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MCU Journal

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From the Editors

U.S. government agencies and military Service branches produce numerous reports and briefs each year that fall in the category of lessons learned. These institutional reports, and the effort that goes into them, play an important role for groups who are responsible for many lives and the nation's resources. Some of these documents come after extensive investigations related to accidents, such as the loss of the space shuttle *Columbia* in 2003, or as a part of regular operations, such as after action reports. Moreover, all of the Services set up divisions dedicated to collecting lessons learned reports for internal and external inquiries, including the Army with its Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Navy's Lessons Learned Information System, whose title mirrors the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, and the Air Force Lessons Learned Program.

The United States Marine Corps is, as always, aligned with its sister Services in its efforts to write, publish, and disseminate doctrinal publications. At Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, home of Marine Corps University (MCU), the Corps supports several divisions that house lessons learned. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) produces a variety of documents to support training and planning for Marine Corps exercises and operations, but also for the warfighting capability development process. Their Marine Corps Campaign of Learning Information System keeps these documents secured and available for those with suitable credentials. The History Division's Archives Branch, located in the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center, is designated by Records, Reports, Directives, and Forms Management (ARDB) to collect, hold, and transfer command chronologies filed by units semiannually (monthly when deployed), which in turn are reported to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and become permanent records of the United States. Command chronologies stand as the official record of a unit and its activities for the reporting period and are used by Headquarters Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, Congress, and other governmental and nongovernmental

entities to understand the activities, procedures, processes, and lessons learned by units.

The Archives Branch holds all submitted unit command chronologies from 1976 to the present. In addition, it maintains after action reports, special action reports, and reports on lessons learned for units deployed during World War I, World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Archives also maintains reports on major Marine Corps amphibious exercises from 1921 to 1980, major developments in amphibious doctrine between 1935 and 1990, and the development of amphibious technology from 1930 to 2000, many of which contain insight into lessons learned from those activities.

These resources, once deposited with the Archives Branch, are useful to commanders and historians, and despite difficulties obtaining high-quality documents, History Division staff encourage Marines to write and deposit command chronologies regularly. Mention the term *lessons learned* to any Marine, soldier, sailor, or airman, and they will joke about lessons captured, observed, unlearned, or the so-called black box where these reports disappear. There may be some validity to their criticism, yet all of the Services continue to record lessons learned with good reason. Without a record of facts, it is impossible to reflect on how to improve operations from the tactical to the logistical.

For this issue of the *MCU Journal*, the editors—with the guidance of the editorial board and numerous peer reviewers—have assembled different interpretations of lessons learned. Indeed, the authors of these four articles address diverse topics in the pursuit of increasing military readiness and effectiveness. Dr. Nathan Packard looks to the Corps' relations with Congress, identifying how the Marine Corps, more so than other Services, has gained a reputation with and sometimes the criticism of members of Congress. Colonel Joseph A. Lore, however, sees room for improvement in supporting military efforts by revising a staple in any Marine officer's library—the *Small Wars Manual*. Dr. Jonathan Wong extends Packard's civilian-military relations theme, recommending that the Department of Defense learn from its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by adopting some of the rapid acquisition techniques used during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to guarantee the future warfighter's ability to engage in the next generation of war, which will undoubtedly strain the nation's resources as the fight against terrorism and insurgencies continues.

Shifting the focus to Asia, James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck examine China's intentions in the East China Sea with a discussion of the 2017 exercise titled "Lessons Learned from the Senkaku War Games." While much of their analysis is a response to the discussion in the *MCU Journal's* Spring 2017 Rebalance to Asia issue, Fanell and Gershaneck note that insight from previous Chinese actions in the period between 1950 and 1979 should serve

as a clear warning that a so-called short, sharp war is possible in the region. Less of a postmortem than an after action report, the article reads more like a premortem based on past Chinese behavior whereby the authors apply lessons learned to future problems. Finally, Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, in a special review essay, uses four historical accounts of various insurgencies, including one on the creation of the counterinsurgency manual, to bring attention to how the past can speak to the present. Nation-states fighting insurgencies can learn from the past to understand how and why nonstate actors operate, as well as seek inspiration from operations and tactics that worked or failed.

Overall, the authors presented here have added their voice to what lessons can and should be learned as well as how both success and failure lead to a better understanding of problems on and off the battlefield. The book reviewers in the final section of the journal add to this conversation both historically and presently. The next issue of the *MCU Journal* will focus on training and education. If this topic interests you or you enjoyed this current issue, please contact the press to be added to the subscription list. MCU Press also publishes a variety of books on contemporary military and policy issues. Copies can be found online, in our bookstore located in the Simmons Center, or by contacting us at MCU_Press@usmcu.edu. You can also connect with us on Twitter and Facebook. You can find us on Twitter @MC_UPress and on Facebook at MC UPress.

Congress and the Marine Corps

An Enduring Partnership

Nathan Packard

Abstract: During the past 75 years, the U.S. Marine Corps has cultivated and sustained a close working relationship with Congress. This article surveys historical examples from the post–World War II defense unification debates and from the post–Vietnam War era to explore the role Congress plays in military innovation as well as the importance of congressional oversight.

Keywords: Congress, Office of Legislative Affairs, Marine Corps, civil-military relations, defense unification, Vietnam War, congressional oversight

During the past 75 years, the U.S. Marine Corps has earned a reputation as the most politically adept of the armed Services, particularly on Capitol Hill.¹ As a fighting force, the Marine Corps is atypical in its mission, force structure, and size. It serves as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness by combining air, ground, and support assets into task-organized teams. As a separate Service within the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps has an amphibious focus and partners with the U.S. Navy to project military power from the sea. Although it is not uncommon for maritime nations to maintain small contingents of naval infantry, the United States is the only country that has a Service of more than 180,000 members explicitly devoted to overseas expeditionary operations. Because its roles and missions overlap with those of the other Services, on at least 10 separate occasions, the Marine Corps

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has had to counter efforts by executive branch officials, often aided and abetted by U.S. Army officers, to abolish the Corps or limit its size or autonomy.²

To protect itself, the Marine Corps made a focused effort to cultivate critical legislators and form bipartisan coalitions on issues relevant to the Service. In the process, it aligned itself more closely to the U.S. Congress than the other Services. In the decades since World War II, the Marine Corps has fostered and sustained similar relationships and used them to increase its influence within the national security establishment. Perhaps the best-known example occurred during the defense unification debates following World War II. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Corps used connections and intrigue to form a powerful congressional coalition that not only ensured the Corps' survival as an institution but also wrote its mission and force structure into law.

Nevertheless, Congress has periodically used its oversight role and power over the budget to pressure the Marine Corps to reform and innovate.³ In the 1970s, for example, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps was an institution in crisis. Problems included recruiting malpractice, recruit abuse, widespread misconduct in the ranks, and the lack of a clear mission. Time and again, Congress made its concerns known to Headquarters Marine Corps through legislation, hearings, policy papers, and by informal means. In the process, Congress pushed the Marine Corps to raise its standards and redefine its strategic relevance. At the same time, we should be careful to not view this as a case of political leaders driving innovation from outside the Service. The Marine Corps was most likely to change when pressure from without combined with recognition of a problem from within led Headquarters Marine Corps, and most importantly the Commandant, to embrace solutions that were acceptable to a critical mass of Marines.⁴

Historically, the Marine Corps as an institution has tended to give itself credit for any and all favorable changes. Marines view themselves as being innovative by nature. In *First to Fight*, General Victor H. Krulak's passionate treatise on Marine Corps history and values, the author identified an "innovative quality" as being "a vital part of the Marine Corps personality."⁵ In truth, while the Marine Corps has been innovative in specific areas and at particular points in time—amphibious warfare in the interwar period, for example—the notion that the Service is inherently innovative is a myth. As an institution, the Marine Corps is conservative by nature in the sense that it has often been highly resistant to change. For change to occur, it takes a concerted effort by concerned Marines, former Marines, and friends of the Corps in Congress. Again, this is not to say that the Corps has not been innovative on numerous occasions, but that the role of outside pressure, particularly from Congress, has been underappreciated, if not ignored, in many cases.

In an attempt to better understand the powerful connection between Con-

gress and the Marine Corps, this article examines both the high points and the low points and offers some observations as to why the relationship has been so productive. It makes two main arguments. First, congressional oversight of the Marine Corps is a good thing. It need not be adversarial, and historically, it has not been. If anything, it is more collaborative than combative. In military parlance, the American people and their representatives in Congress are the Corps' center of gravity, or in other words, its source of strength. Oversight allows for the public's voice to be heard and it makes for a stronger Marine Corps, one that is more closely aligned with the American people. Second, and most importantly, the Marine Corps' political power has been a direct result of the value Marines placed on building and sustaining personal relationships. In an age of hyper-partisanship and instantaneous, yet often faceless, digital communications, this case is instructive. In times of crises, the Marine Corps drew on close personal relationships built on a strong foundation of trust, camaraderie, and a shared interest in the common defense.

The Good Times: The Unification Crisis, 1946–53

The most well-known example of the Corps building a powerful congressional coalition occurred during the defense unification debates that surrounded the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent legislation. In late 1945 and early 1946, senior War Department and executive branch officials, including President Harry S. Truman, expressed their support for various proposals that would drastically reduce the size of the Marine Corps. Advocates believed that shifting Marine Corps ground assets to the Army and air assets to an as-yet-to-be-created independent air force would increase efficiency and cut costs. If the Army had its way, the Corps would be reduced to a few regiments of light infantry. Throughout both the Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations, the Marine Corps relied on its political power to resist efforts to minimize its place within the national defense establishment. Despite the efforts of both presidents, the Corps increased in size and influence. It did so by forming and sustaining a bipartisan congressional coalition.

Headquarters Marine Corps recognized that the only way to ensure the institution's survival, in anything close to resembling its World War II form, would be through statutory protections contained in congressional legislation. According to General Krulak, a major at the time, "Most emphatically, the Marines held as an article of faith that no Department of the Navy would be correctly constituted without a dynamic air/ground Marine Corps of size and composition adequate to fulfill the expeditionary/amphibious force-in-readiness role."⁶ The Service's size, roles, and missions had to be protected by law, but how to do so was not clear.

In 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Hittle observed that "the biggest sur-

prise to me was the sudden realization that the Marine Corps actually did not have a single influential Congressman or Senator who could be contacted at any time on a personal basis and who could be relied on to comply with such requests for political actions as might be made to him.”⁷ The Marine Corps had potential allies, but had yet to approach them, nor was there a plan in place to do so.

Although space does not permit a full discussion of the ins and outs of the unification controversy, in summary, a group of Marine officers, at the direction of Headquarters Marine Corps, spent the next several months developing political connections and lobbying Congress to preserve the Corps. Of note, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the 18th Commandant, went before Congress and delivered what became known as the “bended knee” speech. After acknowledging that Congress had repeatedly served as a safeguard against efforts to abolish the Corps, he remarked:

The Marine Corps feels that the question of its continued existence is likewise a matter for determination by the Congress and not one to be resolved by departmental legerdemain or a quasi-legislative process enforced by the War Department General Staff.

The Marine Corps, then, believes that it has earned this right—to have its future decided by the legislative body which created it—nothing more. . . . The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps.⁸

In addition to preparing speeches for the Commandant, the team of officers, who jokingly referred to themselves as the “Chowder Society” after a famous comic strip, identified senators and congressmen who had either served in the Corps or had connections to the Corps and fostered relationships with them. The Chowder Society also worked with veterans’ organizations to influence Congress through constituent mail, issued press releases, and sought out sympathetic journalists.

Their campaign eventually resulted in the Marine Corps’ roles and missions being defined in the National Security Act of 1947, which read in part:

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.⁹

Following Congress's efforts to save the Corps with the 1947 National Security Act, the Truman administration shifted course and sought to use its authority to reduce the Corps to irrelevance. For fiscal year (FY) 1951, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson decreed the Corps would be cut down to six infantry battalions and six aviation squadrons. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the need for combat-ready forces precluded Secretary Johnson from putting his plan into effect.

For the Corps' supporters on Capitol Hill, the Service's performance in the Korean War provided the justification needed for additional statutory protections. The Douglas-Mansfield Act (Public Law 416, 82d Congress), passed in June 1952 and commonly referred to as the Marine Corps Bill, amended the National Security Act of 1947 to give additional legislative support to the Service's amphibious orientation. Impressed by the Corps' rapid reinforcement of the Pusan Perimeter at the outset of the Korean War as well as its role in General Douglas MacArthur's brilliant landing at Inchon only months later, Congress mandated a permanent force structure of at least three active amphibious assault divisions and three air wings. The Marine Corps remains the only Service to have its minimum size and basic force structure written into law. However, three divisions and three wings do not imply any specific end strength; if Congress were so inclined, the divisions could be very small. Although it did not specify end strength, Public Law 416, which passed the House by an overwhelming majority of 253 to 30, was a significant victory for the Corps. It not only ensured the Service's survival in its World War II-era form, but it also gave the Commandant coequal status with the other Service chiefs when issues related to the Marine Corps were under consideration.

Some have questioned the Marine Corps' methods during the unification crisis. Foremost among them is historian Aaron B. O'Connell. In *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps*, O'Connell provides a thoroughly researched chapter on the three main groups who made up the Corps' coalition: Marine veterans holding office, members who never served but were friendly to the Corps, and Reserve officers who staffed key committees in their civilian capacities. While O'Connell notes the "unqualified success" the coalition achieved in protecting the Service, he is critical of the Corps for becoming "the most politically activist branch of the armed services" in the process and bemoans the extralegal means employed.¹⁰ He offers multiple examples of Headquarters Marine Corps and individual Marines overlooking rules on awards, promotions, political campaigning, and security procedures to increase the Service's political influence.¹¹ In his opinion, "They treated the legislative arena as a theater of war, seeing the other Services, particularly the Army, as the enemy. Survival was the only rule."¹² Interestingly, in a 2015 article, Brigadier General David J. Furness, then the legislative assistant to the Commandant, echoed O'Con-

nell's sentiments. Furness referred to Capitol Hill as a "battlespace" and the U.S. Congress as the Marine Corps' most important ally in the struggle for resources.¹³

In 1952, Headquarters Marine Corps established the Office of Legislative Affairs to cement its connection to Congress and put the relationship on a more solid legal foundation. In the words of the current legislative assistant for the Commandant, the office has been "directly responsible to the Commandant in order to ensure that the CMC's priorities and perspectives are understood on the Hill."¹⁴ The Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) continues to inform legislation today, mainly through the annual National Defense Authorization Act, the federal law specifying the budget and expenditures for the Department of Defense as well as other defense-related provisions. The fact that the Commandant has his own liaison office is unique in comparison to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. For the other Services, the secretaries of their military departments, civilian political appointees, bear the primary responsibility for coordinating with Congress. The uniformed legislative liaisons work primarily for the civilian secretaries rather than their Service chiefs. The result is that the Commandant has a direct connection to Capitol Hill, while the other Service chiefs must coordinate legislative efforts with their respective secretaries.

An example of the Office of Legislative Affairs in action—and another well-known story of the Corps' political acumen—occurred in 1978 during the Commandancy of General Louis H. Wilson Jr. A Medal of Honor recipient who had served as legislative assistant a decade earlier, Wilson was adept at using his connections in Congress to gain support for Marine Corps policies and programs. Wilson also cultivated personal relationships through speaking engagements, visits, and correspondence. For example, he often spoke at functions hosted by a fellow Mississippian, Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Similarly, if high-ranking civilian officials attended a Marine Corps function, Wilson later sent personal notes along with photographs from the events. The typical picture showed the guests posed with Marines in their dress uniforms; if the photographer happened to catch the guests' children enjoying themselves with Marines, so much the better. It should be noted, however, that Wilson's network was not limited to those at the top. He made skillful use of the Congressional Marines, a bipartisan group made up of anyone who worked on Capitol Hill who had an interest in the Corps. The group included senators and representatives as well as interns, janitors, and security guards.¹⁵ Wilson and other key leaders made a habit of informally presenting initiatives at Congressional Marine breakfasts to foster support.

In 1978, General Wilson—working through his legislative assistant, Brigadier General Albert E. Brewster—used his influence in Congress to make

Figure 1. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and U.S. Marine Corps Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr., 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps, at the Home of the Commandants (8th and I), in Washington, DC, 8 May 2015



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy LCpl Christopher J. Nunn.

the Commandant a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The relationship between the Commandant and the Joint Chiefs had long been a matter of contention. In March 1948, when the Service chiefs met in Key West, Florida, to define the roles and missions of the Services post–World War II, the Commandant was neither invited nor was his input solicited. In 1952, Public Law 416 made the Commandant a “co-equal” on any matter that “directly concerns the Marine Corps”; however, according to Title 10, the portion of U.S. Code pertaining to the armed forces, the Commandant was not a full member. In 1978, the issue came to a head when the chairman and all the Service chiefs, save Wilson, were slated to travel. Wilson expected to be acting chairman, but his peers told him that the vice chief of staff of the Air Force would fill the slot due to the Commandant not being a full member. Using his relationship with Senator Stennis, Wilson had an amendment drafted to correct the situation. The amendment making the Commandant a full member passed 89 to 3, and President James “Jimmy” Carter signed it into law on 20 October 1978.¹⁶ Additional legislation was passed to make the assistant commandant a four-star general, which gave the Corps two four-star billets. Wilson would later say of

Stennis, “He has been one of my greatest supports, I believe, and I certainly have been one of his.”¹⁷ Ultimately, these changes were significant because they made it possible for Marines to serve in positions at the highest levels of the armed forces, which included commanding combatant commands and serving as chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The years of the unification crisis had been difficult ones for the Marine Corps as an institution, yet Congress made significant strides to protect the Corps from being absorbed into the other Service branches. In *First to Fight*, General Krulak summed up the relationship between Congress and the Marine Corps in the early Cold War years:

Throughout the two hundred years of our country’s history, Congress has repeatedly acted to preserve and strengthen the Marines’ fighting effectiveness. The congressional determination, while enhanced by lobbying or jawboning, is primarily a product of one thing: confidence in the Corps’s performance. Without steady, reliable performance, year in and year out, Congress would never have so consistently stood by the Marines in their time of trial. Performance is what it is all about.¹⁸

Not surprisingly, Krulak makes no mention of the times when Congress had to step in and use its oversight function to correct deficiencies. Although not as well known as the unification crisis, there have been occasions when Congress lost confidence and took corrective action.

The Not-So-Good Times: The Post-Vietnam Era

The traditional narrative is that the Marine Corps focused inward and reformed itself in the years following the Vietnam War. According to this point of view, Marines were by far the most important agents of change in areas ranging from improving the overall quality of the force to defining the Service’s role in the later years of the Cold War. In reality, Congress played an essential role by pressing the Marine Corps to raise its standards and redefine its strategic relevance to the nation.

To meet the manpower needs of the Vietnam War, the Service repeatedly lowered its entrance standards. The reductions were similar to what had been done during World War II and the Korean War. Unlike in those conflicts, however, standards remained low after the Vietnam War ended. At the direction of General Robert E. Cushman Jr., Commandant from 1971 to 1975, the Service preserved its end strength at the expense of quality. Between 1969 and 1971, the Corps had shrunk from 317,000 to 204,000, and Cushman feared that if the latter number could not be maintained, Congress would make additional cuts.

When asked about his approach to manpower, Cushman described himself as fighting a rear-guard action in Congress based on the “the fear that if we simply refused to recruit enough people to come fairly close to filling up our authorized strength, that the Congress would soon cut the Corps to whatever we were able to maintain with our recruiting. And this was a decision that was very difficult to make because it meant you had to lower your standards somewhat to keep the number of people up to the near authorized strength.”¹⁹

The lower standards led to irregularities in recruiting and recruit training and drew unwanted attention from the media, the public, and ultimately Congress. On several occasions, constituents complained to Congress about fraudulent enlistments and the abuse of recruits. Of note, Congressman Mario A. Biaggi (D-NY), a highly decorated police officer, was alarmed that his constituents were being mistreated with “alarming regularity.” He considered the personnel issues plaguing the Corps to be a question of national security.²⁰ In 1971, Biaggi accompanied investigative reporters on fact-finding trips. The eventual result was a book-length account of the Corps’ troubles—*See Parris and Die: Brutality in the U.S. Marines*—that included an introduction by Biaggi urging the Marine Corps to act before it was too late. The observations of senior Marines supported Biaggi’s conclusions. While inspecting the medical facilities at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, in 1972, General Robert H. Barrow was shocked to learn that 23 recruits had been treated for broken jaws during the course of the year. Although the causes were listed as falls in the shower, Barrow knew that someone had mistreated the recruits. In his opinion, abuse “was just in the system” and the situation was “very bad” and “very wrong.”²¹ Another general officer was surprised at just how many “very stupid things” were being done at the depots.²² Headquarters Marine Corps refused to take action.

The situation came to a head on 4 December 1975, when recruit Lawrence Warner died of heat-related injuries only two days after arriving at Parris Island. Despite being overweight, he had been allowed to enlist and had not received a physical exam upon arriving at boot camp. Two days later, at Recruit Depot San Diego, recruit Lynn E. McClure, a 115-pound underachiever who some claimed was developmentally disabled, was beaten so severely he was rendered unconscious. An investigation revealed that McClure was a high school dropout with multiple arrests. He never regained consciousness and died on 13 March 1976. Less than a month after the McClure beating, on 3 January 1976, a drill instructor shot recruit Harry W. Hiscock in the hand at Parris Island. Each incident was reported on extensively by the media and resulted in a public outcry.

In May 1976, congressional hearings were held to examine Marine Corps recruiting and recruit training. Several members of Congress had received what they considered an alarming number of complaints about the Marine Corps. Testimony given by former recruits, recruiters, drill instructors, and medical person-

nel painted a picture of widespread abuse and systemic misconduct. Problems ranged from recruiters falsifying documents to recruits being physically and verbally abused. Medical professionals described a system that displayed a reckless disregard for the physical and mental well-being of the young men and women in its charge. One congressman concluded, "Congress finds totally unacceptable any repetition of the kinds of abuses that have befallen my constituents and Marine recruits from other parts of the country. This problem can and must be solved."²³ In addition to recruiting, Headquarters Marine Corps had to reform recruit training lest Congress mandate changes to the process and severely circumscribe the Service's authority. The hearings held in 1976 represented a loss of public prestige and a stunning and very public example of where the combination of recruiting malpractice and recruit abuse could lead.

Headquarters Marine Corps immediately set about reforming recruit training, and General Wilson, who had replaced Cushman in July 1975, is typically credited with the reforms. He was responding, in part, to congressional pressure, however. General Barrow, then serving as Wilson's deputy chief of staff for Manpower, feared that Congress would restrict recruit training, thereby destroying a process that was central to Marine ethos. In an oral history interview, he recalled:

If you didn't do a good job, they [Congress] could turn right around and say, well we're going to tell you how this is going to be done, because we don't think you understand what needs to be done, and so we'll just tell you. It seems like they could have easily said, there will be no drill instructors around recruits after 5:00 p.m. Put them in the squad and let them have free time from the time they go to bed. Things like that. They just impose all kinds of restrictions. . . . So we were in a sense, fighting for our lives, to use a metaphor.²⁴

Congress also considered closing the recruit depots and creating a single armed forces training center with an eye toward saving money and reducing abuse. According to Wilson, "The Congress was fully prepared to take over Marine Corps training, which I believe would have been disastrous, and I had to make some immediate changes in order to ensure that this did not occur."²⁵

In response to the challenge, Wilson and Barrow implemented a far-reaching set of reforms. Concerning recruiting, Wilson announced, shortly after taking office, that by FY 1977, 75 percent of enlistees would be high school graduates. Seventy-five percent was a requirement, not a goal; the Marine Corps would shrink if necessary to attain it.²⁶ According to one general officer, "the Commandant made it clear to all involved in the recruiting business that quotas were

to be considered goals but that quality was a requirement.”²⁷ Also, in June 1976, control of recruiting shifted from Headquarters Marine Corps to the commanding generals of the two recruit depots. This reorganized chain of command gave recruiters a personal stake in who they shipped to boot camp. A recruiter’s Social Security number was recorded in the permanent record of each recruit that they brought into the Corps and their fitness reports were to be based on the number of recruits who completed boot camp, rather than the number who started, as had previously been the case.

In the area of recruit training, recruits would be tested, but they were to be treated with dignity and respect in the process. Changes in philosophy were paired with reforms to standard operating procedures. Limits on attrition were lifted. Rates rose from 10 percent to 25 percent in some cases.²⁸ The option to separate poor performers substantially reduced cases of abuse. The process of screening and training drill instructors was made more rigorous. The number of recruits per platoon dropped from 90 to 75, 68 hours were cut from the program of instruction, and recruits were given 1 hour of free time each evening. For quality-control purposes, Headquarters assigned 84 additional officers, 42 at each depot, to serve as assistant series commanders concerned with supervision and safety. Finally, a degree of transparency was achieved by opening the entire process to public scrutiny. Parents, local officials, and the general public were encouraged to visit the recruit depots to see for themselves how the Corps turned the youth of America into proud men and women. In an interview with *People Weekly*, General Wilson told readers, “I’d like to say that the recruit depots are open to anyone, anytime. Visitors can walk in and watch training or look up any individual they know.”²⁹ Both Wilson and Barrow credited congressional pressure as a primary motivation behind the reforms. In the absence of this pressure, it is unlikely that the Marine Corps would have implemented such a far-reaching, and ultimately effective, set of improvements.

Perhaps the best example of Congress’s role was Wilson’s decision to focus on high school completion as the key determinant of success for a first-term Marine. Wilson is credited with deciding that a high school diploma, rather than an intelligence test, was the best indicator of whether or not a Marine would successfully complete the first enlistment. In fact, as early as 1960, manpower analysts had been arguing the very same thing. A bona fide diploma increased a recruit’s chances of success by 20 to 40 percent, depending on other variables. According to the Naval Health Research Center:

Projects showed, with absolute consistency, that level of schooling achieved, or completion of high school, was the strongest predictor of performance in the Marine Corps. No matter what

was predicted, whether or not a Marine survived two or four years on active duty or performed effectively in combat, the best predictor of success was completion of high school.³⁰

Graduating high school demonstrated a willingness to accept authority and what one researcher termed a “stick-to-it-iveness” that carried over into other areas.³¹

Wilson, however, was not the first to recognize the importance of a diploma. In 1973, Congress had demanded that the Marine Corps increase the percentage of high school graduates. In FY 1974, Congress had included Section 718 in the Defense Appropriations Bill that required the armed forces to enlist at least 55 percent high school graduates. The Marine Corps could not hold to the standard and still make its recruiting mission. Ultimately, General Cushman asked Congress for relief from the requirement, a request that Congress initially denied. Then-Colonel William J. Bowers, an expert on Marine Corps recruiting in the all-volunteer era, described Cushman petitioning Congress to lower enlistment standards as a “spectacle” and a “disastrous” start to modern recruiting efforts.³² Thus, when viewed in light of the events of the preceding three years, Wilson’s decision to require high school diplomas was not as visionary as it seemed, but it was more of a decision to follow through on something Congress had been requesting for years.

Similarly, historians credit General Wilson with discharging thousands of underperforming Marines through what was known as the Expeditious Discharge Program. The initiative, announced in November 1975, eliminated the complicated legal proceedings that had previously surrounded punitive discharges. If a Marine and his commander agreed, the program allowed for a voluntary, honorable, early separation. The only stipulation was that the Marine could never reenlist. The program pushed separation authority down to the battalion level and dramatically reduced the time associated with the process; before implementation of the program, it took weeks and sometimes months to kick someone out of the Corps. Afterward, it took days. According to one judge advocate, administrative discharges “cut out [in] the least expensive way those persons who are not going to succeed, those persons who are nonrehabilitable, and those persons who just can’t hack it.”³³ During the first three months of the program, approximately 2,000 Marines were separated for failing to meet standards; by late 1976, the total was more than 10,000 Marines.³⁴

What is less well known is that Congress had been urging the Corps to adopt just such a program for nearly two years. In 1973, the House Appropriations Committee, alarmed by rising rates of military misconduct, mandated that all Services streamline administrative discharge procedures for underperforming members. At the time, the Army and Navy had already implemented pilot programs. Despite the success the other Services were enjoying, Headquarters Ma-

rine Corps refused to comply. In 1974, Lieutenant General Samuel Jaskilka told the committee that once a Marine made it through boot camp, the Service focused on rehabilitation. Discharge was considered a last resort only reserved for the most egregious offenses.³⁵ In truth, the Corps had gotten into the habit of delaying discharges to preserve end strength. Headquarters Marine Corps refused to implement an expeditious discharge program even after the Government Accountability Office, Congress's independent investigative agency, urged that it do so. The Marine Corps was the only Service without a marginal performer/expeditious discharge program when General Wilson took office.³⁶ Rather than being innovative, the Corps was late to the game when it came to expeditious discharge.

By 1978, quality standards had improved dramatically and incidents of indiscipline had been reduced to manageable levels. Between FY 1975 and FY 1978, the percentage of enlistees who were high school graduates increased from roughly 50 percent to 76.8 percent, desertion rates dropped by 60 percent, the confined population rate fell by 54 percent, and special courts-martial were down by 60 percent.³⁷ Thus, by 1978, the turnaround was so complete that it led one general to proclaim victory in the personnel campaign—a campaign that he regarded as one of the most critical and challenging in the Service's history.³⁸ These positive trends continued into the 1980s. On 15 October 1982, the Marine Corps announced that it had not only met its recruiting goals for FY 1982, but that 90 percent of recruits were high school graduates. By the end of the decade, more than 98 percent of Marines were high school graduates, compared to 50 percent in the early 1970s.³⁹ Historians often credit the turnaround to bold and innovative leadership on the part of Headquarters Marine Corps, however, as Major General Arnold L. Punaro points out, “The senator [Samuel Nunn] who made it happen and the staffer who supported him are, of course, not mentioned in these annals.”⁴⁰ It is debatable whether the Corps would have raised enlistment standards or discharged so many underperforming Marines absent pressure from Capitol Hill.

One last factor worth mentioning when it comes to the Marine Corps' ability to recruit high-quality individuals was that massive increases in pay and benefits improved the quality of life for military members. To restore military-to-civilian parity, Congress increased base pay by 11.7 percent in FY 1981 and by 14.3 percent in FY 1982. The result was a 26 percent pay raise in less than two years. Although Headquarters Marine Corps had little to do with the decision, the Service benefited immeasurably from Congress's generosity.⁴¹ As these examples illustrate, Congress played a pivotal role in reforming manpower policies and practices in the post-Vietnam War era.

At the same time that Congress held the Corps to account regarding manpower standards, it also pressured the Service to redefine its strategic relevance.⁴² In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Marine Corps was very much a Service in search

of a mission. Traditionally, it justified its existence by highlighting its capabilities as a rapid response force for third world contingencies and as amphibious shock troops in the event of large-scale, conventional war. The nation's recent experience in Southeast Asia and the subsequent promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, however, signaled a diminished need for the former role.⁴³ Similarly, the need for massed amphibious assaults—the Marine Corps' *raison d'être* since the interwar period—was considered highly unlikely in a war with the Soviet Union. Some critics went so far as to refer to the Service as an anachronism, “a dinosaur which had outlived its usefulness.”⁴⁴

Of particular concern were critiques by members of Congress and their staffs. As discussed in the previous section on the post-WWII unification crisis, Congress had been a longtime ally of the Corps and repeatedly protected it against budget cutters in the executive branch. The situation in the mid-1970s was unique in that the Service's detractors in Congress and the media were generally fond of the Marine Corps as an organization, and many had a personal connection or familiarity with its history and traditions. However, their belief that the Corps' roles and missions had become so disconnected from the nation's actual defense needs overrode whatever affinities they may have had. The message was plain—the Marine Corps must adapt to present realities or run the risk of strategic irrelevance.

From 1975 to 1978, defense analysts William S. Lind and Dr. Jeffrey Record offered the most cogent analysis of the Marine Corps' shortcomings. The opening salvo came from Lind, then serving as legislative assistant for the Armed Services Committee for Senator Robert A. Taft Jr. (R-OH), as an article in the December 1975 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. Lind urged the Marine Corps to rethink its mission and force structure.⁴⁵ During the next year, Record, then serving as legislative assistant for military affairs on the staff of Senator Samuel A. Nunn Jr. (D-GA), followed up with *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?*, a Brookings Institute study coauthored with Martin Binkin.⁴⁶ Also in 1976, Lind reiterated his arguments in a white paper on defense endorsed by Taft. In 1978, the document was reissued with the endorsement of Senator Gary Hart (D-CO).⁴⁷ Later that same year, Lind and Record coauthored a journal article titled “Twilight for the Corps?,” which neatly summarized their collective assessment. That Lind and Record staffed powerful committees was not lost on senior Marines, and neither was the fact that their views received strong bipartisan support. Longtime supporters of the Marine Corps from both parties endorsed such statements as “the maintenance of almost 200,000 men in an obsolescing force structure cannot be justified,” which caught the attention of Marines at all levels and inspired a period of institutional self-examination to a degree not seen since the early twentieth century.⁴⁸

From their analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Lind and Record conclud-

ed that future wars would be quick, technologically intensive affairs defined by the rapid movement of heavily mechanized forces. In their opinion, the Marine Corps was ill-suited for this type of conflict for two reasons. First, the Corps' amphibious ships would never have gotten them to the war in time. Second, even if the Marines were able to get to the fight, they lacked the armor needed to win on the modern battlefield. Consequently, according to Lind and Record, "The brutal truth is that a growing number of defense analysts regard the Marine Corps as an under-gunned, slow-moving monument to a bygone era in warfare."⁴⁹ Despite such stinging criticism, neither analyst harbored any ill will toward the Service. In fact, both Lind and Record hoped their work would inspire reforms that would enable the Marine Corps to make a positive contribution to national security once again. As such, they recommended detailed solutions to some of the most pressing challenges.

The first challenge, as they saw it, fell under strategic mobility; in other words, how the Corps planned to get to the fight. Lind and Record believed the "principal issue confronting the United States Marine Corps today is the future viability of the amphibious mission."⁵⁰ America's most dangerous adversaries, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China, were land powers whose vast territory and large armies offered few opportunities for a decisive amphibious assault. In a war with either power, amphibious operations could serve as little more than a diversion. This observation directly contradicted a Headquarters Marine Corps effort to write itself into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war plans with the northern flank mission. The planning scenario called for the Marine Corps to assist in countering potential European incursions of Warsaw Pact forces by rushing forces to Norway, marrying them up with prestaged gear, and conducting follow-on operations in Western Europe. Although writing itself into NATO war plans helped the Corps survive in the post-Vietnam years, Lind and Record doubted the Corps' utility to NATO. As they saw it, the Corps was simply not configured to fight Soviet mechanized forces. On top of that, a nonnuclear war with the Soviet Union was highly unlikely.

Lind and Record pointed out that criticism of the Marine Corps was not limited to analysts, reporters, and low-level bureaucrats. Senior administration officials and legislators were beginning to question the rationale behind the Corps' existence. The shortage of amphibious shipping led Senator Nunn, previously a strong supporter of the Corps, to doubt the Service's ability to get to the fight: "If the U.S. Marines were called upon to undertake a major landing in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East, they would probably have to walk on water to get ashore."⁵¹ The declining number of amphibious ships and the relative slowness of amphibious transit were highlighted in a 1976 report by the Congressional Research Service, which concluded that deficiencies in amphibious shipping would result in a two-month lead time to launch a division-size operation.⁵²

The Carter years were particularly challenging for the Marine Corps, with its shrinking financial base making force modernization impossible. Under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the Corps saw its procurement budget drop from \$326.7 million in FY 1977 to \$283.78 million in FY 1980. Brown also refused to fund the construction of any new amphibious ships or the procurement of the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier aircraft, the Marine Corps' top aviation priority.⁵³

Defending the Corps against critics in Congress proved challenging to Marines at all levels. Yet, in the process of responding to their critics, the leadership of the Corps refined what it was they wanted their Service to be, namely "an elite air-ground force capable of global deployment," an orientation that the Corps has stuck with to the present. That said, a clear sense of purpose was not enough to free up scarce dollars during the first three years of the Carter administration. According to one Marine general, "You couldn't sell the need for global power projection in the Pentagon prior to events in Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua in 1979."⁵⁴ It would take a major reorientation of national security policy for the Corps to match its capabilities to strategic needs and get the dollars flowing again. The Service needed a mission. It would find one in the chaos and disorder of the Middle East.

On 4 November 1979, Iranian students supportive of the Islamic revolution took dozens of American diplomats hostage. Throughout the 1970s, the United States had relied on the Shah of Iran to maintain stability in the Middle East. By late 1979, the Shah had fled Iran during his country's revolution, and the new governing regime was openly hostile to the United States. The hostage crisis brought to the fore the United States' severely limited military options in the region. To make matters worse, on Christmas Day 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.⁵⁵ The invasion completely changed the strategic equation. It provided a sense of urgency and enabled proponents of more robust military capabilities to argue a more compelling case for expeditionary forces. From Washington's perspective, it appeared the Soviets were making a play for regional hegemony and control of the region's oil resources.

President Carter laid out his administration's response in his State of the Union Address delivered on 23 January 1980: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."⁵⁶ At the time, however, the United States lacked the military capabilities needed to protect the interests identified by policy makers and to enforce the strategic commitments outlined in the Carter Doctrine. Prior to 1980, the United States had interests in the Middle East but limited capacity for projecting force, as evidenced by the Desert One debacle, a failed attempt to rescue the hostages

in Tehran that cost the lives of eight American servicemembers in April 1980.

To remedy this deficiency, the administration placed a renewed emphasis on the rapid deployment force (RDF). The RDF concept was based on prepositioning supplies on ships in the region under what became known as maritime prepositioning and then linking them up with airlifted troops from the rapid deployment force in the event of a crisis. During Carter's final months in office, his administration produced two policy documents that represented a shift in Washington's approach to the Middle East: *Presidential Directive (PD) 62, Modifications in U.S. National Strategy* and *PD 63, Persian Gulf Security Framework*. The former made it clear that a shift in strategic priorities had occurred. American allies in Europe and Asia would be expected to bear more of the burden while the United States redirected its attention to the Middle East.⁵⁷

The reorientation of U.S. strategy brought about by events in the Middle East could not have been more fortuitous for the Marine Corps. During the course of the previous five years, it had repeatedly justified itself to Congress as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness, and now it had an actual adversary and theater of operations to which to tie the claim. The fact that much of the Middle East was accessible from the sea played to the Service's amphibious orientation. In the next several years, the Marine Corps played a leading role in turning Carter's strategic vision into a military reality. Ultimately, it so successfully adapted its capabilities to the challenge that one analyst referred to it as "the core" of the RDF.⁵⁸ Congress appreciated the efforts put forth by the Corps in making the RDF concept a reality. The sudden need for rapidly deployable forces brought about by the Iranian Revolution and Soviet takeover of Afghanistan led to what General Barrow referred to as a rediscovery of the Corps.⁵⁹ By embracing the RDF mission, the Marine Corps benefited significantly from the spending associated with it. Arnold Punaro, the aforementioned Marine reservist and legislative aide to Senator Nunn at the time, told a reporter that the Corps was slated to receive the bulk of the funding associated with the rapid deployment mission. Due to its capabilities in this regard, Nunn continued, "the Marine Corps is the force for the Eighties."⁶⁰ The Service avoided a planned manpower reduction, as a result, and its budget grew by 10 percent in FY 1981 and by another 30 percent in FY 1982.⁶¹ The Marine Corps' newfound strategic purpose, and the spending associated with it, led Barrow to predict the 1980s would be "a kind of golden era" in comparison to the mid-1970s.⁶²

Despite the Corps' newfound relevance and its strong relationship with Congress, by no means did its interests always prevail, a fact that especially held true when they ran contrary to those of the larger Services. For example, the Marine Corps pushed for more amphibious shipping as one of its top priorities throughout the period in question and made little headway because amphibious shipping is not among the Navy's top shipbuilding priorities. In each of his four annual

reports to Congress from 1977 to 1980, Commandant Wilson highlighted what he considered “a critical shortage of amphibious lift.”⁶³ By 1981, the situation reached the point that the head of the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Ships Requirements Branch concluded “amphibious force levels have been repeatedly and arbitrarily lowered to such a point that a glaring mismatch now exists between strategic goals and the amphibious forces available to pursue them.”⁶⁴ In the first installment of *Marine Corps Concepts and Issues*, an annual publication begun in 1981 to keep Congress informed of the Service’s priorities, Headquarters Marine Corps held that “if the United States has an Achilles heel, it is sealift to support contingencies.”⁶⁵ To date, there has been no relief in this area. In 2014, 20 retired Marine generals, distressed by the increased demand for amphibious forces and the declining number of ships, wrote Congress to “highlight concerns” and to request an increase in the number of ships currently programmed.⁶⁶

Apart from the shortage of amphibious shipping and largely as a result of congressional pressure, the Marine Corps entered the 1980s with a clear strategic focus; it was the nation’s force in readiness and the Middle East was the most likely theater of operations. During the course of the 1980s, the Middle East would only grow in importance, while concerns about a war and the focus on Europe diminished with the end of the Cold War. On 1 January 1983, the RDF officially became U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a permanent unified combatant command. The focus on mobility and readiness was borne out following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990; it took the United States only a few months to deploy 540,000 combat-ready troops, 2,000 tanks, 1,800 aircraft, and more than 100 warships to the region. The critical point for the Corps was the speed of deployment allowed by maritime prepositioning shipping. The first heavy units on the ground were Marines. Because the equipment and 30 days of supplies were in the ships, the Marines were able to deploy two large expeditionary brigades—17,000 men each, with all their equipment—very quickly. The Marine Corps provided logistical support to some of the first U.S. Army units to arrive in theater.

Due to its broad utility and political savvy, the Marine Corps emerged mostly unscathed during the four major defense policy reviews of the 1990s: the *Base Force* (1990), the *Bottom-Up Review* (1993), the *Commission on Roles and Missions* (1995), and the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (1997). The *Base Force* provides a case in point. Under projected force reductions for FY 1990 to FY 1995, the Army would be reduced from 18 active divisions to 12, the Navy would drop from 16 aircraft carriers to 13 and from 33 ballistic missile submarines to 23, and the Air Force would see its number of active fighter wings slashed from 24 to 15 and its heavy bombers drop from 268 to 181. By comparison, the Marine Corps would remain at three active divisions and three air wings. The Corps’ end strength was reduced from roughly 195,000 to 175,000 between FY 1990 and FY 1995, a 10

percent decrease, but its force structure remained unscathed.⁶⁷ Of the *Base Force* review, General Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, recalled, “The Marines were on somewhat firmer ground. With justification, they presented themselves as the nation’s ‘911’ response force, with or without a Soviet Union.”⁶⁸ Consequently, the size of the Marine Corps relative to the other Services increased in the decade following the Cold War. The Marine Corps made up 9 percent of the total active force in 1988 and 12 percent by 2000.⁶⁹ A similar situation occurred following the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. The Marine Corps, having convinced Congress of its utility as a crisis response force, maintained its end strength at the same time that the U.S. Army endured significant reductions.⁷⁰

As these two examples illustrate, Congress plays an important yet somewhat unappreciated role in military innovation. In the 1970s, Congress was one of the few institutions that held the Marine Corps accountable. It continues to do so today as evidenced by recent issues related to sexual assault, hazing, and recruit abuse. At the same time, it is important to note that the Corps was better off as a result of the criticism. It provided the impetus for much-needed reforms.⁷¹

Observations and Recommendations⁷²

Congress and the Marine Corps clearly have maintained a strong connection over the years, through both good times and bad. What is it about the partnership that has made it so effective? Part of the answer is organizational. The Marine Corps established the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) in 1952 and over the years has ensured that it has been staffed by highly qualified individuals. The office’s mission statement remains mostly unchanged:

The Office of Legislative Affairs facilitates a shared understanding between the Marine Corps and Congress in order to ensure support for the Commandant’s legislative priorities and requirements, and to maintain the Corps’ unique role within the Joint Force as the Nation’s premier force in readiness.⁷³

As previously mentioned, OLA works directly for the Commandant, while its counterparts in the other Services work primarily for the civilian secretaries of their departments. OLA’s structure and the lines of authority provide Headquarters Marine Corps with a disproportionate degree of influence on Capitol Hill.

The OLA ensures that the Marine Corps speaks with one voice. It provides timely, accurate, and comprehensive responses to approximately 4,000 inquiries per year. Unlike other Services’ liaison offices, OLA serves as something of a gatekeeper. It reviews and tracks all inquiries and responses to ensure consis-

tency, which is particularly important if a constituent wrote multiple members. OLA also meticulously prepares Marines prior to congressional hearings. To that end, OLA provides incredibly detailed briefing books—628 pages for the 2015 confirmation hearing of Commandant General Robert B. Neller—and holds mock hearings known as “murder boards.” Considering the degree of control OLA provides the Commandant when it comes to messaging, the office stands as an excellent example of strategic communications in the political sphere.

The Marine Corps Congressional Fellowship Program is another organizational development that allows for the Marine Corps message to be heard on Capitol Hill. For the past 16 years, this Department of Defense initiative has given active duty officers and senior enlisted Marines the opportunity to work in the legislative branch for one session of Congress. Each year, approximately 15–20 Marines participate. After three months of training, they don civilian clothes and work as congressional staffers for one year. Their typical portfolio includes military and veteran-related issues, though the member is free to use their fellows as they see fit. The fellows are strategically placed in the offices of key committee members or members who have an interest in the Corps. Thus, the fellowship program gives the Corps a window into what Congress as a whole is thinking.

Along with established organizations and programs, there are three aspects of the relationship that are not easily quantified. The first is a reputation for honesty. Although the Marine Corps has official positions typically expressed by the Commandant and OLA, fellows are encouraged to share their personal opinions on issues so long as they differentiate between the two. Every interviewee the author spoke to stressed the importance of being honest with staffers and members. As a result, the Marine Corps has a reputation for conducting honest and open investigations. Historically, this has paid dividends. If Congress sees that the Marine Corps is transparent about its shortcomings, it has been more likely to take a hands-off approach in the crafting of any necessary reforms.

Ultimately, the Marine Corps is confident that if it does enough things right, Congress will be willing to forgive its failings so long as the organization is taking corrective action. In 1980, then-Commandant Barrow expressed his views on the matter in a letter to all commanders:

We do owe the American people a full explanation of what we do as well as what we may fail to do on occasion. . . . Our approach must be one of candor, truthfulness, and timeliness. . . . Commanders are encouraged to provide members of the local community with opportunities for firsthand observation

of Marines. . . . I urge commanders to take every opportunity to tell the Marine Corps story to a wide range of audiences—civilian as well as military—through personal contact and public appearances.⁷⁴

This honest and open approach is valued by staffers and members who work in an environment where trust and honesty are uncommon.

The second aspect is the degree to which the Marine Corps uses its Service culture to its advantage. Marine Barracks Washington, DC, also known as “8th and I,” built in 1801, is the oldest active post in the Marine Corps. The barracks, including the Home of the Commandants, is a national historic landmark and is within walking distance of Capitol Hill. During the summer, the Marine Corps hosts evening parades at the Marine Corps War Memorial (Iwo Jima Memorial) and at 8th and I; senators and representatives are often the guests of honor. Since 1976, the Marine Corps also has sponsored the annual Marine Corps Marathon in Washington, DC. Billed as the “The People’s Marathon,” the Marine Corps encourages maximum participation by not requiring a qualifying time. To foster relations with Congress, OLA and the fellows host a Marine Corps running club on Capitol Hill. Members and staffers are invited to run on a regular basis with Marines in preparation for the marathon. The running club is just one of the many ways that Marines use the camaraderie that defines Marine Corps culture as a way to build relationships.

Figure 2. The start of the 2017 Marine Corps Marathon, Arlington, VA, 22 October 2017



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy James Frank.

The cultural ties among fellow Marines combine to create another essential aspect of the partnership between the Marine Corps and Congress. The saying, “once a Marine, always a Marine” is taken quite literally by those who have worn the uniform. Arguably, the single most crucial thing the Marine Corps did during the past 70 years was identify and cultivate relationships with active, retired, Reserve, and former Marines involved in the legislative process. If one examines the various pieces of pro-Marine Corps legislation, they will find that many of the members involved had served in the Corps in some way, shape, or form: the names Paul H. Douglas, Michael J. Mansfield, John H. Glenn, and John Warner come to mind. Headquarters Marine Corps also maintained its ties to staff members with a Marine connection. Interestingly, the fact that two people had both served in the Marines was often enough to overcome partisan differences. For example, in the early 1990s, Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA), a liberal Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Commandant Carl E. Mundy Jr., a committed conservative on most issues, found that they could work together on the common ground that both had been Marines.⁷⁵ In terms of sheer numbers, the Marine Corps had fewer former Marines serving than the other Services, but as Aaron O’Connell notes, “What they lacked in numbers, the congressional Marines gained in cohesion.”⁷⁶

Finally, and most importantly, the Marine Corps puts people first. As General Punaro, a congressional staffer, who had nearly 50 years of experience as a reservist, attaining the rank of major general, said, “It was clear to me early on that, in large part, any given person’s success or failure in Washington revolved around personal relationships. People remembered when you went out of your way to help them. They also, for far longer, remembered when you didn’t, so I made sure never to burn a bridge by taking the short-term view.”⁷⁷ Time and again, archival sources and interview subjects highlighted the importance of cultivating personal relationships. In the long run, the Marine Corps’ relationship with Congress can be viewed as an exercise in relationship building. In 1945, the connections were there, but productive working relationships had yet to be built. Ever since the unification crisis, the Marine Corps has made a concerted effort to cultivate and sustain those relationships.

Furthermore, the Marine Corps does not wait for a crisis to start building relationships. It focuses on what one interviewee referred to as the “long-game.” As General Punaro points out, “it was *far more important* to think about the long-term objectives and consequences of a decision than simply calculate the short-term fallout or that day’s rewards.”⁷⁸ The Service cultivates ties to young staffers knowing that someday they will be in important positions, possibly even members themselves. One of the first things General Wilson did when he was confirmed as Commandant was call on all the members of key congress-

Figure 3. Congressional staffers met Marines and got a firsthand look at the Service's equipment and capabilities on Marine Day held at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, 27 April 2012.



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy LCpl Emmanuel Ramos.

sional committees, all the former Marines in Congress, all members with interests in Marine Corps matters, and his state delegation. Ironically, he considered it nothing more than “renewing old friendships.”⁷⁹ These were relationships he had been cultivating for years. Along these same lines, interviewees all stressed the importance of respect when dealing with members and their staff. Of note, they highlighted the value of treating even the most junior staffer with the same degree of respect that they would treat the member that staffer served.

It should be noted, however, that in recent years the Marine Corps has risked its reputation for putting people and relationships first. During the past three decades or so, the Corps has championed the development of two expensive weapon systems—the tiltrotor Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey and the General Dynamics Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a high-speed amphibious vehicle. Some argue that these programs have come to define the Marine Corps in the halls of Congress, and as a result the Corps sacrificed its hard-won reputation as the least bureaucratic of the Services. According to analyst William Lind, who had played an important role in the post-Vietnam War reform era, these programs represented the emergence of a “second Marine Corps” whose “highest goal is programs, money and bureaucratic success ‘inside the Beltway.’” Historically, the Marine Corps’ message to Congress and the American people had been, “We’re not like the other services. We aren’t about money and stuff. We’re about war.” The new message coming from Headquarters Marine Corps in the form of glossy handouts and its testimony before Congress

was, “We are just like the other services. We too are now about money and programs.” In Lind’s opinion, the Service was trading its warrior ethos and reputation for frugality—the very sources of its political support—for costly programs.⁸⁰ While Lind’s critique is overstated, it is not without merit. It is imperative that the Marine Corps continue to focus on building and maintaining relationships based on trust and not emphasize its programs and technology.

Furthermore, the Marine Corps’ efforts to inform and coordinate with other government entities are uneven. Marine liaison efforts with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, pale in comparison to what OLA does on Capitol Hill. To more effectively implement so-called whole-of-government solutions to security challenges, the Marine Corps should consider using its relationship with Congress as a model for building enduring partnerships with other agencies as well.

There are also risks that come with being so deeply entrenched on the Hill, particularly as the nation grows increasingly divided politically. Historically, the Marine Corps has pursued a bipartisan approach. However, with the appointment of two retired Marine generals to key positions in the current administration, there is a perception that the Marine Corps has become too closely aligned with a particular politician or party. If the Marine Corps is perceived to be a partisan organization, it could alienate a sizable portion of the American public and their representatives on Capitol Hill. Marines should strive to protect the Service’s reputation for political disinterestedness and partisan impartiality.⁸¹

Conclusions

As illustrated by the examples outlined above, congressional oversight is a good thing for the Marine Corps. In the post–Vietnam War era, the Marine Corps benefited greatly from Congress pushing it to raise enlistment standards and redefine its strategic relevance. In fact, in some cases, such as expeditious discharge, it was Congress that gave the Corps the tools it needed to reform itself. Despite what the Service tells itself, the Marine Corps is highly resistant to change. It often took pressure from the Corps’ friends in Congress, along with concerned Marines and former Marines, to bring about change.

Most importantly, Marines would do well to remember that the Marine Corps’ political power, and by extension its ability to survive and thrive as an institution, has been a direct result of the value Marines placed on building and sustaining personal relationships. The Marine Corps’ relationship with the American people and their representatives in Congress is its political center of gravity. In a 1957 letter to then-Commandant Randolph M. Pate, General Krulak observed that the American people did not need a Marine Corps, but that they wanted one because they were convinced that Marines were upstand-

ing warriors and citizens who stood ready to respond quickly and effectively to national emergencies. However, he concluded his letter on a cautious note:

So long as the people are convinced that we can really do the three things I have mentioned—we are going to *have* a Marine Corps. I feel that is a certainty. And, likewise, should the people ever lose that conviction—as a result of our failure to meet their high—almost spiritual—standards, the Marine Corps will then quickly disappear.⁸²

Whether through inquiries, hearings, or provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress is how the Marine Corps knows whether or not it is meeting the standards of the American public to which Krulak referred and is sustaining that personal connection. Ultimately, congressional oversight and inquiries, while uncomfortable, are essential to the overall institutional well-being of the Marine Corps.

Notes

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3. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. Congress’s authority to provide oversight is derived from cl. 12: “To raise and support Armies”; cl. 13 “To provide and maintain a Navy”; and cl. 14: “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
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14. Furness, "Marines on Capitol Hill," 16.
15. Gen Louis H. Wilson (Ret), oral history interview with BGen Edwin H. Simmons, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1988, 93, hereafter Wilson oral history.
16. BGen Albert E. Brewster (Ret), "The Commandant of the Marine Corps and the JCS: Winning a Seat on the JCS," *Marine Corps Gazette* 92, no. 2 (March 2008): 58–66.
17. Wilson oral history, 17.
18. Krulak, *First to Fight*, 67.
19. Gen Robert E. Cushman Jr. (Ret), oral history interview with Benis M. Frank, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1984, 359–63. Cushman later described himself as somewhat surprised when "we all of a sudden had the bottom fall out." He attributed his successor's ability to preserve end strength and improve quality to Gen Wilson's close ties with Congress.
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21. Gen Robert H. Barrow (Ret), oral history interview with BGen Edwin H. Simmons, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1978–94, 648, hereafter Barrow oral history.
22. Bernard Weinraub, "Marine Corps Is Softening the Role of the Hard-Boiled Drill Instructor," *New York Times*, 11 May 1977.
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 38. Trainor, “The Personnel Campaign,” 22. Of the personnel campaign, Trainor wrote: “Few campaigns in Marine Corps history have been so difficult and critical. Few campaigns have been so dramatically marked by defeats and victories. In no other campaign was the future of our Corps so threatened.”
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59. Lopez, "The United States Marine Corps in the 1980s," 438.
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Winning the War and Winning the Peace Reconciling Occupation Law and the *Small Wars Manual*

Colonel Joseph A. Lore

Abstract: The *Small Wars Manual*, first published in 1940, documents hard lessons learned from the Marine Corps' involvement in small-scale conflicts during the first half of the twentieth century. Comprising the combined experience of a generation of Marine Corps leaders, the *Small Wars Manual* derives those lessons from Marine expeditions to places such as the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. While many of the principles contained in the *Small Wars Manual* chapter on military government remain relevant to current and future stability operations, the manual must be updated to ensure that planners and commanders meet the requirements of international law.

Keywords: military government; occupation law; Operation Iraqi Freedom; OIF; post-conflict operations; small-scale conflicts; *Small Wars Manual*; stability operations; tactics, techniques, and procedures; TTPs

Beginning on 20 March 2003, following four months of buildup and preparation in Kuwait, U.S. and British forces attacked Iraq, forcing Saddam Hussein's conventional forces from the battlefield. As more of the country fell, the Coalition killed, captured, or drove off the remnants

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of Hussein's government and Ba'ath party leadership, leaving Iraq in a political and administrative vacuum. Almost immediately, U.S. and British commanders faced the realities and responsibilities of military occupation. As Congressional Research Service national defense specialist Steve Bowman reported to Congress, "With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, Coalition forces were confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased."¹ The experience of commanders on the ground validated Bowman's assessment. The commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Conlin, noted upon entering Baghdad in April 2003: "In a blinding flash, we had become the local government, the utilities, the banks, the information bureau, the health care provider, the police, the court system, even the dogcatchers." For Lieutenant Colonel Conlin, sending in 1,000 servicemembers to control a dense population on measure with Manhattan Island seemed to be an overwhelming task, but one that had to be done because, as he said, "We were it."²

Experiences such as those of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in Baghdad are not a new dimension of warfare. In fact, by March 2003, the United States had amassed considerable experience with military occupations, the result of numerous expeditions to protect U.S. personnel and interests in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Moreover, an occupier's legal obligations were enumerated in several treaties and principles of international law. According to James Jay Carafano,

The military's role in post-conflict activities is limited but vital. . . . In any post-conflict operation, the United States will have moral and legal obligations to restore order, provide a safe and secure environment for the population, ensure that people are being fed, and prevent the spread of infectious disease. . . . Although the military should be in charge at the outset, even before the end of the conflict, they should work closely with allies, federal agencies, and nongovernmental agencies.³

Yet despite these well-established obligations, the Coalition forces lacked detailed planning guidance for Phase IV stability and support operations.⁴ Consequently, some leaders drew upon the lessons contained in the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* (Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication [FMFRP] 12-15).⁵

The manual, first published in 1940, presents hard lessons learned from the Marine Corps' involvement in small-scale conflicts during the first half of the twentieth century. Comprising the combined experience of a generation of Marine Corps leaders, the manual derives those lessons from Marine expeditions to places such as the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Domin-

ican Republic. This collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) helps commanders at the tactical level (primarily from the company through division levels) address a wide variety of issues, including the establishment and administration of military government during the course of an occupation.

This article will demonstrate that many of the principles contained in the manual's chapter 13 on military government remain relevant to current and future stability operations. However, the *Small Wars Manual* must be updated to ensure that tactical commanders meet the requirements of international law. Beginning with the enduring themes from chapter 13, the article will then consider the manual's TTPs in light of the commander's international treaty obligations.⁶ Finally, by using the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom to expose the tensions between occupation law and the American policies for promoting stability, this article will offer suggestions for supplementing the manual's chapter on military government.

Enduring Themes

The main themes of chapter 13 of the *Small Wars Manual* are twofold: the primacy of the military leader commanding a portion (or totality) of foreign territory and the importance of planning for occupation. Specifically, chapter 13 states that military government relates to the "powers, duties and needs" of an officer who intervenes in the affairs of a foreign country, under conditions requiring military control over the occupied area.⁷ According to the manual, the broad purpose of the occupation is to "maintain order and protect life and property in the immediate theater of military operations."⁸ The manual further defines *military government* as "the exercise of military jurisdiction by a military commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress, superseding as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law."⁹ As for planning, the *Small Wars Manual* strongly encourages commanders to create a separate and distinct civil affairs staff to develop detailed plans for administering the occupied territory, "thus avoiding the interference with the military functions of the usual staff sections," while still maintaining unity of effort.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, both themes are applicable today. As a number of scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations noted in an independent task force report, "The military on the ground represents the only capability to manage the impact of a leadership vacuum and head off a rapid spiral into lawlessness and human tragedy." Moreover, they acknowledged that there might be civilians who are talented or experienced, possibly more so than their military counterparts, but "the military always will have the main responsibility for establishing and maintaining public order, security, and emergency services in an immediate post-combat setting."¹¹ Scholars, observers, and officers agree that occupation

forces, by necessity, are the only ones to provide the “focal point” for the multifarious demands related to stability operations.¹²

In June 2017, the Department of Defense (DOD) revalidated these themes in *DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations*. Recognizing the role of military occupation in establishing order and advancing U.S. interests and values, this instruction broadly defines *stability operations* as “activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹³ Next, *DODI 3000.05* establishes stability operations as a core mission for U.S. forces, declaring “that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”¹⁴ Finally, *Stability Operations* authorizes occupation forces to carry out the immediate goals of stability, specifically by providing security, restoring or providing essential services, repairing critical infrastructure, and meeting humanitarian needs.¹⁵

Occupation Law

Notwithstanding the relevance of these themes to current and future stability operations, the *Small Wars Manual*'s definition of *military government* is premised upon sovereignty passing “into the hands of the commander of the occupying forces.”¹⁶ This vague definition and some of the follow-on text in the chapter are inconsistent with principles of international law and only superficially address the occupying power's authority, obligations, and limitations. The manual was written in a different era using operations from a time in American history when the United States and its military had a different relationship to other countries, especially with Latin America and the international community. It provides good tactical information, but on legal issues it lacks the modern perspective commanders need.

Notably, the *Small Wars Manual* does not explain why the commander's burdens are so formidable, or why Coalition leaders experienced such an overwhelming assortment of responsibilities following the collapse of Baghdad. There are three sources of the manual's deficiency. First, the manual did not incorporate the preexisting international law codified by the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention IV of 1907), specifically failing to alert commanders to the limitations on their authority or their legal obligations toward the civilian population. Rather, the *Small Wars Manual* advises commanders that “it is decidedly to the *military advantage* of the occupying forces to establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order, and as far as possible, *pacify the inhabitants*.”¹⁷ Although this may be true tactically and operationally, the manual's emphasis on military gov-

ernment as a means for achieving some greater strategic objective, rather than safeguarding the local population, directly conflicts with the legal principles of Hague Convention IV of 1907. Second, the manual was published before the creation of the United Nations and subsequent ratification of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV). Therefore, the manual could not feasibly address the commander's occupation duties pursuant to the treaties and the new principles of international law that emerged from World War II. Finally, given the date of publication, the *Small Wars Manual* could not address the importance of interagency operations in *nation building*, defined as the "use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy."¹⁸

Historically, the law of military occupation has been a component of the *law of war*. Per DODI 2311.01E, the law of war is that "part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities," encompassing "all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law."¹⁹ Accordingly, international law establishes when and how military occupations are conducted.²⁰ Occupation law's main objective is to address a society's humanitarian and penal law requirements during and immediately after combat operations while forces are in foreign territory.²¹ These laws "set forth a series of duties and obligations for the parties involved . . . to ensure minimal protection of the civilian population and favor the stabilization of security and living conditions in the territory under the control of invading forces."²² Thus, international law acknowledges that there is an aspect of military necessity regarding occupation, but it also reminds commanders that their forces cannot ignore the needs of those being occupied.

The definition of *occupation* has evolved during the past century. Section III of the Hague Regulations begins with a narrow definition of occupation and establishes the parameters for implementing and maintaining military authority in enemy territory. Specifically, Article 42 states that "territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."²³ As a matter of policy and international law, the U.S. Army's *The Law of Land Warfare* (Field Manual [FM] 27-10) adopted this definition verbatim.²⁴ Consequently, FM 27-10 defines occupation as "invasion plus taking firm possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it."²⁵ Occupation is a question of fact that "presupposes a hostile invasion, resisted or unresisted, as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its own authority, and that the invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded."²⁶ Land is considered occupied when the following three criteria are met: there is an international armed conflict, a foreign military

force has made an incursion into enemy territory, and this force exerts control over the population of the territory.²⁷

Common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention defines *international armed conflict* and presents the broadest view of occupation, omitting the need for hostilities and therefore applying the law “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory,” even if the invasion and subsequent occupation is unopposed.²⁸ Put another way, occupation is effective control by a state or international organization over the territory to which that power has no sovereign title, and without the consent of the government of that territory.²⁹ The *Small Wars Manual* is actually consistent with this view, noting that although “military government is designed principally to meet the conditions arising during a state of war,” it may also apply “where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated.”³⁰ Therefore, much like the Fourth Geneva Convention’s broader definition, the manual acknowledges that occupation may occur after hostilities, or as the result of threats of force, coercion, economic sanctions, or even by the invitation of a sovereign nation struggling to maintain order within its borders.

International law, unlike the manual, regards the occupier’s authority as “essentially provisional,” with no impact on the ultimate sovereignty of the occupied territory.³¹ Legally, the occupying power serves as a trustee with “only temporary managerial powers” for administering “the territory on behalf of the sovereign.”³² Occupation is, therefore, distinct from conquest or subjugation, which terminates sovereignty through annexation or via the terms of a peace treaty.³³

The distinction between occupation and subjugation or conquest is an important one, highlighting an underlying flaw in the current chapter 13 of the *Small Wars Manual*; namely, the premise that military occupation automatically equates to the transfer of sovereignty. As is discussed in more detail below, international law limits an occupier’s authority to restore and ensure public order and safety, permitting “tinkering on the edges of societal reform . . . not a license to reform.”³⁴ Therefore, occupation law is never the basis for changing the form of government in the occupied territory.

The disparity between the authority to tinker and the license to reform apparently results from the manual’s foundational experiences, mainly the invasions of such places as Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, where Marines defeated and displaced the existing governments and established new ones more favorable to U.S. foreign interests. In the early twentieth century, the United States emerged from the effects of the Civil War industrially and materially stronger with a larger population base. It was indeed a world power, but one new to the international scene. President Theodore Roosevelt wanted to use U.S. power, as would his successor President Howard Taft, in Latin

America. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine converted those desires into policy, as the United States acted aggressively in Spanish-speaking countries near North America during the first decades of the twentieth century. Such actions today would violate international law, specifically Article 2 of the UN Charter.³⁵ At the time, however, the Marines' actions to conquer and subject territory were more akin to the Allied acceptance of unconditional surrender by Germany at the end of World War II. Ironically, although some regard the postwar U.S. actions in Germany as a textbook example for military occupation, it was not.

The United States argued vehemently that occupation law, as codified by the Hague Regulations, should not apply to operations in Germany.³⁶ Specifically, the United States noted that Germany's force had been totally defeated, its national institutions had disintegrated, and that none of Germany's allies challenged the Allied occupation.³⁷ With the German state extinguished, the Allies were free to annex Germany, and more importantly, eradicate Nazism and implement the political reforms that were essential to stabilizing the country and the region.³⁸ Therefore, the Marines' actions in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had similar effects, essentially destroying the previous states and institutions, leaving no one to serve as sovereign when the Marines departed. Like the Allies in Germany at that point, the Marines had annexed those territories and were sovereign. Accordingly, occupation law no longer applied, and the Marines were free to change local law and implement the form of government that was consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals. In fact, without the creation of the circumstances that justified annexation under international law, specifically Hague Regulation 43, the United States would have limited authority to change the existing government structure in any of those countries.

In contrast, U.S. actions in postwar Japan were more consistent with the principles of occupation law. Although the United States initially planned to force Japan's unconditional surrender, Army General Douglas MacArthur moderated that position slightly, allowing the emperor and much of the Japanese political structure to remain intact. General MacArthur had several good strategic, operational, and tactical reasons for this approach, most notably the significant language and cultural barriers. Consequently, although the United States also enacted broad reforms in Japan's government, including a new constitution, General MacArthur used the remaining, nonmilitant civilian Japanese government as an intermediary.³⁹ MacArthur's actions, therefore, recognized the reforming nature of the existing (but displaced) sovereign government that would ultimately resume authority for Japan once the U.S. occupation ceased.

In any event, from a legal perspective, the motives for, and circumstances of, the occupation are irrelevant in assessing the commanders' responsibilities toward the populace.⁴⁰ The occupation must be actual (either at the request

of the sovereign or having overcome resistance) and effective (having taken measures to establish authority).⁴¹ Furthermore, authority can be established through a fixed presence or via mobile forces, as long as the occupying force “can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied district.”⁴²

Occupier’s Authority

Although international law contemplates only temporary military occupation, it confers significant powers and authority to the occupying power, so that in the absence of the displaced sovereign government, the occupying force may maintain order and administer the territory.⁴³ For instance, although Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires the occupying force to respect “the laws in force in the country,” the occupying force’s military and civilian personnel are ordinarily immune from the provisions of local law, unless the occupying commander states otherwise.⁴⁴ This immunity provision grants the occupying force great latitude to provide security, conduct raids, and destroy property as required by military necessity. It is not, however, an unlimited license to commit abuses or atrocities, since occupying personnel remain subject to their own criminal laws and liability systems. In fact, international law narrowly specifies the nature and extent of the occupier’s authority, because “the fundamental premise of occupation law has been to confine the occupying power to the humanitarian objectives that preserve the status quo, not to entitle the occupying power to transform the territory it holds.”⁴⁵ These authorizations “permit the occupying power to control or exert influence over almost every aspect of life within the territory,” enabling the commander to establish order and security, thereby protecting civilian inhabitants and preserving existing institutions.⁴⁶

Occupier’s Obligations

Once a commander exerts effective control over the territory and population, international law and U.S. law of war policy impose a wide range of obligations.⁴⁷ Often mistakenly characterized as “mission creep,” these obligations can quickly outpace the resources and capacity of a unit focused primarily on establishing security, so planners must staff and equip the occupation forces appropriately. At a minimum, planners and commanders must be prepared not only to restore and ensure public order and safety, but they must also have plans to provide employment opportunities for the population, as well as to maintain hospitals and public health services.⁴⁸

Occupier’s Limitations

In addition to these affirmative duties, occupation law defines a category of “protected persons” who are to be safeguarded during the course of the oc-

cupation. Article 4 of Geneva Convention (IV) on civilians defines *protected persons* as “persons. . . who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”⁴⁹ International law prohibits commanders from a variety of actions that would facilitate mission accomplishment, including forcing inhabitants to provide information about enemy forces or defenses; using mass punishments; and compelling protected persons to serve in the occupying force’s military or auxiliary forces.⁵⁰

Occupation and Nation Building

Although section two of chapter 13 of the *Small Wars Manual* does address some of the commander’s authority, including the ability to censor the media and newspaper and regulate commerce, it does not address the obligations or limitations that international law imposes upon the military governor. For example, the manual fails to inform commanders about their affirmative duties to restore and maintain public order; respect family honor, life, or religious practices; provide for the educational and developmental needs of children; maintain hospitals and public health; or ensure the public’s access to food and medicine. While many of these things are tactically sound, commonsense considerations for establishing and maintaining stability, they are not mentioned in the *Small Wars Manual*. Given that these are treaty obligations, they should be specified in the manual to help commanders prioritize their efforts and meet these requirements.

Next, consider how the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrated the tensions between the law of occupation and principles of nation building. Specifically, the Coalition operation that was premised on Saddam Hussein’s repeated defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions and Coalition concerns about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction production and delivery capabilities. The operation was “intended to be a transformational process following liberation from a despotic and criminal regime.”⁵¹ The United States’ “stated purpose was ‘regime removal,’ not regime change. [This] reflected a crucial distinction about the basic understanding of the purpose of the war and the limits of military operations . . . [and] suggested that removing Saddam and his lieutenants was a sufficient goal.”⁵² Interestingly, despite all of the rhetoric about Coalition forces entering Iraq as “liberators, not occupiers,” on 22 May 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483, noting the United States’ and UK’s acknowledgment of the “specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command.”⁵³

As discussed above, however, occupation law “trusteeship” is broad in scope, focused on the preservation of existing systems. Therefore, “promoting

the welfare of the Iraqi people, though laudable, is a goal that [could not] be guided by occupation law alone, regardless of how liberally it may be construed. To pull Iraq out of its perceived repressive past and return it to the community of civilized nations,” the Coalition had to use international human rights law, principles of democratization, and economic incentives to promote domestic security.⁵⁴ Recognizing these challenges, the Security Council invoked the use of force provisions contained in chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Specifically, the Security Council directed the Coalition to develop an interim Iraqi administration focused on promoting “the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards restoration of conditions of security and stability and *the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.*”⁵⁵ Therefore, on the one hand, the Coalition acknowledged its obligations under occupation law, while on the other hand, the “[Security] Council specified additional obligations not required by occupation law, but in doing so invited the [Coalition] to act beyond some of the barriers that occupation law would otherwise impose.”⁵⁶ Under this broader mandate, the Coalition was not only responsible for setting the conditions for Iraqi self-determination, but also for protecting hospitals, schools, power plants, oil facilities, nuclear facilities, and government buildings, and establishing and maintaining public order and safety.⁵⁷

Conclusion

Coalition experience following Saddam Hussein’s defeat in April 2003 demonstrates that chapter 13’s enduring themes are as relevant today as they were when the *Small Wars Manual* was published.

Warfighting has two important dimensions: winning the war and winning the peace. The United States excels at the first. But without an equal commitment to stability and reconstruction, combat victories can be lost. The military’s bravery, dedication, and skill is unsurpassed, but it must have the institutional and resource support from the U.S. government to succeed in securing the peace. The immediate post-combat phase of war requires a shift in rules of engagement, doctrines, skills, techniques, and perspective appropriate to the mission. Troops are expected to shift from destroying the enemy to engaging the populace, whether monitoring ceasefires, helping maintain public security where local institutions are lacking, or maintaining basic services and infrastructure. In Afghanistan and Iraq, where there is active armed resistance, these tasks require military forces to shift back and forth from combat to stability operations on a moment’s notice or conduct both simultaneously.⁵⁸

In fact, as Rand’s James Dobbins confirmed regarding the Baghdad experience, stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq seemed to be an inevitable consequence of the war. He suggested that the United States invest in the conflict

and post-conflict outcomes to win the war and create conditions for a better, more stable Iraq. For Americans, of course, the natural vehicle to do so included embedding democratic institutions in the new Iraq.⁵⁹ Thus, the *Small Wars Manual* should reflect a paradigm shift, specifically noting that while the military force may be the “first responder,” providing the secure operating environment for other government agencies as well as various humanitarian and nongovernmental agencies, ultimately a coordinated, interagency approach is required for lasting stability and success.⁶⁰

Furthermore, as recent history demonstrates, the United States will engage in more stability and reconstruction operations in the near future, as we seek to reduce the number of failed states that serve as sanctuaries for transnational terrorists. If the *Small Wars Manual* is to remain a useful and informative tool for tactical commanders contending with the challenges of military occupations, it should accurately articulate the obligations and limitations imposed by international law. By embracing the rules and incorporating them into the manual, we will provide guidance that is more accurate to our commanders, protect the rights of the indigenous population, enhance cooperation with potential Coalition partners, and ultimately increase the legitimacy of our operations, both locally and internationally.

Notes

1. Steve Bowman, *Iraq: U.S. Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 4.
2. Christopher C. Conlin, “What Do You Do for an Encore?,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 88, no. 9 (September 2004): 74.
3. James Jay Carafano, *After Iraq: Learning the War’s Lessons*, Backgrounder no. 1664 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2003), 8.
4. Thomas Donnelly, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2004), 46.
5. Conlin, “What Do You Do for an Encore?,” 79.
6. This examination, however, will not address domestic military occupation and the application of martial law within the United States, related topics that are briefly noted in chapter 13 of the *Small Wars Manual*. Specifically, this paper will examine Articles 42–56 of Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereafter Hague Regulations), and Articles 47–78 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter Geneva Convention IV), as well as the legal principles contained in *The Law of Land Warfare*, FM 27-10 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956).
7. *Small Wars Manual*, FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1940), 13-1-1.
8. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-3-2.
9. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-1-1.
10. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-8-6.
11. Samuel R. Berger, Brent Scowcroft, and William L. Nash, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 13.

12. Carafano, *After Iraq*, 8.
13. *DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations, Incorporating Change 1* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 29 June 2017), 1.
14. *DODI 3000.05*, 2.
15. *DODI 3000.05*, 2.
16. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-3-2.
17. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-3-2, emphasis added.
18. James Dobbins, "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower," *Rand Review* 27, no. 2 (Summer 2003); see also *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), which addresses international law considerations in the context of occupation in a counterinsurgency in appendix D. The *Small Wars Manual* could adopt the language from the appendix as a starting point to address occupation law in a broader context for occupations that do—and do not—involve the existence of an insurgency.
19. David B. Rivkin Jr. and Darin R. Bartram, "Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace," *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2003): 87; and *Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 9 May 2006), 2.
20. Rivkin and Bartram, "Military Occupation," 87.
21. David J. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," *American Journal of International Law* 97, no. 4 (2003): 845, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3133684>.
22. *Military Occupation of Iraq: I. Application of IHL and the Maintenance of Law and Order* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003).
23. Hague Regulations, Article 42.
24. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 138.
25. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 138.
26. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 139.
27. *Military Occupation of Iraq*.
28. Article 2, Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Treaties and other International Acts Series 3365). Article 2 states: "In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."
29. Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4.
30. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-1-1.
31. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 138.
32. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 6.
33. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 138.
34. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 845.
35. Article 2 (4), United Nations Charter, 1945. Absent a demonstration of defense of U.S. nationals or property interests under Article 51 of the UN Charter or a Security Council Resolution specifically authorizing the use of force under Article 43 of the charter, such actions today would constitute unlawful aggression.
36. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 91.
37. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 92.
38. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 92.
39. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 93.
40. *Military Occupation of Iraq*.
41. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 139.
42. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 139.

43. Col Lyle W. Cayce, "Liberation or Occupation? How Failure to Apply Occupation Law During Operation Iraqi Freedom Threatened U.S. Strategic Interests" (unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 3.
44. Hague Regulations, Article 43; and *The Law of Land Warfare*, 143.
45. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 845. See also *The Law of Land Warfare*, sections 368, 375–78; Hague Regulations, Articles 43, 53, and 54; and Geneva Convention Articles 51, 54, and 64, which authorize commanders to establish military, civilian, or mixed military/civilian administrations to manage the territory; to raise taxes to fund the reasonable costs of the occupation; to enact and enforce criminal laws; to establish courts; and even to censor the press and all forms of media.
46. Cayce, "Liberation or Occupation?," 5.
47. *DODD 2311.01E*.
48. Additional obligations include preserving existing local laws, facilitating relief and religious organization access to the population, and supporting childcare and education facilities for children.
49. Geneva Convention (IV), Article 4.
50. Hague Regulations, Articles 44, 50; Geneva Convention (IV), Articles 31, 33, 51; and *The Law of Land Warfare*, 154, 164.
51. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 843.
52. Donnelly, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 40.
53. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483, 4761st meeting (22 May 2003), 2.
54. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 843.
55. UNSCR 1483, 2, emphasis added.
56. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 845.
57. Scheffer, "Beyond Occupation Law," 847.
58. Berger, Scowcroft, and Nash, *In the Wake of War*, 13.
59. Dobbins, "Nation-Building," 13.
60. *DODI 3000.05*, 2.

Applying Rapid Acquisition Policy Lessons for Defense Innovation

Jonathan Wong

Abstract: With the Department of Defense's (DOD) recent focus on importing Silicon Valley-style innovation practices to its acquisition process, it is important to assess an organization's ability to effectively merge new concepts and practices with the existing acquisition system. This article examines applicable lessons from the DOD's rapid acquisition practices during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, which functioned counter to many conventional acquisition processes. This research finds that DOD can incorporate innovation practices by dispersing organizations focused on new capabilities development across the agency to avoid direct competition with the existing acquisition system, allowing them to refocus and adapt often, and by ensuring senior leader championship of these efforts.

Keywords: defense acquisition, defense procurement, rapid acquisition, defense innovation, program management, organizational culture, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, acquisition processes, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, DIUx, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO, Rapid Equipping Force, REF

Silicon Valley-style innovation is a hot topic in the Department of Defense (DOD). For the past three years, its leaders have been speaking about it, writing about it, and setting up new organizations to harness

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it.¹ This focus is motivated by several factors, including a desire to capitalize on the high-profile successes of technology firms in Silicon Valley that are synonymous with cutting-edge solutions; the need to respond to the diminishing technological gap between the United States and potential adversaries; and the Pentagon's perennial desire to continuously modernize its weapons.²

Harnessing the ingenuity of the nation's foremost creative minds for defense is a fine goal. However, the kind of disruptive innovation from which Pentagon policy makers seek to benefit runs counter to existing U.S. defense acquisition processes and practices established during the past 50 years. The bureaucracy that administers the defense acquisition systems is deliberative, risk averse, and governed by extensive regulations. This is intentional; the conservative attitude stems from an institutional instinct for fair competition and good stewardship of taxpayer dollars.³ This conservative approach is just as necessary to procuring the tools of national defense as experimental moonshots are. The challenge for DOD, then, is to join the conventional system and the innovation efforts such that they work harmoniously toward one goal: increasing military effectiveness.

Learning from the recent past will be useful. The DOD's experience with rapid acquisition policies during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars contain striking similarities to the present situation. Like today's initiatives, rapid acquisition operated in contrast to the conventional system. Its goal was to procure urgently needed equipment for deployed troops as fast as possible by eschewing the full acquisition process.⁴ Examining those policies can yield useful insights in crafting innovation policies and organizations that can function smoothly alongside the conventional system. Additionally, examining the contextual factors that influenced rapid acquisition development and implementation will identify which of those insights remain relevant.

This article begins by examining DOD's rapid acquisition policies and how they evolved over the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It then examines external factors that affected rapid acquisition policy development. It concludes by identifying lessons that are applicable to facilitating productive coexistence between DOD's current innovation initiatives and its conventional acquisition system.

Trends in Rapid Acquisition Policy

Rapid acquisition is akin to thrashing a shortcut through a trail switchback; it gets the job done faster, but it is not suitable for regular, sustained use. It is a way to identify equipment needs from forces in the field and fill those needs with whatever combination of commercial off-the-shelf and developmental items are quickest. Maintenance plans are not considered and the gear is often

not ideal for use in every environment or situation. Rapid acquisition is purely a temporary solution, but it was used extensively to good effect during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

An examination of the policies themselves is necessary to understand how rapid acquisition can inform innovation efforts. Twenty-seven policy documents covering all seven of the DOD's rapid acquisition policies between 2002 and 2012 were reviewed to find common features.⁵ These were supplemented by interviews with Service and Joint personnel responsible for administering the policies, as well as select interviews with senior leaders about their perspectives on rapid acquisition.⁶

This analysis showed that policies changed over time to accommodate the capability gaps identified during the bloodiest days of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Rapid acquisition existed prior to these conflicts, but policies were much more modest then. When American forces began operations in Afghanistan in 2002, there were three rapid acquisition policies. The U.S. Army policy consisted of three paragraphs.⁷ The U.S. Navy and Air Force policies were longer, but still provided only vague guidance. All three policies described a process with limited scope. They did not prohibit solutions that required further development, but generally assumed that only commercially available equipment would be acquired. The policies provided little guidance on the origination of funding. All three stipulated time limits for each solution. These policies were generally discouraging for any enterprising officer with a procurement need who might stumble across them.

These scant policies were insufficient to address the numerous equipment gaps revealed during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They were not detailed enough to be implemented regularly. Commercial off-the-shelf equipment did not meet all the needs being identified. In Iraq especially, the increasing lethality of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was a problem that had no commercial solution. Technology development was required.⁸ Rapid acquisition policies prior to 11 September 2001 were simply not up to the task of regulating the Pentagon's expanding need for new gear delivered quickly to troops in the field.

The DOD adapted by issuing newer and more complete policies. Existing policies were clarified and lengthened. Services that did not have rapid acquisition policies developed them, and a Joint policy was added. Lastly, two specific organizations that combined special policies, authorities, and budgets were organized: the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)—now the Joint Improvised-Threat Defense Organization (JIDO)—and the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF). Table 1 shows the progression of policies and their revisions.

Table 1. DOD rapid acquisition policies

Organization	Policy
Joint	<p>Department of the Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) Memo, "Meeting the Immediate Warfighter Needs" (3 September 2004)</p> <p>Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Memo, "Meeting the Immediate Warfighter Needs" (10 September 2004)</p> <p>DEPSECDEF Memo, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat" (27 June 2005)</p> <p><i>DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.19, Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat (27 June 2005)</i></p> <p><i>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution (15 July 2005)</i></p> <p><i>DODD 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (14 February 2006)</i></p> <p><i>DODD 5000.71, Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs (24 August 2012)</i></p>
Army	<p><i>Army Regulation (AR) 71-9, Materiel Requirements (30 April 1997)</i></p> <p>Col Robert A. Lovett, USA, "Rapid Equipping Force Streamlined Acquisition Process" (27 October 2005)</p> <p><i>AR 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination (28 December 2009)</i></p>
Navy	<p><i>Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.2B, Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information Technology Acquisition Programs (6 December 1996)</i></p> <p><i>SECNAVINST 5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (19 November 2004)</i></p> <p><i>SECNAV Notice 5000, Rapid Development and Deployment Response to Urgent Global War on Terrorism Needs (8 March 2007)</i></p> <p><i>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 4000, Navy Urgent Needs Process Implementation (26 July 2007)</i></p> <p><i>SECNAVINST 5000.2D, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (16 October 2008)</i></p> <p><i>SECNAVINST 5000.2E, Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (1 September 2011)</i></p>
Air Force	<p><i>Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-114, Rapid Response Process (5 May 1994)</i></p> <p><i>AFI 63-114, Rapid Response Process (12 June 2008)</i></p> <p><i>AFI 63-114, Quick Reaction Capability Process (4 January 2011)</i></p>

Marine Corps	<p><i>Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 533/03, OIF II Urgent Universal Need Statement (UNS) Process (21 November 2003)</i></p> <p><i>MARADMIN 424/04, OIF III Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) Process (28 September 2004)</i></p> <p><i>MARADMIN 045/06, Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) Process (26 January 2006)</i></p> <p><i>Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS) (17 October 2008)</i></p>
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By 2012, the rapid acquisition enterprise consisted of a network of policies and implementing organizations across the military Services and the Joint establishment. While there was no central direction coordinating these policies, three general trends are observable.

Rapid Acquisition for Wider Applications

First, the policies accommodated a wider range of applications over time. For instance, language in prewar policies implied that rapid acquisition should be confined to acquiring equipment that already existed (either in the commercial world or in another military Service) and did not require further research and development. The 1997 Army policy emphasized that the process should “not [be used] for development and/or procurement of a system for which there is another valid, approved requirements document.”⁹ Early policies also confined themselves to equipment that could be fielded within a relatively short timeframe from request. These times ranged from 120 days (Army) to 270 days (Navy). The effect of these stipulations was to confine rapid acquisition to a limited range of equipment that was ready to be fielded without further development or modification.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed a need for increasingly novel solutions. In response, rapid acquisition policies shed the elements that proscribed or discouraged new technology development. The 2009 revision of the Army policy made no mention of a prescribed timeline. New organizations, such as JIEDDO and the REF, included robust developmental lines of effort. Language in the Army, Navy, and Air Force policies eliminated implicit preferences for nondevelopmental equipment within two revision cycles. The demands of the wars compelled rapid acquisition policy makers to open those policies to accommodate more flexible ways of responding to operational needs.

Leadership over Process

Second, the policies evolved to overcome bureaucratic choke points by directly involving senior acquisition leaders in the decision-making process. These

bureaucratic roadblocks stemmed from the risk-averse preferences inherent to the conventional acquisition system. Prewar rapid acquisition policies truncated the incremental steps used in the conventional acquisition process to ensure judicious use of procurement funding. This exposed the DOD to the risk of making a bad investment in unproven technology or poorly developed systems. That risk was mitigated in prewar rapid acquisition policies by restricting their use to equipment that was already fully developed. However, confining risky rapid acquisition efforts to commercial items was not sufficient for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To adapt, rapid acquisition policies involved senior acquisition leaders directly in the decision-making process, substituting their judgment for bureaucratic processes. Three-star general officers (O-9) were required for approval of rapid acquisition programs in most Services. Several policies also stipulated that Service chiefs or other senior civilian authorities (e.g., Service acquisition executives) be kept apprised of program progress. By involving senior leaders so directly in the decision-making process, the rapid acquisition enterprise transferred the risk of making a bad investment from a bureaucratic process that diluted immediate operational utility for the sake of long-term value to organizational leaders who valued immediate utility.

A Self-disciplining System

Last (and most interesting), rapid acquisition seemed to develop—unplanned—a set of checks and balances. Rapid acquisition policy pathways were generally not funded. Programs had to identify funding from other sources (known as *reprogramming*), which were generally other programs that would be delayed while the rapid acquisition program gaining the funds proceeded. Only the REF and the JIEDDO were given regular, dedicated funding in the procurement budget. All other comers had to hunt for their money.

The lack of dedicated funding disciplined the rapid acquisition processes. Rapid acquisition program officers had to be entrepreneurial in identifying funding sources and gaining enough stakeholder buy-in to ensure funds were reprogrammed to their needs.¹⁰ This served as a screening function that prevented programs that were wasteful or not cost-effective from proceeding. Indeed, the ready availability of dedicated money for JIEDDO products opened it up to accusations that it was being wasteful.¹¹

These trends suggest that DOD rapid acquisition policies balanced the competing needs for speed and responsiveness with oversight and probity through a clever ecosystem of regulatory mechanisms. Rapid acquisition grew to encompass a wider range of applications during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. To maintain its emphasis on speed, though, rapid ac-

quisition substituted strict policies for a loose set of informal screens that relied more on the holistic judgment of senior leaders, specific needs, and funding constraints to minimize bad investments.

These checks and balances were not written in policy, but they were remarkably effective. While the three trends noted in this research do not explicitly point toward the need to balance speed with accountability, the effect was the same nonetheless, supporting the development and fielding of a variety of innovative and useful systems. Some examples include:

- AN/PRC-117G tactical radios, which gave troops in the field the ability to form ad hoc mobile networks to transmit and receive data
- Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems, which were a series of iteratively better IED jammers that eventually rendered enemy remotely detonated IEDs useless
- Palantir intelligence analysis software, which provided intelligence analysts with a powerful tool to sift through large amounts of information to look for patterns and trends

External Factors in Rapid Acquisition Success

It is not enough to copy the best rapid acquisition policy attributes for successful defense innovation policies. Political, operational, and tactical factors influenced their development, and some of these factors may not hold true in the future—some definitely not so. In any case, it is important to examine them as well, to understand the extent to which rapid acquisition lessons can apply to defense technology development programs.

Wartime Feedback

It was easy to discover whether a rapid acquisition program was successful or not because equipment was being used immediately in combat. Feedback from the field was often fast and plentiful. This allowed stakeholders to quickly drop programs that were not effective against the enemy and to incrementally improve programs that showed promise. Such immediate feedback may not be the case for defense innovation efforts today or in the future.

The case of IED jammer procurement illustrates how important immediate feedback was to the way rapid acquisition worked. Improvised explosive devices planted by Iraqi insurgents were maiming and killing hundreds (and later, thousands) of U.S. troops almost as soon as the conventional phase of the war ended in spring 2003. The most sophisticated of these were remotely detonated using cell phones, long-range cordless telephones, and other wireless

devices. Electronic jammers to disrupt these IEDs existed in the U.S. inventory, but they were large and unwieldy devices meant to be used by aircraft to provide electronic jamming for large naval and aerial formations.¹²

One jammer (called Acorn) had potential, though. Originally a Navy program developed in the 1980s to provide electronic protection to docked ships, it was rewired by Army scientists in 2003 to jam one type of remotely detonated IED.¹³ Acorn was not perfect; insurgents merely had to change the frequencies on their detonators to prevent interference. It also jammed U.S. communications equipment. Nevertheless, it was a promising start.

Improvements were necessary. To begin, DOD used new rapid acquisition authorities granted by Congress in 2004 to start JIEDDO. During the next five years, JIEDDO spent almost \$17 billion to develop more than 15 types of jammers.¹⁴ Jammers were fielded quickly to troops, and feedback was collected and used to influence the design of the next iteration. Some types of jammers were fielded in parallel to test different concepts. By 2009, jammer technology had advanced to the point where insurgents were giving up on remote detonation and returning to IEDs that used wires for detonation.¹⁵

Compared to conventional acquisition programs, the IED jammer was a success story. A seemingly intractable problem was solved using a combination of American technological prowess and focus, unencumbered by the conventional procurement bureaucracy. That success, however, owes as much to the ability to get quick feedback from the field as it does to the rapid acquisition policies that enabled JIEDDO. If these jammers were not pitted against thinking and adaptive adversaries from the outset, it is unlikely that the technology would have been developed as quickly as it was.

Evolutionary versus Revolutionary Solutions

Another unfortunate aspect of rapid acquisition policy is that it is not concerned with finding innovative solutions. Rather, it is a reactive process. The enemy finds a U.S. weakness and exploits it. Troops respond by identifying the gap and suggesting a solution. The rapid acquisition process begins there. This bottom-up process is a virtue because it involves troops more deeply throughout the development, fielding, and feedback process, unlike the conventional acquisition system.

However, fulfilling the immediate needs of troops in the field can bias the process toward evolutionary or incremental solutions that can be implemented quickly, rather than the leap-ahead, revolutionary solutions that are the hallmarks of defense innovation. Troops are interested in solving immediate problems and may not be focused on new concepts, employment methods, and technologies. Cutting-edge and clever gear can be developed through rapid acquisition, but not deliberatively.

The IED jammer again provides an excellent example. The most sophisticated jammers today (the Army's Duke series CREW systems) are very effective at stopping IED detonation signals, but they have very little functionality beyond that. The Duke system cannot direction find, spoof, or execute any other electronic warfare task. As a result, the Army had to invest in other electronic warfare projects to supplement Duke's single focus on jamming IED detonation signals.¹⁶ This does not detract from Duke's technological sophistication or achievements, but it does highlight the fact that Duke and other jammers were made for limited, discrete purposes.

Note that the bottom-up rapid acquisition process does not inherently hinder innovation. These processes and policies, however, depend on the creativity of the troops initiating the rapid acquisition process. In some cases, revolutionary advances do occur. The case of the AN/PRC-117G tactical radio is illustrative.¹⁷ Unlike previous radios, AN/PRC-117Gs can be used to construct data networks that enable troops to have wifi-like capabilities in the field, allowing them to access video feeds, files, and even the military's classified networks. The DOD had been attempting to develop this capability through its conventional acquisition process since 1997. By 2009, the program (Joint Tactical Radio System, or JTRS) was still grappling with numerous development obstacles, delaying completion and fielding. In the meantime, a private company, Harris Corporation, foresaw that DOD would have development problems with JTRS and decided to invest resources in creating a networkable radio that was not as sophisticated as JTRS but was a step above radios already in use.

The result was the AN/PRC-117G. It could not host as many network nodes as the JTRS radio and was less elegantly designed, but it was available when Marines in Afghanistan sought a networkable radio for checkpoints. The Marines were conducting biometric screening on Afghans entering the checkpoint, but because they lacked network connectivity, they could not check their biometric databases in real time. Harris made sure the Marines knew about the AN/PRC-117G, and when development was complete, the Marines requested it via rapid acquisition processes. Although the radio was not as sophisticated as the planned JTRS radio, mobile network connectivity significantly enhanced the troops' ability to maintain connectivity during operations.

The bottom-up process was the right approach for wartime rapid acquisition. The focus on troops' immediate needs at the expense of other goals (e.g., greater technological sophistication, added functionality, etc.) enabled the speedy delivery of needed equipment to troops in the field. The drawback to emphasizing bottom-up solutions is that it also must be depended on for revolutionary and experimental solutions, and as has been discussed earlier, troops are focused on immediate needs, not looking ahead to the challenges of tomorrow or those of other operating environments. While it is always possible

for this process to spark an innovative solution with long-term viability, policies designed more specifically to generate revolutionary ideas and concepts are preferable.

War's Motivating Effects

The fact that the United States was fighting a war that consumed American lives, limbs, and treasure dampened bureaucratic resistance to rapid acquisition. Rapid acquisition's relatively fast-and-loose rules ran counter to the DOD acquisition community's cautious instincts, born of a desire to judiciously spend taxpayer dollars, so there was resistance to some rapid acquisition programs. One example is the Palantir intelligence analysis software, which was adopted by the Marine Corps Special Operations Command and other intelligence organizations, but not by the Army.¹⁸ The Army preferred to continue developing the Distributed Common Ground System—Army (DCGS-A), which was being procured through the conventional process. Despite Palantir being preferred by Army intelligence analysts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army backed DCGS-A. It clashed with Congress about Palantir, and litigation about Palantir's future with the Army continues. With the end of large-scale combat operations and the resulting emphasis on rapid acquisition, institutional resistance such as that faced by Palantir will likely increase.


The end of high-profile campaigns also signals the end of devoted senior leader attention to rapid acquisition, which was a critical element of rapid acquisition success. Senior leaders instilled a sense of urgency and purpose across the DOD by their explicit support of rapid acquisition. They also involved themselves in the process. Both a former secretary of defense and a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated emphatically that approving and championing rapid acquisition programs was a priority for them because of the impact the programs would have on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. If rapid acquisition policies and practices form the basis of policies that facilitate defense innovation, then those policies must also retain the attention of senior leaders that can support them and highlight their importance. This was the case with Ashton B. Carter, the former secretary of defense, but the turnover of the new administration means that proponents of such efforts will need to make the case anew.

Lastly, wartime supplemental funds also dampened institutional resistance. Although, as noted above, the lack of dedicated funding sources for rapid acquisition disciplined the process, the easy availability of supplemental funding made it simple for worthwhile endeavors to find funding. An analysis of supplemental funding requests from fiscal years (FY) 2002–12 shows that, after 2004, supplemental funding provided a significant and consistent source of the DOD's overall procurement budget (figure 1). Essentially, the size of the budgetary pie

increased, making it easier for rapid acquisition programs to avoid directly competing with the conventional acquisition system on the basis of limited funds.

In some cases, wartime supplemental funding was directly responsible for the success of a rapid acquisition program. The mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle is a telling example. The MRAP was a heavily armored vehicle more effective at protecting its occupants from IED blasts than existing vehicles, such as the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMVW, or Humvee).¹⁹ In 2005, Marines in Iraq requested MRAPs through that Service's rapid acquisition process. However, the MRAP was not a very good all-around vehicle and did not fit into the Army or Marine Corps plans for vehicle modernization. Exchanging the thousands of HMMVWs and trucks in Iraq for MRAPs and establishing logistics support for a new vehicle was also an expensive proposition. The original request was initially rejected by the Marine Corps for these reasons. It took the direct intervention of the secretary of defense and the emergency allocation of \$50.7 billion by Congress to overcome the Corps' institutional resistance to the vehicle. Ultimately, more than 23,000 vehicles were fielded, reducing potential casualties by an estimated 50 percent.²⁰

Figure 1. Procurement budget requests (FY 2002–12)



Source: Author's analysis of DOD procurement and supplemental budget documents.

Rapid Acquisition's Coexistence

The internal policy and exogenous factors identified here show that rapid acquisition managed to coexist with the conventional acquisition system by avoiding competition with it. Rapid acquisition was small; it was governed by a dispersed array of policies in the military Services and across DOD. It did not exist as a single coherent organization that could be a bureaucratic target. Furthermore, by relying on reprogramming and supplemental funds, it did not directly compete with the existing procurement budget. The total amount spent on rapid acquisition between fiscal years 2002–12 is estimated to be \$103 billion.²¹ Of that amount, \$72.7 billion was definitely spent on the two biggest (and arguably most controversial) programs, the MRAP and JIEDDO efforts. All other rapid acquisition efforts spent between \$13.3 billion and \$30.3 billion during the 10-year period and across scores of rapid acquisition programs. By remaining small, dispersed, and obscure (except for MRAP and JIEDDO), rapid acquisition avoided direct confrontation with the conventional acquisition system in the most vital and bloody of all bureaucratic struggles: the federal budget process.

The relatively small amount spent on rapid acquisition also points to its relatively modest goals. Although rapid acquisition policies became more generalized, they were still geared toward solving small and discrete tactical problems. Rapid acquisition policies emphasized bottom-up input, particularly from troops in the field, often resulting in evolutionary solutions rather than revolutionary ones. While there were exceptions—Palantir and AN/PRC-117G were significant technological advances, despite their origins as rapid acquisition programs—most programs were meant to address limited problems. Again, this helped prevent rapid acquisition from directly competing with the more sophisticated and cutting-edge programs that the conventional system was attempting to develop and procure.

When competition could not be avoided, though, senior leader support was necessary to sustain a rapid acquisition program. The two largest and most prominent programs, MRAP and JIEDDO, were very controversial. The MRAP was seen as a threat to existing tactical vehicle programs, while JIEDDO was considered to be an expensive program with mixed results. In both cases, senior leaders' attention was necessary to sustain them. Both programs encountered institutional resistance due to their size and prominence and required intervention by senior leaders to prevail. As mentioned above, MRAP required direct intervention by the secretary of defense and Congress.

Toward an Innovation Policy Framework

Some aspects of rapid acquisition will not be relevant to the success of defense innovation initiatives going forward. They cannot rely on budget re-

programming or supplemental funding, for instance. Bottom-up input will be important, but it cannot drive development by itself. There are not scores of American troops dying in distant battlefields to spur the defense bureaucracy to greater efforts.

Still, there are aspects of rapid acquisition that are applicable. For instance, the dispersal of innovation initiatives and a willingness to quickly change and adapt policies and organizations to operational environments is relevant. If advanced technology development efforts remain small and dispersed across the DOD, as was the case in rapid acquisition, they may avoid competing with the conventional system for resources. DOD actors, such as the well-funded Strategic Capabilities Office and the chief innovation officer, reporting directly to the secretary of defense, should take care to ensure that these organizations do not become mired in bureaucratic battles with the existing acquisition system.

A willingness to change and adapt innovation policies and modify organizations will also be helpful. Rapid acquisition policies expanded dramatically because they were forced to do so by circumstances. Innovation initiatives will also face rapidly changing environments, as different technologies develop at different times or in ways that cannot be foreseen. Defense leaders should be prepared and proactive in ensuring that policies and organizations facilitate breakthrough developments, rather than serving as constraints that must be overcome. The recent reorganization of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) is a promising sign that the DOD is willing to focus on results rather than process. The DOD should continue to remain open to similar moves.

The most important lesson to learn from the rapid acquisition experience is the critical need for senior leaders' attention. The scope and ambition of DOD's efforts to take advantage of civilian technology development by circumventing normal bureaucratic processes will likely bring them into direct competition with the conventional acquisition system. Unlike rapid acquisition, these efforts are meant to be revolutionary. A significant portion of innovation efforts today are concentrated on developing technologies that will form the basis for a third offset of military capabilities.²² Given the scope of previous offsets, the third offset is also likely to be a significant endeavor.²³ Perhaps some differentiation is possible to avoid friction with the conventional acquisition system, but the scope of DOD's efforts are large enough to engender competition. Indeed, DOD's current efforts have already run afoul with some congressional stakeholders.²⁴

To address this, senior leaders need to be active champions of innovation initiatives. This was an essential factor in successful rapid acquisition programs, particularly high-profile ones such as MRAP and JIEDDO. Senior leaders provided the strategic focus and direction that mitigated most of the institutional

resistance that both programs encountered. However, the MRAP was developed and JIEDDO operated during the height of the Iraq War, when casualties were mounting and leaders were focused on addressing the IED problem.

This may not be the case for future defense innovation initiatives. Although Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis appears to support his predecessor's initiatives in this area, he has not championed them to the degree that former Secretary of Defense Carter did. Without the level of support, drive, and motivation necessary to ensure their survival and success, innovation initiatives may fade into irrelevance, or come into conflict with the conventional acquisition system. This is an obvious but essential challenge that organizations will need to consider.

Notes

1. Defense leaders for the past three years have been particularly prolific in their speeches and writings about the role of Silicon Valley-style innovation in defense. Some organizations that have been set up recently to focus on defense innovation include the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), and organizations specific to the military Services like the U.S. Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). See, for example, Chuck Hagel, "Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote" (speech, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, 15 November 2014); Ash Carter, "Drell Lecture: Rewiring the Pentagon: Charting a New Path on Innovation and Cybersecurity" (speech, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 23 April 2015); and Robert Hummel and Kathryn Schiller Wurster, "Department of Defense's Innovation Experiment," *Science, Technology, Engineering, and Policy Studies*, no. 4 (July 2016): 12–21.
2. These issues are common themes highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter. His speech announcing the opening of the DIUx in Boston is typical. See Ash Carter, "Remarks on Opening DIUx East and Announcing the Defense Innovation Board" (speech, Cambridge, MA, 26 July 2016).
3. How effective those regulations are in achieving this goal is questionable at best.
4. For a general description of rapid acquisition policy methods and goals, see *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009).
5. The high number of revisions across the policy documents suggests that DOD was revising the documents based on increasing usage. Examining policy items that were added, omitted, or retained over time can be particularly important in understanding what policy tools worked and which did not. Documents are available on the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website, as well as by request to the staff of the secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ).
6. The interviews were conducted with a former Service secretary; a former under secretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a former secretary of defense.
7. *AR 71-9, Materiel Requirements, 30 April 1997* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997).
8. For an excellent description of DOD's struggles to confront the IED crisis, see the four-part special report series by Rick Atkinson, "Left of Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, 30 September 2007.
9. *AR 71-9*, 8.
10. It should be noted that the overall defense budget was increasing due to the regular approval of wartime supplemental funds. This almost certainly made it easier for pro-

- gram officers to successfully find funding sources. External factors are discussed with greater detail on pages 57–61.
11. By 2014, JIEDDO was no longer seen as an innovative and mission-oriented organization. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ended, policy makers and commentators questioned its expenditures and the effectiveness of its programs. For a concise description of these arguments, see Dan Lamothe, “The Legacy of JIEDDO, the Disappearing Pentagon Organization that Fought Roadside Bombs,” *Washington Post*, 17 March 2015.
 12. American troops did use these large platforms, which were effective but limited in number. See Glenn W. Goodman and John Knowles, “Compass Call: The New AEA,” *Journal of Electronic Defense* 30, no. 5 (May 2007): 30–37.
 13. Noah Shachtman, “The Secret History of Iraq’s Invisible War,” *Wired*, 14 June 2011.
 14. Lamothe, “The Legacy of JIEDDO.”
 15. For a survey of some of the technical challenges that were overcome by engineers, see Patrick Nickel et al., “Responsive Communications Jamming against Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices,” *IEEE Communications Magazine* 50, no. 10 (October 2012): 38–46, <https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2012.6316774>; Michael E. Pesci, “Systems Engineering in Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare,” *Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest* 31, no. 1 (June 2012): 58–65; and K. Wilgucki et al., “Selected Aspects of Effective RCIED Jamming” (paper presented at the 2012 Military Communications and Information Systems Conference, Gdansk, Poland, 8–9 October 2012).
 16. Kyle Borne, “US Army Electronic Warfare in the Post-Global War on Terrorism World,” *Journal of Electronic Defense* 36, no. 10 (October 2013): 48.
 17. For details on the AN/PRC-117G’s development, see Jonathan Wong, “Balancing Immediate and Long-Term Defense Investments” (dissertation, Pardee Rand Graduate School, 2016), appendix B.
 18. Palantir’s development is documented in a variety of news and trade publications. See Siobhan Gorman, “How Team of Geeks Cracked Spy Trade,” *Wall Street Journal*, 4 September 2009; Ashlee Vance and Brad Stone, “Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 22 November 2011; Shane Harris, “Palantir Technologies Spots Patterns to Solve Crimes and Track Terrorists,” *Wired UK*, 31 July 2012; and Paul McLeary, “Army Orders Intelligence Servers Shut Down, Threatens Palantir, Continues 3rd ID Probe,” *DefenseNews*, 21 September 2012.
 19. The history of the MRAP has been the subject of numerous accounts and case studies. See, for instance, *Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles*, Report No. D-2009-030 (Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2008); Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons, *MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009); Andrew Feickert, *Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011); and *Impediments to Acquisition Excellence Illustrated by the MRAP Case, Hearing on Case Studies in Defense Acquisitions: Finding What Works, before the House Armed Services Committee*, 113th Cong. (24 June 2014) (statement of Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, distinguished research fellow and deputy director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University).
 20. Lamb, Schmidt, and Fitzsimmons, *MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform*.
 21. The amount that DOD spent on rapid acquisition remains unclear due to spotty documentation. The Government Accountability Office estimated the total at \$77 billion for FY 2005–10, while the author’s previous research suggests that it could be as high as \$103 billion for FY 2002–12. See *Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation*, GAO-11-273 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2011); and Wong, “Balancing Immediate and Long-Term Defense Investments.”
 22. For a summary of the third offset, see Robert Martinage, *Toward a New Offset Strate-*

gy: *Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014).

23. The first offset is understood to be nuclear weapons. The second offset is understood to be sensors and precision-guided weapons.
24. See William Thomas, "Tensions Arise between DOD and Congress over Future of Defense Innovation and Research," *FYI: Science Policy News from AIP*, no. 88 (July 2016).

White Warships and Little Blue Men

The Looming “Short, Sharp War” in the East China Sea over the Senkakus

James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck

Abstract: China claims Japan’s Senkaku Islands and vows to seize them in a “short, sharp war,” if necessary. China’s successful seizure of the islands would shatter the Japan-America security alliance and severely undermine U.S. credibility. This study examines China’s attack campaign by tracing its territorial claims to the East China Sea and by addressing its Senkakus campaign doctrine, the military and paramilitary forces it will employ, how the campaign will unfold, the timing of the attack, how China might counter U.S. intervention, and steps the United States and Japan should take to deter it.

Keywords: short, sharp war; China Dream; great rejuvenation; Diaoyu Dao Islands; Senkaku Islands; East China Sea; Japanese Coast Guard; Scarborough Shoal; Scarborough Model; Xi Jinping; active defense; local war under conditions of informatization; people’s war; People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia; PAFMM; little blue men; maritime law enforcement forces; MLEEF; China Coast Guard Bureau; People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps; strategic support force; counterintervention strategy; three warfares; political warfare; decade of concern

In a recent article entitled “Lessons Learned from Senkaku War Games,” a Japanese newspaper reported on a March 2017 wargame designed to help American, Japanese, and Chinese gamers, including former senior govern-

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ment officials, deal with two separate escalating crises regarding the disputed Senkaku Islands.¹ Oddly, each scenario was premised on Japanese actions initiating the crisis with a seemingly inept pacifist democracy (Japan) forcing an aggrieved—albeit hypernationalist, expansionist, and totalitarian—China to react to protect its national sovereignty. The wargame designers ignored the harsh fact that it is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), not Japan, that has the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to create the most serious Senkaku-related crisis, especially one with the intent of wresting the islands from Japan for China.

The exercise highlighted the U.S. team’s penchant for pressuring the Japanese team to relent to PRC threats and interests. Ironically, the wargame exposed serious miscommunications and policy misunderstandings between U.S. and Japanese officials that would have fatally undermined a united response in a real crisis. Despite an alliance spanning nearly 60 years, the American and Japanese gamers reportedly admitted they still did not understand the other country’s political concerns or security objectives. A Japanese participant is quoted as stating: “We learned the United States is more worried about avoiding a conflict with China than it is about Japan’s position on the possession of the Senkaku Islands.”²

In other words, from the Japanese perspective, the default American position was appeasement of the PRC’s core interests at the expense of Japan’s sovereignty and security interests. The Japanese perception was reinforced as the U.S. team reportedly cheered when it successfully pressured the Japanese team to back off its preplanned response of deploying additional coast guard cutters to the crisis.

The purpose of this article is to examine what the PRC is planning to do concerning the Senkakus, especially regarding a Chinese attack, and to make recommendations that will better prepare the United States, Japan, and other affected countries to successfully respond to this inevitable confrontation. It is only a matter of time before China attempts to fulfill its pledge to seize Japan’s Senkaku Islands in a “short, sharp war.” China’s successful seizure of the islands would shatter the Japan-America alliance. This article examines how and when China will attack and the proactive steps the United States and Japan must take to deter it.

The Origins of a Short, Sharp War

The idea that China is actively planning to conduct a limited, yet decisive, war to seize the Senkaku Islands was originally revealed by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo on Beijing Television in January 2013.³ The actions of the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard have subsequently validated Admiral Yin’s revelations. Rear Admiral Yin takes his cues from

the highest level; President Xi Jinping openly promotes China's maritime ambitions—and its campaign of coercive maritime expansionism—as an essential part of his “China Dream.”

To support these ambitions, the PLA has dramatically increased its military capability, lethality, and readiness for combat. Last summer, the PLA Navy (PLAN) proudly publicized a practice run in the East China Sea, calling it a “sudden cruel war.”⁴ The verbiage is a minor variation of Rear Admiral Yin's short, sharp war.

It is important to note that the concept of a short, sharp war is nothing new to the PRC. During the PRC invasion of the Korean peninsula in 1950, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, its 1969 border battles with the Soviet Union, the 1974 Paracel Islands assault, and the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, China sought victory in these similar wars based on doctrines emphasizing strategic deception, highly mobile offensive operations, and battles of annihilation. It is also worth noting that the PRC was willing to sustain massive casualties and economic hardship to win what it hoped would be short, sharp wars.⁵

China would prefer never to fire a single shot to fulfill President Xi's direction “to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”⁶ The great rejuvenation includes the “restoration” of the PRC's “core interests”—those areas the PRC believes are its sovereign territory, to include Taiwan (the cornerstone of core interests), the Senkaku Islands, the entirety of the South China Sea as far south as James Shoal, and disputed territories with India. However, if China's leaders perceive that the nonkinetic forms of their comprehensive national power will not produce the results they desire, they will employ the military option against the Senkakus sometime during what is termed the *decade of concern*, from 2020 to 2030, whereby the PRC intends to solidify all its outstanding territorial claims.

Contested Territorial Claims

While no Chinese government official has yet publicly declared that the Senkaku Islands (or the Diaoyu Dao Islands to the Chinese) are a core interest, all available evidence indicates that China believes the Senkaku Islands are an inherent part of its territory. To Beijing, the islands are no different than Taiwan and the South China Sea; PRC rulers assert they have been part of China since “ancient times.” Nevertheless, the PRC's strategic interest in the Senkaku Islands is rather recent, despite official proclamations that they have been an inherent part of China historically.⁷ Following the end of World War II, the Senkaku Islands were under the control of the United States, as stipulated in Articles 3 and 4B of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco.⁸ Control of the islands was then relinquished by the United States and given to Japan in 1971, as stipulated in the two nations' Okinawa Agreement.⁹ Since that time, the

Japanese government has maintained administrative control over the islands.

Subsequent to a United Nations report suggesting the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan might be extremely rich in oil reserves, China's Foreign Ministry in December 1971 made their first formal claim to the Senkaku Islands. While China publicly set aside its differences with Japan over its sovereignty claims after World War II, that did not change Beijing's belief that the Diaoyu Dao Islands are within China's sovereign territory. Beijing's perspective on those islands was made clear in the following passage from a 2012 white paper on the topic:

Diaoyu Dao [island] has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times, and China has indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. As China and Japan were normalizing relations and concluding the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in the 1970s, the then leaders of the two countries, acting in the larger interest of China-Japan relations, reached [an] important understanding and consensus on "leaving the issue of Diaoyu Dao to be resolved later."¹⁰

For nearly 40 years, China's leaders followed Communist leader Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum to "bide time, conceal capabilities, but do some things."¹¹ China's leaders largely refrained from aggressively and publicly expressing their claims of sovereignty over the islands.¹²

After setting the issue of the islands aside, the Chinese then, indeed, began to methodically "do some things." On 8 December 2008, the Chinese conducted an operation that deliberately upended their previous maritime policy of avoiding confrontations; PLA naval forces sailed to the Senkakus, circumnavigated them, returned home, and publicized the act. It was completely legal within the context of international law, but it was an abrupt change that marked the operational beginning of China's maritime expansion campaign in both the East and South China Seas. It was subtle at first, as China tested the resolve of its neighbors, whose maritime rights it intended to seize, and the ally of its neighbors, the United States. The first physical coercion operation occurred in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship patrolling near the Senkaku Islands.¹³

The most significant event in this timeline, however, occurred not in the East China Sea, but in the South China Sea, with the Scarborough Shoal incident of April–June 2012. This standoff was a watershed event in China's expansionist strategy. After the U.S. Department of State brokered a compromise between the PRC and the Philippines, the PRC abruptly seized Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine president traveled to the United States to personally request the support of President Barack H. Obama, but received no specific

statements of support, and no operational support followed. The PRC seized sovereign rights at Scarborough Shoal from a U.S. treaty ally—without firing a shot.

The head of the PRC's Leading Group, which orchestrated the seizure, was at that time not well-known in the West: a man named Xi Jinping. This event made him a national hero just when he most needed the political legitimacy. The acquiescence of the United States, the Philippines, and others became a significant turning point—a real pivot—for President Xi and his vision to “restore” China's territorial claims. Xi's strategy included destruction of the system of alliances that had long contained China's expansionism. While the Scarborough seizure was downplayed by the Obama administration and treated as a minor fisheries dispute, Chinese scholars recognized the significance of Xi's template for mooting U.S. alliances by undercutting confidence in the agreements, calling it the “Scarborough Model.”

Then in September 2012, Xi Jinping led the dramatic escalation in political tension surrounding the Senkaku Islands by leveraging the Japanese government's six-month advance notification to China of its decision to convert its lease on the islands to ownership on 11 September. Japan's action was entirely administrative—an internal paperwork drill—but it elicited an immediate and furious response from China. China's ambassador to the United Nations, Li Baodong, condemned Japan's actions and stated that the “Chinese government and people will never waver in their will and determination to uphold China's territorial integrity and sovereignty.”¹⁴

Also in September 2012, the PRC's State Council Information Office released an official white paper on the Diaoyu Dao Islands.¹⁵ The document reasserted China's position that the islands are “an inseparable part of the Chinese territory” and that “China enjoys indisputable sovereignty” over these islands.¹⁶ The paper concludes with these subtly threatening words: “The Chinese government has the unshakable resolve and will to uphold the nation's territorial sovereignty. It has the confidence and ability to safeguard China's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.”¹⁷

Strike the First Blow Strategy

China's plans to take the Senkakus are best understood when placed into the context of Chinese strategy and campaign doctrine. Although the PRC has not published its strategic military campaign plan for taking the Senkaku Islands or even made “a unified, single doctrine for guiding military operations” available to the public, documents such as the PLA's 2006 *The Science of Campaigns* and 2013 *The Science of Military Strategy* provide insight into Chinese military strategy and doctrine.¹⁸ Chinese military doctrine is “the combination of several documents and guidelines at different command levels of the armed forces, united

into a hierarchical system that the Chinese refer to as a ‘Science of Military Strategy’.”¹⁹

At the top of this hierarchy of Chinese military doctrine are the three concepts of *active defense*, *local war under conditions of informatization*, and *people’s war*.²⁰ All three have some relationship to how the PLA would conduct an operation against the Senkaku Islands.

First, the PLA asserts that active defense, a Mao-era operational concept, is a “policy of strategic defense and [China] will only strike militarily after it has already been struck.”²¹ But that notion has given way to the concept of “gaining the initiative by striking the first blow” (*xian fa zhi ren*)—“the absolute requirement to seize the initiative in the opening phase of a war.”²² Noteworthy also is that the policy of active defense includes the stipulation “that such a defensive strategic posture is only viable if mated with an offensive operational posture. . . . Moreover, the first strike that triggers a Chinese military response need not be military; actions in the political and strategic realm may also justify a Chinese military reaction.”²³ In the context of the Senkaku Islands, this is especially important given Japanese government use of its coast guard to provide the first layer of administrative control over the island. For instance, Beijing could use something as innocuous as a change in Japan’s Coast Guard force posture or even the language Japan uses when patrolling the islands as a justification for initiating an active defense military operation.

Second, local war under conditions of informatization—official PLA doctrine since 1993—asserts that future warfare will be conducted within local geography (primarily along China’s periphery) and will be limited in scope and duration.²⁴ Under this doctrine, the PLA expects to act decisively and be victorious, especially when its forces are aided by modern, lethal weapons (both kinetic and nonkinetic) and are connected by robust, redundant, and reliable command and control systems. Situational awareness is a key priority for operating under this doctrine, and the PLA will use a densely layered intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network to provide its agile force the capability for high-tempo power projection operations. Additionally, the PLA also will be expected to use offensive cyberattacks to degrade U.S. and Japanese maritime domain awareness. In this case, the aim is to take the Senkakus and place them under China’s physical control.

Third, when discussing the macro levels of Chinese military doctrine as it relates to a Senkaku Islands campaign, the concept of a people’s war is “one in which the people actively support the military during times of warfare: this active support can be logistical, political, or operational.”²⁵ Under this doctrine, the PLA has designated the Chinese population and local governments as being vital resources, especially during a local war scenario like taking the Senkaku Islands. Ultimately, under the doctrine of people’s war, the PLA believes

“the local population can be decisive even in a local, high-technology war.”²⁶

Specifically, the local population will be the principal maritime element of any people’s war against the Senkaku Islands. This will be in the form of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and China’s civil/military fishing fleets, the largest fishing fleets in the world.²⁷ The U.S. Navy War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute provides evidence that “China’s PAFMM is an armed mass organization primarily comprising mariners working in the civilian economy who are trained and can be mobilized to defend and advance China’s maritime territorial claims, protect ‘maritime rights and interests,’ and support the PLAN in wartime.”²⁸ Ostensibly civilians but in reality trained and armed military assault forces, the PAFMM’s *little blue men* can be likened to the Russian little green men used to attack and capture large swaths of Ukraine in recent years. These little blue men will be supported by “White Warships”—China’s Coast Guard—which will be discussed in greater detail below.

Given the growing presence of Chinese sea forces around the Senkaku Islands during the past five years, it is obvious that China not only believes the islands are its sovereign territory, but that it is actively preparing a short, sharp war type of military campaign using the PAFMM as the vanguard to take back the islands.

Senkaku Island Campaign Scenarios

Much of the evidence regarding China’s actions around the Senkaku Islands remains classified by the United States and other governments. Still, there are indicators in unclassified press reporting that provide clear insight into the operational elements of a Chinese military campaign to forcibly take the islands.

Given China’s doctrine and the observed actions of its military and paramilitary forces during the past five years, there are two major scenarios for its short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands: 1) a maritime law enforcement scenario; and 2) a PLA-led assault scenario (exercise or Taiwan attack based). Under each scenario, the goal of the PRC would be to physically occupy the Senkaku Islands and maintain permanent control over them. To varying degrees, each scenario would have significant overlap in terms of forces used to seize the islands. The main difference is primarily how the attack will be initiated.

Maritime Law Enforcement Scenario


First among these scenarios deals with what is known collectively as China’s maritime law enforcement forces (MLEF). China’s National People’s Congress in March 2013 passed legislation to create an “entirely new maritime law enforcement entity, to be called the China Coast Guard Bureau (*zhongguo haijingju*).”²⁹ As it did during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, China has

dispatched an increasing number of MLEF ships to the Senkaku Islands. The mission of the MLEF in the Senkakus is to demonstrate resolve and to apply increasing pressure to the Japanese Coast Guard, which has patrolled the islands on a daily basis for years.

According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs reporting, from 2008 to September 2012, Chinese military law enforcement vessels rarely conducted intrusions into the 12-nautical mile (nm) territorial limit of the Senkaku Islands. There was only one intrusion in 2008 and one in 2011.³⁰ Following Japan’s September 2012 announcement of nationalization of the islands, China’s maritime law enforcement vessels dramatically increased intrusions into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters. In the final three months of 2012, Chinese intrusions increased to 23 times, with more than 68 Chinese Coast Guard ships (an average of 3 ships per intrusion) entering the 12-nm limit and directly challenging Japan’s sovereignty of the islands (figure 1).³¹

But Chinese Coast Guard intrusions into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters are just the tip of the iceberg in China’s response. For instance, when the


Figure 1. Intrusion trends for Chinese government vessels in waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels were not conducting intrusions into the 12-nm territorial limit, they would remain in the general area of the islands (within 30 nm) and would frequently conduct intrusions into the islands’ 24-nm contiguous zone. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the *contiguous zone* as “the area where coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, and punish infringement of those laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.”³²

As at Scarborough Shoal, Beijing’s strategy has been to visibly ratchet up the pressure on Tokyo by increasing the presence of its MLEFs in and around the Senkaku Islands. Its strategy also is to demonstrate gradually increased Chinese civil administration over the islands, a key component of its maritime sovereignty expansion campaign. In the first year (September 2012–October 2013), Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels conducted 52 intrusions into the Senkakus’ territorial waters. Then from 2013 through 2016, these intrusions



normalized to an average of 34 times per year, or 2–3 times per month. The pressure continued to build when, in December 2015, Japan reported that for the first time an armed Chinese Coast Guard cutter, *Haijing* (31239) (formerly a PLAN *Jiangwei* I-class frigate) entered the contiguous zone on 22 December and then the territorial waters on the 26th.³³

China's probing of Japan's defense of the islands came in many forms. For instance, as the Chinese Coast Guard established a presence around the islands, it became obvious that its craft were deficient for the task of continuous presence due to the small size of its patrol boats. Generally smaller than 1,000 tons, these vessels had a limited ability to remain on station near the islands, especially during bad weather and in higher sea states, or significant wave height (usually higher than sea states 3–4).³⁴ This all began to change in 2014, when Chinese MLEF vessels patrolling the Senkaku Islands increased in size.³⁵

Size matters in confrontations at sea, especially in contests between coast guard vessels. In August 2014, at least one frigate-size 3,000-ton Chinese MLEF vessel deployed to the Senkaku Islands, and by February 2015, there were reports of the first intrusion by three MLEF vessels larger than 3,000 tons.³⁶ As China has sought more of its neighbors' maritime sovereignty, it has had to build ever-larger coast guard ships. These are intended to enable its civil maritime forces to carry out China's campaign more aggressively by having the biggest ship on scene. The ships also allow them to conduct operations at increasing distances from China's coastline.

As such, China has demonstrated its commitment to have the largest coast guard vessels in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, China commissioned the largest coast guard cutter in the world at 12,000 tons, the China Coast Guard *Zhongguo Haijing* (CCG 2901) cutter. This cutter went to sea for the first time in May 2015 and is subordinated to the East China Sea area of responsibility. A second ship of the class, CCG 3901, was completed and made ready for operations in January 2016. The Communist Party's *People's Daily* made the purpose of these ships crystal clear, stating they were designed to have "the power to smash into a vessel weighing more than 20,000 tons and will not cause any damage to itself when confronting a vessel weighing under 9,000 tons. It can also destroy a 5,000-ton ship and sink it to the sea floor."³⁷ Note carefully the combat assault mission of these Chinese Coast Guard ships: they are, quite simply, white warships.

While most other nations emphasize their maritime law enforcement agencies' ability to support safety at sea, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations with an emphasis on saving lives and helping those in distress at sea, China has taken a different approach. China instead boasts its large coast guard vessels are not designed to save lives at sea; China publicly admits its large cutters are designed to sink coast guard ships

and fishing boats. This “ram and sink” Chinese Coast Guard mission provides a unique insight into the PRC’s potential operational plan to take the Senkaku Islands by force.

While the size and scope of operations of China’s MLEF are important factors in being able to support a short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands, so is the proximity of operational forces. Beijing quickly realized that any plan to use the MLEF as a proxy force in operations against the Senkaku Islands would be constrained by the distances of existing Chinese MLEF bases to the islands.

Consequently, in June 2015, the first reports emerged of China’s Coast Guard building a new base near the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, much closer to the Senkaku Islands.³⁸ The plans, as posted to the city website (which have since been deleted), indicated the base is being designed to “occupy about 500,000 square meters and will have a pier around 1.2 km long with a facility where six vessels—including large ones with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons—can moor, a hangar for airplanes and helicopters, and a large training facility.”³⁹

Interesting, and no doubt related, were China’s plans for construction of another new base, this time for PLAN on the island of Nanji near the new coast guard base at Wenzhou.⁴⁰ Nanji Island is 60 nm closer to the Senkaku Islands than are the military bases of Japan and the United States located on Okinawa. Nanji is reported to already have “an advanced radar system in place and a heliport for use by carrier-based helicopters.”⁴¹ It is also expected to have a runway that would diminish flight time to the Senkaku Islands, as well as increase available on-station time by either Chinese Coast Guard or PLA air forces.

Another interesting element that can be derived from these reports is the emphasis China places on the integration of MLEF and PLA forces. When it comes to the Senkakus, China’s leaders recognized that a closer proximity for its civil and military forces was absolutely necessary to meet the demands of a short, sharp war to take the islands.

The Chinese would start the war the same way they started their seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, by progressively leaning in on the feature with fishermen, and MLEF “protecting” them. They would increase their presence in fine increments—coming closer, anchoring, taking resources, landing on the islands, building on the islands—until the Japanese had one of two choices: either surrender territory to the encroachment, as the Philippines did at Scarborough Shoal when the United States declined to operationally support them, or take some defensive enforcement action.

That defensive action, no matter how slight and nonconfrontational, would be magnified in Beijing’s propaganda and exploited as the excuse for China’s

rapid escalation to destruction of the Japanese Navy in the East China Sea—within hours, the short, sharp war—before calling for a truce. Beijing would anguish over the destruction caused by the Japanese provocation, and beseech the international community to stop the fighting with no more forces being poured into the region. The call for talks, of course, would be attractive to the United States, and it would leave China in place, in full control of its newly seized territory. This MLEF scenario is the most likely avenue of approach for any Chinese attempt to take the islands by force. This scenario is especially possible during a period of bad weather and high sea states that would drive away the Japanese Coast Guard from its patrol stations.

An event in August 2016 was likely a rehearsal of how China may take the islands. Around midday on 5 August, approximately 200–300 Chinese fishing boats swarmed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands of Kuba and Uotsuri, accompanied by one Chinese MLEF vessel. By 9 August, as many as 15 Chinese MLEF vessels had first entered the contiguous zone and then drove on into the 12-nm territorial water limit of the islands. This was the first time China had ever put that many fishing ships and law-enforcement vessels into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands. This surge of 15 MLEF ships was a dramatic and significant increase compared to the average number of 3 MLEF vessels per year that had deployed into the contiguous zone since 2012.⁴² Particularly noteworthy was the fact that a large number of these vessels were observed with deck guns, greatly increasing the potential volatility of these intrusions.

A PLA-led Assault Scenario

To understand how a PLA training exercise or an attack on Taiwan could easily be used as the launchpad for the Senkakus assault, it is necessary to examine the remarkable strides the PLA has taken in recent years in developing its power projection capabilities.

Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands

As stated previously, China would prefer to achieve its expansionist territorial ambitions without firing a shot. To this end, it has enjoyed successes in acquiring territory and maritime sovereignty from its neighbors through the mere threat of force, as evidenced by Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the building of the new Spratly Islands from 2012 to present. Nonetheless, the Communist Party of China has charged the PLA with transforming itself into a force that will be ready to take Taiwan by 2020.⁴³ By all accounts, the PLA is well on its way toward achieving that goal.

Equally important is the reality that if the PLA can take Taiwan, then it can also take the Senkaku Islands. It is not hard to recognize the multiple overlap-

ping military requirements for both scenarios, especially for the smaller Senkaku Islands. The military capabilities required to take Taiwan apply to a scenario like the Senkaku Islands; in fact, China is more likely to use them against the Senkakus because of the smaller scope and shorter campaign the PLA anticipates to be necessary to achieve victory. Likewise, a case can be made that the Senkakus could also be a prerequisite for the acquisition and assimilation of Taiwan.

Military and Command Reorganization

Since taking office, President Xi has restructured the PLA in China's seven military regions into five theater commands. He also has "subordinated the ground force to an army service headquarters, raised the stature and role of the strategic missile force, and established a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities."⁴⁴

Furthermore, by early 2016, President Xi had reorganized and streamlined the senior echelons of the PLA by discarding "the PLA's four traditional general departments in favor of 15 new CMC functional departments."⁴⁵ And to put a capstone on this transformation, President Xi announced the Central Military Commission (CMC) would now be in charge of the "overall administration of the PLA, People's Armed Police, militia, and reserves" with the new theater commands (sometimes referred to as *joint war zones*) to focus on combat preparedness. Meanwhile, the various services would be responsible for the development of what in the United States are called the Title 10 Authorities to man, train, and equip the force.⁴⁶ A closer examination of each of the forces is necessary to appreciate their rapidly expanding capabilities.

The PLA Navy

The PLA is benefitting from Xi's military transformation: it is the largest military modernization effort since the end of World War II. The PLAN is the prime beneficiary. Its build up from 2000 to 2015 far exceeds the build up in any other nation's navy in the post-World War II era, save for the U.S. Navy during the Ronald W. Reagan years of the 1980s. The reason is simple: for China's leaders to achieve their vision of a "rejuvenated" and "restored" China, they needed a fleet that can expand China's "interior lines" out into the maritime domain.⁴⁷ That goal will be largely met by 2020.

Concurrent with the PLAN modernization has been the changing pattern of its operations. Instead of continuing as a coastal water naval force steaming within 50 nm of China's coastline, today the Chinese Navy has pushed out into the blue water of the Pacific Ocean and beyond (figures 2 and 3). An examination of PLAN blue water operations during the past 15 years reveals that "China's ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically

advanced and flexible force.” This evolving naval force will provide Beijing the capability to successfully conduct a military campaign to take the Senkaku Islands.⁴⁸

This transformation has required a new force structure, one that has increased both the number and type of naval platforms. With respect to far seas operations, the Office of Naval Intelligence 2015 report *The PLA Navy* stated that “during the past decade, requirements for diversified missions and far seas operations have stimulated an operational shift and have catalyzed the acquisition of multi-mission platforms.” These multimission platforms are perfectly suited for naval combat against Japan naval forces tasked to defend the Senkaku Islands.⁴⁹

Not only does the present-day PLAN demonstrate a significant threat to Japan, but it now also threatens the U.S. Navy. In professors James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara’s recently published article, “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life of Surface Fleets,” they assert the PLAN is “particularly well-suited to seize islands.”⁵⁰ They say the PLAN assault forces will be led by surface combatant strike groups comprised of its premier combatant, the Type 052D *Luyang III*-class guided missile destroyers, the Type 054C *Luyang II*-class guided missile destroyers, the Type 054A *Jiangkai III*-class guided missile frigates, and the Soviet-built *Sovremenny*-class destroyers.

Figure 2. PLA Navy blue water operations, 2000



Figure 3. Expanding military capabilities and expenditures for the PRC, 2015



Source: Orders of battle based on author’s compilation of open source data. Build rate derived from Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 27, 29.

Not only could these surface action strike groups provide withering naval gunfire support for an amphibious landing force with their superior (range, speed, and survivability) antiship cruise missile (ASCM) inventory, but these combatants would provide a sea-based air defense that would constrain or even preclude U.S. or Japanese air operations near an amphibious operation.⁵¹ Given China's superior number of advanced surface combatants, "it is far from clear that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy," especially in a Senkaku Islands campaign where naval warfare will determine mission success.⁵²

In addition to China's MLEF and PAFMM ships, PLAN forces have also increased their operations in and around the Senkaku Islands since 2012. Prior to 2012, PLAN warships generally patrolled on the west side of the median line. Since 2012, there has also been an increase in the number of Chinese warships operating for sustained periods of time east of the median line. This trend culminated on 19 June 2016, when the Japanese destroyer *Setogiri* confirmed a PLAN *Jiangkai* I-class frigate had entered the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Island of Kuba.⁵³

The challenge for the defending force of Japanese and U.S. warships operating within the first island chain is compounded by China's ability to bring firepower of all three of its fleets into the sea area around the Senkaku Islands.⁵⁴ In addition, naval fires also will come from a densely populated submarine force armed with supersonic, sea-skimming, 290-nm-range YJ-18 ASCM, as well as air-delivered ASCMs from PLA Air Forces. With these surface, subsurface, and air forces at hand in the East China Sea, the PLAN has the capability to conduct a short, sharp war to take the Senkaku Islands.

PLA Navy Amphibious Forces

Perhaps the most important aspect to any successful Chinese Senkaku Islands campaign involves the act of physically moving forces ashore. China continues to build and train its naval and amphibious forces in the art of expeditionary warfare, a skill set easily applied to a Senkaku Islands campaign. Most recently in the South China Sea, two amphibious dock landing ships, three air-cushion landing craft, and two ship-borne helicopters conducted beach-landing exercises.⁵⁵ This type of training is ubiquitous across the East and South China Sea and is the most tangible evidence of the PLA's intention of being prepared to conduct such a mission.

One facet of President Xi's transformation of the PLA includes a dramatic expansion of the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC) to 100,000 personnel—a tenfold increase of its marine corps of just a few years ago. According to the *South China Morning Post*, "two special warfare brigades had already been incorporated into the PLAMC, raising the forces' complement of soldiers to 20,000."⁵⁶ While the reporting indicates that some of these new PLAMC forces will be

dispatched to far-flung installations such as in Gwadar, Pakistan, or the new PLA Navy base in Djibouti, there is little doubt that the growth of PLAMC personnel is necessary to achieve its maritime territorial ambitions.

To provide the amphibious lift needed for this vastly expanded marine corps, China is producing an increasing number of high-end, large amphibious warships, and is intent on building many more over the near term. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, for instance, as of 2015 the PLA Navy has 56 amphibious warships, ranging from a few World War II-era landing ships to four of the large, modern *Yuzhao*-class Type 071 amphibious transport docks, “which provide a considerably greater and more flexible capability than the older landing ships.”⁵⁷ The *Yuzhao*-class ship is perfectly fitted for a Senkaku Islands campaign as it “can carry up to four of the new air cushion landing craft,” as well as “four or more helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops.”⁵⁸

Not content with the *Yuzhao*, China has announced it “has started building a new generation of large amphibious assault vessels that will strengthen the navy as it plays a more dominant role in projecting the nation’s power overseas.”⁵⁹ The PLA Navy commander, Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, reportedly visited the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding company in Shanghai, where the new ship, identified as the Type 075 landing helicopter dock, is reportedly under construction.⁶⁰

The Type 075 is much larger than any other amphibious warship previously built for the PLA Navy and is uniquely suited to a Senkaku Islands campaign. It can carry a large number of attack and transport (as many as up to 30 helicopters) and has the ability to launch 6 helicopters simultaneously.⁶¹ For a PRC amphibious assault force this is critically important, because at present the closest PLA airfield from which the PLA could launch attacking helicopters against the Senkaku Islands is farther than 180 nm away. The Type 075 will provide the critical element for the PLA to be able to project boots on the ground on the Senkaku Islands. By the early 2020s, the PLA Navy and Marine Corps will be well resourced and ready to fight when called upon by President Xi to take the Senkaku Islands.

PLA Air Forces

The importance of PLA air forces in a Senkaku Islands scenario became clear on 23 November 2013, when the PRC abruptly declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.⁶² Despite this unilateral action being denounced by senior U.S. Defense and State Department officials as “a provocative act and a serious step in the wrong direction,” China has not backed down.⁶³

Not deterred by history or international norms, the PRC government and media propaganda statements declared the ADIZ gave China the right to take

“emergency measures” against noncompliant aircraft in international airspace, even aircraft that were not vectored at the Chinese mainland.⁶⁴ While the ADIZ was portrayed to be about protecting China’s mainland, it could equally be a valuable tool in any Chinese active defense stratagem to take the Senkaku Islands.

Since the ADIZ declaration, the PLA Air Force has increased the scope and scale of flights in and around the Senkaku Islands. In December 2012, a Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft entered the Senkaku Islands territorial airspace—the first time in 50 years for such an event to happen.⁶⁵ This event ushered in an era of expanded PLA Air Force activities in the East China Sea, where fighter, airborne warning and control, signal and electronic intelligence aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles have expanded their air operations farther southeast toward the Senkaku Islands.⁶⁶ Accordingly, Japan increased reactions to Chinese aircraft, from approximately 300 events in 2012 to nearly 700 in 2016.⁶⁷

In addition, the PLA Air Force began an aggressive transition from an exclusively territorial air defense force to one that is now more active and comfortable over the open seas than at any time in its history. For instance, in 2013, the PLA Air Force began flights into the Western Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait, and have since averaged between five and six events per year with multiple aircraft.⁶⁸ The aircraft types conducting flights near the Senkaku Islands include bomber, fighter, refueling, electronic intelligence, and airborne early warning aircraft, all attesting to the comprehensive nature of how China would employ air power to help secure and maintain its control over the Senkaku Islands.

Adding complexity to the air domain, the PLA Air Force conducted “its first-ever exercise over the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel” in late March 2015.⁶⁹ Despite PLA Air Force public assertions that these drills were routine and not targeted against “any particular country, regions or targets,” there is little doubt PLA air forces entering the Philippine Sea via the Bashi Channel or the Miyako Strait provide the PLA considerable operational and tactical flexibility in any Senkaku Island attack campaign.⁷⁰

Upping the ante, the PLA Air Force announced in mid-September 2016 that it would conduct regular exercises flying past the first island chain.⁷¹ True to its word, the PLA Air Force has conducted routine flights through the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel, with the most recent significant event occurring on 3 March 2017 as China sent 13 aircraft through the Miyako Strait.⁷² According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense this was “the largest number of foreign planes Japan has scrambled jets for since such data first became available in 2003.”⁷³

In response, Japan’s Defense Ministry announced in February that its Air

Self-Defense Force (JASDF) “doubled the number of fighter jets it scrambles when responding to airspace checks by foreign planes.”⁷⁴ According to the latest reports by the Japanese, the number of JASDF scrambles launched between April 2016 and January 2017 had already surpassed “the annual record of 944 set in FY 1984, when the Cold War was in full swing and airplanes from the former Soviet Union were active.”⁷⁵

The increasing proximity of Chinese aircraft toward the Senkaku Islands is of particular significance. According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, China has increased the number of PLA air forces that fly south of 27 degrees north latitude, an unspoken demarcation line that Japan has considered a defensive borderline.⁷⁶ JASDF tactical objectives are designed to keep Chinese planes from flying within a minimum protective air umbrella of approximately 60 nm from the Senkaku Islands.

Given the dramatic increase in provocative PLA Air Force activity and Japanese responses to them in the East China and Philippine Sea, the likelihood for an explosive event has risen greatly. This is especially true since Tokyo and Beijing do not have a “hot line” communication network “that can be used by their militaries to avoid accidental aerial or maritime clashes.”⁷⁷ Beijing may use such an explosive incident as an excuse to move on the Senkakus.

China could easily begin its short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands by exploiting and surprising local air commanders. Specifically, the PLA Air Force could launch a large number of fighters and other aircraft toward Okinawa via the Miyako Strait and up through the Bashi Channel with the goal of diverting, diffusing, and degrading JASDF efforts to get to the airspace over the Senkaku Islands. On these islands, an assault by the main invasion force, either airborne from helicopters or seaborne, would be conducted concurrently. And this combined arms diversionary and main assault would all take place under the cover of one of the most sophisticated missile and rocket forces on the planet.

PLA Rocket Forces

In terms of kinetic fires for all three scenarios, per the Chinese military doctrine of joint fire strike campaign, Beijing would likely use its extensive ballistic and cruise missile arsenal, from both the PLA Rocket Force and PLA Air Force/PLA Naval Air Force/PLA Navy, to disrupt rear area operations along the Ryukyu Islands. More importantly, Japan and the United States should expect attacks against military bases on the main island of Honshu and Guam, where the majority of Japanese and U.S. military strength resides. U.S. Navy Commander Thomas Shugart’s recently published article, “Has China Been Practicing Pre-Emptive Missile Strikes against U.S. Bases?” convincingly argues that “the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that

has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China's missile forces to strike U.S. bases.⁷⁸

The purpose of these supporting fires, as articulated in joint fire strike campaign doctrine, would be to coordinate and synchronize antiship ballistic and cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, air strikes with precision-guided munitions, and counter-C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) strikes with specialized weapons. These fires would facilitate the main objective of seizing the Senkaku Islands and isolating Japanese and U.S. military forces arrayed across the region.

PLA Informatization Department and Strategic Support Forces

PLA strategy addresses *informatization* in both its offensive combat and counter-intervention operations. Informatization is at the core of everything it wants to accomplish, especially in a short, sharp war to take the Senkaku Islands. From high-tech missions in space and cyberspace, to long-range precision kinetic and nonkinetic strikes, to naval war-at-sea operations, “the ability to transmit, process, and receive information is a vital enabler.”⁷⁹

Reforms to the PLA Informatization Department began in 2015 and are expected to be complete by 2020, when lines of responsibility are further delineated with the newly created Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF's mission is reportedly focused on “strategic-level information support” for “space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.”⁸⁰ One of its main missions will be strategic denial of the electromagnetic spectrum.⁸¹

The SSF is a critical enabler for joint operations through this mission of strategic-level information support. The SSF has also assumed responsibilities for strategic information warfare. Although usually discussed in the context of a Taiwan contingency, China's cyberforces would play a critical role in any counterintervention strategy against both the United States and Japan in a Senkaku conflict. The two organizations responsible for this, the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters (3PLA) and the Fourth Department (4PLA), are both subordinated to the SSF.⁸²

China has invested heavily in countersatellite electronic warfare capabilities to force a “no satellite, no fight” environment for the United States. The SSF has consolidated the management and control over space-based ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets—and it may also have nonkinetic antisatellite capabilities, such as directed energy weapons.

SSF and the Fight for Public Opinion

The fight for public opinion will be the PRC's second battlefield, and thus requires special attention. Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes

the role of psychological operations (psyops), legal warfare, and public opinion warfare to subdue an enemy ahead of conflict or ensure victory if conflict breaks out. The operationalization of psyops with cyber is key to this strategy.⁸³ China also has taken very real steps to empower its psychological warfare forces, most notably the “three warfares” base (or 311 base), located in Fuzhou. This base has been brought under the SSF and is integrated with China’s cyberforces.

Prior to initiating its offensive, China will begin worldwide psyops and public opinion warfare as part of a concerted political warfare campaign. Chinese front organizations and other sympathizers, along with both Chinese and other-nation mass information channels, such as the internet, television, and radio, will be used.

The focus of these influence operations will be to support China’s position and to demonize the United States and Japan. Internally, this campaign will be important in mobilizing mass support for the “righteous” action, while externally the campaign will attempt to gain support for China’s position. This political warfare campaign will continue through the island operation and after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation.

SSF Impact

Ultimately the purpose of these SSF organizations is to ensure the sanctity of national- and theater-level command and control as well as enhance the war-fighting effectiveness of each of the individual services. In the confines of a short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands, these invisible forces will provide precise situational awareness, target identification of opposing forces, network defenses, and real-time command and control that will enable the PLA to take and hold the Senkaku Islands. They will also work to subvert, demoralize, and confuse the U.S. and Japanese national leadership and operational forces.

An example of these efforts was revealed in 2014, when the PLA established a permanent joint operations command center responsible for integrating the operations of its army, navy, and air forces. It was the first time such a joint operations command had been established and is seen as being able to “boost the unified operations of Chinese capabilities on land, sea, air and in dealing with strategic missile operations.”⁸⁴ When combined with President Xi’s other PLA reforms, it seems clear that China’s ability to command and control all of its forces and disrupt opposing forces in a short, sharp war scenario against the Senkakus is well established and practiced.

How the PLA Exercise Scenario Will Play Out

Since 2014, the PLA has conducted several large-scale exercises that could very well be rehearsals for a Senkaku Islands campaign. Of greater concern, these

exercises also could be intended as a deception campaign, designed to lure U.S. and Japanese audiences into complacency, so that when the actual short, sharp Senkaku Islands campaign commences, it is mistaken for just another exercise. Whether it is the Mission Action (*Shiming Xingdong*), Joint Action (*Lianhe Xingdong*), Stride (*Kuayue*), or even the Firepower (*Huoli*) series, the PLA is actively training its forces “to improve joint integrated operational capabilities by collecting data to support training and doctrinal development and then implement lessons learned from training assessments and evaluations.”⁸⁵

The PLA conducts its exercises under as close to actual combat conditions as possible for supporting research and development for future training and operational methods, but also as a means to overcome lack of combat experience. During these exercises, the PLA focuses on command and control, logistics, civil-military integration, joint campaign planning, long-range firepower and precision strike, deployment of special operational forces, reconnaissance, information warfare, electronic warfare, long-range mobility, and reconnaissance operations, to name a few.⁸⁶

Timeline to Attack: the Coming Decade of Concern


Given the Communist Party’s desire for so-called restoration of territory, the obvious question is: How long will the PRC wait to celebrate the achievement of its goal of national rejuvenation and restoration? Some, like respected China expert Michael Pillsbury, assert that China desires to celebrate the complete restoration by the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. Given that this assumption is correct, the next logical question is: What will happen if Beijing is unable to achieve complete restoration via nonviolent means? Or to consider it another way, what if Japan or Taiwan resists; how long before the PRC rulers believe they will have to use military force to achieve their ultimate goal of national restoration? The answer to the last question is not too long. The PRC will act as early as 2020 and no later than 2030. Call this period the decade of concern (figure 4).

China has very likely calculated a timeline for when it could use military force at the latest possible moment and still be able to conduct a grand ceremony commemorating its national restoration in 2049. The template for calculating that date is the time period from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Olympics.

China’s leaders remember well that in 1989, the international community largely condemned Beijing’s brutal slaughtering of its own citizens at Tiananmen Square. Yet just 19 years later, the world’s leaders eagerly flocked to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games.

Let’s remember the scene on 8 August 2008 at the Beijing National Stadium (a.k.a. Bird’s Nest). There were tens of thousands of people in the seats watching one of the most impressively orchestrated Olympic opening ceremonies in

Figure 4. The PRC's decade of concern, 2020–30



Source: Capt James E. Fanell, USN (Ret), adapted by MCUP.

history. There at the top of the stadium in a cool, air-conditioned skybox were the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, looking down over the masses of humanity. At the center was President Hu Jintao, wearing a black suit reminiscent of Chairman Mao Zedong. President Hu was cool, calm, and collected. And what did he see down in those seats in the 95-degree heat and 95-percent humidity? The president of the United States, with big sweat stains under his armpits. That president later went on to describe the event as being “spectacular and successful.”⁸⁷

What was the strategic message from this event? It reinforced a belief among China’s leadership that the West has a short attention span regarding such issues as crimes against humanity, as reflected in the Tiananmen Square massacre. In short, Beijing believes the West can be counted on to forget even the most barbarous actions after a roughly 20-year time span. Given that logic, the latest Beijing could use military force to physically restore China’s perceived territory would be around 2030. This would then allow for 20 years of “peace” before Beijing would conduct a grand ceremony to memorialize the “second 100”—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.

Which leads to the question: When is the earliest China could use military power?

Given the current environment and readiness of the PLA, it literally could start at any time. However, a more precise answer is 2020. As referenced earlier, intelligence analysis strongly indicates the PLA has, during the past decade, been given the strategic task of being able to take Taiwan by force by 2020. If the PLA is able to take Taiwan by force in 2020, then it stands to reason that the less-included task to seize the Senkaku Islands also would be something the PLA could achieve.

So, the decade of concern begins in 2020, when there will be mounting pressure within China to use military force to achieve the “China Dream” of national restoration by 2049. The chorus for the use of force will grow each year and will crescendo in the late 2020s, and possibly end in a violent clash to seize Taiwan and the Senkakus or any other area Beijing deems to be a core interest.

Recommendations Regarding Chinese Aggression

Given China’s strategic intention to restore its so-called territorial integrity, its modernization and transformation of the PLA, and its commitment to a pre-determined timeline prompt this final question: What can be done to dissuade, deter, or in the worst case, defeat a Chinese short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands?

Below are eight recommendations that fall into three categories: (1) those the United States must take on its own, (2) those Japan must take, and (3) those both countries must pursue jointly.

National Interest

First and foremost, President Donald J. Trump’s administration must fundamentally transform the U.S. national security culture in regard to China: it must move from a culture of accommodation and appeasement to one that acknowledges that China is the biggest threat to our national security interests.

Given the dire nature of not just the Senkaku Islands situation, but all the other diplomatic, financial, economic, legal, and human rights points of friction that have emerged since U.S.-PRC relations were established in 1979, America must now deal with the PRC from a position of strength. The United States must assert its core interests just as the PRC relentlessly does, if not more so.

The administration should declare that U.S.-China relations have entered a new period. President Trump need not explicitly reject the *new type of great power relationship* asserted by President Xi, but should implicitly reject it by affirming that the United States’ relationship with all countries, both great and small, is based on U.S. core interests in respect to international law, Westphalian sovereignty, and negotiated dispute resolution without coercion, with resort to third parties when bilateral negotiations fail. To this end, the U.S. government should

explicitly support the 12 July 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and explicitly reject all claims that conflict with it.

Regarding the Senkaku Islands, this means the United States must not simply say that the Senkaku Islands are covered under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty Mutual Cooperation and Security. The United States must say that it will actively and aggressively reinforce its commitment to use military force against China should China ever attempt to conduct a short, sharp war or occupation by military or nontraditional forces.

Finally, on this theme, as in 1947 when George F. Kennan penned the famous “Article X,” the current administration should articulate a new policy that describes a new U.S. approach to containing the PRC’s aggressive expansionism around the globe. This will require a clear break with the past 40 years of the Kissinger Doctrine, which has placed engagement, cooperation, and even appeasement as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy regarding China.

Assert UNCLOS Rights

Second, the Trump administration must actively and routinely reassert U.S. naval operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. There should be no more walking on eggshells, worrying about whether or not routine actions in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are provoking China. Beijing has deftly turned that fear into a tool to manipulate the United States. As an example, the U.S. Pacific Fleet should resume routine operations in the East China Sea, returning to pre-2000 levels where U.S. Navy warships routinely operated west of the median line, as well as in the Yellow Sea.

Adjust Policy

Third, while seemingly unrelated, the Trump administration should explore recalibrating the United States’ China policy. Regardless of whether we call it, as Beijing does, the One China Policy, or something else, the United States should be openly exploring new policy options, if for no other reason than to remind Beijing that threats to Japan will have far-ranging and significant consequences.

For instance, the notion that U.S. warships cannot make the occasional port call in Taiwan needs to be honestly examined, discussed with our friends in Taiwan, and—if deemed appropriate—executed without fanfare or advance notification. The message to China should be that freedom of navigation and free access to ports is a core interest of the United States and that America is not going to be constrained by Beijing’s threats.

Closely related to this topic, the United States must end the practice of unconstrained engagement with China by the Department of Defense (DOD).

Specifically, we should suspend China's invitation to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises until Beijing alters its threatening behavior, economic sanctions, hate campaigns, and rhetoric against our allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea. RIMPAC should be returned to its origins as an exercise by which the free nations of the world practice the combat skills necessary to deter lawless expansionism of dictatorships, rather than a naval social event. It is simply astonishing that periodically we did not invite a treaty ally because its form of democracy did not meet our standards (e.g., Thailand), yet we invite the Chinese and graciously host them even as they simultaneously aggress our allies and others.

Prepare for Contingencies

Fourth, President Trump and Congress must work together to adequately fund the DOD's return to a strategy that accommodates two major regional contingency operations, as it did during the Cold War. U.S. forces must be fully funded for the unique military requirements for fighting and defeating any PRC attempt to take the Senkakus, as well as for another major attack against the United States or our allies and interests.

In this regard, America needs to return to being a truly global maritime power. America's elected officials carelessly neglected this vital aspect of our national power during the past two-plus decades of emphasis on the Southwest Asia (U.S. Central Command) area of responsibility. While the U.S. Navy can dispatch ships around the globe, today, the Navy is not adequately sized or outfitted to meet U.S. national security requirements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Even worse, it is certainly debatable whether or not the United States could stop a Chinese short, sharp war against the Senkaku Islands. The PLA Navy likely will have more than 500 ships and submarines by 2030. To provide a credible deterrent force and to fight and win wars at sea, the U.S. Navy must get bigger—a lot bigger than the current plan for 350 ships.

Commit to Forward Deployment

Fifth, the Trump administration should proclaim its commitment to a forward-deployed presence, especially for our naval forces, and then it should follow these words with concrete, tangible actions. Not only are these necessary to bolster the flagging confidence of U.S. allies, it will also send a clear and unambiguous statement to China. In addition to the current forward-deployed force structure, new options can also range from home porting a second U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Guam to home porting ships in South Korea, and forward deploying ballistic missile defense systems (e.g., Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD) in Japan.

Increase Public's Situational Awareness

Sixth, and closely aligned with the forward deployment commitment, the United States should conduct a more robust and public information campaign to accurately portray China's plans to expand its maritime sovereignty at the expense of its neighbors and our allies, and to counter Chinese propaganda and political warfare designed to neutralize resistance to its aggression.

While the introduction of the Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Northrop Grumman's soon-to-be-deployed MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicle have improved DOD collection capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, overall the United States has displayed a conspicuous lack of will to publicly report the PRC's actions in the maritime domain. For instance, during the recent deployment of China's aircraft carrier *Liaoning* (Type 001), U.S. Pacific Command did not provide unclassified pictures of China's inaugural carrier flight operations in the open ocean, even though reconnaissance flights had most probably been conducted.

There is a tremendous amount of scholarly documentation regarding China's military pursuits, led by experts in think tanks and academia, but even this research is grossly inadequate for truly understanding China's military.⁸⁸ Although this information shortfall cannot be faulted due to the secret nature of many of the movements of Chinese naval, coast guard, and militia forces across the vastness of the world's oceans, we do have institutions whose primary mission is to observe such activities and to compile databases regarding these activities.

It is a responsibility of the U.S. Navy to know the answers to these secrets, to track ships, submarines, and aircraft at sea. U.S. Navy intelligence has the capability and capacity to provide the kinds of primary source material that the academic and think tank community needs to better and effectively comprehend China's nautical ambitions.⁸⁹ Sharing sanitized and declassified information "would not only improve the quality of scholarship and elevate the public debate, it would also go a long way to help frustrate China's current—and, to date, unanswered—strategy of quiet, coercive-expansion," especially as it relates to China's tightening noose around the Senkaku Islands.⁹⁰

Sharing facts about Chinese activities at sea is not just good for democracy, but it is also smart diplomacy. Making such information widely available would help counter spurious Chinese narratives of American actions as being the root cause of instability in the western Pacific. Both outcomes are in our national interest.

According to U.S. doctrine, a campaign's phase zero (shaping operations), are intended to shape the public perception environment, which should also drive what an adversary military can and cannot do. By allowing China to operate clandestinely in the South and East China Seas, the United States is forgoing

an important opportunity of increasing its own soft power while degrading China's soft power. By providing such damaging information to the public, the U.S. Navy will better inform the public and provide U.S. leadership with bargaining leverage over China.

Encourage Japanese Occupation

Seventh, Japan should physically occupy the Senkaku Islands. Some will suggest that by adopting such a strategy Japan would cross a red line and thus force China to act militarily. However, given China's methodological approach to military campaign planning, it is more likely that Beijing would reconsider the military correlation of forces, as well as the international implications of launching an attack against occupied islands.

Practically speaking, Japan should construct permanent facilities, such as a weather station, lighthouses, heliports, and a harbor, across the Senkakus, as well as station personnel on the islands. The effect of Japan taking these actions on the islands today will lead to deterrence in the future.

[A] proactive policy is necessary now. Proactive does not mean aggressive (just as caution, in this case, has not translated into greater security). Indeed, one cannot be "aggressive" in exercising one's sovereign rights over one's own territory. Proactive is thoughtful and consistent—and the time has come to move away from caution and towards a proactive approach to securing the Senkakus as the rightful territory of Japan.⁹¹

Preparation and Defense

Eighth, the United States should offer Japan to conduct joint operations in defense of the Senkaku Islands. The basic tenet of an alliance is that aggression against one is an attack on all, but the PRC aims to reduce our alliances to friendship agreements. The statement that the "U.S. takes no sides" on a sovereignty dispute involving an ally is illogical; an alliance is the taking of a side. Like the term *marriage*, the term *treaty alliance* means something. Disingenuous quibbling over issues such as the sovereignty of Scarborough Reef, Mischief Reef, and the Senkakus is an invitation for China's expansionism. China has become bold in its campaign to diminish the Japan-America Security Alliance.

For instance, U.S. Pacific warships could conduct over-the-horizon patrols of the Senkaku Islands with their counterparts from Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and Japan Coast Guard. Likewise, American fighter aircraft from the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could be integrated with their counterparts from the JASDF when scrambling against Chinese probes of Japan's ADIZ and the areas around the Senkaku Islands.

Perhaps most important, U.S. Marines and the amphibious-trained Japanese Ground Self Defense Force Southwest Army should conduct amphibious assault training exercises together in the Senkakus to demonstrate that, if the islands were occupied by Chinese forces, the combined U.S. and Japan forces have the capability and will to retake the islands with boots on the ground and bayonets.

By offering this joint operational support, the United States would not only be helping to relieve the stress that Japanese counterparts are experiencing, but it would be a significant enhancement in the interoperability between both forces. Finally, it would send another clear and unambiguous signal to China that if it was foolish enough to attempt such an attack, it would be facing an extremely integrated, competent, and committed fighting force.

While building the United States' and Japan's military interoperability is essential, the two nations should also reach out to other allies in the region to bring them into a broader coalition of nations. This will send the PRC an unambiguous message that any effort to take the Senkaku Islands by force will be met by a larger force of like-minded nations that respect the rule of law and the right to freedom and liberty. Nations such as Australia, India, and Korea all share these same fundamental views and thus should be solicited now for their support in a worst-case scenario for the future.

Conclusion

PRC action against the Senkaku Islands is just a matter of time. An incident precipitating such action could occur at any time, especially with the vastly increased, near-daily PRC provocations in the vicinity of the islands, but more likely as we begin the decade of concern. From 2020 to 2030, it will become increasingly likely that China could launch a short, sharp war to take the Senkaku Islands and put Japan's Nansei Shoto region under missile and air assault. Japan and the United States must take proactive steps now to ensure their allied response does not reflect the arrogance and ineptitude of the March 2017 Senkakus Wargame previously described. For the sake of long-term peace, stability, and freedom in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, Japan and the United States must develop the credible capability to dissuade, deter, and defeat the PRC's increasingly threatening behavior and a seemingly inevitable attack to take the Senkakus.

Notes

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Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty-first Century No Longer Just an Academic Endeavor

José de Arimatéia da Cruz

Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State. By Seth G. Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 352. \$29.95 (hardcover).

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War. By Conrad C. Crane. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pp. 320. \$39.95 (hardcover).

Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq. By William R. Polk. New York: Harper Collins, 2007. Pp. 304. \$15.99 (paperback); \$7.99 (e-book).

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History. By Jeremy Black. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. Pp. 288. \$89.00 (hardcover); \$35.00 (paperback); \$33.00 (e-book).

The study of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) is no longer just an intellectual exercise. It is a necessity, given that the United States is currently involved in several conflicts that fall outside of traditional nation-state-to-nation-state direct warfare. As William R. Polk wrote in *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq*, “Americans are learning to their great and growing cost, insurgency is more than a topic of historical research” (p. 202). According to Adam Kredo, “as America’s

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\$117 billion war in Afghanistan enters its sixteenth year—making it the longest war in U.S. history—conflict casualties have hit an all-time high, calling into question the U.S. strategy in the country, where Taliban terrorists still control a third of the nation and corruption runs rampant.”²¹ In a recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis stated, “we are not winning in Afghanistan. We will correct that.”²² The U.S. government and its armed forces have been involved in Iraq since its invasion in 2003 and have spent more than \$100 billion, yet the country is still unsecured. As the United States continues its involvement in the Middle East and several other locations, an understanding of what an insurgency stands for and its objectives, goals, tactics, and strategies becomes even more necessary to the men and women being deployed to faraway lands. Counterinsurgency must be developed to address the issues and concerns of the local population as well as insurgents. As Mao Zedong wrote in *Yu Chi Chan* [On Guerrilla Warfare], “Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.”²³

The traditional approach to counterinsurgency of more money and more U.S. troop deployments does not and will not work. Therefore, it is mandatory that lessons learned from previous insurgency operations be revisited, adapted, and adopted to the realities of this age of conflicts. The four books under review here attempt to provide guidance in their own way to the future of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century, as it will be a permanent feature of international relations.

Seth G. Jones’s *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State* seeks to better understand how groups start, wage, and end insurgencies. Jones asks several questions:

- What factors contribute to the rise of an insurgency?
- What are the key components involved in conducting an insurgency?
- What factors contribute to the end of insurgencies?
- What do answers to these questions mean for the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare? (p. 4)

Jones, who is the director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at Rand Corporation, defines an *insurgency* as “a political and military campaign by a nonstate group (or groups) to overthrow a regime or secede from a country” (p. 7). From that perspective, an insurgency is a clandestine organization whose primary goal is to undermine the state’s authority and defeat its will. Jones’s definition of insurgency carries with it several components. First, a key characteristic of insurgencies is their nonstate status. Because insurgents are nonstate actors,

they owe no loyalty to those in power; therefore, an insurgency is differentiated from an interstate conflict, which involves war between two or more states (p. 7). Second, insurgencies are not your Boy Scout or Girl Scout groups; an insurgency's primary modus operandi is violence, since it cannot win a direct conflict with a nation-state and its professional military. This violence is indiscriminate; to achieve their objectives, insurgencies will target government authorities as well as the innocent. Finally, according to Jones, insurgent groups have political objectives and seek to govern a specific territory by overthrowing a regime or seceding from a country. The current situation in the Middle East regarding the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), comes immediately to mind; ISIL is an example of an organization that has wreaked havoc in several countries to gain power and establish its caliphate.⁴

Insurgencies do not operate in a vacuum. Every one of their actions is responded to by an opposite action through counterinsurgency. Jones defines *counterinsurgency* as “a political-military campaign to prevent insurgent groups from overthrowing a regime or seceding from a country” (p. 9). Counterinsurgencies include a variety of techniques and approaches best suited to accomplish their objectives. For example, counterinsurgencies may include, but are not limited to, political, security, economic, psychological, and civilian actions—all aimed at weakening insurgencies and bolstering the government's legitimacy as the protector of the population under attack (p. 9). Regardless of the methods used, it is important to keep one thing in mind: the importance of treating the population with kindness cannot be overemphasized. As Mao pointed out, “if historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary guerrilla war, it is that military measures alone will not suffice. . . . The fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.”⁵ While some citizens join an insurgency due to sympathy to its cause, others may join due to fear or force. Regardless of the reason, they are still citizens and members of the society under attack by the insurgency. Therefore, as Sun Tzu points out in his classic *Art of War*, “treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them [for our use]. This is referred to as ‘conquering the enemy and growing stronger.’”⁶

Jones's book uses both quantitative and qualitative data, thus, in nine chapters, providing readers with a wealth of information traditionally ignored in other studies. After an introduction to the topic and some operational definitions, Jones examines the barriers to commencing an insurgency and the factors most likely to give one its lifeblood. He informs his analysis with a number of quantitative and qualitative data on the causes of insurgency, including statements and writings of insurgent leaders. Based on Jones's assessment, three sets of factors increase the probability of an insurgency: grievances tied to a handful

of specific conditions, weak governance, and greed (p. 18). Insurgents not only want to overthrow legitimate governments, they also want to show that they are the population's only saviors. Jones quotes Argentine Marxist revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who said, "We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer . . . and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery."⁷

Jones then investigates the strategies used by insurgents, noting the British soldier and military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart's definition of *strategy* as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."⁸ Strategy, in other words, "is the use of engagements for the object of the war."⁹ The primary goal of a guerrilla strategy is to defeat the will of the legitimate government while gaining the sympathy of the population for its cause(s). Insurgents have the following strategy options, according to Jones: guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, or punishment. Conventional warfare "involves the use of insurgent forces to capture or destroy the government's armed forces, thereby gaining control of the government's values. . . . The goal is to win the war in a decisive engagement or a series of battles by destroying the adversary's physical capacity to resist" (p. 43). In their attempts to destroy the adversary's physical capacity, insurgents usually adopt a direct confrontation stance against the enemies, which could result in complete annihilation of the insurgent forces, given that the legitimate government's armed forces have superior hardware capability. Therefore, insurgents traditionally adopt either the strategy of guerrilla warfare or punishment. Guerrilla warfare is an attempt by insurgents to defeat the will of the government by mobilizing the civilian population, undermining government support, and raising the cost of continued conflict.

Guerrilla warfare resembles what Robert Taber calls the *war of the flea*. According to this analogy, "the military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough—this is the theory—the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws."¹⁰

While punishment is a strategy available to insurgents, it can backfire against them. Punishment involves the "deliberate targeting of noncombatants, such as killing civilians or destroying infrastructure in order to raise the societal cost of continued resistance and coerce the government to concede to insurgent demands" (p. 47). If the cost of punishment outweighs its utility, why would insurgents resort to punishment? According to Jones, there are several reasons to adopt a punishment campaign: (1) to coerce locals in the areas they do not control by baiting the government into overreacting, (2) to minimize the cost of brutality in cases where the government has abundant resources to finance

warfare, (3) to sow discord and disorder among government officials, and (4) as a strategy for ideological reasons (pp. 50–51).

In chapter 4, Jones analyzes the battlefield tactics available to insurgents in their attempts to undermine the authority of the state. Jones defines *tactics* as the employment and arrangement of forces in battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy in an insurgency (p. 58). In other words, tactics “are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives,” as argued by Guevara.¹¹ Insurgents use the following tactics to achieve their objectives: ambushes and raids, subversion and sabotage, assassination, mutilation, kidnappings, and bombings. Jones also points out some recent trends in tactics being used by insurgency groups. In the last two decades, we have witnessed insurgency groups operating with greater lethality, that is, the frequency and total number of individuals killed by their attacks have reached an indiscriminate proportion. Also, insurgency groups have taken their attacks to the streets of major cities. Insurgency conflicts in the twenty-first century will occur less in remote places in Southeast Asia or Africa. Insurgent groups have taken their conflict to major urban areas of the world.¹² Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian Marxist revolutionary and writer, in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, also pointed out that as insurgency groups take their combat to the major urban centers, a new type of urban guerrilla emerges, that of *urban guerrilla demonstrator*. According to Marighella, the urban guerrilla demonstrator “joins the ranks and participates in popular marches with specific and definite aims. . . . The urban guerrilla demonstrator must also initiate the *net within the net*, ransacking government vehicles, official cars and police vehicles before turning them over or setting fire to them.”¹³

Next, Jones looks at the organizational structure of insurgencies. What are the challenges encountered by the groups to maintain legitimacy in the face of adversity? Jones discusses one of the most challenging problems to any insurgency group, namely, collective action and principal-agent problems. The issue of centralization and decentralization as applied to insurgency organizational structure are also discussed. Jones next focuses on the propaganda and information tactics used by insurgents to spread their heinous messages to prospective recruits. The insurgencies of the twenty-first century will be quite different in their approach to spreading their messages, thanks to the development of new means of communication, especially with the advancement of the internet and peer-to-peer methods of communication, such as instant messaging through Twitter, FaceTime, and other digital outlets. Insurgencies use the internet as well as all other means of communication to carry out their information campaigns. Jones defines *information campaign* as the insurgent’s “efforts to spread information to aid the insurgent’s cause, inflict damage, or otherwise undermine counterinsurgents and their supports, influence local and international audienc-

es, and achieve other goals” (p. 116). The importance of communication cannot be underestimated in a conflict. Insurgent groups are using the internet not only to disseminate their heinous messages but also as a tool for proselytizing, recruiting, and fund-raising among their diaspora spread all over the world.¹⁴

Jones’s chapter 7 is an important one. It addresses the impact of outside support from state and nonstate actors on the survival of an insurgency. Support for an insurgency can come from nation-states, great powers, and neighboring states. Diaspora also plays an important function in an insurgency’s success. According to Jones, diaspora support is fairly common in insurgencies, especially from ethnic kin, religious affiliates, and exiled elites (p. 139). In his final chapters, Jones highlights the factors that contribute to the increase and odds of insurgent victory and outlines the implications for counterinsurgency warfare. He reaches the important conclusion that “insurgency and counterinsurgency will remain alive and well for the foreseeable future. The challenge, then, is to better understand this type of warfare: what causes insurgencies, how to organize insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, what strategies and tactics to use, how to utilize information operations and propaganda, how to secure outside support, and how insurgencies end” (p. 203).

The world, especially the United States as a nation and its governmental institutions, changed after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the crash of Flight 93. While the 9/11 attacks prompted the U.S. government to take a proactive role in its fight against international terrorism with the launching of the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine did not change despite a need to rethink insurgency and counterinsurgency in light of new enemies and new strategies and tactics.

Conrad C. Crane writes that his *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* is “a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally in the right direction for the right reasons, and an attempt to draw insights from that experience about future conflict” (p. 5). *Cassandra in Oz* also offers a first-hand account of Crane’s personal journey and vicissitudes into the publication of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ 2013 *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24). Crane, like Jones, believes that insurgency and counterinsurgency will be a permanent fixture of international relations in the years to come. Crane explains that, after the defeat of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, Army schools were directed to throw away their counterinsurgency files. However, the 1980s conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador reenergized the U.S. Army to rethink its operational strategies. Counterinsurgency received an intellectual boost again with military leaders revisiting their doctrinal guidelines (p. 45). One important concept introduced by Crane’s *Cassandra in Oz* is the idea of modern counterinsurgency’s complexity resembling a *mosaic war* (p. 61). Crane

defines a mosaic war as one in which “each piece of the conflict is different from each other. You may be fighting several elements within a country.”¹⁵ In such a complex and chaotic environment, “mosaic wars require a mosaic peace, the elements of which can vary significantly from village to village, region to region” (p. 245). Counterinsurgency, according to Crane, is made up of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” in this mosaic war.¹⁶ In its attempts to deal with insurgency groups, the U.S. government must deal with “different parts of each insurgency, which the manual [FM 3-24] lists as movement leaders, combatants, the political cadre, supporting auxiliaries, and a mass base” (p. 104).

Crane concludes with a list of thought-provoking observations regarding where the American military has been and where it should be going, including the following:

- There are two approaches to warfare—asymmetric and stupid.
- Conflict termination has become even more difficult and thus outcomes even more uncertain (mosaic war and mosaic peace concepts).
- Decapitation strategies are a two-edged sword. Think of the current situation in Iraq in light of the execution of its former president, Saddam Hussein; you may eliminate the head of an organization, but who replaces him becomes a major question.
- Legitimacy does not grow out of the barrel of an American gun.
- In COIN the most important decisions are made by politicians, not generals.
- In irregular conflict, you must be able to disaggregate your friends as well as your enemies.
- In irregular wars, if you think you are winning, you might be; if you think you are losing, you are.
- Precision targeting is not always the answer.
- Who controls the ground controls the message.
- Special operations forces have succumbed too much to the lure of direct action.
- Modern social media can “swarm” disruption but not control.
- We do suffer from *infobesity*, but we still do not have enough intelligence (pp. 245–55).¹⁷

In his final analysis, Crane, like Jones, recognizes that insurgency and counterinsurgency are here to stay and have become an integral part of international

affairs. Crane succinctly argues that “as the American military moves forward into an uncertain future, it needs to build on the insights gained from over a decade of war, not discard them or neglect them. It needs to continue the process of learning, adaptation, and anticipation that is the only real guarantee of success in future conflicts” (p. 255).

William R. Polk’s *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq* is a tour de force, tracing the history of insurgencies starting with America’s struggle for independence and concluding with the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Polk argues that “different cultures, ideologies, and degrees of political consciousness among insurgents and also among their foreign overlords . . . have shaped the nature of struggles all over the world during the last three centuries” (p. xiv). While other writers such as Jones and Crane see insurgencies rising due to a multitude of grievances, Polk argues that “the heart of insurgency is essentially anti-foreign,” which is the central thesis of *Violent Politics* (p. xv). Each of Polk’s 11 chapters is designed to show how a particular climate of insurgency was created, how an outbreak of violence was triggered, the stages through which the insurgents progressed, and finally the outcome of each struggle. Polk argues that an insurgency does not arise out of nothing (i.e., a creation ex nihilo). Insurgencies progress through three phases, according to Polk. The first phase is often characterized by an increase in violence; Polk calls it “terrorism.” During this phase of an insurgency creation, both the insurgency and the government “gain critical mass for extended operations and achieves recognition as the national champion” (p. xxi).

According to Marighella, it is worthwhile remembering that terrorism today may no longer have as negative a meaning as it used to have.¹⁸ Marighella states that “to be violent or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship or its atrocities.”¹⁹ During the second phase of an insurgency uprising, an insurgency comes about when the combatants disrupt the administration of the dominant power and its local allies. Quoting French Colonel (later General) Joseph-Simon Gallieni, Polk introduces the concept of *tache d’huile*, or oil spot (p. xxii). *Tache d’huile* is the idea that once an insurgency controls a village or district, it will merge into other spots already under its control until the whole country is under its control. The current situations in Iraq and Libya in regard to ISIS/ISIL illustrate this concept in the twenty-first century. Under the second phase, insurgencies that are successful create “anti-administrations, anti-economies, and ultimately anti-governments for their increasingly large groups of fighters and even larger groups of supporters” (p. xxiv). In the third and final phase of an insurgency, the bulk of the fighting takes place, thus dividing the country between rebel

forces and government. The fight does not have to lead to a full-blown direct confrontation in which there will be a winner or loser. During the third phase, the fighting resembles Taber's war of the flea. As pointed out by Polk, "what starts as a local infestation must become an epidemic, as one by one the areas of resistance link up, like spreading ink spots on a blotter" (p. xxiv).

Polk also discussed the creation of *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24), however, he is not as congratulatory as Crane in his assessment. Polk posed three questions to Lieutenant Generals David H. Petraeus, USA, and James F. Amos, USMC, signatories of the manual. First, "will COIN create a new and more attractive society?" Polk points out that "when foreign troops move into a country and shatter its existing civic order . . . they are more apt to create chaos than reform" (p. 215). Second, "for all the hype surrounding its proclamation, is this 'doctrine' of COIN new?" Again, Polk is critical in his response; he writes, "the short answer is no. Essentially it is a rehash of the counterinsurgency program employed in Vietnam in the 1960s and in Palestine today" (p. 215). The third and final question is "does it [COIN] bring acceptance or at least acquiescence?" Polk once again responds in the negative: "Those who espouse counterinsurgency have yet to show a single example where it worked" (p. 215). Finally, Polk also warns the United States not to get involved in another conflict, this time with the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Washington politicians and pundits are hawkish toward Iran, and former president George W. Bush even labeled Iran a part of the "Axis of Evil" in January 2002, Polk cautions the United States that, if it were to get involved in Iran's affairs, "the guerrilla war into which we would plunge would make the Iraq war seem like a picnic" (p. 227).

Like Polk's *Violent Politics*, Jeremy Black's *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History* is also a tour de force, discussing the historical evolution of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The book takes a chronological approach to the rise of insurgencies, thus making it possible to consider how and why lessons were learned. According to Black, by taking a chronological approach to the study of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, scholars and researchers "gain a clearer understanding of what we are dealing with—over time, geographical spread, and type of insurgency. The more samples, the stronger and safer the conclusions" (p. xi). While many authors attempt to define what an insurgency is or is not, Black argues that insurgencies "defy categorization because there are so many different groups, with contrasting ideologies and objectives, opposed to each other as well as to the regime they oppose" (p. 4). In other words, insurgencies are not a monolithic group. Despite their common objectives, which are to undermine the legitimate government in power and ultimately overthrow it, insurgencies are not all the same. Therefore, a counterinsurgency may work in one area and not work in another. Another problem

pointed out by Black regarding insurgencies is that “there is the extent to which insurgencies, as it were, can be directed against other insurgencies” (p. 5).

Finally, Black points to the overlap of criminality and insurgencies in the post–Cold War international system. While drug cartel and international criminal organizations may have been involved with insurgencies in the past, only recently have scholars started to pay attention to their symbiosis.²⁰ Black also concludes with a series of observations certainly worthy of consideration. First, Black argues that religious animosity will continue to be a key feature of insurgencies in the future. As Black points out, “religious strife and ethnicity are manipulated by political leaders” (p. 232). Another key feature of insurgencies in the twenty-first century will be the concept of *pinch points*. Pinch points are essentially stressors that can lead to centrifugal forces—which could be resource allocation such as land, water, food, fuel, and government jobs—thus creating a perfect storm of conflicts. In conclusion, Black argues that “the continuing significance of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, both in themselves and due to their wider ramifications, ensure that they require study, and without political blinkers, national prejudices, or conceptual and historiographical confusion” (p. 240).

In conclusion, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are a reality for many national governments. The United States is no exception and is learning the hard way, at great and growing cost, that insurgency and counterinsurgency is more than a topic of historical research and an academic endeavor. It is the new reality of the twenty-first century and likely for centuries to come. Insurgencies will use all of their available tools—political, informational, military, and economic—to achieve their objectives. Counterinsurgency, however, “will use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging.”²¹ Welcome to the “brave new world” at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Notes

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9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 74.
10. Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), 20.
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12. For an excellent discussion of the future of conflict in megacities, see *Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future* (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, 2014).
13. Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Lexington, KY: CreateSpace, 2011), 62, italics in original.
14. As David Galula pointed out in his classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT; Praeger Security International, 1964), propaganda is a powerful weapon for insurgencies. According to Galula, “the insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does” (p. 9).
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BOOK REVIEWS

American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy. By Paul D. Miller. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016. Pp. 336. \$32.95 (hardcover, paperback, and e-book).

Paul D. Miller has written a timely and extremely important book. At a time of vigorous debate about “America First” and America’s role in the world, he mounts a vigorous defense of strengthening and expanding the international order that the United States helped create after World War II. Moreover, as the title indicates, Miller argues that doing so is actually a conservative grand strategy that will increase America’s power, protect its borders and economy, and help it live up to the values that have guided the country since independence.

Miller has the academic and experiential credentials to speak on all of these issues. A Georgetown-educated political scientist and distinguished scholar at the University of Texas at Austin, he is also a veteran of the Afghanistan War, a former CIA analyst, and a former director of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council staff under both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama. These experiences give his work a strategic perspective that is usually absent in both academic and military writing. His is the best kind of political science: grounded in practice, clearly written, theoretically nuanced, and historically informed.

The author’s principal argument is that defending liberalism outside America’s borders is not dewy-eyed idealism, but quite simply the best way to protect American interests in a globally interdependent world. He rejects the “restraint” school of foreign policy, whose proponents argue that the United States is overextended and unproductively involved in overseas military adventures, by arguing that there is no reasonable way to withdraw from the world without endangering American lives and prosperity. Instead, he claims, “American security and liberal order are mutually constitutive: Liberal order is the outer perimeter of American security and American power upholds liberal order. Policymakers should understand threats to liberal order to be indirect threats to the United States itself” (p. 17). The argument is convincing in some cases and less so in others, but Miller’s scholarly rigor and thoughtful, lucid prose will make the book valuable even for his critics.

The argument unfolds in four parts. Part one offers a framework for evaluating the United States' role in the world since 1776 and discusses the major schools of thought on how interests and values should guide that role. Part two tackles the contemporary security environment and offers a spirited and nuanced argument for why defending the liberal order is congruous with conservative principles. Part three applies Miller's brand of *conservative internationalism*—a term he borrows from Henry R. Nau but improves upon—to the United States' major strategic challenges in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The final section, part four, explores the benefits of specific instruments of power, with an emphasis on the instruments too many conservatives love to hate: diplomacy and development.

Nonacademic audiences might puzzle over the title at first (How can defending the liberal order be a conservative grand strategy?), but readers should not misunderstand. Miller is not speaking of the progressive domestic policies of the Democratic Party, but of *liberalism*, that set of political ideas that emerged in the Enlightenment and endorsed free markets and majoritarian political systems that protect minority and individual rights. Thus, he argues that Americans' actions to promote a global liberal order are almost as old as the nation itself. On this point, he overstates the case slightly, but this is just an issue of interpretation, not of fact. Expanding the liberal order is conservative, he claims, because it helps advance the agenda so many conservatives claim to champion: enhancing physical security, improving conditions for wealth creation, and aligning foreign policy with Christian values.

Branding liberal internationalism as “conservative” is neither outrageous nor particularly new. *Realpolitik* appeals for defending the liberal order were frequent and familiar in the political discourse of both Republicans and Democrats during the Cold War and afterward. In fact, at least since 1945, there has been a bipartisan consensus on the benefits of global engagement among all serious foreign policy thinkers, even when that engagement helped lead the United States into ill-conceived wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Those wars may explain why the bipartisan consensus is now under threat, and perhaps the greatest service of Miller's book is its heartfelt plea that Americans not abandon the global infrastructure that has sustained American power for 70 years just because of a few recent, but costly, missteps.

The book is most provocative on the subject that the author knows best—Afghanistan—and it is clear that Miller has given considerable thought on how to balance cost against goals in the difficult terrain of the Hindu Kush. In a move that seems hard to square with his call to pursue only “the cheapest, easiest, or most strategically relevant opportunities to spread liberalism,” he argues that the United States should not only remain in Afghanistan but should increase its military presence there for another decade or more (p. 119). With a

falling dominos argument that scholars of Vietnam will recognize, he argues that failure in Afghanistan will affect numerous other U.S. interests: “Pakistan’s stability, the security of its nuclear weapons, the U.S.-Indian relationship, NATO’s credibility, relations with Iran and Russia, transnational drug-trafficking networks, worldwide democracy, and humanitarian concerns” (p. 185). This claim is technically accurate. Afghanistan does affect all of these things, as do myriad other factors, but the principal strategic questions facing the United States are not *whether* Afghanistan affects broader interests but *how much*. What other tools does the United States have for protecting those interests? And most important, what is the likelihood of accomplishing the goals Miller seeks? After nearly \$1 trillion and 16 years of trying, one thing is clear: the earlier approaches—small footprint counterterrorism efforts from 2002–8, costly counterinsurgency operations from 2009–11, transition to Afghan control after 2011—have not yielded the outcomes American leaders sought. Miller acknowledges these realities and fairly catalogs the mistakes of both presidential administrations, but he still holds out hope that a few thousand more troops and a major increase in targeted foreign aid can set Afghanistan on a path to securing and governing itself responsibly.

He may be right, but the trends of the past 16 years—and indeed, the history of the Soviet occupation and the three Anglo-Afghan wars that preceded it—suggest otherwise. Nothing in Afghanistan’s history suggests that the Taliban will make a rational decision to abandon the fight because Pashtuns have a powerful culture of honor that demands resistance to foreign occupation. In fact, the presence of foreigners is precisely the fuel that keeps them fighting. That is why the number of Taliban attacks rose every year that the United States increased its troops in Afghanistan, even when the numbers crested 100,000 at a cost of \$100 billion per year.

On Iraq and ISIS, Miller is similarly thoughtful and hawkish, though his critique of President Obama’s failure to keep troops in Iraq, which he calls an “astonishing diplomatic failure,” is perhaps a bit over the top. Informed readers will recall that President Bush started a war of choice in Iraq, bungled it to the point of civil war, agreed to remove all troops by 2011, and then handed the war off to the new president in the middle of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Blaming President Obama for not reversing President Bush’s agreement with the Iraqi government is a bit like driving a ship into an iceberg and then blaming the Coast Guard when it sinks.

Readers should not take these interpretive disagreements as major criticisms of the book, which has a far broader sweep than just Afghanistan or Iraq. In fact, the author tackles nearly every security challenge that the United States currently faces—ISIS, nuclear-armed autocracies, and piracy and state failure in Africa—with lucid explanations and thoughtful, pragmatic recommendations.

Particularly welcome is Miller's insistence on delivering better and more development aid, advice that pushes back directly on the White House's recent and inexplicable calls for massive reductions in the State Department's budget. Best of all, Miller's even-handed analysis shows that whether one identifies as liberal, conservative, or politically agnostic, defending liberal institutions truly puts America first in ways that most presidents from both parties have understood since the end of WWII. It is a must read both for specialists and general audiences interested in foreign policy, grand strategy, terrorism, and the United States' role in the world.

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Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow: The Strategic Air Command and American War Plans at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, 1945–1950. By John M. Curatola. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2016. Pp. 236. \$29.95 (paperback).

In August 1945, Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers released nuclear bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, demonstrating an unparalleled force to every other nation on earth. In possession of this nuclear monopoly, America's civil and military leadership embraced this deterrent force in policy statements and war plans. Moreover, the citizenry believed the deterrent—in the form of the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC)—to be competent and capable of conducting massive nuclear strikes. From 1945 to 1950, however, nothing could have been further from the truth, as historian John M. Curatola reveals in his book, *Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow: The Strategic Air Command and American War Plans at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, 1945–1950*. The son of a career Air Force officer who worked in the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Curatola retired as a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and is currently an associate professor in the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a doctorate in history from the University of Kansas in 2008; this book is a revision of his doctoral dissertation.

As a logistician-turned-historian, Curatola's highly accessible, efficiently written, and cogently argued work convincingly unveils how the United States' nuclear plans and abilities from 1945 to 1950 resembled nothing more than a grand illusion. Curatola examines the state of both the U.S. nuclear capability in the immediate postwar years of the late 1940s and the birth of the SAC. While

other scholarship into SAC's development and America's nuclear deterrent acknowledges deficiencies in the 1945–50 period, Curatola's top-to-bottom examination and analysis—from the actual weapons themselves to the makers of national policy at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—convincingly demonstrates the severity of the deficiencies. He concludes the nation's "atomic shield" resembled "little more than a 'paper tiger'" (p. 21) with both the atomic capabilities and "ability to prosecute atomic warfare [as] . . . largely an illusion" (p. 5). "From 1945 until 1950," writes Curatola, "American nuclear strategy was adrift and uncoordinated despite the public's belief that the United States was secure with its atomic monopoly" (p. 21). Furthermore, this inability to align the nation's "ends-ways-means reflects the broken nature of national security policy regarding atomic weapons during this time and provides a lesson in dysfunctional civilian-military relations" (p. 22).

Curatola organizes his work into three broad parts about the atomic bomb, postwar American war planning, and SAC. The first part examines custodial control of atomic weapons, civil-military squabbles and bureaucratic conflict between the civilian Atomic Energy Commission and the uniformed Military Liaison Committee, and the technical problems of the Mark III bomb and developing a usable stockpile of viable weapons. For the middle act, Curatola analyzes and dissects declassified war plans to understand military thinking about the use of atomic weapons, analysis of the strategic bombing campaigns in the war itself (notably their contribution as *a* factor rather than *the* factor of victory), and the envisioned end states for similar aerial atomic offensives directed against the Soviet Union. The plans did not align with national goals and objectives, nor did they factor in the logistical realities of weapons, personnel, or aircraft. In the final part, the author studies the creation of the SAC and its bifurcated issues of aircrew competency and the aircraft destined to conduct the atomic strikes in detail through the lens of leadership and logistical realities. A strong concluding chapter brings these three parts to a logical confluence and places things in perspective with the improvements that emerge in the 1950s.

The author grounds his analysis in objective use of numerical data and careful reasoning. The entire manuscript rests on a solid base of research, drawing upon archival materials from the Air Force, the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower presidential libraries, Library of Congress, Yale University, and George Washington University's National Security Archive. Curatola consults published primary and secondary sources, including official government histories, scholarly works from federal and academic historians, and published government papers, assorted periodicals, journal articles, and electronic sources. Throughout the book, he consistently illustrates how period war plans waxed optimistic or relied on false assumptions and how National Security Council policy documents provided nebulous guidance as to end states following a nu-

clear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Choice quotes and carefully selected examples utilized in the analysis show just how fragile and dysfunctional the entire national nuclear capability actually was during the period of American atomic monopoly. The monopoly arguably proved a hallucinogen, placing public and policy maker trust in a state of gaiety; only the announcement of a Soviet atomic bomb sobered up the masses to the limitations of the nation's atomic program.

Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow alters a critical misperception of military preparedness in the early Cold War. More importantly, the fractious nature of civil-military relationships, inter-Service arguments over limited resources, and disconnect between actual ends-ways-means is a story with uncomfortable parallels with the present. After a spate of Air Force incidents with nuclear weapons handling and performance, a post-Cold War SAC reemerged in 2009 in the form of Global Strike Command. Alas, unflattering press about unprofessional conduct by Air Force missileers and senior officers, poor readiness evaluations, and inflating costs to replace legacy systems of the nuclear triad are joined by deeper questions about nuclear policy and efforts to control proliferation. America's nuclear forces confront problems not dissimilar to those of the late 1940s; once again, the infusion of funding, leadership, and coherent policy are the keys to ensuring America's nuclear deterrent remains second to none.

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Does Terrorism Work? A History. By Richard English. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 512. \$39.95 (hardcover).

Some questions are easier to ask than to answer, such as the one posed by Richard English, a historian and political violence scholar, in the title of his book: *Does Terrorism Work?* As English notes, this question is not new. It has, in fact, been emphatically answered in both the affirmative and the negative by a wide range of accomplished scholars. Understanding the considerable disagreement on such a fundamental question is the first order of business. To do so, English identifies two points that require further refinement.

First, the title question requires nuance to answer. Scholars will invariably reach alternative conclusions if they fail to communicate what it means for terrorism to "work." There are, as English writes, a variety of inherent subquestions bound up in this broader inquiry. Success can mean different things. To

address this, English outlines a systematic framework that encompasses four levels on which terrorism can succeed:

1. Strategic victory, in which an organization reaches its primary objective(s)
2. Partial strategic success, during which an organization achieves substantial gains related to primary goals, achieves secondary goals, or prevents adversaries from reaching their goals
3. Tactical success, which encompasses a wide spectrum of objectives, including securing publicity, temporary concessions, organizational benefits (e.g., resolve among the rank and file), or operational victories
4. Inherent rewards, in which individuals obtain value from participation in terrorism

Second, to answer the question of terrorism's success, scholars must also identify the beneficiaries of terrorist acts. Terrorism involves a variety of parties, from leaders and foot soldiers, to the public and governments. If terrorism can be said to work, it can only do so in relation to the actors involved in a conflict. As readers, we must be prepared to look at terrorism not only through the eyes of governments and victims but also the ideologues and even murderers to truly understand how terrorists perceive the success of their tactics. English's interviews with former terrorists are illustrative of an approach that demands a level of intimacy with a subject that for many is difficult and emotional. Through it all, however, he does not lose sight of the human cost. *Does Terrorism Work?* addresses terrorism as a multifaceted phenomenon, treating seriously the internal motivations and dynamics of those engaged in violence while reflecting on the devastation terrorism produces.

English examines four principal case studies—the book's primary chapters—and, in the conclusion, expands his discussion to include a wider survey of other terrorist organizations. In each case, he applies the criteria of success that he identified in the introduction to add new insight into how we think of groups such as al-Qaeda or the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Some findings are unsurprising; in all of the primary cases, terrorism has never yielded total strategic victory. The deeper we descend into his framework, however, the more complicated the picture becomes. Al-Qaeda failed spectacularly to oust the United States from the Middle East or topple regimes such as the Saudis (primary goals). Yet, the group surely succeeded in levying revenge against the West (a secondary goal). The group had tactical successes of note—the attacks on 11 September 2001 were tragic in their operational execution—but al-Qaeda also largely withered in the face of the sustained military pressure those successes invited. The PIRA, meanwhile, failed absolutely to bring about a unified

Ireland (its primary goal), succeeded in playing an outsized role in determining the political agenda (a secondary goal), and oscillated between tactical victories and increasingly successful suppression by British forces (tactical goals). English's framework makes it easier (though far from simple) to characterize success at multiple levels, but overall questions of victory or failure evidently remain difficult to answer.

Perhaps the most unique component of English's framework is the fourth and final level, inherent rewards, which speaks directly to the question: For whom does terrorism work? English writes that politics and ideology do not encapsulate the entirety of the terrorist experience. Ex-PIRA members note that participation in the organization yielded social benefits, including a sense of camaraderie, a measure of local celebrity, and even occasionally sexual benefits in the community. Some Hamas members, meanwhile, have benefitted financially from membership in the organization and others psychologically from the celebrity associated with volunteering for martyrdom operations (a status that often extends to family members). Members of the Basque separatist group ETA (the Basque acronym for "Basque Homeland and Liberty") have also experienced financial gain or fame through association with their terrorist organization. Yet here too there is no clear answer. Even among terrorists, the experience is not always positive. Imprisonment, injury, depression in defeat, and lost friends are often high costs that former terrorists did not, in hindsight, deem worthy of the cause. Moreover, terrorism certainly cannot be defined as a success for the victims. Throughout his book, English pays homage to the victims of terrorism, the mother of a soldier killed in Afghanistan or the 14-year-old grandson of Lord Louis Mountbatten killed in his assassination, in subtle testimonials that help remind the reader that an academic pursuit need not be cold.

English takes a historical approach to a question that in the past two decades has been plagued (particularly in the pop-literature arena, but in academia as well) by historical amnesia. In a discipline often inclined to consider modern terrorism to be new, or patently distinct from former iterations, English presents a compelling argument for why a historical account is uniquely valuable. For instance, one cannot reasonably assess the question of terrorism working without adequately considering how circumstances in a given conflict have changed over time—something historians are reasonably well equipped to do. Good historical accounts are also deeply skeptical of a narrative of inevitability, which consequently welcomes the use of counterfactuals to determine not only if terrorism works but if it in fact works better than alternative options. This is a valuable line of inquiry, as terrorist organizations themselves frequently justify their violence against the perception that other terroristic endeavors brought gains that were unreachable using other methods. This historical lens should be

of particular interest for those who study political violence from a political science background, where a focus on theories or trends can, on occasion, mean we see only the forest and never the trees.

So, does terrorism work? Those looking for a straight yes or no will finish this book disappointed. Yet English succeeds in his ultimate goal of elucidating and demonstrating a more robust framework through which this debate can continue fruitfully. And, perhaps more significantly, English provides a model through which that conversation can be pursued in a balanced assessment that is simultaneously engaging, nuanced, and human.

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Three Days in January: Dwight Eisenhower's Final Mission. By Bret Baier with Catherine Whitney. New York: William Morrow, 2017. Pp. 368. \$28.99 (hardcover); \$16.99 (paperback); \$14.99 (e-book).

In *Three Days in January: Dwight Eisenhower's Final Mission*, Bret Baier, a Fox News anchor, combines the insights of one of the most important presidential transitions in history with the Eisenhower legacy. The book is a well-researched and timely read about the final days of the Eisenhower administration. *Three Days in January* takes the reader from Eisenhower's prepresidential career to a review of major policy points in his presidency and the discussion of the transition of his administration to John F. Kennedy in 1961. The first section of the book has Baier providing a condensed version of Eisenhower's illustrious career before the presidency, focusing on what shaped him into the kind of man, soldier, and president he would be. The strong work ethic of his parents in rural America coupled with the discipline he received at West Point were major contributors to making a man who was determined and demonstrated strength under pressure.

The second section of *Three Days in January* is the weightiest. The author takes Eisenhower's farewell address, likely the second most famous after George Washington's, and uses parts of his speech as themes to frame key issues examined in chapters. The most famous part of Eisenhower's farewell address is his warning about the development of a "military industrial complex"; Eisenhower felt the military-industrial complex was necessary but that it had the potential to "endanger our liberties or democratic processes" (p. 195). While the warning about the military-industrial complex is the most famous part of Eisenhower's farewell address, it was only one of the many important facets of his speech.

The Eisenhower farewell address also shows his strong quest for peace. As a soldier who had seen the horrors of war, the pursuit of peace was uppermost in Eisenhower's mind. Eisenhower came to the presidency pledging to end the Korean War, which he did. He also proposed Open Skies, a mature approach to arms agreements that would not become policy until the Ronald W. Reagan administration, and invited Nikita Khrushchev to visit the United States in 1959. During the Eisenhower years, war was averted while peace was maintained through strength and balance.

Balance is the overall theme of the Eisenhower farewell address. In one paragraph of the 1961 speech, the word *balance* appears *eight* times. Baier abbreviated the section of the speech in his book, but it is worth noting how Eisenhower emphasized the meaning of the word, because he hoped his last speech would have a significant message:

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between action of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.¹

This balance may be why the Eisenhower legacy was hard to assess in the immediate aftermath of his administration. Eisenhower did not believe, like Kennedy, in lofty rhetoric. Nor was Eisenhower his own congressional liaison, as Lyndon B. Johnson later would be, but rather often worked behind the scenes and through a strong system of organization. Baier sees Eisenhower as a strong, fatherly figure who often did not get the recognition he deserved until years later.

The third part of Baier's book deals with the final three days of the transition between Eisenhower and Kennedy. Eisenhower and Kennedy had a smooth transition, much more so than the one between Truman and Eisenhower, which demonstrates that personality has as much to do with these situations as partisan differences. While they were not particularly close, Kennedy respected Eisenhower very much and sought his viewpoints on issues such as Cuba and Laos during the transition. Kennedy continued to seek Eisenhower's viewpoints on issues ranging from the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and civil rights during his presidency, with some of the issues having originated in the Eisenhower years while others took on new life under President Kennedy. After

Kennedy's assassination, Johnson continued the good relations started by his predecessor. Eisenhower was arguably the most important figure in Johnson's transition. Eisenhower urged Johnson to make an address to a joint session of Congress and urged the new president to say that he came into the presidency unexpectedly and that his purpose would be to carry out "the noble objectives so often and so eloquently stated by your great predecessor" (p. 273).

Three Days in January closes with a brief overview of Eisenhower's final years, including his reluctance to support Barry M. Goldwater for the presidency in 1964 and his continuing advice to President Johnson during the Vietnam War. Eisenhower refused to send combat troops to Vietnam during his presidency and was wary of land wars in Asia, but believed that once America was committed to fighting in Vietnam, as it was under Johnson, that America should go "all out." Eisenhower died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on 28 March 1969, surrounded by his family. He was buried in his Army uniform and rests in a simple \$80 government casket in his boyhood home, Abilene, Kansas.

David Eisenhower, Dwight Eisenhower's well-known grandson, described *Three Days in January* as the best book written about his grandfather in a long time. This assessment must take into account that Eisenhower saw the handing off of power to his successor and his final address to the nation as serious matters. Dwight Eisenhower was a man who, in January 1961, was not only leaving the presidency but also more than a half-century of service to his nation. Like the proverbial grandfather with great wisdom, when he says something, we listen—this Baier captures masterfully. *Three Days in January* is valuable and timely reading for the historian researching presidential transitions and any reader of popular history.

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Note

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," 17 January 1961, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, American Presidency Project, University of California-Santa Barbara.

Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West. By Peter R. Neumann. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2016. Pp. 256. \$17.95 (paperback).

What is worse than having citizens killed by terror attacks? Peter R. Neumann,

who teaches at the Department of War Studies at King's College in London, suggests that terrorism could also trigger the breakdown of fundamental societal bonds. Thus, it could become an all-encompassing danger by which “our societies will become polarized. . . . Far Right parties and militant groups will gain in strength; and [by which] . . . it will become more difficult for people of different faiths and origins to live together” (p. 3).

The author, in *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*, provides an excellent primer on the dangers of both. Neumann divides the book into two sections. The first section tracks trends in modern terrorism, a phenomenon that dates back to 1880, which Neumann quotes American historian David C. Rapoport as being made up of four discrete “waves.” Briefly, these are: *Anarchism* (1880–1905), the *Anti-Colonial* wave (1930s–50s), the *New Left* (1960s–70s) attacks, and finally the *Religious* wave (1979–present). This last wave, whose groups included violent Christian antiabortionists in the 1980s, is especially important to the story of *Radicalized*. This wave sets the stage for today’s violence by promising “heavenly reward[s]” for those willing to martyr themselves “in the service of God” (p. 42).

The second section of *Radicalized* deals with the world’s exposure to the oncoming fifth wave of terrorism; a wave during which, some analysts predict, terrorists will use the internet as an incendiary device. Everything from recruitment to “cyberplanning” of terror attacks will happen online. And for those who are not even official members of a terror cell, individuals can act as lone wolves, claiming kills for whatever terror organization strikes their fancy.

The Islamic State is, claims Neumann, the fifth wave’s first offspring. Born out of the chaos in Syria and Iraq, it is springboarding its membership from fighters in its own conflict areas to include international recruits found online. Neumann writes that “the Islamic State is a would-be global empire, one that has declared all other countries on earth its enemy and—at the same time— attracted followers from all over the world” (p. 56). This is an extreme position even for a jihadist terror group, considering that its members subscribe to the ultra-conservative Salafism movement within Sunni Islam. Neumann is quick to point out, though, that regardless of any viciousness displayed by the Islamic State, no terror wave is composed of only one group. Rather, such waves gather strength from their native sociopolitical climates. The foreign fighters, who make up 40 percent of ISIS’s core organization, prove that individuals become radicalized for many reasons having nothing to do with associations with the Middle East generally or Islam specifically (p. 72).

To understand these nonstate actors, Neumann groups foreign fighters into three classifications: the defenders, the seekers, and the hangers-on. The members of these groups are generally foreign members of Islam or others who converted to it. Not fighting to defend their homeland, they instead fight

to defend Islam or fight for other less obvious, but very personal, reasons. ISIS stirs the emotions of young people, inciting them to risk their lives for what they perceive as a higher purpose that gives their lives (and martyred deaths) meaning.

Studying foreign fighters is vital not only for tracking their actions in ISIS-controlled territories but also for predicting what they may do upon returning to their home countries. Neumann differentiates returnees into four groups, but essentially they fall within two categories of importance to law enforcement: the dangerous and the benign.

So what does Neumann suggest in terms of alleviating the violence? For ISIS, he agrees with Steven Simon, from the Council on Foreign Relations, who advocates “a systemic, long term and comprehensive strategy of aggressive containment” (p. 177). He warns against direct military confrontation by the West. Any Western losses or civilian casualties at their hands could then easily allow ISIS to “portray themselves as anti-imperialist resistance fighters” (p. 177). Therefore, it is much better for the Islamic State to fuel its own destruction. Neumann posits that if “the Islamic State wins no more military victories and is no longer in a position to meet the needs of its population, and its internal contradictions and tensions become obvious, it will gradually collapse in on itself” (p. 177). Moreover, he explains that containment is far from passive. It will require “training, weapons, intelligence work, special forces and targeted air strikes to support local forces on the ground” (p. 177). In addition, online counterarguments to offset jihadist ideology will be necessary, as will helping to stabilize the region surrounding Syria.

Additionally, the author argues that preventive measures need to be put in place to stop the increase of homegrown jihadists in the West. Educational programs should be designed to reach out to “people who are susceptible to extremist influence . . . [such as] young people from unstable backgrounds and socially deprived areas” (p. 182). Offering alternatives to these youth is more productive, states Neumann, than severe repression. First, because repression “doesn’t work. It radicalizes those who previously weren’t prepared to commit acts of violence.” And, second, terrorists look for Western-generated resentment to exploit to aid recruitment and promote divisiveness between ethnicities. He especially cautions against demonizing the Muslim population. Moderate Muslims, instead, represent a valuable portal: “Non-Salafist Muslims provide a counterweight to extremism, embody religious diversity and can reach people to whom the state has no access” (p. 184).

Radicalized provides an excellent overview of our current terror situation, but perhaps more importantly, it stresses the fact that modern terrorism should be considered as a surge of sociopolitical rage rather than violence orchestrated by any specific cluster of individuals or mastermind. Consequently, jihadism

represents a movement of ideas and global networks that has spread beyond the boundaries of Muslim-majority nations. One of Neumann's introductory points hits squarely on this fact: to defeat jihadism, Western leaders will have to engage not just the ideas of the movement but "the political conflicts and social cleavages that make them resonate" (p. xvii).

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Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America's Special Operations Forces. By Mark Moyar. New York: Basic Books, 2017. Pp. 432. \$30.00 (hardcover); \$17.99 (e-book).

Dr. Mark Moyar has written another military-themed discourse titled *Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America's Special Operations Forces*. The author promises to provide familiarization of special operations forces to those who are "historically deprived" (p. xx). Based on the purpose of this book, the scope begins with World War II and goes up to the killing of Osama bin Laden. In the process, the author covered the most well-known direct action operations in America's most recent history. By doing this, Moyar intended for this endeavor to retell the drama of America's special operations forces and, at the same time, to confer the historical understanding that enhances wisdom and informs sound decisions by today's leaders. His intended audience is varied, hoping to address government civilians/politicians, civilians, and special operators, all of whom might wish to know more about the history of U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF).

He has had a wide and varied career before and since Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He is currently a member of the Hoover Institution Working Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). But prior to joining CSIS, Moyar served on the faculties of Marine Corps University and JSOU and in various capacities at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Orbis Operations. He is probably best known for his writing on the Vietnam War, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (2007). After instructing a course at JSOU, Moyar determined to provide the public with more information about special operations.

According to Moyar, this book originated as a result of a class he taught while at JSOU. Published in 2017, it is obvious that the writing of *Oppose Any Foe* took place earlier than that. The rationale is that Moyar makes many opinionated comments regarding Navy Admiral William H. McRaven, the then-commander of Special Operations Command, about President Obama,

and ends with the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011. Those of us who have watched the news since 2011 are aware of the many extraordinary acts of heroism, bravery, and persistent engagement accomplished by USSOF worldwide.

This book has 11 chapters to explore the various vignettes and assumptions in pursuit of justifying his thesis, and Moyar uses narrative-driven analysis to engage his readers through stories about important aspects of USSOF history. There are, essentially, five parts to the book, dividing up the chronology. In the first part, the author lays down the early days of USSOF by looking at the period from World War II through Vietnam. In the second part of the book, the author examined the events leading up to Operation Eagle Claw (Iran, 1980) and the rebuilding of USSOF as a direct result of that failure. The third part consists of a discussion regarding three of the dominant missions that USSOF has been part of since the late 1980s: regime change, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. In Moyar's fourth section, he moves on to events of the Obama administration, especially Operation Neptune Spear (Pakistan, 2011). Finally, the author ends the book with an impassioned discussion of previously stated USSOF challenges through the lens of his personal understanding of the historical portrayal of USSOF missions throughout the book. This represents a cogent overview that could be rather useful for the uninitiated reader.

There are some rather significant problems with this book that should be understood before reading it. It is commendable that Moyar labored to produce a long history of USSOF, and his sources reflect the breadth needed to cover the time span, but they do not cover the depth needed to provide accurate portrayals of certain events. For instance, Moyar claimed in his chapter titled "Overreach" that Admiral McRaven, following the successful raid on bin Laden, attempted to push Special Operations Command (SOCOM) into far more eminent positions, but failed "like Icarus, SOCOM tried to climb higher than its wings could carry it and ended up crashing back to the ground" (p. 341). This seems a poor analogy, because it was not the wings that failed SOCOM but rather a more complex situation. Having been in SOCOM at the time, this reviewer knows that McRaven was well aware that SOCOM had a specific role to fill and did not attempt to push past other four-star commands in search of greater glory. McRaven worked well within the scope of USSOF's imperative that states we cannot do our mission without support from conventional forces. However, Moyar is not to be faulted too critically because his understanding of events is limited to only reading about special operations and the forces that conduct them. Moreover, titles such as *Rogue Warrior* or *Blood Warriors* are popular histories, both cited in this book, that could be used as examples of popular interest in USSOF operations, but not as primary sources for events.

In addition to source problems, it seems that the author's partisan ideology impinges too greatly on his interpretation of events. While a student at Har-

vard, he wrote for the conservative student newspaper, the *Harvard Salient*. He has continued to write as a conservative since, which is not a fault, but it does color the objectivity of his interpretations. For instance, Operation Neptune Spear was a success because the operators killed their target, but Moyar determines that such success was more problematic for long-term counterinsurgency missions, which just cannot be assessed at this stage. For these reasons and many more, this book is more along the lines of flavored popular history than as a reference or true historical work and therefore would appeal to a broader readership. Moyar stated that this book is intended to retell the drama of America's special operations forces and to confer historical understanding that enhances wisdom and informs sound decisions by today's leaders, but unfortunately, to achieve this, he would have needed to dive into primary sources with a more objective eye and to understand that USSOF are not only hyper-conventional forces but possess a far greater strategic utility and operational capacity beyond warfighting than he has given them credit for. For those interested in the topic, Thomas K. Adams's book, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (1998), gives a far deeper dive into the topic.

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Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar. Edited by Jason W. Warren. New York: New York University Press, 2016. Pp. 336. \$89.00 (hardcover); \$30.00 (paperback).

Historian Jason W. Warren conspicuously subtitles this book *The American Way of Postwar* as homage to Russell F. Weigley's seminal work *The American Way of War*, indicating that the United States has engaged in recurring behaviors not only in fighting conflicts but also in recovering from them. In examining this way of postwar, each of the authors in this edited volume contend with one universal theme, that of the *liberty dilemma*, in which the nation struggles with the balance of military readiness versus the desire to reduce government defense spending, otherwise termed the *peace dividend*. From the colonial era to the present, the U.S. military broached these challenges, particularly reconciling the need for the military to "provide a common defense" for the republic with the antithetical political cultural norm of American distrust of large standing peacetime armies.

Within that larger conceptual framework, the editor presents a collection

of chronologically ordered essays that examine the demobilization of the military after each major U.S. conflict during the past 300 years. The authors, however, differ in their individual methodology, focusing on various subjects: doctrine, personnel, equipment, and Service branches. Samuel Watson traces the careers of U.S. Army officers between the American War of Independence and the Mexican-American War as an analytical means to assess the impact on the Army through the various smaller conflicts during this period. John A. Bonin focuses on a single branch, the cavalry, to represent the Army's adjustment to the changing paradigms incurred after the Civil War. Martin G. Clemis ("New Look" and "Flexible Response") and Conrad C. Crane ("Abrams Doctrine") explore broader doctrinal and organizational constructs to elucidate the periods after Korea and Vietnam, respectively. The majority of essays in this collection are arguably those that allow the authors to explore eras that have received little historical attention. For example, Kevin McBride and Ashley Bissonnette's along with Jason W. Warren's analyses on the seventeenth-century American military examine the challenges of drawdowns after various conflicts in the colonies occurring more than a century before the creation of a standing American Army. On the opposite end of the timeline, Richard A. Lacquement Jr. evaluates the most recent drawdown for the United States after the Cold War, provocatively questioning whether America's maintenance of a large conventional peacetime military after the fall of the Soviet Union was truly a drawdown at all.

The two essays examining the post-World War I era, by contrast, explore drawdowns more holistically. Edward A. Gutiérrez and Michael S. Neiberg note in their essay that, in the years following both the Spanish-American War and World War I, the United States applied the same pattern of national attitudes toward the military and postwar society. They assert that this period should be looked at as not a drawdown but a return to the social, political, and cultural conditions of 1898 and 1914, respectively, or a status quo antebellum, rather than a focus on the future adjusted to the new realities shaped by the recently finished conflict. Michael R. Matheny argues that in the aftermath of drawdown after the Great War and the lead up to the Second World War, the Army invested in its people, particularly the education and professional development of its officer corps, a motif that would successfully be repeated and rewarded in postconflict eras both before and after.

The book's most useful contribution is, ironically, through its primary shortcoming: its lack of thematic coherence. This inconsistency actually inspires a worthwhile debate for military historians and strategic academics: What is the difference between a drawdown and interwar period? On the surface, this may just be a semantic issue, but it might be worthy to consider making a distinction between the recovery from the last war in question (reducing capa-

bilities, return to peace) versus the preparation for the next war. The individual essays here focus on either drawdown, interwar, or both. As a result, each case study addresses the ambiguous times when the nation is not at declared war but often not necessarily at peace. To this point, it opens the question of whether there ever truly was, or is, a peacetime for the United States. Even after major conflicts, the military still has to wrestle with various national security issues, pending threats, and occasionally small, isolated conflicts. Additionally, the debate extends to when drawdowns actually happen, and to what extent, as the essays examine such a wide range of conflicts from small-scale contingencies to mass mobilized global world wars.

Moreover, the book too often narrowly focuses on the U.S. Army, as nearly all of the authors are former or current members of the Army or its educational institutions, and as such they inadequately offer analysis of the other Services, which do not always have a similar drawdown experience. Some authors attempt to examine the defense establishment broadly but several fixate on just one Service. Other essays give inconsistent attention to the actual postwar period and become operational histories of the conflict itself, which muddies the waters further to the aforementioned dilemma of when postwar ends and the interwar period begins. To be sure, much of the scholarship here is valuable in exploring previously overlooked eras or challenging the conventional wisdom about decisions made during drawdowns being short-sighted, naïve, or complacent, yet nearly always being connected to unpreparedness in the next conflict. *Drawdown* is thematically inconsistent but is nonetheless a valuable, if uneven, first step into further exploration of this topic.

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Al-Qaeda's Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings. By Fernando Reinares. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. \$50.00 (hardcover); \$49.99 (e-book).

In *Al-Qaeda's Revenge*, Fernando Reinares explains in detail what many Spaniards on the Iberian Peninsula prior to 2004 were blissfully unaware of: that extremist Islamic jihad was alive and active in Spain. In his work, he argues that active security measures enacted by the Spanish government against existing terrorist cells in the 1990s caused the events of 11 March 2004. This event came to be forever known to the Spanish populace as “3/11,” the day a simul-

taneous attack involving several bombs in four commuter trains traveling on Spain's railway system left 191 people dead and more than 1,800 injured. This incident occurred exactly 911 days after the Washington, DC, and New York 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States; and each event in both countries was perpetrated by the same terrorist group, al-Qaeda. Reinares's exhaustive research is evident as he explains the origins and linkages of al-Qaeda in Spain more than a decade before the bombings occurred on that fateful day near Madrid. By doing so, he makes a convincing argument that the motive behind the 2004 attack was not what has become conventional opinion (i.e., to convince Spain to withdraw troops from the military Coalition in Iraq). Neither was the motive to influence the national political elections that came a few days afterward, another popular notion. Reinares's work provides a convincing case that these popular post-event theories sought to explain the attacks in retrospect, with concepts familiar to the Spanish public writ large, and fueled by opportunistic propaganda disseminated by al-Qaeda in the aftermath. The real motivation behind the 2004 Madrid bombings was revenge, set in motion years before the United States invaded Iraq, and before the date of the general election of 2004 was ever announced.

Reinares's *Al-Qaeda's Revenge* is presented in two parts. The first deals with the 3/11 terrorist network, its origins, components, individual members, and ultimate formation. It answers fundamental questions, such as where the terrorist cell came from and how the members coalesced, and finishes by setting up the roots of its connection to al-Qaeda inside and outside of Spain. In the second part of the book, Reinares strengthens the terrorist group's association to al-Qaeda and its overall global jihad strategy, discusses the reasons Spain was considered a necessary target, and finishes with the social and political aftermath of the Madrid train bombings. The first part is necessarily dense and, frankly, difficult to follow, not because of the way it is written, but because of the subject matter. Reinares goes into excruciating detail about the cell members, of whom there were at least 25 persons directly involved, in addition to their outside al-Qaeda contacts. It reads like a human intelligence report, and no author can be expected to make that entertaining for the reader. Coupled with the names, surnames, family names, nicknames, and codenames of those involved in the plot, the first few chapters beg for a pullout criminal network diagram like those seen inside of an American television crime drama. But the work itself is outstanding, well researched, and as the audience trudges on to part II of the book, the names of the main actors begin to stick and apparent truths behind the motives for the attack are revealed.

The second part of *Al-Qaeda's Revenge* is where the audience is rewarded for its persistence. Reinares contends that the mobilization of the 3/11 terrorist cell began in Karachi, Pakistan, long considered a refuge for numerous jihadist

organizations due to its many extremist madrasas and Koranic schools that have supported strategic planning for attacks inside and outside of that region (p. 100). Spanish internal security forces successfully arrested and dismantled a major terrorist cell in November of that same year in an effort named Operation Dátil. Unfortunately, due to the antiterrorism laws in Spain during that time (subsequently modified and strengthened in 2010) and the lack of awareness of the emerging extremist threat by judicial authorities, only 18 of the original 25 al-Qaeda cell members were detained and convicted. The members that were not arrested would later form the core of the 3/11 terrorist cell that would plan, prepare, and commit the massacre on the commuter trains in March 2004 (pp. 8–9). Reinares contends that revenge as a motivation, being an emotional response rather than pragmatic, is often underestimated as a reason for the execution of singular acts of terrorism (p. 103). In addition, fundamental to this particular motive of revenge for the attack participants, the southern part of Spain known to most today as Andalusia was once the easternmost part of the eighth-century Islamic empire, after the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula by the Umayyad Caliphate in 711–18 AD. Present-day jihadist literature calls for the obligation to reconquer and return former Muslim lands to Islamic rule, including the “Al-Andalus” region in Spain. The founding members of al-Qaeda—Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abdullah Azzam—have made direct and indirect references to the religious imperative to regain an Andalusia that is “occupied by infidels” in numerous pamphlets and transmissions as early as 1987 (p. 14). Therefore, Spain has always been a strategic and operational goal for al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations, and a viable target for defensive jihad until a new Islamic authority is established there.

With the motives of specific revenge and general defensive jihad established, Reinares outlines a timeline for the amalgamation of the cell and the execution of the terrorist plot that is independent of the military operations in Iraq, beginning in 2003, and the national elections of 2004. Both events are shown to be more coincidental than causal. Three of the terrorists who evaded arrest were key contributors in the execution of the attacks. Others, who were released prior to 2004, made their resentment and desire for revenge known. It is worth noting that for those members who served sentences stemming from counterterrorist operations from 1997 onward (Operation Appreciate—another dismantling of a major cell in Valencia) who were released prior to 2004 were radicalized in prison. In my view, this leads to another important core lesson presented in Reinares’s work. The formation of the 3/11 cell provides case studies depicting how prisons and detainment centers for foreigners convicted of terrorist-related activities can act as radicalizing venues for more extremist jihad. In some detention facilities, this kind of Islamic doctrine and propaganda reigns supreme, and the natural interaction of extremist actors

inside a holding facility, coupled with the visitation of extremist imams, indoctrinate them to a more rigid—and combative—vision of Islam that the exiting detainee will later use for bellicose actions (p. 67).

Through an analysis of extensive documentation used in criminal judicial proceedings and police intelligence reports, Reinares's work demonstrates that the Madrid bombings of 2004 illustrate that acts of terrorism in Western Europe are not necessarily committed by self-radicalized individuals who are inspired by al-Qaeda rhetoric. Rather, they are evidence of a coordinated, complex strategy that can be directed, supported, and even supervised by al-Qaeda's external operation apparatus, through local operatives who know the terrain firsthand. In fact, the 2004 attack can be considered an example of al-Qaeda's *operational reorganization*, wherein it was decided that attacks should occur not only in those areas of active armed conflict affecting Muslim populations, such as Afghanistan or Chechnya, but also those countries from where terrorist cells originated, and often primarily "occupied by infidel populations," such as Spain (p. 107). In the case of the 11 March attacks, the final jihadist group formed from three separate components, with linkages to al-Qaeda from the beginning. The first emerged as remnants of those who evaded detention in Operation Dátil. A second component was comprised of members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group already present in Spain and based primarily in Belgium. The final component was comprised of common criminals radicalized in Spain and indoctrinated into the terrorist activities of the 3/11 network. They began to unite in March 2002, and were fully formed by August 2003. The 3/11 network predates Operation Iraqi Freedom by more than a year (pp. 76–77). Nevertheless, the 3/11 terrorists made use of the Iraq invasion to justify the attacks in hindsight. This also holds true for the national elections of 2004. The results of the national elections three days after the attacks on 14 March were used as proof of the success of the attacks. However, Reinares's analysis reveals that the date of the attack was established no later than 19 October 2003. The Spanish general election was not announced until 9 January 2004. Although it would be incorrect to assume that the attacks in March 2004 had zero influence on the electorate, it should be noted that the winning party, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) ran on a campaign of withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq as part of its political campaign platform (pp. 111–12).

A decade before the 2004 train bombings, al-Qaeda had established an important terrorist cell in Spain. On 11 March that year, 13 bombs containing no less than 20 pounds of dynamite and 1.5 pounds of shrapnel in plastic bags were placed on four commuter trains filled with people during morning rush hour. As a result, Spanish counterterrorism activities were reformed and made more effective. Counterterrorism operations prior to 2004 focused on the prac-

tices of the Basque nationalist and separatist group known as ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna). There was, by design or through naïveté, a certain collective ignorance regarding global jihad. In the decade preceding the 2004 attack, Spanish authorities arrested an average of 12 people per year for terrorist-related activities from 1995 to 2003. The bombings prompted a new multifaceted and multidepartmental approach to internal security. The Spanish Internal Ministry increased police brigades and Guardia Civil units by 1,000 agents, and a National Center for Counterterrorism Coordination (Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista) was established. In 2010, the Spanish Civil Code was revised, providing for the criminalization of certain activities that support violent radicalization, recruitment, and terrorist training (pp. 162–63). Increased cooperation with European Union counterterrorist initiatives remain ongoing. As a result, in the eight years following the 2004 attacks, Spanish authorities have detained more than 470 people, a yearly rate nearly four times higher than during the preceding decade (p. 166). Successful by any measure, it was driven by the deadliest terrorist attack ever experienced by the reforming country.

Ultimately, Reinares make his case using criminal linkages, established networks, and an apparent revenge motive. Explaining motive in retrospect, extremist propaganda coupled with the national election of a party predisposed to withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, one can see how the mainstream media and popular sentiment would be likely to explain away the attacks of 2004 as something other than what it was. Reinares's work tells us what it truly was with considerable conviction.

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ERRATA

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Can Refugees Be National Security Assets?

Afghan American Contributions to U.S. National Defense since 1978

by John Baden

A sentence previously stated that in a 2009–10 Gallup opinion poll, just “18 percent of respondents from Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries” had expressed a belief that “individual attacks on civilians” are “sometimes justified.” It has been corrected to state that only 14 percent of these respondents expressed such a belief. A sentence quoting a *Washington Post* article previously stated that only 32 special immigrant visas were given out in 2012 “for more than 5,700 Afghan applicants.” This was corrected to state that this statistic only reflected the number given out in fall 2012. Additional context and statistics were added regarding this matter. Supporting documentation for these revisions can be found in new citations within the text.

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
A New Conception of War traces the origins and development of the combat theory the Marine Corps came to call “maneuver warfare” in the post-Vietnam years. The text follows two strands that ultimately merge into the codification of maneuver warfare doctrine in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*. The first strand focuses on the conflict theories of Colonel John Boyd, USAF, which were shaped by a career during the Cold War and his own passion for challenging conventional wisdom in the search for new and

useful ideas. The second strand covers a period of institutional soul-searching within the Marine Corps after Vietnam, driven by the Corps’ historical desire to adapt itself to the exigencies of the day and thus remain a useful contributor to national defense. *A New Conception of War* uses new and previously unpublished material from the major players, including excerpts from the transcript of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” briefing.

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