

objects in view, are not written in the spirit of accusation against men in authority; nor (if I know myself) is there any bias of party zeal on my judgment. I am far from asserting, that the situation and resources of Great Britain were such as to afford a greater body of troops for service in St. Domingo, at the proper moment, than the number that was actually sent thither. I presume not to intrude into the national councils, and am well apprized that existing alliances and pre-engagements of the state, were objects of important consideration to his Majesty's ministers. Neither can I affirm, that the delays and obstructions, which prevented the arrival at the scene of action of some of the detachments, until the return of the sickly season, were avoidable. A thousand accidents and casualties continually subvert and overthrow the best laid schemes of human contrivance. We have seen considerable fleets detained by adverse winds, in the ports of Great Britain for many successive months, and powerful armaments have been driven back by storms and tempests, after many unavailing attempts to reach the place of their destination. Thus much I owe to candour; but, at the same time, I owe it also to truth to avow my opinion, that in case no greater force could have been spared for the enterprize against St. Domingo, the enterprize itself ought not to have been undertaken*. The

* If, from the ill success which has attended the attack of St. Domingo, a justification of the original measure shall be thought necessary, it ought not to be overlooked, that General Williamson, among other motives, had also strong reason to believe, that attempts were meditated by the republican commissioners on the island of Jamaica. He therefore, probably thought, that the most certain way of preventing the success of such designs, was to give the commissioners sufficient employment at home.—I write this note in justice to a distinguished officer, than whom no man living has deserved better of his country.