

CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

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**Cover**

**Italian Campaign,
by Silvia Pecota.**

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**Russia's Near-Abroad
Interventions: Crazy
Like a Fox**



**Future Airpower:
Trends and Implications
for Canadian
Special Operations
Forces Command
(CANSOFCOM)**

- 3 EDITOR'S CORNER
4 LETTER TO THE EDITOR

THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE

- 5 **Russia's Near-Abroad Interventions: Crazy Like a Fox**
by Enno Kerckhoff

AEROSPACE FUTURES

- 16 **Future Airpower: Trends and Implications for Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)**
by David Johnston

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

- 24 **The Royal Canadian Navy in Peace Operations**
by Corey Bursey
35 **25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations**
by Howard G. Coombs

MILITARY HISTORY

- 47 **Yes, French Canadians Did Their Share in the First World War**
by Jean Martin

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

- 56 **Should Canada Have a Foreign Espionage Service?**
by Richard Geoffrey St. John
67 **Reports of the Auditor General of Canada – Canadian Army Reserve: The Missing Link**
by Daniel A. Doran
72 **Expanding Horizons, Leading the Future: The Role of the Chief Petty Officer 1st Class (CPO1) / Chief Warrant Officer (CWO)**
by CWO Sherman Neil and CWO Richard Gillis

COMMENTARY

- 78 **Strong, Secure, Engaged: The Liberal Defence Policy Statement of 2017**
by Martin Shadwick

- 85 **BOOK REVIEWS**

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The Royal Canadian Navy in Peace Operations



Yes, French Canadians Did Their Share in the First World War



Canadian
Security
Intelligence
Service

Should Canada Have a Foreign Espionage Service?

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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

A hearty welcome, one and all, to yet another autumn edition of the *Canadian Military Journal*. Quite a variety of offerings in this issue... Taking the point, Major Enno Kerckhoff, an armour officer, explores Russia's recent 'near-abroad' interventions, and posits: "These are not the actions of a reckless government or even a megalomaniacal leader, but are well-considered strategic moves to prevent further erosion of its sphere of influence." Next, Major David Johnston, an infantry officer serving with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), clarifies the need for Special Operations Forces Airpower, explores six related technological trends, and then presents implications for CANSOFCOM "...in order to advocate for *future* SOF Airpower."

Commander Corey Bursey then makes a compelling argument that there can be a role for navies during United Nations peacekeeping operations, "...either as discrete military effectors, or as a support element to land and air forces." Bursey is followed by Colonel Howard Coombs, who, given the current government's renewed commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, takes a fresh look at the notorious 'Somalia affair' of 1993, when a Somali teenager was tortured and murdered by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. While the perpetrators were tried and punished, the event also led to the still-debated disbandment of the Airborne Regiment. Coombs then goes on to examine the changes wrought by the affair, "...to better understand the lessons of the last 25 years that enable the CAF to conduct more effective peace and other operations." In the last of the major articles this time out, Dr. Jean Martin of the Directorate of History and Heritage contends that contrary to popular assumption, based upon a misleading post-Great War assessment by American author and historian Elizabeth H. Armstrong in 1937, the enlistment of French Canadians into the Canadian Expeditionary Force might have far exceeded the maximum of 35,000 arrived at by Armstrong. Martin makes a compelling argument that the true number of French Canadian enlistments was at least 74,795, and may be as high as 79,000 enlistees.

We then offer three very different opinion pieces for our readership's consideration. In the first, Colonel (Ret'd) R. Geoffrey St. John, formally of the Canadian Armed Forces Intelligence Branch, asks: "Should Canada have a foreign Intelligence service"? Read on and see if you agree. Next, Major Daniel Doran examines the Auditor General's recent report on the Army Reserves. In Doran's words: "The hope is to offer insight into areas where the report overlooked certain key components that are paramount to the successful implementation of any plan whose intent would be to improve the overall functioning of the Militia." In the last opinion piece, Chief Warrant Officers Neil and Gillis discuss the core obligations of Chief Warrant Officers/ Chief Petty Officers 1st Class in the Canadian Armed Forces. In their words: "It transcends



Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Bill Bentley with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.



environment and occupation, going to the very essence of what every CWO/CPO1 must emulate, regardless of employment."

Then, our own Martin Shadwick takes a close look at the current government's Defence Policy Statement of 2017. And finally, we close with a "hat trick" of book reviews for our readership's autumn reading consideration.

However, we at the *Journal*, along with the entire Canadian Defence Academy and the Royal Military College of Canada extended communities were deeply saddened recently due to the sudden passing of a dear friend and colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Bill Bentley, MSM, CD, Ph.D., after 48 years of distinguished service to Canada, first as a long-serving soldier, and then as a military academic and a true champion of professional development. Bill will be sorely missed, and to him, this Autumn issue of the *Journal*, our flagship professional forum to which he made so many excellent contributions over the years, is respectfully dedicated. Rest in peace, old friend...

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

Courtesy of DND colleague


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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Sir,

I read with some dismay a remark within the recent article entitled “Conscience and the Canadian Armed Forces,” by Padre Capt. Victor Morris (Vol. 17, No. 2) that Capt. Robert Semrau could have readily interpreted the First Principle of Defence Ethics, “respect the dignity of all persons,” to justify shooting an incapacitated enemy insurgent. As discussed in my own recent article in this journal on the foundations of secular defence ethics (“Humanism and the Military Conscience: A Reply to Pichette and Marshall,” (CMJ Vol.16, No.3, Summer 2016), the First Principle encapsulates the inherent worth of every person and his or her basic human rights, including life and self-determination. The First Principle is, by necessity, aligned with the Laws of Armed Conflict, including an absolute prohibition on ever intentionally targeting either a civilian or a former adversary now *hors de combat*. Perhaps Morris is demonstrating that an evident lack of understanding of the foundation of Defence Ethics reinforces the need for ongoing reflection and discussion among military members on the meaning of its statements.

The Semrau incident is also a dubious example to support the claim that there may be an inherent tension between the voice of conscience and military law and military professionalism. Morris provides a very strong definition of conscience: “...a powerful and motivating force compelling and driving a person to act in accordance with personally held beliefs,” based upon one’s “knowledge, wisdom, and understanding.” Semrau’s decision was necessarily made in haste just after the end of a battle. It can be reasonably doubted that, if he had had time to reflect upon his conscience before acting, Semrau would have arrived at the same conclusion as he did. This reasonable doubt exists even if Semrau thinks otherwise. Reasoned ethical arguments about his choice



(as have also been provided in earlier issues of the *Journal*) have failed to find a stronger defence for the shooting other than acknowledging that no ideal options were available to Semrau, who may have been motivated by some kind of ethically-misguided pity that perhaps overcame better judgment under extreme stress. In other words, I assume that Semrau, as a product of the Officer Corps, under less unlucky and trying conditions might well have been more receptive to ethical assumptions and reasoning accepted within the Canadian military profession.

It is very much relevant that the pressures and urgencies of operational theatre frequently don’t allow for full reasoning about an ethical problem. If we use a weaker definition of conscience such as “what one intuitively to be the best course at any moment of serious choice,” then there are more likely to be conflicts between “conscience” thus defined, and ethical reasoning. But such a weaker definition also suggests that “conscience” in very difficult moments should be informed as effectively as possible by the fruits of disciplined ethical inquiry undertaken in some more peaceful and unconstrained setting.

A proper schooling in military ethics at the tactical level is necessary to help apply one’s professional identity and values in operations. Given the differences between classrooms and the thick of battle, there is probably a need to reinforce the conclusions of reasoning by repetitive simulations of real-life ethical dilemmas that will shape reflexes under pressure when actual dilemmas in combat are later encountered. The conscience cannot be some mysterious inner voice that rightly disregards whatever moral reasoning of which one is capable, simply because there is little time to think calmly at a moment of critical choice.

Stephen Hare, Ph.D.
Manager, Development and Support
Defence Ethics Programme, Department of National Defence

Kremlin Pool/Alamy Stock Photo F54F4R



A military parade celebrating victory during the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Red Square, Moscow, 9 May 2015.

Russia's Near-Abroad Interventions: Crazy Like a Fox

by Enno Kerckhoff

Major Enno Kerckhoff, MSM, CD, is an armour officer with the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He graduated from RMC with a BA in Military in Strategic Studies (2002), from Norwich University with an MBA (2014), and again from RMC with a Masters of Defence Studies (2016). Major Kerckhoff is currently employed with the Strategic Joint Staff in Ottawa, but longs for the simple days when he had an armoured vehicle and not a cubicle in which to work. This article began as a paper submitted as part of the Joint Command and Staff Program at CFC Toronto.

Introduction and Context

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has made several military interventions in neighbouring former Soviet republics. These actions have been interpreted aggressively in the West; however, in each case the intervention fulfills Russia's power needs in their 'Near Abroad.'¹ Interventions in Moldova (1992), Georgia (1992, 1994 and 2008) and Ukraine (2014) have followed a common pattern where Russia perceives an oppressed minority, deploys military force to prevent this oppression, and a residual Russian military presence in the state provides sufficient instability to prevent that state from having the requisite pre-conditions for joining NATO. This action has allowed Russia to prevent further NATO expansion in some areas of its Near Abroad without coming into direct conflict

with NATO forces. By remaining in the regions where it has intervened, Russia continues to benefit as long as the instability is maintained. These types of interventions have been described as generating a "frozen conflict," where hostilities remain low but unresolved for years. Under these situations, it is not in Russia's strategic interests to withdraw, or to fully resolve the conflicts, because this resolution opens the door for further NATO expansion. These are not the actions of a reckless government or even a megalomaniacal leader but are well-considered strategic moves to prevent further erosion of its sphere of influence.

The Russian military has undergone an evolution in its force structure over the past twenty years, facilitated by the aforementioned interventions. By deploying their military forces in limited conflicts, first in a covert, unconventional role, and later, in open fighting, the Russian military has been able to improve its deployability, increase its leaders' professionalism and send strategic messages to potential allies and opponents alike. Looking specifically at how reforms have made the Russian military more capable in limited interventions, it is possible to get a sense of what national interests the military is being told to prioritize. These modernized forces are then more mobile and more capable of responding to regional threats with a *qualitative* advantage, rather than the historical Russian *quantitative* advantage.



Near a blocked bridge across the Dniester River, Moldova, Dubasari, War of Transnistria, 1990.

Moldova

The conflict in Moldova resulted from a civilian breakdown during the transition from Soviet control. Under the Soviet regime, language requirements kept Romanian-speaking Moldovans from holding important positions in the government. Many Moldovans were expelled to Siberia for having questionable loyalty.² During the *Glasnost* period of the 1980s and 1990s, ethnic Moldovans were able to assert greater control of the industrial and political forces within their republic. Among these measures were language laws that reversed the power dynamic and made it impossible for Russian-speaking leadership to remain in power.³ In response to this threat against their social status, the Russian-speaking Moldovans broke away from Moldova and established the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (TMR) on 1 September 1990. Russia did not immediately intervene. However, ethnic ties to an oppressed minority in a former republic would be repeated as the *casus belli* in future interventions.

Between 1991 and 1992, sporadic clashes between the Moldovan Army and TMR rebels escalated into open conflict, with the rebel personnel and equipment primarily drawn from Russian 14th Army bases in the region.⁴ The TMR was able to provide a sufficient threat to Moldovan forces due to the weapons and trained personnel they received through 14th Army, even if those

“The conflict in Moldova resulted from a civilian breakdown during the transition from Soviet control.”

resources were provided covertly. Stories of thefts and local retirements provided deniability.⁵ Following the conflict, allegations of large transfers of weapons surfaced: “14th Army officials gave the separatists 24 tanks, 12 combat helicopters, 37,000 machine and sub-machine guns, as well as 120 cannons.”⁶ Years of continual deployment to the region facilitated the development of family relationships and ties that would deepen 14th Army loyalties to pro-Russian separatists, rather than the Moldovans. Whether it was separatist sympathies among individual Russian soldiers, or an institutional transfer of arms, this covert support for separatist forces is a theme that would be repeated in future interventions.

Beginning in June 1992, Russian troops began fighting openly alongside the TMR separatists.⁷ With such overwhelming force, ending the fighting took only a month, with a cease-fire line established along the Nistru River.⁸ Those military stockpiles not used in the fighting largely fell under the control of the TMR forces once the cease-fire line was established. In order to secure these sites and prevent them from further destabilizing the region, Russian forces remained in place as part of a tri-lateral ‘peacekeeping’ mission, with all three parties to the conflict (Moldova, Transnistria and Russia) providing the troops.⁹ A proper peacekeeping force under the supervision of the UN or the OSCE¹⁰ would have at least provided sanction for forces to remain. However, international oversight and timelines would provide additional pressure to resolve the conflict. In order

Chuck Nacke/Alamy Stock Photo DYH3BH



Separatist soldiers on a Soviet era BMP with both Russian and Transnistrian flags during the War of Transnistria, 1992.

to withdraw can be justified internally by the need to continue to represent the TMR's interests against international intervention, deliberately ignoring that the Russian involvement is, in itself, a foreign intervention in the eyes of the international community.

Russia intervened in Moldova ostensibly to protect an oppressed minority, to secure military bases where they had significant resources, and to prevent these weapons from being used against Russian interests. Following the cease-fire, however, Russian troops have consistently delayed their departure. Moldova has expressed an interest in joining NATO. However, it cannot do so with an ongoing internal crisis.¹³ If Russian minority rights are

to better control the cease-fire negotiations, Russia has shown a preference to act with the multilateral approval of the parties to the conflict, rather than through a recognized external agency.¹¹ This action allows Russia to exercise its power directly to the conflicting parties, rather than through a potential moderating third-party, allowing it to bully each party individually, as required, rather than having to negotiate with an organized opposition bloc. In the 'peacekeeping' force for Transnistria, two of the three parties were Russian-controlled, allowing Russian interests to be weighted accordingly in the negotiations. With significant quantities of arms and equipment still needing to be moved away from the conflict zone, it was in Russia's interest to stall the proceedings as much as possible. By stalling, Russia could transfer additional arms to the TMR and prevent any future negotiations from including handing over arms to Moldova as compensation. This delay, therefore, fits Russia's strategic interests more directly than a resolution to the conflict.

Continuous negotiations since the 1992 cease-fire have resulted in some reduction in forces and weaponry, although delays in this withdrawal have been a destabilizing influence in the negotiations to establish a more permanent result.¹² The removal of Russian military equipment and forces could occur quickly, if Russia chose to do so. The unwillingness

no longer under threat, and the military equipment is secured (or can be moved back to Russia), then there is no further need for peacekeeping forces. That said, this does not fit with Russian strategic interests. By using the continued military presence to secure arms sites, Russia ensures that the conflict remains without a permanent peace, preventing Moldova from being a candidate for NATO expansion. Moldova's status as Europe's poorest nation continues to be a regional issue. Trade imbalances and embargos on Moldovan goods contribute to their failure to integrate into the larger European community and economic sphere of influence. By maintaining this frozen conflict, Russia can continue to exercise its influence over Moldova and coerce it away from NATO's sphere of military influence.



Map re-drawn by Accurats, taken from BBC news article "Ukraine crisis: 'Frozen conflicts' and the Kremlin" by Patrick Jackson, 10 Sept 2014.



A Russian armoured vehicle passes by the South Ossetian University's building in Tskhinvali during the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, 12 August 2008.

Georgia

There have been several waves of Russian interventions in Georgia. The first, between 1992 and 1994, was precipitated by 1989 Georgian language laws similar to those in Moldova, limiting Russian participation in government.¹⁴ Although the results of these actions took longer to observe in Georgia than in Moldova, this generated the same type of protectionist response from Russia. Russian intervention initially took the form of supplies of personnel and weapons (mostly leftover from the dissolution of the Soviet Union) to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists.¹⁵ Although the Sochi Treaty of July 1992 ended the military conflict of this first wave, Russian 'peacekeepers' have remained in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, providing a Russian-tinted legitimacy to the respective separation movements, and antagonizing the Georgian government.¹⁶ The Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus region and into the Middle East is contingent upon southern bases, including Armenia and Georgia.¹⁷ The loss of Russian basing in Georgia may put Russian expeditionary operations at greater risk; Russia is therefore willing to expend resources to maintain this presence as a function of its continued interests in the region. Georgia is therefore much more important as a state under Russian influence and outside NATO's membership.

In the early years of the new millennium, Georgia explored joining NATO and tensions rose with Russia in response. Between

"In the early years of the new millennium, Georgia explored joining NATO and tensions rose with Russia in response."

2006 and 2008, Russia applied diplomatic and economic pressures against Georgia to demonstrate their displeasure with NATO overtures.¹⁸ In August 2008, the Georgian Army's struggle with South Ossetian separatist forces resulted in open fighting over border villages, prompting the Russian Army to intervene on the side of the South Ossetians. To justify the intervention, Russia claimed the right to defend its peacekeepers present in the border towns as well as the ethnic Russians in the region.¹⁹ Operationally, the Russian military encountered little opposition; the Georgian Army was overcome in only five days using overwhelming force rather than exploiting irregulars.²⁰ Although in this case, there was less of a covert military presence prior to open intervention, Russia has admitted that it had forces conducting exercises in the region and accused Ukraine of providing Georgia with weapons to counter Russia's support for the rebels.²¹

Russian strategy included an informational component, using media to portray the Russian soldiers as saviours to the minority groups in captured Georgian territory, with limited international success although the story was well received in Russia.²² Coordinated cyber-attacks against Georgian government infrastructure were synchronized with the manoeuvre of Russian forces, leading to the reasonable conclusion that the Russian government either conducted or facilitated these attacks.²³ Lastly, Russia advanced on populated areas but appeared to be avoiding moving through them. This could be due to the greater threat from

unconventional forces, but could also be attributed to a desire to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties in order to preserve an element of the 'peacekeeping' myth.

As part of the terms of the cease-fire, Russia withdrew its forces from the remainder of Georgian territory. However, it continues to occupy South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and places pressure upon Georgia by making preparations that would appear to be aimed at annexation of the disputed regions. This continued instability serves the same military interest as Transnistria in preventing further NATO expansion.

Despite the speed and aggression of the attack, Russian military weaknesses were exposed in the brief Georgian deployment. Command and control, surveillance, and ground to air cooperation were all observed as being below expected levels of competence.²⁴ Specifically, several Russian casualties were attributed to a failure to communicate between close support aircraft and ground forces.²⁵ To improve the qualitative advantage over its potential rivals, Russia instituted a series of military reforms, including partial 'professionalization' of the Army, reorganization of reserve forces, and equipment upgrades to bring its estimated 10 percent of modernized military equipment up to 70 percent between 2008 and 2020.²⁶

The Russian military clearly wanted to learn from its experiences in anticipation of future conflicts of a similar type. Although a conventional conflict on a large scale would require the type of mass mobilization typical of Russian forces in previous generations, smaller interventions would require a more specialized, higher quality combat force. The reform measures instituted following the Georgia conflict were an indicator of future Russian military plans, including the value to be placed upon special operations forces, air-to-ground cooperation, and small combat units, rather than massed armour and artillery formations.

In a larger sense, the Georgian conflict was a middle stage between the hesitant intervention in Transnistria and the annexation of Crimea. Beginning with the interventions in the early-1990s, Russia continued the pattern of using ethnic protection as a pretext for military action. It followed up with an ostensibly covert arming of separatist groups, and finally armed intervention on a much more aggressive scale than what was seen against Moldova. The forces used in the intervention were then left in place in the disputed zone, although less as Russia's *de-facto* 'peacekeepers' than a warning against further actions. Russia had made its case against NATO expansion into Georgia, and was prepared to leave forces in place as a reminder against future overtures.



Russian peacekeepers at the Georgian-South Ossetian border, 6 August 2008.



Anti-Russian intervention on Ukraine rally outside the Russian consulate in Gdansk, 15 March 2014. Protest organized by the Solidarity Union.

ITAR-TASS Photo Agency/Alamy Stock Photo BPETW6

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Ukraine

Almost from Ukraine's inception as an independent state from the former Soviet Union, Crimea had special status within the new state. Ukraine recognized Crimea as an autonomous republic. However, ethnic tensions persisted, with significant numbers of Crimean residents who continued to identify as Russians rather than Ukrainians.²⁷ This demographic situation was at odds with the Crimean political leadership, leading to tension between the Crimean population and its government in Kiev. In 2014, the implementation of language laws that disadvantaged Russian-speakers, as well as Ukrainian economic overtures toward the West, constituted the proverbial 'final straws' leading to intervention on behalf of Russian-leaning Ukrainian elements. The political structure at the time was uncertain, with a Russian-backed president having fled, and a Western-backed interim government in Kiev failing to capture public confidence. This situation presented an opportunity for Russia to achieve another *political end* using *military means*. It was also an opportunity to employ the modernized forces following the lessons learned from the Georgian campaign of 2008.

In February 2014, Russian-supported irregular forces began an active resistance against the acting Ukrainian government, adding to the instability, and prompting chaos across the Crimea. The use of irregular forces for this purpose was described immediately prior to the Crimean intervention as a means to create a "...continually operating front over the entire territory of the opposing state."²⁸ The pro-Russian gangs, and later militia organizations, staged violent demonstrations that contributed to an uncertain security environment with constant threats.²⁹ This represented a continuation of the pattern of covert support for separatist regimes, as demonstrated in Moldova and

Georgia. Government instability and a questionable referendum on what Crimea ought to do regarding its status with Ukraine set the conditions for the protectionist argument that Putin needed to justify an intervention at the end of February.³⁰ The introduction of a regional referendum allowed Russia to use ethnic self-determination as a basis for their intervention, regardless of the international community's overwhelmingly negative perception of the referendum's legitimacy.

Anonymous uniformed soldiers began to appear in large numbers behind the demonstrations in February 2014, moving quickly across Crimea. Although the covert forces had removed badges and unit insignia, it has been assessed that they represented some of the best-trained and equipped soldiers in the Russian order of battle: Spetsnaz commandos, naval infantry units, and army paratroops.³¹ Led by professionals rather than conscripts, and using the most up-to-date equipment, the unidentified soldiers clearly belonged to Russia rather than an *ad hoc* citizens' militia. At this point in the operation, however, it was more useful for Russian involvement to remain *covert*. Once key installations such as the Crimean parliament and major airports had been occupied, the conditions were met for *overt* Russian intervention on 1 March 2014, and annexation within the month.

Prior to the 2014 invasion, Russia already had up to 25,000 soldiers and sailors stationed at its Sevastopol naval base in the Crimea. Faced with this superior threat and the movement of additional, highly-skilled units by air and by sea, the Ukrainian military could offer only local, uncoordinated resistance. Although it could be argued that Russia's manpower and equipment advantage was overwhelming, this does not give adequate credit to the strategy chosen. By presenting Ukraine with the *fait-accompli* of occupation of their key infrastructure, there was nothing for the Ukrainian military to fight for in

Crimea – it was preferable to withdraw rather than engage the Russian Army. This strategy aligns with previous Russian actions in Georgia in that Russia did not seek to cause military or civilian casualties as part of its interventions, but rather, employed its military to achieve political ends.

Once the Crimea issue was solved by annexation, other areas of Ukraine were penetrated by Russian unconventional forces. The Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Eastern Ukraine have similar demographics to Crimea, with large Russian populations inside Ukraine's borders. Although it would have followed the common narrative more closely to

"Once the Crimea issue was solved by annexation, other areas of Ukraine were penetrated by Russian conventional forces."



Stephen Foote/Alamy Stock Photo EB81G8

Armed Russian soldier stands guard in front of a Ukrainian insignia outside Perevalne Base near Simferopol, Crimea, 2 March 2014.

Daniel Van Moil/NurPhoto/ZUMA PRESS.com/Alamy Live News/Alamy Stock Photo DWGW70



Alleged Russian Special Forces on a civilian ship next to the Ukrainian fleet then blocked by Russian warships in the port of Sevastopol, Ukraine, 7 March 2014.

have Russia justify their intervention on behalf of an oppressed minority, the Eastern Ukraine intervention was less subtle. Immediately following Crimea’s annexation, armed uprisings in Donetsk and Luhansk (known collectively as the Donbass region) further threatened Ukraine’s hold on regions with large Russian populations. With large numbers of irregular forces and covert Russian military present and advancing into Ukraine, Russia continued to deny official involvement throughout the spring and summer of 2014. Nevertheless, Russia continued to supply the separatist militias with personnel, weapons, and equipment.³² With heavy armaments and the reappearance of disguised Russian special forces soldiers, the separatist militias were able to seize large portions of the Donbass, including the important transportation hub at the Donetsk airport.

With the quality and scale of armaments provided to the rebels, Russian overt intervention was not required nearly as quickly as it was in Georgia. The separatists suffered setbacks during the early summer, including personnel and equipment losses that were widely broadcast as evidence of Russian involvement in brutal fighting with Ukrainian forces.³³ By the end of summer, it was no longer possible to maintain the illusion, and Russia’s overt intervention ensured that any post-conflict negotiation would be done with separatists in control of key transportation nodes and significant portions of Ukrainian territory. It was important that Russia had an official presence in the region prior to a cease-fire because of the delays Russia can impose to withdraw these forces post-conflict. As was seen in Moldova and Georgia, the Russian style of peacekeeping can continue to destabilize the conflict zone

long after the fighting is done. With Crimea, the Russian base at Sevastopol would be a perpetual presence. However, the Donbass region needed a starting point for negotiations. The presence of Russian regular forces established this point.

The annexation of Crimea represents a departure from the stalemate that characterized the conclusion of hostilities in Moldova and Georgia. This decision makes strategic sense in the security it offers for Russian naval forces on the Black Sea, and continued support for separatist forces elsewhere in Ukraine. The residual instability in Donbass and Luhansk suits Russia’s purposes in continuing to deny Ukraine admissibility to NATO. If NATO responds by dropping the stability requirement, and admits Ukraine as a member, the alliance would be bound to defend a country it has already demonstrated it is not comfortable defending.³⁴ While the Russian military presence in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia are by-products of their respective conflicts, Russia derives only marginal military utility from them. Crimea, on the other hand, has the largest naval base on the Black Sea and has been Russia’s military strongpoint in the south for generations. Jeffrey Mankoff is the Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He maintains that the annexation would cause the remainder of Ukraine to lean further toward the West, both economically and militarily. He stated that Russian intervention may have “won Crimea, and lost Ukraine.”³⁵ What this theory ignores, however, is that neither the EU nor NATO have been willing to lower their entry requirements in order to admit Ukraine (with the associated economic and military



A Pro-Russian elderly woman is arguing with bystanders about the future of the Crimea at the Ukrainian Coast Guard Headquarters in Simferopol, Crimea (Ukraine), 8 March 2014.

challenges it brings). NATO has already demonstrated that it has no intent to go to war over Ukraine. It did not do so over Crimea, and has not done so over the eastern provinces. By making its point in winning Crimea, Russia has no need of Ukraine.

Following Russian operations in Georgia, the modernization of the military continued, although at a slower pace. Rather than concentrating on high-technology fields that it could acquire from other nations, Russia sought to deepen the ‘professionalization’ of its personnel.³⁶ The changes implemented between 2008 and 2014 reduced the number of units and improved the quality of leadership, but retained conscription as an



Servicemen block and destroy illegal military groups during joint military exercises by Belorussian special operations forces and Russian airborne troops (VDV) in Chashniki District, Vitebsk Region, 4 April 2017.

economic measure, even though it is less efficient in a military sense.³⁷ As a result, Russia has a two-tiered military, part of which is well-equipped, rapidly-deployable, and has better quality leadership. The remainder of Russia's military is made up primarily of conscripts and non-professional leadership, with less-advanced weaponry.³⁸ With a large military, but a smaller cadre that has a rapid-reaction capability, Russia was well-suited to carry out the type of domestic counter-insurgency and limited expeditionary operations that are described herein. Using these assets, Russia could act covertly with smaller, more agile forces while larger forces remained visibly out of the conflict, along the border zone. This allowed Russia to maintain deniability in the intervention, with their overt forces clearly present on the border, while the special operations forces operated anonymously inside Ukraine.

A warning for Belarus?

With the goal of preventing NATO expansion, it is implausible that Russia would choose to conduct an intervention in Poland, the Baltics, or any other existing NATO member. This clearly-aggressive act would go against the pattern Russia has established, and would not achieve the goal of thwarting NATO expansion. On the periphery, however, it is possible that Russia may seek to employ the same strategy in Belarus as it did in Ukraine. Russia currently has a mutual-defence agreement that essentially removes all distinction between Russian and Belarusian forces.³⁹ Included within this agreement are a number of key surveillance installations and military bases that grant Russia greater range into Western Europe. The perceived threat of Western Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) over the Russian sphere of influence makes the equivalent Russian system a necessary counter-move, with the westernmost range of the Russian system a limiting factor for determining the system's overall effectiveness. Guaranteeing the placement of Russian BMD as far west as possible is therefore an existential requirement for Russian homeland defence.

If this arrangement were to change, through *political regime* change, the imposition of new language laws, or if access to these bases were to be otherwise threatened, Russia could choose to act to protect its interests. Such an action would likely take the same form as Crimea, where it supports a domestic rebellion, covertly supplies these rebels with trained personnel and heavy equipment, then conducts an overwhelming overt intervention to complete the operation. Early indicators for this type of action could consist of:

- Election of West-leaning members to Belarusian parliament
- Changes in tone in diplomatic communiqués or public statements
- Increased pace of joint annual exercises, involving fewer Belarusian forces than typically seen
- Increased threat posture for Belarusian internal security forces
- Lower availability of Belarusian strategic assets to support Russian joint operations
- Pre-positioning forces on both sides of the Belarusian border

Although Russia is currently engaged in Syria and unlikely to seek another campaign in the near term, Belarus should be wary of social policies that might antagonize Russia. The relationship between Vladimir Putin of Russia and current Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will be important to watch; increased personal tensions between the two men could be reflected in foreign policy decisions, and vice versa. This area is worthy of further study as the situations in Ukraine continue to evolve, particularly if Russia wants to more fully establish a zone of instability where NATO cannot make further advances.

Conclusion

Russia's pattern of intervention has been clearly shown in the conflicts described herein. In each case, Russia claimed to have an interest in an oppressed minority, then intervened ostensibly on behalf of that minority, first with unconventional (covert) forces, then through shipments of weapons and support to the rebel groups. When the conflict persisted or deepened, an overt intervention with conventional forces overwhelmed local resistance quickly. When overt interventions were conducted, Russian forces were already well-placed to act quickly, seizing infrastructure and making the defenders' positions untenable. Following a cease-fire, irregular forces and weapons stocks remained in place to maintain an acceptable level of instability that would prevent the subject state from achieving the required standard for membership in NATO.

“Guaranteeing the placement of Russian BMD as far west as possible is therefore an existential requirement for Russian homeland defence.”

In 2016, as NATO announced troop deployments that echo the earlier days of the Cold War, the emphasis for these deployments has been upon the requirement to send a message to Russia of commitment to collective defence. NATO has stated they intend to engage with Russia on a two-track process, using defence and dialogue to maintain security for its member states.⁴⁰ For their part, although Russia wants to prevent further NATO expansion, they will not do so recklessly. Poland and the Baltics are not at as great a risk from Russia as Ukraine, irrespective of NATO's deployments to Romania, Poland and Latvia. Russia may continue to foment instability with unconventional or cyber events to disrupt internal security in targeted NATO-member states but is unlikely to risk an overt attack or even sponsor minority groups due to the risks of those activities being tied back to Russian support. It fits with a hegemonic strategy for Russia to prevent NATO expansion in Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus – antagonizing NATO member states does not serve this strategic interest in the same manner.

If the US were placed in a similar situation, with an adversary expanding their military and political reach into the North American continent, it could be expected that the US would react with hostility. The US had such reactions when Russian overtures to Cuba resulted in the Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis. While a new Cold War may not be on the horizon, all sides are conscious of their respective interests. Russia has elements of power that it can exercise in order to further those interests and it should not come as a surprise when it chooses to do so.

Russian military interventions have been a staple of their security policy in the post-Soviet era. Rather than using diplomatic means to solve a conflict, Russia has been much more willing than western nations to use its military as an extension of diplomatic

means. From Transnistria to South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the Russian military has been employed to good effect and has been able to leverage these deployments to improve their readiness for future operations. Russia has significant diplomatic, informational and economic means to exercise its national power. However, when dealing with its Near Abroad, military force still makes sense as a strategy. By keeping military forces involved in the above conflicts, Russia's strategic goal of preventing NATO expansion has been accomplished. Although Western statecraft would dictate that an end to the conflict is preferable, this is not the case for Russia, where an acceptable level instability meets their national aims.

CMJ

dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo EW55DT



NATO flags fly before the start of the first exercise in the deployment of NATO Spearheads – *Noble Jump* – on the troop drill grounds near the town of Zagan, Poland, 18 June 2015.

Nikolay Vinokurov/Alamy Stock Photo HFNPE8



Russian honour guard soldiers march through Red Square during the Victory Day military parade, Moscow, 7 May 2015.

NOTES

1. The 'Near Abroad' term has been used to describe a wide variety of the states comprising the former Soviet Union, particularly when the intent is to imply that the former Soviet Republics are less than independent from Russian power. For the purposes of this article, the term is intended to mean those neighbouring states over which Russia continues to exert considerable influence, particularly in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe.
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5. Andreas Morike, "The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: The Cases of Moldova and Georgia," in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 1998), p. 124.
6. W. Alejandro Sanchez, "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has become a European Geo-Security Issue," in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, No. 22 (2009), p. 124.
7. Morike, p. 125.
8. Sanchez, "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue.," 163
9. *Ibid.* Although Russia characterizes these troops as peacekeepers, they clearly do not meet the standard of impartiality expected in the concept of the UN peacekeeping operations.
10. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, although at the time it was known as the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE.
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19. Allison, p. 177.
20. Karagiannis, p. 405.
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24. Timothy L. Thomas, "The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises Its Five-Day War in South Ossetia," in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2009), p. 32.
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36. Renz, p. 68.
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38. Märta Carlsson and Johan Norberg, "The Armed Forces," in *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2011*, Vendil Pallin (ed.), p. 105. (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Review Agency, 2012).
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A CH-146 Griffon helicopter over Opa Locka, Florida, during Exercise Southern Breeze, 9 February 2017.

Future Airpower: Trends and Implications for Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)

by David Johnston

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Introduction

Amature Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability requires dedicated Air and Aviation resources, yet the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has not responded to the deepening operational relevance of Canadian SOF. In its capstone document, *Air Force Vectors*, the RCAF clusters SOF with Space and Cyber activities,¹ both significantly more niche and less mature than Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Similarly, recent Airpower articles from the *Canadian Military Journal* and the *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* mention CANSOFCOM in passing only.² With more than ten years of domestic and expeditionary SOF operations in support of Canada's national interest, CANSOFCOM has emerged as a highly reliable organization. More importantly, future indications show no end to the requirement for SOF. The Chief of Force Development characterizes the Future Security Environment as one where "...state and non-state actors alike will seek to combine conventional, irregular and high-end asymmetric methods concurrently, often simultaneously in the land, sea, air, and space environments and the cyber domain to gain advantage in future conflict."³

With irregular and asymmetric threats, the irregular and asymmetric solutions provided by SOF are essential. As U.S. Admiral Eric Olsen stated, "...most conflicts involving NATO in the future will require broadly capable and skilled SOF."⁴

Uniquely poised to respond to irregular and asymmetric threats, CANSOFCOM requires an increase in joint interoperability and capability development with the RCAF. This article analyzes broad trends in Air and Aviation as they relate to SOF Airpower. It clarifies the need for SOF Airpower, explores six technological trends: unmanned systems, autonomy, next-generation rotary wing, future precision strike, alternate-service delivery, and fuel requirements, and ultimately, presents implications for CANSOFCOM in order to advocate for future SOF Airpower.

Why SOF Airpower?

Ad hoc relationships between SOF and conventional Air and Aviation lack the foundational qualities necessary for fulfilling SOF mission sets. The Holloway Report, commissioned in 1980 after the failure of U.S. Operation *Eagle Claw*, concluded that "...the ad-hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most of the major issues,"⁵ and recommended that a permanent organization be created to plan, train, and conduct counter-terrorism missions. This was the genesis for USSOCOM, and in particular, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.⁶ NATO SOF determined a similar force posture after realizing that, without dedicated

Air and Aviation assets, their forces were unable to execute missions for which they were otherwise capable and ready.⁷

The NATO study provides several key reasons why any alternative is sub-optimal: Technical skills are different; common cultural understanding, values and norms are absent; and finally, planning and rehearsal parameters vary significantly.⁸

The rationale for dedicated SOF Air and Aviation does not presuppose an elaborate Air Wing. Light, agile, and interoperable airpower is more appropriate. CANSOFCOM has retained Operational Command of a squadron of CH-146 *Griffon* helicopters since 2006 (even earlier, in other configurations), employing this highly effective unit in support of domestic and expeditionary operations across the spectrum of CANSOFCOM missions and units.⁹ Nevertheless, light utility helicopters have never been sufficient for the broad spectrum of SOF missions. CANSOFCOM needs additional capabilities from across the RCAF or beyond. As a CANSOFCOM member, the author can recount numerous examples of degraded mission results due to non-existent fixed-wing surveillance assets, lack of airborne precision fire support, poor integration with conventional aviation assets, or a combination of the above. To assure operational success into the future, CANSOFCOM must develop a mature Airpower capability.

Future Trends

Manned vs. Unmanned

The air domain now and into the future will mix manned and unmanned platforms, a trend which CANSOFCOM must embrace. The inclusion of unmanned assets, already currently common practice among well-developed militaries, is certain. Many missions flown in support of SOF, along with occasional conventional force missions, include long-endurance unmanned drones. The unmanned suite of aerial vehicles ranges from hand-held micro ‘off-the-shelf’ varieties used by front-line tactical elements, to medium and high altitude long-endurance strategic unmanned assets. Canada is in the process of procuring medium altitude long endurance systems. The CAF’s forays into unmanned systems came from humble beginnings in Afghanistan, relying upon short-term leased versions. The long awaited permanent solution has a goal of procuring “...interoperable, network-enabled Unmanned Aircraft Systems to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Target Acquisition and all-weather precision strike capabilities in support of CAF operations worldwide.”¹⁰

Long-delayed but highly anticipated, unmanned systems will operationally enhance CANSOFCOM.

Autonomy

With certain use of unmanned systems, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must determine how humans will remain relevant in the air domain, a trend known as *Humans in the Loop*. A report from the U.S. Air Force Air University concluded that there are no technological barriers to replacing manned fixed-wing assets with unmanned variants, thereby increasing the endurance of platforms and preserving the lives of air crews in high-threat environments.¹¹

Possibly, the preponderance of future air assets supporting the ‘find-fix-finish’ portions of the targeting cycle may be unmanned. Current unmanned assets fly with either a human pilot operating remotely, or with autonomous computer algorithms replacing human control. When conducting surveillance missions, surveilling a nation’s border or a coastline, for example, the latter might be preferred. Swarms

of unmanned assets may provide persistent coverage and support over wide swaths of land or sea. However, for mission sets that depend on real-time intelligence, split-second adjustments, or those where lives hang in the balance, logic dictates that humans remain in the loop. The Air University report indicates that, even though technology is so well advanced that humans are the limiting factor, in most cases, humans prove more discerning than a machine. For example, an autonomous asset cannot differentiate a wounded soldier from a healthy one, or a chaplain from a fighter.¹² Most commanders with authority over lethal engagements will likely never cede control of lethal force to a machine. While one may defer the notion of phasing out manned flight completely, unmanned assets are certain to become more and more prevalent in future war. Humans will remain in the loop across the spectrum of SOF mission sets, but will recede further and further.

“The rationale for dedicated SOF Air and Aviation does not presuppose an elaborate Air Wing.”



Lockheed Martin S-97 Raider.

Future Aviation

The next generation of aviation platforms must be considered for the CH-146 *Griffon* replacement, as technology advancements position aviation as the platform of choice for SOF missions. Future aviation platforms are trending in two different directions, both with longer combat ranges, faster speeds, and in higher and hotter conditions than today. First is the super-helicopter, exemplified by the Sikorsky S-97 *Raider*. With two coaxial counter-rotating main blades coupled with a rear thrust propeller, the S-97 and other variants achieve significantly increased speed without any drastic reduction in range, capacity, or auxiliary capabilities.¹³

Second is the tilt-rotor platform, most notably, the V-280 *Valor*. This category blends the vertical takeoff of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. The future of tilt-rotor technology looks bright, with the Bell V-280 *Valor* providing a fast, precise vertical takeoff mobility platform.¹⁴ The future of aviation technology may conceivably nullify the payload and range advantage that tactical fixed wing platforms currently enjoy over helicopters. As such, a future SOF planner is likely to choose a precision asset instead of one requiring fixed infrastructure for take-off and landing. CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must collaborate on procurement of future helicopters with these considerations in mind.

Future Precision Strike

SOF operations will need precision fire support far into the future, a role that the RCAF must prioritize. Of the multiple offensive roles and missions of air forces, air-to-ground and close air support are the two most applicable to ground forces, and to SOF in particular. As an indication of this significance, the U.S. Air Force's venerable A-10 *Warthog* has been taken out of impending retirement. According to open source reporting, "...much of

the leadership within the Air Force is keen to retire the A-10 so that the resources used to maintain the fleet can be pumped into the fifth-generation F-35 program."¹⁵ However, the high demand for the A-10 as the premier close air support platform (other than the AC-130 *Spectre* gunship), makes it a constant 'go-to' asset in support of ground forces.¹⁶ The trend of supporting the air-land battle is one that will continue into the future, as attempts in recent history to achieve decisive victory without committing ground forces have failed. In the rare and unlikely event that a future conflict does not involve SOF in some capacity, it is certain to involve proxy forces, civilians in need of defending, or both.

A second trend in precision strike is the case of the F-35 and the A-29, as an illustration of the debate between expensive, complex strategic platforms and ones that are simple, abundant, and tactically focused. The future of strategic attack lies in the F-35 fifth generation stealth fighter, with the aircraft blending a futuristic high-technology airframe with a human pilot. With production delays, cost overruns and some sponsors withdrawing from the program, the F-35 has experienced some developmental problems.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the program continues, with a current cost per aircraft of approximately \$100 million. Juxtaposed with the F-35 is the Embraer A-29 *Super Tucano* light attack aircraft. The A-29, in comparison, costs a mere \$10 million and can be employed in multiple roles, including precision strike and surveillance and reconnaissance.¹⁸ However, its utility should not be overstated: The A-29 is not a stealth fighter or a fifth generation aircraft, and is inappropriate for 'near-peer' conflicts. However, it is certainly a viable option to permit ground forces, either our own or those of a partner nation, to run their own organic fixed wing fire support missions. For example, the Afghan Air Force is training on A-29s in close air support missions with success.¹⁹



© Bell Helicopter

Concept design of a Bell V-280 *Valor*.



DVIDS photo 2311483 by Technical Sergeant Nathan Lipscomb

A USAF Republic A-10 *Thunderbolt II*.



Agência Força Aérea © Sergeant Johnson at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/ministreioda defesa/8780131013>.

A pair of Embraer A-29 *Super Tucano* light attack aircraft.



A USAF Bell TH-1H Huey II.

The US Navy flirted with the concept of employing A-29s but cancelled the program, due to a number of factors beyond need and viability, principally Washington politics.²⁰ The A-29 certainly cannot replace the platform requirement necessary to compete for air superiority or defend Canada’s north as part of our NORAD commitments. Nevertheless, the value of ‘down-teching’ applies to fixed wing strike platforms supporting SOF, and, arguably, in an equal sense across the spectrum of military technology.

Alternative Service Delivery

Contracted civilian aircraft via Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) would ease pressure on scarce RCAF resources while providing much-needed operational flexibility to CANSOFCOM well into the future. Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) means providing “... services or products, which have been provided traditionally by the Public Service, through or in partnership with organizations outside the Public Service... while making the best use of scarce resources.”²¹ When applied to future SOF Airpower, ASD would see CANSOFCOM entering into public-private partnerships to leverage civilian airframes. There are many successful military examples of ASD. The RCAF Contracted Airborne Training Services (CATS) program uses civilian pilots and airframes to provide live-flying instruction as part of fighter pilot training.²² ASD can easily extend beyond the training realm. PAL Aerospace, headquartered in Canada, purports to have provided over 250,000 hours of airborne ISR in support of military and law enforcement missions.²³ U.S. AFRICOM has

“The US Navy flirted with the concept of employing A-29s but cancelled the program, due to a number of factors beyond need and viability, principally Washington politics.”

also successfully used contracted Air and Aviation in operational theatres over the long term with success, and recently awarded new medium-term contracts to two separate air mobility providers.²⁴ In times of relative fiscal constraint, the *lease vs. buy* option provided by ASD makes sense for the RCAF and CANSOFCOM. ASD also opens up flexibility for CANSOFCOM that the RCAF cannot provide. In 2014, the *Globe and Mail* reported that downgrades to the CC-144 *Challenger* fleet would mean the “...air force may have to use larger, more costly aircraft for important military missions, including medical evacuation.”²⁵ Outsourcing access to platforms, perhaps even with outsourced crews, helps to solve future resource scarcity.

The ASD concept may also be applied to re-role current RCAF platforms in order to provide SOF-specific mission capabilities. This is a novel solution with significant potential for CANSOFCOM. The U.S. Marine Corps achieved something similar with their UH-1 *Huey* platforms, in which they upgraded a portion of their fleet into more powerful light-attack helicopters while maintaining 85 percent commonality of parts.²⁶ This same style of program could be applied to the *Griffon* Limited-Life Extension program for CANSOFCOM airframes.²⁷ This upgrade would preserve a common airframe, while meeting future SOF requirements for mobility and fire support. Further, more short-term variations of this concept include light-weight, rapidly reconfigurable weapon and sensor mounts for the *Griffon* helicopter.²⁸ With a system such as this, CANSOFCOM *Griffons* could quickly

re-role from mobility platforms to fire support. This *roll-on, roll-off* concept may be applied across the spectrum of RCAF platforms, allowing greater flexibility and operational relevance for CANSOFCOM through alternate means of delivery.

Fuel Sources

The cost and environmental impact of carbon fuel sources will push militaries to develop alternative fuel sources, a consideration that the RCAF and CANSOFCOM must embrace. The U.S. Navy began this process with *The Great Green Fleet*, a program designed to help their ships and aircraft "...go farther, stay longer and deliver more firepower" through, among other things, advanced biofuel.²⁹ Although future RCAF airframes will one day be powered by perpetual fuel sources, such as nuclear and solar power, the foreseeable future will maintain the requirement for aircraft and helicopters to refuel regularly. Refueling has two viable tactical options: either from the air or on the ground. Air-to-air refueling has long been a standard practice for fixed wing platforms. It is beginning to transition into the conventional aviation realm, although the RCAF's newest helicopter is not equipped with this capability.³⁰ Ground refueling via a forward arming and refueling point remains the most likely tactical option for aviation, and it may be the preferred option for both Air and Aviation mission profiles not suitable for vulnerable tanker aircraft. In recognition of the continued need to refuel, CANSOFCOM has developed the Airfield Surface Assessment and Reconnaissance capability to facilitate tactical airfield operations on unprepared, unconventional, and semi-prepared airfields.³¹ This capability allows CANSOFCOM to facilitate *wet-wing* refueling from CC-130s to helicopters, along with various other concepts to extend the range of tactical mobility platforms.³² Notwithstanding

likely fuel sources yet to be operationalized, the need to refuel will exist well into the future, and capabilities such as this increase the reach that the RCAF and CANSOFCOM can achieve together.

Implications for CANSOFCOM

This article has analyzed a number of future trends applicable for Canadian Air and Aviation. The increase in unmanned assets, artificial intelligence, future fixed and rotary wing platforms, alternate service delivery, as well as changes to future fuel sources will affect the CAF well into the future.

A few conclusions specific to CANSOFCOM appear clear. First, the SOF 'truth' that *humans are more important than hardware* remains highly relevant.³³ All the technological advances aside, the decision-action cycle requires human authority. This is certainly the case in the near term, while there is very low – or no – trust associated between autonomous and manned aircraft. More broadly speaking, however, human decision-makers must remain involved in order to provide accountability to the public they serve. Concurrently, the SOF 'truth' that *most special operations require non-SOF assistance* is equally relevant. CANSOFCOM is unlikely to grow Air and Aviation assets across the entire spectrum of tasks and capabilities. With a medium-size military, and a budget below NATO guidelines,³⁴ CANSOFCOM cannot expect to replicate American SOF assets. As such, Canada must continue and augment the dedication of RCAF elements in support of SOF missions. These relationships must not fall prey to the 'ad hocism' of other nations' past mistakes but rather be lasting and meaningful in order to foster common culture and shared understanding.



Airbus C295W.



An AC-130U *Spectre* gunship in action.

Bearing these SOF truths in mind, consideration of pragmatic and incremental growth in SOF Air and Aviation should occur. Unquestionably, precision aviation will continue to be a core SOF task. A replacement for the CH-146 *Griffon* should be retroactively added to the Defence Policy Review, with SOF-specific considerations onboard.³⁵ In the interim, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must collaborate to meet current needs as part of the *Griffon* Limited Life Extension. Interoperability with the RCAF medium-lift aviation capability should be pursued. This relationship must support CANSOFCOM adequately to allow for episodic and sustained joint training, while determining the best practices for integration of light-and-medium platforms under a Special Operations Aviation Detachment. For mobility needs beyond what aviation can provide, interoperability with the C-130 community must continue and be expanded. ASD options for non-standard fixed wing mobility and fire support should be explored. As an example, procuring a *roll-on, roll-off* ISR and fire support configuration for the C-130 or the recently-procured C-295 may be viable. Regardless of the platform, CANSOFCOM must continue to support tactical refueling of RCAF assets to extend operational reach beyond current capabilities. Lastly, CANSOFCOM must own a portion of the ISR continuum. Affiliation may work for other RCAF assets but will not for high-payoff, low-density intelligence collectors. NATO SOF learned this lesson: “Reliance on non-dedicated air support ... is equally disadvantageous due to scarcity of resources, lack of a habitual training relationship, and unfamiliarity with the SOF mission.”³⁶

Conclusions

Summary

- 1) Despite autonomy and AI, humans must remain in the decision-action cycle, albeit further back in the loop with the progress of time
- 2) RCAF elements must be dedicated to support SOF missions across the range of capabilities
- 3) SOF Airpower must grow pragmatically and incrementally:
 - a. *Griffon* life extension and replacement program with SOF equities
 - b. Force Employment Concept for a combined *Griffon-Chinook* SOAD
 - c. Consider ASD for non-standard fixed-wing mobility and fire support
 - d. Operationalize the CANSOFCOM ASAR Capability
- 4) Generate CANSOFCOM-owned ISR, manned and unmanned

This article has sought to determine which future SOF Air and Aviation assets should support CANSOFCOM’s mandate. Although the themes analyzed here do not provide an unobstructed roadmap into the future, they serve as a starting point for further discussion. Areas for further study include the effects of mega-cities, the struggle to exploit vastly increasing amounts of ISR data, and the organizational design for an expanded RCAF component within CANSOFCOM. Notwithstanding the complexity of future trends, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must be closely linked to remain relevant into the future.



NOTES



A CH-146 Griffon helicopter in Wainwright, Alberta, during Exercise Maple Resolve 16, 29 May 2016.

DND photo IS04-2016-0008-019 by Master Corporal Jonathan Barrette

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Minister of National Defence, Harjit S. Sajjan visits the HMCS *Scotian* at Canadian Forces Base Halifax on 12 June 2017 to make an announcement.

The Royal Canadian Navy in Peace Operations

by **Corey Bursey**

Commander C.A. Bursey, CD, BMASc, MA, *has been, in his own words, "...a proud officer of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) since 1988." Bursey has served operationally on several HMC Ships, and on many operational deployments. Having also held numerous challenging and varied staff appointments, he is currently the Assistant Naval Advisor of the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff in London, England.*

Introduction

The Government of Canada, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has committed to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations (UN) with specialized capabilities, headquarters' commanders and staff, civilian police, and an increased contribution to UN mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction.¹ More specifically, on 8 September 2016, while attending the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London, England, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan highlighted Canada's renewed commitment to international peace operations, reaffirming that Canada stands ready to deploy up to 600 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel for future UN Peace Operations (UN PO).² The details of where such a deployment might occur, the specifics of the missions that might be assigned, or the force composition

of the 600 personnel are still in the planning stages by CAF operational planners. Nevertheless, given that the CAF is a unified force made up of multiple environments – Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Forces – we ought not to assume that any Canadian contribution to UN PO is necessarily going to be army-centric. There may very well be an impact on the other services, including the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Indeed, this article will describe how the RCN, or any navy for that matter, can support land and air PO, even if those forces are operating in a land-locked region. Equally, the RCN can deploy independently and undertake a UN PO without it needing to be in a supporting role. The RCN can deploy rapidly, be self-sufficient if deployed with the right logistics support, remain outside territorial waters, and deliver multiple effects at sea.

Intuitively, one might jump to the conclusion that navies do not have a clear role during PO, at least not in the traditional 'blue beret' sense that many Canadians have come to envision when thinking of UN missions. However, this article will argue that there can be a role for navies during UN PO, either as discrete military effectors, or as a support element to land and air forces. In doing so, it will cite examples of UN maritime PO over the lifetime of the UN, as well as identify the capabilities that are expected of a UN Maritime Task Force (MTF). Lastly, it will review the capabilities that the RCN can offer to such a MTF, and areas for

potential future development to fully meet the requirements of the UN. The intent is to create the foundation for a larger conversation reference the future of the RCN in UN PO, so that new capabilities, if any, can be identified and pursued.

Historical Perspective

The notion of Canada’s naval forces deploying on UN operations is not new. The RCN’s relatively short history is peppered with maritime operations that have been in support of UN missions dating as far back as the very infancy of the UN itself. On 5 July 1950, the Canadian Flag Officer Pacific Coast received the message that he was to sail HMCS *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, and *Athabaskan* from Esquimalt to Pearl Harbor in anticipation of receiving further direction for a wartime deployment to the Far East.³ That order came less than two weeks later, when the Canadian three-ship Task Group was transferred to the operational control of General MacArthur as Commander UN Forces Korea for operations in relation to the invasion of South Korea.⁴ From 1950 to 1953, UN Naval Forces Command helped prevent enemy build-up in Korea, which included interdiction along the coasts by surface blockade forces, harassment with supporting bombardment, ‘naval artillery’ support fire, and minesweeping.⁵

During the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the UN Secretary General acted as a mediator between American President Kennedy and Russian President Khrushchev in an effort to delay

Soviet shipment of arms to Cuba, thus easing international tensions enough for relative peace to resume.⁶ Despite a number of political challenges, the RCN was ordered to increase its readiness and deploy nearly the entire Atlantic Fleet to conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) surveillance. The RCN Atlantic Command had 29 surface combatants in 1962, including the aircraft carrier HMCS *Bonaventure*.⁷ While the military activities during the

Cuban missile crisis did not constitute a UN mission *per se*, it is demonstrative of the role the UN plays in keeping peace even among superpowers, and the role navies have played in supporting that responsibility.

Just over thirty years later, the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti in October 1993. Warships from several nations, including Canada under Operation *Forward*

Action, went to the area to enforce the embargo in a Multinational Force. Over the following year, the RCN rotated eight warships – several of which deployed on multiple occasions – to support the UN mission. By mid-1994, when political stability in Haiti had not improved, the UN Security Council authorized the Multinational Force to take whatever measures were necessary to bring about the return of then-President Aristide and to create an environment in which the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) could take over the role of returning Haiti to democracy.⁸

After the 1991 Gulf War, the UN created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), empowered to ensure the destruction of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. After a brief period of compliance, Iraq refused to cooperate. This was quickly

“The notion of Canada’s naval forces deploying on UN operations is not new.”



HMCS *Bonaventure*.

CFJC/DND photo HS02078647

countered by a build-up of coalition forces from 11 countries in early-1998 as part of Operation *Desert Thunder*. HMCS *Toronto*, already deployed from Halifax to join NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL), was re-tasked to proceed at best speed to the Persian Gulf. On 26 February 1998, HMCS *Toronto* entered the Operational Theatre of the Persian Gulf and began its participation in Operation *Determination* (Canada's contribution to *Desert Thunder*), and conducted boarding operations until her return five months later.⁹

From 1999 to 2001, Canada participated in a major UN mission in East Timor. In September 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security in East Timor, and to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in carrying out its tasks, and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. HMCS *Protecteur* departed Esquimalt in September with a *Sea King* helicopter embarked. The

ship arrived off East Timor in late-October, remaining in theatre until January 2000. During this period, HMCS *Protecteur* served as a floating supply base for the coalition forces ashore, and as an alternate command and control platform for the Canadian Joint Force Commander. The *Sea King* was employed in a transport role, transporting supplies ashore. The sailors aboard the ship also participated in several humanitarian projects, including the reconstruction of several schools.¹⁰

During the same period that the CAF were operating in East Timor, RCN ships began a protracted contribution in yet another UN mission in the Persian Gulf. Operation *Augmentation* was Canada's participation from 1999 to 2001 in the coalition fleet enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq in the Persian Gulf. Between June 1999 and October 2001, four RCN frigates deployed individually on Operation *Augmentation*, each integrated into a US Navy battle group. The battle groups were deployed to enforce the no-fly zone and import-export sanctions imposed upon Iraq by a UN Security Council Resolution.¹¹

The RCN returned to Haiti in 2008, and again in 2010, in support of UN efforts to deliver humanitarian aid and disaster relief after four successive hurricanes hit in 2008, and when a devastating earthquake ravaged the country in 2010, affecting over three million people. After the storms in 2008, HMCS *St. John's* was redeployed from a counter-narcotics mission in the Caribbean to help transport food supplies on behalf of the UN World Food Program. By the time the operation concluded, HMCS *St. John's* had delivered more than 450 metric tons of food and other relief supplies over a 13-day period. The ship's *Sea King* helicopter flew more than 20 sorties, reaching communities all along the coast of Haiti's southern peninsula.¹² After the 2010 earthquake, HMCS *Athabaskan* and HMCS *Halifax*, as part of the greater Joint Task Force Haiti (JTFH), delivered a wide range of services, such as emergency medical services, engineering expertise, sea mobility, and defence and security support.¹³

The final historical example does not actually deal specifically with a UN MTF or PO at all, but is important to mention in the context of a maritime contribution to an ongoing UN security concern, not to mention providing substantiation for any potential future deployment of the RCN in support of a UN mission. Since 2002, the CAF has participated in counter-terrorism and maritime security operations across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean as part of the over-arching Operation *Artemis*.¹⁴ Canada has been part of a Combined Maritime Force (CMF) of 30 navies in the international campaign against terrorism, which also includes counter-piracy operations. The RCN has regularly deployed



DND photo HS2008-1006-030

Humanitarian aid being delivered by ship's company, HMCS *St. John's*, Port au Prince, Haiti, 13 September 2008.

ships and personnel to operate with CTF-150 – an element of CMF – from 2001-2003 as part of Operation *Apollo* and since the beginning of Operation *Altair* in 2004 (from 2004-2008, seven RCN ships served with CTF-150). On several occasions, Canada has provided a leadership role to CMF: command of CTF 151 under Commodore Girouard in 2003; command of CTG 150 under Commodore Santarpia from December 2014 to April 2015; command of CTF 150 under Commodore Davidson from June 2008 to September 2008; and command of CTF 150 under Commodore Edmundson from December 2016 to April 2017.

Definitions

To help readers better understand the context of what militaries may be called upon to do in terms of PO, several definitions are warranted, as follows:¹⁵

- **Peace Operations:** field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence;
- **Peacekeeping:** a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing or monitoring agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Since its conception in the late-1940s, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of conflicting forces, to incorporate a more comprehensive mix of elements – military, police, and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. Today, the mandate and legal basis for peacekeeping is *predominantly*, but not *exclusively*, captured in Chapter VI of the UN Charter – the foundational document for all UN operations – which covers the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”¹⁶;
- **Peacemaking:** generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. These proactive measures to “Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression” are captured under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN Secretary General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his or her own initiative, may exercise his or her ‘good offices’ to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups or states, regional organizations, or the UN. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently; and
- **Peace Enforcement:** involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

“Even with a thorough understanding of these definitions, it may still be difficult to picture where a navy may fit in, given the nature of what navies do.”

- **Peacebuilding:** Peacebuilding is an intervention that is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace. Peacebuilding activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilize society politically and socio-economically. It includes activities such as capacity building.

UN MTF

Even with a thorough understanding of these definitions, it may still be difficult to picture where a navy may fit in, given the nature of what navies do. Planners within the UN, however, have no such difficulty, and the following paragraphs are meant to help describe the maritime aspect of UN PO. In late-2015, the UN published its Peacekeeping Missions Military Unit Manual on the Maritime Task Force.¹⁷ It recognizes the evolving nature of threats, which have spread beyond the traditional land domain, and have defined the core capabilities needed and key roles intended for a UN MTF.

As with most navies, a UN MTF has the ability to arrive quickly to nearly any shore in the world, presenting a timely and potentially meaningful (yet unproven) international response, often before a significant deployment of land or air forces. It is notionally able to “contribute decisively ... by providing a wide variety of capabilities such as monitoring cease-fires, enforcing UN sanctions and embargoes (i.e., an embargo of arms or other military equipment that sustain fighting), or providing humanitarian relief.”¹⁸ The MTF can support land and air forces ashore by providing presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. It could provide command, control, and communications (C3) to enhance situational awareness and force protection. The MTF can also patrol the territorial waters and offshore resources of a state lacking its own maritime capability, and support capacity building for emerging states. Finally, it can provide advanced platforms for military aviation and medical support to forces ashore.

To execute these missions, the UN MTF must have certain core capabilities. In keeping with the potential roles listed above, the capabilities expected of a UN MTF, based upon the Security Council mandate for each Mission, include the following:

- **C3:** Effective C3 with clear lines of accountability, responsibility, and authority; and, employing modern equipment interoperable with partner members;
- **Firepower:** Sensor and weapon systems capable of activities across the spectrum of operations, including protecting the innocent or deterring and defeating threats on land and at sea;
- **Maneuverability and Area Dominance:** The ability to conduct unimpeded day and night maritime operations, such as presence and deterrence, surveillance and reconnaissance, monitoring (i.e., oversight of peace arrangements), reporting, and interdiction. In a maritime context this *Sea Control* means that the UN MTF would have the freedom of action to use an area of the sea for its own purpose for a period of time, and, if necessary, deny its use to adversarial forces;

- Tactical Information: Situational awareness integrating technology, networking, and the necessary decision-making tools to gain tactical and operational advantage over potential adversaries; and
- Sustainment: The capacity to be self-sufficient to include provisioning, accommodations, mobility, maintenance, medical support, and underway replenishment during protracted operations.¹⁹

The UN MTF Manual further cites various vessel designs that meet those requirements.²⁰ Surface ships (carriers, destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels) are capable of conducting tasks, such as maritime security operations (i.e., patrolling, interdiction, and escort and protection operations), surveillance, and contingency operations (i.e., Search and Rescue). Sealift ships can be employed for logistical and personnel transport, carrying material ranging from humanitarian aid to combat equipment. Auxiliary and Replenishment Ships can resupply the UN MTF, particularly while at sea and distanced from fighting forces. Mine Counter Measure (MCM) vessels perform mine clearance, thus protecting the UN MTF and the littoral Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).²¹ Depending upon their specific sensor or equipment fits, these same ships can also conduct surveillance and diving operations. Finally, helicopters (organic and shore-based), unmanned systems, and maritime patrol aircraft support the UN MTF with surveillance, force protection, medical evacuation, humanitarian aid delivery, and search and rescue. This list is not inclusive; it is a sampling of the capabilities provided by various naval platforms that may constitute a balanced, combat-effective, and adaptive MTF, either as an autonomous entity, or in support of forces ashore.

“The RCN is capable of meeting some of the UN MTF requirements today, with a future fleet projected to perform even more of the tasks described above by the mid-2020s.”

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) MTF has been in operation since 2006. The first MTF formed as part of a UN PO, the UNIFIL MTF is tasked to monitor the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, secure the Lebanese coastline, and prevent the unauthorized entry of arms or related materials by sea into Lebanon.²² It carries out its mission through maritime interdiction and surveillance operations. Another aspect of MTF’s mission is its contribution to the training of the Lebanese Navy, so that it may in time assume responsibility for its own security. This is done through operational, tactical, and joint exercises, as well as focused training, both alongside and at sea.²³

RCN Capabilities

The RCN is capable of meeting some of the UN MTF requirements today, with a future fleet projected to perform even more of the tasks described above by the mid-2020s. Today’s RCN fleet consists of 12 recently-modernized *Halifax* Class frigates; four *Victoria* Class [diesel] Submarines (VCS); and, 12 *Kingston* Class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV). Each of these classes of ships has capabilities that are well suited for meeting many of the capabilities and roles needed of a UN MTF. What’s more, shipbuilding is well underway for the *Harry DeWolf* Class Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPV), with the first hull (HMCS *Harry DeWolf*) scheduled for delivery in 2018. A few years beyond that, the Navy is expected to take delivery of the first Joint Support Ship (JSS) renewing the RCN’s underway replenishment and sealift capabilities. Finally, design proposals are expected by 2017 for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), which will replace the



Canadian Naval Task Group.

DND photo ET2016-0468-02 by Corporal Carbe Orellana

Halifax Class frigates and the recently-retired *Iroquois* Class Area Air Defence destroyers.

The *Halifax* Class frigates are colloquially known as the ‘work horses’ of the RCN surface fleet. The ships were originally designed for anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, primarily in the open ocean. Since their delivery 25 years ago, the role of these frigates has changed through the recent *Halifax* Class Modernization program (2010-2016). Sensor and weapons enhancements, as well as innovations in procedures and tactics, have enabled the frigates to operate more effectively in the littoral threat environment, acknowledging that the RCN has operated, so far, in a largely permissive environment. The *Halifax* Class is capable of meeting the patrol, interdiction, escort and protection, surveillance, and contingency operations expected of the UN MTF.

The VCS are viewed as a strategic asset for the Government of Canada, performing a wide range of roles, including surveillance and support to maritime law enforcement, as well as domestic and international operations. Acquired from the Royal Navy in the 1990s, the long range VCS are the Navy’s *Special Forces*. They are capable of patrolling virtually undetected over vast distances, while their flexibility allows them to perform a wide range of unique naval missions. VCS can operate in the Arctic (albeit in ice-free areas), Pacific, and Atlantic oceans, and significantly extend the RCN’s, (and by extension the UN’s if so assigned), tactical and strategic capabilities.



HMCS *Chicoutimi* awaits People’s Liberation Army (Navy) ships visiting Victoria on behalf of the Chinese military, 13 December 2016.

The MCDVs are minor war vessels with a primary mission of coastal surveillance and patrol, including general naval operations, search and rescue, law enforcement, resource protection, and fisheries patrols. Although originally intended with a mine-sweeping role in mind, the ships were constructed to non-military specifications (Lloyd’s A1) standards. Thus, they could not, with the technology of the time, safely operate in a mine threat area. The advent of off-board naval Mine Counter Measure (MCM) technology largely re-validates the MCDV premier potential as an MCM platform, particularly in light of their extended range and endurance, upgraded communications, and active degaussing, to name just a few capabilities. Today, several types of mission specific payloads can be added to allow for rapid role change from one mission type to another, such as a mechanical minesweeping system, a route survey system, and a bottom object inspection vehicle. During the *Halifax* Class Modernization period, the MCDVs bore the brunt of operational commitments to counter



Concept design of the Joint Support Ship (JSS).

© Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems Canada Inc.

narcotics operations in the Caribbean basin and western Pacific Ocean. Mission dependant, this ship class can be well-suited for low-to-medium intensity UN maritime security operations in the littorals.

The RCN has also developed an Enhanced Naval Boarding Party (ENBP) capability. This deployable high readiness unit – the Maritime Tactical Operations Group (MTOG) – provides the CAF and the RCN with an ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations in a high risk environment; advanced force protection duties; and, direct support to a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF). As demonstrated by a 2016 NATO exercise in Morocco, the MTOG can deploy on relatively short notice to support NATO or UN operations.²⁴

In the next decade, the CSC will replace and enhance the capabilities provided by the *Halifax* Class frigates and the *Iroquois* Class destroyers. Although the Request for Proposal for the design of these ships is still going through the bidding process, these new ships will ensure that the RCN can continue to monitor and defend Canadian and North American waters, and they will no doubt make significant contributions to international naval operations through interoperability with allies.

The JSS will replace the RCN's recently-decommissioned *Protecteur* Class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) vessels. The JSS will provide core replenishment, limited sealift capabilities, and support to operations ashore. They will increase the range and endurance of Naval Task Groups by allowing them to remain at sea for protracted periods without having to return to port for resupply and refuelling. The anticipated core capabilities

in the JSS – noting the project is still in the design phase – will likely include the following: provision of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, water, and other supplies; modern medical and dental care facilities, including an operating room; repair facilities and expertise to keep helicopters and other equipment functioning; and basic self-defence functions. Whether providing support to operations in any of Canada's vast ocean territories or supporting global deployments, the capabilities delivered by JSS are crucial for Canada and fully meet the logistical requirements, and partially meet the sealift requirements albeit to a limited extent, of the UN.

The *Harry DeWolf* Class AOPV will deliver ice-capable off-shore patrol vessels that will conduct sovereignty and surveillance operations in Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including in the Arctic. The RCN will also use the AOPV to support other units of the CAF in the conduct of maritime-related operations and to support other government departments in carrying out their mandates, as required. The capabilities of the AOPV will include the following: independent open ocean patrols; a Polar Class 5 international ice classification standard; be able to sustain operations for up to four months; a range in excess of 6000 nautical miles; sufficient C3 capability to exchange real-time information; a remote controlled 25mm gun; capable of embarking and operating a variety of helicopter types; and a capability of embarking and deploying a variety of boat types to support activities, such as boarding operations and transfer of cargo and personnel for ship-to-shore transfer, as well as arrangements for cargo and container storage. These are all important and welcomed capabilities for Canada in terms of domestic surveillance and expression of sovereignty, capabilities that are just as easily transferrable to meet many of the UN requirements for maritime security, surveillance,



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Concept design of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV) underway off the Nova Scotia coastline.

and contingency operations, including sealift, but again, to a limited extent.

The previous paragraphs describe Canada's current and future Navy. While not part of its permanent maritime arsenal, Canada will also be leasing an interim AOR (iAOR) capability through a contract with Project Resolve Inc., which will employ Quebec's Chantier Davie Canada to convert a cargo vessel to an AOR. The ship will be operated and maintained privately, with CAF/RCN mission specialists embarked in the ship when needed. These will include replenishment-at-sea (RAS) teams, command elements, maritime air detachments and medical and dental service teams. The iAOR will allow the RCN to bridge the gap in underway replenishment until the JSS is delivered.²⁵

Capability Gaps

Whether operating continentally or deployed further internationally, the RCN can make a meaningful contribution to UN maritime PO. Our current and future capabilities notwithstanding, there are also capability gaps which prevent the RCN from meeting all of the UN MTF requirements. Requirements such as Sealift, Sea Basing, Amphibious, and even our maritime helicopter capacity will not be fully met by the RCN planned for the coming decades.

As mentioned previously, the AOPV and JSS will be delivered with a limited sealift capability. These classes of ships do not come close to the capacity of similar types or sized ships, nor were they ever meant to be. This means, for example, that a UN MTF deployed with AOPV or JSS as its only sealift capability would be very limited in the amount of material it could transport into an area in need of significant humanitarian aid, for instance.

Sea Basing is not directly related to a platform type or class of warship, but to a capability to use the sea for deterrence, alliance support, cooperative security, power projection, and other forward operations.²⁶ A robust Canadian Task Group consisting of surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliary replenishment could be considered a sea base, as it provides the RCN the range and freedom of action to support its operations both independently or as part of a larger UN MTF. However, until the JSS is delivered, with only one-to-two operational VCS at any given time, and at a risk of having insufficient reserve capability in its domestic surface fleet, the UN mission would need to be a vital strategic interest to Canada to justify deploying such a Task Group.

Canada has no amphibious capability, nor does it intend to generate one. That was not the case over a decade ago when then Chief of the Defence Staff, General Hillier, pushed for an amphibious transport capability for Canada, such as the *San Antonio* Class in the US Navy.²⁷ An "unprecedented strategic opportunity" presented itself for Canada in 2014 when France withheld delivery of two *Mistral* Class ships to Russia.²⁸ These vessels are capable of sea power projection, C3, a larger helicopter capacity than any other RCN ship class, delivery of humanitarian aid, including onboard medical facilities, to name a few of their capabilities. Notwithstanding the capabilities that would have been injected into the RCN, and the CAF, Canada did not pursue the *Mistral*

"Canada has no amphibious capability, nor does it intend to generate one."

purchase, nor is this type of capability being considered as part of the ongoing National Shipbuilding Strategy.

While not a direct RCN asset, the *Cyclone* maritime helicopter is still several years away from its full operational capability. This means that with aging *Sea King* helicopters, the RCN's capacity for a ship-to-shore air connection is limited despite the valiant efforts of aircraft maintainers and aircrews to keep the current maritime air fleet operating.

Future UN Maritime PO

All the historic examples described earlier, and the capabilities inherent in a UN MTF, including those potentially provided by the RCN, illustrate the versatility of maritime forces in meeting the needs of the UN. While history is not necessarily indicative of what is required today, the current global security environment is fraught with potential hotspots that could easily evolve to a point needing UN intervention, with many of these locations in-or-near coastal regions. One such example is the Gulf of Guinea. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant regional challenge. The UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) recorded 62 attacks on ships in West and Central Africa in 2011, and 60 in 2012. In fact, since 2002, the number of recorded attacks in this region has continued to multiply by a factor of ten.²⁹ Further, there is rising concern over the existing security environment in and around West Africa, particularly over the increasing terrorist and criminal activities in central and southern Mali; a deep concern within the UN Security Council over the continuous rise of political tensions in Guinea-Bissau; transnational organized crime and drug trafficking throughout West and Central Africa; and, a growing disregard for human rights in general.³⁰ In an effort to combat the piracy and Transnational Criminal Organizations' activities, there is recognition of the need for a cooperative regional maritime strategy. This may present just the opportunity Canada needs to provide a comprehensive maritime contribution to UN PO. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2018 (2011) addresses "...the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose[s] to international navigation, security, and the economic development of states in the region."³¹ The UNSCR further notes the need for international assistance as part of a comprehensive strategy to address piracy and armed robbery at sea, and encourages the international community to assist, upon request, regional States and relevant organizations and agencies in strengthening their efforts to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.³²

If a maritime force as described above was assigned to a mission in the Gulf of Guinea, it could also provide support to potential land forces that may deploy to the region (depending upon their location) as part of the aforementioned Canadian commitment to supporting international peace operations. This support can cover a wide range of activities; indirect support through surveillance and intelligence reporting to direct support when evacuating personnel. Warships operating in littoral regions can contribute to land forces' battlespace by means of surveillance and intelligence reporting using organic assets, such as an embarked *Sea King* helicopter or Unmanned System. The results of this surveillance could provide vital indications and warning of



Western Africa presents a number of possibilities for Canada to contribute to UN PO. However, readers should not assume that an Africa Mission is a *fait accompli*. For instance, another region where the CAF can support PO is Colombia. Notwithstanding the rejection by Colombians for a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), there was a report of talks held among senior government officials before the referendum which suggested that Canada and Mexico could join forces and conduct a joint operation "...once

any emerging threats originating along a coastline. For example, should a Canadian contingent to a UN PO occur in the vicinity of Western Mali and use Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, or Senegal as potential operational support hubs, the RCN can provide the necessary force protection for the SLOC into those hubs. Additionally, and dependant on the distance of friendly forces from the coast, warships can execute Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) to assist military personnel, Canadian citizens, or designated persons escape danger and relocate to an appropriate safe haven.

Another possibility for maritime operations in Western Africa is in Mali on the Niger River. The trafficking of people, narcotics, and other contraband has increased since 2006, through the Sahel and north into countries such as Algeria.³³ Traffickers often use the Niger River as a transportation route through hubs in Gao, Mopti, and even Bamako. Trafficking has become more than simply a criminal concern for police forces to deal with, but potentially facilitate terrorist activities that have become more prevalent in the region in recent years. The UN has a particular interest in countering terrorism and protecting human rights, which, in part, includes the mandate established for the Counter Terrorism Committee in 2001, and Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003), as well as later resolutions.³⁴ Counter-terrorism, combined with efforts to help the countries in the region re-establish state authority, the rule of law, and good governance can be a potential UN PO mission that is needed in Mali. As part of a hypothetical Canadian joint military and police contribution to such a UN PO, the RCN can be employed in maritime interdiction operations, albeit in a more confined riverine environment, and only if operationally supported inland by land forces. More specifically, the deployment of the MTOG can present an opportunity for capacity building for the Mali Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection, which regulates the National Police Force and Gendarmerie in policing illicit activity along the Niger River.³⁵

“Western Africa presents a number of possibilities for Canada to contribute to UN PO.”

a peace treaty is signed between the Colombian government and FARC.”³⁶ Canada’s relations with Colombia are expanding. A Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed with Colombia in 2012 to guide future bilateral relations. Furthermore, Colombia has been identified as an area of focus for CAF’s Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) Peace Support programming, until at least late-2017.³⁷ All these initiatives may constitute an opportunity for Canada to play a meaningful role in UN PO while advancing foreign policy and the National Defence Global Engagement Strategy. As could be the case for a maritime mission to Western Africa, the RCN can potentially provide support to land forces that may deploy to the region. The nucleus of operations would not necessarily be located in a coastal region. Nevertheless, there is a role to play for a UN MTF in the Caribbean Sea and Northeastern Pacific Ocean. In fact, Canada has been heavily involved in counter-narcotics missions in this region for over ten years through Operation *Caribbe*. Operation *Caribbe* is Canada’s contribution of CAF ships and aircraft to Operation *Martillo* – a joint, combined and interagency effort by Canada, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom to prevent illicit trafficking in the Caribbean Sea, the eastern Pacific Ocean, and the coastal waters of Central America.³⁸ The connection between a counter-narcotics mission and a UN MTF is through the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime in 2000, and the UN Convention on Corruption in 2003, which establish the legal relationship between illicit trafficking, organized crime and corruption.³⁹ With a hypothetical deployment of frigates, MCDVs, organic aircraft, and eventual iAOR in support, Canada can take a leading role in a UN-sanctioned counter-narcotics mission in an effort to assist Colombia in suppressing corruption and furthering the peace process.

Finally, there is a school of thought that believes a Canadian PO ought to remain closer to home.⁴⁰ Established in 2004, the

DND photo ET2015-5121-006 by Leading Seaman Ogle Henry.



The Enhanced Naval Boarding Party from HMCS *Winnipeg* heads towards HMCS *Athabaskan* to conduct a boarding exercise during NATO Exercise *Trident Juncture* in Spanish coastal waters as part of Operation *Reassurance*, 24 October 2015.

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) supports the “immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.”⁴¹ However, UNSCR 2243 considers the possible “withdrawal of MINUSTAH and transition to a future [UN] presence beginning no sooner than 15 October 2016.”⁴² On the other hand, and in light of the slow recovery after the 2010 earthquake, the recent devastation inflicted by Hurricane *Matthew* in October 2016, and the continued human rights concerns (particularly sexual and gender-based violence), there remains an opportunity for Canada to demonstrate a leadership role, with supporting forces, in rehabilitating Haiti while maintaining peace throughout the process.⁴³ [As it has recently materialized, MINUSTAH’s mandate was extended for a final six months in April 2017, after which it will transition to a smaller, follow-up exercise – Ed.] This would not be a new mission for Canada or the CAF. We have a proven leadership history through MINUSTAH and a number of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions. As part of a larger UN HADR and reconstruction mission in Haiti, the RCN can possibly provide ships to transport aid from the mainland, or escort larger transport vessels. It can provide personnel and expertise to support a larger CAF effort in reconstruction of Haiti’s infrastructure. If deemed necessary, the RCN can also provide *support to*, or *leadership over*, the future UN presence needed to assist with the peaceful implementation of a constitutional process.

Conclusion

With Canada’s commitment to contribute to a UN PO, this article proposes a number of possibilities that could be examined. Whatever contribution Canada chooses to make, the resultant force must be capable of roles and tasks across the spectrum of conflict, from benign to combat. To that end, there is a role for the RCN, either in support of land and air forces ashore, or as a stand-alone MTF. The RCN has demonstrated its unique capabilities on numerous occasions throughout the history of the UN, and it continues to consider the requirements of a UN MTF in its future ship design. If the UN MTF is considered the standard for requirements, then there are undoubtedly national capability gaps. However, recognizing the comprehensive capability provided by a multi-national UN MTF, most gaps can be mitigated by the collective UN organization, if not by individual nations.

A UN PO anywhere in the world must also consider the joint capabilities – maritime, air, land, and special forces – during the various planning stages. There are discrete capabilities that can be brought to bear by each of these components, which, when combined, make for a more powerful and influential force in either preserving or enforcing peace. Maritime capabilities, however, are not often viewed in the traditional peacekeeping paradigm and as such run the risk of being overlooked. Nevertheless, as this article has described, naval forces should always be considered when presenting UN PO options for the Government of Canada.



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The Canadian Press/Andrew Vaughan/04149363

Two Somali men sit on the tarmac at Belet Huen, Somalia, 19 December 1992, as they wait for a Canadian Forces transport to be unloaded. The death of Shidane Arone at the hands of Canadian soldiers 25 years ago is often remembered as one of the darkest moments in Canadian military history.

25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations

by Howard G. Coombs

Colonel Howard G. Coombs, OMM, CD, Ph.D., retired from full-time duty with the Canadian Armed Forces in 2003 and transferred to the Canadian Army Reserve, where he continues to serve on a part-time basis with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Command Headquarters, in Kingston, Ontario. He is currently an Assistant Professor of History and the Associate Chair War Studies Program at the Royal Military College of Canada. Coombs has a number of operational deployments to the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan as a military officer on regular and reserve duty. In addition, he deployed to Kandahar Province, Afghanistan from September 2010 to July 2011 as a civilian advisor.

The CARBG [Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group] was not operationally ready, from a training point of view, for deployment to Somalia for Operation Deliverance.

“Chapter 21 – Training,” “Dishonoured Legacy” (1997)¹

Introduction

In late-1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group deployed to Somalia, during which time a series of negative incidents took place. These events far overshadowed any of the successes attained by the Battle Group in fulfilling their mandate. The best known of these undesirable happenings occurred in 1993 while the Regiment was based around the town of Belet Huen. The situation was desperate among the civil population in that area. There had been many attempted thefts from the Canadian camps, and orders were given to *apprehend*, and in some cases, to *abuse* intruders. Subsequently, on 16 March, one such intruder was captured, tortured, and murdered by Canadian soldiers. This killing of Somali teenager Shidane Arone sent shock waves throughout Canada, and resulted in not only the punishment of the perpetrators, but also to the still-debated disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.²



CFJIC/DND photo ISC93-37

Canadian Airborne Regiment members on patrol in Somalia, 1993.

made public, they negatively affected Canadian support for its military.⁴

Nevertheless, it was the incidents in Somalia that received the greatest attention. They resulted in the “Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia,” or, as it is more popularly known, the “Somalia Inquiry” (1993-1997). The Somalia Inquiry reaffirmed that in a tumultuous security environment, general-purpose combat training (GPCT) was the foundation of peacekeeping training. This statement was tempered with the ideas that (1) Canadian peacekeepers would need to be trained and educated in functions applicable to a cross section of peace operations, (2) centralized oversight and direction was required for pre-deployment training, and (3) Canada needed to assist with peace operations training in other countries as part of its’ contribution to peacekeeping.⁵ These thoughts, along with direction that had already been put in place by the Department of National Defence and the CAF to maneuver in a changing operational environment, irreversibly changed how the Canadian military would prepare for peace, and other, operations. In turn, they would also lead to a re-professionalization of the CAF.⁶

Given the current Canadian government’s renewed commitment to United Nations (UN) peace operations, most recently evidenced in the Defence Policy

It must be noted that these occurrences were not the only unfortunate experiences associated with Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)³ deployments during this period of time. Separate occurrences in Rwanda and the disclosure of incidents at Bacovici in the former Yugoslavia during 1993-1994 created a great amount of public and private introspection in Canada regarding the nature of both the profession of arms and of peacekeeping in general. In all cases, when details of the aforementioned events were

Review, how the CAF prepares to conduct 21st Century operations continues to be a subject of debate.⁷ Indeed, some, such as peacekeeping researchers Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, have questioned the ability of Canadian military units to effectively train and educate for peacekeeping. They argue that the CAF has become focused upon non-peacekeeping operations, and this operational perspective has been matched by a diminution of peacekeeping specific professional education and training. Along with this are



CFJIC/DND photo HSC92-0849-300

A Canadian medical technician dresses a Somali woman's eye.

few opportunities for CAF members to study peacekeeping as an academic subject.⁸ For that reason, to better comprehend the lessons of the last 25 years that enable the CAF to conduct more effective peace and other operations, it is necessary to understand what has taken place since Canada's military was first committed "in the service of peace," and the subsequent changes wrought by the "Somalia Affair."⁹

Public Perceptions

Even today, when Canadians visualize 'peacekeeping,' they tend to picture an iconic image of soldiers wearing the UN 'blue beret' interposing themselves between warring factions to bring a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflict.¹⁰ In 2010, Canadian academics, Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liégeois

argued that this image has, in part, been created by the public rhetoric of successive Canadian governments who utilized it as an element of national identity; they actively reinforced the national myth that "...Canada is a country of peacekeepers."¹¹ While one can argue that this idea did not have as much prominence during Canadian deployments to Afghanistan, this mythic image has been brought back and reinforced by the current government.¹² Despite the popular national perspective of peacekeeping and 'blue berets,' the past few decades have been characterised by activities that are more challenging and complex than 'traditional' peacekeeping. These modern peace operations are normally non-permissive, favour one side or another, and might not be limited in their use of force. On top of this, a political resolution is not always easily attainable.



The Ratification of the Treaty of Münster (Westphalia), 15 May 1648, by Gerard Ter Borch.

This public perception of peacekeepers developed from the missions produced by the relatively stable international system produced by the Cold War, and relied upon the Westphalian notion of the primacy of the state. In this context, states are the arbiters of conflict and are allowed to pursue any means to ensure the stability of the international system.¹³ These concepts were firmly rooted in a post-Second World War international system based upon balance of power relationships that allowed for peacekeeping in a UN setting grounded in Chapter VI mandates.¹⁴ One can contend that these ideas persisted until the end of the Cold War, and the fragmentation of the relative stability established within the bi-polar balance of power relationship between East and West. Today there is no doubt that operations are conducted in a post-Westphalian world. In this setting, the sources of conflict and power wielded are not limited to state actors, and consequently, threats to peace are difficult to detect, discern, and resolve.

The peace operations of the Cold War were typically carried out under the auspices of the UN. These missions were divided into categories corresponding to the relevant articles of the UN Charter, either Chapter VI “Pacific Settlement Of Disputes,” or Chapter VII “Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, and Acts Of Aggression.” The purpose of Chapter VI missions was the resolution of disputes endangering international peace and security. Generally, under this chapter,

military contingents are deployed once negotiation, mediation, or arbitration have led to some form of agreement, and the parties involved in the conflict agree to allow a UN force to monitor the agreement. Canadian examples of such Chapter VI operations include contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (1964 – present), and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (1974 – present), located in the Golan Heights. Those participating in Chapter VI deployments wear the blue beret to visibly demonstrate their status as peacekeepers.

Chapter VII of the Charter allows for actions pertaining to threats to stability, transgressions of an established peace, or in reaction to acts of aggression. This chapter allows the UN to impose or enforce peace, by any means required – both military and non-military – with the goal of these activities bringing about the restoration of international peace and security. Examples of Canadian participation in Chapter VII operations include the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992 – 1993); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) (1995 – 1996); the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) (1999 – 2000); the NATO organized International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (2003 – 2014); and *Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti* [UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti] (MINUSTAH) (2004 – present).¹⁵



A Bison ambulance in Somalia during Op Deliverance.

Somalia

The mission in Somalia commenced with a desire by the UN to assist with humanitarian aid in a country torn by civil war and famine. This changed over time into an attempt to help stop the violence and rebuild the country into a functioning nation-state. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was initiated on 24 April 1992 to meet the initial goals of the UN, and grew from its originally small commitment of 50 observers, to thousands of troops. This included a commitment from Canada to provide an infantry battalion. By July 1992, this role was assigned to the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which had already been earmarked and prepared for a previously-postponed UN mission in the Western Sahara (Operation *Python*).¹⁶ The unit started to prepare anew for the Somalia mission almost immediately, and training commenced in earnest during September 1992 after the posting cycle, reorganization, and initial equipping with armoured vehicles. The latter proving to be an ongoing and problematic process.

During this period, support of UN activities could not be gained from key Somalia warlords and turmoil continued, impinging upon relief efforts. Consequently, on 2 December, UNOSOM I was temporarily suspended. Almost immediately, the United States-led multi-national coalition Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) was approved by the UN Security Council to create a secure environment and to facilitate UN humanitarian operations. The United States invited Canada to participate in this coalition. After Cabinet debate on 4 December by the *ad hoc* Committee of Ministers, utilizing advice from the Department of National Defence and External Affairs, it was decided to switch the Canadian commitment from UNOSOM I to UNITAF. By the end December, the CARBG was deployed and enmeshed in operations. With this change, the CARBG deployment in Somalia changed from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate. After months of operations, the unit returned to Canada in June 1993, leaving behind a sector that was considered “stable.”¹⁷

CFJIC/DND photo HSC92-849-314



CFJIC/DND photo ISC99-101B3

A Canadian serviceman 'giving five' to a Somali child at a refugee camp.

to meet larger operational requirements. These individual skills included proficiency in weapons, fieldcraft and communications, protection against biological and chemical agents, first aid skills, and the attainment of an acceptable level of physical fitness. These individual skills, once mastered, were combined in collective training scenarios at successively higher levels until the desired objective was achieved. This, along with some mission-specific training, formed the basis of Cold War peacekeeping preparations. There was a philosophy that peacekeeping would require the same skills as combat, but to a lesser degree. It was believed that training specific to the mission could be achieved in the time between the mission notification and deployment. Regrettably, this did not transpire with the CARBG and the Somalia mission.¹⁸

Indeed, that is how the separate services of the Canadian military visualized and trained for peacekeeping during the Cold War. From the beginning, there was a steady stream of Canadian casualties, starting with Brigadier-General Harry Angle in 1950, killed while serving with the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.¹⁹ The omnipresent danger of violence during peacekeeping likely made defaulting to a training framework based upon GPCT self-evident, particularly for a military that had just participated in the Second World War (1939 – 1945), and later Korea (1950 – 1952). Reinforcing that service was

While many flaws were found in the training of the CARBG, the Somalia Inquiry noted that GPCT had been the foundation of all deployments of the Cold War. The Inquiry went on to observe that general purpose combat training still constituted part of the core training, but not exclusively so, for peace operations. GPCT provided soldiers and units the ability to successfully complete a wide variety of combat functions, and to integrate them collectively

successful involvement in the first large-scale UN mission of this period, known as UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) (1956 – 1967). After the 1956 Suez Crisis, then-Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson put together a Canadian proposal for an interim UN force to supervise the withdrawal of French, Israeli, and British forces, and to also monitor a cease-fire between Egypt



UN_Multimedia/142303

Canadian mechanics of UNEF's maintenance unit at El Arish, April 1959.

and Israel. This initiative resulted in Pearson receiving a Nobel Peace Prize and being perceived as the 'architect' of UN peacekeeping. Significantly, UNEF defined how the Canadian public and its military came to visualize 'peacekeeping,' in related but different fashions.²⁰

UNEF I affirmed that the core of peacekeeping training was the military skills of GPCT. Due to the deployment rapidity, the Canadian contributions had no specialized peacekeeping training. While challenges were cited regarding this Middle East peacekeeping mission, training was not discerned as one of them.²¹ This idea was maintained in the decades that followed. At a Department of National Defence sponsored conference in 1964, representatives from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) opined that the involvement of their services in peacekeeping differed little from normal operations. From a Canadian Army (CA) perspective, it was opined that the main requirements of the Canadian UN standby battalion were that it "...be lightly equipped, fit and hard and highly adaptable to adverse conditions."²² Two years later, in 1966, a study of Canadian military operations supporting the UN re-affirmed that RCN and

RCAF training for these types of military activities "...is to some extent consistent with other operational commitments." It noted that for the Canadian Army, "the transition from other types of operations to UN operations is not great."²³

Successive Chiefs of the Defence Staff, Generals Jean Victor Allard and Paul Manson, reaffirmed this idea. Allard testified as follows to the House of Commons Defence Committee in 1966:

In any future peacekeeping or peace restoration mission, we must ensure the most judicious application of our forces is made...The deployment of strong, highly organized multi-purposed forces to an area of trouble does not mean that force will be used; it merely means that a deterrence to more serious types of conflict will have been achieved.

Over two decades later, in 1989, Manson supported the requirement to train as "soldiers first" to deal with the complexities of peacekeeping.²⁴



Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Victor Allard, on board HMCS *Gatineau* in 1966.

While GPCT was deemed appropriate for peace operations, it was evident from the Somalia Inquiry and other studies that it needed to be coupled with appropriate education and training. The requirement for professional and educated military leadership identified during the Inquiry was further delineated by a succession of initiatives that had been coalescing either *concurrently* or *subsequent* to the Inquiry. Not the least of these enterprises was Minister of National Defence Doug Young's 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. This report, along with the monitoring and implementation committees that surrounded it, created a significant paradigm shift. The tools of academic education and professional education were made relevant to 21st Century Canadian military professionals. The new policies ranged from the need for a 'degreed' officer corps and emphasis upon higher level education, to a succession of new senior staff courses to provide higher level professional competencies. Educational requirements, both professional and academic, were reviewed, and new requirements were put in place. Furthermore, the initiatives extended beyond the officer corps. Today, the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development program

“In addition to greater education requirements, more emphasis was placed upon training appropriate to peace operations.”

located in St-Jean, Quebec, educates the Non-Commissioned Officers of the Forces. Also, to provide institutional support to both education and training recommendations, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created in 2002, and in 2004, it was given an official mandate "...to act as the institutional champion of Canadian Forces professional development."²⁵

It can be argued that 'peace operations education,' as a subject of study, is not given emphasis within these initiatives. Despite that, this professional education has equipped the officer corps, as well as senior non-commissioned sailors, soldiers, and aviators, with the cognitive competencies to understand and formulate appropriate military responses in a complex modern security environment. Education is not just specific expertise, but includes developing the ability to think critically and creatively, as well as expanding the intellectual breadth required to design and conduct military activities in all types of situations.²⁶

In addition to greater education requirements, more emphasis was placed upon training appropriate to peace operations. A Senate

Report of 1993 acknowledged GPCT as the basis for this training, and it suggested that "...the best trained peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor or airman, one who knows his or her trade." At the same time, this Senate Report also identified that the current military training could be "...improved by adding to the curriculum subjects which are not necessarily military in character," such as mediation.²⁷ The Somalia Inquiry recommended that, along with GPCT, generic peacekeeping training (UN processes and common peace operations tasks), in addition to mission-specific training (theatre particular) be taught. Additionally, due to the quantity and general applicability of these topics, they needed to be integrated into the general training system.²⁸ Concurrently with the Inquiry, the Canadian military put into place systemic oversight of peacekeeping missions and standards through a series of Deputy Chief of Defence (DCDS) staff instructions and mandated training evaluation of pre-deployment peacekeeping training at the individual and collective levels. This supervision continues today with Canadian Joint Operations Command.²⁹

With DCDS direction, along with the Somalia Inquiry and other recommendations, peace operations training became mandated. GPCT still forms the foundation of mission preparedness, and over the years, it has been broadened out with areas of general and specific training that today *includes*, but is not *limited to*: cultural, religious, and historical awareness; use of force; rules of engagement; refugees and internally-displaced persons; civil affairs and language; communications, command structure and logistics; dealing with international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and regional organizations; public affairs; environment specific medical training; tactical training in operations; information gathering; mediation; negotiation; use of technology; and gender integration. Ethics material is imbued within much of this training, as is the need to support

vulnerable populations. This includes people who, individually or collectively, are at greater risk than the general population of being harmed or of having a lower quality of life imposed upon them.³⁰ Upon considering this list, which is constantly evolving, one could also argue that these skills are demanded by most 21st Century military operations, not just peace operations. On top of this, CAF peace operations doctrine created since the Somalia Report and updated within the last decade or so is still relevant and regularly scrutinized.³¹

The recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry pertaining to the institutionalization of peace operations training in Canada and assisting with peace operations training capacity in other countries were addressed through the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in 1996. The Somalia Inquiry Report lauded the formation of the PSTC, and its' connection to the Lessons Learned Centres established by the Canadian Army. It highlighted: "...that they should help to satisfy the need for co-ordination of training, the production of training material, and the updating of training content and standards in a more systematic manner than has been true in the past." The PSTC was mandated to not only deliver pre-deployment peace operations training, but also to provide peace operations training assistance to Canadian and other foreign organizations. Since then, the role of the PSTC has enlarged to give "...specific, individual [peace operations] training to prepare selected members of the Canadian Forces, Other Government Departments and foreign military personnel." As elements of this training, the PSTC increases foreign peace operations capacity through (1) active participation in foreign and domestic conferences, (2) dispatching instructors to other countries to support their training and build capacity, and (3) training foreign instructors and students in Canada. The training they provide is closely linked to Government of Canada objectives, and reflects



Minister of National Defence Doug Young leaves National Defence Headquarters after holding a meeting with Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Boyle in Ottawa, 7 October 1996.

Canadian Press/Fred Chartrand/1801412



An upbeat presentation at the Peace Support Training Centre, Kingston Ontario, 11 September 2007.

both UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization requirements. For instance, the “United Nations Military Experts on Mission” course is the signature course of the PSTC, and it reflects UN core pre-deployment training knowledge. This course has been certified with the UN since the late-1990s, with re-certification occurring every five years, to ensure the training reflects directed UN requirements. Additionally, the PSTC is the Centre of Excellence for Canadian peace operations training, as well as having the added responsibilities of Influence Activities – Information and Psychological Operations, as well as Civil-Military Cooperation. A small unit of about 60 personnel that utilizes significant CA augmentation in support of its courses, the PSTC provides enormous joint institutional capacity that far outweighs its size.³²

The current Commandant of the PSTC, Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, eloquently summarized the complexity of the changes, particularly with respect to CAF education and training for peace operations, that have occurred since Somalia when he observed, “The days of simply taking off your helmet and putting on your blue beret are gone.”³³ In the security atmosphere of the 21st Century, countries not only have the *domestic* responsibility, but also the *international* responsibility to anticipate, prepare for, and deal with myriad crises and conflicts. Military capabilities and forces must be used to counter a broad range of

threats and requirements, from conventional to asymmetric warfare, in addition to the gamut of peace operations. As a result, Healey’s words resonate now more than ever. The CAF must be an adaptive and responsive military force that is able to work domestically or abroad in the multi-agency context required for integrated military operations. The structures developed in the wake of the Somalia

Affair for education, training, and capacity building have far greater relevance than simply addressing the needs of peace operations, but give the capability to design and execute relevant security options for Canadians and their Government while conducting all types of military activities. Despite arguments to the contrary, the changes to education and training that have occurred over the last 25 years have enabled the CAF to better deal with the ill-defined and complex problems posed by peace and other operations in the current and future security environment.³⁴ The re-professionalization of the Canadian military and its recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced skillfully led forces who adeptly represent Canada at home and abroad.

“The re-professionalization of the Canadian military and its recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced skillfully led forces who adeptly represent Canada at home and abroad.”

I would like to thank Colonel Tod Strickland CD, Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Magee CD, Ph.D., Dr. Chris Kilford CD, and Ms. Lindsay Coombs for their review and advice with this article.



NOTES

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9. "In the Service of Peace" is struck on the reverse of the standard UN Medal. The medal ribbon from which the medal hangs is unique to a specific mission.
10. Peacekeeping consists of activities, normally undertaken by military personnel, predicated on "consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force" and aimed at creating a durable and lasting peace. While peace operations consist of a broad range of actions in which expeditionary military and police forces undertake to "prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath." Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams with Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010; reprint, 2011), respectively pages 173-175 and 18.
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27. Canada, Senate of Canada, "Meeting New Challenges," p. 11.
28. Canada, "Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 2," pp. 559-561.
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for domestic operations. Later, in 2012, these two commands were unified within the current Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), which is responsible for all operational force employment. The RCN, CA, RCAF, and other force providers, are responsible to generate trained military contributions for CJOC. See Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Bill Bentley, with a foreword by Romeo Dallaire, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015); and, Trista L. Grant-Waddell, "'Soldiers First': The Evolution of Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, 1956-2000" Ph. D diss., University of Western Ontario, London, 2014, at: <http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3438&context=etd> , accessed 16 February 2017.

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33. Healey interview.

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DND photo IS2009-8498-19 by Corporal Shilo Adamson.

Major Justin Schmidt-Clever, Chief Logistics Information and Reporting Officer for the still-ongoing United Nations Operation *Minustah*, shows a child from the Compassion Orphanage how to use one of the many yo-yos distributed to the children of the orphanage, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, October 2009.



Over the Top – Neuville Vitasse, by Alfred Bastien.

Yes, French Canadians Did Their Share in the First World War

by Jean Martin

Jean Martin, Ph.D., is an historian with the Directorate of History and Heritage at National Defence Headquarters, and he is responsible for the official history of Canada's participation in the first United Nations Emergency Force (1956-1967) in Egypt. Dr. Martin also has a specialized interest in military geography and the defence of Canada's territory during the Second World War.

Introduction and Background

In 2014, I published a book in which I boldly suggested that, contrary to popular assumption, the enlistment of French Canadians into the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) might have far exceeded the maximum of 35,000 stated by the American author and historian Elizabeth H. Armstrong in 1937, and taken for granted by most Canadian historians in the following decades.¹ My estimates were then based upon three elements: 1- an assessment of the maximum possible Anglophone enlistment in the province of Quebec; 2- casualty data extracted from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) records, and 3- a 1927 letter written by the Director of Records at the Department of National Defence.² I was later given access to a database assembled by a team of researchers at Guelph University with

all the enlistment records of soldiers whose name began with the letter 'B', representing roughly 10% of all the enlistees in the CEF.³ After a thorough analysis of this quite sizeable sample, I predicted that the total number of Francophone members of the CEF, once all the records had been examined, would most likely range between 70,000 and 75,000, possibly up to 79,000. This prediction was contested by certain historians who refused to challenge the traditional view of a much smaller participation by Canadian Francophones.

Well, I have personally been through the 627,586 enlistment records held at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), and I can now confirm that, at least 74,795 French Canadians were at some point during the First World War members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. I say "at least," for it is certain that a substantial number of Francophone soldiers escaped my scrutiny. There is no certain way to determine who is a Francophone, and who is not from the enlistment records of the CEF. There is no declaration regarding the language spoken by the recruit, and the only reliable basis upon which Francophones can be identified is the origin of their name. One therefore needs to go through all the 627,586 names and extract all those that are clearly French in origin.⁴ This is the methodology that was applied in my analysis.

The Method

The only available database containing all the CEF enlistment records is held at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), and it can only be downloaded in an XML format, which defies any attempt at whatever kind of processing.⁵ It was therefore necessary to use LAC's website to retrieve all the records for each alphabetical letter, one by one, and to copy them into a spreadsheet.⁶ The maximum size of a downloadable batch being of 2,000 records, it was necessary to launch our requests using at least two initial letters, and sometimes three, or even four.⁷ On every spreadsheet, the names were all reviewed to identify those of clearly French origin. It was impossible to check every enlistment sheet to make sure that the recruit with a French name was really from a French-speaking family, so it was assumed that all those with a French name were francophone.⁸ This method can be disputed, as some would argue that not every person bearing a French name does actually speak French, but we believe that this is a quite reliable way to determine the overall number of Francophones for two reasons.

“We have seen no example of an English-speaking soldier who would have had his name changed to look or sound more French, on the other hand...”

First, although it is possible that a certain number of “false Francophones” may thus be included in our count, this is largely counter-balanced by the fairly large number of Francophones who will be lost because of their English-sounding name. Last names like Martin, Gilbert, Lambert, Page (Pagé) and several others are quite popular in both languages, and, unless the individual bore a clearly French first name, such as Onésime or Anatole, none of those with this kind of ambiguous last names were considered as Francophones. We also know that a good number of Francophones had their name transformed or distorted beyond recognition, most of the time to make it more acceptable to their English-speaking colleagues and superiors, and those true Francophones were therefore also lost. We have seen no example of an English-speaking soldier who would have had his name changed to look or sound more French, on the other hand.⁹

The second reason is that ‘anglicization’ had yet to make much progress in Canada at that time. The laws banning French schools in the west only dated from the last years of the



Wartime recruiting poster – Canadiens français.



Wartime recruiting poster – 178th Battalion.




Figure 1 – Proportion of francophone enlistees for each initial letter.

19th Century and early years of the 20th Century, and the young men of 1915 in those provinces had no reason to have forgotten their native French. In other older provinces in the east, strong French-speaking communities thrived, and in Eastern Quebec, it was the descendants of Irish and Scottish settlers, like the Harveys, Murrays, or Blackburns, who had long started to swing from their native English or Gaelic to French. The 1941 census gives us an idea of the languages spoken by Canadians of different origins. Among the 3.5 million persons of French origin still living in Canada at that time, more than two million spoke only French, and in excess of one million more spoke both French and English. Overall, more than 20 years after the First World War, it is nearly 95% of the Canadians of French origin who could still speak French. No doubt this proportion was even higher two decades earlier, in fact, probably not very much less than 100%. There were certainly many French Canadians who had learned to speak English in 1914, and even more so in 1919, but as long as they could still speak French, I cannot see how they should not be regarded as Francophones.

It is therefore quite safe to consider that all the CEF enlistees who bore a clearly French name, such as Fréchette, Simard, or Turgeon, were Francophones, and I have personally counted 75,755 of them in the 627,586 files held at LAC. Now, there are a certain number of duplicates among those files, which also include an unknown number of records associated with defaulters or deserters under the terms of the Military Service Act (MSA). The number of those records is not known, but we know from other sources that the official number of CEF members was 619,636.¹⁰ This represents a bit more than 1% records in excess, and so the number of Francophones was accordingly prorated and adjusted to 74,795.

Some Details

It is somewhat interesting to look at the distribution of Francophones throughout the alphabet. Although Francophones generally account for 12% of all the enlistees, their proportion can be as high as 35% with respect to certain letters, such as 'L'. Nearly 13,000 Francophones were found

with this letter initial only. This is followed with respect to most common usage by the letters 'B' (11,145), 'D' (7,840), and 'G' (7,199). More than half the Francophones bore a name with one of those four initial letters. Other initial letters were much less popular, such as 'W' (no Francophone), or 'K' (only 20), but the letter 'M' was a special case, where apart from the nearly 30,000 Scottish names beginning with Mc, Francophones accounted for nearly 9% of the rest, including a significant number of "Mac" and Martin (1,970 cases) that had to be disallowed.

I have already suggested that one reason that can partly explain the gross underestimation of Francophone enlistment in the CEF was the large number of Francophones who enlisted outside Quebec, around 35% of the total.¹¹ We cannot tell where the recruits came from, or where they enlisted from the basic list we have consulted here, but there are still some clues. We found, for instance, around 400 Arsenault and 800 Leblanc, two very popular names among Acadians, but not as popular in Quebec. By comparison, Tremblay, by far the most popular name in Quebec, was found only 650 times, although Tremblay is at least three times more popular than Leblanc in the province of Quebec. This seems to indicate a strong representation for the Acadians, and, it is reasonable to assume, a generally lower proportion of enlistment in Quebec than with Francophones outside this province.

There is little more analysis that can be done with these numbers, because this is basically only what it is: a list of numbers, with no other information attached to it. However, as the total number of enlistees that was found confirmed the validity of the extrapolation that was made from the 'B' database in my previous article, we can assume that the other analyses can also be reliably extended to the whole body of Francophones that were found. The 'B' database, contrary to the crude list consulted here, contains all the information available from the enlistment sheets of all the soldiers with a surname starting with the letter 'B', representing roughly 10% of the entire CEF. All manner of calculations can be performed with these records.



Draining trenches: 22nd infantry battalion, July 1916.

The first thing to remember is that not all those 75,000 French Canadians were enthusiastic volunteers, far from that. About 52% of the Francophones in the ‘B’ database were conscripts. If the same proportion is applied to our general count, this would mean that roughly 39,000 Francophones in the CEF were conscripts, and, consequently, 36,000 would have been volunteers. Compared to the entire CEF, it is clear that French Canadians enlisted much less readily than others, but there are good reasons for that. First, it is true that French Canadians felt less concerned with a war that was fought on a continent where they had very little connection, compared with the English Canadians, who were either born in Britain, or, very often, still had close relations living there. Most French Canadians came from families established for more than 150 or 200 years in North America, and there is a good chance that they had never met a true Frenchman in their life. Henri Bourassa was quite right when he declared in 1916: “In short, English-speaking Canadians enlist in much smaller numbers than the newcomers from England, because they are much more Canadian; French-Canadians enlist less than English-Canadians because they are totally and exclusively Canadian.”¹²

Second, the Canadian Expeditionary Force was an English-only institution, and those who could not speak the language did not always feel welcome in it. Some unit commanders were prepared to accept new recruits from all backgrounds, but others simply rejected volunteers who did not fit well within an

all-British environment, particularly in the first few months of the war, when everyone expected the conflict to be over by the end of 1914. For the first contingent that left Valcartier in October 1914 with over 30,000 men, 3,280 volunteers were rejected. One in every four Francophone volunteers was rejected, against only one in twelve for the others.¹³ Francophones were rejected three times more easily than any other volunteers. Was this a matter of racism? Probably not, in most cases, but it is understandable that, when one has a choice between an applicant who cannot speak his language or even understand the orders he is given, and another one who speaks good English and sometimes stems from the same county in England, the latter stands a much better chance of being accepted.

	Volunteers (approximate)	Rejected	Proportion
Francophones	1245	302	24.3%
Others	35,022	2978	8.5%

Table 1 – Rejection of volunteers for the first contingent, 1914.

But whatever the reason, many of the first French Canadian volunteers felt undesired and humiliated by the Canadian military, and they were certainly not good publicity when they returned

Author




Figure 2 – Enlistment pattern of volunteers, 1914-1917.

1915 and 1917 appears to have been somewhat more stable than recruitment in the other sectors of society. The two problematic years for the Francophones were 1914, when French Canadian recruits were not that welcome, and 1918, when so many of them were called up under the Military Service Act. Nearly 21% of the francophone volunteers joined in 1917, compared with only 14% in general. However, it must be said that the majority of the 1917 Francophone volunteers joined in the last months of the year, after the MSA had been adopted in Parliament, which was not the same with respect to the general enlistment pattern.

Clearly, the majority of the French Canadians joined the CEF through the effect of the MSA, but not only French Canadians were conscripts, nor were they all conscripts, either. An estimate produced in 1920 stated that approximately 25% of the English-speaking Canadian-born recruits were conscripts.¹⁴ According to

that estimate, 52% of all the conscripts were English-speaking Canadian-born, versus 22% French Canadians and 26% who were not born in Canada. We now know that, just as the total number of Francophone members of the CEF was underestimated, the number of their conscripts, as a consequence, was also underestimated. Instead of the 27,757 French Canadian conscripts stated in the statistic table produced by the Department of National Defence, our own evaluation sets this number at about 39,000. Admitting that

the total of 92,302 Canadian-born conscripts stated by DND still remains valid, this would bring the number of English-speaking Canadian-born conscripts down to about 53,300. The total number of Canadian-born CEF members is 318,728, and French Canadians account for 75,000 of them, so this leaves roughly 240,000 other Canadian-born enlistees, of which at least 53,000 were conscripts. We therefore have a possibility of 187,000 Canadian-born volunteers who were not Francophones, versus 36,000 Francophones. This is a ratio of one French Canadian volunteer for every five other Canadian-born volunteers.

to their respective communities. Some tried, sometimes successfully, to re-enlist some time later with another unit, but others swore that, if they were not good enough for the army in 1914, the army would never be good enough for them in the future. This constituted a poor beginning for the recruiting of French Canadians in the CEF. We can see in the 'B' database that the enlistment pattern of the Francophones follows a similar evolution to the general enlistment pattern. In general, the number of enlistments increases sharply from 1914 to 1915. Then, it continues to grow, although much more slowly, in 1916, prior to a dramatic decline in 1917. That said, Conscription more than doubled the number of new recruits in 1918, bringing it back to the level of 1915.

The evolution is quite similar with Francophones, with the exception of 1918, which accounts for more than half their total contribution. From 1914 to 1916, the number of Francophone enlistments, all volunteer, actually grows at a substantially higher rate than the general enlistment pattern. It also falls sharply in 1917, although not as low as with the rest of Canada. Thus, as far as volunteering is concerned, Francophone enlistment between

“Francophone enlistment between 1915 and 1917 appears to have been somewhat more stable than recruitment in the other sectors of society.”

	Volunteers					Conscripts				
	Francos	Prop.	Others	Prop.	Total	Francos	Prop.	Others	Prop.	Total
Dir. of records 1920	30,276	13.4%	195,127	86.60%	225,403	27,757	30%	64,745	70%	92,502
Our count	36,000	16.1%	187,000	83.10%	223,000	39,000	42.4%	53,000	57.6%	92,000

Table 2 – Canadian-born enlistment.

	Volunteers	Prop.	Conscripts	Prop.	Total	Prop.
Francophones	36,000	7.3%	39,000	31.3%	75,000	12.1%
Other Canadian-born	187,000	37.8%	53,000	42.5%	243,728	39.3%
All others	272,048	55%	32,588	26.2%	300,908	48.6%
Total	495,048		124,588		619,636	

Table 3 – Total enlistment in the CEF.

French Canadians represented about 24% of the whole Canadian population in 1915, but probably at least 30% of this population had been born in another country. Therefore, about 35% of the Canadian-born population spoke French. This is much more than the 16% of the Canadian-born volunteers who were French Canadians, although this proportion is far from negligible. Considering that the 75,000 French Canadians we were able to find is a minimum, this means that, among the Canadian-born population, one-in-six volunteers was a Francophone, and one-in-four of all those who served in the CEF, either as conscripts or volunteers, spoke French, while Francophones represented roughly one-in-three persons born in Canada. Considering the greater difficulty to serve and the much weaker connection with Britain, or even with the European continent, this is actually rather remarkable.

Discussion

Some, although very few historians, have hinted at the possibility of a Francophone recruitment somewhat higher than the 35,000 suggested by Elizabeth Armstrong in the late 1930s. and Canadian historians Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier in 1986 and David Bercuson in 2008 simply repeated Armstrong's guess, but distinguished historian Jack Granatstein wrote in 2002: "After conscription came into force, the usual guesstimate, almost certainly too generous, is that 50,000 Francophones served during the war, a number that would include volunteers and conscripts."¹⁵ Only Professor Patrice A. Dutil of Ryerson University, in a 2005 article, wrote: "Although no records of language spoken were kept by the military, it is commonly asserted that roughly 62,000 French Canadians enlisted in some way in the war effort. By the end of the war, it is estimated that there were 35,000 French-speaking men from all parts of Canada in uniform".¹⁶ I have no idea from where this "common assertion" might have materialized, but this shows that at least a few people were ready to accept the idea of a larger recruitment for the Francophones.

In general, however, very few people wanted to question the comfortable perception of a general refusal to enlist on the part of the French Canadians, and if the possibility of a larger number of Francophone enlistees was sometimes accepted, it had to come largely from conscription under the 1917 Military Service Act. All this had been 'given legs' because of one crude estimate pitched in a 1937 book, which everyone seemed to have accepted unquestionably: between 32,000 and 35,000, including the CEF, RFC, and merchant marine. But where had this estimate come from exactly? Nobody ever seemed to have asked that question, since it was so tempting to blindly accept it.

Elizabeth Armstrong gives no reference for her figures. She just quotes a letter from retired General Léo Richer Laflèche, then Deputy Minister of National Defence, in answer to one of her inquiries,

stating that: "...there is not nor ever can be, any precise, accurate or authentic statement as to the number of French Canadians who served in the Canadian Forces in the World War 1914-1919." This is basically what Colonel F. Logie Armstrong, Director of Records, had answered to General Louis-Alexandre Panet, Adjutant-General of the Canadian Militia, in December 1927. Colonel Armstrong sent a breakdown based upon national and geographic origin of the 619,636 enlistees to the CEF on 6 December 1927.¹⁷ He had added a note saying that, although no official numbers could be provided regarding the linguistic origin of the recruits, he could submit these unofficial, approximate, figures: 260,895 English-speaking Canadians and 57,833 French-speaking Canadians.

Three days later, General Laflèche forwarded to the Chief of the General Staff the exact same table he had received from Colonel Armstrong, but the table had been amputated from the note on linguistic origin.¹⁸ Then followed, on 13 December 1927, a letter in response to an inquiry from one Colonel W. Wood about French Canadian enlistment in the CEF.¹⁹ This letter explains at great length why it is impossible to provide official figures for French Canadian enlistment, but it concludes with this interesting sentence: "Your figure of 20,000 French Canadian enlistments prior to enforcement of the MSA is certainly too low by half at least, but as above, the exact figures cannot be arrived at." In March 1929, Major Clyde R. Scott, Assistant Director of Records, sent a response to another inquiry, this time from the Prime Minister's Office, with a series of enlistment statistics for the CEF. The last sheet shows a breakdown of English and French-Canadian enlistment *prior to* and *following* the enforcement of the MSA. They are those exact same numbers that had been offered by Colonel Armstrong in December 1927. Major Scott explained that these numbers were compiled in 1920 and had never been divulged, and he insisted upon the importance that they must be kept secret. One can only wonder why it was so important to keep those numbers secret.

The fact is, however, that National Defence's subsequent response to any inquiry regarding this was that no official figures existed; which was essentially true, although there could have been reasonable estimates available, had Colonel Armstrong's note and earlier compilations been retained. How Elizabeth Armstrong's estimate of 1937 could be deduced from this absence of answer, however, remains a mystery to this day.

So, a very precarious guess, then, has been almost universally repeated, without being seriously questioned for eighty years. How can that be? How can so many historians from both English and French Canada possibly have accepted so easily such an unwarranted evaluation of French Canadian participation in the First World War? I guess this was rarely contested because this idea of a low participation by the French Canadians in the war satisfied everyone in Canada. In English Canada, this just comforted the old lament of the pro-conscription



William Rider-Rider/DND/Library and Archives Canada, PA-002045

22nd Battalion resting in a shell hole on their way to the front line, September 1917.

campaigners of 1917 about French Canadians not giving their share, so that English Canadians could remain the sole heroes of this nation-building war. French Canadians, on their part, particularly in Quebec, were just happy to use this as further evidence of their being different from English Canadians: They claimed French Canadians had refused to fight because they were a peace-loving people, not interested in military matters. Although historians of the New France era could easily dispute such an assertion, this is a very popular belief nowadays in Quebec.

Yet, it would have been fairly easy to do what I have just done with the enlistment records. Any interested university teacher could have given the assignment to a team of students and what I have just done by myself would have been completed in just a few weeks. But it was never attempted. For nearly a century now, no one ever thought of counting the French names in the enlistment records to have a better idea of the scale of French Canadian participation in the First World War. Everyone was content with the idea that French-speaking Canadians had not “given their share,” and nobody seemed to really want to know.

But when one thinks of it, it simply made no sense that so few French Canadians might have joined. As I demonstrated in a previous article, it was impossible that the pool of Anglophones living in the province of Quebec had provided much more than 30,000 servicemen (of the total of 88,052 men, who enlisted in the province of Quebec),²⁰ and the million Francophones living outside the province of Quebec must have given at least 30,000 soldiers to the CEF.²¹ Therefore, the total of

French-speaking recruits could hardly be lower than 60,000.²² Yet, the idea of only 35,000, which could perhaps be stretched up to a weak 50,000, endured. This could only be possible through a blind act of faith.

So now, instead of a mere 5% of the CEF coming from French Canada, we find ourselves with 12% Francophones who served. But more importantly, French Canadians represented nearly 24% of the soldiers born in Canada. It is not fair to compare the French Canadian contribution to that of all the other enlistees, as more than 50% of them had arrived from Britain or elsewhere, most of them less than 15 years earlier, and in many cases, much more recently. French Canada had not benefited from the same kind of French-speaking immigration, and the vast majority of Francophone enlistees were born in Canada and had deep roots there.²³ Thus, French Canadians among the whole of the Canadian-born enlistees, actually represented a fair share.

The population of French origin in Canada represented nearly 29% of the 7.2 million inhabitants of Canada at the 1911 census. By 1915, though, nearly 1.6 million more immigrants had arrived, mostly from Britain, and the Canadian population had grown to nearly 9.4 million. The population of French origin meanwhile had not grown in the same proportion, and it now stood barely above 24% of the whole. This proportion is actually very close to the proportion of French Canadians among the Canadian-born members of the CEF. This must certainly be regarded as a fair share. A hypothetical requirement from the French Canadians to provide 24% of all the 619,636 members of the CEF, regardless

	Population 1911	Immigration 11-15	Natural growth 11-15	Total 1915
Canada	7,206,643	1,597,420	540,696	9,344,759
French origin	2,054,890	10,779	209,486	2,275,155
Proportion of Francophones	28.51%			24.35%

Table 4 – Evolution of the Canadian population, 1911-1915.

of their country of birth, would require a contribution of nearly 149,000 soldiers, almost one-in-two Canadian-born soldiers, when they represented only one-third of that population.²⁴ Such a commitment would far exceed their fair share.

In France, the participation of troops from the colonies is rightly praised and emphasized by historians, although their contribution represents barely 7% of the total mobilized by the French army.²⁵ French Canadians provided 12% of all the members of the CEF, 24% of those who were born and raised in Canada. This is a remarkable contribution for a people who had no strong connection with the people and culture of Great Britain, and, for most of them, had to quickly learn a foreign language at the same time they were learning to fight. Because there was only one French-speaking fighting unit in the field during the war, it is too often forgotten that Francophones served in a wide variety of units from all over Canada. Less than 6,000 soldiers served with the 22nd Battalion (French Canadian) during the war, but if all the French Canadians had been brought together into distinctive units, like most French Colonial troops, they could probably have manned two full infantry brigades from 1916 to 1918. One

famous Canadian historian once wrote: “However apologists then and later massaged the data, Francophones had not given their ‘share’ to the war.”²⁶ Well, I did not need to ‘massage the data’ to determine that far more French Canadians had joined the CEF than the number that has been traditionally accepted. All I did was what any other interested historian could easily have done: simply by counting the names, one by one.

Historians have now started to study and recognize the participation of Aboriginals, immigrants, Black Canadians, and other minorities in the First World War. This is all good, but is it not about time that we put an end to a century of delusion and start to acknowledge that French Canadians also gave their fair share to this war? French Canadians did take part in large numbers in that war, if not necessarily in quite the same manner as their English-speaking counterparts. It would be a good thing if we would no longer have to answer this meaningless yet so often repeated question: Why did French Canadians not play their part in the First World War?



22nd Canadian infantry battalion crossing the Rhine at Bonn, December 1918.

NOTES

1. Jean Martin, *Un siècle d'oubli : les Canadiens et la Première Guerre mondiale (1914–2014)*, (Outremont, Athéna Éditions, 2014); Elizabeth H. Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec: 1914–1918*, (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart 1937).
2. Jean Martin, « La participation des francophones dans le Corps expéditionnaire canadien (1914–1919) : il faut réviser à la hausse », in *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3, September 2015, pp. 405–423.
3. Jean Martin, « Francophone enlistment in the CEF, 1914–1918: the evidence », in *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 25, No 1 (Spring 2016), Waterloo (Canada).
4. Excluding the French-sounding names of the enlistees from the Channel Islands.
5. The website Ancestry.com also owns a complete database of the CEF soldiers, but they hold exclusive rights on its use.
6. The records can be found at: <http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/first-world-war/personnel-records/Pages/search.aspx>
7. With the initial 'P', for example, there were more than 9,000 enlistees bearing a name starting with 'Pa', and more than 3,000 with 'Par,' so it was necessary to go through the entire alphabet with up to four initial letters.
8. It could be possible to confirm that a person is really a Francophone through his place of residence, for example, or his next of kin's first name (Télesphore, Adéodat or Étienne, for instance can only be French).
9. Just a few examples of those French Canadians serving under a different name: Ernest Joseph and Louis Leblanc both served under the name White; Georges Legault was known as George Hall; George Mainville had his name transformed into Mayville; Edmond Maillet became Edmund Myers; Sylvestre Mercier was known as Samuel Stanley Mercer. And those are only a few examples that could be found. How many more were never discovered?
10. This is the number that was produced in the 1920s by the Director of records at DND, and repeated in official history this is what was published in G.W.L. Nicholson's *Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919* (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1962). See J. Martin, 2016.
11. Henri Bourassa, *Canadian Nationalism and the War*, (Montréal, Le Devoir, 1916); quoted in Pariseau and Bernier, pp. 86–87
12. Those records are also available from the LAC website at: <http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/first-world-war/personnel-records/Pages/search.aspx>
13. LAC, "CEF Statistics – Enlistment and Medical Unfitness 1919-1938" RG24-C-1-a. Volume 1163, File HQ-64-1-24, Letter of 1929 to the Prime Minister's office.
14. Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism, Vol. 1, 1763-1969: the Fear of a Parallel Army*, (Ottawa, Department of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), p. 88. David J. Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians*, (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 2008), p. 161. Jack L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 75.
15. Patrice A. Dutil, "Against Isolationism: Napoléon Belcourt, French Canada, and 'La Grande Guerre'" in David Mackenzie (ed.), *Canada and the First World War. Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 115.
16. LAC, "CEF Statistics – Enlistment and Medical Unfitness 1919-1938" RG24-C-1-a. Volume 1163, file HQ-64-1-24. Letter from F. Logie Armstrong, Directeur of Records.
17. LAC, "CEF Statistics – Enlistment and Medical Unfitness 1919-1938" RG24-C-1-a. Volume 1163, file HQ-64-1-24 Letter from Léo Richer Lafèche, Adjutant-General of the Militia.
18. This might well be the same Colonel William Wood who was member of a special mission sent to Europe by the Dominion Archivist of Canada in 1918-1919 to document the war effort. William Wood had been a long time resident of Quebec City. He was in 1927 assistant archivist of the Province of Quebec, and he had been for many years a prominent member of the Quebec Historical and Literary Society. See Robert McIntosh, "The Great War, Archives, and Modern Memory," in *Archivaria*, (Journal of the Association of Canadian Archivists), No. 46 (Autumn 1998).
19. See J. Martin, CHR, 2015.
20. About half a million French Canadians lived in other provinces, and over half a million more Francophones were living in the United States at that time.
21. 88,052 men enlisted in the province of Quebec. If only 30,000 of them were Anglophone, this means that over 58,000 were not. Even allowing for as many as 15,000 to 20,000 enlistees coming from outside the province to enlist in Quebec, this still leaves between 30,000 and 35,000 Francophone soldiers enlisted from Quebec.
22. French immigration accounted for less than 1% of total immigration in 1914. According to DND statistics, only 1,319 members of the CEF, or less than 2% of the Francophones, were born in France.
23. 318,728 members of the CEF were born in Canada. 24% of the total of 619,636 would provide 148,713 French Canadians, against the 170,015 remaining.
24. About 565,000 colonial troops served in the war, from a total of eight million mobilized.
25. J.L. Granatstein, p. 75.



Canadian
Security
Intelligence
Service

Chris Wattle/Reuters RTR4D0BL

Should Canada Have a Foreign Espionage Service?

by Richard Geoffrey St. John



ART Collection/Alamy Stock Photo HKKKXX

Henry St. John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke (1678).

“Together let us beat this ample field,
try what the open, what the covert
yield ...”

~Alexander Pope, ‘An Essay on
Man – Addressed to Henry St. John,
Lord Bolingbroke’¹

Introduction

Unlike most countries, Canada does not have a foreign espionage service, similar to the Secret Intelligence Service of Britain or of Australia, or the Clandestine Service of the American Central Intelligence Agency. Some argue Canada needs one in order to understand the world, and that with one, we would no longer need to rely upon allies for intelligence.

But before spending a lot of money on an espionage service, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how such services work, and what one *could do*, and *could not do*, for Canada. It is particularly necessary to comprehend that espionage is a morally hazardous business, not to be engaged in for other than high moral purpose.

Espionage is not some dark magic that only wizards can understand. It is readily comprehensible by anyone with common sense and some insight into human nature – and a mind free of the many silly fictions of spy novels and films. Those who wish to delve deeper into the subject are encouraged to read the books and speeches referred to in the endnotes.

Espionage, espionage agents, and espionage officers

“...the brave men and women who ... we call agents, are not usually members of MI6 ... they will usually not be British.”

~Speech by the Chief of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)²

Espionage is the secret collection of intelligence by humans who work inside the given organization being spied upon. Sometimes loosely referred to as ‘humint’ (human intelligence), espionage is, in fact, just one manner of collecting humint. A captured enemy soldier, when answering his captors’ questions, is providing humint. Humint (with its espionage subset) is one of the three major types of intelligence, the

other two being imagery intelligence and signals intelligence. Humint collection is secret in method, and secret because the officials of the organization being spied upon are not meant to know their secrets have been uncovered by espionage.

The term ‘CIA agent’ in popular parlance refers to an American working for the CIA. For professionals, however, the agent is the foreigner who spies for an espionage service, while the espionage service uses its own country’s citizens to serve as ‘intelligence officers’ or ‘espionage officers.’ In 2012, the head of the Australian SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) said: “ASIS is ... in the business of collecting secret human intelligence ... largely through intelligence officers managing a network of agents ...”³ In this writer’s view, he and his British counterpart quoted previously use the term ‘agent’ correctly.

If Canada had a foreign espionage service, and one of its targets was, for example, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, a Canadian espionage officer would seek to recruit an Iranian nuclear scientist as an espionage agent and then spy for Canada. The Iranian in this case is the *agent*, not the Canadian espionage *officer* who ‘runs’ him.



CIA Headquarters, McLean Virginia.

Mark Reinstein/Alamy Stock Photo FUJTP6



charlstoone-images/Alamy Stock Photo BB9HHR

Sun Tzu.

Why is espionage still conducted?

“What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”

— Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’⁴

Spying, according to Sun Tzu, some 25 centuries ago, was all about human beings. But in these days of spying by imagery satellites and by interception of electronic communications, and not forgetting how much is openly available to everyone, what room is there for old-fashioned espionage? To be sure, *much*, and usually, *enough*, may be learned without resort to espionage. But there are some secrets that cannot be seen by a satellite or intercepted by a signals intelligence service, and all too much of what is publicly available is simply wrong. The intentions of an enemy may be known to only a handful

“It is just a fact that enemies have secrets that cannot be revealed by other than intelligence methods, and some of those secrets cannot be uncovered except by espionage.”

Espionage – The ultimate ‘inside job’

“Inside agents are enemy officials whom we employ.”

— Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’⁶

Espionage is an ‘inside’ job. Imagine how much easier robbing a bank would be if you had a bank employee act as your spy and tell you all about bank security measures, rather than snooping around yourself

of its people. Is, for example, Iran soon going to make the decision to begin building nuclear weapons?

It is just a fact that enemies have secrets that cannot be revealed by other than intelligence methods, and some of those secrets cannot be uncovered except by espionage. In the relatively-recent words of the UK SIS Chief: “Our job ... is to recruit and run secret agents ... I can assure you that is a technique that remains as effective today as it ever was.”⁵

How espionage is *not* done

To clear away first some ludicrous notions about espionage, it is not done by heavily-armed ‘secret agents’ storming a top-secret facility inside an enemy’s capital city. If one believes that really can be done with any prospect of success, imagine deciding you want to rob a bank. How would you do it, and get away with it? Think of all the things you would have to know in advance – alarms? guards? vault code? police? off-shore bank accounts? Then, think of all the things that could easily go wrong. Frankly, and for myriad reasons, it is just too risky and difficult to accomplish. In the same manner, commando operations for the purpose of espionage are out of the question.

To use the Iranian nuclear weapons program example, some imagine that another country, such as Canada, could train one of its own espionage officers to speak perfect Farsi, to act like a native Iranian, and to be able to build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Hypothetically, he could then be secretly inserted into Iran with forged documents, show up at an Iranian nuclear facility and get a job in the weapons program. Any volunteers out there for this suicide mission? Pretty sure his bosses would check with the Iranian university that our man would have to allege he graduated from, only to find neither record nor recollection of him.

And espionage is not about wandering around a country’s bazaars, hoping to hear something secret being discussed. Espionage is not about striking up conversations with the locals, assuming they are not too afraid to talk. To be sure, in a country experiencing unrest, finding out what the ‘mood on the street’ is can be most important. There are many things in this world that are not secret, but are nevertheless essential to know. Secret intelligence is not always the most important kind of intelligence. But you do not need spies to capture this mood. Diplomats – and New York Times reporters – can do this just as well, the latter for the cost of a subscription! Using spies would simply add a counter-productively sinister air to this manner of intelligence work.



Martyn Williams/Alamy Stock Photo HWC77E

Headquarters of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) at Vauxhall Cross, London.

trying to learn what they are. Contrary to myth, espionage officers do not spy *themselves*. Rather, they get foreigners to steal information for them; the foreigners, as agents, do the actual spying. Certainly, espionage officers working in hostile countries keep their eyes and ears open. But if they want to know in detail what is going on inside guarded, secret enemy facilities, what is being discussed in high-level political meetings, they almost always need someone working on the inside to inform them.

An espionage officer wandering around a country with a camera or trying to question locals about sensitive matters would merely draw attention to himself, and if caught by the country's counterintelligence authorities, can lead to him being declared *persona non grata* and thrown out of the country, and that is assuming the officer has diplomatic protection. And, barring the odd lucky strike, the espionage officer on his own will normally only be able to collect general background information on the country, not any truly valuable secret intelligence.

Action from knowledge

The best intelligence in the world is useless if it does not lead to some sort of action. It is pointless for Canada to establish an espionage service, it is no good to run even highly successful espionage operations, if there is neither a *government willingness* nor a *capability to act upon* the intelligence it gets from espionage. "What is the point of the whole exercise?" is the question that must be answered. Merely wanting

to know something secret for its own sake is wholly insufficient justification for espionage.

Strategic direction of the espionage effort

Once determined to act upon intelligence received, at least in principle, and when sensible to do so, it is up to the government (ideally a Cabinet committee in Canada's case) that controls the espionage service to set espionage priorities, that is, to select the targets of the service. No secret intelligence service should select its own targets, nor should it be allowed to carry out espionage against targets that the government has not specifically identified as such. "We are not a self-tasking organisation; we obtain intelligence based only on the questions set for us by government," as said by the head of the British SIS.⁷ Only the most important, enduring strategic threats should be targeted for espionage. Secondary, transient threats should be investigated by other means.

Hypothetically, what might be a key Canadian strategic espionage priority? Nuclear weapons proliferation... In my view, nuclear war is the greatest single threat to mankind, climate change and terrorism not excluded. The more countries with nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood that there will be 'fingers on nuclear triggers' that belong to fearful, irrational, aggressive, or stupid people, with the consequent, measurably-greater risk of nuclear war. To jump ahead a bit, I can easily foresee a Canadian espionage service which had nuclear weapons proliferation as its sole priority.



eventually, the espionage officer must make a recruitment pitch to the prospective agent: will you spy for us? This is the moment of truth – often *literally* a moment, since the pitch typically has to be delivered rapidly. If the assessment of the prospective agent and their desires has been good, they will accept. But why would they? What is in it for the new agent?

The motives of agents

“One who confronts his enemy ... yet who, because he begrudges [his spy] ... a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy’s situation, is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general, no support to his sovereign, no master of victory.”

~Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’¹⁰

Hunting and recruiting agents

With sensible priorities – let us keep using nuclear weapons proliferation as our example scenario – the espionage service now embarks upon its arduous and wholly ‘non-glamorous’ work of learning as much as possible about the targets, specifically the people and organizations that might be involved in nuclear weapons acquisition in the targeted countries. Previous intelligence work may have revealed that a particular country’s military has a ‘special projects office.’ Might it be nuclear weapons-related? Gradually, in a variety of ways, including low-level espionage for essential background information, a picture of the office and its personnel is established. The aim of this tedious process is to identify people who should be in a position to know whether the office has a nuclear role. Obviously, this preparatory work can take months, even years, so the threats investigated by espionage have to be those that will endure for years, if not decades.

The espionage service now has something of a picture of the special office and its people, and so, the next stage of espionage begins. Now, an espionage officer, or an already-recruited agent, has a ‘chance’ encounter with an employee of the special office; the employee has been tentatively selected as a prospective espionage agent. The espionage officer turns this encounter into a friendship – or so the prospective agent *believes*, and indeed, it *may well be* such – which allows the espionage officer gradually to explore the personal and professional life of the targeted person. Over time, the officer learns what ‘makes the prospective agent tick,’ and what motives the candidate might have for agreeing to become an agent. It is obvious that this can take months to accomplish, perhaps even longer.⁸ The friendship, more accurately, this developmental stage of the operation, cannot be forced to move at an unnatural pace. ‘Softly, softly, slowly, slowly’ is a good motto for espionage officers.⁹

Unless the agent has been recruited by stealth, as it were, (I will remark later upon sophisticated blackmail techniques),

Agents spy for one-or-more of five main reasons: money, ideology, compromise, ego, and revenge. (MICER, for those who feel they must have an appropriate acronym.)¹¹ Some argue quite cogently that friendship should be included as one of the motives.¹² These are normal motives for a lot of what all human beings, not just espionage agents, do throughout their lives. Espionage services look for prospective agents with these normal motives and weaknesses; they do not seek out psychologically-warped individuals.¹³ Far more people than most readers suspect would be willing to become agents, given the right circumstances and the right recruitment ‘pitch.’¹⁴

Money appears to be the primary motive of most agents.¹⁵ Those who spy for ‘pure’ ideological reasons are in the distinct minority, although a sophisticated espionage service will try to awaken a favourable ideological impulse in its agents.¹⁶ It is important that the agent feel good about themselves and their spying, at a minimum that their conscience does not bother them.¹⁷

People who have dark personal secrets they are desperate to keep family, friends, and bosses from learning them are said to be compromised, in that an espionage service can threaten to expose those secrets unless they become spies. For some agents, the ‘ego-boost,’ the thrill of being on centre stage in their own secret *pièce de théâtre* is sufficient justification for being an agent. And some agents are out for revenge against their superiors, colleagues, organizations, or countries, or vengeance as payback for real or perceived slights.¹⁸

The tactics of espionage services

“The professional skill of espionage ... is the exploitation of human weakness.”

~Gordon Corera, ‘The Art of Betrayal’¹⁹

“Hypothetically, what might be a key Canadian strategic espionage priority? Nuclear weapons proliferation...”



dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo EBF9W1

US Secret Service agents check out the scene in front of a suspect bookstore in Washington, DC, 29 December 2014.

Those who propose the establishment of a Canadian espionage service tend to downplay, or not even mention, the morally hazardous tactics espionage services use to recruit and retain agents. These tactics are based upon the motives noted previously.

Because money is the main motive for the majority of spies, it follows that bribery – cash, or valuable or hard-to-get goods – is the most common recruitment tactic.^{20,21} The bribe must be enough to make a real difference to the agent’s life and happiness,²² although not too much, lest the agent’s spending of a lot of cash leads to uncomfortable questions from the agent’s home counter-intelligence service. (Often, much of the agent’s pay is put into a foreign bank, waiting for the day when the agent decides to defect and leave their country for good.)

The agent should be paid regularly, whether they provide intelligence regularly or not. This appears to be counter-intuitive. Is it not the intelligence that is being bought? In fact, there are two good reasons for this approach: 1) the agent does not feel under pressure to take unnecessary risks just so they can provide their espionage officer with something, anything, regularly; and, 2) the agent does not start fabricating intelligence just to maintain a regular flow of intelligence to the officer. Sophisticated espionage services don’t buy the *intelligence*, they buy the *individual*.²³ And the espionage officer will try to make the agent feel they are not being bribed, but are simply being paid a decent salary for a job well done. Given the propensity of all people to rationalize what they do, indeed, sometimes, to engage in outright self-deception, this should not be particularly difficult to do for the intelligence espionage officer.

Unsubtle, brutal blackmail is a tactic of espionage services, but one this writer suspects is little used, whatever spy fiction tries to tell us. The espionage officer-agent relationship will be poisoned

from the beginning if it is based solely upon crude blackmail, and few espionage officers are as stupid as to imagine that sort of relationship is conducive to getting good intelligence regularly.

So, when possible, smart espionage services use much more subtle methods. Again, hypothetically, suppose the intended agent is having an extra-marital affair that they desperately wants to keep their spouse from learning about. The espionage officer, who has found out about the affair, will send a disreputable-looking character to threaten the prospective agent with sending photos to their spouse if they do not ‘fork over some cash.’ The intended agent is induced by a newly-acquired ‘friend’ to tell him about the blackmail, the new friend being, of course, the espionage officer (or a previously-recruited agent). The espionage officer tells the intended agent to do nothing, since they believe they know how to get the blackmailer to back off. Sure enough, and ‘wonder of wonders,’ the blackmailer goes away.

The prospective agent now feels deeply obligated to their new friend, and so, in due course, the espionage officer asks for some sort of not-too-sensitive document on some pretext, like an internal phone directory of the organization targeted by the espionage service. How can the prospective agent refuse? Over time, increasingly important secret documents are turned over, until it dawns upon the agent he has *become* an agent, in a sense by stealth, and that it is too late for him to confess all to his home country’s counter-intelligence service.

The agent may never catch on the fact that he has been set up by blackmail, and so, far from resenting the espionage officer, they tend to feel positively in the officer’s debt. This relatively-sophisticated method should not obscure the fact that this is still espionage enabled by blackmail.²⁴



officer feeds that vanity by telling them how much the intelligence the agent produces matters for the betterment of the world.

In his speech, the ASIS Director-General said ASIS tactics do not include “violence or blackmail or threats,” suggesting to me that, by omitting to mention it, he is implicitly indicating that *bribery* is an ASIS tactic.²⁶ The Chief of the UK SIS, in his speech, simply says that the SIS does “...things for our country that would not be justifiable in pursuit of private interests. But they are necessary, proportionate and legal in pursuit of national security.”²⁷ He thus distinguishes between the dictates of private and public morality. It would seem from his remarks that, for SIS, perhaps not even blackmail is always ‘off the table,’ although to be fair, a former SIS Chief denied that pressure of this sort is a SIS tactic.²⁸ His remark about SIS’s work being legal this writer takes to mean legal under UK law. Espionage is against the law in most countries; agents of espionage services break those laws in the course of spying against them.

The former SIS Chief’s remark about proportionality invokes the doctrine of the lesser evil; he is saying that SIS tactics, whatever they are, are justifiable if they are in pursuit of a high moral purpose, i.e. the national security of Britain. But because espionage is the most morally hazardous method of intelligence collection, espionage must be the last resort of intelligence.²⁹ In the Canadian context, I personally do not believe espionage enabled by blackmail or bribery is morally justified, except in cases where Canada’s strategic national interests are seriously threatened.³⁰

The perils of the ‘walk-in’

It is evident from the foregoing that hunting agents, and developing the relationship between the espionage officer and the prospective agent, is time-consuming, difficult work. Would it not be easier and faster (and ‘nicer’?) simply to wait until foreigners ‘walk in’ and volunteer to become agents? Common sense reveals some of the downsides to this approach.

First, a passive stance makes getting a genuinely worthwhile agent a matter of luck. Years may pass before even a single important volunteer shows up.

Second, since hostile countries watch foreign embassies and embassy officials, a walk-in may be spotted as they attempt to make contact with an embassy official, and may be put under intense surveillance by their country’s counter-intelligence authorities. The walk-in may then be required by the counter-intelligence authorities to feed the espionage officer bogus information.

Agents frequently get lied to by espionage officers; not about everything all the time, but still lied to about some matters. For another hypothetical example, as an American espionage officer sizes up a prospective agent, they may learn that the target would never countenance spying for the United States, but would have no trouble doing so for Denmark, or India, or some other country. Fine; the American espionage officer (apparently grudgingly) ‘admits’ that he is a Danish intelligence officer. This is known in the trade as ‘false-flag’ recruitment.²⁵

Prospective agents are frequently emotionally manipulated to some extent. Perhaps the intended agent resents his boss for some reason? The espionage officer builds upon this so that the prospective agent becomes really resentful. They like to think of themselves as something of a good but unappreciated actor? The espionage officer promises them star billing in a grand secret drama. They are vain? The espionage

between the espionage officer and the prospective agent, is time-consuming, difficult work. Would it not be easier and faster (and ‘nicer’?) simply to wait until foreigners ‘walk in’ and volunteer to become agents? Common sense reveals some of the downsides to this approach.

“Unsubtle, brutal blackmail is a tactic of espionage services, but one this writer suspects is little used, whatever spy fiction tries to tell us.”



Gary Doak/Alamy Stock Photo F4P6KB

Gordon Corera, British author and journalist.

Third, the walk-in may have access to serious secrets, but are they secrets of useful relevance? For example, Laos may have a few deep, dark secrets, but does anyone, aside perhaps from Vietnam, really care what they are? If the espionage service's only target is nuclear weapons proliferation, then it scarcely matters what secrets are on offer if they have nothing to do with that particular issue. Even so, if the espionage station has no agents, there will be a temptation to accept a walk-in, because, well, it does not *have* any other agents. Such temptation is to be avoided; it is much better to stick to the government's espionage priorities. Espionage, for the love of the game or to create the illusion of productivity, is a very bad idea.

Fourth, and most concerning, the walk-in may, in fact, be an *agent provocateur*, sent by a hostile counter-intelligence service to try to identify who at the Embassy is an intelligence officer, who their agents are and what their espionage tradecraft is, and then, perhaps, to pass on false information.

For these reasons, all intelligence services are properly wary of walk-ins.³¹ And one final point in the Canadian context... Why do we imagine the first stop of a would-be agent would be a Canadian embassy? No, if intending to spy for the West, American, or British, or French officials would be much more likely to be approached. Waiting for a walk-in to a Canadian embassy would be a very long wait, this writer believes.

The relationship of the espionage officer and his agent

Espionage is virtually all about human beings, their natures and their relationships; technology and spy 'tradecraft' are minor matters.³² It is the duty of the espionage officer to put the relationship with his agent – the single most important facet of any espionage operation – on the most positive footing that can be achieved. This is no super-secret spy trick, just good psychology and common sense. The espionage officer strives to create an atmosphere of trust, even friendship. They endeavour to cause the agent to feel they are really doing the right thing by spying, that they are not in fact betraying anybody or anything, by introducing an ideological purpose into the mind of the agent. The espionage officer's intuition, their gut feeling about their agent is the most important element of the relationship; espionage is about taking risks based upon the personal judgment of an espionage officer.³³

Many espionage officers come genuinely to like their agents (and vice-versa), and many are fiercely protective of them. Seen in this light, it is obvious that much spy fiction is trash. Very few espionage officers would ever deliberately betray their agents, not even if an agent decides that they no longer want to continue spying. What would-be agent would ever agree to spy for an espionage service that had the reputation of routinely betraying its agents?

In his excellent book on British espionage, Gordon Corera quotes a British Secret Intelligence Service officer, Daphne Park:

"For Park, Secret Service work was about trust, not betrayal. For that reason, she had a deep loathing of the bleaker fictional portrayals of her world. 'John le Carré I would gladly hang, draw and quarter ... He dares to say that it is a world of cold betrayal. It's not. It's a world of trust. You can't run an agent without trust on both sides ... What he says is going to be protected and his identity is going to be protected.'"³⁴

However, this writer Park protests a little too much... Somebody or something is *usually* being betrayed in an espionage operation. But she is perfectly right to highlight the need for trust and for the protection of agents – to repeat, good secret services do not betray their agents – and, she might have added, sometimes the need for genuine friendship as well. Several decades later, the UK SIS Chief said: "...the essence of what we do – creating relationships of trust [between the espionage officers and the agents of the SIS] – will remain unchanged."³⁵

What a Canadian espionage service could not do

Proponents of a Canadian espionage service sometimes make much exaggerated claims for what it could do. Let me dispose of several myths. A Canadian espionage service, however good, would not be the answer to all Canada's intelligence challenges, as I know from long experience in the business. It would not make us smarter about the whole world, only about a limited number of specific (though ideally very important) issues.

Having espionage agents reporting to Canada would not necessarily allow for accurate predictions to be made, nor would it necessarily make decisions easier. It would not make Canada an 'independent' intelligence actor in the world, since Canada is



Street scene 1, *Bridge of Spies*.

already that with its current intelligence capabilities; an espionage service would simply make Canada more so.

It could not replace methods of intelligence collection that Canada is already employing, such as foreign signals intelligence collection by the Communications Security Establishment Canada. And getting intelligence from a Canadian espionage service most certainly would not eliminate the crucial need for Canada to continue acquiring intelligence from close allies. Canada benefits greatly from the intelligence flowing to it from the US, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand.

Five arguments for not having an espionage service

There are five main reasons that would likely be given as to why Canada should not have a foreign espionage service:

- 1) 'The low tactics of espionage services are unacceptable to many Canadians.' If true, and I suspect in the current security environment it is, then Canada should not establish an espionage service for fear of the harm it would do to Canadian self-esteem. (Although I believe it is also true that, should Canada's security situation deteriorate markedly, Canadian attitudes would change rapidly in favour of a hard-hitting espionage service.)
- 2) 'Spy services always go bad and start killing people and blowing stuff up.' Certainly, intelligence officers who are not under strong political control may well do things they should not – but then, so could some

police officers. That has not stopped democracies from having intelligence services – or policemen. And in the Canadian context, neither CSIS nor CSEC has ever been accused of any sort of violence, and both have been in service for decades. The 'spies going rogue' reason is a bad argument for not having an espionage service. A Canadian espionage service is not bound to go bad, provided Canadian political leaders do their jobs, that is, to exert tight, active control³⁶ over the service and require the service's officers to follow the lawful direction of the Canadian government. Part of the answer is to deny the espionage service any capacity for violence. For example, there is generally no need for espionage officers to be trained in the use of weapons, although in the special case of espionage against terrorists, some espionage officers probably have to be armed for self-defence at least some of the time.

- 3) 'If Canada does not have an espionage service, other countries would not spy on Canada, because they will be so impressed with our high ethical standards.' This is a ridiculous objection. It is simply untrue. Other countries have long spied on Canada, and whether or not Canada has an espionage service, our enemies will continue to conduct espionage against Canada. More to the point, with CSEC, we have been in the foreign spying business since the Second World War. Canada would hardly be deemed in my opinion to be much more aggressive, or much less admirable, by the world if we had an espionage service as well – even assuming the world actually took notice. This

is a bad argument against having an espionage service. Our enemies (and friends) probably view past Canadian disinclination to set up a foreign espionage service as short-sighted at best, stupid at worst.

- 4) 'Eventually, one of our espionage operations will go wrong, and the country we were spying on will make a big public flap about it; the diplomatic repercussions will be severe.' The first part of the sentence is true. It is just a matter of time. Sure, the country being spied upon might make a big issue out of it, but typically spy scandals do not lead to any real breakdown in diplomatic relations, just the expulsion of a couple of intelligence officers. (Indeed, some countries are reluctant to make a big deal of espionage attacks on them, because they may reveal embarrassing security weaknesses.)
- 5) Espionage is illegal under most countries' laws. Espionage involves asking agents to commit treason and to steal information. If we do not want to encourage law-breaking in other countries, ever, if we do not want ever to encourage treason and theft, then the answer is simple – do not have a Canadian espionage service.

The covert yield – What a Canadian espionage service could do

Canada's enemies have secrets they intend to keep to give them serious advantages over us and our allies. The job of our intelligence services is to reveal their most important secrets. While some of an enemy's secrets can be uncovered by imagery and signals intelligence, other secrets can only be discovered through espionage by agents with access to the intelligence sought, either because they have *access to documents* detailing those secrets, or *access to people* who know the secrets.

Realistically, since there would be limits to the resources that could be devoted to it, the best that a Canadian espionage service could accomplish would be to have four, six, maybe as many as eight dozen espionage agents in different places around the world, each one collecting intelligence on one of, say, a dozen issues of vital Canadian interest. For example, if the Iranian nuclear weapons program was one of a dozen targets, Canadian espionage officers would try to recruit as agents around a half-dozen Iranians believed to be involved in various aspects of the program, in order to achieve a holistic understanding of the program.

But even a small espionage service with a limited number of strategic targets, given well-trained espionage officers, tough offensive tactics, and a bit of luck, could well produce intelligence of very high value to Canada and its closest allies on matters, such as nuclear weapons proliferation. The espionage effort would have to be focussed upon only recruiting foreigners who had access to the most important and closely guarded secrets of our enemies.

By giving close allies Canadian espionage agent reports, we would get, in return, reports from agents working for their espionage services. Canada would likely benefit disproportionately, in that, in terms at least of quantity, Canada would get back more human intelligence reporting than it gave, above all, if agents spying for Canada were producing key intelligence otherwise unavailable to allies. I cannot prove this, but I have had enough

experience in international intelligence to be very sure of my judgement in this matter.

In sum, an aggressive, tough Canadian espionage service would probably confer a distinct and enduring strategic advantage upon Canada, both with respect to the targets chosen, and with respect to greater access to allied intelligence, as long as it, in fact, attacked genuinely strategic targets, and avoided operations that offered only tactical, transient gain.³⁷

Conclusion ~ So Canada should have a foreign espionage service, right?

No.

Because I do not think Canada would be able to run a highly effective espionage service – I think we would screw it up. If not to be highly effective, why waste the money? To be very effective, an espionage service must aggressively hunt for agents, must resort very often to bribery, perhaps infrequently to blackmail, and usually to lying and emotional manipulation of its agents. I believe that many Canadian politicians and many Canadians, at least in the current Canadian security environment, would not stand for a service that used such tactics.

Rather, I think that any Canadian espionage service established would be compelled to practice what I will disparagingly refer to as 'espionage lite,' passively waiting for walk-ins, and then accepting as agents only those walk-ins who volunteered to spy for 'pure' ideological reasons. If required to operate in this manner, the service would produce little intelligence of value. (And even if the agent is spying for acceptable ideological reasons, there are still the issues of Canada condoning treason and theft, and abetting the breaking of anti-espionage laws.) To imagine that we need only 'hang out a sign' at Canadian embassies, and then to imagine that ISIS terrorists, Russian intelligence officers, and Iranian nuclear scientists will line up at the door, demanding to tell 'nice' Canadian intelligence officers all their secrets, is the purest nonsense.

Restricted to only 'espionage lite,' a Canadian espionage service would not be worth the several hundred millions of taxpayer dollars a year that I estimate it would cost. Finally, if a Canadian government is still bound, bent, and determined somehow to spend several hundred million dollars more annually on Canadian intelligence, I can think of some improvements that would benefit Canada much more than any 'espionage lite' secret intelligence service.

Colonel (Ret'd) R. Geoffrey St. John, MSM, CD, *retired from the Canadian Armed Forces Intelligence Branch after nearly forty years of CAF service. He served in a variety of intelligence posts, including as director of imagery intelligence at National Defence Headquarters. He also was employed three times in non-intelligence posts, as Canadian Defence Attaché to Italy, Greece, and Albania, as director of peacekeeping policy at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and as Canadian Defence Attaché to Israel. Alas, he never inherited the title 'Lord Bolingbroke.'*





Street scene 2, *Bridge of Spies*

NOTES

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3. Nick Warner, *ASIS at 60*, 19 July 2012, p.3, accessed at: <https://www.asis.gov.au/media/Images/ASIS-at-60-speech.pdf>
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6. Griffith, p.233.
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8. Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service*, Penguin Books, 2012, p.58. Crumpton spent two years developing a relationship with one prospective agent.
9. Stephen Grey, *The New Spymasters*, St. Martin's Press, 2015, p.64.
10. Griffith, pp.231-232.
11. Crumpton, p.58. Crumpton also adds identifies coercion as a motive.
12. Grey, p.65.
13. Miles Copeland, *Without Cloak or Dagger*, Simon and Schuster, 1974, p.34. Not everyone agrees that a 'normal' person would ever agree to spy, but who is to say what constitutes 'normal'? See footnote 14. (Copeland's book about espionage is the best that I have read.)
14. *Ibid.*, p. 147. See footnote 13; Copeland believes as many as one out of every three US government employees would agree to become agents in certain specific circumstances and if the recruitment pitch was just right. Are all these people therefore abnormal?
15. Gordon Corera, *The Art of Betrayal: The Secret History of MI6*, Pegasus Books, 2012, p.146.
16. Copeland, p.147.
17. *Ibid.*, p.128.
18. Corera, p.146.
19. *Ibid.*, p.30, quoting an MI6 officer.
20. Grey, p.81.
21. Copeland, pp.147-148.
22. *Ibid.*, pp.126-128.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18. I built this scenario from Copeland's remarks. A similar scenario about development and recruitment without blackmail can be found in pp.18-21.
25. *Ibid.*, pp.32-33.
26. Warner, p.4.
27. Younger, p.10.
28. Corera, p.232.
29. Copeland, p.35.
30. Grey, p.285.
31. Copeland, pp.154-159.
32. Crumpton, p.70.
33. Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action*, Reader's Digest Press, 1977, p.259.
34. Corera, p.100.
35. Younger, p.8.
36. Grey, pp.282-283, p. 296.
37. Rositzke, pp.258-261. My judgement as to what a top-notch Canadian espionage service would look like is largely inspired by Rositzke's views.



DND photo LF01-2016-0061-008 by Master Corporal Kurt Visser

US Army soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, and Canadian Army soldiers from the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, on patrol together during Exercise *Maple Resolve* at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright, 27 May 2016.

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada – Canadian Army Reserve: The Missing Link

by Daniel A. Doran

Introduction

The objective of this short article is to provide a synopsis of the Auditor General’s report on the Army Reserves. The hope is to offer insight into areas where the report overlooked certain key components that are paramount to the successful implementation of any plan whose intent would be to improve the overall functioning of the Militia.

The Auditor General’s Report on the Army Reserves focuses mainly upon training, funding, human resources, and materiel challenges faced by the organization, and it provides guidance to assist the Army in overcoming these challenges.¹

It is the contention of this article that the essential tension that underlies all these challenges and that will continue to hamper any real progress in improving the Army Reserves is a *misalignment between the Reserve capabilities sought by the Regular Force and the inherent constraints and organizational culture of the Militia*. This essential conflict at the center of the issues facing

the Army Reserves is not addressed in a meaningful way by the Auditor General.

So long as this fundamental misalignment is not addressed with effect, the ‘square peg’ of Reserve capabilities will continue to fail to fit the ‘round hole’ of Regular Force expectations.

Background

In the Spring of 2016, the Auditor General released *Report 5 – Canadian Army Reserve – National Defence*. The report’s scope spanned the period between fiscal years 2012-2013 and 2014-2015, while reaching further back in time for certain data.² The report team set out with the primary objective of determining “whether the Army Reserve is ready to deploy for domestic and international missions” with the three following sub-objectives:³

- 1) Whether National Defence assigned missions and objectives to the Army Reserve and its units with the necessary resources;

- 2) Whether Army Reserve units had the capacity to accomplish assigned missions; and
- 3) Whether Army Reserve personnel and units were trained to be combat-capable and to achieve their assigned missions.

This questions were explored and analyzed through a comprehensive review of a number of types of information (*i.e.*, plans, data, reports, *etc.*) and processes (*i.e.*, recruiting), in addition to a series of interviews spanning the Reserve hierarchy.

Using this methodology, the report team developed a series of conclusions and associated recommendations grounded in their observations and associated analysis. The recommendations were far-reaching and touched upon some key technical challenges facing the Army Reserve, specifically: training, funding, human resources, and equipment.

The report came to a series of general conclusions about the most pressing challenges facing the Army Reserves, these were:⁴

- 1) Guidance on preparing for missions:
 - a. Units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions; and
 - b. Units and groups were not fully prepared for domestic missions.
- 2) Sustainability of Army Reserve units:
 - a. Units did not have the soldiers they needed; and
 - b. Funding was not designed to be consistent with unit training and other activities.
- 3) Training of Army Reserve soldiers:
 - a. Soldiers received less training than Regular Army soldiers; and
 - b. Army Reserve and Regular Army training were not fully integrated.

Each of these conclusions was accompanied by broad recommendations as to how these problems should be resolved, as follows:⁵

- 1) Guidance on preparing for missions:
 - a. Provide individual Army Reserve units with clear guidance so that they can prepare their soldiers for key tasks assigned to the Army Reserve for major international missions;
 - b. Define and provide access to the equipment that Army Reserve units and groups need to train and deploy for domestic missions; and
 - c. Require Army Reserve groups to formally confirm that they are prepared to support domestic missions.
- 2) Sustainability of Army Reserve units:
 - a. Design and implement a retention strategy for the Army Reserves;
 - b. Review the terms of service of Army Reserve soldiers, and the contracts of full-time Army Reserve soldiers, to ensure that it is in compliance with the NDA;
 - c. Review its policies and clarify Army Reserve soldiers' access to medical services;

- d. Ensure it has up-to-date information on whether Army Reserve soldiers are prepared for deployment;
- e. Ensure that budgeted annual funding for Army Reserve units is consistent with expected results; and
- f. Complete planned changes to the way it reports its annual budgets and the expenses of the Army Reserves.

- 3) Training of Army Reserve soldiers:
 - a. Work with departments and agencies to consider including coverage of absences to include all types of occupational skills training;
 - b. Consider amendments to the proposed Compensation of Employers of Reservists program;
 - c. Ensure training of Army Reserve soldiers for international deployments addresses all known gaps in skills; and
 - d. Improve the collective training and integration of Army Reserves with their Regular Force counterparts.

It is not so much the actual conclusions and recommendations of this report that are discussed in the following portion of this article, but more so, some of the overlooked elements that underlie them. Specifically, while the conclusions themselves remain valid, the recommendations fail to consider some of the key organizational constraints that would prove to be critical stumbling blocks to much of their implementation.

Some of these organizational realities *include* but are not *limited to*: the small percentage of Reservists that actually deploy domestically and internationally; objective availability of Reservists, irrespective of pay and allocated budget; unavoidable 'skill fade' inherent with part-time soldiers irrespective of training parity; and the overarching organizational culture of the Army Reserve, which remains intractable with the *Regularization* of the Army Reserves proposed in the Auditor General's report.

Analysis

The Auditor General's report on the Reserves took a very methodical approach in formulating its recommendations in an attempt to align the Army Reserve's capabilities with the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This unfortunately is where the report went astray, and led it to the solutions it proposed: *i.e.*, more training, more money, more equipment, and more personnel. These are noble objectives in that the Army Reserve is underfunded, under-equipped, and undermanned. However, these issues are not at the root of the actual problem. They are peripheral issues that need to be solved, but doing so will not solve the deeper challenges facing the Army Reserve, nor those of the CAF in their desire to optimize the Reserves to better support them.

Part-time Army Reservists can be divided into two general sub-sets: young students, and older working professionals. The former make up the bulk of the junior ranks of the Army Reserve, as well as the bulk of those that support the Regular Force in overseas operations. The latter represents the 'home-guard' and senior leadership of the regiments that engage in the cyclical work



DND photo CK05-2016-0633-028 by Master Corporal H.J. MacRae

Members of 44 Troop D Squadron, 12e Régiment blindé du Canada on road reconnaissance at Haines Junction, Yukon, during Operation *Nanook*, 30 August 2016.

of planning training and running units. These two groups have a symbiotic relationship. The junior members need the senior members to lead and plan the activities at the unit that allow the junior members to maintain the basic skills of their part-time trades through evening and weekend training. The senior members require the junior members to ensure succession.

The emphasis the CAF places upon the Reserves as a manpower pool for missions is sub-optimal, in that it does not reflect a real capability within the Reserves. Functionally, only a small percentage of Reservists deploy. The vast majority do not, and they simply parade as part-time soldiers for their full careers. It is unrealistic to try to shape the Reserves to be more operationally ready when so few active members actually deploy on operations. This would be akin to renaming all Combat Engineer Regiments ‘Dive Regiments,’ because 5% of their members are combat divers.⁶ This misalignment of expectations *has been and remains* a real challenge for the Reserves, since the CAF has not yet fully recognized this reality.

Given the small a fraction of reservists that deploy on active service, the question arises of why so much importance should be placed in the Auditor General’s report upon the achievement of skills parity. Training 100% of a group to reach a level of performance only practiced by 5% of its members seems at the very least like a misallocation of resources, both human and financial. This issue becomes more acute when one considers how this training structure inhibits many Reservists from progressing in

their part-time military careers, due to irreconcilable conflicts with their civilian work commitments.⁷

A second underlying factor ignored by the report is the reality of ‘skill fade’ in the Reserves and the inefficiencies associated with trying to create a training structure that aims to achieve skill parity between the Regular and Reserve forces. Reservists are part-time soldiers, and as such, parade around 35-45 days a year. During these periods, they engage in keeping up basic skills, such as marksmanship, battle fitness, first aid, and trade-specific skills. Over time, many of the non-basic skills of these soldiers fade, not through a lack of effort or professionalism on the part of the members, but simply due to the limited time available to practice them. This reality underscores the flaws in the current training structure. Specifically, that irrespective of training parity policies imposed, much of the benefit will be slowly lost over the ensuing years of intermittent service, irrespective of the individual’s natural acumen and dedication to the profession. While this is also true in the Regular Force to a degree, it remains a monumental challenge in the Reserves, a situation which would only be worsened should more training expectations be imposed upon its members.

A further issue that needs to be addressed is that of the objective availability of Reservists. The Auditor General’s report recommends more funding for training of Reservists. This is certainly an excellent idea on the surface, as many of the younger members of units across the country would gladly come in more often if given the opportunity. This is not the issue; the issue is

what to do with them when they arrive. Having soldiers present themselves to their respective armories more frequently is an easy objective to achieve – the question is where does one find the resources to provide these soldiers with meaningful training once they show up?

The answer lies with the senior members of the units who represent the core of the training and planning structure, as mentioned earlier. These individuals typically have full-time jobs and families, in addition to other responsibilities outside the military. They are dedicated Reservists who decided to stay beyond their formative years, due to their love of the job. These individuals typically already give as much as they can to support training, and they are unlikely to be in a position to give more to support additional training days. Herein lies the bottleneck to achieving improved training within the Reserves.

There is a natural limit that is reached with the capacity of Reserve senior leadership to support training, and in most units, that limit has been reached. The allocation of more person-days per Reservist will not necessarily create better trained individuals and units, since the senior staff responsible for creating this training would remain, for the most part, no more available than they were before the increase. This constraint could be mitigated through the progressive growth of the overall force structure of the Reserves, creating more senior staff to train the force – but this would require a great amount of time, since senior officers and NCOs are not created overnight. Another option would be to augment permanent staff of reserve units to support training. The downside of this option is that in doing so, the Regular Force augmentees would co-opt the ability of Reservists to conduct the required work by excluding them from leading the planning process. This would likely have a negative institutional impact upon Reservists' ability to grow professionally within their roles.

The final issue ignored by the Auditor General's report pertains to the misalignment between Regular and Reserve organizational culture. Peter Drucker famously noted that "culture eats strategy for breakfast,"⁸ and this statement is as true in the Army Reserve as it is in business. Despite the post-9/11 reality of the Reserve force employment strategy which has been impacted through progressive "regularization," the Reserves' organizational culture has remained steadfast in its own self-preservation with respect to its distinct values and social norms within the larger CAF culture.

While it is important that the organizational culture of any group not totally exist in isolation, it should also be acknowledged that the Regular and Reserve cultures *can* but likely *should not* become homogeneous. It can be argued that such a situation would be impossible given that many of the values and priorities of citizen soldiers do not align with the Regular Force, which is the manifest reason these same individuals did not join the Regular Force in the first place.

Becoming and remaining a Reservist at its core means enjoying the part-time nature of training and service. On occasion, members will volunteer for periods of full-time service, but this remains within an overarching part-time paradigm. Further, the very nature of the 'The Regiment' to Reservists is, in many ways, very distinct from any other comparable troop body within the CAF. While Regular force members would argue that the notion of 'The

Regiment' exists within their lines as well, it can be argued that the tenets of the Reserve culture within a regimental context are unique in that they intimately extends to communities, families, ex-members, and active members in a way uniquely different from their Regular Force counterparts. The Auditor General's report does not take this into account, possibly because delving into cultural elements such as these tends to 'muddy the waters' when trying to create clear conclusions leading to implementable recommendations.

This issue, however, remains the 'elephant in the room' when it comes to any attempt at successful Reserve transformation. Without intimately *engaging with* and *making efforts to understand* the nature of Reserve culture, the CAF's best plans will be undone through the Militia's longstanding cultural inertia that takes the form of Honourary Colonels, regimental guilds, ex-members in influential positions within the body politic, as well as the fundamentally intractable nature of the 'The Regiment,' which, despite efforts to change it, refuses to yield in any substantive manner.

Conclusion

For any transformation of the Reserves to be considered successful, the approach taken needs to be grounded in a re-alignment of the capabilities sought by the CAF with the organizational culture and inherent constraints at the core of part-time service.

Many such re-alignments lie in direct opposition to the recommendations of the report. As an example, if the Regular Force wants to incentivize the same soldier and leader-types as their Regular Force counterparts within a part-time paradigm, it would do well to consider de-coupling the Reserve career progression structure from the Regular Force, so as to create an environment that allows higher quality (but less available due to their success in civilian life) personnel to achieve and progress.⁹ Failing to do this will simply accelerate the current race towards mediocrity, which will only further hamper the Army Reserve's ability to enhance its leadership, and in turn, improve support to the Regular Force through better staff support and training.

The Auditor General's report fails to examine the Reserves as more than Regular Force augmentees within the CAF. While this may be the case for the 5% of reservists that represent augmentees – it ignores 95% of the organization of citizen-soldiers who represent a pool that could be leveraged in other ways, such as through employing them in part-time capacities related to their civilian professional skills. These members include engineers, lawyers, doctors, architects, and project managers, to name a few. These officers and Senior NCOs represent, not only the senior leadership core of the Reserves so often ignored, due to their inability and unavailability to be deployed, but also a huge potential pool of specialists and generalists that could act in consulting roles within the CAF. They would have the benefit of their civilian experience, tempered with their understanding of the military ethos and culture. These traits combined would have huge potential within the CAF to support sober second thought to policy and procedures throughout the institution.

In the end, the recommendations of the Auditor General's report that more training, money, personnel, and material will solve the problem ignores something more fundamental and at

the core of the challenges faced by the Reserves. The Reserves are distinct culturally from the Regular Force in a way that impacts the way Reservists think, work, and live. The Auditor General and Regular Force leaders need to start with this reality as the baseline for any change, and then look to thoroughly understand these components of Reserve culture before embarking upon any strategies that ‘tinker’ with the inner-workings of an institution that pre-dates its own.

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DND photo LF01-2016-0061-009 by Master Corporal Kurt Visser

Further US/Canadian cooperation during Exercise Maple Resolve at CFB Wainwright, 27 May 2016.

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Then-Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance, then-Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, passes the Chief Warrant Officer pace stick from CWO Gérard Poitras (centre), Outgoing Command CWO, to CWO Gaudreault (right), Incoming Command CWO, during the CJOC Change of Command and Change of Appointment Ceremony in Ottawa, 2 June 2015.

Expanding Horizons, Leading the Future: The Role of the Chief Petty Officer 1st Class (CPO1) / Chief Warrant Officer (CWO)

by **CWO Sherman Neil** and **CWO Richard Gillis**

Introduction

This short article formally addresses the core obligations and responsibilities of CPO1/CWOs in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It transcends environment and occupation, going to the very essence of what every CPO1/CWO must emulate, regardless of employment.

Background

In an increasingly complex and ever evolving operating environment, multi-disciplinary, comprehensive, and innovative approaches are critical enablers to sustain Canada's defence and security requirements, now and into the future.¹ Without a doubt, CPO1s/CWOs represent a vast depth of experience, wisdom, professionalism, ethics, and integrity, whose core competencies have served the CAF well in the past, and must remain sacrosanct at the operational and

tactical levels.² CPO1s/CWOs are also closely involved in leading an institution that presents two inseparable faces: a profession tasked with the defence of the state, embedded in the wider Department of National Defence (DND), where “[institutional excellence] is especially important because the current and proximate security environment compels it.”³ The past two decades have shown that CPO1s/CWOs must also be strong contributors to CAF leadership teams⁴ immediately upon employment by participating in the decision-making cycle, which converts *strategic intent* into *operational and tactical effectiveness*. In order to meet these demands, it is essential that CPO1s/CWOs be capable of understanding, adapting and prevailing despite operational complexity and the challenges of balancing institutional imperatives for professional effectiveness and organizational efficiency. The ability to transform and adjust to new realities will be critical to the continued success of the CAF and CPO1s/CWOs have an important role to play in both hemispheres of the department.

The current state of CPO1/CWO succession planning has not evolved sufficiently to keep pace with the institutional requirements envisioned in *Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model*, the *Leadership Development Model*, and supported in the *Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System Study*.⁵ To that end, the role of CPO1s/CWOs must be clearly defined, not only for those succession planned, but for all of them. They will need to be developed systematically, over time, and specifically employed within a model that synchronizes all the pillars of professional development⁶ and competencies, which will expand its strategic contribution to operational and institutional excellence.⁷

The Role

As members of the Defence Team, CPO1s/CWOs occupy a unique position within the framework of the CAF. They perform three equally important functions within our institution: they serve as trusted advisors within leadership teams, co-stewards of the Profession of Arms (POA) in conjunction with CAF Senior Officers, and as custodians of the Non-Commissioned Members (NCM) Corps.

CPO1s/CWOs are developed over the course of their careers. They are the product of a structured professional development system, and have been promoted through the ranks within their respective occupations, based upon both merit and potential, in order to fill a service requirement within the CAF. Over time, as their spheres of influence⁸ and scope of responsibilities⁹ increase, they begin to evolve from exerting *direct influence* (leading people) to performing *indirect influence* (leading the institution).¹⁰

Member of the Leadership Team

CPO1/CWOs provide knowledgeable advice grounded in critical thinking, supported by ethical reasoning, and cultured in practical experience.

While the definition of a Leadership Team may be flexible, the relationship between a CPO1/CWO and an Officer holding Command is unique. This partnership is formed by the deliberate pairing of that officer and the CPO1/CWO¹¹ to meet the needs of the command or environment. As the highest ranking NCMs within the CAF, CPO1s/CWOs have been entrusted by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to serve as effective advisors to the senior leadership of our military. A commander should endeavor to seek the advice of his CPO1/



DND photo RP07-2017-0059-002 by Leading Seaman Ogle Henry

The Coxswain, Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Phillip Hampson, greets crew members from the Spanish Auxiliary Ship *Patiño* onboard HMCS *St. John's* during a Mediterranean crew excursion as part of Operation *Reassurance*, 21 March 2017.

CWO in order to get the NCM perspective and ‘buy-in’ that will lead to mission success. Only then will the Senior Officer and the CPO1/CWO cultivate an atmosphere of respect, trust, and “unquestioned confidence”¹² in each other’s abilities, resulting in an integrated leadership team. As such, CPO1s/CWOs represent an important conduit, bringing distinctive and valuable contributions as loyal members of leadership teams. Their competencies, experience, knowledge, training, and education¹³ complement those of their commanders, thus enabling more informed decisions.

Members of a leadership team gather leadership characteristics and attributes as they have different experiences in both leading *people* and leading the *institution*. Their synergy in using a combination of direct and indirect influence is necessary for successful accomplishment of essential outcomes. It is this set of complementary skills that makes the pairing of Senior Officers and CPO1s/CWOs so unique.

CPO1s/CWOs are key enablers and change agents who exert influence upon conditions of service, as well as upon the formulation and implementation of policy changes that affect uniformed personnel, civilian employees, and their families.¹⁴ They come

from a “unique position of credibility when communicating”¹⁵ because of their trusted position as senior advisors and confidants. In line with our military ethos, every CPO1/CWO must possess the moral courage to speak truth to power. This trust must also be maintained throughout the NCM Corps by consistently being an example of professionalism in all circumstances. The CPO1/CWO must be able to bridge the gap between both the Officer and NCM Corps by communicating up and down the chain of command, using an extensive network that is based upon the relationships they have been built over the span of their careers.

Further to meeting the expectations of these responsibilities, a certain number of CPO1s/CWOs will also lead their Occupations and Branches. Their qualifications, education, and training, gained over the course of their careers, allow these subject matter experts to provide knowledge and guidance that is focused towards either an Occupational or an Environmental domain on all matters affecting NCMs, from professional development to succession management principles. These responsibilities are critical in providing the institution with a platform upon which training and education can be built.



DND photo KW05-2016-0056-013

Lieutenant-General Steve Bowes (left), then-Commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command, presents Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Andrew Tiffin, outgoing JTF-1 Chief Warrant Officer, with his General Service Medal in recognition of CPO1 Tiffin's service during Operation *Impact*, 3 June 2016.



DND photo RP006-2016-0019-005 by Corporal Jay Ekin

CWO Gaudreault, CJOC CWO, addresses members of Land Task Force Rotation 6 in Camp Albertshof during *Allied Spirit V* of Operation *Reassurance*, 2 October 2016.

Co-Stewardship of the Profession of Arms (POA)

*“Given a choice between self-serving behavior and pro-organizational behavior, a steward’s behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her organization. [...] Thus, even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value on cooperation than defection. The behavior of the steward is collective, because the steward seeks to attain the objectives of the organization.”*¹⁶

The POA is comprised of experts in the lawful, ordered application of military force,¹⁷ serving under the authority of the Canadian Government. They are trusted professionals who defend Canadian rights and interests. The core military values – duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage – are the heart of the POA. “The legitimacy of the [POA] in Canada essentially depends upon members fulfilling their professional responsibilities in accord with Canadian values, Canadian and international laws, and the Canadian military ethos.”¹⁸ Members of the POA share a common loyalty toward doctrine that ensures the organizational effectiveness of this unified

force. To maintain the health of the POA, we must achieve the appropriate balance between the functional imperative of professional effectiveness and the societal responsibility to be subordinate to civil authority and to reflect national values.¹⁹

Stewards of this profession are responsible to achieve mission success, while considering member well-being, internal integration, and the external adaptability of the institution, all the while fostering the ethical conduct of CAF members, based upon Military Ethos.²⁰ It is through these responsibilities that stewards maintain the trust of the government they serve, and ultimately, the confidence of the Canadian people to meet its mandate. The public’s trust and the belief in its military are non-negotiable.

As co-stewards of the POA, CPO1s/CWOs are instrumental in nurturing the four attributes of the POA: military ethos, identity, expertise, and responsibility.²¹ Competent and committed, they have an obligation to model and foster the practice of ethics, which includes respecting the dignity of all persons, serving Canada before self, and obeying and supporting lawful authority such that members of the CAF and members of the Defence Team will consistently perform their duties to the highest ethical standards.

As the future security environment will challenge all aspects of the POA, the co-stewards must help build a force capable of professional standards that will exceed the expectations of Canadian society. This trust between the CAF and Canadian society can be achieved by fostering an ethical culture that will ensure a proper balance between military identity and Canadian values.

Custodian of the NCM Corps

“NCM Corps 2020 established the criteria for a fully professional NCM corps and initiated a restructuring of NCM courses for the most junior, through intermediate and advanced courses, culminating in a [CPO1/CWO] qualification. These actions ensure that those selected to the highest NCM ranks are prepared for the responsibilities associated with their role as “custodians” of the NCM corps and “co-stewards” of the profession of arms.”²²

If co-stewards of the POA ensure Canadian values are respected, the custodian of the NCM Corps is responsible for maintaining a distinct military identity grounded in fundamental beliefs and expectations about military service, including the acceptance of unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline, and teamwork.²³ This responsibility is an important stability pillar in an ever-changing organization.

As custodians of the NCM Corps, CPO1s/CWOs must be keenly aware of the delicate balance between mission success and member well-being by taking proactive steps to ensure institutional excellence in areas including, but not limited to welfare, efficiency, and good discipline. This role shall never be taken lightly, and it must be transmitted to those who follow them.

CPO1s/CWOs have a responsibility to invest in our Professional Development (PD) System, and to support their subordinates' participation in, not only military training and professional military education, but also through the provision of personal lifelong learning and experiential opportunities. Additionally, they are responsible for the development of the NCM Corps by ensuring that the knowledge and expertise they have gained over the course of their careers is mentored to the next generation.

Their character and military experiences must shape and create a fighting spirit that is the hallmark of a highly effective force.

As the most senior ranking NCMs, CPO1s/CWOs are entrusted to protect and promote our military customs and traditions, which “...produce special social structures that contribute to a sense of organic unity and military identity.”²⁴ They must also ensure that organizational stability is balanced against the need to adapt to rapid changes.²⁵

Conclusion

This cadre of professionals represents the culmination of many years of experience, knowledge, training, education, and self-development. Regardless of their service, occupation, or specific job, each and every CPO1/CWO must share the core responsibilities of advisor, co-steward of the POA, and custodian of the NCM Corps. Their sphere of influence and scope of responsibility can range from the tactical, where they are firmly anchored in the direct leading of people, to the strategic, where their effect is more indirect. CPO1s/CWOs require a deliberate ability to anticipate and create the conditions necessary for operational success and institutional excellence. It is these three unique functions of providing an essential and distinct capability to the leadership team, co-stewarding the Profession of Arms, and embodying the role of custodian of the NCM Corps which form the bedrock upon which all employment must be developed and their importance safeguarded for future generations.

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DND photo SW2016-0167-05 by Leading Seaman Brad Upshall

Members of the Joint Task Force Nijmegen 2016 contingent are greeted at the airport in Lille, France, by Regimental Sergeant Major Chief Warrant Officer Luc Moreau, 15 July 2016.

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7. *Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership*.
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Northern Lights, also known as *Aurora Borealis*, at moonset.


Strong, Secure, Engaged: The Liberal Defence Policy Statement of 2017

by Martin Shadwick

Although scarcely two years old, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has published, or encouraged the publishing, of an impressive array of defence-themed studies, reports, speeches, and policy statements. To the defence plank in the Liberal campaign platform of 2015, one can add the governmental and non-governmental literature associated with the defence policy consultation process of 2016 (i.e., a 27-page Public Consultation Document, six multiple-topic and three specialized roundtables, “consultation events” hosted by Members of Parliament and assorted non-governmental organizations, numerous formal submissions and 20,000 entries online), the deliberations of a high-level Ministerial Advisory Group, insightful reports by Parliamentary committees, some candid speeches by Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan and a particularly oft-cited speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland on 6 June 2017 (given events on an earlier sixth of June, arguably a most appropriate date on which to offer reflections on Canada’s foreign policy priorities). The end product of Ottawa’s defence policy review, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, was, not coincidentally, rolled out

one day later. Noticeably more detailed than its white paper and *de facto* white paper predecessors of recent decades, the copiously illustrated (and alliteration-heavy) policy document promised a “new vision”—and extensive capital investments—for Canada’s armed forces while devoting unprecedented attention to personnel issues and the “health and wellness” needs of serving and retired military personnel. These will be the subject of a follow-on column.

Unconventionally but thoughtfully setting the stage for *Strong, Secure, Engaged* was Chrystia Freeland’s speech—delivered, most appropriately, in the House of Commons—on Canada’s foreign policy priorities in the contemporary world. “Two global conflicts and the Great Depression, all in the span of less than half a century,” noted the minister, “taught our parents and grandparents that national borders must be inviolate; that international trading relationships not only created prosperity but also peace; and that a true world community, one based on shared aspirations and standards, was not only desirable but essential to our very survival. That deep yearning toward lasting peace led to the creation of international institutions that endure to this day—with the nations of Western



Government of Canada

Europe, together with their transatlantic allies, the United States and Canada, at their foundation. In each of these evolutions in how we humans recognize ourselves, Canadians played pivotal roles. [...] It is important to note,” continued the minister, “that when sacrifice was required to support and strengthen the global order—military power, in defence of our principles and our alliances—Canada was there. In the Suez, in Korea, in the Congo, in Cyprus, in the First Gulf War, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, up to and including today in Iraq, among many other places, Canada has been there. [...] Today, it is worth reminding ourselves why we step up—why we devote time and resources to foreign policy, defence and development, why we have sent Canadian soldiers, sailors, aviators, diplomats, aid workers, intelligence officers, doctors, nurses, medics and engineers into situations of danger, disaster and chaos overseas, even at times when Canadian territory was not directly at risk. Why do we spend billions on defence, if we are not immediately threatened?”

Although one “could easily imagine a Canadian view that says [...] let’s turn inward. Let’s say Canada first. Here’s why that would be wrong. First, though no foreign adversary is poised to invade us, we do face clear challenges. Climate change [...], [c]ivil war, poverty, drought and natural disasters anywhere in the world threaten us as well—not least because [they] spawn globally destabilizing mass migrations. The dictatorship in North Korea, crimes against humanity in Syria, the monstrous extremists of Daesh, and Russian military adventurism and expansionism also all pose clear strategic threats to the liberal democratic world,



KCNA KCNA/Reuters RTSLOPZ

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, released by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 4 August 2016.

including Canada. Our ability to act against such threats is limited. It requires cooperation with like-minded countries. [...] Some think, some even say, we should [take a] free ride on U.S. military power. Why invest billions to maintain a capable, professional, well-funded and well-equipped Canadian military? The answer is obvious: To rely solely on the U.S. national security umbrella would make us a client state. And although we have an incredibly good relationship with our American friends and neighbours, such a dependence would not be in Canada's interest. That is why doing our fair share is clearly necessary. It is why our commitment to NORAD, and our strategic relationship with the United States, is so critical. It is by pulling our weight in this partnership, and in all our international partnerships, that we, in fact, have weight. To put it plainly: Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes requires the backing of hard power. Force is of course always a last resort. But the principled use of force, together with our allies and governed by international law, is part of our history and must be part of our future."

In its assessment of today's "complex, unpredictable security environment," the 2017 defence policy statement, in turn, stressed that "three key security trends will continue to shape events." These trends included: (a) the evolving balance of power (i.e., the "return of major power rivalry, new threats from non-state actors, and challenges in the space and cyber domains [that] have returned deterrence to the centre of defence thinking", a changing Arctic, and numerous challenges to global governance);

(b) the changing nature of conflict (i.e., its growing complexity, the "grey zone" and hybrid warfare, the linkages between inter- and intra-state conflict, global terrorism, the security challenges imposed by climate change, increased weapons proliferation, and the changing nature of peace operations); and (c) the rapid evolution of technology (i.e., the *rise of*, and *challenges to*, the cyber and space domains).

Given the uncertainty and complexity of the global security environment—and its multi-faceted implications for Canada—the country would "continue to invest in a multi-purpose, combat-ready force that is able to act decisively and deliver results across the full spectrum of operations. The roles and missions of the Canadian Armed Forces have traditionally been characterized in geographic terms, with distinct lines drawn between domestic, continental and international responsibilities. The Canadian Armed Forces' commitment to defending Canada and the broader North American continent and contributing to international peace and security will be stronger than ever. However, making sharp distinctions among the missions that fulfill these roles is becoming less and less relevant in the new security environment. The rise of borderless challenges such as terrorism and cyber attacks, the increasingly strong connection between global stability and domestic security and prosperity, and the fact the Canadian Armed Forces is as likely to support broader whole-of-government efforts abroad as it is at home, mean that its three traditional roles are becoming more and more intertwined."



DND photo ET2015-5118-005 by Leading Seaman Ogle Henry

HMCS *Winnipeg* sails the Eastern Atlantic Ocean on ship's transit to Exercise *Trident Juncture* during Operation *Reassurance*, 21 October 2015.



DND photo ET2016-0468-03 by Corporal Carbe Orellana

HMCS *Chicoutimi* escorts People's Liberation Army (Navy) ships visiting Victoria on behalf of the Chinese military, 13 December 2016.

Consequently, the “eight new core missions” of the Canadian Armed Forces identified in the 2017 policy document “must reflect this reality. Instead of being simply divided geographically, they are now also plotted against the spectrum of military options. These missions are all critical to delivering on Canada’s defence objectives, and are not listed in order of priority”: (a) detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada; (b) detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, including through NORAD; (c) lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability; (d) lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners; (e) engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad; (f) provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad; (g) provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and (h) conduct search and rescue operations.

To the relief of Canada’s maritime forces, the 2017 defence plan “fully funds, for the first time, the [...] full complement of 15 Canadian Surface Combatants [CSC] necessary to replace the existing [*Halifax*-class] frigates and retired [*Iroquois*-class] destroyers. Fifteen. Not “up to” 15 and not 12. And definitely not six,” stressed defence minister Sajjan, “which is the number the previous government’s plan would have paid for, as the Parliamentary Budget Officer [has] reported....” The single class of 15 Canadian Surface Combatants, noted a Backgrounder, would be “capable of

meeting multiple threats on both the open ocean and the highly complex [littoral] environment.” The policy statement also pledged to move forward with the inherited plans for two joint support ships and five-to-six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. The Trudeau government’s pledge of full funding for the Canadian Surface Combatant—clearly the future backbone of the RCN—represents no small undertaking but, that said, the CSC will require substantial and sustained funding over multiple decades and multiple governments. Whether that will ultimately generate a fleet of 15 comparatively high-end frigates, or something rather less, remains to be seen—particularly when even major navies have been directed, for financial, political and other reasons, to plan for high/low or high/intermediate mixes of frigates (i.e., the Royal Navy’s Type 26 and projected intermediate Type 31). The commitment to the joint support ships is welcome, but a case can continue to be made for the acquisition of an additional support ship possessing greater multi-role flexibility (i.e., replenishment, sealift, support to forces ashore and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) than either the JSS or the interim ‘*Resolve*-class’ conversion. Such a ship, either a conversion or new-build, would appear to be a logical match for the defence priorities set down by the Trudeau government.

The policy statement also pledged to “modernize the four *Victoria*-class submarines”, acquire “new or enhanced naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, upgraded armament, and additional systems for current and future platforms allowing for more effective offensive and defensive naval capacities” and “upgrade the lightweight torpedoes carried by surface ships, maritime helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.” The pledge to modernize the four *Victoria*-class submarines has been well-received in some quarters, but some observers have bemoaned the absence of a submarine replacement plan, and, concomitantly, the absence of a rebalancing of the ratio of submarines to major surface combatants in the Canadian fleet.

For the RCAF, the cornerstone of the 2017 defence policy statement was the pledge to replace the aging CF-18 fleet with 88 “advanced fighter aircraft” following an “open and transparent competition.” The new fleet, substantially larger than the 65-strong fighter force envisaged by the Harper government’s



A Canadian Ranger receives an orientation ride on a LAV 6.0 armoured vehicle by members of Land Task Force Pacific in Williams Lake, BC, during Operation *Lentus 17-04*, 25 July 2017.

Canada First Defence Strategy, would help to “counter today’s evolving threat environment,” “improve [Canada’s] air control and attack capability,” and “allow us to fully meet both our NORAD and NATO commitments simultaneously.” In a cryptic passage, the policy statement also reported that the Government of Canada was “continuing to explore the potential acquisition of an interim aircraft to supplement the [legacy] CF-18 fighter aircraft fleet until the completion of the transition to the permanent replacement aircraft...” Dating back, at least in formal terms, to the Trudeau government’s November 2016 announcement that it planned to acquire 18 Boeing F/A-18E/F *Super Hornets*, the interim fighter concept has drawn fire from various quarters, including a plethora of retired air force commanders, for being overtly political, expensive, “strategically unwise” and a wasteful diversion of scarce aircrew and groundcrew (see, for example, John Ivison, “Fighter Jet Deal ‘Makes no Sense,’ Liberals Told,” *National Post*, 23 February 2017). In a 2017 survey conducted by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, fully 88 percent of the defence specialist respondents rejected the interim *Super Hornet* proposal. Should, however, the Trudeau government wish to reconsider the interim fighter option, it may have been provided with a most convenient out by Boeing’s decision to ask the United States Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission to investigate subsidies for Bombardier’s C-Series airliner.

In addition to the 88 advanced fighter aircraft, the 2017 defence policy statement pledged to: (a) replace the CC-150 *Polaris* with a next generation strategic air-to-air tanker-transport; (b) replace the CP-140 *Aurora* with a next generation multi-mission ISR aircraft (one trusts that Ottawa will resist, as the first Trudeau government did in the mid- 1970s, political and industrial lobbying for a superficially attractive but operationally and financially suspect made-in-Canada solution to maritime patrol/ISR requirements); (c) replace the CC-138 *Twin Otter* utility transport aircraft; (d) acquire new short-range and medium-range air-to-air missiles; (e) invest in medium-altitude remotely piloted systems; (f) “sustain domestic search and rescue capability, to include life extension of existing systems, acquisition of new platforms, and greater integration with internal and external partners”; and (g) “operationalize the newly-acquired Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue [i.e., C295W] fleet”. The defence policy statement also pledged to: (h) upgrade/life-extend, to varying degrees, the CH-149 *Cormorant* SAR helicopter, the CC-130J *Hercules* airlifter, and the CH-146 *Griffon* utility tactical transport helicopter; (i) “acquire space capabilities meant to improve situational awareness and targeting, including replacement of the current RADARSAT system[...]; sensors capable of identifying and tracking debris in space that threatens Canadian and allied space-based systems[...]; and space-based systems that will enhance and improve tactical narrow- and wide-band communications, including throughout

Canada’s Arctic region;” (j) upgrade air navigation, management and control systems; (k) acquire new aircrew training systems; and (l) “acquire new Tactical Integrated Command, Control, and Communications, radio cryptography, and other necessary communications systems.”

Although devoid of a CSC or fighter-like megaproject, the capital investments projected for the Canadian Army—which “will recapitalize *many* [emphasis added] core capabilities”—are deemed by the 2017 policy statement as “fundamental to [the army’s] future effectiveness as a combat-ready force.” *Strong, Secure, Engaged* seeks to: (a) acquire “ground-based air defence systems and associated munitions capable of protecting all land-based force elements from enemy airborne weapons;” (b) acquire a new multi-purpose anti-armour, anti-structure weapon system; (c) procure 20,000 new assault rifles; (d) upgrade the light armoured vehicle fleet “to improve mobility and survivability;” (e) replace the family of armoured combat support vehicles, including command vehicles, ambulances and mobile repair teams vehicles; (f) modernize logistics vehicles, heavy engineer equipment and light utility vehicles; (g) acquire “all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles and larger tracked semi-amphibious utility vehicles optimized for use in the Arctic environment;” (h) acquire “communications, sustainment, and survivability equipment” for the Army light forces, including improved lightweight radios and soldier equipment; (i) modernize land-based command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; (j) improve “the Army’s ability to operate in remote regions by investing in

modernized communications, shelters, power generation, advanced water purification systems, and equipment for austere environments;” (k) acquire new night vision and related systems; and (l) modernize “the fleet of Improvised Explosive Device Detection and Defeat capabilities.”

Lengthy and eclectic, the capital investment list identified by the 2017 defence policy statement provides a useful—if sobering—insight into the capability gaps and deficiencies that have developed over recent years and decades in the Canadian Army. That said, the number of references to “light forces,” expanded “light forces capability” and “light” vehicles will raise concerns in some quarters over the future of heavy armour (i.e., the *Leopard C2* main battle tank).

In addition to adding 605 personnel to Canada’s Special Operations Forces—an eminently sensible enhancement, given the high operational tempo of SOF formations—the 2017 defence policy statement pledged to: (a) “acquire airborne ISR platforms” (long-mooted and potentially quite useful, but with a number of potentially awkward intelligence-gathering and domestic privacy implications); (b) “recapitalize existing commercial pattern, SUV-type armoured vehicles”; (c) “modernize and enhance [SOF] Command, Control and Communications information systems, and computer defence networks”; and (d) “enhance next generation [SOF] integrated soldier system equipment, land mobility, and maritime mobility and fighting vehicle platforms.”



Aerial photograph of Nunavut, taken from a CC-177 *Globemaster III* aircraft during Operation *Nevus*, 10 June 2016.

DND photo YK-2016-036-004 by Petty Officer 2nd Class Belinda Groves

Other initiatives outlined in the 2017 policy document focused upon the future of the reserves, the bolstering of academic outreach (i.e., \$4.5 million per year for a “revamped and expanded defence engagement program, including collaborative networks of experts, a new scholarship program, and an “expansion of the existing expert briefing series and engagement grant program”), an enhanced presence in the Arctic and improvements in the defence procurement system. While noting that “the Reserve Force has a long history of making important contributions to the Canadian Armed Forces across the spectrum of operations, most recently during the Afghan conflict,” the policy statement posited that “fundamental changes are necessary for the Reserve Force to meet its full operational potential.” Reserve Force units and formations would consequently be assigned “new roles that provide full-time capability to the Canadian Armed Forces through part-time service,” including light urban search and rescue, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence, combat capabilities such as direct fire, mortar and pioneer platoons, cyber operators, intelligence operators, naval security teams, and linguists. Existing roles assigned to the reserves, including information operations, combat support and combat service support, and air operations support technicians, would be enhanced. There is much of merit in this list, although there could be nervousness in some reserve quarters over an apparent shift to niche specialization.

In the Arctic, new initiatives included “enhancing the mobility, reach and footprint of the Canadian Armed Forces...to support operations, exercises, and the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to project force into the region,” aligning the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) with our sovereign airspace, enhancing and expanding “the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers to improve their functional capabilities within the Canadian Armed Forces,” collaborating “with the United States on the development of new technologies to improve surveillance and control, including the renewal of the North Warning System,” and conducting “joint exercises with Arctic allies and partners and support the strengthening of situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic, including with NATO.” Those and related declarations, suggested Arctic authority Rob Huebert, underscored a shift from a sovereignty-focused approach to the Arctic to a security-focused approach. In a quest for “effective” defence procurement—which, the 2017 defence policy statement correctly observed, was “essential for ensuring public trust”—new initiatives included reducing “project

development and approval time in the Department of National Defence by at least 50 percent for low-risk and low-complexity projects through improved internal coordination, increased delegation and strengthened approval processes” and growing and professionalizing “the defence procurement workforce in order to strengthen the capacity to manage the acquisition and support of today’s complex military capabilities.” Increased transparency and timeliness of communication with both the defence industry and the public would also be pursued.

Initial reaction to the 2017 policy statement from defence analysts and other stakeholders was predictably mixed, ranging from near-universal endorsements for its attention to “health and wellness,” to assorted complaints over a perceived lack of detail at some junctures, a perceived lack of specificity regarding defence policy priorities, and the somewhat unorthodox sequencing of the ‘chapters’ in the defence policy statement. The overwhelming focus of attention, however, was the adequacy (or otherwise) of the additional funding promised by the Trudeau government. A *Globe and Mail* editorial of 7 June 2017 adopted a middle path, lamenting that the aim of the new defence plan “is to allow the Canadian [Armed] Forces, a decade from now, to be able to do roughly what the Canadian [Armed] Forces were doing, a decade ago” while acknowledging that the Trudeau government “nevertheless is promising to spend more on defence—not less. It is promising to reverse the decline in the Canadian [Armed] Forces, not accelerate it. And it’s promising to greenlight the two biggest ticket items, fighter jets and [combatant] ships, despite huge price tags and massive cost escalation. This is not nothing.” Indeed, as the defence minister noted, the defence budget would grow, on a cash basis, from \$18.9 billion in 2016-17 to \$32.7 billion in 2026-27. These figures, he added, did not include the costs of future major operations or NORAD modernization. Further substantial injections of new money would appear post-2026-27. In many respects, though, the real question may not be the total amount of new funding—important as that is—but the *speed* with which the new monies actually arrive.

Martin Shadwick *has taught Canadian Defence Policy at York University in Toronto for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.*



Combat Mission Kandahar: The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan

by T. Robert Fowler

Toronto: Dundurn, 2016

271 pages, \$21.99

ISBN: 978-1-4597-3516-3

Reviewed by Karen P. Page

Combat Mission Kandahar: *The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan*: the title alone intrigued me. As a result of my experience in an international support role in Afghanistan in 2011, I have always been curious to learn more about the experiences of fellow Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members who were directly involved in the combat mission. This book presented an opportunity for me, as it does for any reader. In his preface to *Combat Mission Kandahar*, T. Robert Fowler stated that he hoped his book would “help Canadians gain a better understanding of the challenges their men and women faced in Afghanistan and how well they carried out their duties.”¹ That he chose to include recounts of personal experiences lends an element of oral history that breathes life into the topic, while still respecting historical aspects of the mission.

Combat Mission Kandahar is divided into two parts; the first provides a brief history of the conflict and the second relays personal experiences of seven military personnel. For Fowler, one of the challenges was that it was difficult to obtain official information that wasn't severely redacted, and much of what Canadian troops did in Kandahar is hidden in what is termed as the “Fog of War.”² As a result, Fowler used open sources and interviewed military personnel who had participated in the combat mission to write this book.³

The first part begins with two chapters which provide a very brief history of the Afghan conflict, Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan mission from 2001 to the end of the official combat mission in July 2011, and it introduces Counter Insurgency Warfare to situate the reader into the Afghan environment. The second part provides seven accounts of personnel whose duties took them ‘outside the wire,’ which significantly increased the risk of injury or death, as these duties placed them directly in dangerous situations and districts without the benefit of barriers and guards.⁴ Although he does not indicate the number of soldiers with whom he spoke, Fowler clearly states that the seven “stories”


were selected “with no other criteria than they each had different duties while in Afghanistan.” This is summed up with the subtitle “*Seven Soldiers. Seven Military Specialties. Seven Stories.*”⁵

The seven stories were from personnel who ranged in rank from corporal to captain, and who were involved in diverse roles in the Afghanistan mission. Each of the seven interview chapters provides a brief summary of the type of operations: counter-insurgency; reconstruction; psychological operations; explosive ordnance disposal; mentoring; reconnaissance; and infantry operations. His writing style is engaging, and the reader becomes immersed in each of the individual stories. It is suggested, however, that the recounts of experience provide but a glimpse of what it must have been like for the individuals involved. In my experience, military personnel tend to normalize the situations they encounter while on deployed operations. As a minute example, many Canadians left the Kandahar Airfield with t-shirts that sported the expression “only a rocket attack stops a workout” which reflects how rocket attacks became commonplace and little more than an inconvenience, despite the significant threat that they presented. Therefore, it is likely that the accounts convey but a snippet of the stress, danger, and conditions faced by the soldiers. What I particularly liked about each story is that Fowler provided a quick synopsis of post-combat service comments for the interviewees. Most touching, for me, is the story of Corporal François Dupéré, whose indomitable spirit following severe injuries sustained from an improvised explosive device is indicative of willpower, courage, and enthusiasm for life.

A comment was made in a previous review by Craig Mantle that all the interviewees were male, for which Fowler, in his response to the review, indicated

that “(he) would have very much liked to have included a female soldier, particularly a medical technician.”⁶ From my perspective, the combat mission and experiences are not a gender issue. That the selected stories were only from males does not detract from the value of the recounted experiences. If I were to make a change to the book, it would be a simple addition of the names of the personnel killed during the combat mission.⁷ Reference is made in *Combat Mission Kandahar* to some personnel who lost their lives as a result of their mission. While comment on each and every life and experience is beyond the scope of the book, a list of the names of all 158 CAF personnel who lost their lives to the combat mission would recognize the sacrifice of each and every one, and it would be a tribute to their friends and families.

Fowler writes in an engaging manner. Ultimately, he achieved his intent by providing a greater understanding of the challenges



BOOK REVIEWS

military personnel faced in Afghanistan, and the commitment with which they performed their duties through a glimpse into the experiences of seven personnel. In my opinion, he took it further through depicting the courage, spirit, and tenacity of the interviewees. *Combat Mission Kandahar* is an excellent read, for both a military and civilian audience, and is highly recommended.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Karen P. Page, CD was a *Logistics Officer in the CAF from 1980 to 2014. In addition to her Canadian postings, she served in Geilenkirchen, Germany and deployed to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Camp Mirage, Afghanistan and Cyprus. While in Afghanistan from July to December 2011, she was the J8 FINCON with the international staff at Command Kandahar Airfield.*

NOTES

1. Robert T. Fowler, *Combat Mission Kandahar: The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan*. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), p. 11.
2. Robert T. Fowler, Author's personal website; available at <http://www.trobert-fowler.com/blog>; accessed 13 July 2017.
3. Robert T. Fowler, *Combat Mission Kandahar*..., p. 16.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Craig Leslie Mantle, Book Review: T. Robert Fowler, *Combat Mission Kandahar: The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan*. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), p. 271. Available at <http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/review-of-t-robert-fowlers-combat-mission-kandahar-by-craig-leslie-mantle/>, accessed 11 July 2017.
7. Website: iCasualties, Operation Enduring Freedom, Canadian Casualties; available at; <http://icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Canada>; accessed 11 July 2017.

Out Standing in the Field ~ A Memoir by Canada's First Female Infantry Officer

by Sandra Perron

Toronto: Cormorant Books, 2017


316 pages, \$24.95

ISBN: 978-1770864948

Reviewed by Bill Bentley

This reviewer served 34 years in the infantry before being appointed as a Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC). However, during my four years as a cadet at RMCC, women had not yet been admitted. By the time I left regimental duty in the early-1980s, women had not yet been admitted into the combat arms. In addition, during my subsequent years in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), I served 13 years overseas or on secondments to the Department of Foreign Affairs. All this to say that my perspective has been shaped by not having been directly exposed to the trials and tribulations of integrating women into the combat arms during the time covered by Sandra Perron's book.

That having been said, Sandra has written a heartfelt and compelling story of her personal and professional experiences during this era. I have a strong sense that she has tried to be truly honest, even brutally honest, with both her readers and herself to the extent permitted to humans, which can never reach 100 percent for anyone.



Sandra tells us at the outset that from the age of 14, at least, she was *committed to*, even *obsessed with*, joining the army, and especially, the infantry. When she was able to enlist, the military had not yet opened the combat trades to women, so she joined the Logistics Branch. However, the minute the infantry branch opened to women, she transferred to the Royal 22 Regiment (the fabled 'Van Doos'), and here is where her real story begins.

Much of the early part of the book deals in meticulous detail with her introductory Infantry Phase training through four phases in Gagetown, New Brunswick. Infantry Phase training is very tough indeed, and after Phase 2, all other female applicants had either quit or had failed. The physical and mental challenges any infantry candidate undergoes in this 'boot camp' environment were greatly exacerbated by emotional and psychological pressures induced by the incessant harassment, always conducted with a sexual undercurrent. Some instructors are implicated, but the main problem was clearly with her peers. At the same time, Sandra tells of her 'six precious brothers-in-arms' who shared Phase training with her, and the several Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) who were supporters. These individuals apparently provided support and helped mitigate the stress of harassment and rejection she was otherwise enduring. Now, there is no question that negative peer pressure can be enormous, but one cannot help wishing she had been able to bring these countervailing forces into better balance.

Clearly, Sandra succeeds in her Phase training, and subsequently joins the 'Van Doo' battalion as a platoon commander. She serves both in Canada, and notably, two tours in the Balkans,

BOOK REVIEWS

the second time (Croatia) as the Anti-Tank Platoon Commander. It is here, culminating at the end of her second tour, that she confronts the final challenge to her commitment as an affront to her pride and sense of professionalism. Despite high performance ratings and considerable operational experience, she is told she will be posted back to Gagetown as the second-in-command of a Phase 2 infantry serial, working for a male officer junior in rank with less experience. This was, to employ a well-worn but apt metaphor/cliché, 'the straw that broke the camel's back.' After several attempts to have this decision reversed, she relents and submits her resignation.

Sandra Perron had served for 15 years during a very tumultuous time in the CAF, and although she never refers to it, the context must be noted. The time frame in question is the 1990s, the period often referred to in the Canadian Armed Forces as the 'the decade of darkness.' Despite an extremely high operational tempo in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and throughout the Balkans, the CAF endured crippling cuts in the defence budget. Beginning around 1994, and continuing through to 2000, the Somalia Affair was a debilitating distraction, especially for the senior leadership. This cannot be viewed as an excuse for the failure to more effectively deal with the integration of women into the combat arms, but must be acknowledged at least as a mitigating factor. Perversely, it could also be argued that it is an indictment of an institution and its strategic leadership that was apparently incapable of 'walking and chewing gum at the same time.'

Looking back from the vantage point of 2017, it is clear that Sandra Perron was a courageous pioneer who paved the way for the women who followed. She cracked the 'glass ceiling' that permitted others to break it, **albeit, not shatter it yet**, up until today.

Significantly, Sandra began writing her book in May 2015, the same month that Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps released her report with respect to sexual harassment in the CAF. Shortly thereafter the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Jon Vance, initiated Operation *Honour*, focused upon addressing the "sexualized culture" that Deschamps had uncovered. Thus, twenty-odd years after Sandra Perron's experience, one has to wonder how far we have come. It certainly speaks to the almost intractable problem of changing culture, or put somewhat differently, enhancing and embedding a professional culture that demands standards of conduct higher than those set for the broader Canadian society.

Sandra Perron's book is a 'cautionary tale' that was not adequately addressed. Given the current situation I believe it is fair to say that the book should be widely read and discussed by leaders at all levels.

Bill Bentley, MSM, CD, Ph.D., *was until recently the Senior Staff Officer Professional Concepts at Canadian Defence Academy Headquarters in Kingston, Ontario.*

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam

by **H.R. McMaster**


New York: Harper Collins, 1997

446 pages, \$20.20 (softcover)

ISBN 0-06-092908-1

Reviewed by
Peter J. Williams

If the name of the author of this quite revealing, and indeed, shocking book sounds familiar, then it should. He is currently (July 2017) the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States of America. Herbert Raymond McMaster was a major at the time of writing this book, which was a



result of part of his work toward his Ph. D. at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

The essential thesis of the book is that the war in Vietnam was not one that was forced upon the US, but one that was lost in Washington DC, "...even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war..."¹ The period covered by the book runs from 1962, when the US effort was largely of an advisory nature, to 1965, when an uprated level of American commitment was announced by President Johnson at a press conference. At that media event, LBJ announced that he would increase US troop levels in Vietnam to 125,000, leaving no-one in any doubt that, like it or not, and not withstanding later attempts at the so-called "Vietnamization" of the conflict, this was now America's War.

BOOK REVIEWS

We all know how this story ends, but the author does a very convincing job (in this reviewer's opinion) of explaining how it started and then escalated. In the author's view, the 'slide down the slippery slope' in South-East Asia began under the Kennedy Administration, and as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis. During that event, the advice of the Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara (to institute an effective blockade) was accepted by JFK in the face of conflicting advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who argued for more overt military action. McMaster then goes on to argue that a key outcome of the crisis was that the military advisors to the President and his administration, a role enshrined in law, were sidelined and marginalized, often only being consulted after an executive decision had been taken with respect to the deployment of military forces. Instead of thinking and acting strategically, those military advisors were often relegated to being, as we would now say, "in the weeds."

The position of the JCS continued in this way under the succeeding Johnson Administration. This brought challenges of its own, including the author's claim that LBJs preoccupation with his domestic agenda and the "Great Society" he envisaged, as well as his focus upon future elections, meant that insufficient attention was given to Vietnam. Further, US objectives in Vietnam never seemed to be clear. At one point, the President seemed to be overly fixated upon killing Viet Cong (a focus I have always thought came from the military alone), while at other times, some of LBJs senior civilian advisors were of the view that, "...if the United States demonstrated that it would use military force to support its foreign policy, its international stature would be enhanced, *regardless of the outcome.*"² (reviewer's emphasis). One wonders to what extent does such a view exist today in the corridors of power in the West? The author also asserts that Johnson and McNamara deceived Congress, and by extension, the US public, as to the level of US commitment and its cost.

As the title asserts, the JCS did not cover themselves in glory throughout the course of events described in the book, either. In McMaster's view, their deliberations were often fraught with inter-service rivalry, dissension which their civilian masters appeared to exploit, nor did they normally speak with one voice, much less, a voice which would explain to the civilian leadership the possible consequences of US military actions. In not speaking truth to power, McMaster concludes that the JCS were also "derelict" in their duty.

Much to my surprise, Canada receives mention in this book. The Johnson administration used the Canadian emissary to the International Commission for Supervision and Control (Vietnam), Mr. J. Blair Seaborn, as a 'go-between' to pass on to Hanoi the aims and objectives of the US government, a strategy which was based

upon "graduated pressure," a concept advanced by McNamara, and in which the threat of the use of force was more important than its actual usage.³

The author cannot be faulted for either the depth or the breadth of his research. At the time of his writing, many of the relevant documents had been declassified, manuscript collections had been made available, and the official history of the JCS during the Vietnam War had just been written. Thus, the bibliography is weighted in favour of primary source documents, including numerous oral histories and personal papers of many of the *dramatis personae*, as well as transcripts of White House telephone conversations. Indeed, the author conducted several interviews himself, including those with General Westmoreland, the former in-theatre US Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Extensive Notes that run to 83 pages supplement the main text.

The Editor of this journal challenged me to demonstrate the relevance of a book written some 20 years ago to today's Canadian defence reality. Given the fact that we have just had a new defence policy released, that the government is still considering options for the deployment of Canadian soldiers and police on United Nations peacekeeping missions, the interplay between our military leadership and our government regarding future missions remains worthy of consideration and analysis. I found that as I read this book, many of the issues I have grappled with when serving, in particular, following a "whole of government approach," translating government direction into military tasks, and assessing mission progress, kept coming up again and again as America's engagement in South-East Asia in the early-1960s was analyzed.

This book is strongly recommended to our senior military and civilian leaders, and to journalists, who will be challenging these same leaders as to the 'whys and wherefores' of future Canadian military commitments overseas. I would also hope that the author himself returns to the pages of this instructive book from time to time, lest he be accused of joining the ranks of the "silent men" he so damningly decries herein.

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NOTES

1. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 333.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 159.