Cover
Kingston artist Silvia Pecota’s tribute to the Canadian landings on Juno Beach in Normandy, 6 June 1944. © Silvia Pecota, www.silvipecota.com

Russian Military and Security Privatization: Implications for Canada

Enabling Organizational Resilience through Communication and Information Systems Design

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Welcome to the Spring 2019 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. As I pen these words, however, we are still very much in the throes of winter, and conditions here in southern Ontario have been more up and down than a rollercoaster at Canada’s Wonderland. That said, many within our readership have been much harder done by, so spring’s promise will be particularly welcome this year.

The issue’s cover this time out is graced with a stunning tribute by Kingston artist Silvia Pecota to commemorate the 75th anniversary year of the D-Day landings in Normandy. Canada punched far above its weight on this occasion, having been assigned responsibility for invading just one of five beaches (Juno Beach) designated for the attack. And by day’s end, the Canadians had pressed further inland than any other Allied troops. While Canadian combat losses had been relatively light during the actual landings, fierce German resistance would soon take a dreadful toll upon them during the fierce fighting that ensued in the Normandy bridgehead and beyond.

Yet another eclectic scope of offerings this time out… First up, Dr. Christopher Spearin of the Royal Military College of Canada’s Department of Defence Studies Branch, located at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, examines Russia’s enthusiastic usage of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in order to achieve strategic results. Spearin maintains: “PMSCs have become actors that the CAF [Canadian Armed Forces] and the Canadian government will more and more have to view as a contemporary challenge. This is due to the increased Russian usage of firms, and the manner in which they are used, in areas of interest to Canadian policymakers.”

Next, signals officer Captain Joseph Long examines the CAF’s contemporary operational environment, noting that it is becoming increasingly ambiguous and complex, and is subject to rapid, and to an extent, unpredictable change. While Long maintains that the CAF is doing a credible job of training its members for the expected operational challenges, he believes that “…the current Communications and Information Systems (CIS) used by those members and organizations are not built to best enable operations.” Accordingly, his article “…will analyze three adaptive, resilient organizations celebrated for success at the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic levels, paying particular attention to their use of Communications and Information Systems.”

He is followed by defence scientist Dr. Barbara Waruszynski and her distinguished colleagues, who conduct a fresh (and refreshing) examination as to how the military “…can serve as a viable and important career option for women.” This team leads off with an historical perspective of societal trends and events that led to female involvement in the Canadian military, then goes on to describe the experiences of women currently serving, including the main challenges they face. Then, after tabling some recommendations as to how the CAF can advance toward a more diverse, integrated, and inclusive Canadian military, the team concludes: “This article will give the reader a better understanding of the history of women serving in the Canadian military, what women are currently experiencing as members of the CAF, and the direction that the CAF needs to consider to further strengthen its military capabilities and operational effectiveness.”

Moving right along, we have two very different offerings in our Military History section this time out. In the first, historian Desaree Rosskopf, who is a Fellow at the Juno Beach Centre, takes a fresh look at the 1917 Conscription Crisis, the lead-up to that crisis, and how each of “the Two Solitudes,” [English Canada and French Canada] viewed their own participation, as well as that of the other, in the conflict. In the final analysis, Rosskopf concludes: “French Canadians did fulfill their obligations to the war, but not for imperialism, unlike many of their English counterparts, but for Canada, the country they loved.” In our last major article, Sergeant B.J. Turner, an artilleryman completing the Bachelor of Military Arts and Science program at the Royal Military College of Canada, chronicles the German 1916 attritional siege of the strategically-important city of Verdun, launched with the intent of forcing the French from the war, and leaving the British forces essentially alone to stand against Germany. “Targeting France was viewed as knocking England’s ‘best sword’ from their hands.” While both sides suffered devastating losses at Verdun, the German commander [von Falkenhayn] was “…wrong in assuming he would be able to push them [the French] past their breaking point. French will in 1916 was still strong enough to fight on. Her soldiers proved their devotion by defending Verdun, even though it may have made more sense strategically to pull back to prepared positions.”

Two very different opinion pieces in this issue… First, naval warfare officer Lieutenant-Commander Patrice Deschênes discusses the global proliferation and miniaturization of drones of all manner, but particularly the mini-aerial drones, and the concerns expressed by tacticians of Allied navies, “…who are aware of the increasing vulnerability of their naval forces; a vulnerability for which they are not ready to face.” He is followed by artillery officer Lieutenant-Commander Patrice Deschênes discusses the global proliferation and miniaturization of drones of all manner, but particularly the mini-aerial drones, and the concerns expressed by tacticians of Allied navies, “…who are aware of the increasing vulnerability of their naval forces; a vulnerability for which they are not ready to face.” He is followed by artillery officer Captain Nicholas Kaempfer, a previous CMJ author, who chronicles the bold counter-attack by Colonel Kurt Meyer, commander of the 25th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment in the Normandy Campaign, against Canadian forces attempting to capture the airfield at Carpiquet. “While Meyer and his men had failed to push the Canadians to the sea, he prevented the Allied seizure of the airfield at Carpiquet, and it would take another month for the Allies to recapture the ground…”

Next, our dedicated defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, examines Auditor General the late-Michael Ferguson’s most recent report on the state Canada’s fighter fleet, tabled in November 2018, as well as the report on maritime search and rescue tabled the same month by the Senate Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. “…[which] drew markedly less attention than the findings of the Auditor General on risk management in the fighter world.”

Finally, we close with a book review essay by Dr. Sean Maloney on two recent books dealing with, what in effect, is the same threat, namely, “Russia seeking to interfere with, disrupt, and dominate Europe.” Sean’s essay is followed by a brace of book reviews on very disparate subjects, which we hope will pique our readership’s interest.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
Russian Military and Security Privatization: Implications for Canada

by Christopher Spearin

Dr. Christopher Spearin is Professor and Chair of the Department of Defence Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada branch, located at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He is the author of Private Military and Security Companies and States: Force Divided, published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Introduction

Not too long ago, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) were actors both to manage effectively and to rely upon for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Canada’s operations in Afghanistan made this plain. For Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, the commander of Task Force Kandahar in 2008, “…without private security firms it would be impossible to achieve what we are achieving here… We just don’t have the numbers to do everything.” For one major commanding a Forward Operating Base, “…it definitely gives us flexibility… If it was not for the private security, it would not be possible for me to do the next operation.”

For a CAF spokesperson, thanks to PMSC utilization, “Canadian Forces personnel are able to focus their efforts on the tasks that deliver the greatest value to the mission.” Such was this dependence upon PMSCs that Canada, along with several of its NATO partners, successfully lobbied Afghan President Hamid Karzai not to curtail the PMSC presence in his country. In short, for Canada, PMSC reliance underwrote the CAF’s efforts, and in turn, helped make the Afghan mission politically palatable.

However, more recently, PMSCs have become actors that the CAF and the Canadian government will more and more have to view as a contemporary challenge. This is due to the increased Russian usage of firms, and the manner in which they are used, in areas of interest to Canadian policymakers. For instance, in the wake of Russia’s hostile moves in Crimea/Eastern Ukraine, Canada bolstered its military presence in Eastern Europe in support of NATO collective defence endeavours. It is no less than one of the lead nations for the four NATO battlegroups deployed in the region. On the Russian side, PMSCs were and are part of the Russian moves to employ “little green men” to ultimately achieve
strategic results. As another example, in response to the turmoil unleashed by the Syrian civil war, instability in Iraq, and the terror instilled by Daesh, the CAF have had a constant presence in the Middle East since 2014. On the Russian side, PMSCs serve as “unofficial boots on the ground” supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad whereas the official Russian presence mostly rests upon state-supplied air power.7 Additionally, the Liberal government announced Canada’s return to United Nations peace support operations on 26 August 2016 with Africa as the assumed focus. Also on the Russian side, PMSCs are active in Africa. Recently, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic launched an investigation after the July 2018 shooting deaths of journalists covering the unconfirmed presence of the Russian PMSC Wagner in the country. What is more, it is likely that Russia will continue, and even expand, its usage of PMSCs, thus remaining on Canada’s military and diplomatic radar in the years to come.

Indeed, one analyst described Russian actions in Ukraine as a refining “live-fire exercise” for the future, and another assessed activities in Syria as “an excellent laboratory” for Russian practitioners.8
Examining this unsettling development in the PMSC industry through Canadian eyes is this article’s objective. This consideration has two parts. First, the article explores how and why Russia has worked to change the parameters of the military and security privatization phenomenon. Second, the article identifies what is at stake for Canada, militarily and diplomatically, due to this Russian endeavour. The article contends that the Russian approach is different from the Canadian experience, and that of its allies, because of the offensive and deniable use of firms. One can link this stance both to the contemporary “New Generation Warfare” outlined in Russian military thought, and to past Soviet Cold War era practices. The article asserts that such a Russian approach potentially neuters the utility of the CAF’s, and NATO’s wider,
military strength. This approach also goes against longstanding Canadian efforts to develop an international PMSC industry that is defensive in orientation and undeniable in its usage. In its conclusions, the article offers some issues for future investigation that fall out of its findings.

Differences in Approach

One can note the various ways the aforementioned Canadian usage of the PMSC industry is in keeping with similar approaches embraced by Canada’s allies. Just as such contractors of all sorts explicitly and officially form part of the “Defence Team” in Canada, they are part of the “Total Force Concept” in the United States and the “Whole Force Concept” in the United Kingdom. This speaks to contractors being “ubiquitous” in the Western military experience. Second, the move to PMSC employment points towards the fulfillment of strategic desires despite limited coffers and smaller militaries. In this vein, turning to the private sector is to allow for harvesting the assumed neoliberal benefits of reduced costs, efficiencies, and economies of scale. It follows that PMSCs are to specialize in defensive matters or the reactive application of violence. As one Canadian military spokesperson emphatically put it, “the Canadian Forces does not use any private security contractors to conduct offensive operations.” In contrast, for state militaries, their “greatest value to the mission,” employing the language above, is offensive activities or the proactive application of violence. Put differently, PMSCs are to hold territory whereas state militaries are to focus upon seizing territory and taking the initiative. In short, PMSCs support state militaries, such as the CAF, by allowing them to concentrate on certain tasks.

The Russian approach is substantially different, and for three operational reasons. One, companies have operated both independent from and alongside Russian military organizations. They might work to prepare the ground for later Russian military activity, or their efforts may be standalone. Two, Russian firms are not anemic to offensive activities. This was demonstrated, for instance, when companies, along with other actors, were at the forefront of Russian operations in Crimea/Eastern Ukraine, with Russia’s conventional military forces often playing only a supporting role. This was also seen in Syria in February 2018 when a Russian-led force attacked a base for the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and its US military advisors. Third, Russian usage occurs in a non-transparent and deniable manner. While reliance upon PMSCs by Canada and its allies does not match the same level of transparency as the usage of state forces, such usage is not denied, and it has been the subject of official policymaking and scrutiny. Dissimilarly, consider the Russian Foreign Ministry’s response to the February 2018 confrontation: “It has been pointed out that

Armed men believed to be Russian servicemen march outside a Ukrainian military base in the village of Perevalnoye, outside Simferopol, 5 March 2014.
certain Russian citizens in Syria have arrived there of their own free will and for different reasons. The foreign ministry does not have the authority to assess the validity and legality of their decisions.” The fact that such overseas operations by Russian firms are technically illegal adds yet another layer of obfuscation.

As for the dynamics of state relations, the approach is again different. On one hand, Western state employers of PMSCs, such as Canada, often focus upon the mechanics of utilizing the private sector in economic and managerial senses. Although contractors, writ-large, are parts of conceptual public/private teams, there remains the desire of states to foster competition amongst private actors in order to accrue the previously-mentioned savings, efficiencies, and economies of scale. Emphases are upon tendering, on bid considerations, and on selection processes. Attention is paid to contract monitoring, and there is fretting when it is deemed insufficient. These efforts highlight differences between public actors and private actors that nevertheless may be seeking common or integrated goals together. On the other hand, these economic and managerial considerations are not prominent in the Russian experience. Firms are state contrivances to be used without worrying over such intermediating factors – the baggage of private actor employment in the Western case. For instance, a Russia watcher asserts that companies are “technically private, but essentially acting as the arms of the Russian state.” Another suggests that...
a firm such as Wagner is, “…a private special force that performs military tasks on Kremlin orders and [Federal Security Service] FSB oversight.” Going further, one Russian writer disputes that firms are in fact “private,” contending that they “are some sort of governmental structures, and a tool of the state’s foreign policy.” Simply put, the obfuscation above in fact camouflages a much more intimate relationship with the state.

The ideational backing for this Russian usage of companies is both new and old. Regarding the new, the Russian reliance upon companies fits into the “New Generation Warfare” (NGW) concept presented by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, in 2013. In NGW, conventional and highly kinetic warfare is deemphasized such that:

…the very “rules of war” have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness…. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures.19

The “non-military means” accrue their potency both on their own capabilities and through integrative efforts (thus pointing to the murky divide between the public and the private identified earlier). Though usually armed, Russian companies nevertheless fall into the non-military designation because of their differing sizes, weapons, and capabilities compared to those of conventional armed forces.20 Regarding these latter forces, analysts such as Tony Balasevicius capture the Russian sense of the “reduced… importance of frontal engagements by large conventional military formations, which they believe are gradually becoming a thing of the past.”21 What is more, a Defence Research and Development Canada report examining Russian activities in Crimea offers that non-military measures were applied at a ratio of four-to-one over military measures.22 With NGW, the non-military toolbox is to be frequently opened because of the perception that objectives can often be achieved without, or with only the limited use of, the highly symbolic, the highly publicized, and the highly destructive methods of state military forces.

Regarding the old, the Soviet approach was very comfortable with relying upon different types of armed groups not necessarily categorized as being state organizations and/or as being under direct state control. Soviet success during the Second World War is frequently explained through the resourcefulness and capabilities of partisans and guerrilla fighters.23 During the Cold War, Moscow often relied upon proxies in the developing world through what have been described as “active measures.”24 Admittedly, the Soviet Union deployed considerable numbers of military advisers to assist partisans and guerrillas in the Third World.25 But this approach was not without some risks and challenges given the desire at times to steer clear of state officialdom. In the 1970s, Soviet troops in the Middle East were transported to the region under the guise of “tourists.”26 Similarly, in 1970, an authority no less than Defence Minister Andrei Grechko said to Soviet pilots...
Central America during the Cold War. Through contemporary Soviet reliance upon Cuba to provide proxy forces in Africa and Central America during the Cold War. Through contemporary Russian military and security privatization, this hesitancy and concern are mitigated through deniability.

Overall, it is evident that Russia is utilizing military and security privatization in a manner different from the experience of Canada and that of other countries, such as the United States. This is in keeping with the wider assertion made by General Gerasimov: “We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves.” The article now turns to examining the implications of this attempted “outstripping” and “occupying” for Canada regarding military and security privatization.

**Challenges for Canada – Military**

Russian military and security privatization generally and purposefully operates at a lower level of kinetic ability compared to military organizations – hence the non-military designation from above. Therefore, the general and successful Russian stance is seemingly to utilize firms in a context such that encountering heavy and sophisticated opposition is unlikely so that objectives can be achieved. Certainly, the historical record points to the merits of limiting this exposure. When an encounter did occur between a well-armed adversary, the results for the Russians were not positive. The aforementioned February 2018 exchange – a frontal engagement to be sure – featured US forces employing jets, helicopters, UAVs, and artillery, which led to the deaths of 200-300 members of the opposing “pro-regime force.” This result was in keeping with a 2014 DRDC Research Report underscoring the advantages a conventional force possesses against such an adversary.

In the right context then, violence, threatened or employed, at lower levels and yet nevertheless deniable by the Russian government, helps “…to generate a situation where it is unclear whether a state of war exists – and if it does, who is a combatant and who is not.” This approach is substantially different from the ‘military-on-military’ expectations of Canada, the United States, and other similar states: “Such societies are more comfortable with simple, traditional conflicts with well-defined objectives, a defined time frame, and a clear winner. Operating a changing, ambiguous, long-term campaign challenges the strategic personality of democracies.” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NOPI) research fellows Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud and Dr. Patrick Cullen similarly contend that “the West is largely stuck in an instrumentalist, technicist, battle-centric and kinetic understanding of war” (emphasis added). The contrasting Russian approach, characterized in Western discussions as employing hybrid tools in gray zone conflict, allows for the “bleeding” to continue given the strong unlikelihood, military-resource wise, that massive force will be applied in opposition. Indeed, such military efforts are usually highly substantial, highly expensive, and highly public organizationally-intensive affairs. Russian military and security privatization for the most part has been of an intensity and blurriness not liable to stir this considerable response. Certainly, this is in line with General Gerasimov’s assertion that “…no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found.” If this approach is successful, then the CAF together with other allied militaries, while technologically sophisticated and quite capable (in comparison to both Russian firms and even Russian conventional military forces), will be less useful or less likely to be called upon for deterrence and response.

Building upon this, in the NATO context, there is the strong political unlikelihood that military effort might be applied. Described as a “cumbersome” decision-making institution or “constrained” by “slow and rules-based decision-making,” NATO is not well-situated to respond to quick developments involving relatively small scale actions of violence that are, moreover, being denied by Russia. Additionally, alliance member efforts on whether and how to respond to low level activity might catalyze disunity in NATO – a Russian objective no doubt. Certainly, this fear of disunity is so recognized in “Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy”:

Hybrid methods are frequently used to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of a national government or international alliance… The use of hybrid methods presents challenges in terms of detection, attribution and response for Canada and its allies, including the understanding and application of NATO’s Article 5 (emphasis added). This potential for undermining the alliance is no small issue due to the aspirations Canada has for NATO and the country’s leadership therein, let alone the longstanding importance of Article 5 obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

**Challenges for Canada – Diplomatic**

On the diplomatic side, Russian endeavours fly in the face of longstanding Canadian diplomatic efforts to come to grips with the commercial advancement of military and security privatization. Even before the increased Canadian employment of firms in Afghanistan, Canadian diplomats were interested in the industry’s development and status. Initially, Canadian officials were concerned with respect to the repercussions firms posed for humanitarian efforts. Later, their focus was upon responding to the implications of PMSC usage in the Middle East and elsewhere, along with the desire to ‘be ahead of the curve’ because of the increasing presence of PMSCs globally. Being ahead of the curve was also important, due to the agility the industry presented in terms of responding to evolving demands from clients and shifting market pressures. Indeed, given that firms have been described as inherently “protean,” setting out limitations and expectations for the industry was key for the CAF, for the advancement of Canadian policy, and for the global management and control of non-state violence ‘writ-large.’
Therefore, Canadian diplomatic desires were for the industry to operate in a defensive and undeniable manner. Starting in 2006, Canada was a part of an international initiative led by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Government to investigate the international legalities of the state employment of PMSCs. The Canadian stance was to advance a pragmatic approach in order to make plain what were legitimate PMSC activities, and how states might best manage the industry.44 The result was the 2008 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies. Canada was one of the document’s initial 17 state signatories, and at present, 54 states have signed – Russia is not a signatory.

This document indicates that international humanitarian law does apply to firms and their state employers, and it offers good practices for states to consider in their handling of the industry. The document inherently makes plain that the firms are actors explicitly used by states to respond to a number of security challenges. Firms do not sit in the shadows, and hence, their employment cannot be denied. The document also makes evident, through its casting of PMSCs, that the industry has a defensive structure because “…force and firearms [are] only [to be used] when necessary in self-defence or defence of third persons.”45

Building upon this, in 2009, Canada became a state participant in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative.46 This effort advances the 2000 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, a multi-stakeholder initiative involving states, oil, gas, and mining companies, as well as non-governmental organizations. While the emphasis here is more on PMSC employment by extraction companies, the initiative, such as the state-oriented Montreux Document, advances a defensive orientation for firms: “Consistent with their function, private security should provide only preventative and defensive services and should not engage in activities exclusively the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities.”47

Canada has served as the initiative’s chair on two occasions, in 2011-2012, and in 2016-2017.

Coinciding with Canada’s second leadership stint as the initiative’s chair, the nation became, in December 2016, the seventh state signatory to the ICoC Association (ICoCA). To explain, the ICoC is the 2010 Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, the industry’s follow-on to the Montreux Document. Through this document, “…signatory Companies [numbering over 700] will require that their Personnel not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”48 From one standpoint, ICoCA membership further commits Canada to uphold the Montreux Document and the ICoC: “In becoming a Member, such States… commit to provide information related to their implementation of the Montreux Document and the Code, including the development of their domestic regulatory framework for… [company] activities, and to promote compliance with the ICoC in their contracting practices and policies.”49 From another standpoint, the leadership role of the ICoCA is to “govern and oversee implementation of the… [ICoC] to promote the responsible provision of security services and respect for human rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code.”50 This is an important venue for Canadian leadership because, as asserted by US Army Major Kenneth Segelhorst, and as published in Fort Leavenworth’s Interagency Journal on International Security, association membership allows states “…to observe and influence these companies around the world.”51

Given this longstanding Canadian activism on the PMSC issue, Russia’s usage of firms is an anathema for three reasons. First, the offensive application of privatized violence means that firms can upset the political status quo. On one hand, this does not necessarily make a conflict more destructive relative to what a state military could achieve. On the other hand, it does make a conflict more likely because of the relative ease of applying private forces, and it can risk conflict intensification.52 Second, analysts such as Dr. Deborah Avant of the University of Denver’s Joseph
Korbel School of International Studies, point to the growing strength of transnational governance vis-à-vis PMSCs that is anchored by the Montreux Document and follow-on developments. While the resulting normative consensus derived from this governance is not likely to collapse in the near term, the longer term may become more problematic. This is because either a) other states see the functional value in the Russian approach and wish to replicate it, and/or b) other states increasingly recognize and respect Russian power and thus wish to adopt practices they view as important and legitimate as played by Russia. Third, some elements of Russia’s usage run specifically counter to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Russia struck an agreement with the Syrian regime so that Russian extractive companies can receive 25 percent of the proceeds generated from resource sites not presently under the regime’s control. The quid pro quo is reliance upon firms to apply violence and recapture the sites. As such, the Russian oil and gas industry engineering construction company Stroytransgaz signed a phosphate-mining deal for a military-controlled site, and Evro Polis, a Russian private mercenary company, made similar arrangements for some oil and gas wells. Additionally, the February 2018 clash in Syria perhaps was driven by a similar profit motive because a Conoco oil processing facility was near the action. It seems clear, in light of the diplomatic language identified here, that Russian firms will not be used solely for “preventative and defensive services,” and that they are being encouraged to “engage in activities exclusively [that are] the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities.” Although Russia is not a state signatory to the Voluntary Principles Initiative and Human Rights, its efforts nevertheless risk upsetting the Russian view as important and legitimate as played by Russia. Third, some elements of Russia’s usage run specifically counter to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Russia struck an agreement with the Syrian regime so that Russian extractive companies can receive 25 percent of the proceeds generated from resource sites not presently under the regime’s control. The quid pro quo is reliance upon firms to apply violence and recapture the sites. As such, the Russian oil and gas industry engineering construction company Stroytransgaz signed a phosphate-mining deal for a military-controlled site, and Evro Polis, a Russian private mercenary company, made similar arrangements for some oil and gas wells. Additionally, the February 2018 clash in Syria perhaps was driven by a similar profit motive because a Conoco oil processing facility was near the action. It seems clear, in light of the diplomatic language identified here, that Russian firms will not be used solely for “preventative and defensive services,” and that they are being encouraged to “engage in activities exclusively [that are] the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities.” Although Russia is not a state signatory to the Voluntary Principles Initiative and Human Rights, its efforts nevertheless risk upsetting the defensive stance towards military and security privatization that Canada has advanced globally.

Conclusion

To summarize, this article has both grappled with Russia’s offensive and deniable approach towards military and security privatization and made plain the implications this approach presents to Canada from military and diplomatic perspectives. It behooves Canadian policymakers to recognize that the Russian usage of companies is likely to continue, given the past successes. Indeed, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg asserts that the overarching Russian approach has undermined both the “transparency and predictability of military activities” and “a commitment to resolve differences through diplomacy, not force.” What is more, Russian strategic aspirations, both absolute and relative to the United States/NATO, are unlikely to change in the near future. As bluntly put by the NATO Secretary General, “[w]e cannot look at Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine in isolation. They are part of a disturbing pattern of Russian behavior that goes well beyond Ukraine.” Russian usage of firms in the Middle East and elsewhere underscores this assertion.

Looking to the future, one can ask what Canada might do to potentially limit Russian usage of military and security privatization in this offensive and deniable manner. This inquiry relates to the increased possibility that the CAF will face the ramifications of the Russian usage of firms, if not encountering Russian companies directly. It also relates to the larger issue of managing violence globally in line with Canadian policy and military requirements. No doubt this is a challenge. Certainly, some suggest that Russian private personnel, because they have been officially denied by the Kremlin, should be open targets by Western forces. This might discourage their usage and curtail their personnel recruitment. However, for this approach, Canada currently does not have the opportunity nor the means. If anything, there is some rationale for Canada to proceed carefully, given an overreactive desire to “get Russia right.”

An over-reaction may catalyze further divisions. Alternatively, applying no effort presents a carte blanche for the further morphing of military and security privatization regarding Russia and potentially other counties.

With this in mind, there are two possibilities that Canada might pursue requiring further investigation. The first would be to reinvigorate its diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis non-state violence. Building on their activism in the Voluntary Principles Initiative and the ICoCA, Canadian diplomats might push for the further international acceptance of the Montreux Document. In direct concern to Russia, this would place Russian activities more and more as outside the international norm. More broadly, this might also limit the contagion effect of other states mimicking the Russian example, thus sustaining a more orderly management of international violence. As well,
it would help to preserve a defensively-oriented PMSC industry upon which the CAF has relied in the past and may very well utilize in the future. The second would be to explore further the idea that while Russia’s usage of firms might be framed in terms of contemporary concepts such as NGW, it nevertheless has roots in the Soviet Cold War experience. As Canadian Armed Forces Intelligence Officer Major Andrew Duncan put it in these pages, “…far from a dead art, active measures now find expression… internationally, as a means for Russia to pursue its interests.”

Consideration here would allow for a (re)examination of what in the past worked, what did not, and why. Looking at the historical record will make Canadian policymakers more cognizant of all the tools Russia might employ in the present. This will be valuable as Canadian actors, the CAF included, encounter manifestations of “Global Russia” in their various endeavours overseas.

NOTES

1. As indicated in the Montreux Document, PMSCs “are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.” “The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict,” 17 September 2008.


Enabling Organizational Resilience through Communication and Information Systems Design

by Joseph Long

Captain Joseph Long is a Signals Officer and Certified Information Systems Security Practitioner. He graduated from RMC in 2011 with a BSc in Computer Science.

Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) operational environment is becoming more ambiguous and subject to rapid change. Leaders and organizations are expected to confront situations of greater complexity than ever before. The contemporary operational landscape involves violent extremist organizations, climate change, cyber threats, humanitarian emergencies, and other new and unique challenges. The Department of National Defence and the CAF are doing an excellent job training, educating, and equipping members for expected operational challenges, but the current Communication and Information Systems (CIS) used by those members and organizations are not built to best enable operations.

This article will analyze three adaptive, resilient organizations celebrated for success at the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic levels, paying particular attention to their use of Communications and Information Systems. Extracting lessons learned and best practices will show how adaptive organizations can best be enabled by CIS that creates shared consciousness, has low barriers to entry, and duplicates natural communication patterns. The article will also examine the trade-offs that must be accepted for resilience, and show how applying these lessons will enhance future CAF CIS development and design.

The Contemporary Operational Environment

Environmental Complexity

In the contemporary operational environment, State and non-state actors are becoming increasingly more powerful and interconnected. These actors, unable to mass power to enable a traditional ‘force on force’ confrontation against Western industrial military might, use any and all techniques available to gain an advantage. Global connectedness and the speed of communication exponentially increases the number and variety of actors with their competing interests who are able to participate in any given conflict.

The International Space Station, back dropped by space and Earth's horizon.
The old ‘top-down’ command model where commanders could read carefully-collected reports from subordinates, concoct elaborate and intricate plans, and execute operations on a deliberate timetable no longer exists. In order to be successful, military forces must integrate a wide variety of knowledge and expertise, rapidly fusing diverse viewpoints to instantaneously react to changing conditions. Decision-making authorities have been pushed lower, as deployed detachments become smaller and required reaction times become shorter.

Resiliency

The new Canada Defence Policy Report – Strong, Secure, Engaged, calls this “…a new approach to Defence: Anticipate. Adapt. Act,” clarifying, “…anticipating emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence Team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict.”

This ability to rapidly and appropriately react to changing situations can be called “agility” or “resilience.” When situations become more complex than any one commander can completely understand and oversee, decision-making powers need to be distributed to lower levels, with the knowledge, intelligence, and context to best enable these subordinate decision-makers. Rapidly changing situations also require rapidly changing teams and structures to address these changes. Specialists, enablers, and operators from various units, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and geographical areas must rapidly cohere into an effective force and then just as rapidly disband and reform in other ways for the next mission.

Command vs Network

This changing organizational dynamic by which organizations morph and reform is only possible when members are empowered to make horizontal connections enabled by the trust of their superiors. Members at all levels of the hierarchy need to develop relationships outside of their formal chain of command to facilitate faster and more accurate passing of information to generate context for decisions. Expertise can easily be accessed when and as needed, from the most capable source. This networked organization is illustrated in the following diagrams:
**Shared Consciousness**

The “team of teams” networked structure, while important for decision making and coordinating action, adds the most value to a networked organization by enabling a “shared consciousness.” Every member of a resilient organization needs to have a shared perception of the situation, mission, and context in which the organization operates. As decision-making is delegated to lower levels, the decision-makers (note that the Defence Policy Review refers to “decision-makers,” not “commanders,”4) need to have the information required to correctly and optimally decide in line with the organization’s requirement.

Shared consciousness also reduces friction internal to organizations. Disputes between sub-units for shared resources can be minimized when each sub-group understands why each other sub-group is requesting the resource, as well as how other groups will use it to accomplish the shared mission.

**Case Studies**

In order to illustrate important factors in designing and maintaining resilient CIS, this article will examine three successfully resilient organizations. The Cajun Navy and Occupy Sandy will illustrate resiliency in rapid reaction forces achieving tactical success. General Stanley McChrystal’s description of his Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq is an excellent example of a military formation achieving operational success. Finally, the open team developing the popular Linux computer operating system ‘kernel’ [the foundational layer of an operating system – Ed.] will show resilience in a large “strategic level” and capability development organization.

**Cajun Navy and Occupy Sandy**

One of the most striking examples of technology-enabled resiliency and adaptations in recent memory is the emergence of community-based aid groups in the aftermath of natural disasters in the United States.

In late-October 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck the Eastern Seaboard of North America, killing more than 150 people, destroying at least 650,000 houses, and causing more than $71.4 billion (USD) in damage in the US alone.5 As official aid organizations struggled to cope, and within hours after hurricane landfall, members of the Occupy Wall Street [Occupy Sandy] movement on social media began coordinating ad-hoc aid and assistance. Within days, an estimated 60,000 volunteers were providing direct aid (food, water, warmth), medical and psychological care, remediation and rebuilding support, case management and legal assistance, as well as fundraising.6

In a common thread, emergent citizen organizations have been observed following other major disasters, often taking advantage of social media to coordinate efforts. A similar group, the Cajun Navy, a loose grouping of volunteers with private fishing boats, conducted search and rescue missions alongside trained first responders7 in Texas and Louisiana after Hurricane Harvey struck...
the southern US in the summer of 2017. Coordinating all missions with free smartphone apps, hundreds of volunteers rescued thousands of fellow citizens. The volunteers were eventually officially recognized by the federal government for saving thousands of lives.

**General McChrystal’s “Team of Teams”**

In 2003, then-Major General, now retired General Stanley McChrystal took command of a Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq, transforming it from a reactive, ‘siloed’ organization into an efficient and effective counter-terrorism force, ultimately finding and killing Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In a new book, *Team of Teams*, General McChrystal describes steps he took to transform his efficient but inflexible and hierarchical organization into the titular “Team of Teams,” able to rapidly adapt and react to new intelligence and operational situations.

While General McChrystal’s book contains many excellent lessons for the manager and leader creating adaptive organizations, clearly explaining the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of procedural, cultural, and organizational changes, relatively little space is spent describing the communications and information technology behind the transformation. What little there is, however, describes a technical architecture very different from most enterprise-level CIS. In describing his daily Operations and Intelligence (O&I) meetings, daily video conferences virtually attended by Task Force members at all levels, partner agencies, and command staff, General McChrystal writes: “In time, people came to appreciate the value of systemic understanding. O&I attendance grew as the quality of the information and interaction grew. Eventually we had seven thousand people attending almost daily for up to two hours (emphasis added).” It almost goes without saying that a seven-thousand person two-hour video call requires unique CIS solutions and technological considerations.

**Linux**

In 1991, 21 year-old Finnish university student, Linus Torvalds, began work on a project to develop an operating system for a new computer he had received. Thinking that other computer users might want to use it as well, he released the code for free public use. Eventually, others began collaborating on-line to introduce improvements, always maintaining the spirit of open collaboration. Today Linux-based operating systems are the most widely used operating systems in the world, used in all Android-based personal devices, most web servers, the International Space Station, and all the world’s 500 most powerful supercomputers, as of 2017.10

The adaptability and resiliency of the Linux kernel is due to the on-line collaborative ‘open source’ development process, where the entire code is freely available and modifiable, and the on-line development community can suggest and make changes to the official code, which is reviewed by other trusted community members before implementation. In 2006, it was estimated that over 13,500 developers from more than 1300 companies have contributed to the code since 2005.11

**Principles of CIS-Enabled Resilience**

While the Cajun Navy, General McChrystal’s Joint Special Operations Task Force, and the Linux kernel development community have wildly different organizational structures, cultures, goals, and methods, there are striking similarities. Each has emerged in response to uniquely-challenging situations, all place a premium on collaboration and communication, and all have demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability, leading to success.

On close examination, it becomes evident that each organization uses uniquely-adapted CIS to enable the high levels of communication and collaboration required, and that specific patterns of use and technological adoption emerge. These patterns form the basis of this article. Creating CIS for adaptive and resilient organizations requires different methods and priorities than traditional military communications systems planning and design. Specifically, each of these organizations uses CIS that creates shared consciousness, minimizes barriers to participation, and duplicates natural communication patterns at all levels.

**Build the Market Square(s)**

Shared consciousness is the most important factor in allowing an organization to effectively analyze information and respond to new challenges. While even the most rigid and inflexible organizations will have some level of shared consciousness (often only in the form of an organization chart and position Terms of Reference), successful agile organizations take this to next levels. When planning CIS to support an agile organization, one of the questions that must be asked is, “Where will the shared consciousness exist?”, or “Where is the ‘market square’ in which diverse teams can share knowledge?”

The ‘Open Source’ software development model championed by the Linux kernel development community is based upon a commitment to shared knowledge. All production code, proposed changes, and most work discussions are open for viewing by anyone interested. The ‘market square’ exists in two places: GitHub, an on-line read-only code management database containing the Linux kernel, as well as proposed and past changes, and mailing lists to which interested developers can subscribe. Out of these easily-accessed forums, a large number of specialist sub-communities, tutorials, and working groups have emerged to more effectively concentrate and develop expertise.

General McChrystal describes the success of his O&I meetings as, “…the most critical element of [the] transformation – the heart muscle of the organism we sought to create and the pulse by which it would live or die.” The O&I, physically or virtually attended by thousands of people inside and outside of the Task Force, ensured common information and context throughout the force. At the tactical level, the *Cajun Navy* after *Harvey* relied
upon two key platforms: Zello, a smartphone ‘walkie-talkie’ app used to create dispatch channels, and Glympse, a shared positional awareness app. These modern takes on old-fashioned means (radio voice traffic and location reporting) enabled planning and coordination of thousands of rescues.

At a certain size, the ‘market squares’ can get unwieldy and congested. Any CIS for resilient organizations must pay attention to both the centralized knowledge sharing forums, as well as places for the specialized communities to work in smaller groups. As General McChrystal points out, “…many of the traits that made our teams so good also made it incredibly difficult to scale those traits across an organization… Building a single team the size of our Task Force would be impossible.”

To solve this problem, the Linux kernel development community maintains smaller specialized code repositories and email distribution lists dedicated to various sub-elements of the kernel, such as graphics processing, network drivers, and security.

Make it Easy to Join

Writing for The Harvard Business Review, data scientist Alex “Sandy” Pentland examined the communication patterns of high performing teams, noting that: “Higher-performing teams seek more outside connections,” calling this objective measurement of a team’s outside connections “exploration,” finding that: “…scoring well on exploration is most important for creative teams, such as those responsible for innovation, which need fresh perspectives.”

It falls to the designer of CIS to enable these teams to ensure that this exploration can occur by minimizing any barriers (financial cost, policy, or technical challenge are examples) to new nodes joining the network.

Describing his communication systems, General McChrystal says: “We knew that forging the neural network that would facilitate our emergent analysis of complex problems was vital for our long term success,” and so he ensured the Task Force took concrete steps to enable access. Occupy Sandy and the Cajun Navy achieved success by coordinating the efforts of volunteers, and the Linux kernel development community allows computer programmers all over the world to easily contribute their expertise, contributions that almost certainly would be less if contributing was inconvenient.

Duplicate Familiar Communications Patterns

On small scales, humans naturally tend to self-organize into resilient organizations, as evidenced by continued survival over the millennia. Therefore, designers of CIS to enable resilient organizations should seek to replicate natural means of communication as much as possible. Alex Pentland, in his research...
on communication patterns in teams, found that: “...the most valuable form of communication is face-to-face. The next most valuable is by phone or video conference, but with a caveat: Those technologies become less effective as more people participate in the call or conference. The least valuable forms of communication are email and texting.”

CIS that enables, as much as possible, naturally resilient communications should seek to prioritize voice over text, and direct communication over indirect communication. General McChrystal’s O&I is an excellent example, the daily voice and video contact that Task Force members had with him allowed the passage of more than just operations and intelligence data. It offered him “…a stage on which to demonstrate the culture [he] sought.”

Interestingly, the Linux kernel development community almost completely eschews voice communications, relying instead upon email distribution lists. Most community members are experienced computer programmers, and so configure their email to show the email chains in an ‘online forum’ format. In this case, the distributed nature of the community and the technical comfort level allows a different means of communication enabled the human brains to focus upon collaboratively solving problems, and not upon navigating unfamiliar CIS.

Caveats

Resilient CIS Requires Command Support

Not all CIS planning should or can place organizational resiliency above all other factors. Prioritizing support to resiliency over other factors when designing and maintaining CIS requires deliberate and conscious command support, as the trade-offs required to enable resiliency can be significant.

Resilient Networks Are Less Secure

The National Defence Security Orders and Directives (NDSODs) for Information Technology Security specify extremely strict requirements for the security of information. The standards of “least privilege” – everybody is given the absolute fewest rights necessary for their job and role – and “least functionality” – no CIS has more functionality than absolutely necessary for the designed task – are mandatory. These concepts are good for security and compartmentalization of information, but they severely restrict resiliency.

On a more granular level, the commonly applied ‘need to know’ test also restricts resiliency. With this test, every piece of shared information is examined to determine whether the intended recipient has a valid requirement for access. As the point of resiliency-enabling CIS is to better share information and context to build collaborative solutions, a more useful philosophy to enable agility is the ‘need to share’ idea. In this model, information is shared as widely as possible by default, and only restricted on a case-by-case basis when to do otherwise would be an unacceptable risk.

Resilient Networks Are Less ‘Capable’

Every community using a particular CIS will have different preferences and desires for functionality, performance, and user feel. While the desire for ‘agility’ can manifest itself in a desire to constantly add functionality or otherwise modify the CIS, it is important to remember that we are seeking agility to enable organizational resilience, not rapid change to suit individual tastes. CIS designers and managers should resist adding new features and tools – especially information management (IM) repositories – that could functionally be serviced by existing structures. No user should ever have to wonder where a needed piece of information is stored, or how to contact somebody else, even if this means sub-optimal methods are used. It is essential to maximize connectivity, not to optimize any one individual task.

In many cases, this will manifest itself as a lack of capability. If one sub-set of users prefers shared drive-like file structures, another sub-set prefers collaborative programs, such as SharePoint, and another wants a more webpage-like structure, it is better for the ‘cross-pollination’ of information essential for resilient organizations to consolidate information into one unified system, although most communities will perceive the system to be less capable than their ideal.

Resisting the urge to continuously modify and change CIS to suit individual tastes will require strong support from high levels of command, and CIS managers must remain ambassadors of the current system, ensuring that users have the skills and knowledge to use current systems to full benefit. Remember that one of the principles of designing resiliency-enabling CIS is reducing barriers to entry, and training is one of those barriers.

Planning Resilience

These principles of CIS-enabled resilience should form the basis of military CIS planning, but function more as guiding principles than practical planning guidance. In this section, I will make recommendations for IT professionals to plan CIS for resilient organizations.

What Is the CIS For?

The first question that needs to be answered when designing resilience-enabling CIS is, “What is the network designed to do?” The answer is not always obvious, but defining the purpose of networked CIS will allow definition of key factors. Generally speaking, it is designed to support some mix of coordinating operations and managing resources, and the degree to which each function is required will drive design considerations.
In a military context, CIS that coordinates operations should prioritize resiliency, enabling operational partners to join the network and share information. The ‘market square’ will often be an all-informed live chat, such as Mirc, and voice communications are considered essential. Availability is prized over most other security considerations. Designers should focus upon simplicity and common standards. The Cajun Navy use of Zello (voice) and Glympse (positional awareness) is an extreme example of CIS designed to coordinate operations.

In contrast, CIS designed for resource management should focus upon collectively maintaining accurate and auditable databases. Information integrity is prioritized over openness, to ensure confidence in the databases. Information is normally exchanged through more formal and structured means, such as standardized reports, asynchronous messaging (email), and libraries of documents. The Linux kernel development community is built around progressively developing and maintaining a stable code repository, and the primary means of communication are the online GitHub code database, and the internet forum-like distribution lists. Most successful CIS networks will fall somewhere in the middle of the two extremes: General McChrystal’s daily O&I to coordinate operations and integrate intelligence reports was enabled through extensive intelligence sharing databases and an enterprise-level email system.

“ Communicate Sideways

As mentioned earlier, General McChrystal describes the concept of networked individuals and organizations as a “Team of Teams.” In ‘teams’ as opposed to ‘commands,’ horizontal relationships between members grow organically and are as important as the vertical links inherent in the chain of command. He explains, “…we didn’t need every member of the Task Force to know everyone else; we just needed everyone to know someone on every team… We needed to enable a team operating in an interdependent environment to understand the butterfly-effect ramifications of their work and make them aware of the other teams with whom they would have to cooperate.” In the same way, any designer of resilience-enabling CIS must determine how users and nodes will communicate between each other.

Although determining what the ‘market square’ for any given community will be is the biggest design problem to solve, close attention must also be paid to how individual users and communities will communicate between each other. Again, easily-scalable means that closely mimic natural human communication is preferred. Open standards supported by a wide range of products are better than proprietary formats, worth the trade-off to lower functionality or higher cost.
Plan the Access

In the same way that any agile organization will change throughout its lifespan, resilience-enabling CIS must be prepared to enable that change. While planning CIS, the question, “How will additional nodes gain access to the system?” must be answered. Further, the cost of adding new users should be reduced as much as possible.

Depending upon the information security requirements, there are two ways to enable access. Using an ‘open’ philosophy, common standards can be used, allowing new users to best select the means to join the network. A Department of Homeland Security analysis found that Occupy Sandy “…used free open-source software platforms because they were familiar and accessible. The small learning curve and minimal training kept the network running efficiently, and made it easier for existing and potential volunteers to maintain situational awareness.”23 The ‘cost’ of joining the network is the time it takes to download the app and any internet package data fees. The Linux kernel development community is even more open; email and web pages do not require users to download any program other than a web browser, which is a standard feature on almost every device.

Another approach, already discussed as having been used by General McChrystal’s Task Force, is to assume the cost on behalf of potential new nodes. He describes how the Task Force “…designed prepackaged communication bundles that [the] teams could take into the field, wherever they were in the world… We invested in bandwidth to enable us to reach every component of our force and our partners… any member of the Task Force, and any of the partners we invited, could eventually dial into the O&I securely from their laptops and listen through their headphones.”24

In either case, the designer must plan how to add nodes and integrate them as functioning members of the community. Procedures and necessary authorities must be determined in advance and well known. Training for new members must be planned, either through ‘landing screens’ and frequently asked questions (FAQs), tutorials, or by using technologies and procedures already familiar to likely new users.

Conclusion

Organizational Agility, or Resilience, is not simply a function of the command environment or culture. In the modern distributed world, resilient organizations require communications and information systems that enable that resilience to develop. Communications and Information Systems must be specifically designed to enable resilient organizations, with the designer and community fully aware of the trade-offs that must be made to functionality, security, and cost. However, the benefits of creating shared consciousness, lowering the cost of participation, and emulating familiar human communication patterns are significant.
NOTES


4 Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy, “Anticipating emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict.”


6 US Department of Homeland Security, The Resilient Social Network, (USA: Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 2013): “Occupy Sandy is a grassroots volunteer disaster relief movement which provided innovative support to Sandy recovery efforts. Within four months, Occupy Sandy amassed 60 000 volunteers, collected nearly $1 million in donations for Sandy Survivors, and distributed food, clothing, medical supplies, and construction materials. Occupy Sandy impacted thousands of survivors in New York and New Jersey. Some of Occupy Sandy’s notable accomplishments included:

- Establishing food distribution centres in Brooklyn and other Hubs, such as Coney Island;
- Setting up online donation and volunteer social media sites;
- Serving nearly 10000 meals a day in the week after Sandy made landfall, through 15000 volunteers recruited via social media sites; and
- Coordinating motor pools to transport construction teams and medical committees to survivors in the field.”


McChrystal, p. 168.


“We migrated key functions from Windows to Linux because we needed an operating system that was stable and reliable – one that would give us in-house control. So if we needed to patch, adjust, or adapt, we could.”


10 <github.com/Torvalds/Linux>.


12 McChrystal, p. 164.

13 Facebook.com/LaCajunNavy

14 McChrystal, p. 132


16 Pentland.

17 McChrystal, p. 227.

18 Department of National Defence, National Defence Security Orders and Directives, 2015, Ch. 7.

19 McChrystal, p. 128.


21 McChrystal, p. 164.
Women Serving in the Canadian Armed Forces: Strengthening Military Capabilities and Operational Effectiveness

by Barbara T. Waruszynski, Kate H. MacEachern, Suzanne Raby, Michelle Straver, Eric Ouellet, and Elisa Makadi

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Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Suzanne Raby joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1980, and was in the first class of women to graduate from the Royal Military College of Canada. In addition to holding positions across Canada and internationally, she recently led the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Tiger Team to increase the enrolment of women in the Canadian Armed Forces.

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Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has a mandate to increase the representation of women to 25.1% by the year 2026. With the current rate at 15.5%, attempting to increase the representation of women remains an important goal. There are several principal reasons why attracting more women to join the CAF remains an important objective for the Canadian military. As women make up slightly over 50% of the Canadian population, they represent a large resource of highly qualified and skilled people who would benefit the CAF. Furthermore, diverse ideas and perspectives can foster new and different ways of thinking. At the core, attracting and retaining women to join the CAF goes beyond politics and employment equity: it is about strengthening military capabilities and operational effectiveness.

The purpose of this article is to examine how the military can serve as a viable and important career option for women. The first section presents a historical perspective on women serving in the CAF, and will outline historical events and trends that led to the involvement of women in the Canadian military. The next section describes the experiences of women currently working in the Canadian military and the main challenges impacting them. The experiences and issues presented in this article stem primarily from the findings associated with three reports: the Earnsliffe Strategy Group study on women in the Canadian public, the Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Ouellet (2018) study with respect to the perceptions of Regular Force women in the CAF, and the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Tiger Team (CFRG TT) study of the recruitment of women in the CAF. The Earnsliffe Strategy Group’s (2017) study was conducted on behalf of the Department of National Defence (DND) to primarily understand the perceptions of women in the Canadian public, and how they regard a career in the military. The Waruszynski et al. (2018) study was based upon focus groups with women currently serving in the CAF for the purpose of better understanding the attraction, recruitment, employment, and retention of women in the Canadian military. Finally, the CFRG TT (2017) study was based upon the findings of four working groups to help assess the issue of recruiting women into the CAF. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of the recommendations with respect to how the CAF can move toward a more integrated, diverse, and inclusive Canadian military. This article will give the reader a better understanding of the history of women serving in the Canadian military, what women are currently experiencing as members of the CAF, and the direction that the CAF needs to consider to further strengthen its military capabilities and operational effectiveness.

Historical Perspective of Women Serving in the Canadian Military

History is rife with stories of female heroines on the battlefield, and Canada’s history is no exception. Women have played an important role in military history since the 19th Century, and continue to actively participate in a variety of roles. The first formal participation of Canadian women in a military force occurred during the North-West Rebellion of 1885. Growing from an initial nursing staff of one single woman, a small corps of nurses was assembled and dispatched to two field hospitals in the province of Saskatchewan. Overall, 12 women endured the same conditions and dangers as those on active combatant service. Although they were dismissed from the military once the conflict was resolved, all the women involved were awarded the North-West Canada Campaign Medal in recognition of their service.

At the turn of the 20th Century, the Canadian government agreed to offer medical services to British Forces, and were overwhelmed with volunteers to act as nursing sisters. A select group of eight nurses was sent
overseas by the end of 1899, and each nurse was given the rank of lieutenant, with commensurate pay and allowances. As a result of this conflict, the need for a permanent Canadian military nursing organization became apparent, and a Permanent Active Militia Army Medical Corps was created. These women were designated as nursing sisters and had no authority or military command, but did benefit from the same pay and allowances as lieutenants.
With the eruption of the First World War, an order to mobilize nurses came swiftly.12 Thousands of Canadian women volunteered, with over 2800 of them joining the Royal Canadian Medical Corps.13 Many women had no previous military training before boarding the trans-Atlantic ship and received lectures during the voyage.14 At the end of the First World War, women returned to civilian life, although many joined service-minded organizations, such as the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment.15 The drawdown was significant, and by the start of the Second World War in 1939, there were only 10 nursing sisters and one matron in the Regular Force, augmented by a further 331 women on the Reserve List.16

At the onset of the Second World War, women were still viewed as best suited for nursing roles. The perception was that women in military service would not only lead to social disruption, but would also be attributed to the squandering of limited defence funding.17 However, as demand for personnel exceeded the number of male recruits, women were necessary to help shore up military capabilities. In response, the Canadian Women’s Armed Corps, the Canadian Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, and the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service were formed.18 Each organization allowed women to serve in roles other than health care, so that men employed in non-combatant roles could be made available to fight.19 Of the 102 trades available at that time, 65 were open to women, with the caveat that they would be prohibited from taking on a combat role.20 Most of these women were employed in ‘traditional’ fields, including 5000 female nurses, and received less pay, less benefits, and, in some cases, had a separate system of rank and regulations.

Altogether, almost 50,000 service women were employed during the war years, permeating all aspects of military life.21 With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, demobilization plans were made and activated. While all three services recognized the need to maintain a small number of women in uniform, the government was firmly opposed, with the exception being made for nurses, who continued to provide care to injured veterans.

With the start of the Cold War and the concurrent outbreak of hostilities in Korea in the 1950s, Canada re-evaluated its posture with respect to women in the military and re-established female service organizations with limits being set as to the maximum number of women allowed into the Regular Force.22 Women served in both clerical and technical positions, and for the first time, received equal pay to their male counterparts. However, certain restrictions were placed on women’s employment. For instance, terms of service dictating the length of time a woman was required to serve were shorter than those established for their male counterparts.23 Women were also restricted to occupations for which training was less than 16 weeks,24 and which were in a lower pay scale than traditionally male-dominated areas.25

In 1971, following on the heels of the unification of the three services into the Canadian Forces (CF), The Royal Commission on the Status of Women made important recommendations with respect to the future of women in the CF.26 As a result, women joining the CF encountered the same set of enlistment criteria and pension benefits as men. Furthermore, the doors of the Canadian Military Colleges were to be opened to women, married women were given the right to enlist, and pregnant women were permitted to remain in uniform. The only recommendation that was not accepted at the time was the opening of all occupations to women. During this time, the military believed that for operational reasons, specific positions should only be filled by men.

Another legislative milestone took place in 1978 when the Canadian Human Rights Act came into effect, forbidding discrimination based on gender (among other criteria), unless for a bona fide occupational requirement.27 The Service Women in Non-Traditional Environment and Roles (SWINTER) trials, which ran from 1979-1984, evaluated women’s ability to function in “near combat” units and was seen as a positive step forward.28 This was also the case for women at sea and within the Air Force environment. For the first time, women were also sent to the High Arctic to work at Canadian Forces Station Alert; and starting
in 1980, women donned the characteristic scarlet tunics at the Royal Military College of Canada. Thus, the only barrier to full integration was the employment of women in combat. In 1985, the Equality Rights section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. In response, the CF began the Combat Related Employment of Women (CREW) trials that ran from 1987 to 1989, with the goal of evaluating the operational effectiveness of mixed gender units that engaged in direct combat. At the conclusion of the trial, Canadian women were eligible to serve in any military occupation for which they were motivated and qualified, making Canada one of the first in the contemporary western world to promote gender integration.

Since the removal of systemic barriers to service in the late-1980s, women have worked side by side with their male counterparts, participating in every major military operation around the globe, sharing the same hardships, and celebrating the same victories. Since 2000, nearly 10% of Regular Force personnel deployed on operations have been women, including significant operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the same time period, women accounted for approximately 13% of the Regular Force. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact that a relatively large proportion of those who were deployed came from combat arms occupations, in which women have a low representation rate. Contemporary military efforts have been sustained by many women fighting alongside their male colleagues and supporting their fellow service members.

The introduction of women into the Canadian military has a long and storied past. Although the CAF has come a long way since the first woman served as a nurse with the North-West Rebellion, there remains a long road ahead. The mandate to achieve a representation rate of 25% requires attention to the current state of integration, and a clear understanding of the ways in which change must occur. The CAF is an organization that supports and encourages the success of women in its ranks, and tries to ensure that the legacy of all women who have served Canada and Canadians alike continues to live on.

Women's Experiences and the Military Culture

Although women have been a part of military life for centuries, women serving in the military today still face barriers to true integration. As women represent a valuable and skilled sector of the workforce, the military is making an effort to identify the ways in which it can foster an inclusive environment that is welcoming and attractive to women. As part of this mission, the CAF has commissioned a number of research studies to look specifically at the experiences of women serving in the Canadian military. The results of these studies have brought to light important issues that need to be addressed if the CAF wishes to move forward in its quest for increasing the representation of women in the Canadian military. These issues centre upon the warrior culture, family life, career progression, harassment, standards, and basic necessities.

The Warrior Culture

The warrior is an ancient notion that takes on great meaning upon the battlefield. It is someone who, in battle, is seen as strong, relentless, brave, heroic, and, often, someone who is male. This warrior motif underscores the commonly-drawn connection between soldiers and masculinity. For women, this conceptualization of a soldier can create a difficult environment in which to thrive. Naturally, there are women for whom this is not an issue, and who view themselves as a sailor, soldier, and aviator first and foremost, with no separation between their identities. However, for many, it is a challenge to be both a woman and a serving member.

This challenge is compounded by the fact that many women are criticized, regardless of their action, and feel that they need to adopt a masculinized way of being and fitting into an “old boys’ club.” As a way to fit in with their male
colleagues, some women try to minimize their femininity in favour of a persona that is more in line with a masculine portrayal of a serving member. This may mean taking on male characteristics, and not trying to appear overly feminine in their appearance or behaviour.34 Balancing femininity and their military service identity can be challenging for many women, especially when this dichotomy is consistently reinforced through the actions of others. For example, women may be mocked, belittled, or harassed by fellow soldiers for being too masculine. However, many prefer this categorization to being branded too feminine.35 When it comes to femininity and military identity, women can be presented with a very challenging and narrow path upon which to walk. 

Family Life

A difficult dichotomy for some women is that of mother and military member. The decision to have a family is often met with negativity, and it may force women to select between career advancement and family life.36, 37 To avoid negativity and questions of loyalty, some women have tried to plan their pregnancies to better accommodate unit or leadership objectives. In addition, some have returned from maternity leave early to avoid missing out on career opportunities. Women have also expressed concern with respect to their supervisors or leaders, questioning their ability to go on training exercises when they are nursing their babies.38 Many women acknowledge that there is some inconvenience rendered to their colleagues when taking maternity leave, or even when nursing after returning from their leave.39 However, understanding and support reflected in CAF policies and culture would go a long way in alleviating the stress that some women feel when they choose to have a family. Families have long been valued as a critical piece in the health and well-being of service members,40 and allowing service members the flexibility to care for their families is just an extension of this principle.

Career Progression

Progressing in a chosen career can sometimes be challenging for women in the CAF. As discussed, one challenge centres around the need to prioritize family before work, and the potential negative impact on one’s career progression.44 Other hurdles include the lack of female mentorship, and procedures surrounding career planning and advancement.45, 46 Lack of opportunity to progress in one’s career is an often-cited reason for leaving a military occupation,47 and it represents a key facet in understanding women’s experiences in the CAF.

Findings from the Waruszynski et al. (2018) study highlighted the notion that some women are promoted because of their sex, and not because of their abilities.48 Women have described situations in which they are explicitly told that they will be getting
a promotion because senior leadership wants more women. For women in positions of power or elevated ranks, the reasoning that a woman may be in her role due to her sex alone can translate into difficulties establishing credibility and respect among her subordinates. This questioned respect is further complicated by the fact that many women feel the pressure as a representative of their sex. If a female leader fails to gain the respect and credibility of her subordinates, she may be blamed for misrepresenting women in the military. On the other hand, if she succeeds and is promoted, her career progression may be attributed to her sex and not her merits. Essentially, some women in the military face a ‘no-win situation,’ whereby both successes and failures are attributed to the fact that they are women. Changing such perceptions would go a long way with respect to allowing women to succeed in their military careers.

One way such perceptions might be addressed is through the development of mentor-’mentee’ relationships. Specific to the CAF, women in the Waruszynski et al. (2018) study emphasized the desire and necessity for mentorship programs in the Canadian military, but lamented the lack of women available to take on that role. Thus, while mentorship practice tends to benefit the well-being of women in the workplace, of concern is the lack of women in senior leadership roles in the military available for mentoring.

Another concern regarding mentorship is the suitability of some women, and men, to serve as mentors. Madam Justice Marie Deschamps pointed out that many women in the higher ranks have become indoctrinated into the masculine culture, and are not well-suited to take on a mentorship role. Senior leadership, in general, needs to continue to work towards the cultural change the CAF has espoused. However, this may be even more important for women in senior leadership roles in order to continue the progression towards a supportive work environment for fellow women. With a lack of available and suitable mentors, women in the military may be missing out on opportunities to foster their career progression. Men serving in the military can also act as role models, mentors, and allies in helping women to take on leadership roles in the CAF.

These missed opportunities are further accentuated by the lack of female representation on career advancement committees. Suzanne Raby (2017) asserts that advancement committees are predominantly made up of white males, and their decisions are not made available for review. The voices of women and minorities is missing on these committees, and the career advancement of these groups may be impacted. Taken together, the findings show that career progression is a challenging issue for many women in the CAF.

**Harassment**

Perhaps one of the most serious issues facing many women in the CAF is that of gender-based harassment and sexual misconduct. Harassment has become a significant issue for the CAF, as described in the Deschamps Report (2015). With 27.3% of female Regular Force members of the CAF reporting some form of sexual harassment, this issue represents a tremendous barrier to women. The type and severity of harassment ranges from so-called “low level” harassment, to unwanted touching, to non-consensual sexual activity. For many women, this harassment can begin as early as basic training. The implications for enduring harassment and abuse at the hands of colleagues can be varied. Some women are forced to accept this behaviour or face rejection, while others feel they are forced to leave the military in order to escape the abuse. Harassment is a serious issue with serious consequences, and it requires serious action.

The official response to allegations of sexual misconduct in the CAF was the implementation of Operation HONOUR. The
The purpose of Operation HONOUR is to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour in the Canadian military. The designation of this program as a mission within our armed forces denotes the seriousness of the response. However, this initiative has been met with skepticism regarding its efficacy. Although many women highlighted the importance of the initiative in the Waruszynski et al. (2018) study, some women mentioned that Operation HONOUR creates an uncomfortable and potentially-damaging divide between men and women. There is a perception, particularly with the frequency of presentations relating to Operation HONOUR, that men become wary of interacting with females for fear of being accused of any wrongdoing. In some cases, women have reported feeling that the initiative is shedding an unnecessary light upon them and their lives in the military.

All workers have a right to feel safe in the workplace. Together, the observations related to Operation HONOUR and based upon the Waruszynski et al. (2018) study underline the continued need for leadership to take on the responsibility for ensuring that all members in the military are treated with respect and dignity.

Application of Standards

With the inclusion of women in all military roles in 2001, many believed that the physical standards were lowered to allow women to pass qualification tests. However, today’s military members must pass the same standardized test (FORCE) to meet the Universality of Service principle. Standards are applied to everyone regardless of age, gender, rank, or military experience, and failure to pass can lead to discharge from the military. Despite the fact that women are required to pass all the same qualification tests as male military members, perceptions can be hard to change; many people still believe that women are given an unfair advantage. This faulty perception can lead women to feel that they must continually prove their abilities. Many have asserted that once women are able to prove themselves capable, they are typically accepted. However, the onus may well be on each woman to show she is able to carry out her duties; and with each new posting and each new role, she may be required to repeat the cycle of proving her abilities.

A similarly-challenging issue for women in the military is the pressure of being a representative of the female gender. Many military women have spoken to the challenge of feeling responsible for how all women are perceived in the military. As alluded to earlier in this article, failure on the part of one woman is thought to reflect poorly upon all women in the military. Such pressure and responsibility can lead to feelings of competitiveness and friction between female members of military units. At a time when female camaraderie and support is an important step in the way forward, a competitive, tense atmosphere between women is...
counterproductive to the overarching goal of creating a supportive work environment for all members of the CAF. Furthermore, the added pressure of one woman feeling she has to show that all women are capable military members can add stress and create an unrealistic expectation that is challenging to meet.

**The Basic Necessities**

Findings in the Waruszynski and colleagues’ (2018) study reiterated the commonly-reported issue of inattentiveness to the basic necessities for women in the CAF. Specifically, women have repeatedly raised concerns over ill-fitting uniforms and protective gear, and a lack of appropriate washroom facilities, issues that have been raised over the past 20 years. Serving women pointed out that, for example, women are physiologically built differently than men, and poorly-fitted uniforms can impact comfort levels. Anything that can affect focus, inhibit range of motion, or reduce protective capability should be a serious concern. At a very basic level, ensuring comfort and satisfaction with uniforms signifies that the organization is concerned about the well-being of its employees. At the most extreme level, ill-fitting safety equipment puts the lives of women at risk, and can potentially jeopardize operational effectiveness.

Limited access to appropriate washroom and shower facilities also puts into question assumptions of respect and dignity for women who are not afforded the same consideration as their male counterparts when it comes to privacy and personal hygiene. In addition, there can be safety concerns when it comes to showering facilities, particularly when deployed (i.e., risk of being sexually assaulted), as chronicled in the Waruszynski et al. (2018) study. Unfortunately, a few women have expressed concern over trying to access appropriate facilities without it being viewed as receiving preferential treatment.

**The Way Forward**

The way forward will require greater collective leadership, integration, and teamwork to foster a CAF culture that is both welcoming of all its members and one that promotes the value of having a diverse and inclusive military environment. Numerous studies have discussed the experiences of women in the military and have provided several options for change. It is essential that members in leadership positions continue to address the challenges experienced by women and further take the necessary actions that will generate a more positive military culture. The newly-published defence strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, speaks to the fact that the military is in the midst of a cultural change through the emphasis placed upon diversity, inclusiveness, and the importance of fostering a supportive and safe work environment for all CAF personnel.

**Family-Friendly Environment**

There is a need to consider how personnel policies are applied so that they are supportive of a strong work-life balance for all service members. This could include consideration of new forms of support, such as day-care arrangements and enhanced services offered by the CAF. Raby (2017) discussed the possibility of having flexible day-care options and the importance of having programs in place to help with postings and training schedules that are not conducive to regular 9-to-5 day-care centres. In addition, women have decried the inflexibility of their schedules which restrict their ability to attend to children’s medical appointments, or care for their sick children. Allowing for service members to take time to go to appointments and attend to sick children without fear of reprisal will encourage a family-friendly, supportive work environment. This can also extend to aging parents or other family members in need of care.

**Mentorship Programs**

The implementation of a formal mentorship program was a key recommendation made by both Raby (2017) and Waruszynski et al. (2018). A mentorship program can provide two important services to women in the CAF. For example, mentors can help to guide and support ‘mentees’ in their careers, and they can also act as exceptional listeners, advisors, and confidantes. It is important for women to see that others have been successful in their careers, and that women do have opportunities to forge their paths and progress in their chosen careers.

Another important recommendation made by both Raby and Waruszynski is the need to create an accurate portrayal of what life is really like in the military. Women in the military have expressed concern with respect to the way media and recruitment messages portray them and their daily lives as military personnel. To help clarify these portrayals, some women have suggested the use of social media, such as YouTube channels run by women showing their day-to-day routines. This increases engagement with the general population, and provides what is perhaps a more accurate glimpse into these women’s lives.

An interesting program that may provide women with an accurate glimpse into the military is the Women in Force program. This is a new initiative that is currently being evaluated for its efficacy, and is one that may offer a more unique introduction to women interested in a military career. The program was designed to offer interested women the opportunity to experience the military through hands-on activities, presentations from members of the CAF, and living the profession for a few days. Such new and unique ideas may help facilitate the attraction and retention of women in the CAF, and also foster connections between those currently serving and those who are new to the profession.

**Safe and Supportive Environment**

The implementation of Operation HONOUR demonstrates the importance of the CAF leadership’s response to resolving sexual misconduct in the Canadian military. However, the program is not without its drawbacks. Although the ultimate goal of this program is to make the CAF a safe and supportive environment for all service members, some members do not see it as effectively accomplishing this goal. As such, it is important to examine the efficacy of Operation HONOUR and to determine if any gaps continue to exist in response to eliminating sexual misconduct in the CAF.

**Value in Diversity and Inclusivity**

What occasionally gets lost in the political messaging is the desire to attract and retain skilled and highly capable members in the Canadian military. Presently, a large portion of the
Canadian population does not consider the Canadian military as a viable career option. A lack of diversity and inclusivity may limit the capabilities of the military, particularly if individuals are focusing upon their careers elsewhere. The landscape of military operations is changing and requires a variety of skillsets in order to achieve mission success. The archetypal image of a warrior needs to change to meet the modern landscape of military operations.

**Conclusion**

To move forward, the military culture must continue to evolve to better foster diversity and inclusion in the Canadian military. By promoting a more diverse and inclusive military, the CAF will not only bolster the military workforce, but it will ultimately strengthen military capabilities and operational effectiveness. Through its defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, the CAF is committed to increasing the representation of women in the Canadian military, and to ultimately, generating greater diversity and inclusivity in the Canadian military. The future of the CAF as a diverse and inclusive military institution is promising, and it will serve to further augment the diverse Canadian population that it serves, both domestically and abroad.

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Introduction

On 11 November 1918, the habitually-vibrant and boisterous city of Toronto immersed itself in an unfamiliar silence that was mirrored on the Western Front as individuals reflected upon the cost of the First World War. “The first day of peace that we looked forward to through many tears… we exulted it quietly,” recalled Captain Ian McKay, who served in Italy. “[W]e forgot the self-made promises of delirious joy on the day of the war’s end.” The reverent quiet began the nation’s attempt to understand and justify the tragedy of war. It also was an opportunity to evaluate the motivation and contribution of Canadians. To many of the English-Canadian imagination, they were patriots that defended the nation throughout a noble crusade, while French Canadians enjoyed unearned freedom. For Canadiens, the 1917 Conscription Crisis and accusations of cowardice overshadow their memory of the First World War. Each of the two solitudes see the Great War as a story of betrayal, and French Canadians, such as Major Talbot Papineau, worried that history would forget their contributions. “I venture to think that the French Canadians who have fought and died in France and Flanders are the most truly representative of the spirit and ambition of their race.” Rather than the passive observers forced into the First World War by the 1917 Military Service Act, French Canadians were active participants motivated by nationalism.

By 4 August 1914, Canadians understood that war was inevitable. Despite achieving Confederation in 1867, the country’s connection to Britain remained, and many English-Canadians maintained a strong loyalty to the ‘Mother Country.’ Quebec politician Henri Bourassa wrote disparagingly of this devotion, because “…Canadians of British origin have become unsettled in their allegiance; they have not made up their mind whether they are British or Canadian.” Thus, Toronto’s celebratory reaction to Britain’s declaration of war was expected because of its high Anglophone population—many of whom were born in Europe. Streets flooded with impromptu parades as a myriad of voices sang “Rule Britannia,” and people jubilantly throwing their hats into the air became the dominant image of English Canada’s reaction to the war. But a patriotic response was not exclusive to Toronto…

Quebec anticipated the declaration, and understood that it was the government’s prerogative to decide the extent of Canada’s military contribution. While the Montreal Gazette criticised Britain’s impatience, because it, “…did not wait for the expiration
of the time limit specified in the ultimatum.”9 Canada’s decision to send an expeditionary force swept war fever across the country.10 Similar to Toronto, Montreal’s “…Militia Department was buried under the avalanche of applications for service.”11 One offer emerging at this time was French businessman Edward J. Diisitsey’s proposal to raise a Montreal regiment immediately.12 Contrary to the interpretation that anti-imperialist sentiments discouraged Francophone Canadians from enlisting, The Montreal Gazette declared: “…they were equally ready to serve under the English or French flag,”13 suggesting that Imperial attachments were inconsequential to their decision whether or not to enlist. For these applicants, their loyalty was attached to Canada. One newspaper reported, “…loyalty of populace [for Canada] was strikingly emphasized in Toronto, Ottawa, and Quebec.”14 While two English-speaking cities are explicitly mentioned, the article suggests that patriotic sentiments penetrated Quebec society and did not remain clustered in Montreal. It also indicates that nationalistic sentiment was not omnipresent across English Canada, since it mentioned cities as opposed to provinces.

Discussion

The patriotic English-Canada rhetoric contradicting these initial enthusiastic responses in French Canada is infused with the myth that it did not proportionately contribute to the war effort.15 However, enlistment records suggest an alternative interpretation, because 31% of the initial 34,500 men that enlisted16 were born in Canada. Meanwhile, 65% of enlisted English Canadians were born in the British Isles,17 which supports Bourassa’s observation that these individuals might not be motivated by Canadian patriotism, but by loyalty to England.

Conversely, of the 11,000 Canadian-born volunteers, 3,000 were French Canadians,18 exemplified by John Baptist Adams from Rat River, Quebec, who volunteered a few weeks after the declaration of war.19 On 10 November 1914, the Honourable Postmaster Thomas Chase Casgrain20 observed patriotism in Quebec, stating, “…to say that French Canadians have no interest in this conflict is criminal. Our people understand it perfectly. Let me tell you; no part of Canada is taking a greater interest in the war and the triumph of the allies than those in the province of Quebec.”21 Some French Canadians that enlisted had limited military experience in comparison to their European-born English counterparts. Private Clement Adams worked as a labourer in St. Majorique, Gaspe – a predominately-francophone town where he was born – before enlisting in 1916.22 When the Canadian-born youth was asked if he preferred domestic defence or service overseas, Clement selected the Canadian Expeditionary Force.23 Clement was assigned to the 189th Battalion,24 commanded by P.A. Pluze. The battalion was comprised of, “…hard-bitten farmers and fishermen of the Lower St. Lawrence,” and was broadly recognized as a well-disciplined unit that even surpassed some of the English
Canadian regiments. Contrary to the prevalent narrative of significant numbers of French-Canadians deserting their units, Pluze’s soldiers professed loyalty to serving Canada, and his regiment never experienced a deserter. That said, incidents of desertion occurred in English- and French-Canadian units. For example, English-Canadian Private Herman Abbot from Coldwater, Ontario, voluntarily enlisted in 1916, but deserted his unit the following year. Meanwhile, French-Canadian Private Armand Alarie of the 206th Battalion deserted in 1917, a few months after being conscripted. This suggests that even though French-Canadians did desert their units, many of them were conscripts, while regiments from English Canada struggled, at least in part, with their volunteer soldiers deserting.

The discrepancy between the numbers and the traditional interpretation is partly due to statistical misunderstandings and English-Canadian bias. Quebec is often portrayed as representative of the French-Canadian response to the war, and that of Ontario is considered indicative of the English-Canadian response. However, while 60% of volunteers came from either Quebec or Ontario, by 30 April 1917, less than half of the 14,100 French Canadian volunteers hailed from Quebec. French Canadians lived in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and other provinces, exemplified by George McGrath, who was born in Montreal but enlisted in Smith Falls, Ontario, where he lived. His enlistment record was in French, but he joined the English-speaking 80th Battalion. Also, the statistics do not account for those who identified as French Canadians, but predominately spoke English. English-Canadian hubris appears to further distort the narrative of French Canada’s military contributions.

Globe reporter Amy Lacey went to Quebec in 1915 to write on the condition of French-Canadian opinion. Lacey concedes that she went into Quebec with stories of mutinous French soldiers, interfering clerics, and community “indifference to the demands of war.” However, she encountered the exact opposite of these misconceptions gleaned from Ontario. “Not one word have I heard in this province that is not pro-ally,” Lacey wrote in a 27 December 1915 article, “Nationalism in Quebec and the war cannot be separated.” One French-Canadian told Lacey, “I am so glad that my boy was willing to go as a private,” causing her to opine that the English Canadian recruits were not willing to accept the lower ranks. Perhaps French Canadian willingness to accept less glamorous positions in the army that made some English Canadians scoff at them suggests a more profound sense of duty in the allegedly-indifferent race. It takes a strong commitment to willingly humble oneself at the lowest rank when officer positions are more appealing…
“The trouble is that some people start out with the presumption that we are different people and that we view our great nation from different standpoints,” Postmaster Casgrain said, “nothing can be further from the fact.” This presumption tarnished the reputation of French Canada, but Casgrain maintained that it is not a grassroots idea, “…politicians are to blame for the false impression taking foot amongst the people.” Politicians had a significant role in distorting and preserving the war narratives on both sides of the union. The foremost figures dictating these interpretations were Prime Minister Robert Borden, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and Henri Bourassa.

Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden was an English-Canadian born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and he had little patience for French Canadians. Borden predicted the war and consulted the Minister of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes, with respect to recruitment and necessary military reforms. On 7 December 1914, he went to the Canadian Club in Montreal to give a recruitment speech that appealed to a sense of loyalty to former countries that were now at war, indicating his limited knowledge of a population predominantly born in Canada. The Prime Minister wanted the war to demonstrate that Canada’s autonomy resided in declaring that it fought for its sovereignty, and not for Great Britain. However, like many English Canadians, Borden was sympathetic to the mother country and his desire to prove Canadian superiority on the battlefield contrasted with French-Canadian sensibilities that Canada had by then contributed enough to the war. Borden grew impatient with the decreasing number of volunteers, and proposed conscription in 1916, enacting The Military Service Act in 1917. The following year, Borden denounced Quebec for railing against conscription.

Conversely, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was admired in Quebec, and also had acquired the respect of some English Canadians. Laurier’s position on recruitment and conscription is contested because he did participate in its promotion to the same extent as Borden. While Laurier agreed with Borden in 1918 that conscription must be obeyed in Quebec, he accused the Prime Minister of provoking dissent. Like many French Canadians, Laurier was patriotic towards Canada, and not interested in Britain’s interests, but he did not want to see “Quebec fail to respond to the call of blood.”

In January 1917 Laurier prophetically stated:

If it is said that Quebec did not come forward in the same number as the English provinces, I have reason to believe that when the figures are analyzed, the margins of difference between the native-born populations of Quebec and the native-born populations of other provinces will not be very wide.
As much as Borden represented the Anglophone Canadian sentiments, Laurier symbolized the patriotic French Canadians in the First World War. Laurier’s counterpart, Henri Bourassa, represented the third side of the Canadian war mentality.

Bourassa had nationalist ideas, but was distrustful of English Canadians, and opposed any Canadian participation in imperial wars. 46 He thought that conscription was a “blood tax” and dedicated his influence as well as resources to combat it. 47 However, Bourassa stressed the importance of peaceful protests, potentially saving Borden from several chaotic riots. 48 Despite Bourassa’s influence, units such as the 189th and 22nd Battalions separated themselves from him, and accused him of having “…refused to share in the glory and agony of our nation’s birth.” 49 In sum, Borden, Laurier, and Bourassa represented the three dominant perspectives of Canada’s war.

While politicians influenced the creation of Canada’s war narrative, it is the 22nd Battalion that perhaps best represents French Canada’s battle experience and its motivation. At the start of the First World War, Sir Sam Hughes was unwilling to mobilize the French-speaking militias, but by September 1914, the French elite expressed a practical desire to create a battalion composed of only French Canadians, instead of having them scattered throughout English-speaking units. 50 Dr. Arthur Mignault—a colonel of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, pledged $50,000 for the unit’s creation, and he is considered one of its founders. 51 On 15 October 1914, the Canadian government authorized the establishment of the battalion, appointing militia officer Colonel Frederic Mondelet Gaudet as its commander. The force quickly gained a distinguished fighting record, surpassing some Anglophone units. 52

The battalion had 36 officers and 1,017 troops when it set off for Europe in 1915, augmented by reinforcements added throughout the war. 53 It fought in every major battle from Flers-Courcelette to Vimy Ridge, with two-thirds of its 6,000-man force eventually either being killed or wounded. 54 For many French Canadians, this battalion paid the province’s “blood tax” for the war, and proved its loyalty to Canada.

The 22nd Battalion earned a reputation at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, which was a distinctively-French Canadian success. While history remembers it as the first major tank battle, it is a testament to French Canadian loyalty. The French Canadians were sent to break the stagnation of trench warfare and attacked the lower-end of Courcelette before sweeping up the main street and pivoting around to trap the German advance. 55 The commander was praised for his strict devotion to duty and gallantry, but the regiment suffered severe casualties. 56 “The unit was later nicknamed “Van Doos” from the mispronunciation of Vingt-Deux, and adopted the patriotic song Vive la Canadienne, which many French Canadians sang before the national anthem. The translated lyrics of the song suggest a patriotic sentiment:

“Bourassa had nationalist ideas, but was distrustful of English Canadians, and opposed any Canadian participation in imperial wars.”

Long live the Canadian
Fly my heart flies
Long live the Canadian
And her pretty sweet eyes
And her pretty sweet soft soft eyes

We take her to the wedding
Fly my heart flies
We take her to the wedding
In all her fine attire
In all its beautiful tricky
In all her fine attire
In all its beautiful tricky
In all her fine attire

We dance with our blondes
Fly my heart flies
We dance with blondes
We change in turn
We change in turn

So time goes by
Fly my heart flies
So time goes by
It is really very sweet
Finally, long live the Canadian

Fly my heart flies
Love the Canadian
And her pretty sweet eyes

Although the 22nd Battalion earned a reputation at Flers-Courcelette, Canada writ large earned its reputation at Vimy Ridge, a battle hailed in English Canada, but French-Canadian units also served with great distinction in the battle. The New York Times correctly observed, “April 9, 1917, will be in Canada’s history one of the great days, a day of glory to furnish inspiration to her sons for generations.” 58 Meanwhile, the New York Tribune called Vimy, Canada’s “…opportunity to write its name on the map of Europe, and their imprint will be remembered.” 59 Beyond it being a dramatic victory, Vimy Ridge offers a strong correlation between the militia myth and Canada’s subsequent military achievement.

Vimy Ridge was a critical strategic choke point that both Britain and France had failed to capture up to this point. 60 The Ottawa Citizen designated Vimy “…the strongest defensive position of the enemy on the Western Front.” 61 Thus, with Canada’s reputation for success against seemingly-insurmountable odds, the Entente Powers summoned the Canadian Corps to Vimy. 62 Canadian Major General Arthur Currie,
then-Commander of the 1st Canadian Division, advised the use of the “Creeping Barrage” artillery tactic, combined with Colonel Andrew McNaughton’s system of counter fire, based upon determining the location of German guns by light and sound. Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng, then-Commander of the Canadian Corps concurred, and the trio began to prepare for the attack. The Canadian Corps utilized the relatively quiet winter to make weapons of stealth, including daggers, and practice its assault. As this was the first time that all four Canadian divisions would concurrently attack the enemy, Byng left nothing to chance. He built a model of the ridge, and soon, the Canadian soldiers were unquestionably familiar with its topography. By 9 April 1917, the Canadians were prepared to oust the German army from its stronghold.

The attack commenced with an artillery barrage, and the Canadian Corps moved in unison directly behind it. The Ottawa Evening Citizen brought the thrilling assault home on 10 April 1917:

The attack was preceded by a bombardment which continued for several days and in which guns of the heaviest calibre took part. The results were, from an artillery perspective, a repetition of the Battle of the Somme. Reconnaissance aircraft could find only shapeless masses of churned up earth where the first enemy line had previously existed.

Again, Canadians were convinced of their military superiority over the German army. As one soldier reported to the Globe: “It was fine, though terrible to watch our shells bursting and I figured to myself the fright of the Germans… I heard yelling from my fellows, and I knew they were giving it to the Germans good. Isn’t it fine to be Canadian? I won’t go home again until there is nothing more to do in Empire.” He was not alone in saying, “…isn’t it fine to be Canadian?”

The Canadian Corps was victorious over the Germans, and took 119 German officers prisoner during the battle, along with inflicting many casualties. As Borden later declared, “…the Canadians have proven themselves more than a match for the best troops that the enemy could send against them! They possess the splendid courage and resourcefulness, which its accomplishments demand.” Notably, despite the CEF’s pride in its military accomplishments, it harboured respect for the Germans as a fighting force. This respect was mutual as each side was both innovative and determined to win. There was an understanding between the opposing forces of the importance of defence and the corresponding skills needed to ensure successful defence. Although English Canada seems to have claimed this victory as its own, the French-Canadian 21st, 25th, and 22nd Battalions were essential in capturing enemy machine guns, along with almost 400 prisoners. The battle that has been claimed to mark the birth of Canada was won by both sides of the union; it is the solitudes’ patriotic narrative.

However, the same year, the Conscription Crisis also became part of Quebec’s war narrative. The Federal Government was waxing nervous at the dwindling numbers of volunteers following the accusation from English Canada that French Canadians felt removed from Britain’s plight. Borden had recently pledged 500,000 recruits by the end of 1916 despite the nation’s total population being less than eight million, and desperate to keep his promise, Borden reintroduced the Military Services Act, retreating from his earlier pledge of 18 May 1917 not to implement conscription.
The Military Service Act required: “All male inhabitants of Canada of the age of eighteen-years-old and upwards under sixty, not exempt or disqualified by law, and [being] British subjects, shall be liable to serve in the militia.” Most English-speakers in Ontario supported Borden, but those living in rural areas throughout the provinces thought conscription went against everything the war stood for because it was supposed to be, “…a just war to free the oppressed and restore liberal ideals.” British Columbia and Nova Scotia were concerned with respect to the nation’s stability, and opposed conscription on similar grounds as Quebec. It was easier for urban dwellers to enlist but those from the rurally-populated English provinces had to consider their agricultural responsibilities.

Laurier cautioned that conscription would rend the country asunder, and Quebec officials sought to discourage its implementation. The Honorable Charles Marcil told Parliament that the province required more patriotic leadership, but Quebec citizens defended Laurier’s role in recruiting. Marcil also maintained that the decreasing French Canadian military participation was the Federal Government’s fault because it had failed to inspire its citizens. It sent “…the wrong type of people”—namely, English officers or officials appealing to British imperialism in a manner that did not enthuse Francophone Canadians. Focusing upon national duty or the preservation of Canada might have been more efficient, based upon the ties of the French Canadians that enlisted. After the declaration that conscription was pending, Major General Le Sand cancelled a meeting scheduled to take place in Montreal to gain more French Canadian volunteers. Le Sand reasoned: “…it was felt that we could not make an appeal for voluntary enlistment while a measure of conscription was in force.” For Le Sand, it appears that the French Canadians were a monolithic group that either joined freely or would be conscripted, and he believed that the latter direction was more efficient.

English Canada mostly remained aloof to the profound sense of betrayal felt by many French Canadians on the eve before the Military Service Act was passed. The Globe published a small article stating that Quebec was still requesting tolerance and patience on the part of English Canada. Besides the plea, the change of the Globe’s description of the Anglophone and Francophone Canadians demonstrates the societal shift from “ally” to “other.” In 1916, the English newspaper referred to English and French Canada as “…two sides of the union,” suggesting a difference, but also a connection. By 1917, it called them the “…two dominant races of Canada on other sides of the gulf.” The symbolism of connection was shattered by three years of disloyal anti-French sentiments propagated in English society. The implementation of conscription enflamed the gulf as Anglophone and Francophone Canadians sought to define themselves by what the other was not. Laurier’s prophetic prediction that conscription would tear Canada apart proved correct.

On 28 March 1918, the festering tensions in Quebec exploded into the Anti-Conscription or Easter riots. The protests resulted from the Dominion Police’s detainment of a French Canadian who failed to present his draft exemption papers. The man was held at the St. Roch District Police Station, Quebec City, but was later released before 200 outraged citizens descended upon the station. The crowd then advanced to the conscription registration office and damaged other official buildings. Rumours of a province-wide revolt quickly spread, and Quebec City’s mayor, Henri Edgar Lavigueur, requested assistance from Ottawa. Fearing a potential insurrection, Borden enacted the War Measures Act, declaring martial law in Quebec. The riot only lasted three days, but it dominated much of the memory of French Canada during the war. Twice during the conflict, a three-day period had changed the country. Vimy Ridge brought the nation together, and the Anti-Conscription riots helped rip it asunder.

Thus, by 1917, Canada was fighting wars domestically and internationally as French Canada sought to defend its honour, but also argued that the ‘nation’ had contributed enough to the war effort. For many, Canada had already made an emphatic military
contribution. It had captured points of significant strategic value, such as Vimy Ridge, and had earned a reputation as ‘shock troops’ among both allies and foes. Moreover, it had dedicated, “…men and money proportionately superior to that of any nation engage in the war.” From 1914 to 1917, Canadian society dedicated itself wholeheartedly to the war effort, but it could only sustain that pace for a limited amount of time. French Canada was concerned with respect to the well-being of its ‘nation,’ not that of Europe. Furthermore, Canadians on both sides of the union were concerned with respect to the message it sent to recent immigrants that had been promised no mandatory military service in Canada. Canadians questioned if a war, even a great crusade, should turn Canada into a military state. Bourassa accused Borden of betraying these immigrants by luring them to Canada on the false promise of freedom from mandatory military service, only to reverse his position to fulfil an unrealistic undertaking. Statistically, Borden’s pledge of 500,000 troops was unrealistic, given a total national population of eight million at the time.

Predominately, English Canada wrote the nation’s war narrative, but it failed to appreciate the sentiments behind French Canada’s adverse reaction to conscription. The Military Service Act implied that Francophone Canadians, especially those living in Quebec, were not fulfilling their duty to the country. It questioned the extent of their loyalty, which irked those who understood that there was only a small proportion of French Canadians that railed against serving in the war. As Postmaster General Casgrain wrote to the Globe: “The people of French Canada are of the same proud and martial race as the heroes of Joffre’s glorious armies. They will still answer the call of blood if that call is heard more clearly than the voices of discontent.” The New York Times even commented on the state of patriotism in French Canada, writing: “…a view of all the facts shows that French Canada will stay in this war to the end.”

English Canadians appeared to have forgotten the boisterous song parades in Montreal in 1915, and that French Canadians are credited with filling French units, such as the 189th and the 22nd Battalions that earned sterling reputations throughout the war. As Olivar Asselin wrote: “The French Canadians made the sacred sacrifice for the existence of their country,” before conscription was enforced. French Canadians acknowledged that Ontario did more than Quebec, but not because of unselfish patriotism. English Canadians were motivated [at least in part] by loyalty to their former mother countries in Europe, but French Canadians possessed a nationalism “…associated with the soil of Canada first, last, and all the time.” As Bourassa observed, French Canadians remained “…unhyphenated Canadians. The French Canadians have remained, and want to remain, exclusively Canadian.” In contrast, English Canada generally viewed Empire as “…all and everything, but we fight for the good of Canada.”

Some English Canadians understood the insult levied at French Canada through the arguments surrounding conscription. Protestant magazines in Canada tried to reinforce the idea that Quebeckers were not slackers in the war, but gave of their own proportionately to Ontario, which possessed a greater urban population. Meanwhile, journalists, such as Amy Lacey, asserted that the blood of their forefathers spurred French Canadians to bear arms if necessary to defend Canada’s sovereignty.

French Canadians began to refute biased opinions of their role in the war. Sir Lomer Gouin, who earlier predicted that French Canada would joyfully receive conscription, wrote a tract denouncing English Canada’s hypocrisy with respect to its treatment of Quebec. Gouin accused Ontario of unjust treatment towards Quebec, since Ontario did not regard New Brunswick or Nova Scotia with similar prejudice, although those provinces also opposed conscription. He asserted that he was proud of, “…my country Canada,” and did not
appreciate Ontario suggesting otherwise. The palpable betrayal the French Canadians felt when their English counterparts accused them of disloyalty is often forgotten with respect to the overall war narrative.

Conclusion

The First World War was Canada’s domestic and international trial by fire. It upheld Borden’s vision of a respected Canada as it participated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, but it also confirmed Laurier’s fears that the union of French and English Canadians would be ripped asunder. Collective memory suggests that English Canadians were patriots fighting for their nation, while the French Canadians were unwilling to participate in the war. However, this narrative is too simplistic for the paradoxical country struggling to comprehend itself. Contrary to the established narrative, French Canadians felt a profound sense of loyalty to Canada and were told that their patriotism connected to its soil. Meanwhile, English Canadians generally were not as clear with respect to their loyalties, as many remained connected with their homelands, and might not have fought with the selfless patriotism often accredited to them. Indeed, rather than having two dominant races standing on either side of a gulf, French and English Canada are two sides of a union. It is a union as diverse and complicated as their responses to the war, but neither side was monolithic. French Canadians did fulfill their obligations to the war, but not for imperialism, unlike many of their English counterparts, but for Canada, the country they loved.
40 The 1917


17 Ibid, p. 27.


19 John Baptist Adams, Enlistment Records, RG Accession 166, Box 31-46 #24586.

20 Thomas Casgrain was a French-Canadian lawyer and politician who frequently wrote for newspapers during the war; he also owned L’Eveneet. He focused his efforts upon encouraging recruitment efforts alongside Laurier. Although he was sixty-three at the start of the war, he volunteered for active service. He was Bourassa’s antithesis.


22 Adams Clement, Enlistment records, RG 150 Accession 166 Box 24-40, #1297.

23 “All Canadians rush to aid mother country,” in The Montreal Gazette, 4 August 1914, p. 4.


25 Sharp, p. 28.

26 Dyer, p. 47.

27 George McGraw, Enlistment records, RG 150 Accession 166 Box 6857-1, #154028.

29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.


34 “Loyalty of the French Canadians in the war,” p. 5.


38 Cook, p. 15.

39 Henri Bourassa, “Win the War and Lose Canada,” in Le Devoir, Montreal, 4 July 1917, p. 3.

40 The 1917 Military Service Act required all men between the ages of 18 and 60 to participate in active duty. Few of those conscripted saw the front lines.


43 “Government will deal firmly with Quebec resistance,” p. 1.

44 Sharp, p. 31.


48 Cook, p. 9.

49 Dyer, Canada in the Great Power Game, 130.


51 Dyer, p. 85.

52 Ibid.


54 Ibid., p. 168.


57 “Vive la Canadienne” in Le rajeunissement de notre hymne national, January 1935.


59 Ibid.


61 Stewart Lyon, “Canadian Troops Carried Famous Vimy Ridge,” in The Ottawa Citizen, 10 April 1917, p. 7.

62 Ibid.

63 Joel Ralph, “A Bloody Triumph,” in Canada’s Great War Album, p. 112.

64 Ibid.


66 Ibid.


68 Black, p. 479.

69 Ralph, p. 112.

70 Lyon, p. 7.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ralph, p. 112.


76 Ibid.


80 Sharp, p. 24.


85 “Recruiting Meeting at Quebec Cancelled,” in The Globe, 21 May 1917, p. 11.

86 Quebec, Laurier, and Recruiting,” in The Globe, 10 July 1916, p. 4.


89 “Recruiting Meeting at Quebec Cancelled,” in The Globe, 21 May 1917, p. 11.

90 Ibid.


95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., p. 31.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., p. 15.


104 Ibid.

105 Quebec Hears Call to Serve,” in The Globe, 5 December 1916, p. 5.

106 “Loyalty of French Canadians in the war,” p. 5.


108 Dyer, p. 102.


112 Ibid.


114 Gouin, “The True Spirit of Quebec.”

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.
Intent upon Destruction: German Strategy at Verdun, 1916

by Barton J. Turner

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Introduction

From the onset of the First World War, Germany had planned a swift manoeuvre strategy against both France and Britain, implementing the “Schlieffen Plan,” which aimed to encircle the enemy’s forces in a grand sweeping movement. The plan was the brainchild of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff prior to the First World War, and was carried forward by his successor, General Helmuth von Moltke [the Younger – Ed.]. The scheme had indeed showed promise, but had been stopped during the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. The Schlieffen Plan relied upon momentum, and when Germany’s forces halted short of its objective, von Moltke, who failed to maintain control during this decisive movement, was replaced as the Chief of the Imperial German General Staff with General Erich von Falkenhayn. Afterwards, the Western Front essentially came to a standstill. The deadlock only moved mere metres in some sectors, while combatants suffered incredible casualties. Fortunately for Germany, both their East and West fronts had stabilised by the end of 1915.1

Around that time, Falkenhayn briefed Kaiser Wilhelm II that a mass breakthrough of the enemy’s lines was beyond Germany’s means.2 Instead, Falkenhayn believed that separating Germany’s enemies would enable them to secure victory, albeit a negotiated victory. Falkenhayn saw Britain as Germany’s true arch nemesis, one that used Russia and France as projected British weapons on the European continent.3 He concluded that squaring off against Britain and France on the field would play into Lord Kitchener’s strategy of a “war of exhaustion,”4 which Germany was keen to avoid. In order to defeat Britain, Falkenhayn had to first direct his forces against one of their allies. Believing that Russia’s internal struggles would “compel them to give in within a short period,”5 Falkenhayn focused his attention upon France. By attacking France separately and forcing them from the war, he surmised that Britain would be no match for Germany, who would then push the enemy off the European continent. Targeting France was viewed as knocking England’s “best sword” from their hands.6

The Battle at Thiaumont, Verdun.
Falkenhayn’s strategy was to force France to sue for peace, independent of England. In order to achieve this, he envisioned a kill zone on an unprecedented scale, enforced by a massive artillery concentration. As noted from previous battles, offensive operations rarely benefitted the attackers in terms of the ratio of territory gained to lives lost. Those in defensive positions held the upper hand and could impose huge losses with limited means. Falkenhayn concluded that Germany must persuade France to attack prepared defensive positions, which would achieve an advantageous kill ratio for the defending Germans. The city of Verdun was chosen for its political, cultural, and historical elements, while also being located close to the German-controlled railway at Metz, which meant a battle in the vicinity would be well-supplied. Ultimately, Falkenhayn viewed Verdun as an object “…for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have.” Through the use of attritional warfare, Falkenhayn aimed to destroy as many French soldiers as possible in order to convince the French to give up their cause. With France no longer a combatant, Germany could focus what few resources they had left upon Britain. However, due to contrary and institutionalised strategic beliefs, attritional warfare at Verdun did not force France into a separate peace, due to the German 5th Army’s disregard for the intended attritional scheme, the erroneous belief by Falkenhayn that the French Republic was near-collapse, and the stubborn devotion of the French to defend Verdun.

Map of Battle of Verdun, 1916 / Western Front.
Discussion

Falkenhayn’s sole intent, to “...bleed France white,” was not shared by his subordinate commanders in the 5th Army, the formation selected to carry out the task. Crown Prince Wilhelm, overall commander of the 5th Army, was “uncomfortable” with Falkenhayn’s determination to “bleed” the French army. Both the Crown Prince and the 5th Army’s Chief of Staff, Constantin Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, attempted to distance themselves in later years from the knowledge of Falkenhayn’s true attritional intent behind Verdun. Yet, in both their writings, they acknowledged that Falkenhayn had used the term “exsanguination” throughout the planning process, and was adamant about the concept as being central to his strategy. While it is clear that top military officials in the 5th Army understood Falkenhayn’s intended purpose, they nonetheless re-prioritised objectives, which ultimately contravened the strategic value of the operation. These commanders disregarded the Falkenhayn’s intent, because his strategy ran contrary to the established thinking within the German military. For decades, German Chiefs of Staff had planned for and relied upon the principle of fighting a short war, based upon a strategy of annihilation, where a clear victor was decided in one-or-two decisive battles. However, due to the industrialisation of warfare during the First World War, a new strategy of attrition was taking hold out of necessity. The German army failed in this new era of warfare by maintaining its theory of seeking and engaging in a decisive victory. Further, Falkenhayn’s subordinate commanders found it difficult to accept a battle without clearly-defined territorial objectives, which is why they developed their own objectives.

The battle began on 21 February 1916 with a massive bombardment, fired from over 1200 artillery pieces, and Falkenhayn ordered patrols to survey what was left of the French after the bombardment had concluded. Instead, 5th Army officers exacerbated German casualties by sending their men to capture territory, again disregarding the intended process. General von Zwehl, Commander of the Westphalian Reserve Corps, “disregarded these orders,” and sent forward his entire force. In fact, upon hearing of Zwehl’s advance that evening, Knobelsdorf “removed all limits” imposed by Falkenhayn on the 5th Army with respect to their advance.

Reflecting in his post-war memoirs, Falkenhayn had envisioned that the German troops at Verdun would be “…free to accelerate or draw out [their] offensive, to intensify it or break it off from time to time, as suits her purpose.” Movement of this nature was crucial to ‘sell’ the trap to the French, and to encourage their continued attacks. This deception was so important to the entire operation that Falkenhayn kept the purpose of the battle vague, only sharing the truth with top military commanders. If the French realised the true purpose behind the battle, surely they would not have entered the trap at all. Falkenhayn determined that the soldiers would play their part better if they honestly thought they were sent to capture Verdun. Due to the General Staff’s secrecy and the disregard for the intent by their corps commanders, troops were manoeuvred in the real sense, rather than for deception. The 5th Army was aiming to occupy territory and change the battle lines, forgoing their role as bait, and proceeding with actual conquest. Importantly, Falkenhayn believed the capture of Verdun itself to be irrelevant. The only objective was to lure in and kill French troops. While introducing the scheme to the Kaiser, Falkenhayn reported that in the off chance that France did not commit troops to the battle, Germany would simply take Verdun, thereby inflicting an enormous moral defeat upon the French, and providing reasons for celebration in Germany. However, as the French were intent upon defending the line, Falkenhayn had no intention of actually capturing Verdun, because attempting to do so threatened to ensnare his own troops in the trap. In an attempt to curb potential losses and ensure his strategy of attrition was being followed, Falkenhayn had ordered that “…all plans of attack, redeployment and eventually withdrawal” had to be sent through him for approval. Despite this, on the 4th of March, the Crown Prince ordered his 5th Army to capture the city of Verdun, at which point they suffered “intensive shelling” from French artillery, and failed to reach even the outskirts of the city. This is further proof that Falkenhayn’s subordinates continued to disregard his intent, as well as his orders. If they had been committed to following his strategic plan, they would have withdrawn in order to lure more French soldiers to within range of the waiting German artillery.
The reason Falkenhayn was continually undermined was because the German officer corps was brought up on the teachings of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, who focused upon strategies of massed breakthrough, encirclement manoeuvres, and decisive victories. Falkenhayn was not a disciple of these Schlieffen strategies, having only served a short time under the former Chief of the Imperial German General Staff. This contributed to the officer corps’ view of Falkenhayn as an outsider and untrustworthy. Wilhelm Heye, an officer in the German General Staff and supporter of Falkenhayn, wrote, how “…immediately obvious even to us young General Staff officers that he lacked the schooling in operations taught by the genial Schlieffen.” Heye concluded that he was not astonished that Falkenhayn’s operational methods at Verdun found “little acceptance” from the subordinate commanders.

Falkenhayn’s plan for wearing down the French through Verdun rested upon the ‘miscalculation’ that France’s war efforts were near the point of collapse, and that they could be “coaxed to the bargaining table.” The French were facing manpower shortages, and had “suffered enormous losses,” both realities of which Falkenhayn viewed as the further weakening of their resolve. In his post-war memoirs, he recounted that “…the strain on France [had] almost reached the breaking point,” and that his strategy would be the element to push them past it. He was further convinced of France’s decline by virtue of German intelligence reports. In August 1915, one such report stated that, due to the amount of French casualties during the war to that point, the French Government “…will be faced with the question of whether, despite all outside help, the ending of resistance is a more fitting path for the future of the nation.” Reports such as this fueled Falkenhayn’s decision that France would give up after losing thousands more soldiers, so much so that only nine divisions were allotted to the 5th German Army at the beginning of the battle. This would have been more than enough to execute the feint that Falkenhayn intended, but not enough to conduct an actual assault upon a fortified position, such as Verdun. In order to ‘compel’ the French to give up, the Falkenhayn relied upon the devastating fire power of the artillery. An enormous amount of artillery and ammunition was massed prior to the battle, the Germans having fired around a million projectiles alone in the initial bombardment, leaving virtually nothing standing within the kill zone. Falkenhayn did not allocate extra divisions due to his reasoning that the artillery would inflict the wounds, while the troops lured more French into the trap. Had a lengthy and drawn-out resistance been forecast, more troops would have been necessary at the beginning of the battle. The French army, shaken from the initial bombardment, did, in fact, offer limited resistance in a few areas. As the battle raged on in the following months, Falkenhayn merely observed the dogged French resistance as a dramatic last-ditch effort that would surely succumb to German military might. He had surmised, erroneously, that the will of France would not “slowly and visibly bend,” but would rather “snap” all at once. To him, these “most strenuous acts of resistance” were the “last gasps” of the dying French state. This “last gasp,” as viewed by Falkenhayn, turned out to be extremely dangerous and costly to Germany. By assuming that every renewed resistance was at the apex of the French tipping point, German soldiers were repeatedly thrown into the ‘mill’ with the assurance that they were on the verge of victory. Unfortunately for these soldiers, who were being chewed up by this purposeful battle of attrition, France was far from being at the tipping point. In fact, their soldiers were rallying together and strengthening their resolve to fight. They were quite aware they were taking many casualties, but Falkenhayn was right when he picked Verdun as a French symbol that the nation would strive to retain.

General Joseph Joffre and General Philippe Petain visit the front at Verdun, France, in 1916.
Falkenhayn acknowledged in his memoirs that the French had borne their considerable difficulties “with the most remarkable devotion.”29 The fact that their enemy recognised their determination demonstrates just how committed the French were during this period of the First World War. Ironically, despite the symbolic nature of the city, defending Verdun itself made little-to-no strategic sense. After the Germans began their attack, Marshal Joseph Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief of all French forces on the Western Front, initially proposed that the city be abandoned, so that better defensive positions could be built on favourable terrain, and could thus hold the Germans in place.30 In fact, the forts around Verdun were viewed as relics of the past. Joffre went as far as having dozens of artillery pieces and more than a hundred thousand projectiles removed from around Verdun in 1915 for use elsewhere on the Western Front. When the local commander, General Frédéric-Georges Herr, voiced his concern over the removals, Joffre replied that the strongholds no longer had a role to play, and that Verdun must “…under no circumstances be defended for itself.”31 While the French General Staff saw Verdun as a ‘liability,’ French Prime Minister Aristide Briand insisted to Joffre that it must be held, “…believing that national morale and his government’s survival was at stake.”32 Six days after the offensive began, General Philippe Pétain assumed command of the 2nd Army, as well as command of all the forces at Verdun. He immediately issued orders strictly forbidding counter-attacks. Despite how Prime Minister Briand felt about Verdun, Pétain shared the same feeling towards the city as that of his superior, Joffre. Pétain even intended to evacuate Verdun if the Germans could not be stopped. But due largely to the significantly-favourable improvement of the French soldiers’ morale at Verdun, the Germans were halted and the city was ultimately not evacuated.33 This is largely accredited to Pétain’s arrival at Verdun, as he was viewed by soldiers as a general who valued their lives, and who would not use them up in vain. He understood the effects of artillery fire power, and he grouped large numbers of guns together with his defences in order to cripple any German advances.34 With Pétain in charge, the Germans were being crushed under the weight of his artillery.

Another source of pride within the French army was the way in which supplies reached the battered sector. The Germans had destroyed all the rail lines connected to Verdun. Dubbed the voie sacrée, or the “sacred way,” a solitary forty-five mile stretch of country road was the only link between Verdun and the rest of France. Pétain employed a small army just to maintain that route, ensuring that the trucks, passing day and night in both directions at intervals of every fourteen seconds, would be unencumbered along their route.35 Hundreds of thousands of troops were trucked in and out along this lifeline, along with thousands of tons of ammunition.36 Without this lifeline, soldiers would not have been able to deploy to Verdun as rapidly as they did, while the same can be said of the wounded being evacuated. Due to the constant German bombard-
ments, flamethrowers, and phosgène gas, the French soldiers had to endure a new type of hell that undoubtedly wore on them. To ensure that units would not be completely exhausted, Pétain instituted a unit rotation system, which “...allowed the French army to endure massive casualties [from] the battle without breaking.” This policy enabled France to fight on, but it also meant that, for better or for worse, the horrors of Verdun were shared by the majority of the entire French army. The pain and suffering was dispersed over many soldiers, and it even acted as a unifier for Frenchmen, solidifying their determination.

Conclusion

The Battle of Verdun proved to be one of the longest and costliest battles of any war in history, in terms of both lives and material resources spent. The poignant truth behind the battle is that it was purposely designed to grind up troops, with the intent of pressuring France to sue for peace. Falkenhayn only envisioned Verdun as a means for “…the forces of France to bleed to death.” never actually intending to capture the city itself. His subordinate commanders were hard-pressed to accept his views, as his logic was alien to the established Schlieffen way of thinking in the German officer corps. Falkenhayn was an outsider and ultimately not accepted by the officer corps, nor by the Crown Prince. The corps commanders’ preconceived notions of battle hijacked Falkenhayn’s vision for Verdun, while the Falkenhayn made little effort to ‘rein in’ on their misguided interpretations of the task. With respect to France reaching the breaking point, many warning signs certainly may have given that impression. The French army had been battered, was exhausted physically, and was running low on new recruits. Falkenhayn was correct in picking an object of attention for which France would be prepared to fight. However, he was wrong in assuming he would be able to push them past their breaking point. French will in 1916 was still strong enough to fight on. Her soldiers proved their devotion by defending Verdun, even though it may have made more sense strategically to simply pull back to prepared positions.

Verdun will forever be synonymous with attritional warfare. During the First World War, this strategy presented the Germans with a paradox. By avoiding decisive battles and implementing attritional strategies, Germany would have had to endure a lengthened war, which it could not afford, due to economic and resource limitations, both in materiel and in manpower. Germany also could not conduct a decisive battle because it was beyond their means. For other nations, attritional warfare would prove feasible with the colonial contributions in the form of troops and materiel. In fact, the Entente powers built more of these “bleeding machines” on the Western Front, the next one occurring at the Somme, which began five months after Verdun, and which was instrumental in relieving some of the pressure on the French [although at great cost – Ed.]. After July 1916, the German capacity to continue their actions at Verdun diminished. The Somme was now causing great anxiety in the German army, and on 11 July, Falkenhayn ordered all offensive operations at Verdun to cease and to remain in a “strict defensive,” because he needed to transfer troops to the Somme. Verdun would have a lasting effect upon the rest of the war. Due to the volume of German artillery fired at Verdun, the Germans had depleted their ammunition stocks so much, especially with respect to phosgene shells, that they had to resort to using inferior projectiles, while the supply system Strived to keep pace. Also, both combatants had to re-design their future operations due to the diminished pool of soldiers from which to draw. The French had originally planned a much larger contribution to the Somme offensive than they ended up sending, while the Germans, who may have lost less men than the French, could not really stage any large-scale successful offensives for the rest of the war. In total, about thirty per cent of the German army fought at Verdun, compared to seventy-five per cent of the French army. For France, this would have a profound effect upon its soldiers, who would use the battle as a rallying cry and a symbol of solidarity during the mutinies of 1917.

Once the battle was set in motion, the kill zones created to destroy French forces sucked German soldiers in as well. The planned and purposeful destruction of troops at Verdun had worked, but unfortunately for the German forces, they would end up suffering almost as much as the French. The battlefields around Verdun still show the shell holes one hundred years later. The area is believed to be the most heavily bombarded site in history, with over thirty million artillery shells having been fired by both sides, that bombardment wiped nine villages off the map, never to be rebuilt. Falkenhayn planned for attrition, but nothing could contain the resultant destruction that scarred both Germany and France.
NOTES

3 Ibid, p. 214.
4 Herwig, p. 179.
5 Falkenhayn, p. 216.
8 Herwig, p. 182.
12 Simkins, Jukes, and Hickey, p. 81.
13 Fisher, p. 286.
14 Falkenhayn, p. 218.
16 Herwig, p. 182.
17 Falkenhayn, p. 217.
19 Herwig, p. 184.
21 Foley, “German Strategy and the Path to Verdun,” p. 90.
22 Ibid.
24 Falkenhayn, p. 217.
27 Henkin, p. 7.
30 Fisher, p. 284.
33 Ibid.
34 Stevenson, p. 133.
35 Herwig, p. 190.
37 Falkenhayn, p. 217.
38 Herwig, p. 182.
40 Strachan, “The Strategic Consequences of the World War.”
41 Fisher, p. 291.
The Rise of the Drones: Technological Development of Miniaturised Weapons and the Challenges for the Royal Canadian Navy

by Patrice Deschênes

Introduction

The proliferation and miniaturization of drones of all kinds, but especially the mini-aerial drones, is a hot topic among tacticians of Allied navies who are aware of the increasing vulnerability of their naval forces; a vulnerability for which they are not ready to face. Yet the threat is not new. For at least ten years, ground forces have been confronted with the growing use of mini-drones by non-state actors.

In the conflicts in Syria and Iraq in particular, at least half-a-dozen militant groups have been observed operating drones available commercially, and sold at relatively-low prices in any neighborhood electronics store. Today, even the poorest fighting groups can impose their presence upon the battlefield’s airspace and command effective engagements against better armed ground forces. Conventional ground forces were taken aback by this threat to the point that a US Special Forces officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Salinas, said that US forces in Syria had effectively lost control of the airspace below 3,500 feet.¹

For as little as $500.00, terrorist groups can purchase a range of easy-to-operate drones from local retailers, then turn these recreational objects into rudimentary, but no less effective, guided bombs. ISIS used drones with high-definition cameras (usually included with the drone) to remotely guide vehicles filled with explosives to their targets. During the liberation battle of Mosul in Iraq in July 2017, dozens of Iraqi troops were killed or wounded, and combat vehicles were destroyed by grenades and small bombs parachuted by mini-drones.² Today, the threat is no longer limited to the battlefields of the Middle East. It is proliferating all over the globe.

Examples of security breach incidents related to commercial UAVs have increased in recent years, with incidents that have highlighted the serious vulnerability of certain strategic facilities and important individuals. For example in 2013, the Pirate Party, a German political party, flew a drone without being challenged or intimidated, close to Chancellor Angela Merkel during an outdoor event. Even more frightening, drones have been observed several times in the vicinity of French nuclear installations.³ Had either of those drones been controlled by terrorist groups, the German head of state could have been easily assassinated, or a possible nuclear disaster could have been unleashed in the heart of France.
An Iraqi officer inspects drones belonging to Islamic State militants in Mosul, Iraq, 27 January 2017.

A photo taken 14 March 2017 in the northern Iraq city of Mosul shows a drone carrying two grenades in a test flight by Iraqi forces, who plan to use it against Islamic State (IS) group fighters.
Warships are no longer immune to the threat of miniature UAVs, even when moored to their comfortable and secure berths inside highly protected and fortified bases and arsenals. Drones were seen above the Kitsap-Bangor nuclear submarine base in Washington State, and a small Phantom IV drone landed on the flight deck of the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in August 2017. Once again, one ill-intentioned individual could have inflicted material damage or even casualties.

**Asymmetrical Tactics**

Drones available on the market can be modified to become lethal weapons, but they can also be used for a wider range of tactics.

Indeed, drones can be used as a tool for monitoring and collecting information. Equipped with high-fidelity cameras, they can be used by an enemy to obtain precise and detailed information with respect to infrastructures, sensitive equipment, details regarding the surveillance and protection of a target, routine human activities, and targeting information. In an urban environment, the $500.00 mini-commercial drones can provide a potential enemy an excellent level of imaging fidelity without having to invest $400 million in sophisticated imaging satellites.

Drones can also be used to disperse chemical or biological agents in an urban environment. A panoply of commercial drones designed to irrigate agricultural fields is easily accessible, and they would not require any significant modification to disperse toxic agents; an easy and inexpensive way for a terrorist group to create chaos.

Used by state actors, mini drones can also be used as tools for collecting electronic information and collecting other miscellaneous information.

**Detection, Tracking, Identification, Neutralization**

Mini-drones represent a real danger for naval forces because they are practically impossible to detect at a distance which would allow a complete and effective decision making process. They have minimal radar signatures, and are extremely difficult to detect, even with the naked eye. When detected, mini-drones can be so close to ships or port facilities that their detection has an effect of surprise. And the time required to track them, identify them, and confirm their intentions is pushed to a minimum before the naval protection forces feel compelled to undertake defensive action. This chronological reduction of the decision chain can have serious consequences, including collateral damage, since a decision with respect to the action required to be taken against the detected drones has the potential to not be supported by adequate and relevant information, and to prevent the proper application of a command and control process.

Unlike ground troops in a combat theatre, naval forces usually operate in densely populated urban areas in times of peace. Warships are usually moored in ports frequented by the public and civilians, especially when moored during diplomatic calls. These characteristics make the engagement and the neutralization of mini-drones difficult because they pose a high risk of collateral damage. The prosecution and engagement of a drone in flight with small arms involves the release of a volley of ballistic projectiles without control or precise destination in the air over a distance of 1,400 x .50 Cal Kinetic range.
of up to 700 metres. For visualization purposes, 700 metres can be pictured as twice the width of the Ottawa River separating Quebec from the Canadian Parliament in Ontario. In the event that a force protection team engaged a mini-drone while a ship was alongside, the civilian population in the neighborhoods surrounding the port and the boaters on the harbour would be at risk of becoming victims of collateral damage.

Considering the difficulty with respect to detecting and engaging a single drone, a coordinated attack of several drones would become impossible to counter with the means available today on Canadian warships. The technology that enables a coordinated attack by a swarm of drones already exists, and it is available on the market. New algorithms able to synchronize the flight of several UAVs that are able to sense the position of each other in the sky, and fly in coherent units, have already demonstrated their effectiveness. One particularly spectacular demonstration of drone synchronization was made at the Olympic Winter Games in Pyeongchang, when 1,218 perfectly-coordinated drones have illuminated the opening ceremonies in 2018.

In a naval force protection context, only two-to-five unmanned drones, synchronized and equipped with small quantities of explosives, would be enough to seriously damage one of our state-of-the-art frigates, injure or kill sailors, and put out of commission a ship for an indefinite period of time. Considering that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)’s fleets of combatant ships do not have more than four operational vessels per coast at any given time, a single drone attack, for an investment of as little as $5,000, would have the potential to incapacitate 25% or more of the RCN’s combat capability in the Pacific or Atlantic for a potentially-protracted period of time.

Available Solutions

The market for products available to counter mini-drones is flourishing. The industry has exploded in recent years, and today, there are more than 230 drone detection and defence systems produced by 155 companies in 33 countries. Despite this sudden explosion of available products, the proposed systems, for the most part, have not reached the technological maturity required, or are not suitable for use on board warships in urban centres. Indeed, various systems have been used at various locations and events such as the Boston Marathon, and others, at some airports, and on the periphery of military bases, but they do not provide a satisfactory solution for effective protection of a naval force alongside. In short, the systems on the market suffer from a problem of ‘over promising but under delivering.’

The various detection systems, from active radars to acoustic sensors, camera and infrared systems, all have their share of limitations in urban environments that result in the same problems of late detection of the threat, and a high risk of collateral damage. Today, the most effective detection of a possible drone attack is through an early warning from the intelligence services, and the neutralization on the spot of terrorist networks before they can deploy their drones.
The means available to neutralize mini-drones are also inappropriate for navies. Radio frequency jammers affect the civilian population, and they are not effective, with some features being only available on some drones, concentrated energy beams have not reached the maturity necessary to neutralize flying objects quickly enough, and nets and other less-lethal means are not effective against the threat of swarm attacks. In short, warships calling at or operating near the coast or inside a port are today extremely vulnerable to the threat of mini-drones.

To the Research and Development Drawing Boards

Ceasing diplomatic stopovers, installing protective nets around ships in ports of call, or banning and restricting the sales of mini-drones are not acceptable solutions to the threat. The private sector and our research and development centres must ‘get down to business’ and develop technology and ways to counter the threat of mini-drones adapted to the context of warships.

To do this, innovators must consider the following factors in the development of their system concepts. First, detection systems must be able to detect unidentified flying objects at an appropriate distance, while preventing the risks of electromagnetic interference and other radiation hazards in urban centres. To do this, a hybrid detection system including one-or-more active and passive sensors, combined with electro-optical sensors capable of recognizing characteristic shapes, should be adapted for use on board a ship. In addition, these sensors should be integrated with a combat management system (CMS), (preferably the vessel’s CMS), to optimize the decision chain, maximize the threat engagement envelope, and enable a layered defence concept.

Secondly, a mini-drone neutralization system should take into account that naval operations susceptible to the threat of mini-drones take place in urban centres, which creates a high risk of collateral damage, especially when the threat is airborne. Such a system should not be limited to the engagement of a single mini-drone, but should be designed to be able to neutralize a swarm of drones (five-or-more). Simpler solutions, such as the use of restricted-range munitions from remotely-controlled and highly-stabilized weapon systems, combined with advanced electronic systems to take control of drones, should all be explored in order to put in place a system of layered defence.

Conclusion

The rise of the mini-drones is just beginning, and the threat associated with it will only increase. The Royal Canadian Navy and other navies around the world are very vulnerable to mini-drones, and will have to develop effective means of defence sooner rather than later. The probability of a drone attack occurring today is much higher than the probability of having to defend against an anti-ship missile attack. And yet, the resources allocated to research and development of defence against the threat of mini-drones at this time are negligible. A single successful attack on a Canadian ship has the potential to decommission at least 25% of the RCN’s fleet combat capability for an indeterminate period of time, and also to generate a number of civilian casualties.
The existing technology is not adapted to the conditions of operations of warships, and a major research and development effort remains to be initiated. It is strongly suggested that the appropriate resources and efforts be allocated to developing a complete detection and defence system for the Royal Canadian Navy.

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NOTES

1 Andrew Clevenger Tweet: “LTC Joe Salinas, Army spec ops, tells DIB that because of drones, forces returning from Syria say US doesn’t control airspace below 3,500 feet,” 24 October 2017, at: https://twitter.com/andclev/status/922829571644328990?lang=en


3 “More drones spotted over French nuclear power stations,” Agence France-Presse, 31 October 2014, at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/31/more-drones-spotted-over-french-nuclear-power-stations


On the morning of the 7th of June, 1944, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9th CIB) stepped off the line of march at Villons-les-Buissons, located in the Normandy region of northwestern France, surging forward to meet their D-Day objective of the German airfield at Carpiquet. The vanguard force consisted of the battalion of North Nova Scotia Highlanders, along with tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers, supported by a troop of Anti-Tank destroyers and the guns of 14th Field Regiment, RCA (14th Fd Regt). Upon reaching the commune of Authie at noon, the Canadians were unaware that they were under the direct observation of Colonel Kurt Meyer, the commander of the 25th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment (25th SS-PGR), who spied them from a church tower at the Abbey d’Ardennes. Within hours, this holy place, and the ground around it, would be profaned with Canadian blood, as the Highlanders captured during a ferocious German attack would be murdered by the Hitler Youth they had so bravely fought against. At the centre of this firestorm was Meyer, whose determined counter-attack against the 9th CIB ground the Canadian advance on Carpiquet to a halt, where they inflicted heavy casualties, during an engagement where a lack of Canadian artillery support proved to be a critical shortcoming. To understand how this battle unfolded, this short article will describe the situation surrounding the German counterattack against the 9th CIB, and the impact of Allied artillery throughout this D+1 clash between the Allies and the Axis.

Panzermeyer Attacks! Allied Artillery and the 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe during the D+1 Advance upon Carpiquet Airfield

by Nicholas Kaempffer
Operation Overlord clearly caught the German military off-guard – while significant defences and operational planning had taken place to counter such an invasion, the actual response following the airborne landings and subsequent establishment of a beachhead were largely uncoordinated during the first critical hours. 2 12th SS Panzer Corps, commanded by General Sepp Dietrich, was subordinated, attached, and ordered to move in a variety of confusing directions before finally receiving a clear mission, at approximately 1500 hours on the 6th of June, to “drive the enemy… back into the sea and destroy him.” 3 Dietrich, now commanding the 716th Infantry (716th Inf Div) and 21st Panzer Divisions (21st Pz Div), in addition to his own, rapidly issued orders to Major-General Fritz Witt, the commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend (“Hitler Youth” or “HJ”), to prepare for a divisional counter-attack in the vicinity of Evrecy. 4 Meyer’s 25th SS-PGR was the first element of the 12th SS Panzer Division (HJ) to reach the invasion area, due to the disordered German response to the Normandy landings, as units were harried by terrific Allied airpower on the march, and beset with a lack of fuel, making the concentration of men and equipment a costly and time-consuming matter. 5 On the 6th of June, Meyer proceeded to the headquarters (HQ) of 716th Infantry Division to the North of Caen, to discuss a three Panzer Division counter-attack for the next day. It is important to understand the mindset and background of Colonel Meyer, known as “Panzemeyer” to his men, to contextualize his battlefield actions.

An archetypal SS commander, Meyer possessed a beguiling mixture of admirable and loathsome traits, and was beloved by his soldiers for his leadership, toughness, aggression, and combat experience. Highly decorated for his bravery, historian Michael Reynolds described Meyer as a “…natural and brilliant soldier… destined to become [one of – Ed.] Nazi Germany’s youngest general at the age of 34,” as well as an ardent National Socialist, who, following the cessation of hostilities, would be convicted as a war criminal. 6 Meyer, manoeuvring forward to receive orders, was a leader eager and able to successfully utilize opportunity, intuition, and mission command, in an attempt to meet his higher commander’s intent of driving the Allies into the sea.

Once arriving at the 716th Inf Div HQ, Meyer, within his autobiography, Grenadiers, recounts the orders of his divisional commander:

The situational necessitates speedy action. First of all, the enemy has to be denied Caen and the Carpiquet airfield… we can only consider a coordinated attack with the 21st Panzer Division. So the division is to attack the enemy along with the 21st Panzer Division and throw them into the sea. H-Hour for the attack is 7th June at midday. 7

During this meeting, Meyer infamously referred to the Canadians as kleine fische (little fish), 8 and appeared very confident in his soldiers’ ability to repel the landing force. 9 Following the orders group, Meyer then received further instructions from General Witt over the telephone, who delayed the combined counter-attack with 21st Pz Div to 1600 hours, due to the slow movement of German forces, especially tanks, who were still completing road movements to their assigned positions. Meyer then returned to his Command Post at the Abbey d’Ardennes, where he spotted the Canadians manoeuvring towards Carpiquet. Keenly
aware of both the friendly and enemy situation, Meyer quickly relayed plans to attack in advance of the planned counter-attack, in favour of seizing the short-notice opportunity, in accordance with his superior commander’s intent, as the German airfield at Carpiquet was about to fall to the Canadian advance. The Canadian 9th CIB faced a significant force, as Meyer formed a combined arms team known as a Kampfgruppe, consisting of his 25th SS-PGR, a battalion of guns from the 12th SS Artillery Regiment, and approximately 50 Mark IV tanks from the 2nd Battalion of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment. All in all, the vanguard of the 9th CIB would be struck by a German force approximately equal in terms of tanks and artillery, while the 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe possessed a marked advantage in the numbers of infantrymen.

After observing the vanguard of the 9th CIB apparently oblivious to the presence of 25th SS-PGR, Meyer recounted the moment in his memoirs as: “My God! What an opportunity! The tanks are driving right across II Battalion’s front! The Unit is showing us its unprotected flank.” At this moment, he rightfully used the initiative, and seized a fleeting opportunity, ordering his Kampfgruppe to attack, recounting:

I am thinking of Guderian’s principle and the divisional attack orders, but in this situation, I must use my own initiative. The 26th Regiment is still east of Orne and I/12th Panzer Regiment cannot move because of the lack of fuel and is 30 kilometres east of the Orne… Decision: When the leading enemy tanks pass Franqueville the II/25th will attack with the tank company waiting on the reverse slope. Once the battalion has reached Authie the other battalion with then join the battle. Objective: The coast.10

The German counter-attack caught the strung-out vanguard of the 9th CIB by surprise, and within moments, Sherman tanks from the Fusiliers were on fire, and the Hitler Youth surged forward, supported by the weight of over 50 guns. During ferocious fighting over the course of many hours, often conducted hand-to-hand, the Canadian advance on Carpiquet was halted. As the shells of battered tanks burned over the French countryside, the end of the 7th of June witnessed the Germans back in possession of Buron, and hundreds of men on both sides had been killed, including Canadian prisoners of war, who were murdered by their captors within the grounds of the Abbey.11 While Meyer’s counter-attack against the Canadian vanguard failed to push the Allies into the sea, his force denied the 9th CIB their objective of Carpiquet. A key element of Meyer’s success on the battlefield that day was the lack of Canadian artillery fire support throughout the majority of the German counter-attack, which forced the brave soldiers of the 9th CIB into a desperate attempt to repel their attackers with their direct fire weapons.

When Meyer’s bold strike against the flank of the Canadian vanguard at Authie caught both the Fusiliers and Highlanders in a desperate situation, the inability of the Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) from the 14th Field Regiment to provide timely fire support magnified the initial impact of the German onslaught.12 As Meyer’s 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe called in the withering barrage of over 50 guns on the Highlanders, the Canadians were told that “…no friendly artillery support could be had.”13 Meyer was likely aware of this situation, and exploited it, as he was at the front for the majority of the operation – indeed, he noted within his memoirs that the Canadian guns failed to fire during the initial assault on the 9th CIB vanguard.14 While Meyer took advantage of the lack of defensive Canadian artillery fire, his early
successes were not exploited by the resources of the 21st Panzer Division, which remained in place until their original 1600 hours timing before they committed to the counter-attack. In this, both distinguished historians Marc Milner and Michael Reynolds justifiably criticized Meyer’s command and control during the battlefield, as he (Meyer) was often away from his headquarters, with minimal communications – Meyer himself even recounts being stuck in a shell hole during a key moment in the battle. By the time the 21st Pz Div joined the fight, the Canadians had sorted out their artillery issues, and brought thunderous fire down upon the Germans, which quickly ground their counter-attack to a standstill. Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that had Meyer demurred from attacking the Canadian advance on Carpiquet, his force may have been devastated by the same artillery fire that stopped the 21st Pz Div in its tracks.

This, in part, justifies the legitimacy of Meyer’s actions – his bold, aggressive attack, which was a product of his intuition as an experienced battlefield commander, combined with his forward positioning, allowed him to exploit the initial failures of the guns to provide a wall of steel between the 9th CIB and the 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe.

The issues surrounding Allied fire support during D+1 are well documented throughout the primary source material, battery and regiment, therefore, served as the conduit through which forward infantry units could access fire support on a vast scale...it was possible for any FOO or even a “gunner” – an artillery private – to deliver the fire of everything from his own battery to that of all guns of the Corps onto a single grid reference in a matter of minutes. Under the British system you fired first and asked questions later...this very powerful system...was intended to and actually did crush the anticipated German Panzer assault on the beachhead in the days after 6 June 1944.

However, during the critical moments of the 9th CIB advance into Authie, when the Canadians received heavy German artillery fire, followed by a frenetic attack by Meyer’s 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe, Allied fire support was silent. Indeed, when the commander of the Canadian vanguard ordered his FOO to call in defensive fire, he was told that the guns were “out of range,” and would need some time to be moved up. This situation was further exacerbated by communications issues that prevented the Naval FOO from calling in the flat-shooting guns of the HMS Belfast. Simply put, as Meyer’s men assaulted forward, they did so under a significant umbrella of fire support coverage – while the Canadians were initially left unprotected, and out in the open. What happened?
While the failure of the guns to repel the German assault on the 9th CIB vanguard is well-known, there is little first-hand evidence to explain what precisely had gone wrong. It is widely (and rightfully) assumed that Meyer’s force would have been “…shattered had it [9th CIB] supporting artillery been on line at 1300 hours,” which Milner describes as “…one of the great unsolved mysteries of the early days in Normandy.” The war diary of 14th Field Regiment provides scant details within this regard – that they moved positions at approximately 1100 hours before the 9th CIB attack on Authie is well documented, but the war diary of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders very much refutes the 14th Fd Regt entry that “… [Batteries] Btys provided continuous support and stepped up to new regt’l position,” and both Milner and Will Bird report the guns as “silent.” While it is understandable that the guns of the 14th Fd Regt were at the maximum extent of their range during the initial action at Authie, there was nothing to stop the FOOs from requesting fire from their Division at minimum – yet they did not do so. A plausible explanation for these events was the lack of FOOs deployed forward with the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, and the failure of the vanguard FOOs to find adequate positions of observation from which they could call in and adjust fire. Indeed, the war diary of 14th Fd Regt reports that their FOOs moved back from the front line, to find a position within an anti-tank ditch at Buron, far from the battle raging at Authie. Regardless, what is known is that Canadian guns did not fire during the critical moments during Meyer’s counter-attack – and that when they finally came back online at 1800 hours, they quickly routed the German assault. Clearly, both the failure and the phoenix of Canadian artillery had a major impact on the success and cessation of the 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe’s counter-attack.

While Meyer and his men had failed to push the Canadians to the sea, he prevented the Allied seizure of the airfield at Carpiquet, and it would take another month for the Allies to recapture the ground 25th SS-PGR Kampfgruppe had taken. Meyer’s “little fish” still had legs in France, but he had inflicted heavy casualties upon the Canadians, and achieved one of his higher commander’s objectives while German forces to his flanks floundered against the Allied onslaught. The product of limited options as well as initiative, Meyer’s bold counter-attack against the Canadian vanguard was successful, as he utilized the tenants of mission command to seize a fleeting opportunity, where Allied artillery played a decisive role in how the battle fatefully unfolded.

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NOTES


4. *Ibid*.


9. Reynolds, p. 60.


11. Milner, p. 188.


15. Reynolds, p. 69.


21. 14th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery War Diary, June 1944.

22. *Ibid*.


25. Milner reports that the maximum range of the M7 Priest was 12,500 yards, but that practical ranges were “…much less.” 14 Fd Regt war diary, indicated that their new gun position was located at GR 989 815, while that of the North Novas records Authie at GR 985 713. The author calculates that the distance between these positions was approximately 10.2 km (11 150 yards).

26. 14th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery War Diary, June 1944.

27. *Ibid*.


29. Reynolds, p. 70.
The Auditor General on Fighters ~
Parliamentarians on Search and Rescue

by Martin Shadwick

Auditor General the late-Michael Ferguson was no stranger to the vagaries of Canadian defence procurement, in general, or to the selection of a successor to the stalwart McDonnell Douglas (later Boeing) CF-18 Hornet, in particular. In his Spring 2012 report, his first as Auditor General, Ferguson’s audit team examined “Canada’s participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Program and the decision process to acquire [Lockheed Martin] F-35 [Lightning II] aircraft.” The resulting report breathed new life into the criticisms of those who already harboured doubts about the F-35 and/or the process leading to its selection by the government of Stephen Harper in mid-2010, and significantly altered both the political optics and the political stakes of the proposed acquisition.

Sharply critical, the Spring 2012 audit “...concluded that [the Department of] National Defence did not manage the process to replace the CF-18 fleet with due diligence and that Public Works and Government Services Canada [later Public Services and Procurement Canada] did not demonstrate due diligence in its role as the government’s procurement authority.” The audit cited a litany of “significant weaknesses in the decision-making process” utilized by the Department of National Defence. For example: “Required documents were prepared and key steps were taken out of sequence,” “key decisions were made without required approvals or supporting documentation,” and “briefing materials did not inform senior decision makers, central agencies, and the Minister of the problems and associated risks of relying on the F-35 to replace the CF-18. Nor did National Defence provide complete information to Parliamentarians.” Moreover, “…when National Defence decided to recommend the acquisition of the F-35, it was too involved with the aircraft and the JSF Program to run a fair competition.”

The most recent audit, tabled in November 2018, “…focused on whether National Defence managed risks related to Canada’s fighter fleet so that it could meet Canada’s commitments to NORAD and NATO until a replacement fleet is operational.” To this end, the report “examined the steps taken by National Defence” to manage such risks, including “the use of interim aircraft, staffing and experience levels of pilots and technicians, upgrades to capability, interoperability, and regulatory requirements, management of the structural life of the CF-18 fleet until its retirement in 2032, and limitations on how and where the aircraft
can be flown (technical and operational restrictions)." "We did not examine," noted the report, "the process that the [Trudeau] government launched in 2017 to buy the 88 replacement fighter aircraft. We did not follow up on our recommendation from our 2012 report on replacing Canada’s fighter jets. We also did not examine Canada’s ongoing participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Program.”

In its “overall message,” the report notes that “…in 2016, the Government of Canada directed National Defence to have enough fighter aircraft available every day to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time. This direction would require National Defence to increase the number of fighter aircraft available for operations by 23 [percent]. The new operational requirement came at a time when the Royal Canadian Air Forces faced a growing shortage of trained and experienced pilots and technicians. Furthermore, the current fleet of CF-18 aircraft are already over 30 years old, the CF-18 will continue to become more vulnerable, and there are no plans to improve its combat capability.” To “…have the number of aircraft needed to meet the new operational requirement, the government focused efforts on increasing the number of aircraft. The government’s original plan was to buy 18 new [Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet] fighter aircraft, even though National Defence’s analysis indicated that this plan would not help the Royal Canadian Air Force meet the new operational requirement and would make the personnel shortage worse. The government is now planning to buy used [F/A-18A/B Hornet] fighter aircraft from Australia that are the same age and have the same operational limitations as the CF-18s that the Royal Canadian Air Force are currently flying.”

Over “…and above existing budgets, National Defence expects to spend almost $3 billion on extending the life of the current fleet and to buy, operate, and maintain the interim aircraft, without a plan to deal with its biggest obstacles to meeting the new operational requirement: a shortage of pilots and the declining capability of its aircraft. Although National Defence has plans to address some risks, these investment decisions will not be enough to ensure that it can have the number of aircraft available daily to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time.” Not surprisingly, the 2018 report “…found that Canada’s fighter force could not meet the government’s new operational requirement, which is to have enough aircraft ready each day to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time. The fighter force could not meet the requirement because National Defence was already experiencing a shortage in personnel, and the CF-18 was old and increasingly hard to maintain. We also found that the government’s proposed solution of buying interim aircraft will not help solve either the personnel shortage or the aging fleet.”

Indeed, it what was arguably one of its most trenchant observations, the 2018 audit found that “National Defence’s analysis showed that buying the [Super Hornet] alone would not allow the Department to meet the new operational requirement. The Department stated that the [Super Hornet] would initially decrease, not increase, the daily number of aircraft available because technicians and pilots would have to be pulled away from the CF-18 to train on the new aircraft.” Department of National
Defence “...analysis further stated that once the [Super Hornet] fleet was operational, the Department would still not be able to prepare the aircraft needed daily to meet the new requirement because of the shortage of trained personnel to maintain the CF-18 fleet. The Department stated that it needed more qualified technicians and pilots, not more fighter aircraft.”

Moreover, “according to National Defence, the Australian purchase would give it more aircraft and spare parts to help manage the CF-18 fleet. However, the purchase will not fix the fundamental weakness with the fleet: the aircraft’s declining combat capability and the shortage of personnel. The Australian F/A-18s will need modifications and upgrades to allow them to fly until 2032. These modifications will bring the F/A-18s to the same level as the CF-18 but will not improve the CF-18’s combat capability. In addition, National Defence still does not have enough technicians to maintain and pilots to fly the aircraft.” In “…our opinion, purchasing interim aircraft does not bring National Defence closer to consistently meeting the new operational requirement introduced in 2016. With more technicians and pilots, the effect on fighter force operations will be small.”

The November 2018 report advanced two recommendations. First, “National Defence should develop and implement recruitment and retention strategies for fighter force technicians and pilots that are designed to meet operational requirements and prepare for the transition to the replacement fleet.” And, second, that “National Defence should analyze what upgrades are required for the CF-18 to be operationally relevant until 2032 and should seek approval for those that are appropriate and achievable.” The Department of National Defence, in its published response, agreed with both recommendations. In response to the first recommendation, the Department “…will implement plans to increase the number of technicians and pilots in the fighter force. Initial steps have already been taken, such as the Fighter Capability Maintenance Renewal initiative (which will add over 200 technicians to front-line squadrons), and new recruitment efforts and retention strategy and initiatives to be completed by fall 2019.” In the case of the second recommendation, “National Defence is currently seeking approval on a number of upgrades to meet regulatory and interoperability requirements to continue flying the CF-18 until 2032. In addition, the [RCAF] is conducting analysis to assess necessary combat upgrades that could be implemented to address the growing challenges presented by evolving threats. This analysis, anticipated to be completed by spring 2019, will take into consideration plans to transition to a future fighter capability in the mid-2020s.” Such measures constituted the core of a separate press statement released by Minister of National Defence Harjit S. Sajjan on 20 November 2018. The Minister added—in a move likely to raise broader questions about the use of alternative service delivery in a military milieu—that the maintenance personnel initiative would utilize “…contracted second-line maintenance to return over 200 technicians to front-line squadrons.” He also stressed that “…an enduring solution to the CAF’s fighter capability will...
not be achieved until we have both procured a future fighter and increased the number of skilled and experienced technicians and pilots that will allow the RCAF to generate sufficient numbers of mission-ready aircraft.”

There are, perhaps, two key takeaways from the November 2018 report of the Auditor General. The first, as the minister’s statement acknowledged, is that an “enduring solution” to Canada’s multiple fighter capability challenges is far from imminent.

The second is reflected in the report’s final conclusion. The report concludes that “National Defence has not done enough to manage risks related to Canada’s fighter aircraft fleet so that it can meet commitments to NORAD and NATO until a replacement fleet is in place,” but cautions that “National Defence has not done enough, in part because of factors outside of its control. Uncertainty around when a replacement fighter fleet would be in place and increased operational requirements established by the government in 2016 put National Defence in a position that will make it difficult to manage risks until a replacement fleet is in place.” In essence, the 2012 report made for uncomfortable reading by the Harper government—which, after all, owned part of the “uncertainty around when a replacement fighter would be in place”—but focused its core attention upon perceived deficiencies and oversights in the Department of National Defence. The 2018 report, in contrast, makes for some uncomfortable reading in the Department of National Defence but focuses much of its criticism upon elements of the Trudeau government’s handling of the fighter file, including its desire for an injection of interim fighter aircraft. To date though, the 2018 report has not unleashed the political fireworks of its 2012 predecessor. Does that reflect superior damage control by the Trudeau government (assisted, perhaps, by a measure of good luck), or is it the proverbial lull before the storm?

Also appearing in November 2018, the report on maritime search and rescue by the Senate Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans—When Every Minute Counts—drew markedly less attention than the findings of the Auditor General on risk management in the fighter world. The lower profile was hardly surprising—SAR can almost instantaneously become a supercharged media, public and political issue in Canada, but typically draws relatively little day-to-day attention—but was unfortunate, given that there was much of merit in the committee’s report (most notably the recommendations related to the Canadian Coast Guard), as well as some highly debatable observations and conclusions related to the SAR role and activities of DND and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Understandably Coast Guard-centric, the report devoted considerable attention to personnel, basing, training, prevention, and governance issues. Most prominent in the latter regard was the recommendation that the “…Canadian Coast Guard be established as a separate statutory agency reporting to the Minister of Transport.” There was, regrettably, no reference to the National Search and Rescue Secretariat in the SAR governance component of the report. Relatively youthful by comparison with the rest of the Canadian Coast Guard fleet, the primary SAR vessels of
the CCG made only fleeting appearances in the report. The committee was, however, “concerned” by “the aging of the existing CCG fleet,” noting, in particular, the infirmities of “the multi-tasked and secondary vessels which can also be used for maritime SAR…” Indeed, “the committee learned that the fleet is one of the oldest in the world. Nationally, 29 [percent] of the large vessels are more than 35 years old, and close to 60 [percent] of the small vessels are older than their design life of 20 years. They require major and lengthy repairs that reduce their time in service. The fleet urgently requires renewal.”

As the provider of “primary and secondary aeronautical assets in support of the execution of maritime SAR operations,” DND and the Canadian Armed Forces figured prominently in the committee’s study. Dominating this segment of its report were personnel and staffing issues (including enhanced utilization of alternative service delivery), reaction and response times, basing and SAR coverage, and fixed-wing and rotary-wing equipment issues. On the personnel front, the report took note of challenges in the recruitment and retention of aircrew, search and rescue technicians, and aeronautical SAR controllers, and recommended that the “Canadian Armed Forces seize the opportunity afforded by the Defence Investment Plan 2018 to increase and diversify [with a focus on women and indigenous peoples] its search and rescue workforce to respond to the increased demand for search and rescue.” It further expressed the hope that “…the CAF will reconsider its [existing SAR reaction times] once its workforce shortages are adequately addressed as part of the Defence Investment Plan 2018.”

“Repositioning current aeronautical SAR assets,” argues the report, “is not feasible for better strategic coverage at this time because the fleet is fully utilized. Accordingly, additional aeronautical SAR assets are needed. The committee repeatedly heard that maintaining the status quo should no longer be the only option. SAR stakeholders from Canada and other countries…presented us with possible solutions,” including:

- increasing “the size of the SAR aircraft fleet operated by the CAF; this would be a multi-year, mega-government dollar capital procurement project”;

- privatizing “aeronautical SAR and replacing government-owned and operated SAR [aircraft] with a private civilian service provider through a multi-year contract (like in Australia, Ireland, and the United Kingdom)”;

- using “a private civilian service provider to temporarily fill the gap in coverage during upgrades of the existing fleet and/or procurement of new assets…”;

- using “a private civilian service provider to supplement existing government SAR assets and expand coverage.”

The committee “…does not believe that privatization of aeronautical SAR (like in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia), or another large government capital expenditure project for additional SAR [aircraft] (or to rebuild the older ones), fits Canada’s unique requirements. However, the committee believes that alternative service delivery—in the form of public-private partnerships that leverage the best of both public and private capabilities/resources—could offer, in the short- and medium-terms, an innovative and cost-effective solution to supplement SAR resources in regions with little or insufficient coverage.”

The committee suggested, for example, that “…staging a private SAR helicopter provider in the Canadian Arctic could significantly improve SAR coverage and response in this vast region.” Similarly, “given the lack of a CAF fixed-wing SAR aircraft in [Newfoundland and Labrador], having a private aeronautical SAR asset staged at proximity of [expanding marine activities] could reduce SAR response times and improve outcomes.” In the Trenton search and rescue region, SAR coverage in the Great Lakes “is provided by the [CH-146] Griffons, but they are currently on a life extension project to extend their operating life to 2030. A private SAR provider could be contracted to bridge the gap in coverage during the life extension project.” In the Halifax and Victoria SAR regions, “the [CH-149 Cormorant] helicopters operated by the CAF…need to undergo mid-life upgrades. These upgrades will necessitate taking [aircraft] out of front-line service for extended periods, thus potentially creating a coverage gap in SAR capability. A private SAR operator could deliver interim SAR capability until the [Cormorants] have been modified and are back to operational status.”

In making its case for a substantial injection of alternative service delivery (ASD), the committee noted that it “had the opportunity to meet with different private helicopter SAR providers in Canada and in other countries. The committee also held discussions with SAR authorities in the countries that have contracts with such commercial operators. They enumerated the following advantages of public-private partnerships for the government”:

- the “short time on delivery of a contract helicopter compared to the delay on delivery of a purchased military aircraft”;

- the “flexibility a private contractor has to recruit experienced crew and to pay a market rate for the job compared with the difficulty of the military to train and retain pilots and maintenance personnel”;

- the “fact that there is no front-end cost to the contract compared with the heavy initial capital commitment required by the purchase option”;

- there “are no additional capital costs to the government in developing a permanent SAR helicopter base since such costs are [borne] by the contractor within the contract fee”; and

- “should a contractor lose a helicopter, the company would be obliged (by contract) to replace it promptly at no additional cost to the government (if a military aircraft was lost, the government would have to meet the cost of replacement).”
The committee took note of a major caveat “…that a private SAR helicopter company could seek to recruit its expertise directly from the CAF, which is currently having trouble in recruiting and retaining staff.” Those interviewed by the committee “stressed that a private company would need to become self-sustaining and generate its own workforce. It was also indicated that the private operator could have mixed crews with the CAF who could fly its helicopters. Military and civilian SAR personnel could also train together on a regular basis. Perhaps more importantly, the civilian operator would remain under the command and control of the CAF.”

In the committee’s view, “it is reasonable to require an improved SAR service for Canada. The committee believes that private helicopter companies could fill some gaps in SAR coverage, most particularly in the Canadian Arctic and in Newfoundland and Labrador.” It consequently recommended that, “as a pilot project, the Department of National Defence authorize a civilian helicopter operator to provide aeronautical search and rescue coverage in the Canadian Arctic and in Newfoundland and Labrador. The assessment of the pilot project, including its costs and benefits, should be made public.”

It would be difficult for an objective observer to fault the committee’s central conclusion that the thoroughgoing privatization of aeronautical SAR—as in the United Kingdom—would not “fit Canada’s unique requirements.” That said, one might challenge, query, or seek clarification of some of the committee’s other findings and observations. Some, such as the misstating of the number of Cormorants in the Canadian fleet, are minor; others are much more fundamental. The committee’s report, for example, states that “…another large government capital expenditure for additional SAR [aircraft] (or to rebuild the older ones)” would not “fit Canada’s unique requirements,” but it is unclear to what expenditures it is referring. There is no formal indication that it is referring to the acquisition of the CC-295, or to the Cormorant mid-life update and augmentation project (although the report does seem somewhat confused about the exact status of the Cormorant mid-life update and, significantly and curiously, does not even mention the vitally important augmentation element of that project). Concern over government expenditure in an age of fiscal prudence is one thing, but does the committee mean to suggest, for example, that the acquisition of some follow-on SAR CC-295s or maximizing the secondary SAR potential of the CC-130J Hercules would ‘break the bank’?
The call for an ASD pilot project could prove instructive, but it is sometimes difficult to shake the conviction that the committee more than adequately consulted with “private helicopter SAR providers both in Canada and in other countries,” and with “SAR authorities in the countries that have contracts with such commercial operators,” but may have been rather less diligent in seeking out those—and this does not necessarily mean serving CAF search and rescue personnel—who may hold differing, but potentially more objective and holistic views on the supposed advantages of alternative service delivery. The committee might also discover that short- and medium-term SAR/ASD gap-fillers could, by default, develop an unexpected degree of permanence.

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The CCGS Cape Naden Search and Rescue lifeboat, working in concert with a Bell 429 helicopter.
Weaponizing Unreality

by Sean M. Maloney

Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (Crown Publishing Group, 2018)


Canada’s latest involvement in the European project entered a new phase with the decision to deploy military forces to Latvia in 2017. One could argue this is an extension of our half-century involvement with NATO during the Cold War, and that the units are descendants of those that composed Canadian Forces Europe during that time. Today, we are confronted with what is, in effect, the same threat: Russia seeking to interfere with, disrupt, and dominate Europe.

We are, however, conditioned to view the threat through our traditional lenses, while at the same time, the means by which this interference and domination takes place has itself evolved. It is crucial that the CAF as an institution, at all levels down to our ‘strategic corporals,’ understand the labyrinthine methodology now employed by our adversary. This is no easy task. To assist us, however, we have two valuable allies: historian Timothy Snyder and journalist Shawn Walker. Both have spent significant time in the theatre of operations, and both bring perspectives that are sorely lacking in Canadian discourse, such as it is, on the topic.

In essence, Putin’s Russia employs a new ideology and significantly-evolved influence operations that will appear convoluted, contradictory, and even kaleidoscopic to those in the West who attempt to use traditional political science approaches to understand them. In doing so, the dangers that the new threat pose may be underestimated if their origins and basis are misunderstood. Furthermore this is a multi-generational long game recognized by our adversary, one that is virtually incomprehensible to a
Canadian political system and society conditioned to operate on a two-to-four-year horizon, and one with the inability to process historical context. The manipulation of perceptions of history is, in fact, the basis of this new Russian nationalist ideology, as well as a key component of its operational methodology. We must never forget that similar convoluted esoteric ramblings by Adolf Hitler in the 1920s and their wholesale adoption by the most scientifically, technologically, and arguably philosophically-advanced nation of the day brought us into the Second World War and generated the Holocaust. Similarly, the underestimation of Joseph Stalin’s multi-generational Communist project and its esoteric basis by Western diplomats, journalists, and politicians of the day led to the domination and enslavement of Eastern Europe, which was the basis of the Cold War, and our long term involvement in that conflict. If Snyder and Walker are correct, and they are in a position to be correct, we are currently dealing with something that is equally sinister and well advanced.

Snyder’s argument in *The Road to Unfreedom* is a sophisticated mechanism that defies simplification. For our purposes, the key aspects of it relate to the basis of the new Russian ideology and how it presents itself, both to us in the West, and to Russians themselves. The key theories that inform Putin’s ideology come from three, and to us obscure, Russian sources: Ivan Ilyan, a proponent of Christian fascism in the 1920s; Lev Gumilev, a proponent of Eurasianism in the 1990s; and Alexander Dugin, who is, for want of a better descriptor, a man who employs Eurasian concepts “to make Nazi ideas sound Russian.” While reading Snyder’s attempts to ‘wrap his head’ around the key components of these bizarre views, one cannot escape comparing them to the Thule Society and its influence upon Hitler’s esoteric thinking. Gumilev was also a member of the Izbrosk Club, whose members litter the Russian elite, and whose ideology is an extension of these and other theorists operating along similar lines. A TU-95 nuclear bomber of the Russian Air Force was recently dedicated to this organization, with “Izbrosk Club” stenciled on its fuselage.

Holocaust denial is integral to the new ideology. In this view, the Russian people suffered more than did the Jews. There were more dead Russians than Jews. Therefore, the Holocaust is an irrelevant Western construct. The basic idea underpinning the ideology is that ‘Russia the virgin’ is being penetrated by Western ideas and perversion, and in particular, homosexuality, with attendant HIV ‘poison.’ Russia can do no wrong in defending itself against this threat. The Ukraine is Russia. Nazi fascists occupy the Ukraine repressing and raping Russians, and stealing resources. The syllogistic argument that anyone who protests Russian moves in the region is gay, and therefore supports the Nazi agenda to defile Russia was and is employed repeatedly. As absurd as it appears to us, the re-conquest of the Ukraine and the liberation of Europe from what amounts to a “…gay Nazi Jewish international conspiracy, as Russian propaganda suggested to various target audiences;” is, in part, the basis of the present situation. Homophobia and anti-Semitism are central to the ideology.

The Russian propagandists learned in the past that Western media could undermine authoritarian control, so they have deliberately set out to generate as much confusion for their population as possible. The war in Ukraine was equated to the Second World War: “So long as the battle was raging, it was always and forever 1941. During a major incursion in summer 2014, young Russians painted the words FOR STALIN! on their tanks.” Snyder sums up Vladimir Surkov, Putin’s primary ‘political technologist’ (read: Goebbels equivalent): “To end factuality is to begin eternity. If citizens doubt everything, they cannot see alternative models beyond Russia’s borders, cannot carry out sensible discussions about reform, and cannot trust one another enough to organize for political change. A plausible future requires a factual present.” A key aspect of the assault on reason identified by Snyder is that, “The adage that there are two sides to a story makes sense when those who represent each side accept the factuality of the world and interpret the same set of facts.” What if they do not? In effect, “The war [in Ukraine] was not taking place, but were it taking place, America was to be blamed; and since America was a superpower, all was permitted in response to its omnipotent malice. If Russia had invaded, which it was somehow both doing and not doing, Russians would be justified in whatever they were doing and not doing.” Truly mind-bending stuff, but effective as it creeps into Western and even Canadian media. Snyder calls this ‘reverse asymmetry,’ where during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “…the strong used the weapons of the weak-partisan and terrorist tactics-in order to pretend to be weak.” Chechen and Ossetian battalions were brought in on the pretext they were fighting to defend Russia against the United States. Indeed, Mujahedeen from Chechnya (the Death Battalion) were organized and directed against the Ukrainians in the service of the Orthodox Church, yet another mind-bending move. This is an eternal war, where the West is the eternal enemy, and everything is justifiable. In this world, $2+2$ does equal 5.

Moving along, Shaun Walker’s *The Long Hangover* parallels Snyder’s work. Walker notes that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “Russians felt they had lost not an empire or an ideology, but the very essence of their identity.” Putin’s “manipulation of history and…aggressive stifling of dissent” was part and parcel of “…the curation of the past in the service of the present; the attempt to meld collective memory of the painful and complicated Soviet decades into something Russians could be proud of.” In doing so, the bizarre contradiction of a Russian fascist state celebrating Soviet Communist victory over fascism in the Second World War becomes more understandable. The new ideology with its appeal to “purity and chastity” was calibrated to meet the expectations of this supposedly-directionless people.

Putin’s view was thus: “…if Russia could regain the global importance the Soviet Union once possessed, then people’s well-being would automatically improve.” By pursuing this line, Walker notes, Putin “tapped into…a political philosophy that fetishized the strength of the state and sovereignty.” The main vehicle for
this was a rebranding of The Sacred War [the Great Patriotic War –Ed.] in order to set it marching in the service of the new Russia.

A significant obstacle, however, was the emergence of the post-Cold War historiography whereby the crimes of the Soviet Union against its own population, particularly Ukrainians, became inconvenient, as were things like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Katyn Forest and other mass murder operations directed against the Poles. Consequently, “...it became ‘unpatriotic’ to dwell on the darker pages of the war,” and “…anyone trying to undermine or complicate the narrative was also attempting to undermine Russia itself.” This led to the 2009 “Commission to Prevent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests,” which rewrote narratives about the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Poland to call into question their people’s victim status and indict them as Nazi collaborators. Indeed, any questioning of these new narratives was branded by state-controlled media as the moral, legal, and the functional equivalent of Holocaust denial.

To augment these new narratives, a variety of carefully-written alternative history novels, as well as calibrated pseudo-history books flooded the Russian market (including novels depicting the invasion of the Ukraine as early as 2005). Walker details the deliberate distortion of history in Chechnya whereby the wartime Chechen deportations are being erased from history by a former anti-Russian mujahedeen who controls the country as an extension of the Kremlin’s will: “Chechens were required to recalibrate their memories of the past, and tolerate Kadyrov’s personality cult.” Those who dissented were labeled gay and rounded up.

Walker cogently compares the 2012 Sochi Olympic Games to the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. They were employed by the Kremlin for “internal consolidation,” while the state-controlled media deflected any doping scandal criticism as “…part of a sinister plot, dictated by the West determined not to allow Russia to have its moment in the spotlight.”

The Ukrainians, however, were not interested in going along with the program. Because they did not want to be part of a Russian-controlled sphere of influence, complex matters from the Second World War were activated as part of the effort to ‘prove’ the current anti-Russian Ukraine was an extension of Nazi policy from the 1940s, and thus, it was justifiable to intervene in Crimea and Donbass to protect Russians from pedophilic rape, gays, and HIV. If the Holodomor in the 1930s did not happen, then Ukrainians fighting the Soviet Union in the 1940s had no justification for doing so, and thus they were fascists. The same went for the Baltic States. The historical facts of these states being caught at the time between two totalitarian states and being forced to choose one or the other to survive after being victimized by both, of course, was and remains lost in the discourse.

According to Walker, and on the same track as Snyder, the argument that Canada is protecting a fascist Latvian state that is merely an extension of National Socialist Germany, for example, has already been employed against Canadian troops. The victimization of Latvia by the Soviet Union is not discussed, and Canada’s efforts against National Socialist Germany ignored. Incidentally, NATO’s and thus Canada’s intervention in Kosovo to stop genocide in 1999 is now used as justification for Russian intervention in the region. Again, the historical facts do not matter to those supportive of the Kremlin’s efforts.

Russia’s agenda is advanced and they have made significant progress. If we cannot agree upon what constitutes the threat, we cannot program an effective response to it. The current leadership in the Kremlin understands this and has done everything it can to confuse the issues, as well as to generate disruption and uncertainty at every opportunity. It is absolutely crucial that we ‘pull the curtain aside’ and discern the true objectives and the mechanisms by which Putin’s Russia is using to pursue them. Snyder and Walker would agree that we can only do so by having a firm understanding of the history of the region before we can confront and undermine those efforts.

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Appel: A Canadian in the French Foreign Legion
by Joel Adam Struthers
Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2019
260 pages, 30 illus. $24.99
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ISBN 978-1-77112-390-7 (PDF)
Reviewed by Michael Boire

For readers wanting to learn about the reality of soldiering in the contemporary French Foreign Legion, unencumbered by the myth and conceit which characterize so many of the past descriptions of ‘la Légion,’ this is the book for you. In this cheerful memoir and thoughtful autobiography, Joel Struthers takes us on a heartfelt journey through his six years in ‘la Légion.’ He was indeed blessed to have served most of his time in the Legion’s elite airborne component, the incomparable 2ème Régiment étranger de parachutistes, (‘le REP’), then and now, the vanguard of the French Special Forces.

As a young Canadian boy, fresh out of high school, with a self-described ‘chip on his shoulder,’ more aggressively physically fit than poised and mature, the author felt out of place in what he considered his dull and ordinary milieu. Coming from a well-travelled RCAF family with long and honoured service to Canada beginning a century before during the Boer War, Struthers’ inclination was to turn to a military career as a way to set himself straight and gain focus on his own way ahead. The profession of arms that had brought much credit and pride to his grandfather and father in the past would now be the vehicle to bring him success, fulfillment, and a welcome end to self-doubt.

Struthers began his pursuit of maturity by joining the Royal Westminster Regiment, one of the cornerstones of the British Columbia militia. Comforted by his newfound life in uniform and fascinated by the challenges of training in his regiment’s armoury and on the wide-open spaces of Wainwright, young Joel found a measure of happiness. Although busy and focused, he remained, nonetheless, unfulfilled. There was something missing. As Joel continued his journey to adulthood in the Canadian militia, he heard the clarion call of the Legion’s aggressive marketing. Indeed, for a young man seeking self-realization in the adventure of battle in distant lands, the lure of Legion proved irresistible to young Struthers. He was quick to learn that, “While the Legion is part of the French military, it retains its own history, traditions, and discipline. Within the French military, it is understood that a Légionnaire differs from a regular soldier in that the expectations and discipline are higher.”(p.35) This was to be the author’s new life.

This book gives readers the lowdown on the Legion. Although it is a cascade of detail with respect to this special and unique form of military life, the book offers all the technical detail of a Clancy novel, but one written with a sensitive touch. Struthers takes us through his entire six-year adventure in 24 fascinating chapters, each one brimming with minutiae of his basic and specialized training, formal and informal qualifications, multiple deployments to Africa with its brushes with death, and his final acceptance into the Legion’s most select brotherhood: le Groupe des commandos parachutistes, the REP’s pathfinders.

The author takes pains to set the record straight about many of the Legion’s current practices, which have often been shrouded in myth. Touted as a refuge for fugitives pursued by the law in their home countries, today’s Legion is not the sanctuary for the lawless, as portrayed in ‘B movies’ of yesteryear. The Legion’s security service, nicknamed ‘le Gestapo,’ subjects potential recruits to thorough vetting. Less than the whole truth can result in immediate expulsion. Legionnaires encourage each other to tell the truth when asked about their origins, as well as their reasons for applying. This avoids wasting time and effort on recruits who may be untrainable, may not respond to discipline, or may eventually cause embarrassment to the Legion. Moreover, the myth that all Legionnaires must receive an assumed identity when sworn-in is an exaggeration. Recruits from countries whose laws forbid its citizens from joining foreign militaries must assume a false identity to protect themselves. Struthers kept his real name because he was a citizen of Canada, whose laws remain silent on this issue.
However, Struthers makes it very clear that the Legion’s well-worn reputation for demanding – and brutal – training remains accurate. Physical punishment administered by training staff was the norm. The author himself was the object of such treatment on more than one occasion. But he admits that there was a spirit of fairness in the Legion: privates and NCOs could mutually agree to settle scores ‘out back’ without the risk of disciplinary action, for the winner or the loser.

The author sums up his experience of basic training in a few words: fitness, French, and hunger. Whereas extreme physical training was constant, the rations did not keep up with the effort expended. Recruits remained hungry during the four long months of training up and down the mountains of southern France. Also, with 150 different nationalities in its ranks, it is not surprising that the Legion’s most significant training challenge remains teaching its soldiers French. Struthers’ recruit class spent most of its classroom time mastering the basics of their new language. Nonetheless, for all that is legendary about the Legion, “It’s a fact that in a bid to set itself apart from the rest, the Legion maintains iron discipline and places heavy restrictions on personal freedoms. Although this works as a short-term solution, it results in a high turnover.” (p.168)

However, the author admits that the Legion’s insistence upon singing on the march, at table, in the classroom, in short, everywhere, was just not for him. That said, as he admits: “In hindsight, I now appreciate that every military unit maintains tradition since it creates a sense of identity, and in the case of the Legion, recalls the operations and wars fought. Songs are a tradition since it creates a sense of identity, and in the case of its classroom time mastering the basics of their new language. Nonetheless, for all that is legendary about the Legion, “It’s a fact that in a bid to set itself apart from the rest, the Legion maintains iron discipline and places heavy restrictions on personal freedoms. Although this works as a short-term solution, it results in a high turnover.” (p.168)

In conclusion, Joel Struthers has given us a touching and highly personal rendition of a soldier’s life in today’s French Foreign Legion. He uses the French term ‘Appel’ (the call), starting with the cover, to underline the notion that the Legion is indeed a calling, and as such, is meant for just a few.

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The Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1920: The Diplomacy of Chaos
by Ian Moffat
317 pages, $57.07
ISBN – 10: 1137435712
Reviewed by Terry Loveridge

Ian Moffat’s The Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1920 fills a need. The episode and the period are not well known or understood, but they constitute a fundamental period that created the modern world. It was one of the most important, if neglected, outcomes of the Great War.

Moffat provides a classic diplomatic history that focuses upon the intentions, actions, and inactions of a number of key players in the unspooling of a series of decisions that established the political framework that dominated world history for the next seventy years. His is a political-diplomatic view, so the reader should not expect much in way of military campaign analysis, socio-cultural conflict, or grand history, and this makes it a work aimed at those with some existing knowledge of the era and its events.

The work is organized in chronological and geographic chunks. An Introduction outlines, economically, the flow of the Great War, and introduces key leaders, and this indicates what will be the point of view for the remainder of the work: it is from the west looking east. Specifically, it is from London, with occasional glances toward Paris, Washington and Ottawa.

The actual western involvement is depicted in three parts, theatre-by-theatre (Murmansk and Archangel, the Caucasus, and Siberia). Part One describes what occurred from March 1917 to November 1917, when the theme was to “keep Russia as an ally.” Part Two covers November 1917, after the Bolshevik Revolution, to November 1918, when the aim was to keep Russia from making a separate peace; then Part Three, November 1918 until the fall of the Whites, when the aim appeared to achieve some form of stabilization or Bolshevik containment.

The Diplomacy of Chaos in Russia 1918-1920: The

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The work ends with a short, analytic conclusion that derives a number of excellent points. Some of these point to promising areas for further work, especially the growth in the relationship between Britain and its Dominions, and perhaps the connection of the intervention to the strained relationship between the USA and Japan.

This is a thorough treatment, but, as indicated in the Introduction, it is from a very specific point of view. Events in Paris, Moscow, Washington, Tokyo, and Ottawa are interpreted, for the most part, in London. The key statement that defines the view occurs on page 13, where the author writes that the “…most significant result of the Russian collapse was the creation of a new strategic geography for Britain.” The statement would have been just as valid without the last two words, but, for this work, it proves to be a theme.

This point of view is encapsulated in the Introduction, where the progress of the War underlines the motivation of the primary actors. There is no parallel summary for the Eastern Front, or the Russian Revolution, or the consequent civil war. David Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and Georges Clemenceau receive major billing and character sketches, while Lenin and Trotsky fall into the ‘also influential’ group alongside Churchill, Balfour, and Borden, but they are least named, unlike the generic “Whites.” From that side, Anton Denikin, a leading general of the White movement, and Admiral Alexandr Kolchak, the head of the anti-Bolshevik fight, do not warrant a mention until well into the narrative, along with the Germans and the Japanese. The outsider western view holds throughout the book and leaves the reader wanting to know more about what the Russians, Japanese, and Germans thought, rather than what the British, and, to a lesser extent, the Americans, thought they thought…

Moffat’s analysis has a theme: the chaos of poorly-understood and implemented allied policy. Here, Moffat, a career navy officer, excels at describing the effects of decisions made (or not made) by policy makers, diviners, and men-on-the-spot. In fact, Moffat describes their actions, competing agendas, and misunderstood communications in such detail that he subverts his own title. He exposes that it was not so much real chaos as a series of contributions by ‘too many chefs’ that turned a complex potluck dinner into a disorderly and competitive buffet. Lenin, he insists, was the only one to make a satisfactory meal out of it.

Despite marking the Big Three western leaders as key characters, Moffat soon makes clear that a series of intermediaries and local representatives drove events. A pride of politicians, such as Winston Churchill and Robert Borden, a coterie of generals, like the American Graves and British Ironside and Dunsterville, and a murmuring of official or self-appointed diplomats, including the British Lockhart, the American Lansing, and the French Noullens, interacted with a confusing array of Reds and Whites (but mostly Whites). All acted as they thought best, and while this sometimes proved to be in contradiction of their remits from home, most seemed to believe they were accomplishing the real outcomes that their masters really desired. Some, though, sought to shape policy by presenting de facto products to what they viewed as naïve or misinformed governments. Moffat provides a welcome Appendix listing all of these heroic villains (or villainous heroes), as befits a work with a cast rivalling that of War and Peace.

The book’s pedigree as a soundly-researched doctoral thesis shows. Recalibrating it to the general or scholarly reader has produced a number of syntactical problems that should have been caught by the copy editor: far too many sentences begin with conjunctions; many phrases and terms become redundant; words like adverse and averse become interchangeable; Baron Wrangel becomes Baron Wrangle; and so on. The work does insist upon using the term “Allies,” which has become common currency in Great War works even though it is a technical error. The Entente allies of the First World War eventually grew to become the Allied and Associated Powers, and to use the term “Allies” in Russia becomes technically unsound, since Russia was an ally, but the United States was a co-belligerent. The author’s note for use of shorthand may have been excised in the conversion.

The narrative is supported by copious British and Canadian documentation, and by a formidable body of published and unpublished papers and monographs. It substantiates its Anglo-centric point of view, but also provides some keys to a broader international perspective. There are a number of reprinted and serviceable maps, although the map for Eastern Siberia lacks a scale.
BOOK REVIEWS

For those wishing to add perspective and depth on the important and history-shaping western intervention in Russia, this book is well worth the effort. For most readers it will come across as a political drama in which the USA and Japan compete for position on the eastern side of the stage, while Britain and France struggle to reassert dominance on the western half. Minor players, such as Canada, Estonia, and Finland, will be seen moving closer to centre stage as Germany exits, and as these players support, or refuse to support, the dialogues of the lead actors. In this production, however, while Russia provides the backdrop and the chorus, the Russians themselves—Reds, Whites, Cossacks, Czech Legion and Kerenskyites—remain bit players throughout.

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Canadians Outside the Depot, Siberia, Russia, painting by Colonel Louis Keene.