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JFTC Towards New Challenges

**Interview with the JFTC Commander
Brigadier General Grabowski**

Resolute Support to Resolute Support

**Joint Force Training Centre sets standards
for new pre-deployment training**

Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process

How to Demystify the Devil



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„Transformation Through Training“

The aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among training and educational institutions across NATO in the area of training, military professional education, and related technological support. In the context of The NATO “Smart Defense” approach, there is growing importance for cooperation with partner states and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and institutions beyond the NATO environment, to publish in the Transformation Through Training magazine. The magazine will focus on the best practices in the areas of command and staff training, professional military education, simulations and simulation technologies, distributed training, military training development as well as other related areas. The JFTC also welcomes recommendations for the application of the most recent experience and lessons learned from ongoing operations, training events and recent innovations in the field of simulations and information technologies. The magazine will also briefly cover the life of the international community at the JFTC with the aim of promoting the centre within NATO and among the partner nations. The magazine will be published twice a year, during the spring and fall, by the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

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Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz (JFTC)

Managing director:

Brigadier General László SZABÓ,
JFTC Deputy Commander / Chief of Staff

Chief Editor:

MAJ Goran PIJETLOVIC, Chief PAO JFTC,
Spokesperson COM JFTC

Editorial Board:

Mrs. Kamila SIERZPUTOWSKA, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland
BG Ing. Jaromír ZŮNA, MSc., PhD, Director of the Logistics Agency, Army of the Czech Republic

Advisory Committee:

Ms. Radosława KUBICZEK, Public Affairs Specialist
Mr. Tomasz OCIŃSKI, JFTC Language Specialist

Editorial Contact Information:

Public Affairs Office
Joint Force Training Centre
ul. Szubińska 2
Bydgoszcz, 85-915, Poland.
E-mail: pao@jftc.nato.int

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JFTC Towards New Challenges

Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski

Sir, last year the Joint Force Training Centre celebrated its 10th anniversary. You have been the Commander of the unit for 1,5 year. You took the helm of the JFTC in a very interesting time – the change of mission in Afghanistan, new challenges appeared. How do you asses readiness of your centre to respond to today's needs of the Alliance? Did the JFTC make a good use of the past decade?

I will not talk about numbers, statistics, as we did it last year – we summarized the ten years

– how many people participated in events conducted by the JFTC, how many people we trained, in which areas, what training events, exercises, experiments, courses and conferences were executed throughout that time. My assessment can in fact be based on what I have observed since I became the JFTC Commander. And I have to admit that it is a very interesting time. The ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan, supported by the JFTC in terms of Headquarters' and their staffs' preparation, came to an end.

A new, completely different, non-combat Resolute Support (RS) mission was launched and its future members are also trained by the JFTC. What is more, completely new challenges appear, like training for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), for NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and many others.

Each of these new tasks is a test for the JFTC and its staff. This evolving situation verifies the professionalism of our centre – we passed



this test and it was a faultless performance. Thus I can say with complete certainty, that the JFTC made very good use of the past ten years.

**You said that this moment, full of new challenges, ‘verified the professionalism’.
How?**

Let's focus on the new Afghan mission for a moment. We had to shift our way of thinking towards a totally new direction. Before, we trained HQ's staffs that fulfilled their

duties in the combat ISAF mission, now we are preparing them for a train-advise-assist mission, which additionally is held in a combat-environment. The fact that a soldier was good in a combat mission doesn't mean that he would make a good trainer or advisor. This is exactly where our role starts. We have changed the training system, revised it and thanks to it we can demonstrate how to utilize soldiers' combat skills in the train-advise-assist reality, how to transform these skills into advisory qualities.

Also areas which we are requested to support have changed. ISAF required training for Headquarters and their staffs. Now we are training advisors and trainers to advise in the areas of mission execution, planning, support, reporting system, etc.

In most areas related to combat preparation, Afghan soldiers are now ready. NATO troops that we have trained are to show them how to be two, three steps ahead – how to plan budget for upcoming years, equipment modernization, how to prepare for new

operations, cooperate with allies, etc.

I want to underline that meeting new training needs and circumstances was possible only thanks to the JFTC staff's professionalism.

Training for future participants of the Afghan mission is, however, only a part of the JFTC's work.

That's true. Another relatively new challenge the JFTC is successfully coping with is the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). NATO is currently in the transition period from its engagement in Afghanistan into a newer model which is better suited to its near and mid-term missions. The Alliance will maintain its capability of performing its core tasks and it will also keep a high level of its forces' readiness. To help achieve this, Allied Leaders have set out the goal of modern, tightly connected NATO Forces 2020 that will be properly equipped, trained, exercised, and led. The CFI's task is to help maintain NATO readiness and combat effectiveness which can be achieved through increased education and training, exercises, and better use of technology.

The JFTC closely cooperates with its parent command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), other training units as well as with Nations in order to identify requirements, test the existing potential, identify shortages, and propose possible solutions aiming at achieving the CFI goals. And here comes the CWIX - the annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise which is one of the most important CFI events which we have hosted annually since 2011. This is the training that engages most NATO nations and also many partner countries who come to Bydgoszcz to check the level of interoperability between their command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems and ones that other nations use. The JFTC meets high standards required to execute this extremely challenging event.

We cannot forget either about the VJTF. The geopolitical situation in the Eastern Europe forces NATO nations to change certain concepts, strategies and doctrines related to their own security. In critical areas of operation NATO nations are capable of

defending their own territory. What we have to take care of is how to prepare defence in a coalition. The JFTC is ready to respond to tasks in this regard.

How do you see the JFTC's role in this area?

VJTF - a "spearhead force" within the NATO Response Force (NRF) was designed to be able to deploy to respond to a security threat within days. Rapid deployment of the VJTF will be facilitated by NFIUs - small command and control and reception units that are being established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. My intention is to merge training for the VJTF's brigade with the one for the NFIU. Cooperation implemented already during the training phase will enable integration of the two new structures - that may have different procedures, regulations or be equipped with different command and control, liaison systems - so that they could cooperate effectively and fulfil their tasks.

When you talk about adjusting to the new reality, one may have an impression that these changes are being implemented seamlessly, without any problems. Is it really so?

Experience of the JFTC staff guarantees completion of new tasks. However, it is true that challenges we face, are sometimes very demanding. But this is what professionalism is about – we have to be, and we are, flexible and open for the new. We receive orders which we fulfil, and the way we do it is highly appreciated by our customers.

"Transformation through Training" – this is the JFTC's motto. Although it refers mainly to transformation the Alliance undergoes thanks to training, it also describes changes, development the JFTC staff goes through and how the centre adjusts to current needs thanks to practice. The JFTC is a relatively small unit, however, it is, without a question and doubt, a showcase of NATO training.

Talking about numbers – the JFTC consists of 107 posts only. Conducting and hosting so many training events, exercises, courses, experiments with total audience between 4 and 6 thousand people a year –

how this, as you mentioned yourself, small team, can handle it?

Huge support comes from contractors. Approximately 30, and during bigger exercises even more, cooperate with us. We can execute our Program of Work thanks to devotion of the JFTC permanent staff, the contractors, but also thanks to the JFTC Support Unit and the NCI Agency Communications and Information Systems Support Unit Bydgoszcz. We have to remember that our work is much more than just training executed in Bydgoszcz. Our staff travels a lot - in support of other training events conducted all over the world, to participate in various conferences, recce visits in the theatre, where they collect current data indispensable for preparation and execution of up-to-date training. It is quite common, that the JFTC employees devote their free time so that the JFTC tasks are executed on the highest possible level.

Now, when the JFTC is facing new challenges, the needs regarding the manpower will grow. We will need experts in new areas and more personnel to support training. On one hand we will use contractors, subject matter experts, who will augment the centre's staff depending on current needs. On the other hand, we have to invest in our permanent personnel – here I mean training and courses for JFTC members as well as increasing the centre's Peacetime Establishment. This is also my key task for the months to come – to prepare the JFTC core staff that will enable us to complete new tasks with full professionalism.

Human factor is one thing, and what about the infrastructure, tools the JFTC uses in execution of training? Were or are changes in those areas equally challenging?

Our largest challenge is combining Simulation systems that support exercises on different levels. This centre was designed to handle primarily exercises below Joint Operational level, and for that we have a great system called JCATS (Joint Conflict And Tactical Simulation system). It does a great job at brigade and below and can even be stretched to corps level. Although joint operational level is not our primary task we do have JTLS (Joint Theater Level Simulation) which is excellent for that purpose. The two simulations were never designed to work together. In the past,



this was not an issue, we always kept the two types of exercise separate, using JTLS at the JWC for joint operational level exercises and JCATS at our centre for below joint operational and Afghan Mission training. Today and in the foreseeable future we have to integrate multiple levels of training into a single comprehensive exercise which means these two systems must be linked. Although previously more ambitious project to federate the two simulations as a whole have failed I think we can this time succeed by limiting the data that has to be exchanged between the two systems by using new technical support tools and services. Thus we can use our experience with JCATS – the JFTC is the NATO custodian of JCATS - to support the evolving mission.

The training for VJTF and NFIU will make our work much more challenging on the one hand. On the other, we can prove that providing and using our given capabilities the JFTC can make a difference for the level of training execution. The new exercises, in particular VJTF, are far more CAX and CIS extensive than those the JFTC has been involved in by now. We're going to go from simple CIS support at a single location

to a large scale, possibly even distributed exercise involving multiple training audience at multiple locations using a complex simulation driven synthetic environment. In short, our work load will grow exponentially in scope and complexity in the upcoming months. Of course we have been anticipating this for some time. The Wargaming Branch was shaping the battlefield for example by participating in the Modeling and Simulations functional area in CWIX and by conducting simulation tests using the South East European Exercise and Training Network Exercise Balkan Bridges 2015 that prepared us for many of the challenges that we will face with NRF/VJTF training. Our goal is to provide a state of the art training support to set the stage for exercises reflecting the operational reality (train as you operate).

If you were to describe the position of the JFTC in the NATO training network, where would it be? Would execution of NATO training programme be possible without the JFTC?

Possible? – maybe yes. What I am sure of, is that the quality of NATO training would be incomparably lower without what is undertaken

and done in Bydgoszcz. It happens very often that commanding generals who visit us for the first time observe what we do here, in what conditions, what tools or equipment we use, also SMEs who cooperate with us and they see clearly that training at the JFTC is simply irreplaceable. Only with the JFTC is the NATO training programme complete.

Eleven years ago the JFTC was established as a smaller element of the NATO training network. We have become one of the key players and our presence and work are an indispensable part of the Alliance's training system.

I would like to use this opportunity to thank and to congratulate my staff. They deserve appreciation for their hard work, professionalism and devotion every day, however, not every day do I have a possibility to express my gratitude and admiration for what they do. I would like the JFTC staff to feel proud of what we are achieving and to know that our work is highly respected in the Alliance and the difference it makes is invaluable. ■

Questions asked by
the JFTC Public Affairs Office

Resolute Support to Resolute Support

Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training



■ **MAJ Goran Pijetlović**, German Army,
JFTC Public Affairs Officer and Spokesperson COM JFTC
Ms. Radoslawa Kubiczek, Polish Civilian,
JFTC Public Affairs Specialist

In late 2014 and early 2015 media all over the world reported on the change in NATO's engagement in Afghanistan. The ISAF combat mission came to an end and was followed by a new allied endeavor - the Resolute Support (RS) mission with the aim of training, advising and assisting Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other institutions on a national level.

Although it was only a short message in majority of the broadcasts, this change had a fundamental meaning for the Alliance and thus had a vast impact on both the soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and institutions responsible for their preparation for the mission.

New task for JFTC

In January 2014 the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) that formerly focused mainly on ISAF pre-deployment training, was given the responsibility for preparing future members of the RS

mission. This was the starting point of a planning and tailoring process of the new training so it would meet new challenges and needs of the non-combat mission in Afghanistan.

The new training had to focus primarily on the functionally based train, advise and assist roles assigned within Afghan ministries, institutions and at the ANSF Corps level. Headquarters personnel dedicated to work in the RS HQ in Kabul, as well as those working in the regional Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAACs) and their advisors were to receive the final part of their training before leaving for Afghanistan. However, shifting the centre of gravity from preparation for a combat mission, with the task of establishing a secure environment, to teaching soldiers how to train, advise and assist their Afghan counterparts and representatives of ministries and other institutions, was a big leap into a totally new direction. Therefore

JFTC specialists had to plan, prepare and execute a completely new exercise.

Tailoring new exercise

The key element of the preparation phase was knowledge base. In the first step it was crucial to understand how internal procedures in Afghanistan worked and to find out about the main challenges that Afghan institutions, ministries and ANSF faced. Focused on these, teams of planners from the JFTC Training Division visited Afghanistan several times in order to get a realistic picture of the future mission. In theatre they had a chance to build up their knowledge base and interact with staff members and advisors in the HQs in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. All the information gathered plus interaction and communication laid a perfect foundation for generating a realistic and up-to-date exercise scenario for the future JFTC training audience. A combination of all these with the in-theatre Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) support



during the exercises, created a professional training event that met current needs and challenges the Alliance faced.

Execution

In July 2014, the JFTC conducted the Train Advise Assist Command-North/ Train Advise Assist Team (TAAC-N/ TAAT) Training Event. It was not Resolute Support training in its current shape, however, it had been designed for soldiers who were going to serve in the first structures of the new mission. More than 100 soldiers from 12 NATO and Partnership for Peace Nations were trained in this first combined pre-deployment training. For the future members of the TAAC-N Headquarters

the event was about building capable, confident and cohesive staff, thus creating effective new HQ. The TAATs on the other hand received a standardized preparation for their mission of training, advising and assisting their Afghan counterparts and national and regional institutions.

In November 2014, the Centre prepared and executed the first Resolute Support TE. Within this exercise, specifically aimed at preparing soldiers for the new mission, advisors and staff both from the Resolute Support Headquarters and from Train, Advise, Assist Command (TAAC) East were trained.

Again in January and February 2015 close to 400 people from 27 NATO and partner nations worked hand in hand in

Bydgoszcz, Poland. Half of them were supporting the next Resolute Support Training Event and preparing others for the new challenges in Afghanistan and the other half were getting ready for their deployment.

During his visit to the training area, General Hans-Lothar Domröse, the Commander of the Joint Force Command Brunssum, thanked the JFTC Commander and his staff for the commitment:

"I could not think of a better facility than this in Bydgoszcz. (...) It is best suited for training".

"I'm delighted to be back in Poland, to be back in this wonderful training facility in Bydgoszcz. It's a great pleasure to see the progress that has been achieved here". ■



Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, pointed out main changes and challenges during the preparation phase of the future Resolute Support training:

"First of all we have to change our attitudes. We had to significantly change our training strategy. I will stress it again – the Resolute Support is not a combat mission, but it is a Train, Advice and Assist mission in a combat environment. Those two things must be combined. Earlier, during the ISAF mission, the troops going to Afghanistan had helicopters, wheeled armored vehicles or aircrafts with them. Now the advisors, their experience and the knowledge we are providing them with are the main weapon system."

Resolute Support Advisory Training




■ **MAJ Ronald Roy, Canadian Army,
JFTC Training Division**

In July 2014, the JFTC executed its first Train Advise Assist Team (TAAT) training in support of Resolute Support. There have been three subsequent training events since then (Resolute Support (RS) 14-2, RS 15-1 and RS 15-2) with an average of 70 advisors per training event.

For the purpose of this article an Advisor is a person who gives an opinion or a suggestion to an equally experienced person about what or how something could be done but does not make decisions about how the events or activities are executed. A mentor is a person who teaches or gives help and advice to a less experienced and often younger person but does not make decisions about how the events or activities are executed.

To say that anyone who is a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in a field or branch can then become an advisor is to veer from the truth. Advising is an acquired skill or ability that requires specialist training. (Some of the skills or abilities are stated in the following figure).



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
Mistakes can be made in training, lessons learnt and then additional practice provided in order to achieve a competent level of proficiency. Advising requires formalized training to develop those special sets of techniques used by any military advisor. This article will explore the JFTC advisory training model and uncover how these special sets of advising techniques are utilized and practiced within the RS Training Events.

RS advisors are employed at all levels of command from the Training Advise Assist Command (TAAC) up through to the RS HQ and into the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The RS advisors are NATO personnel from various countries that are to be assigned to specific key personnel within each ANDSF Corps Headquarters, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior (Commanders, G1 thru G6 staff officers and other key like functions). During JFTC Training Events, RS advisors are grouped in teams of eight and are led by a Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME. The Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME main function is to provide a forum in which an exchange of information and experience can occur between the SME and the RS advisor. First and foremost the RS advisors are members of their National Military organization and not that of Afghanistan. The RS advisors are trained to associate themselves with their ANDSF counterparts and are only a conduit between Coalition Forces and the ANDSF. The primary focus of the

JFTC advisory training is to permit the RS advisors to practice acting as functional experts, and then in time advise in support of ANDSF units in theatre. RS Advisors can also provide a liaison capability between ANDSF and NATO forces in order to coordinate the planning of operations.

The JFTC Advisor Training Model consists of three distinct parts - Mission Specific Training (MST), Battle Staff Training (BST) and then the Battle Staff Training plus (BST+).

JFTC Advisor Training Model



MST is the first module provided by JFTC and is at the tactical level. It consists of a combination of specified lectures, panel discussion and briefings delivered by the SMEs on specific topics dealing with the pre-deployment training and focused on the theatre environment. During this part of the training, RS advisors' are focused on initiating internal team SOPs, developing team spirit, preparing for the BST and liaison with the Staff. BST is the second module provided by the JFTC, again at the tactical level, and is a demonstration phase led by SMEs. The BST provides the training audience with an integrated

training designed to maintain and improve the Advisor's proficiency in mission-essential tasks comprised of responsibilities from several functional areas / directorates / divisions. The training aim for the RS advisors during the BST is to prepare for future operations with a focus on understanding NATO concepts and tasks in theatre. These SMEs led and monitored tasks include interaction with their Afghan partners on a daily basis, interacting with the RS HQ staff on a daily or weekly basis, being involved in Operational Planning Teams (OPT) within RS HQ, and tracking observations / problems through the RS HQ Staff process. The BST + is the last module provided by JFTC, again at the tactical level. During this last phase the RS advisors take the lead (SMEs now take a backseat role) and now integrate with both their ANDSF counterparts and the wider Staff through the provision of FRAGO to initiate interaction in a vignette format.

A **Vignette** is a brief description, account or short action which evokes a reaction or initiates staff work. The use of this training method exposes the training audience to new approaches and creates discussion. Vignettes also provide for a deeper understanding of the influences culture awareness, honour and respect has within any professional relationship. These sessions allow for SMEs to introduce specific tools and tips to support the preparation of the interaction. This situation brings together

actual advisors and their interpreters with real Afghan staff officers from various Afghan Regions and, using these current in theatre scenarios, tasks them to produce or discuss a way for resolution. This formula results in Advisors interacting with their ANDSF partners by way of arranged face to face daily meetings, thus establishing a professional relationship. The RS advisors utilize his/her listening skills to develop trust, credibility and confidence which will result in them being able to influence his/her ANDSF partner.


During the BST and BST+, there are 42 vignettes covering all issues from corrupting to female recruiting to logistical support problems to budgets to planning operations. These 42 vignettes are divided into two groups. Group one (24 Vignettes) is designated as Senior Advisor interactions and results in follow-on meetings between RS HQ senior staff and/or Afghan partners. The second group (18 Vignettes) is designated as stand-alone interaction and no further staff action is required after the interaction has been completed. For all 42 vignettes, all team members are in the room when the interaction between the Afghan and advisor occurs – whilst only two training audience are actually involved, the others as observers (or as our Afghan partners describe them “Ghosts in the Room”). After each interaction there is a consolidated after action review. All team members, the Afghan partner and interpreter are present for the review. All RS advisors learn from each other’s positive and negative points for each interaction. The RS advisors not only built their relationship on each interaction but also their confidence. The vignettes were staged in progressively harder and more complex issues so that the RS advisors were always challenged in their advisory skills. The most complex and challenging vignettes involve the political / religious / ethic and gender issues, indeed, these are typically assigned to the most experienced Senior Advisors so as to not destroy the less experience advisors’ as they gain confidence.

Through respectful and honest discussions / interactions, the RS advisors attempt to establish common ground, thus permitting him/ her to gain the trust between his/her ANDSF Partner. RS advisors from theatre have noted that every conversation is a negotiation and that they are never really off duty. There are situations where the RS advisors were required to be humble and empathize with their Afghan counter partner in order to maintain the advisor/ advisee relationship. JFTC Training Events encourage RS Advisors to be curious as to how the current Afghan system/ procedures function within theatre, the creation of an Afghan technical or practical solution to the issue. The increase in culture awareness is key to any successful engagement for an RS advisor. He/she gains this knowledge through observations and being open-minded while in Afghanistan. Coalition Force culture and way of operating is not necessarily appropriate or acceptable to our Afghan partners. Patience, understanding and flexibility of approach in the RS advisor are essential elements to a successful interaction. The Figure below illustrates this developmental model.



This approach is taught and practiced during each interaction within each training event at the JFTC.

Each interaction requires many hours of preparatory work for the team and even more patience when working with their Afghan partners. It is said that “we westerners have a watch but an Afghan has all the time”. The RS advisors have to learn that ISAF weapons and combat enablers






were no longer available to support the ANDSF; instead, their weapons are their enthusiasm, sense of humor and daily commitment in seeing the ANDSF succeed in establishing a long term sustainable solution to all issue. By recommending realistic goals within the Afghan ways and means, the RS advisors maintained rapport, gain credibility, demonstrate their

value to their advisee and thus increase their influence on their primary advisee. Success is always in terms of little steps. They are most definitely evolutionary steps rather than revolutionary ones.

Through this interactive and tested model the JFTC is able to impart key training messages. Training audiences learn that they are not commanders but honest brokers for their Afghan counterparts,

furthermore they learn that Afghan failures are not their failures and that all RS advisors are not there to win the argument each time. RS Advisors are professional competent officers and the requirement for specialized advisory training at JFTC is of benefit to them in order that they can understand their Afghan counterparts and achieve mission success of **“Train/ Advise/ Assist”**. ■





2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC



■ **MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army,**
CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

Another edition of the annual SACT-led Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX) opened on 8 June 2015. For this key event, 21 Nations and NATO agencies came together to the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, for three weeks to test interoperability of their communication systems, as well as Modelling and Simulation (M&S) platforms. Over the last two decades NATO has grown to 28 nations. At the same time national command and control systems have grown in complexity especially since all NATO nations have pursued their own unique command and control systems. CWIX is the one place where NATO nations can come together and technically test their ability to operate together. This interoperability is the backbone of multinational NATO operation. Without it no future NATO mission can be successful.

CWIX 2015 spurred JFTC efforts

to expanded cloud. The JFTC has kept the pace with the industry's embrace of the virtualization technology. For the third year in a row we offered participating nations vCloud service for their testing needs. The benefits were tremendous. The nations could configure their systems ahead of time from remote locations, saving time which was then used for more tests. They needed less equipment hence lower transportation costs. Over the years CWIX facilitated steady expansion to the cloud service to generate room for more clients. Eventually our goal is to place the majority of CWIX participants on the cloud servers.

The growth of vCloud at CWIX fuels our evolution at the JFTC. Not only does the expanding vCloud service expand our technical ability to host more clients, generating larger and more realistic exercises but it also builds up our staff expertise at bridging national and NATO systems. One of the JFTC's functions is a Gateway between NATO Joint Operational

level training and National tactical level training. CWIX is the one event where the JFTC can test the systems and develop procedures that support the future training events. It is in this role, aided by residence experience and CWIX triggered flexibility that makes the JFTC the future place for training NATO's most current formation, the VJTF.

The future of CWIX looks bright. This year alone, six additional NATO nations have expressed interest in joining CWIX. Among those nations are such long term members as Spain as well as newer members such as Albania, Slovakia and the Baltic States. Even the EU and the newest NATO partners such as Montenegro have started looking at CWIX as an event important to their future.

Undoubtedly the growth of CWIX will bring new challenges as the capability and network capacity at JFTC will be stretched but the experienced and highly skilled JFTC CWIX team will take it on. ■



JFTC and NCIA

The Team Behind CWIX 2015



■ **MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army,**
CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

It has already been five years since the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) became the home for the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise (CWIX). Before this year's edition of CWIX, the Centre was working hand in hand with the NATO Communications and Information Agency CIS Support Unit Bydgoszcz (NCIA CSU Bydgoszcz) to make major refinements to the exercise by improving the money saving cloud services at the JFTC facility in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Through close cooperation the team in Poland has made sure that the future of CWIX and allied interoperability will continue to remain a success.


What is CWIX?

CWIX is a Military Committee directed annual program designed to support the continuous improvement to interoperability for the Alliance and Partner Nations. In 2015 over the three week

period, CWIX brought together engineers, technicians and operational users, from 21 Nations and Agencies, to test interoperability between different information systems in Bydgoszcz, Poland and 21 testing sites distributed throughout Europe and North America. They brought together 181 capability configurations in key testing areas of Cyber Defense, the Federated Mission Networking, and Friendly Force Tracking.

Why CWIX?

The importance of CWIX cannot be understated. It is the largest annual NATO approved event of its kind. CWIX is designed to bring about continuous improvement in interoperability for the Alliance and Partner Nations. It is one of the driving test beds for the "Smart Defense" concept and the "Connected Forces Initiative" (CFI). It builds interoperability and facilitates a common framework for Alliance members and Partner Nations to "plug and play" their Command and



Control (C2) networks. During the Afghan mission it took several years to create Afghan Mission Network. It allowed the entire ISAF coalition sharing real time information across the entire coalition and was vital to ISAF's success. The CFI and the FMN seek to capitalize on successes of the Afghan Mission Network, capture its lessons and create a framework for future deployable networks which can be set up in a matter of months instead of years, giving NATO rapid crisis response ability. CWIX is where the concept takes life and nations have a chance to test, document and refine the interoperability of their C2 systems.

The cloud service at CWIX

The cloud service for CWIX was started in 2013 with the twin aim of reducing the hardware shipment and promoting mobile computing field in NATO. In obvious terms of practical equipment reduction, cloud service is invaluable. It allowed the nations to



configure their virtualized systems from their locations in advance of arriving at JFTC. They did not have to bring their own hardware and instead relied on virtual infrastructure available at JFTC. This conserved the physical space, saved energy, reduced heat output and shipping costs of moving expensive equipment.

Furthermore, IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) service model implemented at JFTC reached out beyond that. It is believed that on-demand infrastructure provisioning, resource pooling together with dynamic resources reassigning and flexibility it offered, changed the model of CWIX capabilities experimentation and testing. It sped up the capabilities deployment and reconfiguration process, extended the experimentation windows and provided new performance and productivity indicators.

The second aim of JFTC IaaS implementation was to promote cloud computing within NATO. Over the recent years cloud computing has become one of the main driving forces in the industry. More and

more companies and organizations processed, stored and maintained their data on the cloud accessing it remotely from different locations. After 2 years of testing and exploring the potentials of this technology, JFTC together with NCIA CSU Bydgoszcz fielded with success vCloud Director that is has opened its doors for more CWIX participants.

Cooperation

NCIA and JFTC, represented by Training Support Division, have reached an unprecedented level of cooperation. NCIA's efforts were led by its Interface and Integration Engineer Waldemar Slifarski. Thanks to him and his technical support team, together with Fulvio Postogna, a JFTC CIS engineer, the service provided by technical infrastructure at JFTC has greatly improved. What was most striking was the ability of JFTC's CIS branch and NCIA to work together, share expertise and exploit their respective strengths at just the right place. It allowed CWIX to be a success every year. For example,

NCIA, which owned and operated most of the JFTC's technical infrastructure, was able to fully integrate with the JFTC battle lab, which was owned and operated by JFTC Wargaming branch. Whenever one of the Agencies had a short fall in one area, it was able to immediately rely on its partner to backfill the gap, providing seamless service to the CWIX community.

Future

The future of CWIX is bright. The event furthers the NATO's interoperability and promotes the closer integration of the Alliance. Together the Bydgoszcz team of NCIA and JFTC will continue to improve the smooth running of this important event. Within the cloud area the next targets are PaaS (Platform as a Service) and SaaS (Software as a Service) service models that are more advanced cloud computing capabilities, aiming at making the JFTC infrastructure even more attractive to the CWIX participants. ■

Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process

How to Demystify the Devil



■ **David Dominicci, US Civilian,
JFTC Training Support Division**

Welcome to an introduction to Modelling and Simulation (M&S), and how it assists in a NATO training and exercise event scenario. Our intent is to give you a better understanding of M&S; and how it improves the goal of meeting all the Training Objectives (TOs) for the Training Audience (TA) during a particular event. In other words, to demystify the devil of M&S from your psyche.

What is M&S

M&S is a technical capability to provide realistic conditions of field action in a synthetic way. To put it another way, it is the art of using tools, physical and conceptual models, and computer hardware and software, in order to create artificial realism in a training environment.

It is an essential element to achieving the goal of “Train as you Fight”. It may be viewed as cliché, but the best training has always been when the most realism takes place, to include all the uncertainties associated within the “Fog of War”. M&S provides that realism, complete with some outcomes that may be

contrary to the Commander’s wishes (such as inadvertent blue-on-blue engagements; destruction of a high-value unit, etc.).

What M&S is Not

Something to be afraid of. M&S is computers; and yes, there are still many among us that are leery of relying on technical tools. But the bottom line is that technology has and will continue to improve the quality of life of everyone who embraces it.

A compromise to training objectives. To make it clear, M&S is a tool to achieve the ultimate outcome of any Computer-Assisted Exercise (CAX); which is meeting or surpassing the assigned TOs for the TA. Every CAX is built toward the successful completion of the exercise TOs; never the other way around.

Extra work for unclear reasons with no reward. Yes, M&S is a lot of work; but not on the part of the TA. A simulation center uses multiple resources in manpower and machines that they bring to bear in order to provide a realistic Common Operating Picture (COP) to the TA, while at the same time maintaining an M&S transparency to that

audience. Remember, all the TA should see is the COP; not any of the M&S that feeds that COP.

Preconceived Notions about M&S

It is too complex and hard to understand. There are many in the military that have the opinion that M&S in a CAX is too hard for a regular soldier to comprehend. That cannot be further from the truth. The fact-of-the-matter is that, for the TA, M&S is transparent to them. Unless the TA is providing augmentees as “Pucksters” (model operators) to the Exercise Control (EXCON) section of the CAX, there is no need to even be aware that M&S is being utilized; let alone having to be trained in an applicable Model. This leads us to the next notion.

It will make our life too complicated. Many think that the TA’s daily routines will be complicated because of M&S; when in fact the opposite is true. M&S exists to provide a realistic COP of the Battlefield. Any Command & Control expert will tell you that when the COP is kept accurately and expediently updated, the decision-

making process by the TA is simplified and significantly improved; thereby greatly increasing the successful outcome of the overall exercise.

It is too technical. M&S has kept up with all the technical advances of the time. As soon as a new application has proven itself in the commercial sector, the M&S community quickly follows suit in incorporating that technology to its models. Case in point: the use of virtual software (known by many as the cloud) has revolutionized the ability of distributing M&S to customers who normally do not have the resources to support such distributions. But too much technology is not bad; when it is utilized for the simplification of efforts conducted by the TA. M&S is constantly striving to achieve that goal.

It increases the risk of failure. On the contrary, M&S actually reduces the risk of failure from the TA perspective; because M&S can inform the EXCON of anticipated problems ahead of time, so that they can alter scenarios in order to minimize the risk of failure. M&S can also solve potential problems quickly, which in turn insures that the CAX stays on track of achieving all the TOs set out for the TA.

How Does M&S Make a Difference

It increases the quality of products.

By products we mean all the resources that insure that only the highest quality training is provided to the TA. Achieving the best possible COP is just a function of this. Through joint cooperation by the Training Division (TD) and the Training Support Division (TSD) at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), the quality of the Training to meet the TOs are insured; which ultimately means better trained soldiers.

The Training Audience gets a more realistic experience; which means better Training. By M&S providing as much realism to the scenarios as possible, which in turn translates to better training to all that make up the TA. M&S also provides more efficient operation of the EXCON, primarily in its role of insuring de-confliction of scenarios; maximizing mobility of units; etc.

M&S's Role in Training & Exercise

M&S tools can be divided into four categories:

- (1) Exercise Planning & Management Tools
- (2) Constructive Simulation Systems & Ancillary Tools
- (3) Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area Services
- (4) Experimentation & Analysis Tools

This would be a good time to be reminded of the stages and phases of the NATO Training Doctrine (Directive 75-3), which are as follows:

Stage 1: Concept & Specification Development

Stage 2: Planning & Product Development

Stage 3: Operational Conduct – With the Following Four Phases:

Phase I: Foundation Training


Phase II: Crisis Response Planning

Phase III: Execution

Phase IV: Assessment

Stage 4: Analysis & Reporting

How the M&S tools fit into the NATO Stages and Phases are not easy to describe; therefore, the below graphic shows the relationship that each of the tool categories has to each one:



Exercise Planning & Management Tools.

These primary tools are used everywhere. See the above graphic regarding the stages and phases of their use. The Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) is a planner tool for structuring exercise scenarios and defining action timing. Other planning tools are the Training Objective Management Module (TOMM), and the EXCON De-Confliction Matrix.

Constructive Simulation Systems & Ancillary Tools.

These simulation systems are used for Stages 2 & 3; and also in Phase III. The simulations at the JFTC include: (1) the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) for Operational/Tactical level training; (2) the Virtual Battle Space (VBS) for Tactical/Individual level training; and lastly (3) the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). The Exercise Information Services (EXIS) platform is for managing information from multiple M&S systems and providing tools in exercise planning and execution processes; and is a vital link between the EXCON and the TA.

Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area Services.

These interfaces are used in Stage 3 and Phase III as denoted above. In addition to EXIS, another interface is the Networked Interoperable Real-Time Information Services (NIRIS) system.

Experimentation and analysis tools. EXIS, JEMM, and batch files from JCATS are tools used by the Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) in

many stages and phases (see the graphic above), to aid in the After Action Review (AAR) process. They can also be used for experimenting new future capabilities, such as EXIS, which is in the last phases of its research and development (R&D); and Mobile O/T, which was tested in a recent Resolute Support (RS) exercise.

The Advantages of using M&S

For EXCON:

Proper design of the script – Success or failure of any CAX can rest in the successful prior planning of the scenarios; and subsequent editing as necessary to insure that TOs are to be achieved. The use of the right tools can make that a reality.

Full view of the exercise with the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) – Keeping an accurate COP is essential to the success of any CAX. This is especially true when it comes to the “Game Truth” view that EXCON sees with the OPFOR. M&S is the engine that feeds that “Game Truth”.

Total control, and altering as necessary to insure training objectives are met – EXCON can edit the scenarios as necessary in order to insure that the TOs are met; M&S can make changes quickly and accurately.

Proper execution of all muscle movements – Important events can be planned early and meticulously in order to insure their success. Also, quick and seamless edits can be made on-the-fly to minimize any deviations.

Maintaining a consistent picture and control of all exercise tasking. Using the EXCON De-confliction Matrix the EXCON can be more efficient in its operation.

Better computer-aided observation collections. O/Ts can obtain collections in a more timely, accurate, and efficient manner.

For the TA:

A proper COP – Maintaining an accurate picture insures that the TA is venturing where the

EXCON wants them to venture; or redirect them as necessary if they are drifting off on a tangent. It also allows the TA to maintain situational awareness and time-space-force consistency with their units and other coalition partners.

Realism and consistency throughout the exercise – Again, making the CAX as real as possible thru the use of M&S makes the training seem as realistic as if one was actually on the battlefield; without any added manpower. Recent exercises at JFTC have utilized live UAV feeds from VBS into the training scenarios; providing that added edge of realism for the TA to utilize and explore further.

Proper “Perceived Truth” based on sensors – An accurate “Perceived Truth” is essential to proper training of the TA. No cheating can be allowed. If no sensor exists in a certain area: the units in that area cannot be seen, pure and simple.

Upcoming Events Using M&S

South East European Exercise and Training Network (SEEETN) – Balkan Bridges. SEEETN-Balkan Bridges, consisting of nine NATO and Partner nations, builds on NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) in support of national linkages of JFTC with the technical capabilities of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey.

Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration Experimentation Examination Exercise (CWIX) 2015. This exercise is a North Atlantic Council (NAC) endorsed, Military Committee directed and Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board guided Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) annual programme designed to support the continuous improvement of interoperability for the Alliance.

Resolute Support (RS) 15-3. This exercise is to educate Individual Augmentees (IAs) of the TA on the mission specifics of RS in Afghanistan; train the TA that will be assigned to advisor roles; and lastly create

conditions for team building.

Citadel Bonus (CIBS) 2015. This Battle Staff Training (BST) event will train the Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) in the refinement of its Integrated Component Command Land (ICC-L) Command Post (CP) organization.

Georgia 2016. Still in its planning infancy, this event will allow JFTC the ability to mentor Georgia in the preparation process for hosting a non-NATO operated multinational exercise.

Trident Joust 2016. This exercise is for validating NATO’s upcoming Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This is to be a brigade that will be able to deploy within 48 hours; part of the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO’s high-readiness force comprising land, air, sea and Special Forces units capable of rapid deployment wherever needed.

Summary

M&S does make a difference for better, more realistic training to the TA, by maintaining an accurate COP, and negating the chance of a latent, or worst yet, blank COP.

M&S also insures that the EXCON is more efficient in its operation; and can make quicker decisions on the direction of the exercise, while using fewer personnel.

M&S can simulate a complex joint environment, complete with air assets; and can augment that environment with relative ease, in order to meet the TOs of the TA.

Lastly, M&S is able to support training with real troops working with a Headquarters in a joint environment with minimal assets to bear.

Hopefully, we have eliminated any perceived negative opinions of M&S; or in other words, demystified the M&S devil from your mind. M&S really is a force multiplier that can improve overall training throughout NATO; and is very much in keeping with the spirit of CFI. Its utility is a win-win for all those involved. ■

The Treason Files

Countering the Threat from British Nationals

Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown



■ Christopher McKeating, GBR Civilian

This essay is an abridged version of the research to date and has been designed not to argue each position or provide references, but to elicit feedback and guide the ‘reader’ through the author’s hypothesis. Although based on a literary review, the hypothesis is being tested for its qualitative value through the commentary of 143 senior professionals and practitioners from across NATO, including British and American Generals, Admirals and Ministers of State. Through triangulation with literary sources and an analysis of any consensus as to the extent of the threat and the measures needed to confront the threat, their comments will be studied to: (1) contextualise the contemporary nature of the threat and the implications of failing to engage it and (2) conceptualise the viability of suppressing the phenomenon through the proposed process of ‘defragmenting’. The results of this analysis will appear

in the Autumn issue of the JFTC journal. If you would like to contribute to this analysis, please send your feedback to ccm5@st-andrews.ac.uk

The research was initiated as a consequence of the British Prime Minister’s declaration that the country faces a “*greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before*” and that “*we are in the midst of a generational struggle*.” That the country’s social heritage and cultural capital could be at risk of a long-term clash with radicalisation, extremism and terrorism hence lies at the heart of this paper and provides the framework to: 1) further an understanding of the phenomenon of British citizens adopting loyalties beyond the Crown, 2) assessing the threat that they pose and 3) providing an insight as to how this threat might best be countered.

Whilst the research accepts the government’s assessment of the threat

it does not accept British extremism as the root cause of it. That the response to the phenomenon entails a ‘generational struggle’ *i.e.* open-ended conflict with a vaguely defined enemy, is also rejected: ‘learning to live with terrorism’ and having to endure a deep-rooted, protracted conflict, with no guarantees, is but one school of thought and does not have to be the answer – there are alternatives.

The hypothesis is that the phenomenon is a consequence of a global insurgency against the West and that any delay in confronting it as such risks the militarization of nationals loyal to forces beyond the Crown. It is further argued that the ideological, counter-terrorist approach to confronting extremism in the United Kingdom, not only underestimates, but exacerbates the potential for internecine conflict. The alternative proposed for Britain is to optimize the response to

the threat by ‘defragmenting’ it and thus accelerating the end-game.

‘Defragmenting’ is a liberal, muscular response to the threat that works by: 1) concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist between the immigrant populations of Great Britain and the Crown and 2) taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force. In short, the exposition of non-contiguous threats to the United Kingdom by the extraction of front-line populations from the theatre of potential conflict and the overwriting of any extant, political content that is exploitable. Such an initiative, compacted and protected by a strengthening in the Covenant between Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and the nation, would enable those communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions and build a better, more secure, liberally orientated, integrated and united Kingdom.

The paper is presented in five parts: Part I is an analogical discussion on the general threat and why the phenomenon is rooted in a ‘transnational insurgency’ and not extremism – how the United Kingdom has been targeted by a foreign enemy as a frontline in a global, asymmetrical war and why military led, counter-insurgency measures are needed on the home-front. Part II contests the strategy of a ‘generational struggle’ – it is argued that this policy will lead to the para-militarization of militant forces, the polarization of Muslim communities and a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric. Part III demonstrates why counter-terrorism measures underestimate and exacerbate the threat from militants in the United Kingdom - the implications for the country and the

consequences of misinterpreting state-sponsored espionage, sabotage and acts of insurgency as acts of terrorism. Part IV proposes that, to reverse the politicization and radicalization of British nationals (Muslim and non-Muslim), the threat needs to be ‘defragmented’. Part V propounds the use of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces to protect the communities held hostage by British militants and, through a revised Covenant with the nation, transforming the country’s relationship with the international community.

PART I

Wild Geese & Jackals

La Menace Générale: This paper concurs with the government’s assessment of the threat as ‘severe’ and that an attack on the interests and assets of the United Kingdom is ‘highly likely’. It is argued that this is not due to extremism but a lack of investment in the Crown, the institutions of the Commonwealth and Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, the metamorphosis of Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s chrysalis and the aggregation and mobilisation of Muslim organizations and non-violent extremists into powerful social and political constructs. In brief, it is because British militants are in the process of re-positioning their forces from the well-defined battlefields of contemporary state-sponsored terrorism and subversion to the relatively unknown quantities of 21st century insurgency warfare.

It is concluded that, to counter the threat, demonstrable, public acts of allegiance to the Queen and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty by Muslims to the institutions of the state are key. The monarchy and the shared history of the nation are seen as not only fundamental to stifling the dissent and

sedition but, as evidenced in the United Kingdom’s battle for the allegiance of British Catholics, reversing it. In short, qualifications on allegiance to the Crown are not unprecedented in the United Kingdom and there are political, historical and theological parallels from which to derive policy. The history of Catholic emancipation and the lighting of bonfires is but one.

Indeed, the hundreds of thousands of Catholics who have worn a King’s uniform over the centuries epitomize this analogy and clearly demonstrate what can be achieved by the encompassing nature of the British Crown and its unique ability to transcend politics and religion and consolidate the diverse and often competing identities of its nationals; were a Papist power to threaten British interests today, there would be no question as to the loyalty of the country’s six million strong Catholic population. This achievement is not because of Shakespeare, Rome or the stigma of historic acts of terrorism and insurrection but, for the majority of Catholics, centuries of allegiance, patriotism and military service to a shared ideal – a history and a constitutional compromise which has culminated in an identity that today eclipses the boundaries of race, religion and politics.

Although the allegiance of British Catholics has involved a series of tumultuous periods of internal strife this in no way implies, as with the ‘generational struggle’ against British Jihadists, that the potential for treason was countered through any protracted policy of attrition. Indeed, whilst the banner of anointed princes may indeed seem to have been obsoleted by time alone (in hindsight) and usurped and supplanted by the comparative irony of their historical predilection for terror and political zealotry, this is not the case - it was the culmination of the direct and immediate deployment of

military force by each government of the day and the concurrent policies of emancipation and acquiescence of generations past that secured the country and silenced the murderous echoes of Catesby's 'Gunpowder Plot'. In short, with every Catholic 'generational struggle', time and political adroitness have been of the essence and it is from this perspective that the analogy is both relevant and important.

As with many internal conflicts however, today's insurgency is being reacted to out of context and within artificial constructs that not only belie the applicability of lessons from historical precedents but distort the nature of the threat from one with abstraction to one without. In doing so, it has become near impossible to determine which values are necessary to balance the equation of threat and the arithmetic of the accumulative, individual efforts of generations past has been lost. The result is that instead of a conventional adversary with threads of reference and a common anthology, the conflict has been divorced from its roots and left to culture on its own theological indifferences. The *zeitgeist* of the 'generational struggle' with radical Islam in the United Kingdom has hence become typified and influenced not by political action but by political reaction and, in relative terms, an Asquith-like policy of non-engagement.

To return to the analogy, at no point, at least not until the Home Rule Crisis in British Ireland, was such a strategic response to the Catholic threat one of either isolation or a policy of containment in which an acceptable, sustainable level of violence was the ultimate goal. Even with the IRA's 'Long War', sixty years later, it would be disingenuous to negate the cumulative effect of attempts by previous generations to counter the stalemate directly and the

historical parameters in which the war itself was eventually waged. Indeed the accelerated rate, at which each generation actually set out to crush any Catholic dissent, is readily apparent. From the Jacobite Rising to the Easter Rising, time has always been primary and the luxury of a waiting game or a victory dependent on the passing of a generation, an uncertain, unwarranted and, arguably, unprecedented and dangerous concept.

To put this threat to the state into perspective, more than half a million Catholics served with foreign powers against their King in the years leading up to the 1790s and millions more were in empathy. Indeed, in the first half of the century, over a 100,000 had been killed and wounded in foreign service. The import of the analogy however is not to highlight the terrific numbers involved but to show how the phenomenon of foreign fighters was reversed and the speed with which, step by step, the loyalty of Catholics was secured - despite a century in which Catholics rebelled on no less than six occasions and extreme, redolent, flagrant and radical displays of treason, a rising immigrant population and political necessity ensured that ways were found that negotiated the paths between the different visions of the religion's adherents and united the Kingdom's populations.

Although the Papist and Relief Acts bear the scars of the tempestuous nature of these paths, their application led directly towards the dismantling of the penal laws and to policies that ensured the demise of the spiritual and communal influence of foreign powers. By doing so the country was able to reign in the political outcasts that allegiances and oaths to the Crown had hitherto engineered by default and encompass Catholic powers into the apparatus of the state. The fruits of the process were evident from the outset and

of immediate significance – compared to the few thousand Irish Catholics that served Napoleon for example, no less than 200,000 had served the Crown by Wellington's victory at Waterloo in 1815. Indeed, by the 1830s, a good half of the rank and file of the British Army were made up of Anglo-Irish Catholic blood. In short, despite the legitimate fear of insurrection with many of the revolutions of the Enlightenment having either collapsed against the old regimes of Catholic Europe or indulged in the regicide and wholesale slaughter of its ruling families, the drive towards emancipation and allegiance to the Crown continued unabated. The reason for this was not because of public demand or any egalitarian calling, but that the political development of Britain had been staked and rested upon delivering an alternative to combat what was readily becoming a common enemy and an obstacle to the progressive expansion of the Empire.

This political commitment to reformation (as opposed to segregation) in the early 19th century not only liberated the country from religious intolerance and buried the prejudices of its recusant inheritance, but enabled Britain to counter the aggressive, anti-Catholic sentiment that had stifled the concept of a unified state and release millions of English, Welsh, Scots and Irish nationals from loyalties that their fellow countrymen had perceived to be tantamount to treason. By the time of the Great War when the allegiance of entire populations was required and alongside hundreds of thousands of Muslim volunteers, a generation of Irish, Scots, Welsh, English and foreign Catholics answered the call and enlisted to fight for the shared values and commonality that this reformed concept of 'King and Country' had come to represent.

Simply put, in a short period of time, temporal and spiritual allegiances

were no longer viewed as contradictory assertions but complimentary and intrinsically British concepts of nationhood. Citizenship was now founded and expressed in terms of civic engagement and the theological and historical barriers to serving the Crown had been obsoleted. By the last decade of Victoria's reign, with some two thirds of the country's Army being made up of Irish Catholic descent, the paradox was complete. The relevance of this to British Muslims is clear in that, for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, the greatest influence on the political development of Islam has equally been of British origin.

Indeed, from the 18th Century on, the journey from 'caliphate to nation-state' was largely defined by British history, particularly so after 1917 with General Allenby's capture of Jerusalem and the death knell of the Ottoman Empire - by default, the British had become, in many ways, an Islamic power *per se* themselves and masters over the destiny of over half of the world's Muslims. As such, the historical context of the United Kingdom's influence on modern Islam is key to not only defining and understanding the threat from British citizens loyal to forces beyond the Crown, but countering it.

All this is not, however, to suggest that the root cause of the threat to Great Britain today is a disenfranchised Islamic population, depleted of a history and torn between the suffering of lost brothers and the inalienable demands of their Protestant, Christian, British heritage. It is patently not - merely that the key to countering it lies in the perception that it might be and that this (and what 'King and Country' represents today) is what has brought the allegiance of British Muslims into question. Islamic State's metamorphosis, from a relatively subjunctive epithet to a

religious phenomenon and Al Qaeda's chrysalis, from its defeat at Tora Bora to its return as the Praetorian, Hydra-like vanguard of Revolutionary Islam, has not only devalued the concept of British nationhood but, indirectly, the efficacy of the British Crown to establish any capacity for uniting its peoples against them - the threat today hence stems from a lack of investment in consolidating the intrinsic value of a British heritage, the teaching of the Empire's Muslim legacy and deploying at home and abroad against what has become an internationally established challenge to it. Without such investment a flight of Wild Geese to the new Caliphate will be but the beginning: at some point, in the near future, the current schism between Al Qaeda and the Caliphate will be bridged and, through a network of well-entrenched and fledgling insurgencies, the Jackals will re-surface.

The basis for this and what makes this so very different a threat and so very dangerous a threat is not just the epic, international nature of Islamic State's metamorphosis or Al Qaeda's appetite for political tyranny and terror, but the apocalyptic expectations and revolutionary inclinations with which legions of ordinary citizens and insurgent forces from across the world have identified with Islamic State. Moreover, as with the terror-regimes of late 18th century France, the progressive depravity of the violence associated with the politicization of 21st century Islam has become an intrinsic part of the Jihadist's creed and the acceptance, endorsement and glorification of it a quantifying factor in their religiosity and fervour - the founding of the Caliphate and Al Qaeda's continued penchant for terrorism has, simply put, morphed into a convincing, political and theological manifesto for not only the young, but the disenfranchised and the enraged.

How far counter-terrorism measures will be of any value upon a resurgence of attacks in the United Kingdom is hence largely dependent on the number of allegiances nurtured to counter the narrative of this platform. Unfortunately, however, a 'generational' outlook and the episodic approach of focusing on terrorists to counter terrorism pays scant regard to winning the hearts and minds of the constituent masses - the individuals that are jailed, killed or 'de-radicalized' are simply replaced. It is therefore argued that, to counter the nature of the threat at large, the focus needs to be re-adjusted and the enemy re-targeted through the peripheral, thematic and immediate lens of counter-insurgency and counter-subversion initiatives – tactical alternatives that, by overwriting any political content that is exploitable and providing permanent, one-way exit-strategies for entire populations, would negate the value of the communities targeted by the enemy.

Unfortunately, despite the furore over the involvement of British Muslim communities in terrorism, there have as yet been no significant inroads to actually understanding the parallels with historic insurgencies and the depth to which this phenomenon threatens the country. As a result, the 'generational struggle' has become a strategy in itself - an indictment of this government's investment in thwarting the threat and an error of judgement that has caused counter-terrorism measures to lack the political and military courage needed to rally Muslims around the Crown and engage effectively the hysteria that emanates from the heart of this insurgency. In turn, opportunities to capitalise on Britain's history and its wealth of experience with minority groups and insurgent forces have subsequently been missed and the British state has lost not just many of its citizens but its ability and credibility

to foster any degree of confidence in its capacity to reverse the offensive and protect its Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Politically, this has been compounded by a lack of pragmatism and experience in the implementation of well-intentioned but ill-thought-out initiatives to counter the threat from identified individuals and, as a consequence, mistakes that have further exacerbated the situation, namely: **1)** the aggregation and characterization of Muslim community leaders and their ‘moderate’ forces as quasi-secular, politically correct constructs with benign, foreign aspirations and complaisant, theocratic overtones; **2)** the failure to see Al Qaeda’s chrysalis, its separatist-insurgent forces and the Caliphate as attractive, rational, comprehensible and realistic alternatives for many British Muslims and **3)** a lack of investment in the Crown, the Commonwealth and the human capital of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces – errors that, for a large portion of the electorate, have allowed state-sponsored terrorism and espionage to eclipse the tentative bonds that had, until recently, held the remnants of the Muslim community’s allegiance and kept any arguably intrinsic threat (if it had hitherto existed) at bay.

Much of this was due to the fact that the issues surrounding Islam in the United Kingdom have been too controversial, too contested and too fast moving for any grounded academic research to effectively engage or parallel *i.e.* provide any real-time insights to those having to make value judgments based on the given threat. In effect, policy has therefore been supplemented with ideological, outdated, academic debates that rarely venture beyond the semantics of ‘new terrorism’ and ‘Islamic radicalisation’ – cyclical and academic discussions that are more often than not void of any new

subject based content and bereft of any relevance to the United Kingdom, its history, its Muslim communities, the legacy of their British ancestry and the theologies and philosophies of the Wild Geese and Jackals that reside within them.

As such, Islam in the United Kingdom has been manipulated and exploited by forces that have, to the detriment of their constituents, taken issues beyond their mandate and held the historic bonds of traditional allegiances to ransom. In short, the identity of British Muslims has been hijacked and the relationships between the United Kingdom and the many Muslim communities that have strong ties to the Crown, terrorized. The loyalty of Muslims today is hence presumed by many to be of a de-territorialised nature in which the fraternity of Islam overrides any allegiance to the Crown and the authentic voice of British Muslims is that of a small, highly politicised elite.

With the consequences of this being compounded by mass immigration the result has been the generic isolation and public, wholesale ‘quarantine’ of Muslims en masse from their historical milieu, their cultural heritage and their British lineage: Khudadad Khan VC is testament to this fact. As too are Muhammad Aslam, Abdullah Khan, Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Usman and the many others whose allegiance and bodies lie alongside those who died from Australia, Canada, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom at Ypres. Forgotten are the ‘Red Eagles’ who, despite 4 Victoria Crosses and Wavell’s insistence that the division would go down as, “*one of the greatest fighting formations in British history*”, few in England can even recall.

It is consequently imperative for policy-makers to be aware of not just the strengths and weaknesses of the research upon which knowledge

of this ‘global insurgency’ and those empathetic to it is based, but the trans-national nature of the insurgency, the lack of opportunities to serve, the vulnerability of British Muslims to foreign dogmata and the historical flaws in the arguments and counter arguments for their deference to forces beyond the Crown. The centre of gravity in this war is no longer Iraq or Afghanistan but, along with the United Kingdom’s belief in herself and her history, the Islamic world yet to fall to the insurgents and the continued export of their war to the front-lines of the British home-lands – battlefields that are increasingly being shaped by the propaganda of Al Qaeda and the Caliphate.

There will be grave consequences for Great Britain should the government fail to take the initiative and continue to misinterpret the perniciousness of these combatants and the trans-national nature of the global insurgency. With the aggregation and mobilisation of British Muslims and non-violent extremists into powerful social and political constructs and the religious resonance and geopolitical significance of Islamic State and Al Qaeda, it is with utmost urgency that the initiative is not handed to the enemy and that the threat to Great Britain is finally (and formally) identified and recognized for what it is - a global, core driven insurgency that has rooted itself at different levels, on different fronts and at different locations in the minds and hearts of many British citizens. Not only have the Islamists undermined and challenged the British concept, they have offered a viable alternative.

In tandem with this, the interpretation of the phenomenon as the consequence of two Gulf Wars, artificially removed from the context of the West’s long standing struggle with Islam and its colonial history has fuelled not only Islamic State’s ‘quest’ to manifest prophecies and the lethality

of Al Qaeda's 'crusade' to reconquer 'lost' territories and cities, but terrorism itself and Huntington's flames of an era characterized by cultural conflict. To be frank, with the United States fighting a war that started in 2001 and Al Qaeda and Islamic State fighting a war that started in the 7th Century, positions on a 'generational conflict' not only appear naïve in 2015, but positively dated.

Moreover, the modernity of Islamic State's application of revolutionary tradition has made a mockery of this and not only further compounded the paradoxical nature of this conflict but, through its ability to transcend borders and engage symmetrically, brought the concept of a clash with Islam closer to reality. In fear of their own Muslim populations, the West's insistence as to the secular nature of the terror has, ironically, compounded this threat and led not only to misinterpretations of the language spoken by Islamic State and Al Qaeda, but miscalculations as to their intentions. By staking the argument on a skewer of political correctness and dubious theological grounds, centuries of conflict with Islam have been dismissed. More dangerously, the West's ability to win the argument has been assumed. Regardless of its religious rhetoric and that the language of Islamic State has more in common with the verbiage of 20th century fascism than the magnificent courts of Harun al Rashid or the Golden Age of Baghdad's Abbasid Caliphs, understanding that the theological and religious basis for the terror is inherent and real (and nothing new) is fundamental to exploiting it.

A Foreign Enemy: When the Mayor of London said, in the wake of the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is, "*wrong to try to draw any link between this murder and British foreign policy*", he was mistaken - there is a clear connection between British foreign

policy and the Woolwich slaying. What linked the murder to Britain's policies abroad was the manifestation of enemy forces on the streets of Britain and treason. Intrinsically, however, Johnston was right – regardless of foreign policy, as Britain has been targeted in a global insurgency against the international powers of the 21st century, she (along with Russia, America, France, Australia and Canada) will be attacked. Irrespective of arguments to the contrary, the United Kingdom, like the United States, is a threat to the insurgency by its very existence and to suggest otherwise is to underestimate the adversarial nature of the enemy, the power of modern Britain and a closeness with the Islamic world that no other Western country comes close to.

Whilst a change in policy towards Israel or Iraq for example might shift the frontlines of the global insurgency at an operational level and pacify a number of militants intent on individual acts of terrorism in the UK, it would not affect the theological justification for political violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and Islamic State, or the mechanics of their ideologies. Capitulating to the violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign forces is hence unlikely in itself to reverse any extant threat to Britain and not only risks the consolidation of political Islam as a global force but the strengthening of radical positions within the UK itself.

This is not, however, to say that a *re-positioning* of British power is futile. Indeed, a glance at the sub-text of the insurgency not only enables insights as to the need for reform, but the vulnerability of the country to forces beyond the Crown and the potential benefits of weighing anchor on the remnants of the 20th century and forging ahead into the 21st. To better understand the threat to Britain, to push what has become a frontline in

an offensive against the West beyond the territorial boundaries of the British state and to take the fight to the enemy, the consensus needs to be deeper than a reaction to the spill-over and blow-back from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Israel and deeper than a policy of hunkering down and holding course.

And this is where the crux of the question lies: unless absolute, countering the foreign threat by targeting terrorists not only fails to undermine the rationale behind the insurgent forces engaged in political violence, but exacerbates the potential for that rationale to morph, particularly at home. In short, in that counter-terrorism is generally reactive and, by definition, employed *ex post facto*, it is not designed to counter the intangible, idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent force. Counter-insurgency, however, is so and is not only proactive and geared towards the root causes of a political struggle, but the heart of a struggle. Unfortunately, in that such measures would require the mobilisation of not just the military and the police forces of the UK but the state, it is also more radical and overtly confrontational (in the paradigm of this proposal, counter-insurgency would translate to the mobilisation of the state itself to protect its citizenry).

With regards to the last two decades, the reason the rationale for counter-terrorism as opposed to counter-insurgency became the vehicle through which to counter mainstream analyses of Al Qaeda and, later, Islamic State, is not because of any reluctance to engage terrorism politically or that the terrorism was unprecedented, but because there was little architecture in place to enable readily, comprehensive understandings of the scale or nature of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda and the horrors of the Caliphate have catapulted Islamic violence beyond the tenets of 'ordinary' terrorism and

hence, any legitimacy in drawing parallels with historic manifestations of Islamic terrorism has been dismissed. Indeed, an appetite has developed for analyses of it as ‘exceptional’ and that it can only be destroyed by war. Understanding the threat in reverse, as a global insurgency that cannot be contained (never mind destroyed) by war, would enable the emplacement of an architecture that engages not the theology of Islam or the nature of its militancy, but the political reality of what is merely an alliance against the *Jahili* world.

To propose that ‘home-grown’ terrorism does not exist and that manifestations of it are of an inherently foreign lineage is a bold statement but, from the perspective of countering it, a new one and one in which the dynamics and importance of allegiance are readily apparent. With Islamic State now an international singularity with legions from Kandahar to Marrakesh and Al Qaeda a network of increasingly para-militarised webs, the onus on the British government needs to be reversed: from one of de-radicalising individual Muslims and countering charges of ‘home-grown’ terrorism to protecting its Muslims wholesale – in essence, a shift from the apprehension of specific perpetrators to the defeat and marginalisation of the insurgents’ strategy and the undermining of the ideological effect that entices British Muslims to the banner and political zealotry of foreign princes.

Basically, the nature of the insurgency has graduated from a singular threat to that of a community threat and, through cross-pollination, from a national threat to an ‘*ummaic*’ threat. Islamic terrorism has taken on a life beyond that designed to counter it and metamorphosed beyond the parameters of counter-terrorism. The horror of the latest manifestation is that it is designed not to terrorize

people but, perversely, to win their hearts and minds. Countering the threat to the UK from foreign forces hence involves recognizing that Islamic State and Al Qaeda have evolved beyond the concepts of current analyses. United, they command the hearts and minds of millions of people across the globe today and, far from the product or consequence of foreign policy over the last two decades or the proliferation in failing states, have a much deeper and intricate history. The success of Islamic State and Al Qaeda and the threat to the United Kingdom is not so much their ability to tear down borders and establish frontlines or position on the apex of the see-saws of major powers - it is their capacity to encompass the annals of a people’s history.

The Home-front: Because Al Qaeda and Islamic State have moved so far beyond the paradigm of terrorism *per se*, the rise of militant Islam in the UK has largely gone unnoticed and, as a consequence, taken place under the radar of counter-terrorism forces. Artificial parameters on variations of Islam and levels of radicalization have left the security forces fighting a legion of ghosts. Without addressing this and the further politicisation of British Muslims, the risk is a move by the militants from deploying terrorists to employing them – a move from the phenomenon of British ‘terrorists’ to ‘British terrorism’. If this process is allowed to complete, the ability to engage the threat will be reduced beyond the control of civil forces and centred on grievances that, ultimately, either do not exist or that involve apocalyptic demands - an insurgency that transcends *any* counter-terrorism measures and that, by the very nature of its violence and stance will (at some point) require direct military action.

Although the negative consequences of military action in Northern Ireland have left enduring

legacies for the British and that, as a result of it, the deployment of the army is often seen as a last resort, the precedents for not utilizing the armed services of the Crown in the ‘Home-Front War’ are few and far between, particularly if applied in an indirect manner and that the mandate is to ‘defragment’ the threat and counter any insurgency as opposed to any terrorism. In short, due to their experience and that the state needs to be seen to be protecting its people, a role has unfolded for the Armed Services that is not just unprecedented, but unique in the history of modern Britain - in not just leading efforts to win the hearts and minds of Muslims abroad, but in leading them at home: replacing the supplementary efforts of police led counter-terrorism doctrine with military led counter-insurgency measures that proactively target the populations most vulnerable to the militants and where the skills of disaggregation, denying ground, interdicting links, exploiting local actors and returning entire communities to modes of ‘normal interaction’ are key.

PART II

British Terrorism & the Plurality of the State

The Generational Struggle: The Prime Minister’s calls for a less tolerant society (in the context of values) and a ‘generational struggle’ against Islamic extremism have not only contributed to a culture of political conformity that has escalated confrontation, but a counter-terrorism strategy that has become dependent on it. One reason for this is that, in an attempt to foster mainstream beliefs, an attempt by the government to manufacture a collective of secular values has undermined both the foundations of British democracy and the inclusive, pluralistic traditions of

not just Muslim loyalty to the Crown but that of many other minorities. Without any alternative for strengthening the collective identity, calls for integration, moderation and cohesion have hence become not only monochrome and divisive, but intolerant, dependent on the endorsement of populist votes and profoundly dangerous – especially for those with their own identities, traditions, values, religions and historic, proven notions of patriotism and loyalty.

As a result, the ‘generational struggle’ has become a strategy in itself and an indictment of the commitment to thwarting the Islamic threat on its own merits and obtaining the resources needed to rally Muslims around the Crown and directly engage the insurgency. It is hence argued that open-ended conflict with a vaguely defined enemy will continue to lead not just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric from elements of the Muslim population, but the fraying of traditional tensions between groups that have existed peacefully in these islands for many years – groups that have not only characterised the pluralistic nature of British democracy but the tangled web of loyalties that have held the United Kingdom together for centuries. Given the artificial and untested nature of the doctrine, it is believed that the strategy would neither last the test of time nor the economic, political and social impact of a bombing campaign.

It must equally be pointed out that the insurgency has, in any case, little concept or appreciation of the West’s approach to time and has been well embedded for many decades. Hence, with the ‘generational approach’, the enemy has the advantage of time and is able to exploit the policy of non-engagement that characterizes the reactive, episodic approach of this government. What is at risk here is

greater than ‘living with terrorism’: the pluralistic nature of the country’s democracy, a clash between the secular and religious forces of the population and a window of opportunity for the enemy to exploit and para-militarise its British contingents.

PART III

Gunpowder, Treason & Plot

Attacks to Come: In that one of the most striking features of Islamic terrorism is the destabilizing nature of its mere presence, crucial are the implications of counter-terrorism measures having failed to adequately address its religious and apocalyptic façade. The extreme to which this has affected the public is extraordinary and turned what was little other than a terrorist organization into a phenomenon with revolutionary, global proportions. Counter-terrorism responses to Islamic fundamentalism have hence not only failed in challenging the façade but in protecting contemporary views of British Muslims from subversion. Indeed, as one of the most striking political features of the early 20th century was the repeated destabilizing nature of militant violence and the reaction or lack of reaction to its realpolitik, the far reaching consequences of Islamic terrorism in this century must not be underestimated.

The consequences of focusing on ‘home-grown terrorism’, as opposed to the nature of the exported / imported threat, are hence not only cyclical in that they continue to fail to address this politick but vulnerable in that they can be framed and exploited by the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive against what could be portrayed as an isolated, immigrant, minority population. Furthermore, as counter-terrorism is not designed to indent upon

the cohesiveness of any incumbent insurgency, it not only fails to prosecute the weaknesses of these forces but exacerbates the politics behind them. Whilst jailing terrorists and criminalising their actions may indeed be of value to delegitimising their cause, it underestimates the intensity and ferocity of the non-violent conflict and overestimates the weight of any convictions.

To divest Islamic terrorism of its political capabilities and strategic reach, it is hence necessary to protect Muslim populations from any subversive or insurgent activity and rendezvous with the connections outlined above in the Woolwich attack. Both the engagement of British nationals loyal to forces beyond the Crown abroad and the public interdiction of treasonable activity at home would offer better protection than ‘generational projects’ in social engineering, community policing and counter-terrorism. The reason for this is twofold: 1) Islamic terrorists in the UK have as yet to go ‘blind’, in an all-out directive to force a crisis of legitimacy for the government and the targeted communities 2) Islamic insurgents have barely developed beyond the incipient stage, *i.e.* because engaging the insurgency as a foreign, intrinsic, strategic and symbiotic component of the enemy’s *gestalt* in its early stages increases the likelihood of an earlier, visible and quantifiable victory.

The consequences of failing to halt the militant forces of Islam are wrought with danger: an increase in the violent rejection of society by Muslims and the reticent forces of republicanism, an increase in propaganda of the deed, illegalism, demonstrative bloodshed, terror and wide-scale treason - all traits of the modern incipient stage and responses to long-term counter-terrorism initiatives. It must not be forgotten that, as with the strategic corporal of a 21st century conventional

force, an individual terrorist has immense asymmetrical power and the circumstances in which he is most likely to employ it to its full effect is in a long-term offensive – with 6,000 flights going in and out of the UK in a typical 24 hour period (and in range of shoulder launched missiles), it is merely a question of time.

In summary, the opportunity to employ counter-insurgency measures could be lost were there to be another mass-casualty attack and the ability to reign in the militants with it. The alternative to the status quo, at present, is hence either: to go on the offensive and intensify counter-terrorism measures with draconian legislation or, alternatively, to ‘defragment’ the threat with a surge of forces and take direct control of the lives of the populations targeted by the terrorists. If the British are to develop successful counter-insurgency strategies for the country’s built-up, racially diverse, Muslim communities, its strategists must understand that it is pivotal on such an ideological component. Just as Al Qaeda and Islamic State are competing for the hearts and minds of British Muslims, so too must the Crown.

PART IV

Defragmenting the Threat

The Pragmatic Model: The ultimate aim of defragmentation is not integration or social cohesion, but the development of *common ground* around which allegiances to the Crown can be rallied when called - it is not designed to draw an end to Jihad or the dedication of oneself to a foreign cause, nor to assimilate the citizenry of the United Kingdom. Whilst the consequences of defragmenting may provide context for the above, its goals are independent of any racial or religious agenda and unconcerned with the root causes of

terrorism. The reason for this is that defragmenting is not about terrorism or the defence of the realm *per se* but the sovereignty of the nation’s parts.

Under the assumption that integration is the answer to the phenomenon of nations adopting loyalties beyond the Crown, counter-terrorism measures have been intrinsically designed to thwart the violent and non-violent ambitions of British Muslims questioning the world into which they have been born. Not only is this counter-productive and an inducement to abandon their inheritance, but an assault on the pluralistic nature of British sovereignty. Whilst integration and desegregation are indeed key to the progression of a nation’s identity, neither are about the social engineering of a generation based on an artificial interpretation of a culture. The components of the country are simply too fluid, too complicated, too diverse and too intricate in their nature to define, understand and appreciate for them to be stopped in time, disassembled and reassembled to please a generation.

Defragmenting is hence neither the disassembly nor reassembly of communities but the protection and enhancement of their clock-like components – a protective casing to prevent the fragmentation of the identities and values that each cog and spring represents and that are crucial to the equilibrium of the nation. The aim is therefore to create a protective cover in which the independent performance of each component can be accessed and enhanced for its symbiotic qualities. Adapting to the unique dynamics of the threat to these cogs and abandoning the doctrine of counter-terrorism is not, however, without collateral damage and, although liberal, is a muscular response that forcefully takes ownership of and incorporates into the security apparatus of the state the communities targeted

by the enemy. Moreover, as a counter-insurgency measure, its targets are deeper than those of counter-terrorism and include not just the returnees and the militants, but their parents, their families and familial links abroad.

Given the nature of the task in hand and the controversial nature of the proposal, the mechanics of defragmenting the threat need to be put into perspective. The reason for this is that, despite the complexity of the phenomenon, the mission is overtly simple in definition - to win over any constituency that has been infiltrated by forces beyond the Crown and to secure its allegiance. Defragmenting has no other ambitions: it is not to improve the rights of women within these communities, to improve levels of education or to reduce any propensity or predilection for anti-social behaviour or criminal activity. Nor is it to instil any Anglo-centric notion of justice, liberty or freedom – none of which are deemed prerequisites to allegiance. Interpreting the battlespace as a map of human terrain and exploiting it for the purposes of allegiance alone is not only proactive but devoid of the religious, cultural and racial baggage that characterises counter-terrorism. Hence, instead of attacking civil liberties each time the country is faced with an act of terrorism, defragmenting means protecting them - taking advantage of the situation by offering a bridge from the diabolical to the moral and draining the enemy of its human resources.

Defragmenting is hence an innovative, integrated and strategic theory designed to kill an insurgency in its early, embryonic stage. It is a response to a threat that is too fragmented to cope with in its entirety - so spread out amidst the available data that there are too few contiguous intelligence leads at any one specific threat to target, to locate, engage and destroy in time. Defragmenting the

threat breaks through this data and concatenates the strings of intelligence to the degree whereby access and response times on the ground become more manageable. Through a process of working from both ends of the strings (from the terrorist to the target and from the target to the terrorist) it not only identifies the source of the threat and target, but the likely outcome.

This reflects a very new way of understanding the tangible threat to the UK and mobilizing against it; concentrating resources on both the terrorist and the target as opposed to any intangible enemy. It also enables practitioners on the ground to tap into real time intelligence that reflects the human terrain. By defragmenting the exposure and experience of the returnees, the sanctuaries within the terrorists' communities and the terrain of the targets, the Prevent and Protect strands of the Contest Policy would be seen not only to be dated, but to have fundamental flaws in their ability to counter Islamic fundamentalism.

There are 3 major components to the process: 1. Defragmenting the threat from returnees (their competencies) 2. Defragmenting the threat from their communities (their constituencies) and, 3. Defragmenting the threat to their targets (their proficiencies). The mechanics of the defensive strands of the policy are hence primarily based on an analysis of the terrorists' competencies in asymmetrical warfare and the levels of proficiency that would be required to attack targets in the United Kingdom. The delivery of that intelligence and the objectives of the mission would be achieved through control of the sanctuaries within their communities and the 'castle-building' of allegiances throughout them by:

A) Concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist between the immigrant populations of

Great Britain and the Crown.

i.e. locating, linking and connecting values that are fixed and compatible with, not mainstream politics or social norms, but allegiance to the Crown.

B) Taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force through:

1. The enforcement of grassroots democracy *via* a policy of political, economic and social subsidiarity that isolates 'Islamic Issues' from 'Muslim Issues'.
2. Handling 'Muslim Issues' at their lowest geographical and demographic level of organisation and dealing with social problems at the most immediate point of contact.
3. Reconfiguring the political landscape by capitalising on the dissipated energy of internal conflict, sectarian competition and the extant fault lines of nationality (Somali, Bengali, Pakistani *etc.*), religion (Shia, Sunni, Ahmadi *etc.*) and politics (Jihad-nationalists, Jihadi-trans-nationalists *etc.*).
4. Investing economically in allegiance and encouraging political and social aspirations that reinforce the new status quo.
5. Germination of the human product and recycling of the social product.

i.e. the exposure and engagement of insurgent forces by dividing the militants into multiple, antagonistic, sectarian factions and forcing their communities into taking public, irrevocable and irrecoverable stances on position and family.

C) Enabling those communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions by a strengthening in the Covenant between Her Majesty's Armed Forces and the nation.

i.e. a demonstrable, experienceable return on the defence budget through a radical transformation of

civil-military relations both at home and abroad.

PART V

The New Covenant

Civil-Military Relations: That the end of the Cold War reignited colonial, tribal and religious conflict that had been dormant for generations has been well documented. That it gave birth to the extremism and ethno-nationalist terrorism of the Muslim world and is the legacy of 70 years of repressive, dictatorial regimes and the political, economic and social ramifications of globalization, regional alliances and the diminishing power of nation-states is less established. However, in the context that the 'wastelands' of Islam were abandoned in the wake of the Soviet Empire, the rise of Salafi-Jihad and the race to reverse the perceived onslaught of such powers is far from surprising.

In this sense, whether the threat emanates from radicalized Western based converts, lone wolves, Al Qaeda Central, AQAM, Islamic State or the 'Leaderless Jihad' is a moot point, for any attack on the West is but one more front in what is an ongoing war on a much larger battlefield than the homelands of the British Isles. It is hence of great importance that any drive to reverse the threat to the UK recognizes the global nature of the threat, is international in scope and driven by the military; protecting the United Kingdom from trans-national conflict and securing the communities held hostage by British militants are but one and the same.

The consequences of maintaining the status quo and failing to utilize the mandate of the Armed Forces to protect the country at home and abroad are the increasing para-militarization of non-military forces and, to the

detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and national security, a further process of civilianization, privatization and cuts across the armed forces. The problem with this is that, even if the ‘War of the Wastelands’ were to continue *ad infinitum* and the détente with Russia to last, the enemy have transformed and so too have the stakes. The colonial, tribal and religious conflicts of the past are no longer contained by dictatorial regimes, and the borders of yesterday, have become today’s frontiers. The end of age-old alliances and the collapse of proxy-wars have brought an international, conventional and state-like element to the modernity of 21st century political violence that counter-terrorism cannot defeat. Although, at present, British brigades have exactly the type of manpower, resources, equipment and experience to engage and destroy the armed forces of Islamic State it would, as the threat simply morphed from Iraq and Syria to the ‘Wastelands’ of Somalia, Libya, the Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Maghreb or Aden, indeed even to the barracks from which the British marched, exhaust the country, divide its populace and leave them defeated.

The threat today must therefore not be confused with that of yesterday. Whilst to contain the monster of the type of terrorism that was born between the foundations of the modern state and its citizenry, a government would of course be best advised to consider learning how to live with it, maintaining its more often than not benign malevolence, this is only were it content to feast from a Cyclopic, cave-like existence. With the threat that Britain faces, this is not the case. Britain’s monster has tendrils beyond the state. The main premise for this is that as national-separatists have a traceable lineage that are inseparable from that of the governments they oppose, they remain, to all intents and

purposes, ‘civilians’. Al Qaeda and Islamic State, on the other hand, have a bloodline and an ideology that is soaked not in politics or insurrection, but combat.

As a result of a shared experience and a shared ideology that stems from the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (a lineage that has enabled them to survive the onslaughts of two superpowers) they have arguably transitioned from ‘civilian-terrorists’ to ‘stateless-soldiers’ and cannot be appeased. With the ‘stateless-soldiers’ of Islamic State, the hordes of Cyclopses not only help Polyphemus outwit and kill Odysseus, but march on to Ithaca for his Crown. Military engagement hence needs to involve the mobilisation of the nation and its communities in a combined offensive – a symbiotic, ideological advance on the enemy, both at home and abroad.

Hence, what Michael Gove achieved with cadet forces in British secondary schools needs to be viewed with admiration – and as a blue-print for a much grander strategy in which the example set by the NHS and Military in Sierra Leone is replicated across not just the institutions of the state, but the citizenry: tens of thousands of workers commissioned with reserve and regular soldiers into the national and international framework of the country’s security apparatus – a Britain and a world in which Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and Carriers are first on the horizon to provide aid, engineering and sanctuary, a Britain in which Her Majesty’s Armed Forces reflect the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of the nation from which they draw their strength and a Britain in which the profound changes that the country is undergoing are shared.

A social return on investment in defence and a foreign policy that reflects the might of the country’s

inheritance has many precedents and can be seen not just in Gove’s legacy or the nation’s response to the Ebola crisis, but across the history of the world. Were Britain to strive to lead once again as the world’s first to respond militarily to the needs of those in help, the might of her neutrality would be restored and enhance not just allegiance at home and pride in the defence and foreign aid budgets, but her reputation and respect as a power-broker abroad.

One of the most historic precedents for this actually lie in the remnants of the British Army’s regimental system and is a further reason as to why the Armed Forces are a good starting point to rebuilding the country’s allegiances. Given that this is a well-documented example of where the British have failed to take advantage of their past, it is sufficient to say that, today, alongside the Irish, Welsh, Scots, English and Nepalese parade-grounds of the British Army lie the ‘abandoned waste-lands’ in which the footsteps of the Sikhs of *King George’s Own*, the Punjabis of the *Burma Rifles*, the Bengali *Lancers* of the *Duke of Cambridge’s Own* and the Kenyans, the Ugandans and the Somalis of the *King’s African Rifles* are but ghostly echoes of a forgotten time.

The role of Catholic, Irish, Scots, Welsh and Nepalese soldiers needs to be emphasised up and down the country as they, along with the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Regiments (were they to be revived), are an irreproachable example of loyalty to the Crown and the key to both countering the threat and enfranchising the ‘enraged’ with demonstrable, public acts of allegiance and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty to the institutions of the state. To conclude, defragmenting has not only precedents, but established precedents. ■

Major Lessons from COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to Use Them in the Future



■ MAJ Nikolaos Charalampopoulos, GRC Army,
JFTC Training Division

Introduction

Nowadays majority of military conflicts happening on our planet have a form of irregular war, while classic warfare between conventional forces is rather an exception. This observation has led a number of strategy analysts and practitioners alike to conclude that in the future we will experience a new form of guerilla war, also known as “low intensity conflict”. There is a rich bibliography dealing with this type of conflict, however, the use of this special term was invented by US Army staff officers back in 1981, in a rather failed attempt to develop a new counter-revolutionary doctrine, based on experiences gained from the Vietnam guerilla campaign.¹ Besides, the use of the adjective “low” did not mean to decrease the importance and the lethality of such a conflict but it was used in order to demonstrate and describe the differentiation in terms of power. At the same period of time, the term “classical counterinsurgency” was introduced

through a variety of theoretical approaches in order to describe the military actions taken during the colonial wars.²

Today, in the aftermath of the war conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN has become fashionable again. The US Army in its relevant field manuals, defines insurgency “as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”³ or in a similar way “insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and the legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control”.⁴ On the other hand, “COIN is military, paramilitary political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”.⁵

The constant theme in the aforementioned definitions is the relationship between politics and violence. Moreover, their main characteristics is that both

insurgency and COIN fall under the same subtotal of conflict, known as irregular warfare, while in parallel their central issue is all about political power. Therefore, an insurgency is a politico-military struggle, with the primacy of the political element. Insurgency and COIN are defined by their highly lethal and extraordinary complex character, but at the end of the day, insurgency and COIN are about political power, and who owns it.

At this point, further to the definitions, it is worth mentioning that there is no clear borderline between insurgency and terrorism. In many cases public opinion can hardly distinguish a “terrorist” from a “rebel” or an “insurgent” from a “freedom fighter”. Undoubtedly, there are conceptual and ideological differences between insurgency and terrorism, but it would be useful to identify the differences between those two forms of asymmetric threats, since an insurgency is considered as a greatest threat to the established power rather than terrorism. The easiest way to

understand the difference between the two is that insurgents try to hit the rival armed and security forces as a whole, while terrorists execute individual hits mainly directed against civilian targets.

However, the main difference is that terrorists seek to impose a change in the political status mainly through the use of indirect force, while insurgents try to achieve the same goal in a straightforward way. That means that insurgency has more to do with military power and tactics thus, an insurgents want to have absolute control over the targeted area. Putting it in a less complex way, insurgents will use terrorism – armed violence against unarmed people to intimidate and influence, while in parallel they will also use guerrilla – hit and run tactics to target the government's vulnerabilities and convey their message. Insurgency and terrorism often coexist which creates a chaotic security environment especially for those involved in COIN.⁶

Lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan

Understanding the environment

The use of the term “environment” in COIN is used so as to describe all aspects that pose a direct or an indirect influence in accomplishment of the mission. In all military operations the study of the environment is of high value. However, in case of COIN it has a unique meaning since it is related to elements that traditionally are considered as non-combatant. To be more specific, the study of corruption in Afghanistan or the gender discrimination in Iraq are closer to the field of social sciences rather than to military matters, but in our case it is important to underline that the COIN campaign requires methods quite different than those applied to a conventional conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highly indicated that success requires more than armed security as it heavily depends on influence and persuasion thus, demands the ability to understand and communicate with local

society through their culture. Just because an Afghan says ‘yes’ and nods his head, does not necessarily mean that he agrees with you - he may just want you to stop talking.

Culture is the way people behave and it is very hard to be determined. Members from different societies often have different perception of life, religion, justice, social status, sexual orientation and gender norms, even different notions of rationality.⁷ History provides many examples of where failure to know, understand or apply the culture of others often led to disastrous results.⁸ Arab cultural awareness includes a variety of key elements, all equally important such as tribalism and authoritarianism,⁹ hierarchy, institutions, roles and statuses, values and beliefs, elders, gender, religion, public protocol, promises and other. Even corruption plays a unique role in the Arab tradition and culture. As Colonel Juan Ayala, a senior adviser to an Iraqi Division, wrote: “Corruption exists. The Iraqis know that we know. They know we would never condone it or report it if we saw it... It has been part of life since the sands of Mesopotamia... Seeking corruption would distract mission focus, severely strain sensitive personal relations, and worse, compromise our force protection posture (meaning there would be retaliation)¹⁰”.

Insurgents by definition will always be one step ahead in terms of local knowledge, communication and understanding the interests of native communities. Cultural knowledge enables counterinsurgents' ability to identify in depth the needs of the local population and plan their next steps accordingly. Moreover, counterinsurgents will be able to avoid one of the most typical mistakes made by U.S. planners in Iraq, which was to impose their ideas of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem.¹¹ Therefore, commanders, small unit leaders and soldiers are highly encouraged to improve their cultural skills through personal training, engagement with indigenous key personnel, relationship building, patrolling, and other interaction with natives, so as to offset insurgents' advantages.¹² After

The aim of this essay is to identify and indicate what is considered to be an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of lessons learned (LL). Moreover, this essay will demonstrate possible ways of how all knowledge gained from past and contemporary experiences can be implemented and used in an attempt to facilitate COIN planning procedures and overcome problems in the future. In order to achieve this it is important for the readers to familiarize themselves with the topic through a short knowledge update starting with some important definitions. Thereafter, this essay will proceed further to a deeper analysis by using a logical methodology based on a step by step study through the lens of the COIN principles, as they have been adopted by the traditional COIN theory.

all, COIN is fundamentally a competition between many groups and is always more than two-sided.

COIN Planning and Design

COIN has to be designed, planned and executed as any other military operation on condition that its special characteristics and dynamics should be prioritized accordingly. The initial strategy against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan was not new. Actually it was similar to the doctrine employed at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries during the colonial wars to pacify acquired territories; occupy the territory and establish numerous garrisons, eliminate armed opposition and then withdraw the troops.¹³ Initially there was not any particular interest within the campaign planning to incorporate concepts such as civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), psychological operations (PYSOPS), public affairs and social/political internal relations of the country. Nevertheless, these tactics did not allow the army to occupy a sizeable part of the territory, the insurgent attacks remained constant and the population remained mostly negative.

It was not until recently, when coalition forces realized that success is gained mainly by targeting the populace, not the insurgents. In other words, success

in COIN comes from winning the hearts and minds of the population, where “hearts” means persuading people that their best interest are served by counterinsurgents’ success, and “minds” means convincing them that counterinsurgents can protect them. Therefore, the objective, or better say, the center of gravity in a COIN campaign must be the people. That was exactly the key point in General Petraeus’ strategy when he tasked his forces to primary secure and serve the local population by living with it, as this would eventually lead to regional stability, governmental sustainability and economic growth.¹⁴ That is to say that, military forces have to get out from the security of their compounds and actively set their boots on the ground so as to get in touch with people.¹⁵ One can argue that since high-tech surveillance equipment offers comparative advantages there is no reason to put soldiers’ lives at high risk. In this case the answer is that nothing can replace visible force’s presence, especially when insurgents have repeatedly shown that they can immediately adjust their tactics to new challenges, more like a balloon that “...you squeeze one end, and the enemy moves to the other”.¹⁶

Another fundamental element in COIN planning procedure is the ability to involve indigenous forces as a part of the entire process. In this case there must be a preparation phase that includes recruiting, training and evaluation, and gradually within a reasonable period of time indigenous security forces should participate in common operations in the light of embedded partnering, until finally they are capable to plan and execute their own missions. This will create a negative picture and send the right message to the natives as it will be their own people who fight for them thus, it will deepen their confidence and enable responsibility and accountability.¹⁷ When there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can be done unless they decide to take over initiatives and rely on their own power until they finally manage to isolate and eradicate insurgents from their cause and support.

COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also taught us that

insurgency today has the ability to receive support from national and international sources due to its global nature.¹⁸ The rise of globalization has significantly changed the way that insurgency is being fought “...from Madrid to London, and from New York to Baghdad, insurgency is leveraged by a worldwide criminal market, and feeds off media that broadcasts its violence and multiplies the latter’s psychological impact”.¹⁹ Globalization has also offered additional potential to insurgents, such as access to a worldwide audience, freedom of moving and communication, ability to conduct financial transfers without being tracked, but above all, globalization allowed them to create and use “active” – geographical space sanctuaries and “virtual” – internet based sanctuaries that facilitated their needs and activities in terms of training, indoctrination, recruitment, and regrouping.²⁰ From this point of view, contemporary COIN must be able to mobilize and energize all available support at all levels while in parallel it must assume initiatives and establish measures in order to prevent its rivals from doing the same.²¹

Finally, time is of critical importance and must be included in the planning as well. Usually policymakers provide time frames and expect troops to be withdrawn from the theater accordingly, however, it should be underlined that COIN is a time consuming effort and often its duration is a question without a clear answer.²² As mentioned before, COIN is directly related to indigenous populace whose reaction cannot be measured in advance. Lack of tactical patience in COIN operations contributes to missed opportunities and intelligence failures, and sometimes, waiting, collecting information, reporting and doing nothing is the best reaction.

Legitimacy

Insurgents’ primary objective is to delegitimize the current political system and its representatives while in parallel they are seeking ways to legitimize their struggle and translate this into sympathy and vital support from internal and external

actors. The key method that insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their actions are ideas of self-determination and sovereignty, therefore the use of violence from their side is justified as a result of chasing a political objective. In addition, insurgents, through demonstration of moral superiority over state forces try to create their image of martyrs who are ready to sacrifice themselves for freedom and independence of their homeland.²³ The idea behind this is that the moral justification for the purpose of a political goal (self-determination and sovereignty) will generate indigenous and international sympathizers ready to provide support and mainly legitimization for the use of violence in order for them to overset the current status.²⁴

Theoretically, governments described as legitimate rule primarily with blank acceptance and support of their citizens without the fear of consequences as long as their activities stay within a reasonably predefined frame. On the other hand, the primary responsibility of any government is to provide security to its people. In COIN operations this might be turn out to be problematic and become Achilles’ heel. Indeed, no government can claim full consent from the governed side unless it is able to provide them with security and thus, securing populace requires efficient and continuous employment of security forces. The overall concept is quite challenging since it requires ability to maintain control over an overwhelming force without causing a negative impact to the local populace.²⁵ As a response to this action, insurgents will try to provoke and undermine the government’s effort by drawing it into a game of attrition where insurgents usually have an advantage in delegitimizing the state’s efforts.²⁶

Practically speaking, insurgents seek to have the government and coalition forces do their work for them. This overreaction is exactly what insurgents are looking for so as to drive the populace or international opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents’ bottom-up efforts should align top-down initiatives dealing with daily civic issues, impunity and the negative influence of parallel structures that attack government’s

credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local and international communities. Utilization of the local government to work out those issues offers a governmental signature on all actions. Finally, counterinsurgents need to know that democracy and elections do not have the same meaning and do not apply to any society of this world as it might have little to do with “governments being elected and governments being popular”.²⁷ No doubt, the power given to a democratically elected government by its populace is important but this power has to translate into security, law, order, civil services and prosperity.

Unity of effort

There is no need to mention that unity of effort or unity of command as it is known in military COIN doctrine, plays a special role within COIN operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, beside international military forces, a great number of governmental (GO), non-governmental (NGO), and other international organizations (IO) are actively involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of the entire area thus, unity of effort must be present at every dimension, every level, and in any daily activity. In this case, the challenge to overcome is very complex, since we refer to a combat system dominated by a number of players, each of which has a different role and position within this system, but all of them are equally important for the stability of the system.

Collaboration among military and civilian entities might be an answer to this, especially since the military cannot solve all COIN related issues on its own due to its structure and mission. Therefore, troops can be used in a way that will create a safe path to be followed by civilian subject matters that from their side will go into deeper waters in their respective field of expertise.²⁸ Furthermore, the ideal solution would be a COIN leader, military or civilian, who should be given authority and power to direct all COIN aspects vertically and horizontally towards the common objective.²⁹ However, this course of action

appears to be problematic in Afghanistan while in Iraq cannot bring at all the required synergy.³⁰ Moreover, reality has proven that in many cases IOs, GOs, and NGOs can perform better if they are allowed to stay outside of the wire, meaning without falling under COIN leader's command and control.³¹ Therefore, it would be more realistic if we should try to achieve synchronization rather than command and control. Otherwise, well-intentioned efforts may turn into failures and give opportunities for insurgents to undermine the whole project.

Intelligence in COIN

One of the major problems in COIN operations is to track and target an enemy who is not dressed in military uniforms, has no trenches or front lines, and is hiding among populace.³² In a situation like this the only tool available is effective, active and accurate intelligence (INTEL). By definition INTEL is vital for all forms of warfare however, in COIN operations INTEL is encountering an additional theoretical problem: intelligence versus information. Put it in another way, INTEL in COIN has a dual role; from one side it emphasizes collection and analysis on current operational issues based on the traditional model “who-when-where-why-how”, while from the other side it strives to delineate skills, characteristics, tactics, and goals of an invisible enemy. Meanwhile, insurgents consciously study and learn from their weaknesses in an attempt to become more adoptive and resilient to COIN methods, which fact in many cases allow them to be one step ahead.³³

Lately, INTEL knowledge gained from the theater offered new perspectives in terms of sustains and improvements. To start up, coalition forces realized that despite the fact that operations will be INTEL driven, intelligence will come mostly from their own efforts, and somehow INTEL must be pushed down to the lowest level possible, to include friendly indigenous forces and vice versa. Thus, all personnel are now considered as information collectors to include linguists

and translators. Moreover, they have improved INTEL awareness in coordination with all international organizations, taking advantage from their connections with the elders and key personnel of a given area, as 50% of the success of COIN INTEL relies on positive relationships with elders and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied INTEL now emphasizes collection on social and religious networking by connecting the dots between the tribes, families, businesses, and political organizations. Finally, international military troops have to accept the chaos of not having perfect INTEL in a COIN environment. Insurgents will always surprise them and attack their weakest points; what is important is that individual soldiers must identify those weak points and communicate that information effectively.³⁴

Investing Knowledge in Future

Learn and adopt

“In COIN the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly, usually wins”.³⁵ Coalition forces should adopt LL as quickly as possible if they want to maintain their superiority in the future. The study of the two COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the below mentioned conclusion: the decline of communist ideology is irreversible, nationalism remains a powerful force and, religious fundamentalism is raged –basically Muslim, but with the possible creation of opposing tendencies in other religions. The methods of the rebels will remain basically the same, but there will be adjustments to technological developments. The increasing urbanization of the population will lead to greater recourse to terrorism, possibly with weapons of mass destruction, but as insurgency is politically effective, the most important movements are expected to use a combination of both methods. How effective will the insurgents be in the future? Technological developments facilitate observation and real-time transmission of information and therefore, impede the concentration of large insurgency groups.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the technology is not available in most of the countries facing insurgency. Physical superiority of conventional forces against the insurgents is obvious, but the analysis that preceded shows that a lot depends on willingness of conventional forces to use its superior power and adjust their structure so as to fight “wars amongst people”.³⁶ In this context, the growing international sensitivity for human rights can prevent conventional forces from using the most effective methods to combat the insurgents. Besides, the international interest in human rights is manifested most often selectively and in any case where a rebel movement transformed from mere annoyance to a threat to the established order, then the state forces act and ignore international public opinion. Consequently, the effectiveness of insurgents seems not to differ from that they had in the past. But, which will become apparent, generalizations have no place in an insurgency conflict.

This conclusion explains why while conducting a COIN campaign one should avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics and viewing the population merely as onlookers or irrelevant; at best local tactical victories against an ever replenishing insurgency can be gained in the short term, but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. On the other hand, indigenous political leaders, police and military forces need to be trained and brought onside on the broadest possible basis. The population must be actively engaged and the weight of the campaign must be transferred over the local forces. Finally, success will be established only by diminishing the active support basis for the insurgency, by marginalizing it within the society and associating the new government with a distinct improvement of the general living conditions of the population, as opposed to those still supporting the anti-government forces. This is a quote from David Galula’s classic work Counterinsurgency Warfare, published in 1964: “A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces...A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the

population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”³⁷

Future dynamics in COIN

Experience gained in theater indicates that COIN operations nowadays and in close future will be dominated by three new dynamics as analyzed below. Shortly after the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents started to use Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain support from local Muslim communities. Later on, during escalation of the conflict, Al-Zawahiri stated that “Victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq”,³⁸ and coalition forces and international public opinion realized that they witnessed the beginning of an Islamist rally, a global jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and preachers from Arab and non-Arab world promised a glorious afterlife to those who were ready to be baptized with the blood of non-believers, and become martyrs.³⁹ As a result, hundreds of “Muslim brothers” from different parts of the world came to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to fight in the name of their God and of course in support of insurgency.

This issue becomes even more critical as it has additional consequences in other global aspects. Nowadays, it has been confirmed that fighters who gained combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are also used by terrorist networks in attacks against “Christian West” or in other cases they are transferred from one conflict zone to another in accordance with the insurgents’ plans and needs. It cannot be denied that sanctuaries in western Pakistan were used by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda,⁴⁰ while in the past disenchanted Islamist groups used Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training.⁴¹ The message that insurgents’ are sending out is that all Muslims must stand united against western imperialism and its NATO representatives,⁴² and that “you are either

with us or against us”.⁴³

The second challenge refers to practices used lately by insurgents in terms of sending messages to general public both at a national and international levels. It seems that insurgents have launched a global propaganda campaign in order to apply more pressure in the field of non-kinetic operations. Therefore, negative images and videos contained imagery of violence, dead bodies, beheadings, and depictions of individuals being mishandled are used in order to create negativity amongst the recipients as they portray a pessimistic image of life. Moreover, this method applies social pressure and draws political impacts to civilized countries where human lives are of high importance and human rights are a part of their culture. This extreme campaign is facilitated by today’s information revolution as today we can see ourselves from different sources what a conflict looks like.⁴⁴

It is about time for international forces and respective organizations acting in the theater to regain their momentum and confront the enemy without trying to “put lipstick on pigs”.⁴⁵ Some of the best weapons for COIN do not shoot and international community needs to use them wisely; money for economic and infrastructure development, governance reform, industrial and agricultural development, social services development through training and mentoring programs and many other actions that could be used to send out an optimistic message and discharge what is regarded by locals as the “humiliation of occupation”.⁴⁶ The question is for how long armed forces can hold against the insurgency while the political stakeholders are still occupied by their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically speaking, the per capita commitment of the USA and NATO ISAF personnel in Afghanistan is the lowest since the end of WWII.⁴⁷

Finally, the third challenge is that of the so-called “green-on-blue” threat or else an insider threat (IT) attack which occurs from a person or persons who have a position of trust among international troops – in contradistinction to a “green-on-green” attack which targets native

populace. Nowadays, this course of action is assessed as a high threat level and it is characterized by a “problematic unpredictability”, which undermines morale and cohesion among unarmed populace, international and indigenous security forces. An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of complex motivations but basically attackers can be categorized as insurgent manipulated, personally motivated, criminally motivated and for an unknown reason. Whatever the reason caused an insider threat attack, insurgents will always claim it and try to use it in their favor. Usually, there is no specific concept for an IT attack and that is why they are characterized by full surprise and shock. The latest statistics show that the percentage of fatalities caused by this type of action shows an increasing trend. However, the most important remark in this case is again the message sent out by insurgents as the political capital and impact gained is much bigger.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the previous section, an insurgency is a persistent, ubiquitous, small, dirty and uncomfortable war⁴⁸ that in case of Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the will of a national – religious group to resort to the use of force in order to achieve political objectives, without necessarily making rational estimations about the expected results. Moreover, it was also stated that the modern rebel movements are basically ethnically or religiously motivated since the traditional ideological source of their inspiration – Marxism and communism have declined and are no longer valid. The aforementioned fact in combination with the current social and economic discontent acts in favor of low-intention conflicts thus, the phenomenon of insurgency is expected to be continued in the immediate future.

To recapitulate, learning and adopting is a never ending procedure that applies in every aspect of human activity. It also offers a variety of practical lessons, as well as some specific recommendations in terms of policy and military doctrine. Despite the differences between the two

insurgencies, there are several cases where common ground can be detected and therefore, courses of action already tested with success can be applied.⁴⁹ Consequently, COIN requires a similar approach and therefore we must ensure that all best practices and LL are equally shared and adopted by friendly forces and organizations. Today's types of insurgency differ from those of the past mainly in terms of motivation and objectives to be achieved. It is important to understand that the principles and the means of this complex subset of warfare remain unaltered through ages and therefore, experiences and lessons gained from the past could be re-examined and appropriately tailored to the needs of the contemporary theater of operation. After all, “what works today may not work tomorrow, and what works in one location may not work in another”.⁵⁰ ■

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³⁷ Galula also highlights that special relation exists between insurgents' forces and their political organization.

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
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Together in NATO

15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO - Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region



■ **Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD,**
Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland

“Together in NATO” is a program related to the anniversary of Poland’s joining the North Atlantic Treaty that falls on 2014. It is happening under the patronage of the Minister of National Defence and not only citizens of the region participate in it, but also youth from “uniform classes” from all over Poland, Polish soldiers and representatives of other NATO armies from our region.

Local government of the kujawsko-pomorskie province is the main organizer of the anniversary celebrations. The “Together

in NATO” program was initiated during a special conference in Toruń, formally opened by the Region Marshall, Mr. Piotr Całbecki, on 12 March 2014. While opening the conference, he particularly stressed the following: *“We treat the celebrations with due respect. We are the region in which matters related to the army are and will be of importance not only because significant NATO structures and military units whose soldiers serve in stabilization missions all over the world are located, but also because companies connected with*

the army make an important part of our economy”.

The conference was devoted mainly to the role of Polish soldiers in international peace keeping formations in troubled parts of the globe. Among participants of the conference there were representatives of scholarly environment: LTC ret. PhD Zdzisław Polcikiewicz (Kazimierz Wielki University), general Jarosław Wierzcholski, the former Commander of the Polish Army Artillery and Missile Defence Troops, representatives of the fourteen veteran

organizations that cooperate with the kujawsko-pomorskie government, officers from the NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) and peace missions veterans. Also students and teachers from “uniform classes” (with curriculums extended by subjects related to defence and military services) took part in the conference. They were students from 6th High School in Toruń, 8th High School in Bydgoszcz, Upper-Secondary School Complex in Kościelec, the Inowrocław Poviat, School Complex in Wronie, the Wąbrzeźno Poviat and School Complex from Marysin, the Włocławek Poviat. There were also students and teachers from the International School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB).

During the conference, winners of the 1st Regional Competition of English and Knowledge of NATO, organized in Bydgoszcz by the ISOB in cooperation with the JFTC, received awards. The competition was aimed at students of 5th and 6th grades of primary schools and junior high schools from the area of the kujawsko-pomorskie region and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall, was the honorary patron of the event.

The next part of the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO was the formal part of the regional parliament session held on 24 March 2014. During the session *Unitas Durat Cuiaviano Pomeraniensis* – Marshall of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province Medals were awarded.

The formal part of the session was held in front of the Marshall Office building. A Polish Army Honorary Company, Military Band from Toruń, color corps of the Artillery and Armament Training Centre (CSAiU) and kujawsko-pomorskie province, awarded guests, province council members and other invited guests took part in it. Civilians and soldiers of merit received Marshall Medals. The head of the province awarded the medals for significant contribution to the state’s security and functioning of the regional community and also for direct and close relations with the community.

The next episode of the “Together in NATO” celebrations were military shows and concurrent events happening from 7 to 9 May 2014 in Bydgoszcz and Toruń and also a concert performed by the “Sonata” Warsaw Symphonic Orchestra in the Toruń Garrison Church (8 June).

Last year’s program of celebrations included, among others, formal gatherings, presentations showing Poland’s participation in NATO missions, simulations of tasks executed during NATO military missions performed by their participants, a VTC with soldiers currently serving on NATO missions, quizzes, exhibitions and entertainment performances. The participants could also enjoy concerts performed by the “Riwiera” Polish Navy Band, Toruń Military Orchestra and Kobranocka band.

Young people who participated in the program had a chance to see how the army functions. From 7 to 9 May the youth were accommodated at the CSAiU barracks. They had to obey the same rules as soldiers. Thanks to courtesy of military institutions the youth and region citizens could participate in the events in the premises of the CSAiU in Toruń, the Toruń training ground, the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, 1st Logistic Brigade in Bydgoszcz and in 12th Military Economic Department in Toruń.

The Marshall Office of the kujawsko-pomorskie province is a state institution that has been actively involved in creating a positive image of Polish Armed Forces among the society. To achieve this, it organizes or co-organizes numerous events addressed to children, youth and grown-ups, like festivities: “Soldier May Picnics”, “Together in NATO”, “I am EKO”, “It is Safer with the Army”, meetings and competitions for students of military classes in the country, contests on military topics (including army songs), etc.

The celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO, organized within the “Together in NATO” program, created a great opportunity to invite MPs who deal with defence related issues to visit our region.

It must be mentioned here that the kujawsko-pomorskie province is an important point on Poland’s military map. This is where three out of four international NATO structures operating in our country are located, as well as Polish Army units that are fundamental for the country’s defence system. The program of the session co-organized by the Marshall Office included meetings in the Artillery and Armament Training Centre in Toruń, NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and also in the premises of the Bydgoszcz Military Aviation Plant.

In Bydgoszcz, on the other hand, BG Wojciech Grabowski, the Commander of the NATO Joint Force Training Centre, and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall of the





Province gave their honorary patronage to the Days of the Kazimierz Wielki University Political Science Institute held from 12 to 13 May 2014. Formal celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Poland's joining NATO were the theme of the Institute Day.

Third Age, youth and high school teachers from schools teaching "uniform classes" as well as ISOB students.

The program included lectures given by the invited guests, a discussion concerning effectiveness of NATO operations and

hosted participants of the "Together in NATO" program. The two-day stay that was coorganized by Polish Artillerist Association, the Marshall Office of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province and of course the CSAiU gathered almost 300 students and their teachers. They came from military classes from upper-secondary schools from the whole province.

To let young people experience reality of military life, they were accommodated in soldiers' rooms that normally are used by soldiers getting ready to become the National Reserve Forces. On the second day the students had a chance to see the centre's training basis, artillery museum and equipment used by the CSAiU soldiers. Rocket launchers, barrel artillery and also weapons and marksmen's equipment were elements that attracted most interest.

The program executed during



Among others, the celebrations were attended by BG Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, Janusz Ostoja-Zagórski, the President of the University, university prorectors, PhD Jan Waskan, the Director of the Political Science Institute, JFTC representatives, Military Band conducted by CPT Dominik Sierzputowski, invited guests and graduates of the Political Science Institute, members of the University of the

prognoses for the future, a contest on NATO knowledge and NATO diplomatic protocol workshops organized for members of the Scientific Group from the National Security specialization. There were also theme exhibitions devoted to the 15th anniversary of Poland's presence in NATO and 10 years of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz.

From 20 to 21 April the Artillery and Armament Training Centre in Toruń

the celebrations of the anniversary of Poland's joining NATO ended with a concert entitled "Together in NATO" and performed by the Military Band from Toruń and the "Riwiera" Polish Navy Vocal Band. ■

Translated by Tomasz Ociński,
JFTC Language Expert

Christmas Event 2014

Close to 200 children gathered at the Joint Force Training Centre compound on 16 December 2014. They arrived at the JFTC to meet the Santa and filled the compound with good spirit, colours, joy and laughter. Together with their parents, members of the JFTC, the NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz and the JFTC Support Unit, they celebrated the annual Christmas Event.

Altogether around 300 people from the Bydgoszcz NATO family met next to the beautiful JFTC Christmas Tree. With the sound of beautiful Christmas carols performed by the military orchestra and sang by all participants, the lights on the tree were lit. The Santa Claus presented all young participants of the event with Christmas presents.



The Christmas Event is one of the JFTC's most beautiful traditions. It gathers the whole JFTC family together and creates an opportunity to spend wonderful time among friends, sharing wishes for the upcoming Christmas and New Year. So it was this time.



2015 New Year's Reception

JFTC achievements in 2014 and plans for 2015 were the main topics of the speech delivered by Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) Commander, during the traditional New Year's reception at the NATO training entity in Bydgoszcz. The event took place on 14 January 2015 and gathered many distinguished guests, centre's partners and friends.

"The year that we have just left behind was in many ways exceptional for our institution. In 2014 we celebrated 10th anniversary of establishing the JFTC and for the first time in the JFTC history the facility was visited by the President of Poland" - said General Grabowski. "Last year was exceptional also from the point of view of the events that we organized – there were 6 big events that took place at the JFTC,

23 events of lower rank, like conferences, courses or seminars and 52 other including VIP visits. The numbers speak for themselves. (...) During all the events we hosted more than 3000 participants."

The JFTC Commander also underlined changes to NATO mission and their influence on the centre's work: "In December 2014, after 13 years, the ISAF mission came to an end. We have to remember that our training efforts were aimed mainly for the ISAF mission which was replaced by the new mission called Resolute Support. The character of the support provided for the Afghan National Security Forces will also change."

General Grabowski thanked all those whose support was an integral part of the JFTC success in 2014, to include the JFTC Support Unit, NATO Communications and Information Agency, 3rd NATO Signal Battalion, the Allied Command Counter

Intelligence as well as representatives of the Host Nation Poland. "We enjoy excellent cooperation with the Voivode Office, Marshal Office, City Hall, Local Government, Police, Military Police, Customs Office and other institutions. Thank you for all that you do to make our life easier."

Many special and honoured guests were on hand to celebrate the beginning of the new year at the JFTC. The Centre enjoyed the company of Mr. Łukasz Krupa, a Member of Parliament, Mrs. Ewa Mes, the Voivode of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province, Mr. Zbigniew Ostrowski, the Deputy Marshal of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province, Major General Werner Weisenburger, Commander Armed Forces Office, Mrs. Anna Mackiewicz, the Deputy Mayor of Bydgoszcz and Brigadier General Ryszard Szczepiński, the Deputy Chief of the Inspectorate for the Support of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff.

In Retrospect

Life at JFTC



ACT Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management Visits JFTC

Turkish Army Major General Salih Sevil, Allied Command Transformation Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management (ACT DCOS R&M) visited the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). He met with Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, and his staff on 19 February 2015.

In discussions with the JFTC Commander, Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff and division heads, General Sevil was provided with detailed information on the centre's current activities and future challenges. He also received answers to in-depth questions regarding various aspects of the JFTC work. During the guided tour of the centre's compound the ACT DCOS R&M received a broader picture of the NATO Bydgoszcz training centre's capabilities in support of training.

The visit took place concurrently with the Military Police Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Course, therefore the distinguished guest used the opportunity to meet with representatives of the Military Police Centre of Excellence responsible for the event and also to observe how the JFTC staff, facility and equipment supported successful accomplishment of the course.

As Turkey is one of 18 nations represented in the JFTC structure, General Sevil also met with his compatriots serving in Bydgoszcz.

JFTC Staff Visits Exploseum

On 6 March 2015 JFTC members visited Exploseum - the museum established in the remains of the premises of the DAG Fabrik Bromberg (the centre of the military technology). It was a factory that supplied the Third Reich.

The Exploseum was established under the auspices of the Leon Wyczółkowski District Museum in Bydgoszcz. In the past, the factory, in whose premises the exhibition was founded, produced substances like TNT, nitroglycerine or smokeless powder. It could cover approximately 20% of the Third Reich's Army's demand for explosives on the Eastern front. Currently, it is one of the most interesting tourist attractions in Poland. Visiting the complex of seven buildings linked with a network of narrow tunnels and passageways you can feel the spirit of the place, filled with the history of 40 000 workers, prisoners, POWs who were forced to work in the factory.



EUROCORPS Commander at the JFTC

Lieutenant General Guy Buchsenschmidt, the Commander of the EUROCORPS, visited the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) on 4 March 2015. Together with Brigadier General Andrzej Przekwas, the EUROCORPS Deputy Chief of Staff Support, he met with Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, and explored the centre's training capabilities.

General Grabowski with his staff introduced the guests to the centre's history, structure, mission, current activities and future challenges. They also provided detailed information on JFTC work and engagements the EUROPORPS representatives were interested in. During the demonstration of the centre's simulation capabilities, Generals Buchsenschmidt and Przekwas had a chance to learn what tools the JFTC uses in support of training, how new technologies enhance NATO training as well as how it might evolve in the future.

"Your institution is fully a part of an efficient and powerful NATO training process" – General Buchsenschmidt wrote in the JFTC memory book.



In Retrospect

Life at JFTC



Polish National Defence University Students Discover JFTC

Students of the Defence Policy Postgraduate Studies at the Polish National Defence University explored the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) on 11 May 2015. The group, supervised by Lieutenant General (ret.) PhD Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, met with Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, and with the centre's staff. The visit was incorporated in the programme of the postgraduate studies.

The JFTC guests received broad information regarding the centre, its mission, structure as well as the role and place within NATO training programme and network. The JFTC Commander, assisted by his staff, also provided the officers with facts and figures related to centre's main training undertakings – especially related to the recent changes in Afghanistan and the Resolute Support mission. A vivid discussion touched upon challenges the JFTC faced regarding the continuously changing Alliance's needs.

During the walk around the JFTC compound the guests had an opportunity to see the heart of the centre – the training facility with its state-of-the-art infrastructure used in support of training events and exercises.



Open Day for Schools at the JFTC

Close to 150 students from 5 schools explored the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) on 13 May 2015. It was the first, pilot Open Day for Schools organized by the JFTC and turned out to be a huge success.

A meeting with Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, briefings filled with information about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the NATO Bydgoszcz training centre and also about Polish Armed Forces missions abroad, discussion with officers serving at the JFTC, presentation of simulation tools used in support of training and a walk through the compound – all that was offered to participants of the first Open Day for Schools at the JFTC. The event was a response to a high interest of local schools in the centre's work.

In the past the JFTC hosted smaller groups of students interested in the Alliance. This time it was decided to prepare a broader



event, gathering a bigger number of young people. On 13 May the centre was visited by representatives of Bydgoszcz International School "Sokrates", two Bydgoszcz junior high schools (No. 17 and 32) as well as two uniform classes representing the Manager High School of Bydgoszcz and Technical College from Szubin.

The success of the event was possible also thanks to the JFTC guests. The centre's staff had a pleasure to meet with the youth highly interested in military topics and current global situation. Numerous questions, touching upon Alliance's work, JFTC's activities, soldiers' careers and life of foreign staff in Poland, laid a foundation for a vivid, fruitful and very substantial discussion.



National Military Representatives Explored JFTC

15 National Military Representatives (NMR) visited the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). They were welcomed and hosted by Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, who introduced the guests to the centre and its capabilities. The visit took place on 1 June 2015.

Vivid discussions and interesting in-depth questions regarding the JFTC's work and abilities filled in the NMRs' stay at the Bydgoszcz NATO training centre. The visitors, led by the Dean of the NMR Echelon, Commodore Frank Sijtsma, were exposed to the JFTC's mission, structure as

well as main tasks and activities. General Grabowski together with Brigadier General Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, and division heads presented how the centre's potential and exercises evolved throughout the eleven years and what its current place in the NATO training program was. The discussions focused on new challenges related to both the change of the mission in Afghanistan as well as Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NFIU.

General Grabowski underlined that not only was the JFTC fully equipped and ready to prepare future members of ongoing NATO missions for their service but also able to train national units requiring professional support. "You are more than welcome to come to Bydgoszcz and train in this specialized environment. You can use your national entities, however, you will not find all the systems there, nor all the equipment,

all the tools and expertise needed for a complete and professional NATO training. And this is exactly what the JFTC offers." – General Grabowski stressed.

The JFTC guests also had an opportunity to see the training facility and watch the demonstration of modern and sophisticated modelling and simulation tools used in support of JFTC training, presented by the Training Support Division. This gave them a clear picture of the centre's high level capabilities. They were also introduced to the Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP COE). Colonel Grzegorz Wasielewski, the MP COE Director, provided the guests with information on the centre's work, activities and structure.



In Retrospect

Life at JFTC



JFTC Supports NATO Knowledge Competitions

Approximately 150 pupils from Kuyavia and Pomerania Region's primary and junior high schools participated in two competitions focused on NATO-related topics. On 29 May and 2 June the Joint Force Training Centre's Commander and Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff awarded the best participants of both contests.

On 29 May Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski met with laureates of the second edition of the "Together in NATO" English Language and NATO Competition. The event aimed at encouraging young people to improve their English skills, promoting knowledge of NATO, as well as at commemorating Poland's presence in the Alliance. Over 100 students participated in the first, school phase and the best of them met in May in the International School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB), where the final

stage was held.

Four days later, on 2 June, Brigadier General Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff, met with participants of the 7th edition of the Municipal NATO Knowledge Competition, organized by the Primary School No 38 in Bydgoszcz. The JFTC has supported this event since its beginning in 2008 and it has already become a tradition that the centre's Flag Officers take part in the award ceremony and congratulate winners. So it was this time.

The competition is designed for primary schools of Bydgoszcz. Its main goal is to raise young people's knowledge on NATO's history, the Alliance's role in global peace keeping, good cooperation between NATO Nations and symbols of both the Alliance and member nations. This time close to 50 participants from 9 schools took the challenge and verified their knowledge throughout respective phases of the competition. 12 of them made it to the final. After a stiff rivalry, laureates of three first places were announced.





TRANSFORMATION THROUGH TRAINING