

Indeed, efforts have been made and are being made to deal with every one of the short-comings we have mentioned. The question to be faced is why these efforts have been unsuccessful, as they are generally conceded to be. The answer to the question is apparent enough from the nature of the problem and the records of previous and current attempts.

Because agriculture is beset by a wide range of impediments, an attempt to deal with any one of them will be balked by the presence of the others. Water, fertilizer, seed, agricultural practices, and salt-free soil are complementary factors of production; no one of them can be applied to full effect in the absence of the others. Yet a coordinated attack on all these fronts is impossible when dealing with a planted area of upwards of 25 million acres. The record of the attempt to deal with the problems on so wide a front is presented vividly in the report of the Food and Agriculture Commission. It is a record of insufficient supplies, insufficient manpower, insufficient transport, insufficient coordination. It is a record of too few men with too little material trying to deal with too large a problem. No wonder that the results have been so meager.

Analysis of the production of wheat and rice from 1949 to 1959 in the five canal-irrigated districts of the Former Punjab that have suffered relatively minor waterlogging and salinity damage illustrates the stagnation of the agricultural sector. Gross production of wheat over the last five years of the decade decreased about 0.7 percent, while the average area sown increased about 5.8 percent. The figures for rice are even less encouraging. Average gross production over the same five-year period decreased about 9.2 percent, while the area sown increased approximately 4.8 percent. In both cases the decrease in yield per acre explains the failure to secure increased gross production. The data are summarized in Table 3. 1.

#### Concentration on a Series of Limited Project Areas

Our primary recommendation is a reorientation of strategy in the direction of a concentration of effort on limited project areas. On the administrative side, we recommend a shift from an administrative structure based on function to one based on area. This shift will permit a coordinated attack on all aspects of the agricultural problem in regions of manageable size.

We propose that the major part of the culturable area of the Indus Plain in the Former Punjab, Former Bahawalpur, and Former Sind be divided into some 25 to 30 project areas, each manned by a competent and adequate staff,