberals "see problems better and work to resolve them."

Conservatives were depicted as aiming to conserve tradition, "neglecting the common welfare," "believing that ignoring problems is the best way to handle them, thus avoiding needed reforms." Furthermore, they were seen as opposing state intervention, "believing that the individual has absolute rule over private property." Calling to mind that state intervention has been a pillar of Conservative doctrine and anathema to Liberal tradition, the Liberals seemed to be moving closer to Conservative ideology. One notes the different interpretation given to such intervention. The modern orientation leans considerably toward more socio-economic reforms, thus, a possible change in the structural situation of the socio-economic system; whereas the

traditional one favored a strong executive to preserve order and exercise sufficient regulation to maintain an assumed harmony among the different strata of society, essentially a status quo position. It must be noted that the Oficialista DD, more so than the DM or the Conservative factions, alluded to practical differences between the two parties, in socio-economic programs and orientation, rather than to the perennial ideological, doctrinal distinctions.

With regard to the responses of Revitalización leaders concerning important differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties, some seemed to indicate a comparison between the Revitalización movement, rather than the overall Liberal party, and the Conservative party. For example, one leader contended that the Liberals represented "renovation and social change," as opposed to the Conservatives' attachment to the status quo; but he had earlier proclaimed that the Oficialistas represented the status quo and were in need of renovation. Furthermore, the Liberals were depicted as being linked to the masses, whereas the Conservatives were tied to the oligarchy, specifically to the Church and landowners, in the opinion of two leaders. One Revitalización leader did, however, make a distinction between his faction and the overall Liberal party in offering his comparison, claiming that the oligarchical Liberals and oligarchical Conservatives represent the same thing; but that some young Conservatives have a more progressive outlook than some Liberals. Indeed, this has been an oft-repeated comment in Colombia, and seems to be another indicator of the lack of homogeneity within the ranks of each overall party.

The MRL leaders, who were more inclined to deny the existence of important differences between the overall Liberals and Conservatives, seemed to be somewhat differently oriented from both the Oficialistas and the Revitalización leaders. Many Oficialistas had pointed to the traditional ideology of the two parties to support their contention that important differences existed; the Revitalización leaders, more idealistically, had found the major difference to lie in the area of attitude toward social reform, comparing the Conservatives' status quo position with the reformist orientation they felt that Liberals ought to have had; whereas the MRL leaders, while considering themselves to be reformist, apparently did not feel that way about Liberals in general, nor did they express the belief that Liberal ideology was basically socialist oriented only to have been betrayed by present Liberal leaders.

In essence, the Revitalización leaders, apparently, were comparing their movement with the overall Conservative party, whereas their MRL counterparts seemed to be comparing the overall Liberal party with the overall Conservative party and basing their argument on the practical positions of the two parties rather than on their traditional ideologies. An indication of this is the fact that the majority of the MRL sample failed to affirm the existence of important differences between the two parties. Among the minority who did find differences, mention was made of the "progressive, advanced programs" of the Liberal party, including the role of the state in promoting such socio-economic measures as agrarian reform (giving all credit to Lleras and none to his Unionista partners), as opposed to the "status quo" orientation of the Conservative

party. Obviously, these MRL leaders were thinking more of their own faction than the overall Liberal party as being "progressive" and "advanced"; but they, significantly, were giving some credit to President Lleras, also.

In contrast to the general Liberal position, most Conservative references to differences between the two overall parties were basically oriented toward traditional ideological distinctions. The Unionista DM leaders stressed that the Conservatives believe in a state of law and respect for the established order and traditions, whereas the Liberals adopt solutions to problems to fit the occasion, thus sacrificing laws and the established order, actually producing libertinism, with its lack of control and order. This situation was pictured as one which might even lead to communism, according to one Unionista DM leader, since Liberals based their programs too much on the ephemeral will of the people. Other DM leaders alluded to the traditional Manchester liberalism of the Liberal party as opposed to the Conservative position in favor of a somewhat directed economy and greater state intervention (which led some Unionistas to claim that it was no sacrifice of Conservative principles to support Lleras Restrepo since he had become more Conservative than Liberal by rejecting laissez-faire capitalism and introducing greater state intervention in the economy). The ideological differences were summed up by one DM leader with the comment, "We are rightists and they are leftists."

In essence, the division between those Unionistas who asserted the presence of major differences between the two parties and those who

did not appear to rest on whether the respondent regarded the traditional ideologies of the two parties as fixed and eternal--hence there would always be basic differences between Conservatives and Liberals, and any waning of these differences in practice would simply constitute an ideological victory for the other side--and was most concerned with the theoretical positions of the parties, or whether he was most concerned with the practical side, irrespective of traditional doctrine. Evidence of this orientation was provided by the consensus opinion that President Lleras was acting in harmony with Conservative party traditions.

With respect to the Unionista DD leaders, of some significance is the fact that more saw important differences among the Conservative factions than between the Conservative party as a whole and the Liberal party (57 per cent vs. 43 per cent). The minority who found differences between the two overall parties alluded primarily to the traditional, philosophical differences, specifically to the closer Conservative ties with the Catholic Church, and the Conservative support for a strong executive branch vis-à-vis Liberal support for strength to lie in the legislative branch. Furthermore, Conservatives were seen as being more closely linked with the rural masses whereas Liberals had more intimate bonds with the urban working class. The fact that the Liberals allowed the MRL, which many Conservatives considered Marxist oriented, to be included within their ranks was given as evidence to support the position that Liberals are more tolerant of Communists than Conservatives.

Much more so than Unionista leaders, the Independientes also found greater differences among Conservative party factions than between the

Conservative and Liberal parties as a whole. While only 11 per cent denied the existence of important differences among the Conservative factions, 67 per cent asserted their absence when comparing the overall Liberal and Conservative parties. The varying responses of the Independientes and the Unionistas might be explained in the following terms. Being the Conservative party purists, at least in theory, the Independientes could understandably be expected to consider themselves as having unique qualities; whereas the less traditional, more pragmatic position of the Unionistas, admitted by the Independientes, would appear to have made them somewhat less inclined to use doctrinal precepts as a measuring gauge. The fact that the Independientes recognized that the Unionistas were the maincurrent of the Conservative party in terms of popular support, and that they (the Independientes) formed a small minority faction as opposed to Unionismo plus Anapismo might explain the small percentage of Independientes sampled who could mention important differences between the Conservatives and Liberals, given the purist belief that the Unionistas currently represented the same thing as the Liberals.

With regard to the Independiente minority that did find important differences between the two main parties, it seemed obvious that they were comparing the Liberals with themselves, or, better said, traditional Liberal doctrine with traditional Conservative doctrine. Hence, they were allowing Conservative ideology to represent the maincurrent of their party rather than voting strength or popular appeal. Specifically, reference was made to Conservative party respect for hierarchy and authority; its calling for a disciplined order behind a strong govern-

ment; its respect for the orientations of the Catholic Church and tradition in general; and its defense of a planned economy behind moderate state intervention. In the words of one Independiente, this position entailed a situation where "The state and the individual have equal rights and obligations without one absorbing the other" The Liberal party, on the other hand, stood for laissez-faire and weak government, with the resulting effect of libertinism and reducing the state to the role of a tool of the individual. To illustrate the concern with traditional doctrine rather than present practice, one Independiente actually picked up a copy of a nineteenth century Conservative ideological program and began to read verbatim to explain his contention that the two parties are radically different today. Nonetheless, all three conceded that the current Liberal president had deviated from Liberal ideology and was closer to Conservative doctrine.

Anapo, on the other hand, maintained a position somewhat similar to that of the Independientes in that each group gave the image that it represented something significantly different from the Liberal party while the Conservative party maincurrent did not. In explaining this phenomenon, one can again assert that the Independientes were comparing the Unionistas with the Liberals whereas the Anapistas were apparently comparing both the Independientes and the Unionistas with the Liberal party. Anapo's growing disassociation from the Conservative label, regardless of the roots of their movement, appeared tantamount to their attaching the same label to the Independientes and Unionistas. Both these factions and the overall Liberal party, in the opinion of Anapistas, represent the oligarchy against the masses. The small minority

of Anapo leaders who were able to encounter major differences between the Conservatives and the Liberals referred to traditional ideology and religious orientation in general.

When the hierarchical leaders were asked to describe what they liked about their parties, they alluded in general, to qualities they found lacking in the other overall party. Oficialista DM leaders seemed most pleased with the Liberal position of "openly preaching freedom," allowing a situation whereby "each member can freely express himself." This also translates into a "generosity with the adversary." A lesser degree of stress was placed upon the social programs of the Liberal party as a further favorable characteristic. Hence, the doctrinal side, since freedom to dissent is a Liberal tradition, drew more favor from the DM sample than the socio-economic side, an indication of a traditionalistic position. More so than their DM counterparts, the Oficialista DD leaders stressed the social programs of their party as something that pleased them. However, this orientation continued to be limited, and more responses affirmed a pride in the Liberal tradition of individual freedom than in the present socio-economic stance of the party. Comments were closely akin to those given in stressing the differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties.

In contrast to this, the general orientation of the Revitalización leaders was to accent their overall party's social programs and close ties with the masses. Contrary to the responses of the Oficialistas, little mention was made of traditional Liberal doctrine such as freedom of expression. Rather, the non-theoretical, practical side was accented,

specifically its "direct contact" and "close association" with the masses, and "socio-economic orientation" to help the lower-class, based on an "unrest toward the status quo." Nonetheless, two Revitalización leaders did refer to theoretical aspects, including the party's "essence, philosophy, and rationalistic liberalism."

In like manner, most of the MRL leaders accented the practical rather than the ideological position of their party when asked to describe its favorable characteristics. Thus, references were made to its "capacity to adapt to modern practices to serve the community"; its trying to "change the structures of the country to deal with modern needs"; its "working for the rights of the masses"; and, in general, its "leftist orientation," and some "tendencies toward socialism." Furthermore, the comment of one MRL leader that "The present government represents just a small elite" revealed that the movement was not united in its satisfaction with Lleras. Contrary to the majority's practical position, two MRL leaders did stress ideological characteristics of the party as what pleased them most, making reference to the internal democracy which allowed for ample discussion of issues and a flexibility in handling problems that arose.

Much more so than the Liberals, the Conservatives, minus Anapo, stressed ideology and tradition over socio-economic programs. Accordingly, most of the Unionista DM sample praised their party's defense of traditions, specifically that of the Catholic religion, its respect for law and liberty within a system of harmonized order, and respect for authority both inside and outside the party. With regard to the preservation of Catholicism, one Unionista commented that the Liberals

had adopted the orientation of the Conservatives. Several also expressed contentment with the party's popular base, its social programs, and its contact with the masses. One, however, claimed that he liked nothing in particular about his party, that he was serving it "simply on account of family tradition and sentiment."

Unionista DD leaders, in general, admired their party's ability to renovate while continuing to adhere to the traditions of promoting liberty within a regime of order and respect for established authority (to prevent libertinism). Specifically, the authority of the Catholic Church as an institution and Catholic doctrine was implicit in this position. This outlook provoked one Unionista to claim, "We are more realistic than the Liberals since our position is based on the internal characteristics of Colombia while theirs is determined more by the international environment." Indeed, some Conservatives admitted that their Church-oriented ideology might be completely out of place in many other countries, but that Colombia has had a rather unique situation due to the highly Catholic orientation of most of the country's people.

Independientes, as was to be expected, elaborated more upon the traditional ideology of the Conservative party than Unionistas in expressing what they liked about their party. Hierarchical order, freedom within a disciplined order regulated by a strong executive and the principles of Catholic papal doctrine, "which is our ideological base," was the essence of these responses. The entire Independiente sample referred to the country-old theoretical position of the party, while giving very little attention to its present practical position.

Finally, as one might well have predicted, the Anapo leaders were most proud of the popular base of their group and its socio-economic orientation, while expressing no favorable commentary concerning the traditions of the Conservative party. Thus, they assumed a position distinct from that of the Unionistas and, especially, the Independientes, who manifested greater pride for theoretical base than for practical activity. What pleased Anapistas about Anapo were its "rebelliousness against the existing system"; its "working mainly for the gain of the lowest social classes"; and its "tendency to give participation to the masses and to work for them." Reference was also made to its nationalism and its providing youth with an opportunity to work for their ideals, thus "freeing them from Liberal and Conservative stagnation." One leader made an oblique allusion to Anapo's roots in the Conservative party, claiming that he liked his party's discipline and that of the Conservative party traditionally. Other responses revealed the personalistic nature of Anapo and some worship of General Rojas Pinilla. One leader referred to "our great chief, who is a man of the people"; while another alluded to the movement's ideology "inspired by the caudillo Rojas Pinilla."

Some surprises were provided when the hierarchical leaders described the characteristics of their parties that they disliked. Most of the Oficialistas DM leaders accented personal ambitions of some party leaders as the characteristic which most displeased them. Ironically, they blamed the very internal freedom that they had earlier praised for encouraging personalism and a general individualism which caused divisions within the party and resulted in a lack of effort to benefit the

collectivity as a whole. Whereas personal ambitions were seen to have a detrimental decentralizing effect, other responses rebuked a counter-producing over-centralizing consequence caused by the monopolizing of all the important decision-making by the DN in Bogotá, without consulting the DDs and DMs. (The Liberals, unlike the Conservatives, have not had a system of federated departments, which allows greater autonomy to the DDs of some major departments.) In like manner, the choosing of party leaders only at national conventions was seen to contribute to this effect.

Similar to the DM paradox, the characteristic which most pleased the Oficialista DD leaders was also the one which most displeased them. While two of the ten sampled found nothing they disliked, seven of the remaining eight made statements to the effect that the internal democracy and freedom to dissent within the party organization had been abused, resulting in a lack of discipline and the triumph of personal ambitions at the expense of loyalty to the collectivity. The result was the development of cliques (círculos) within the organization, producing divisionism and "exclusivism." One leader contended that "The same people always want to run things, excluding others." Two other leaders claimed that this tendency led to the sacrifice of Liberal ideology, thus representing a serious problem. Such self-criticism by Liberals appeared to be an implicit support of the Conservative position that the Liberals' lack of controls and regulations has often led to an abuse of liberty or libertinism. The eighth leader criticized his party for becoming increasingly conservative.

In the case of the Revitalización movement, the dislikes of most of the leaders sampled regarding their party appeared to be criticisms of the overall Liberal party rather than their own movement; whereas their likes had seemed to reflect mainly their attitudes toward their particular faction. Hence, the ten leaders who expressed criticism referred to the "old guard," "traditionalistic," "oligarchically oriented," "personalistic," leadership within the ranks of the party. Two leaders, however, admitted that the Revitalización movement did not completely escape these ills, but was far less afflicted than the Oficialistas. On the other hand, three members of the MRL hierarchy, in a manner akin to that of some Oficialista leaders, mentioned a lack of discipline and good organization as their major dislikes regarding their party. Two others alluded to social questions, one lamenting his party's "inability to win over the masses and break the control of the ruling elite," the other objecting to the party name "Liberal," because "this means laissez-faire, free enterprise." The remaining two, respectively, spoke against pacts with the Conservative party, and the excessively broad scope of the Liberal party, allowing an undue heterogeneity of elements within its ranks.

Turning to the Conservative leadership, only two of the twelve Unionista DM leaders sampled found nothing they disliked, whereas the other ten were for the most part surprisingly critical of the party's "backwardness," "obsolescence," "lack of modernization," "lack of progressive and energetic socio-economic programs to aid the masses," "stagnation," and "failure to keep up with the times." (This type of

criticism was less pronounced on the part of DD leaders, which could imply an ideological satisfaction in direct proportion to hierarchical level.) Concomitant with this apparent ideological discontentment, a criticism was expressed regarding the disproportional, highly disciplined control of the party by an "old guard oligarchy of know nothings," with the names of Ospina, Lloreda, and Independiente leader Alvaro Cacedo mentioned in one case.

Ironically, while there was a deep respect for the Conservative traditions of order, respect for authority over the whims of the rank-and-file, and general discipline, there was also a resentment toward over-discipline and the establishment of an unchallenged, non-modernizing "old guard" as the result of this very respect for established authority. Therefore, the same paradox prevailed among the Conservative leadership that was found among the Liberal leadership. The very party heritage which was praised with one breath was condemned with the next for its ill effects. Hence, homage is rendered to the theory but not to the practice. An important point to consider is that party leaders continue to believe in their party's faithfulness to original party mystique (at least as abstract principles), although they might condemn opposition factions for a betrayal of tradition.

As for Unionista DD leaders' dislikes of their party, only one departmental leader revealed none. The others generally referred to the factional division within the party, claiming that it was basically personalistic in nature, but due in part to false interpretations of Conservative doctrine. However, reference was also made to an "old

guard" which was too traditionalistic, "overlooking the masses." One leader candidly observed that the Conservative party was "too religiously bound, too tied to the Catholic Church and influential priests," and actually against freedom of religion. (This final point was not supported by the results of the scale on attitude toward Protestant missionary activity, included in Chapter IX, Table 52.)

Similar to the Unionistas, the Independientes expressed general discontentment with the non-progressive character and old guard rule of their party. Reference was made to "elite" families in the top positions of the party to the exclusion of those lacking in-group roots. According to one Independiente, "This is almost intrinsic in the Conservative party here." The personal ambitions of the leadership elite were seen as a factor which compounded the detrimental effects of elite rule. Nonetheless, this structural situation could be attributed to the glorification of the caudillo, in this case, Laureano Gómez. When the party is effectively led, the above complaints might disappear; but when this is not thought to be the case, as it has not been since the death of Gómez, such discontentment can become manifest in the hierarchical ranks of the party.

According to one Independiente "We believe that Laureano Gómez was the incarnation of the Conservative party, and this was counter-producing since his successors have been bad" The linking of the ruling elite with an old guard connotation was evident from the use of such adjectives as "oligarchical" and "reactionary." Two Independientes illustrated this point by referring to their faction's implacable opposition to President Lleras Restrepo and his programs even though the

masses supported them, which, they argued placed the Independientes against the interests of the people. A further complaint expressed by Independientes was the poor electoral organization of their group, a situation which one leader blamed on the decentralization promoted by the federated department system of the Conservatives. This appeared to be another example of a complaint generated by the current ineffective leadership of the faction.

Finally, contrary to the case for the Unionistas and Independientes, the majority of Anapistas sampled asserted that there was nothing they disliked about their group. No reference was made to non-progressive character or old guard rule by the three Anapistas who did manifest dislikes; rather, they objected to the personalistic, one-man control of the movement, and one criticized its lack of a well-defined program. Another noted that he had been repelled by the one-time readiness of Anapo leaders to resort to violence; but he claimed that this phase had terminated. One essential difference between the Anapo leaders and those of the remaining political groups was that the latter considered themselves to be Liberals or Conservatives above all, and, thus, both their praise and their criticism took into account both their faction and their overall party. Anapistas, on the other hand, manifested an almost complete detachment from the Conservative party and, consequently, a break with Conservative mystique. Moreover, the Anapo leaders saw no discrepancy between their group's theoretical base and its actual practice since the movement was founded on a position of solidarity with the masses and opposition to the oligarchy, and the leadership appeared to believe that Anapo had been faithful to its ideals.

The leaders were subsequently asked what they liked about the overall opposition party. Significantly, only one Oficialista DM leader and a minority of DD leaders found Conservative party characteristics that they felt worthy of praise. The DM leader admired "the solidarity among their members," while four DD leaders praised the Conservative party's discipline, which "makes it easier to operate as a party," allows them to have "control over their party members," and is conducive to the "loyalty of its leaders and members of the party." Hence, we have the ironical situation where the Liberals first condemned the allegedly rigid hierarchical organization and discipline of the Conservatives for being anti-libertarian, dictatorial, and conducive to dogmatism; then, after reflecting upon their own situation where lack of restraints had led to abuse, some saw a good side to this Conservative orientation. The Conservatives, on the other hand, were to repeat this irony in reverse order. First, they condemned the Liberals' lack of ability to impose discipline as a cause of libertinism; then, after reflecting upon their own situation where an excessive discipline and respect for authority had maintained an allegedly retrograde old guard in top leadership posts, they saw a good side to the Liberal orientation. Quite apparently, each side would like to conserve its orientation while cautiously toning it down by introducing a bit of the other side's orientation.

Somewhat surprisingly, more Revitalización than Oficialista leaders offered favorable comments about the Conservative party, seven of the eleven finding admirable characteristics. However, one of these responses was totally apocryphal, and the laudatory character of two

others was dubious. The first of the three favored the Conservative party for "its mere existence, which gives us something to fight against . . . ," while the latter two praised the minority of its leaders who were leftist-oriented and favored social reform. The remaining four responses were indeed favorable to the Conservative party as an organization, acclaiming it for its centralization behind strong leadership and discipline, and its close-knit character which provided a "strength of union." Conservatives were depicted as somewhat of a "mutual aid" society, helping one another unconditionally in time of need, a quality admittedly lacking in the Liberal organization. Finally, three MRL leaders discovered admirable qualities within the Conservative party, including "their organizational discipline," their "conservation of the principle of political and social order," and the "political equilibrium" they promoted by "sustaining and defending" their traditions. In summary, the overall Liberal sample was most favorably impressed by the strong leadership and discipline of the overall Conservative party.

In contrast to the total lack of admiration for the Conservative party on the part of most Liberals, the majority of Conservatives, aside from Anapo, praised certain characteristics of the Liberal party. This is best illustrated by the fact that ten of the twelve Unionista DM leaders encountered favorable Liberal attributes. Reference was mainly directed to the less traditionalistic character of the Liberal party, the evolution of its doctrine as opposed to that of the Conservatives, and its greater identification with the masses in its

more progressive socio-economic programs. Paradoxically, however, some of the Unionistas who had expressed a like for their party's great respect for established order and authority also praised the Liberals for their tendency to dissent against their hierarchy and for the greater freedom of expression allowed within their ranks. In like manner, some Unionistas had praised their party for adhering to fixed principles, condemning the Liberals for promoting libertinism by basing their programs on the ephemeral will of people while others were now praising the Liberals for "giving priority to the masses to intervene in the destiny of their party."

With regard to the Unionista DD leaders, their most laudatory comment about the Liberal party was its declining hatred for Conservatives and, consequently, its fairly harmonious participation with the latter in the Frente Nacional. The Unionista DD leaders who had declared that they saw no important differences between the two parties claimed that the termination of what once were important differences, accompanied by a greater approximation of the two parties, led them to like the same points about the Liberal party that they admired in their own. Three of the seven departmental leaders frankly admired the social position of the Liberal party, "which has impelled much needed social action to aid the masses." Another leader gave credit to the Liberals for their "free examination of public problems."

Even among the Independientes, the most traditionalistic and inflexible of Conservative factions, two-thirds of the leaders discovered praiseworthy characteristics of the Liberal party. Similar to the general Unionista response, praise was directed toward the

Liberals' internal democracy and unhindered freedom of expression. This position suggests disquiet with the discipline and authoritarianism associated with their own party, although no Independiente would admit such discontentment (perhaps because this would have represented an attack on the traditional Conservative doctrine which they have upheld so tenaciously). Again in harmony with some Unionista responses, two Independientes lauded the Liberals for their progressive programs and, in one case, "their great desire to improve the lot of the working class." A third laudatory remark concerned the approximation of the Liberal party to the Conservative position; and the connection between this point and the previous one should not be gainsaid since specific reference was made to greater state intervention. The state's role has been one of promoting socio-economic programs, which suggests that the Conservatives have been attempting to claim an ideological victory while manifesting solidarity with the masses.

Again, the Anapo position differed from that of the Unionistas and Independientes in that most of the latter had described characteristics which they liked about the Liberal party, whereas nearly all Anapo leaders could think of nothing. One, however, did admire their internal freedom of expression, something apparently absent within Anapista ranks, and another wryly remarked that she liked "the Liberals among the masses who support us." The majority position appears to be in harmony with the Anapo consensus that important differences exist among the three Conservative factions, and that the Conservative and Liberal parties represent the same thing. One might conclude from this viewpoint that the hold of any original Conservative

roots that Anapo might have had is very weak indeed, and that the movement, as witnessed by its growing number of Liberal lists, has been moving ever closer to a third party position.

Finally, the leaders were asked what they disliked about the overall opposition party. At this point, the tenacity of traditional party mystique in orienting responses seemed most pronounced. An integral part of the socialization process of Liberals, perhaps well before actual recruitment since it may be imparted from one's own family, seems to stress the good qualities of Liberal party internal democracy and the bad qualities of the disciplined, authoritarian rule prevailing within the Conservative party. In contrast, the socialization process of Conservatives appears to accent the benefits of discipline as opposed to the drawbacks of uncurtailed individual freedom.

Correspondingly, the Oficialista DM sample was in general agreement in criticizing the strong, dictatorial governments which they considered to be a feature of Conservative rule, governments which have denied the basic rights of the people and have persecuted Liberals specifically. One DM leader complained about the "dogmatism" of the Conservative party, an apparent reference to the continued influence of traditional Conservative doctrine. In like manner, their DD counterparts accented the authoritarian characteristics of the Conservative party as the aspect they most disliked. This sentiment was summed up by a comment of one leader regarding the "lack of freedom and the rigid hierarchy in their ranks, demanding rigid subordination." Other reference was made to Conservative links with the oligarchy, and one Oficialista criticized their "tendency to exploit religion as a political instrument." It

should be stressed that both Liberals and Conservatives revealed most concern with the other's orientation when it was in power. Thus, Liberals referred to dictatorial rule by strong Conservative presidents who severely restricted civil liberties, whereas Conservatives alluded to weak Liberal presidents who were ineffective in controlling the country and preserving order, which led to instability and anarchical situations.

Revitalización leaders, in describing their dislikes about the Conservative party, also placed some stress on past Conservative actions when in power. Five of the eleven made comments alluding to their "methods to get into power and stay there," their "history of violence," their "persecution of Liberals," and their "sectarianism." In like manner, the Church-oriented position of Conservatives, their dogmatism, and their "accentuated attachment to traditions" were accented by two leaders. Six, however, noted a "retrograde," "reactionary," and "status quo" orientation of the Conservative party which, according to one, made the Conservatives a "force that paralyzes the development of means to aid the masses" Considering that only one out of sixteen Oficialistas had asserted that he disliked the Conservative party for defending the status quo, in spite of the fact that six had contended that the Liberals were more actively behind social reforms when they were proclaiming the important differences between the two parties, this appears to be another indicator that the Revitalización movement has been more socio-economic reform conscious than the Oficialistas, and less concerned with comparing the traditional doctrines of the two parties.

Similar to the Revitalización position, the general response of the MRL leaders was a composite of criticism of Conservative ideology, oppressive governments, and status quo position toward socio-economic reforms. MRL leaders disliked the Conservative party most for the actions of past Conservative governments, one claiming that "All Conservative presidents have created violence in Colombia and have destroyed the economic reserves." Two others attacked its traditional doctrine of placing order above freedom of expression, one contending that Conservatives believe that political power comes from God and is channelled down through a "vertical division established between rulers and ruled." Three others condemned its general status quo position, including its "inflexibility and reaction against necessary social changes," and its "representation of the most ideologically backward groups." One rebuked its ties with the Church.

In spite of the majority of Conservatives, excluding Anapo, who had found grounds for praising the Liberal party, an even larger majority found grounds for rebuking it. While two of the Unionista DM leaders could mention nothing they disliked about the Liberal party, the other ten alluded mainly to Liberal "sectarianism" and traditional Liberal party ideology and manner of governing when in power. Liberals were depicted as being overly arrogant toward Conservatives, boasting that they stood for all that was good while Conservatives represented everything bad, especially in attaching the blame for the bloody violencia and inter-party hatreds. This sectarianism was seen as a threat to the Conservative rights within the Frente Nacional and even a threat to the principle of presidential alternation

(referring to 1970). Reference was made to the Liberals' preaching libertinism to the masses, against the order of the state, by "weakening authority and traditional ideological principles by allowing too much internal democracy and basing decisions on the will of poorly prepared majorities" In essence, weak leadership by past Liberal presidents was blamed for resulting disorder and libertinism.

This criticism of Liberal leadership suggests that the Conservative critics cannot detach themselves from traditional Liberal theory as opposed to present practice, and that President Lleras' admittedly strong executive role represents nothing more than a temporary departure from traditional Liberal ideology. Again with reference to the actions of Liberal presidents in power, some Unionista respondents scorned their alleged lack of respect for the written law, resolving problems by "impromptu, de facto" means. One Unionista even condemned Liberals for their alleged laissez-faire orientation, another example of an apparent inability to divorce traditional theory from modern day practice. Again, along the line of respect for established authority, another Unionista found fault with the continuing anti-clericalism of Liberal party leaders, although he admitted that this had diminished greatly over the years.

In like manner, the Unionista DD leaders also stressed the negative "sectarianism" of the Liberals, contending that the latter consider themselves to be the sole defenders of democracy, are demagogic in their actions, and want full control, even within the Frente Nacional, to determine Colombia's destiny. This orientation allegedly impelled Liberals to infringe upon the rights of Conservatives, consequently fanning the hatreds which the Frente Nacional was supposed to terminate.

Comparing the Independientes' dislike for the Liberal party with those of the Unionistas, one detects a greater ideological orientation on the part of the former. Much Unionista criticism simply referred to Liberal intolerance of Conservatives, hence, to outer-directed Liberal policies toward the overall opposition party rather than to intrinsic qualities of the Liberal party itself. Independientes, on the other hand, approached a consensus that the Liberal party was intrinsically bad in some respects, that Liberal ideology was potentially dangerous due to its "revolutionary," "idealistic," and "utopian" features. Following this argument, the Liberals occupy a closer position to communism on the political spectrum than the Conservatives; and the Independientes illustrate this contention by pointing to the Liberals' greater tolerance of communism and the fact that Communists (referring to elements within the MRL, notably the MRL del Pueblo), have had more links with the Liberal party than with the Conservative party. One Independiente claimed that old guard control of the Liberal party had contributed to this situation since dissatisfied young Liberals turned to the MRL and the La Ceja movement for relief, both of which some Independientes considered to be deserving of the Communist label. Similar to some Unionista responses, there was Independiente criticism for the Liberal support of a strong parliament and weak executive, another example of attaching greater importance to traditional ideology than to practice. Independientes also found Liberals to be overly sectarian, specifically in having undermined the Frente Nacional principles by imposing the candidacy of Lleras Restrepo, and permissive of a freedom which leads to license.

Finally, as one might well have predicted by this stage, most of the Anapo leaders asserted that what they disliked most about the Liberal party was its oligarchical control and orientation, against the interests of the lower-class (in other words, exactly what they would have disliked most about the overall Conservative party). In fact, six of the nine Anapistas referred to such Liberal oligarchical orientation. The other three, however, manifested that the Conservative party roots of some Anapistas had not yet entirely decayed. One referred to the "anti-Church" orientation of the Liberals, while the remaining two respectively condemned their "materialistic ideology" and the "Communist orientation" of some Liberal leaders.

A Closer Look at Party Programs

In order to further compare and evaluate the two overall parties, a closer look at Liberal and Conservative party programs seems in order. The traditional Liberal and Conservative programs closely parallel those of other archetypal Liberal and Conservative parties which abounded in Latin America during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but have for the most part faded from Latin American political systems. Hence, we will note the applicability to the Colombian party dichotomy of Frank Brandenburg's stereotype of Latin American Liberal and Conservative parties:

These Liberal and Conservative parties were really factional groupings within a small, wealthy ruling class. Yet this does not mean that they lacked issues. The Liberals generally advocated encouragement of commerce through free trade, freer immigration, free secular schools, a broader suffrage, and republican government.

Conservatives also favored some of these things at times as well as regularly upholding the Church's interests, strong unitary forms of government, the Spanish or Portuguese connection through loyalty to monarchism, and the interests of large landowners.¹

Charles Anderson adds further insight by referring to the "organic relationship between state, Church, and economy" sought by Conservative governments.²

The tenacity of this traditional Conservative doctrine in Colombia is exemplified by the fact that the new promulgation of Conservative party doctrine in 1949, occasioned by the one hundredth anniversary of the original promulgation in 1849, in great part conserves the exact wording found in its mid-nineteenth century predecessor. The following precepts provide an illustration:

1. We defend the natural rights of the human person before the State, integrated into society by means of the family and called to a supernatural end.
2. We affirm the rights of the family as the fundamental cell of civil society, its constitution by means of Catholic matrimony and the inviolable moral faculty of parents to educate their children in a Christian manner against the monopoly and laicism of teaching . . .
3. We support the rational rights of the State . . . the recognition of legitimate authority as naturally necessary to social order and of divine origin . . .
4. We recognize the rights of the Catholic Church as a perfect society, superior to any other by the order of its activities, and the need for religion as a natural and existing link between man and his Creator.³

Dix notes the continuing Conservative allegiance to traditional party tenets, citing the following section of the Conservative party platform issued by the national directorate in 1957, at the beginning of the Frente Nacional: "The key to the prevailing social unrest can be found in the contradiction which exists between the sad situation of the Colombian community and the formidable thought of Conservatism in social and economic matters, which is wise and just, based as it is

on the truth of Catholic philosophy." Dix, himself, adds that "In keeping with this general orientation, the family, rather than the individual, occupies the central position in the social order" Moreover, "As mentor of the moral order, the Church's role in education--public as well as private--is to be a key one" Dix stresses that the Conservative party continues to emphasize "order and hierarchy" and a "strong central authority."⁴

Thus, the strongly Catholic orientation continues to prevail, together with a close relationship of "authority," "order," and "divine origin." The political order seems to fit the Augustinian conception of a vertical relationship between God, the "legitimate authority," and the people, the implication being that the kingdom of man is to be subordinate to the kingdom of God and entrusted with the preservation of Catholic principles above all.

The Liberals, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat less enamored with their traditional ideology, perhaps an effect of the apparent peace pact they have made with the Catholic Church and their declining adherence to laissez-faire principles. Nonetheless, the new party statutes adopted at the Liberal convention in 1963 paid deference to tradition by declaring that "Liberalism should without delay remake its organization to readjust it to its traditional democratic and decentralist principles"; and that "The Colombian Liberal Party is an association of citizens united for the respect that they profess for human rights; for their common faith in political liberty and in the systems of representative democracy"⁵

However, in lieu of rendering homage to laissez-faire doctrines, the Liberals characterized themselves as a "coalition of leftist shades . . ." with the "will to establish . . . a social organization founded on the recognition of human solidarity and directed toward jointly attaining an accelerated economic development and a progressive improvement in the distribution of the wealth and income." The final blow to ideological adherence to laissez-faire is provided by the statement that "The party considers it necessary that to reach those goals the State intervene in accordance with the Constitution in the organization of the functioning of the national economy It reaffirms the primacy of the social interest and public utility over private interests" ⁶ Finally, traditional Liberal deference to the weak executive fell by the wayside when presidential candidate Lleras Restrepo included in his program the strengthening of the role of the executive: "The legislative branch has continued to enjoy powers in areas in which it cannot exercise them with the agility and speed that are indispensable." ⁷

Due to the fact that many of the traditional Liberal-Conservative points of conflict have virtually disappeared or, at least, have lost their political impact, one might assert that Liberal and Conservative leadership and, presumably, the parties' respective followings today come close to sharing a common political culture. Anti-clericalism as a divisory factor has waned considerably as have the centralism vs federalism issue and the broader suffrage issue, to mention some of the major fields of combat. Moreover, as Dix observes, the two

parties have practiced an "accommodation or aggregation of a multiplicity of interests" in recent times.⁸ This multi-class nature and overlapping interest group base of the two parties should have aided the development of a common political culture. Hence, from a political culture standpoint, one should not be overly surprised that the maincurrents of the Liberal and Conservative parties have appeared to work quite well together.

It must be stressed that past differences in political culture served to create an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred that has outlived the objective reasons for its existence; and the following of one party, in great part, continues to view that of the other in the light of the periods where differences in political culture were greatest as reflected by the parties' political programs and types of decision-making while in office. (This attitude was especially prevalent during the violencia.) Thus, the socialization processes of the two parties have served to teach "born" Conservatives how different they are from Liberals, and "born" Liberals how distinct they are from Conservatives. However, this negative, now ill-founded, indoctrination appears to be on the decline, at least in urban areas, where inter-action between Conservatives and Liberals seems to be greatest. This development has occurred as the Frente Nacional working relationship has revealed a diminishing of basic differences between Conservatives and Liberals. It remains to be seen whether the "hereditary hatreds" are now on the decline.

Nonetheless, our earlier conclusion that the only pronounced differences between the two parties are between their extremes seems worthy

of further comment. This is not a pattern that has only recently developed as a consequence of the Frente Nacional. Burnett, writing shortly before the coalition was established, observed that "The left wing of the Liberal party and the right wing of the Conservative party show little if any agreement over Church-State relations. The moderate wings of both parties, however, tend to differ more in degree on some issues and are almost in full accord on others."⁹ Furthermore, the clashes between Liberals and Conservatives since 1930 have been depicted as consequences of confrontations between party extremes. According to Burnett,

Colombian political parties appear to operate best within a democratic framework when the moderate factions of the two major parties are in power When the more extreme wing of either of the parties has attained control of government, however, normally democratic competition is transformed into intense and unduly bitter rivalry.¹⁰

Unfortunately for tolerance and stability, many Liberals and Conservatives alike associate the opposition party with its extremist wing. However, the recent findings of Johnson support those of the author:

There is a striking lack of a genuine substantive ideological distinction between the Liberals and Conservatives who now comprise the National Front. Members of both groups readily admitted, in personal interviews with the author, that there remained few real differences between the political skills and goals of the ospinistas and the Liberal followers of Lleras Restrepo.¹¹

Nonetheless, the recent reunification of the MRL with the Liberal party mainstream might serve to accentuate prevailing Liberal-Conservative differences, if only due to Conservative fears concerning MRL extremism.

Significantly, it is not merely the Conservative extreme which has voiced strong fears regarding the MRL. The more moderate Unionistas, through El País, have spoken scornfully of this Liberal movement,

denouncing it as recently as late 1966 as "a group influenced by Marxism-Leninism." The Cali newspaper warned Colombians: "Don't believe that communism is alone against society and the State. The Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal receives its votes and defends it."¹²

Indeed, the original orientation of López Michelsen and the MRL in the early 1960's gave the movement an image which would inspire fears among non-Communist elements. However, a change in MRL orientation is aptly described by Dix:

The MRL's alliance with the Communists has worn thin. After a long period of hesitation, during which López sometimes spoke at Communist-organized rallies under portraits of Lenin and Castro, and at other times appeared to disavow Communist support, the leader of the MRL pronounced the movement as firmly opposed to undue links with the Communists . . . Henceforth, Communist candidates were not to appear on MRL lists, nor would the MRL surrender its autonomy by joining in a Popular Front of all leftist groups¹³

Conservative fears seem to emanate from an underlying preoccupation that the control of Liberal party moderates, those participating in the Frente Nacional, may be increasingly undermined by more radical Liberals, those inclined to advance the cause of Liberal sectarianism at the expense of the Frente Nacional and cooperation with the Conservative party. El País has manifested such suspicions with reference to the La Ceja movement, asserting that the La Ceja "encuentros" were "shrouded in a sectarian spirit which is not in agreement with the noble policy of National Transformation for whose dismantling they are clamoring," at a time when the upcoming presidency corresponds to the Conservative party. The Unionista daily then proceeds to accuse the La Ceja movement of trying to revive old hatreds between the two parties

by undermining the rights of the Conservatives.¹⁴ (This commentary appeared to be impelled by a discussion at a recent La Ceja meeting concerning the immediate ending of legislative parity as a preparatory step toward ending the Frente Nacional in 1974. The Conservatives, being the minority party, would probably lose a considerable amount of legislative representation with the end of parity.)

Beyond the sixteen-year coalition agreement dictated by the Frente Nacional, perhaps the major factor which has produced close ties between the Oficialistas and the Unionistas has been their need to work together in the face of the growing strength of Anapo. Any pronounced split within the coalition might not only fan the flames of past hatreds, but also attract more Colombians to the side of Anapo as they lost more faith in the ability of the Frente Nacional to serve as an effective vehicle for the promotion of meaningful socio-economic reforms.

The desire of both Oficialistas and Unionistas to strengthen the reformist image of the Frente Nacional to counter growing disillusionment (which in turn has led to growing opposition or, simply, outright apathy or withdrawal from all forms of political participation), has led them to strengthen the role of the executive to enable him to give greater impulse to reforms. This growing socio-economic orientation of the mainstreams of both parties, in turn, has undermined the traditional ideologies of Liberals and Conservatives alike. In a notable ideological turnabout, the Liberal El Tiempo applauded President Lleras Restrepo's threats to rule by decree unless congress gave him

extraordinary faculties to carry out economic measures;¹⁵ while the Independientes' Occidente simultaneously rebuked executive usurpation of legislative roles and wondered how Unionistas could support such an undemocratic president.¹⁶

Notes

¹ Frank R. Brandenburg, "Political Parties and Elections," Government and Politics in Latin America, ed. Harold E. Davis (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 191-192.

² Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 19.

³ Los Programas Conservadores de 1849 a 1949 (Bogotá: Directorio Nacional Conservador, 1952).

⁴ Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 233.

⁵ Estatutos del Partido Liberal Colombiano (Bogotá: Directorio Nacional Liberal, 1963).

⁶ ibid.

⁷ Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Un Programa de Transformación Nacional (speech) (Bogotá: November, 1965).

⁸ Dix, op. cit., p. 222.

⁹ Ben G. Burnett, 'The Recent Colombian Party System: Its Organization and Procedures' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955), p. 149.

¹⁰ ibid., p. 169.

¹¹ Kenneth F. Johnson, "Political Radicalism in Colombia: Electoral Dynamics of 1962 and 1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VII (January 1965), 25.

¹² "Hacia la Unidad Conservadora," (editorial), El País, October 25, 1966, p. 4; and "El País Político," op. cit., p. 5.

¹³ Dix, op. cit., pp. 266-267.

¹⁴ "Los Encuentros" (editorial), El País, May 16, 1967, p. 4.

¹⁵ "Llamamiento al Congreso," (editorial), El Tiempo, January 18, 1967, p. 4.

¹⁶ "Golpe al Parlamento" (editorial), Occidente, January 18, 1967, p. 4.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

It would be fitting as a final task in our comparison of Liberal and Conservative party leadership in Cali, Colombia, to draw a portrait of the average hierarchical leader in our study. We may describe him in the following manner: He is male, about forty years of age, and has lived in Cali a long time, nearly thirty years. He has attained a college degree, quite likely in law, and lives in an upper middle-class neighborhood.

He is very conscious of his party's ideological traditions and strives to maintain allegiance to them, stressing those which do not relate directly to socio-economic questions, such as individual freedom or respect for authority. His socialization and recruitment into his overall party have been based greatly upon his identification and association with its ideology. Quite likely, his family has played a role in this socialization and recruitment, if only in the sense of serving as an example. Specifically, he has maintained the partisan allegiance of his father, and as a further stimulus, the father, himself, has very possibly been active in politics.

Such influence notwithstanding, our leader took the initiative in his own recruitment and rendered services to his overall party in lesser roles prior to his appointment to a hierarchical position. He has a mildly favorable attitude toward his role as hierarchical leader,

but aspires to a superior hierarchical position. Based on current longevity figures, we should not expect him to remain in the hierarchy more than five to ten years.

His hierarchical role by no means occupies the bulk of his overall activity. Since it provides no remuneration, he spends much of his time at another occupation, probably law. Moreover, he is either currently serving in a legislative role or has done so in the past, most likely as a member of a city council or a departmental assembly. Thus, we might expect to find him in a triple role: hierarchical, legislative, and non-political occupation (which provides his major means of livelihood).

He considers himself to be well informed about voter distribution in Cali, and has actually partaken in campaigns to recruit new voters. This is merely one facet of his wide array of organizational activities, given the lack of functional distribution of labor within his hierarchical directorate. The bulk of his electoral campaign efforts are rendered in lower-class neighborhoods (the barrios populares). Moreover, he remains fairly active during non-campaign periods.

Our leader has had considerable contact with national directorate leaders, but feels that he has had little influence upon national party policy, a situation which he is inclined to resent. His critical attitude extends to the shortcomings of his own directorate, such as the inactivity of some leaders, lack of a functional distribution of labor, excess of personal ambition, and excessive promotion due to factors of influence and personal ties rather than merit. He is somewhat less critical of his overall hierarchy for some of the same defects.

His ideological orientation is very pronounced. He proclaims that he favors defenders of party ideology as electoral candidates over individuals who have greater voter appeal but are less faithful to party traditions. His greatest satisfaction in his hierarchical role is ideological contentment. Our leader associates his role with an obligation to the community, and expresses more favorable attitudes toward the middle- and lower-class than toward the upper-class and big landowners and big businessmen in particular. He believes in the existence of key individuals in Cali politics, but fails to associate them with a particular interest group or to admit his dependence on such individuals.

Finally, he tends to be critical of the other overall party's traditions, but is also inclined to praise certain favorable aspects related to these traditions. Obversely, he admits certain unfavorable characteristics of his own party's traditions while he continues to pledge allegiance to the traditions themselves. This attitude suggests that the severe cultural fragmentation which has traditionally separated Liberals and Conservatives has begun to weaken in the face of growing cultural homogeneity.

Various illustrations in Chapter XI and in the overall body of the text have accented the fact that a common Liberal-Conservative political culture has been developing as both overall parties have loosened the binds of their divisionist ideologies and have become more pragmatic in outlook. While the labels Liberal and Conservative had the connotation of disparate ideological syndromes, one could well have spoken of separate Liberal and Conservative sub-cultures.

Accordingly, political integration was very incomplete, and the socialization processes of the two parties were dysfunctional in the sense that they fortified the fragmented political culture rather than serving as vehicles to promote a single, all-encompassing political culture. Indeed, the fact that the major media of communication, the press and the radio, continue to serve the particularistic objectives of a determined party or faction accents the limited autonomy of sub-systems (within the overall political system), a condition often related to a fragmented political culture.

If we define political culture as consisting of the "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place,"¹ (hence the boundaries of accepted political behavior); and political integration as "essentially the degree of normative consensus about political behavior,"² we may contemplate the extensive inter-relationship between the two concepts. Accordingly, Calude Ake observes that "In essence the problem of political integration is one of developing a political culture and of inducing commitment to it."³ Little imagination is required to relate political culture and political integration to political socialization, which has been a major theme of this paper. In effect, much of the data exhibited during the course of the paper have been a reflection of the stages of socialization to which the Cali hierarchical leadership has been submitted; and the socialization, in turn, has been a reflection of what has indeed been a fragmented political culture, although one which has

manifested signs of defragmentation as far as Liberals and Conservatives are concerned. (But perhaps a new and growing fragmentation has arisen, caused by Anapo's apparently increasing alienation from both the Liberal and Conservative sub-cultures.)

As we have seen, Colombia's bifurcated political culture has been based on non-socio-economic values, including the Church-State controversy, governmental centralization, and the role of the executive branch of government. It has, furthermore, represented a conflict between the ideals of authoritarianism and those of individualism. This may explain why both the Liberal and Conservative mystique have remained remarkably well preserved after a century-and-a-half of Liberal-Conservative rivalry. Most notably, the Liberals have been changing from a laissez-faire to a social welfare orientation, but have maintained a close identification with their original ideological foundation. The perpetual and often bitter Liberal-Conservative rivalry may have served to petrify both party ideologies to the point where they have become fetishes, objects of blind reverence. If such is the case, one could argue that the ideologically oriented responses induced from the Cali hierarchical leadership were merely automatic reactions and not necessarily related to reality.

Whether the ideologies are facades or are truly functional in producing cause-effect relationships is a complex question which demands a complex answer. Indeed, the growing pragmatism which has produced greater compromise and its corresponding ideological impairment is a case for the fetish-facade position. However, the fact that the ideological orientation as a product of party mystique continues to

prevail indicates that party socialization continues to be channelled along the same divisive Liberal-Conservative ideological lines. The recent bloody civil war between Liberals and Conservatives manifests the limits of pragmatism as an emasculator of ideology. Post-civil war pragmatism has been pronounced and has been exemplified by the prolonged Liberal-Conservative coalition regime. It may be in great part the product of the shock which resulted from the terrible violencia. Once preoccupation with peace at all costs begins to wane, will pragmatism decline relative to ideologism? Will this be the result of the termination of the Frente Nacional (scheduled for 1974)?

If Anapo succeeds in developing into a homogeneous and cohesive third party on the left side of the political spectrum and assumes an ideology highly defined in socio-economic terms, with an exaggerated lower-class orientation, the effect upon the Colombian political culture could be pronounced. The impact of an ideology defined basically in socio-economic terms might impel greater Liberal-Conservative pragmatism which would further unite the two sub-cultures. Since both Liberal and Conservative mystique are not highly defined in socio-economic terms, and since non-extremist factions of both parties are fairly close in socio-economic orientation, the author would expect greater common effort on the part of Liberals and Conservatives the more they viewed Anapo to be a threat to the socio-economic interests they defended and, in general, to the long-time Liberal-Conservative monopoly over the Colombian political system.

Should the Anapo threat be taken as highly serious, the author could conceive of a continuation of the Frente Nacional to block Anapo from asserting its independence as a third party. We have seen that a sizable percentage of our Unionista sample, in contrast to our Oficialistas, favored the continuation of the coalition past the scheduled 1974 termination date. The author attributed the Unionista orientation to the fact that the Conservatives are the minority party in Colombia's two-party system, and open competition with the Liberals, not to mention Anapo, might prove highly detrimental to the Conservative cause. A Liberal triumph in a post-Frente Nacional election would wipe out the lucrative patronage which accrues to the Unionistas under the coalition parity provision. If Anapo was successful in mobilizing the huge percentage of non-voters (see Chapter III) behind its banner, and, as a result, obtained a percentage of the total vote equal to or greater than that of the (now united) Liberal party in the 1970 elections, the author could foresee, as the initial step if it had not already been taken, the reunification of the Unionistas and Independientes, and, subsequently, overwhelming Liberal-Conservative solidarity on behalf of the extension of the Frente Nacional coalition.

If the results of our survey in Cali are applicable to the Colombian political system as a whole, we can see a considerable waning of ideological extremism, a fact reflected by Liberal praise for alleged good aspects of Conservative authoritarianism and Conservative praise for alleged beneficial characteristics found in the Liberal accent on individual freedom (see Chapter XI). Hence, a prolonged working relationship between the two parties does not seem unfeasible. However, a

common fear of Anapo or a return of the violencia in the absence of coalition government would probably be a necessary catalyst to produce a continuation of the Frente Nacional, given the Liberal, if not the Conservative, opposition to extension.

On the other hand, we should consider the possible effect of a substantial decline in Anapo voting strength prior to 1974. The coalition would probably end on schedule, and the moderate-extremist dichotomy in each party would probably persist. The current reunification of the Liberal party might imply an end to the Liberal dichotomy; but such an assumption might prove unwarranted. Currently, President Lleras Restrepo has served as a force of cohesion, unifying behind his leadership both party traditionalists and party modernizers. However, such a balance may be delicate and fragile, and, hence, prove to be ephemeral. A major question to be answered is whether MRL leader López Michelsen will be content to play the role of a follower, or will eventually be capable of assuming the leadership of the Liberal party. Since he denotes extremism to Conservatives, his leadership might stir up old hatreds (see Chapter XI on the moderate-extremist dichotomy). To illustrate this point, Cali Liberals have stressed that the Liberal party would not allow a Conservative extremist to run as the Frente Nacional candidate in the 1970 elections.

One major imponderable, again starting with the promise that Anapo declines in strength, is how far the Liberals and Conservatives will drift from one another, assuming an end to the Frente Nacional. As we saw in earlier chapters, the political socialization orientations

of the two parties differ considerably given the differences in party mystique. However, our results also manifested a dichotomy between deference to party mystique and ideological orientation in practice. We saw, for example, that most Unionistas and Independientes preferred an unstable democracy to a stable dictatorship (Chapter IX).

Everett Hagen links the authoritarian personality to traditional society and the innovating personality to modernizing society.⁴ Indeed, the traditional Conservative orientation closely relates to the authoritarian personality pattern, whereas traditional Liberal orientation fits the innovator pattern (in the face of the authoritarian Spanish heritage). However, the move away from these polar positions by both Liberals and Conservatives--the Conservative disavowal of dictatorship as opposed to the Liberal support for a powerful executive--has rendered such a dichotomy inoperative. At present, each party appears to represent a combination of innovators and traditionalists.

However, the highly authoritarian orientation of Anapo leaders brought out in our survey does not seem to fit into Hagen's pattern, just as Communist authoritarianism appears to defy such categorizing. Anapo, at the time of this writing, was not a homogeneous party with a definite position on the political spectrum. Nonetheless, it seemed to have little in common with the traditionalism of yore. The fact that some Liberals revealed authoritarian personality characteristics, such as favoring the stable dictatorship over the unstable democracy, might indicate that some sincere innovators believe that democratic procedures may have to be sacrificed to promote meaningful socio-economic reforms.

The recent experience of the violencia must again be accented to prevent an undue interpretation of the present heterogeneous character of the Liberal and Conservative parties and the overlap of innovators and traditionalists in both parties. Such inter-party butchery strongly indicates a negative, extremist, non-compromising socialization of followers on both sides. Lucian Pye observes that in "stable political systems [that] have relatively homogeneous political cultures . . . the various agents of political socialization, ranging from the family, the school, and the church to the mass media and the articulations of politicians themselves, tend to reinforce each other . . ."

In contrast, where

political cultures tend to be fragmented . . . people do not share common orientations toward political action. Without a dominant political culture to guide and shape the various socialization agencies the tendency in such societies is for people to turn to political action not only with quite different expectations but also with socially undisciplined motivations.⁵

According to this analysis, Colombia, with a traditionally fragmented political culture, should have lacked mutually reinforcing agents of political socialization. However, the socialization efforts of both Liberals and Conservatives have indeed been mutually reinforcing, at least in many rural areas of Colombia, because of their respective monopolies of socialization processes due to insulation against the other party. The reader will recall that the Liberal-Conservative division has been largely regional in character. Below the level of the more heterogeneous larger cities, some of the smaller towns have been highly homogeneous, composed almost exclusively of either Liberals or Conservatives. In such cases, the concept of fragmented political culture has no meaning since the people are exposed to only one sub-culture. Accordingly,

Charles Anderson comments that "In the countryside, party identification tended to reinforce other social cleavages--of community, family, and region--cleavages that had a component of conflict about them as part of the legacy of the civil wars of the nineteenth century."⁶

Significantly, the violencia was felt far more in the rural areas than in the major cities of Colombia. Thus, the bloody civil war might be attributed, at least in part, to the exclusivist nature of the socialization process. So fragmented was the overall Colombian political culture with respect to these rural areas that the two sub-cultures had no common meeting ground except on the battlefield. In effect, nineteenth-century civil wars reinforced such exclusivism due in part to the resulting inflammation of hatreds and to the need to unite more cohesively with fellow partisans for protection against the other side. Anderson observes that

Should a marauding band under a Liberal chieftain pillage a rural community, its inhabitants might seek out the protection of a Conservative landowner and his armed retainers. Identification with the Conservative party and a seething hatred for the Liberals, emerging out of such an incident, became institutionalized and perpetuated in the local community, passed down from father to son.⁷

From the above analysis, it is evident that one must use great care in attempting to generalize from the Cali results. The fact that Cali is a major city may explain why Liberals and Conservatives failed to manifest a high degree of hatred for one another, but, instead, revealed a relaxation of ideological extremism and, to some extent, an inclination to recognize good qualities in the ranks of the traditional opponent. In the case of Cali, Pye's comments on the effects of a fragmented political culture may be applicable. Socialization of the

hierarchical leaders sampled appeared to be less extreme and exclusive than the author would hypothesize the case to be for hierarchical leaders in homogeneous Liberal or Conservative towns where organizational leaders of the other party have been totally absent, and a monopoly of political sub-culture, communication, recruitment, and socialization has been in effect over a long period of time.

Notes

¹ Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

² Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 2.

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1962), chapter 3.

⁵ Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 105.

⁶ Charles W. Anderson, "'La Violencia' en Colombia," Issues of Political Development, ed. Charles W. Anderson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 112.

⁷ Ibid., p. 113.

7. What positions within your party have you held in the past?
(Open-ended question)

8. Did you work for your party prior to becoming a member of the hierarchy?

1. yes ___; 2. no ___. (If the answer is yes) (a) what did you do?

(Open-ended question)

9. Do you have any of the following information about voters in Cali?

yes somewhat no

1. the percentage of the total vote that went to my overall party in the past election.

2. the percentage that went to my political group.

3. the socio-economic groups that vote for my political group.

4. lists of individuals who are important within the circles of my political group.

10. What were the most important orientations of your political campaign during the past elections? (Assign priorities among those that you codify)

1. direct propaganda to groups which supported us previously ___

2. direct propaganda to groups which did not support us previously ___

3. encourage a larger vote turnout in general ___

4. encourage the registration of new voters ___

11. What type of aid from non-members of your hierarchy did your directorate and you personally receive during the past electoral campaign? (Assign priorities among those that you codify)

1. none ___

2. direct contact with known party (or factional) supporters ___

3. aid in holding social functions on behalf of the political group to attract more voters ___

4. aid in transporting supporters of my political group to the polls. ___

5. aid in the diffusion of both written and spoken propaganda ___

12. During what portion of the campaign was such aid extended?

1. none ___; 2. 25% ___; 3. 50% ___; 4. 75% ___; 5. 100% ___.

(a) What was the entire duration of the campaign? (Open-ended question.)

13. Have you done anything to register new voters? 1. no___; 2. yes___. (If the answer is yes) (a) what? (Open-ended question)
14. What other types of work did you carry out for your political group during the past electoral campaign? (Open-ended question)
15. What differences are there between the municipal and departmental levels of the hierarchy of your political group? (Open-ended question)
16. What contact have you had with the leaders of your political group at the national level? (Codify one) 1. during the entire year ___; 2. almost exclusively during electoral campaigns___; 3. seldom___; 4. never___.
17. What degree of influence would you say that you have in the direction of the policies of your political group at the national level? (Codify one) 1. very little___; 2. some___; 3. quite a bit___; 4. a lot___.
18. Do you believe that the members of the municipal directorates should have more influence in the direction of policies at the departmental level? (Codify one) 1. they should have more___; 2. they should have less___; 3. the present situation is fine___.
19. Do you believe that the members of the municipal directorates should have more influence in the direction of policies at the national level? (Codify one) 1. they should have more___; 2. they should have less___; 3. the present situation is fine___.
20. In your opinion, did your political group have a well-defined program in Cali and in Valle department with regard to the activities that it carried out during the past electoral campaign? 1. no___; 2. yes___. (If the answer is yes) (a) how were you informed about the program? (Open-ended question) (b) what kind of program was it with regard to its strategy and mechanics? (Open-ended question)
21. When an election is not close at hand, does your political group carry out any activities? (Codify one) 1. no___; 2. yes___; 3. few___. (If the answer is yes or few) (a) what are they? (Assign priorities among those that you codify) 1. demonstrations___; 2. social functions (such as fiestas)___; 3. social services (to the community)___; 4. distribution of partisan propaganda___; 5. political debates___; 6. conferences (lectures, discussions)___
- (b) What is your role in these activities? (Open-ended question)

22. What aspect do you consider of greater importance in your role as hierarchical leader? (Codify one) 1. preserve the ideology and doctrines of the party___; 2. do everything possible to increase the vote of my political group___.
23. If you wanted to reach higher levels within the hierarchy of your political group, what would you do to achieve this goal?
(Open-ended question)
- (a) Do you want to attain higher levels? 1. yes___; 2. no___.
24. At times it seems as though one or two key individuals, or perhaps a small group, has considerable influence upon the politics of a region. Do you believe this to be the case in this municipio or department? 1. yes___; 2. no___. (If the answer is yes)
(a) are these individuals leaders of other groups or associations? 1. yes___ (Codify according to prevalence of cases) a. labor unions___; b. business elites___; c. landed elites___; d. the Church___; e. the military___; f. newspaper publishers___. 2. no___ (If the answer is no) why do they appear to be key political figures? (Open-ended question)
- (b) During the past electoral campaign, did you seek out these key individuals to request aid for your own political activities? 1. yes___; 2. no___.
25. What are the satisfactions and benefits that you receive as a political leader? (Assign priorities among those that you codify) 1. prestige___; 2. social advancement___; 3. economic advancement___; 4. political advancement as a candidate sooner or later___; 5. political advancement in the hierarchy of my political group___; 6. a feeling of power___; 7. ideological satisfaction___; 8. none___.
26. If you had to abandon political activities tomorrow, what would you miss most from your overall political role? (Codify one) 1. the social benefits___; 2. the economic benefits___; 3. the role of being a leader___; 4. the opportunity to work for my ideological ideals___.
27. What were the reasons that led you to participate in the leadership of your political group? (Assign priorities among those that you codify) 1. traditional bonds with my party or political group; 2. family reasons___; 3. business contacts___; 4. the work is good and respectable___; 5. obligation toward the community___; 6. it serves as a bridge to a higher position___.

28. According to the results of the past elections, how has the electoral strength of your political group changed? (Codify one) 1. no change___; 2. a favorable change___; 3. an unfavorable change___.
- (a) What events or activities have produced this change (or account for a lack of change)? (Open-ended question)
29. Would you say that there are important differences among the factions of your overall party? 1. no___; 2. yes___. (If the answer is yes) (a) what are they? (Open-ended question)
30. Generally speaking, would you say that there are important differences between the Conservative and Liberal parties? 1. no___; 2. yes___. (If the answer is yes) (a) what are they? (Open-ended question)
31. What do you like about your party in general or your political group in particular? (Open-ended question)
32. What do you dislike about your party in general or your political group in particular? (Open-ended question)
33. What do you like about the other overall party? (Open-ended question)
34. What do you dislike about the other overall party? (Open-ended question)
35. What is your attitude toward the Frente Nacional? (Codify one) 1. it should be abolished immediately___; 2. it should be continued after 1974___; 3. it should terminate on schedule in 1974___.
36. What have been the principal effects caused by the Frente Nacional upon the organization of political parties, comparing the present situation with that which existed prior to the creation of the Frente Nacional? (Assign priorities among those that you codify) 1. personalism has increased___; 2. the division within each of the two principal parties has increased___; 3. popular support for the two parties has declined___; 4. due to the compromises which have accompanied the Frente Nacional, the doctrines and ideology of the parties have suffered___; 5. there have been no effects of any consequence___; 6. other___.
37. What were the most important issues in the past electoral campaign? (Open-ended question)
- (a) What are the most important issues today? (Open-ended question)

38. If your opinion, what attributes should candidates have whom your party runs for the presidency in future elections? (Codify two, assigning priorities) 1. any candidate who increases our number and percentage of votes___; 2. a candidate who defends and practices the doctrines and ideology of my party___; 3. a candidate who has worked in the ranks of the party organization___.
39. In your opinion, what attributes should candidates have whom your party runs for legislative posts in future elections? (Codify two, assigning priorities) 1. a candidate who defends and practices the doctrines and ideology of my party___; 2. any candidate who increases our number and percentage of votes___; 3. a candidate who has worked in the ranks of the party organization___.
40. Are you from Cali? 1. no___ (a) where are you from? _____
2. yes___ (a) in what barrio do you live? _____
(b) how long have you lived in Cali? (Codify one) 1. 1-5 years___; 2. 5-10___; 3. 10-20___; 4. 20-30___; 5. 30-plus___; 6. I was born in Cali___.
41. How old are you? (Codify one) 1. 20-30___; 2. 30-40___; 3. 40-50___; 4. 50-60___; 5. 60-plus___.
42. What level of education did you attain? 1. I lack a college degree___; 2. I have a college degree___ (in the profession of) _____
43. Outside of political activities, do you have a job? 1. no___; 2. yes___ (If the answer is yes) (a) what kind of a job? (Open-ended question)

(b) What was your job when you first entered politics? (Open-ended question)
44. What party did your father support? (Codify one) 1. Liberal___; 2. Conservative___; 3. other___; 4. none___.
45. Was your father active in politics? 1. no___; 2. yes___ (If the answer is yes) (a) what positions did he--or does he--occupy? (Open-ended question)
46. Do you believe that the majority of voters know their own interests and vote accordingly? 1. yes___; 2. no___ (If the answer is no) (a) if they knew their own interests and voted accordingly, what would be the effect upon the political situation? (Open-ended question)

47. Do you believe that a stable dictatorship is worth more than an unstable democracy? 1. yes___; 2. no___.
48. Do you believe that the president and in general the executive power in comparison with the congress and the judicial power has too much power, not enough power, or exactly the right amount of power? (Codify one) 1. too much power___; 2. not enough power___; 3. the right amount of power___.
49. Do you believe that the national government as opposed to the departmental and municipal government has too much power, not enough power, or exactly the right amount of power? (Codify one) 1. too much power___; 2. not enough power___; 3. the right amount of power___.
50. Do you believe that there should be sanctions, on the part of the leadership of one's political group, against a member of the municipal council, departmental assembly, or national congress who does not vote according to the orientations given by his political group? 1. yes___; 2. no___.
51. What changes in the organization of your own directorate would you recommend? (Open-ended question)
52. What changes in the organization of the overall hierarchy of your political group would you recommend? (Open-ended question)

A Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward any Vocation Political Leader

(Codify all statements with which you agree)

1. No matter what happens, this job always comes first.
2. This job is my hobby.
3. I can think of few jobs I would rather have than this one.
4. This work will bring one greater respect from both oneself and others than most other jobs.
5. Everyone should like this vocation.
6. Most people like this kind of work.
7. I can think of a lot more advantages than disadvantages in this work.
8. The advantages of this vocation slightly outweigh the disadvantages.
9. I enjoy only parts of this work.
10. My likes and dislikes for this work about balance one another.
11. There are a few unpleasant things connected with this work.
12. Why should I do this when there are so many more pleasant vocations?
13. I do not care about this job.
14. There are too many undesirable qualities about this occupation.
15. I hate to think of Monday morning coming and having to come back to this job.
16. This work has no place in the modern world.
17. This work is disliked by everyone.

A Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward any Defined Group

(Codify all statements with which you agree)

1. big landholders
2. big businessmen
3. labor union leaders
4. the upper-class
5. the middle-class
6. the lower-class
7. military leaders

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | 1. Can be depended upon as being honest. |
| | | | | | | | 2. Are far above my own group. |
| | | | | | | | 3. Some of our best citizens are descendents from this group. |
| | | | | | | | 4. Deserve much consideration from the rest of the world. |
| | | | | | | | 5. Command the respect of any group. |
| | | | | | | | 6. Are quick to apprehend. |
| | | | | | | | 7. Are a God-fearing people. |
| | | | | | | | 8. Have an air of dignity about them. |
| | | | | | | | 9. Are highly emotional |
| | | | | | | | 10. Take an exceptional pride in themselves. |
| | | | | | | | 11. Are superstitious. |
| | | | | | | | 12. Are self-indulgent. |
| | | | | | | | 13. Do not impress me favorably. |
| | | | | | | | 14. I am not in sympathy with these people. |
| | | | | | | | 15. Would likely prove disloyal to our government. |
| | | | | | | | 16. Belong to a low social level. |
| | | | | | | | 17. Are mentally defective. |

A Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward any Proposed Social Action

(Codify all statements with which you agree)

1. expropriation of agricultural lands not utilized by their owners without compensation.
2. more taxation of the rich to give more state aid to the poor in order to redistribute the wealth.
3. stronger action against communists.
4. restriction of Protestant missionary activity.
5. putting an end to the teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools.
6. changing the government from unitary to federal.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | 1. Is vitally necessary for the welfare of the country. |
| | | | | | | 2. Will advance civilization to a higher level. |
| | | | | | | 3. Will stand the test of time. |
| | | | | | | 4. Shows great possibility of being a success. |
| | | | | | | 5. Will be appreciated by the general public. |
| | | | | | | 6. Shows common sense. |
| | | | | | | 7. Probably will be accepted by the majority. |
| | | | | | | 8. Will be liked only fairly well. |
| | | | | | | 9. Will do just as much harm as it will good. |
| | | | | | | 10. Is too much of a deviation from normal procedure. |
| | | | | | | 11. Is too contradictory. |
| | | | | | | 12. Will not fit into our modern world. |
| | | | | | | 13. Is entirely a haphazard plan. |
| | | | | | | 14. Is a foolish inconsistency. |
| | | | | | | 15. Is an enemy of liberty. |
| | | | | | | 16. Is a ridiculous plan. |
| | | | | | | 17. Can mean only disaster. |

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council and was approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


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