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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Committee on Foreign Affairs

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Secretary of State, I am transmitting herewith a Certification to Authorize Continuation of Certain Assistance to Haiti, in accordance with section 203 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986. I have also enclosed a Statement of Justification for this Certification.

We share the Congress' concern that our economic and security assistance to Haiti support continued progress made by the Government of Haiti on political and social reforms. The determination required for economic assistance was provided to the Congress in December 1986. The present justification accompanying the certification for security assistance discusses the generally positive record of the new Haitian government in fulfilling its political, human rights and economic commitments in the year since it assumed office, including in those specific areas mentioned in section 203. It provides the background which allows an understanding of the past and ongoing efforts of the new Haitian government and of the role U.S. assistance is designed to play in assuring the success of the transition to an elected government which will respect human rights.

The United States Government has supported Haiti's democratization process. Economic assistance levels were greatly increased for fiscal year 1987. This increased economic assistance in a time of domestic budget austerity is founded in a belief that political stability in the hemisphere and in Haiti can only be built in the context of steadily improved living standards for the Haitian people. It is also the belief of the United States Government that economic development can occur, that our aid can work, only in a climate of respect for human rights and of public order in Haiti and progress toward democracy in accordance with the will of the Haitian people.

The Honorable  
Dante B. Fascell,  
Chairman,  
Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives.

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In pursuit of this philosophy, the major amounts of economic assistance are to be complemented by a limited and carefully-developed program of non-lethal security assistance to the Haitian armed forces.

The purposes of this security assistance are to put the armed forces on a professional footing after years of deliberate neglect by their own political leaders, and to give them the skills and means to maintain order in a manner respectful of the human rights commitments of the current Haitian leadership.

Much remains to be accomplished in Haiti. But much has been accomplished. The provisional government of Haiti has made substantial efforts on all the conditions contained in the legislation. The reorganization of the Armed Forces of Haiti has begun in earnest. The army has endeavored to prevent human rights abuses and corruption and has prosecuted a number of individuals. Freedom of speech and assembly are respected. The CNG has conducted investigations into the cases listed in the legislation and has prosecuted where they found evidence that warranted the action. The FAD'H has conducted seminars on human rights for its members. It has taken steps to disarm the VSN and collect the weapons. Further progress on these conditions will be helped by the military assistance that this certification authorizes. However, the Administration reserves the right to withdraw this certification if there is a regression in the trend that justifies this report.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox  
Assistant Secretary  
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosures:

Certification to Authorize Continuation of Certain Assistance for Haiti.

Justification for Certification to Authorize Continuation of Certain Assistance to Haiti.

CERTIFICATION TO AUTHORIZE CONTINUATION  
OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE FOR HAITI

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Executive Order 12163, as amended, I hereby reconfirm the certification issued by the Acting Secretary on December 23, 1986, as it applies to the provision of assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and I hereby determine that the following conditions imposed by section 203 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986 (PL 99-529) with respect to the provisions of assistance under that chapter, as well as chapter 2 of Part II and the Arms Export Control Act, have been met.

(1) The Government of Haiti has submitted a formal request to the United States specifying a comprehensive plan for the reform and reorganization of the mission, command, and control structures of the Haitian armed forces consistent with a transition to democracy, the rule of law, constitutional government, and an elected civilian government. Such a plan should include a publicly announced commitment by the armed forces of Haiti to abide by international human rights standards and adoption of a code of conduct to assure adherence to these standards.

(2) The Government of Haiti is making substantial efforts:

a. To prevent the involvement of the Haitian Armed Forces in human rights abuses and corruption by removing from those forces and prosecuting, in accordance with due process, those military personnel responsible for the human rights abuses and corruption;


b. To ensure that freedom of speech and assembly are respected;

c. To conduct investigations into the killings of unarmed civilians in Gonaives, Martissant, and Fort Dimanche, to prosecute, in accordance with due process, those responsible for those killings, and to prevent any similar occurrences in the future;

d. To provide education and training to the Haitian armed forces with respect to internationally recognized human rights and the civil and political rights essential to democracy, in order to enable those forces to function consistent with those rights; and

e. To take steps to implement the policy of the Government of Haiti requiring former members of the volunteers for National Security (VSN) to turn in their weapons and to take the necessary actions to enforce this requirement.

This certification shall be reported to the Congress immediately and shall be published in the Federal Register.



George P. Shultz

March 23, 1987

(Date)

Justification for Certification to Authorize  
Continuation of Certain Assistance to Haiti

Section 203 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986 provides that funds may be obligated for fiscal year 1987 to carry out assistance for Haiti under Chapter 2 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to grant military assistance), Chapter 5 of Part II of that Act (relating to international military education and training), and the Arms Export Control Act (relating to FMS Assistance) only if the following is certified to the Congress:

"(1) The Government of Haiti has submitted a formal request to the United States specifying a comprehensive plan for the reform and reorganization of the mission, command, and control structures of the Haitian armed forces consistent with a transition to democracy, the rule of law, constitutional government, and an elected civilian government. Such a plan should include a publicly announced commitment by the armed forces of Haiti to abide by international human rights standards and adoption of a code of conduct to assure adherence to these standards.

(2) The Government of Haiti is making substantial efforts:

a. To prevent the involvement of the Haitian Armed Forces in human rights abuses and corruption by removing from those forces and prosecuting, in accordance with due process, those military personnel responsible for the human rights abuses and corruption;

b. To ensure that freedom of speech and assembly are respected;

c. To conduct investigations into the killings of unarmed civilians in Gonaives, Martissant, and Fort Dimanche, to prosecute, in accordance with due process, those responsible for those killings, and to prevent any similar occurrences in the future;

d. To provide education and training to the Haitian armed forces with respect to internationally recognized human rights and the civil and political rights essential to democracy, in order to enable those forces to function consistent with those rights; and

e. To take steps to implement the policy of the Government of Haiti requiring former members of the volunteers for National Security (VSN) to turn in their weapons and to take the necessary actions to enforce this requirement."

Economic and security assistance to Haiti have long been matters of special concern to the United States Government. The depth of Congress' concern that our support to the new government should reflect progress made by that government itself is manifest in the determination and certification provisions of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986 covering economic and security assistance to Haiti for fiscal year 1987. The determination required for the provision of economic assistance was provided to the Congress in December 1986. This document accompanies the certification for the provision of IMET, MAP and FMS assistance and provides a discussion of the facts that led to the decision to certify. It outlines the generally positive record of the new Haitian government in fulfilling its political, human rights and economic commitments in the year since it assumed office, including in those specific areas mentioned in section 203.

Haiti began a new political era on February 7, 1986 when president-for-life Jean-Claude Duvalier fled to exile in the face of massive popular rejection of his hereditary dictatorship. The months leading up to February 7 were characterized by spreading disorders, the first time in nearly three decades that the Haitian people had taken to the streets to vent their dissatisfaction with the regime. The surge of popular anger was focused on a single objective--Duvalier's ouster--but it had a profound and complex progressive character. Haitians wanted to enjoy civil liberties and human rights. They wanted to choose those who would govern Haiti in their name in a free and honest fashion, without intimidation or manipulation. They wanted government to work for the common good, not for the enrichment of the few.

The sudden circumstances of Duvalier's decision to leave Haiti meant that the Haitian armed forces (FAD'H) took over the mechanism of the government with virtually no time to prepare for what faced them. The armed forces as an institution and the military leaders as individuals had not been prepared over the years for a political role of this sort. Indeed, the Duvalier policy had been to weaken the military by underequipping and underpaying it, providing little training and fragmenting the command structure.

Fears of a bloody settling of scores between the Tontons Macoute militia, the army and the general populace dominated most observers' concerns about the immediate post-departure period. In fact, only a small amount of such revenge-taking took place and was characterized by members of the public against individual Tonton Macoutes. The Haitian armed forces, under the direction of the National Governing Council (CNG) formed upon Duvalier's ouster, were able to manage the first days of the new government by using curfews and other non-lethal public order strategies to avoid more killing and to dissolve the Tonton Macoutes.

Neither the CNG nor FAD'H is an institution that can impose its will by force. In the first statements and actions, Haiti's new leaders established a contract with the Haitian people to deliver elections and carry out other reforms. The CNG is fulfilling that contract. It confirmed the new direction in which it has steered Haiti over the last year in a series of liberalizing actions and pronouncements. It made immediate commitments:

- To disavow political ambitions of its own;
- To build respect for human rights;
- To build democratic institutions such as a liberal constitution and political activities laws; to guide a transition to elected government; to permit free labor unions and freedom of expression in all media;
- To work for economic well-being for all Haitians; to end corruption, mismanagement and favoritism in government activities.

The CNG freed all political prisoners it found in Haiti's prisons. It lifted all controls on the press, labor unions, return of political exiles and political activity of any sort. It abolished the 1983 constitution with its noxious "presidency-for-life" provisions, the rubberstamp legislative assembly and the Volunteers for National Security (VSN - Tonton Macoutes) militia.

Subsequent actions have affirmed the CNG's determination to carry out its program. It has instituted a series of economic reforms to build the base for recovery, expansion and jobs for the unemployed poor. It has prosecuted several senior Tonton Macoutes and others charged with abuses under the past regime and has other cases in preparation. In a complex legal process, it has aggressively sought to recover Haitian Government funds stolen by Jean-Claude Duvalier and his associates. In early June 1985 it announced a calendar for the transition to elected government.

The CNG has faced several waves of unrest. The origins of this unrest have been obscure, though at root it appears to flow from continuing popular uncertainty about the future after the years of dictatorship, from frustration at the deep-rooted economic constraints faced by the people of this, the poorest of Western Hemisphere nations, and from the machinations of political extremists who have exploited and exacerbated legitimate popular concerns for their own ends.

The National Governing Council has consistently stressed its inalterable commitments but also the narrow reading it gives its mandate as an unelected, transition government. The focus has been on building a framework and managing a transition, not on developing and implementing fundamental policy measures more the province of an elected leadership.

In spite of the enormous task facing the CNG, it has worked hard to achieve the transition to democracy. It has maintained its commitments to human rights and civil liberties in the face of unrest. Each step of the transition calendar has taken place on schedule. Most recently, an elected constituent assembly worked independently to develop a draft constitution which will be presented in a March 29 referendum for the approval of the Haitian people.

That draft constitution provides sweeping guarantees of human rights and civil liberties and establishes a structure of government that, with the proper political will on the part of the electorate and its future representatives, will give Haiti a liberal democracy. Other articles will strictly control political activity by the military and will mandate several steps to ensure the armed forces work in a fashion supportive of constitutional government. Other articles will establish a broadly representative independent electoral commission.

The CNG has established rules for the referendum itself which will guarantee Haitians a clear opportunity to accept or reject the assembly's work. The rules provide for independent counting and tabulating of ballots by the judiciary to avoid the appearance or reality of manipulation. The CNG is actively encouraging Haitians to vote in the referendum, without counseling which way they should vote.

The effect has been to focus public attention on the political debate. Unrest is much less frequent than in the first months of the new government. There is less talk about replacing the CNG and rejecting its transition framework and more indication that Haitians accept its reality and are working to find their own role in building the new polity.

The United States Government has advocated and implemented a policy of support for this process since February 7, 1986. Economic assistance levels were increased for fiscal year 1987. This increased economic assistance in a time of domestic budget austerity is founded on a belief that political stability in the hemisphere and in Haiti can only be built in the context of steadily improved living standards for the Haitian people. It is also the belief of the United States Government that economic development can occur, that our aid can work, only in a climate of respect for human rights and of

public order in Haiti and progress toward democracy in accordance with the will of the Haitian people. In pursuit of this philosophy, the major amounts of economic assistance are to be complemented by a limited and carefully-developed program of non-lethal security assistance to the Haitian armed forces.

The purposes of this aid are straightforward: to put the armed forces on a professional footing after years of deliberate neglect by their own political leaders, and to give them the skills and means to maintain order in a manner respectful of the human rights commitments of the current Haitian leadership.

United States Government officials have discussed the nature of the Security Assistance Program proposed for Haiti with many Haitians. Responses have varied. Significantly, those who have demonstrated the greatest commitment to making the current transition work and to participate in building democracy have shown the clearest understanding of the need for a professional army with good morale and of the role our assistance can play in building such a force. They know that such a force is needed not only for the short term, but will also be essential to the elected regime which will take office on February 7, 1988. They know from Haitian history that that government will face numerous challenges from those who will not accept the freely expressed will of the Haitian people.

There has been much advance criticism of such assistance. However, the critics have exaggerated the scale and have portrayed the proposed assistance as lethal, designed to suppress free expression of ideas and to nip democracy in the bud. That is the intent neither of our own government nor of the Haitian authorities. The objectives of our assistance program are non-lethal training and professional development in the areas of public relations, civic action, logistics management training, communications, transport, maintenance and human rights standards. The United States Government will undertake active public outreach efforts to ensure that distortions of the scope or intent of our program gain no currency and that Haitians are informed of its limits.

The foregoing introduction sets out the context for U.S. Security Assistance to Haiti. The next paragraphs address the specific points highlighted in section 203.

203 (B) (1): Reorganization:

The Government of Haiti has requested assistance from the United States in reorganizing the Haitian armed forces. Reorganization of the command and unit structures as an

essential framework for re-equipment and training was a major topic of discussion between Haitian military leaders and the U.S. Government from immediately after February 7, 1986. These discussions culminated in early April, 1986, in a formal request from Brigadier General Jean Beliotte, Acting Chief of Staff of the FAD'H, to a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and Brigadier General Fred Gorden of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, for U.S. assistance in a comprehensive reorganization and rehabilitation of the FAD'H. This request in turn led to the August 1986 visit to Haiti of a U.S. military "Defense Requirements Survey Team" (DRST). A comprehensive survey and analysis of a foreign military's situation and needs by such a DRST is a prerequisite to the sort of assistance sought by the FAD'H.

The Haitian armed forces have already begun to implement some of the reorganization recommendations of the DRST. The Minister of Defense signed orders on February 6, 1987 transferring 80 persons, 40 from the police and 40 from the military including 30 from the presidential guard, to a test training unit for a provisional gendarmerie. The armed forces have also decided to redeploy most of the remaining personnel and materiel currently comprising the presidential guard to other units across Haiti. Under Duvalier, these troops functioned as a praetorian guard responsible only to the president.

The overall reorganization proposal is still being refined at the highest levels of the CNG. In the proposal as it currently stands, the FAD'H envisages several other major changes including a restructuring of the general headquarters to establish normal military channels of command and control the better to accomplish the military's revised, stated mission of external defense and support of the constitutional government. Establishment of a rigorous and accountable command structure will minimize the possibility that individual military units, commanders or personnel could be drawn into activities outside their constitutional mandate. This will be an important step in moving the FAD'H away from the Duvalier-era model of direct presidential command of individual military units, which served primarily to reinforce that undemocratic regime.

The revised draft constitution the CNG provided to the constituent assembly on December 4 as a working document strengthened the original proposals made by nine civilian experts to require the military to uphold the constitutional rights of the people in its actions. Notably, the CNG revision eliminated the historic principle (embodied in previous constitutions) of "passive obedience of orders," a concept that

in many countries has allowed military personnel to disclaim responsibility for having obeyed illegal orders from their political masters. In its deliberations, the assembly has approved further provisions toward the same ends: separation of the police from the army; reduction of the president's scope for direct command of military units; establishment of a police academy; and severe restrictions on political activity by military personnel.

In the person of its commander-in-chief and chief of staff, National Governing Council (CNG) President Lt. General Henri Namphy, and of the Minister of Defense, Col. Williams Regala, the Armed Forces have on numerous occasions since February 7, 1986, reiterated their firm commitment to the observance and entrenchment of internationally-accepted human rights standards of behavior. The reorganization of the armed forces includes the adoption of a code of conduct that will require personnel to swear to uphold the constitution. The constitution already contains a comprehensive set of human rights guarantees. The previous code of conduct required armed forces personnel to swear absolute allegiance and obedience to the person of the President.

203 (B) (2) (a): Efforts to Improve Various Human Rights Aspects of the Armed Forces:

The government of Haiti and its armed forces have attempted to develop methods of dealing with unrest that do not compromise its human rights and political commitments while simultaneously preventing anarchy. Over the past year, however, the pattern of behavior of the FAD'H in response to unrest has revealed its lack of appropriate training. The FAD'H has neither the expertise to retrain its soldiers in new methods nor the appropriate non-lethal equipment, and must look to external sources for appropriate training, guidance, and equipment.

Since the advent of the CNG, there is no evidence to indicate that any of the several deaths which have occurred in the course of confrontations between demonstrators and/or agitators and the security forces have been premeditated, purposeful or based on any individual's political belief or activity. There have been, however, several incidents where people have been killed by government forces during disorders or demonstrations, and others where armed forces personnel acting in their private capacity have killed individuals. The government has completed investigations of several of these incidents and is looking into others.

In cases where military personnel are determined to have exceeded their authority, courts martial have resulted. One case was that of adjutant (warrant officer) Robesse Metellus, convicted by a court martial at the end of November in the

shooting death of truck driver Jules Louis while Louis was in his custody. Metellus was sentenced to eight years at hard labor, stripped of rank and ordered dishonorably discharged and to forfeit his benefits when his term ended. Another was that of soldier Etzer Francois, who murdered an antagonist in June 1986; he was sentenced in February 1987 to six years in prison with other penalties similar to those imposed on Metellus. Earlier in 1986, courts martial convicted Lt. Col. Samuel Jeremie and warrant officer Jean Franco Valdemar of involvement in other killings and sentenced them to jail. Jeremie received a sentence of 15 years and Valdemar, one year at hard labor. Investigations in two other cases of individual action are in course. These convictions support the CNG's position that military personnel are not exempt from CNG human rights policies and must account for their actions.

A clear trend is evident. The CNG is willing to prosecute military personnel as well as civilians whenever they have found that laws have been violated. Several cases have been tried and the Justice Ministry and FAD'H have pursued others. Legal action against individuals accused of human rights abuses during the Duvalier era has lagged, often because of a lack of credible evidence against the defendants. In numerous public and private statements the CNG has stated its willingness to prosecute anyone against whom a substantiated case of criminal actions can be prepared. It has invited injured parties to register their complaints in a judicial forum. In some civilian and military cases, initial accusations against alleged offenders could not be substantiated. Often witnesses failed to appear. In other instances, accusers tried to withdraw their complaints.

203 (B) (2) (b): Freedom of Speech and Assembly:

The CNG has placed no restrictions on the exercise of free speech and assembly. Peaceful demonstrations on any subject are permitted and occur regularly. In June 1986, the government instituted police requirements for marches which included provisions for advance notification and for demonstrator/police cooperation to ensure no disorders occurred. The government has not enforced this requirement very often and most marches have been allowed to proceed without having met these conditions. In a very few cases, generally during times of recent political tension which increase the risk of violent disorders, the police have refused permission for marches.

In a similar fashion, politicians of all leanings have freely travelled throughout Haiti in pursuit of their political objectives. They have given speeches and press conferences and held public meetings with full media attention. There have

been no substantiated allegations of official interference in these activities; indeed, many of the politicians inform us they have been facilitated by local military officers.

The Haitian media speak out fully and frankly on all issues. The preponderant tone is often critical of the CNG, sometimes harshly so. There have been no credible allegations that the CNG has interfered in any way in this activity, which indeed it encourages in all media, including that owned by the state. The press law promulgated in July 1986 has come under some criticism as placing restrictions on press operations (though some of the restrictions were the result of input from journalist groups). There have been no indications that this impeded the freedom of the press; indeed, it does not appear that the law has been implemented by any significant measure.

Section 203 (B) (2) (c) singles out three cases. The record on these three cases is generally positive but still incomplete.

The first case mentioned is that of the 1985 Gonaives killings of three students, the Duvalier-era incident which sparked the protests which ultimately led to Duvalier's ouster. An investigation of that incident was carried out by a mixed civilian-military commission of inquiry under the Duvalier government. As a result of that inquiry, an army officer and two members of the now-dissolved VSN militia were detained for trial. That trial began in the last week before Duvalier's fall; however, public anger ran high over suspicions that the trial would be rigged, and the Gonaives courthouse was burnt down. The new government ordered further investigation of the killings. Legal proceedings against the two former VSN members began again the week of February 2, 1987. They are still in prison in Gonaives. The army officer charged in the case, Captain Jean-Diedonne Ulysse, was transferred to Port-au-Prince December 17, 1985. He is assigned to a menial job in the army laundry while the FAD'H staff judge advocate prepares a court martial against him.

The second reference, to Martissant, is to an incident in that suburb of Port-au-Prince in mid-March, 1986. In December 1986, the armed forces released the findings of an investigation of that case. According to that report, a routine traffic incident developed into a major disorder resulting in two deaths, two serious injuries and several minor injuries. The investigation determined that no security forces or identifiable civilian individuals were culpable in the incident. This report has been accepted by the public, though it contradicted a widely-held belief that an army officer was at fault. The father of the man at the center of the incident, who was an eyewitness to the events, told Haitian journalists that the report was accurate and the military personnel acted properly in difficult circumstances.

The third specific case cited is Fort Dimanche, a reference to the tragic deaths of seven persons at the time of a large march to that former political prison on April 26, 1986. On that day, a commemorative mass took place in Port-au-Prince to honor victims of a 1963 massacre by the Francois Duvalier regime. Thousands of marchers then proceeded peaceably to Fort Dimanche where the organizers had previously arranged with the military for certain relatives of the 1963 victims to enter the military reservation to lay a wreath. There, as television film clearly reveals, a group of a few hundred agitators, who were not members of the main peaceful group, attempted to provoke a confrontation. The agitators threw rocks and bottles and threatened to invade the military reservation by force, completely disrupted the wreath-laying and shouted down the main organizer of the commemoration who attempted to restore calm. At one point, a shot was fired by an unknown person. One policeman was wounded. Some police then fired into the air but at least one fired into the crowd. Three persons died of gunshot wounds. Another four died when an electrical power line fell, apparently severed by the warning shots. The incident caused a major furor. However, when the evidence of the film was seen by the public, a period of sober reflection ensued. The agitators were criticized for sparking the incident; the government was criticized for not providing adequate security for the fort and the event. The investigation concluded that no police were culpable as the agitation and first gunshot created what appeared to be a self-defense situation. No legal action was instituted either against the police or the agitators.

203 (B) (2) (d): Human Rights Training:

In November, FAD'H headquarters conducted seminars on human rights and other subjects for commanders of the nine military departments. This training was augmented in January 1987 in a series of visits by senior headquarters staff to provincial commands, where field officers were indoctrinated in the CNG's policy of observance of human rights. A major conclusion of the report on the March 1986 Martissant incident was that the FAD'H had serious deficiencies in its crowd control methods. The FAD'H has since begun to correct these to avoid more such incidents.

203 (B) (2) (e): Disarming the VSN:

Disarming members of the dissolved VSN militia remains one of the FAD'H's primary missions and has been largely accomplished. The CNG disbanded the VSN by means of a public decree issued on February 8, 1986. The VSN and all other persons holding unlicensed weapons were instructed to turn them in to the local FAD'H forces on February 10. Orders to collect

such weapons were given through military channels to all units at the same time. All weapons taken from ex-VSN members were inventoried by serial number and are now stored in the FAD'H armory. Of the estimated 4,000 weapons recorded as having been issued to VSN personnel as of February 7, some 90 percent have been collected, either through voluntary surrender or in search and seizure operations which were carried out across the country. The search for the remaining weapons continues. Although occasional recoveries still occur, the task of recovering the last few weapons is naturally the most difficult.

In conclusion, the CNG and its principal instrument of authority, the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H), is making significant efforts in the areas mentioned in the law and in building respect for human, civil and political rights generally. The previous government did not respect these rights and, as a matter of policy, did not train or equip the armed forces to support political and human rights commitments of the sort the CNG has made. The CNG has taken many steps to change that situation. More is planned though much depends on the level of external resources for training and to improve the logistics and communications capability of the FAD'H. The CNG's commitment to human rights sometimes has exceeded its and the armed forces' ability to implement policies. It is quite clear, however, that the human rights record of the Haitian armed forces has improved since February 7, 1986. This reflects a substantial effort on the part of the National Council of Government of Haiti to implement the reorganization, human rights reforms, and investigation as required by section 203 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986.