

PERHAPS the most fatal oversight in the conduct of the whole expedition, was the strange and unaccountable neglect of not securing the town and harbour of Aux Cayes, and the little port of Jacmel on the same part of the coast, previous to the attack of Port au Prince. With those places, on the one side of the peninsula, and the post of Acul in our possession on the other, all communication between the Southern and the two other provinces would have been cut off; the navigation from the Windward Islands to Jamaica would have been secure, while the possession of the two Capes which form the entrance into the Bight of Leogane (Cape Nicholas and Tiburon) would have protected the homeward trade in its course through the Windward Passage. All this might have been accomplished and secured; and I think it is all that, in sound policy, ought to have been attempted. As to Port au Prince, it would have been for-

Return of the British forces in the island of St. Domingo, 1st January 1795;

	Rank and file effective.	Sick.	Total.
Port au Prince	366	462	828
Mole St. Nicholas	209	166	375
Jeremie	95	59	154
Tiburon	34	18	52
St. Marc	48	33	81
	752	738	1490

The next reinforcement from Europe arrived the latter end of April 1795, and consisted of about fourteen hundred men (the 81st and 96th regiments): a further reinforcement (the 82d regiment) landed in August following. All these corps, the last especially, from its landing at so unfavourable a season, suffered prodigiously. The 82d landed nine hundred and eighty men, of whom six hundred and thirty were buried within ten weeks. In one of the companies, three rank and file only were able to do duty.

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