THE VERY FEW, THE PROUD
Women in the Marine Corps,
1977–2001
Colonel Nancy P. Anderson, USMC (Ret)

The Very Few, the Proud documents a generation of changes to accession and assignment policies pertaining to women seeking to serve in the U.S. Marine Corps between 1977 and 2001. This history intentionally ends at the threshold of the Global War on Terrorism—the gateway to current history. Anderson’s research follows the changes in social and gender distinctions, definitions of combat and combat support, and the belief—by voters, legislators, and military leadership—in the value of using the best person to fill a military billet regardless of gender. The Very Few, the Proud draws upon hundreds of personal accounts of women who served during the period, personal archives of Marine Corps leaders, and journalistic accounts of the treatment of women in and by the U.S. military.

8.5 x 11 | 280 pp | August 2018

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Director’s Foreword

Paul J. Weber

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NOW AVAILABLE

The Legacy of Belleau Wood
100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles
AN ANTHOLOGY

The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles examines the Marine Corps during the last century, doing two things it does best: making Marines out of civilians and winning battles in defense of the United States. This anthology of articles demonstrates how Marines continue to follow in the footsteps of their Great War forebears, who fought the wars at hand while planning for the wars to come, refining and innovating tactics and organization so that the Corps remained relevant and effective in a rapidly changing technological environment.

8.5 x 11 | 368 pp | May 2018

BOOK REVIEWS

Remembering America: How We Have Told Our Past
Reviewed by Adrienne Chudzinski

The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial
Reviewed by Lawrence Provost

The Frozen Chosen: The 1st Marine Division and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir
Reviewed by Colonel Craig Price, USMC

Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World
Reviewed by Aaron O’Connell, PhD

Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11
Reviewed by Major Jessica J. Ryu, USMC

PT 109: An American Epic of War, Survival, and the Destiny of John F. Kennedy
Reviewed by Frank A. Blazich Jr., PhD

We Were Going to Win, or Die There: With the Marines at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan
Reviewed by Colonel Walt Ford, USMC (Ret)

American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II
Reviewed by Major Harold Allen Skinner, USA (Ret)

Toxic Exposures: Mustard Gas and the Health Consequences of World War II in the United States
Reviewed by Thomas Faith, PhD

Spider Web: The Birth of American Anticommunism
Reviewed by Vance Skarstedt

Veteran Narratives and the Collective Memory of the Vietnam War
Reviewed by Tal Tovy, PhD

Scholarly Debate

Marine Corps History is a peer-reviewed, scholarly publication, and in that tradition we recognize that the articles published here are not the official or final word on any topic, merely the beginning of a conversation. If you think an author missed the target or failed to deliver, please join the debate by submitting an article for consideration. Email the managing editor at stephani.miller@usmcu.edu for deadlines and author guidelines.
As this issue of *Marine Corps History* is readied for press, news reports closely follow the historic summit between the president of the United States and the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This seems an opportune time to contemplate and remember the importance of studying and learning history and to consider how the study of history is important to our understanding of current events.

Benn Steil’s excellent book *The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War* (2018), which covers the creation of the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program), also includes an extensive discussion on the importance of understanding the history behind an event as far reaching as the Marshall Plan and, by extension, the history of any event, large or small. At Marine Corps History Division, we have a deep understanding of historical context and employ it every day in our mission to document and preserve the Corps’ history. We do our very best to faithfully ferret out all possible information about obscure events, eschewing the seemingly ever-more-popular quick fact gathering that now passes for research to feed the insatiable 24-hour television news cycle in favor of the rigorous process of the professional historian.

The staff at History Division work hard to remember that however insignificant an event might seem to us now, when it occurred it became the focal point for the Marines on the spot and for their supporting families at home. For the Marines involved, an event may have been a life-and-death moment. History Division holds the records of thousands of such events—significant and insignificant—that provide a road map to what happened, when, how, why, where, and by or to whom. For Marines who did not come home, as well as their families, such events became the defining moments of their lives. For survivors years later, History Division is here to provide the facts and the circumstances surrounding individual points in time.

*Marine Corps History* represents the biannual stage on which we offer insightful answers to some questions, bringing the history back to life for a short time on the printed page. We seek to publish a wide range of articles and book reviews to engage the largest percentage of our patron base as possible. Readers and
patrons seek out the magazine for a variety of reasons. The active duty Marine wants to update unit lineage and honors certificates in preparation for an inspection. The students here at Marine Corps University need information to complete papers and research projects. The families of the fallen or those who served generations ago hope to find information to help them understand where and in what conditions their Marines served and what they might have seen or done. We have the daunting task of offering articles that cover the wide range of Marine Corps history—positive or negative—and that continually engage our audience and increase the historical scholarship in Marine Corps topics. In our fourth year of publication, we are reaching out to a larger historical community for articles. Prior service with the Marine Corps or any military branch is not required to submit an article; authors of any discipline and any experience level may participate. Solid scholarship on a topic about or relative to the Marine Corps and its history is all that is required.

As the official historical recordkeeper of the Marine Corps, History Division strives to remember and respect the contributions of each Marine to their oaths, to the Constitution, and to the country. Answering one of the many questions we field about Marines is an act of remembrance. We pull the casualty card to read about the one defining moment of a young Marine’s life—a Marine who grew up at Rural Route 2, Box 36, Somewhere, USA, who will never again stroll down the gravel lane to pick up the paper and that day’s mail. As one battalion commander put it when discussing casualties, the Marines lost will live in our memories as always being young. Each Marine is remembered as we answer the question related to their service and the incident that ended it or made them famous. It is hard to imagine from the distance of time and circumstance the impact the telegram, phone call, or casualty team visit must have had on those at home waiting for news of their Marine. We are fully aware that, across the expanse of time, the feeling of loss is not softened and the pride of participation in events that shaped our Corps today does not fade with time.

But make no mistake—History Division is also the keeper of the flame for the entire Corps, not just the individual Marine. While the individual often tugs at the heart strings more than units, commands, and organizations, we are here to support historical inquiry for and about the whole Marine Corps. We respond with equal dedication regardless of the question or the inquirer.

In this edition of Marine Corps History, you will find several scholarly articles on a variety of subjects that focus narrowly on individuals and on the Corps more broadly. Mark R. Folsen explores the ways in which the U.S. government and the Marine Corps shaped the ideal of American manhood and used the image of Marines as the pinnacle of this ideal for recruiting and marketing, highlighting the Corps’ ability to transform the nation’s youth prior to and during World War I into strong, brave, steadfast men and model citizens, an image that persisted well into the 1970s. Army Major Joseph DiDomenico discusses the lessons learned from the initial failures and key successes of the Corps’ adoption of Army tanks and tank doctrine during World War II and how they impacted the Corps’ development of its own tank doctrine. Bryan J. Dickerson digs into the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve forces during World War II and explores the contributions of reservists to the war effort. The World War II exploits of Ernest Hemingway and his small group of compatriots in the Caribbean feature in Colonel Nicholas J. Reynolds’s article, which recounts not only how Marines enabled Operation Friendless to be carried out but how his association with Marines informed Hemingway’s last novel. Next, Major Brandon H. Turner draws parallels between Britain’s war with Argentina in the Falkland Islands and future conflicts the U.S. military may face in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments. Then, we hear from one of Marine Corps University’s schoolhouses with William M. Morgan’s overview of how the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) employs case studies in the Diplomacy and Statecraft course to enable students—our nation’s future strategic leaders—to develop the insights and analytical tools that will assist them in responding to
the global challenges they will likely face during their careers. Finally, Charles Grow, deputy director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps, reflects on his time serving as a combat artist, the work that inspired his interest, and the role combat art plays in the nation's strategic communications.

We also mark the passing of retired Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, who was awarded multiple honors during his service and who, after retirement, embarked on a second career as a journalist, author, military analyst, and university lecturer.

As usual, we include several incisive reviews of the latest books on military and American history. We hope you enjoy this issue of *Marine Corps History* and that each reader understands the spirit and pride that goes into its crafting. We have put our best foot forward, and we offer these articles in tribute to all Marines, regardless of their contributions, past and present.

Semper Fidelis,
Paul J. Weber
Deputy Director
Marine Corps History Division
and Gray Research Center

• 1775 •
“The Cleanest and Strongest of Our Young Manhood”

MARINES, BELLEAU WOOD, AND THE TEST OF AMERICAN MANLINESS

by Mark R. Folse, PhD

In his memoirs published shortly after the Great War, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, former commander of the 6th Regiment of Marines at Belleau Wood, remarked with pride on how his men had conducted themselves in battle. “Can we read what our college boys did in Belleau Wood,” he asked readers, “without thanking God that the soil trod by Washington and Lincoln, the Pilgrim Fathers and the builders of the great West, can still produce men of such stuff as that?” For Catlin, the Marines’ cause was a high and

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1 Dr. Mark Folse recently completed his PhD at the University of Alabama. His dissertation, “The Globe and Anchor Men: U.S. Marines, Manhood, and American Culture, 1914-1924,” explores how Marines made manhood central to the communication of their image and culture, a strategy that underpinned the Corps’ efforts to attract recruits and acquire funding from Congress. Folse has published with Marine Corps History magazine and has written Keystone Battle Briefs for the Marine Corps History Division in Quantico, VA. He is the 2015 recipient of Marine Corps Heritage Foundation’s General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. Memorial Dissertation Fellowship, and he recently accepted the Class of 1957 Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the U.S. Naval Academy for the 2018-19 academic year. He is also a Marine veteran with combat tours to Afghanistan and Iraq as an infantryman in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The title of this article was inspired by Georgia governor Hugh M. Dorsey’s words about Marines who fought in the Great War, which appeared in the December 1919 issue of the Recruiters’ Bulletin. This quotation reflects the common assertion Marines and their admirers made about men who joined the Corps during the war: that they were the finest examples of American manhood. Hugh M. Dorsey, “Governors Endorse the Marine Corps,” Recruiters’ Bulletin, December 1919, 6.

holy one. America “went into this war solely to save the ideals of Christianity from destruction,” he wrote. “It is my country that sent the flower of its manhood to fight and die for that cause.”

His Marines proved to him and to the rest of the country that America still made men of great quality—men that could proudly stand with the manly generations that came before.

Historians identify the June 1918 Battle of Belleau Wood as one of the most pivotal events in Marine Corps history. The bulk of the battle’s traditional scholarship has focused on its operational aspects.4 The question of why the battle became culturally significant for Marines and for the contemporary American public has received scant attention, however. This article addresses that question by exploring the shared cultural ideals between Marines and American society. Americans understood the Great War as a test of manhood. At the Battle of Belleau Wood, Marines demonstrated that American men were strong, courageous, and willing to sacrifice themselves for a high and noble cause. This understanding helps explain why the battle was significant to Americans in the summer of 1918 and why it has been important to Marines ever since. The Corps proved to the public that American manhood was second to none and could pass the test of war.

Belleau Wood is a familiar concept among Marines even though the war in which it was fought seems to attract little popular attention compared to the other, larger world war of the twentieth century. Americans may have celebrated the victorious return of their troops in 1919, but Kimberly J. Lamay Licursi has argued recently that “Americans simply forgot the war after the first few parades welcoming doughboys home,” because their public memory of the Great War “never congealed into a consensus view, which would have helped create a sustaining and coherent memory.”5 After the war, society moved on quickly without ever forming a lasting and significant memory of the conflict within American culture. This is simply not the case with the Marine Corps. As an institution, the Corps remembers well the long summer of 1918, the battles, the gas, and those who fell in the woods and wheat fields of France.

Belleau Wood stands out prominently among the Marines’ collective memory in part because of the efforts of Marine Corps historians (many of whom were Marines themselves) over the decades. Every general history of the Marine Corps published since 1918 has given special attention to the significance of Belleau Wood.6 Paul Westermeyer’s recent assertion captures well how Marines have attached meaning to a battle that many outside the Corps simply have not; at Belleau Wood, “Marine tenacity and media savvy catapult-

3 Catlin, “With the Help of God and a Few Marines,” 306.

5 Kimberly J. Lamay Licursi, Remembering World War I in America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), xv.

ed the Corps into even greater public consciousness, cementing the Marine Corps’ self-proclaimed reputation as an elite force into reality.\textsuperscript{7}

Marine Corps historians argue that the Great War offered many Marine officers important lessons in tactics, logistics, artillery, and air support that would be used later in amphibious doctrinal development. Allan Millett claims that “six months of extensive combat in France gave the Marine Corps enough practical experience to sustain two decades of serious study on the problems of attacking an entrenched enemy, problems particularly appropriate for an amphibious assault force.”\textsuperscript{8} Marines also “proved” that they were elite warriors.\textsuperscript{9} Heather Marshall’s “It Means Something These Days to be a Marine” argues that Belleau Wood and the Great War “was the coming-of-age story, the fulfillment of everything it had sought to become on paper since the late nineteenth century,” because the war reinforced Marines’ carefully constructed image as the country’s best troops.\textsuperscript{10}

But many Marine historians, and even many actively serving Marines today, have forgotten a significant historical component about the Marines of the Great War. Lost among the drum and bugle histories of Belleau Wood and the war are the Corps’ claims to be good for the young men of the nation. This is surprising when one thinks about it. Marines, throughout the twentieth century, have claimed, as Victor Krulak did in the 1950s, that they are “masters of an unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud self-reliant stable citizens.”\textsuperscript{11} Within the context of the Great War, these claims came in the form of appeals to manhood.

**American Manhood**

Before U.S. entry into the Great War, the Corps claimed to give young, middle-class white men a chance to become fit, develop good character, see the world, and become “real men.” The Marine was strong, disciplined, clean of mind and body, and assertive—embodying the Victorian manly ideal promoted by many contemporary civilian authors at the time.

According to American sociologists, physicians, politicians, and preachers of the time, manhood was a many-sided thing. Manhood was a stage in one’s life that came after boyhood and before old age. Metaphorically speaking, it was a national resource, something that was grown and harvested. The term manliness tended to mean physical, mental, and moral manifestations of one’s manhood. Strength, self-control, courage, and kindness were all manly qualities.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore,


\textsuperscript{8} Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 318; see also Leo J. Daugherty III, “To Fight Our Country’s Battles: An Institutional History of the United States Marine Corps During the Interwar Era, 1919-1935” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2001), 55.

\textsuperscript{9} Axelrod, *Miracle at Belleau Wood*, 239.

\textsuperscript{10} Heather Marshall, “It Means Something These Days to be a Marine: Image, Identity, and Mission in the Marine Corps, 1861-1918” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2010), 353.


it tended to make up the bulk of one’s character.13

Manhood could be molded and hardened like steel. Therein lay the foundation of the Marines’ appeal: they shaped men into their own image. They claimed to recruit the finest specimens of American manhood and make them even better. The result was a strong, brave, clean, and morally upright man. He would be a proud and worthy citizen who had earned respect through his years of service, training, and struggle in the Marine Corps. Becoming a Marine benefited the man; being a Marine benefited the nation. As men became manlier, so did the country.

Manhood could weaken, become sick, tainted, and corrupted. People took that risk seriously because many saw healthy manhood as essential for both the man and the nation. R. Swinburne Clymer argued in 1914 that the United States had much to lose if its manhood was weak. “The moment a nation loses its sense of manhood and strength,” he wrote, “at that moment does it begin to decay and to decline.”14 A people without strong manhood risked decline and foreign subjugation at the hands of manlier nations. Therefore, the United States needed “Manhood—virile, vigorous, strong, self-reliant, self-assertive manhood” to survive the age.15 Officials in the federal government echoed these sentiments. “A nation stands or falls, succeeds or fails, just in proportion to the high-mindedness, cleanliness, and manliness of each succeeding generation of men,” claimed a writer for the U.S. War Department.16

Leading up to the Great War, many American intellectuals, public figures, politicians, and military officers argued that the men of their country suffered from emasculation. The closing of the frontier, the concentration of capital, and rapid industrialization compromised manly individualism that was founded upon the ability of men to own their own land, control their own labor, and become economically independent.17 Healthy manhood kept a nation free from destructive vices, tyranny, and bondage.18 Real manhood manifested itself, even became stronger, during times of trial, adversity, and struggle.19 During the Great War, Victorian ideals of manhood found “more concrete expression,” according to Peter Filene. Marine recruiters would have probably agreed with his claim that “through the crucible of combat a boy would emerge a man.”20 Seemingly immune to the emasculating effects of modern society, Marines promised to reinject the element of struggle and adversity deemed necessary for assertive manhood into men’s lives.

The term masculinity became fashionable around the turn of the twentieth century largely in response to the white middle class’s paranoia concerning the

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19 Summerbell, Manhood in Its American Type, 40.

strength of its own manhood. While manhood was primarily about such inner qualities as character and morality, masculinity comprised more physical aspects. It had to do with appearances, activities, ways of speech, and even virility. Femininity encompassed its opposite. The male body was important to subscribers of both Victorian manhood and the new masculinity. But followers of the latter demonstrated their manliness less through work or moral uprightness and more through consumerism and muscular masculinity. Athena Delvin put it succinctly when she argued that the new form of men’s culture was “more physical and less intellectual, more competitive and less spiritual, more strenuous and less sensitive.” Strenuous activity became important precisely because the nature of middle-class work had changed. Masculinity needed demonstration in other ways since manual labor now largely fell to the working classes.

Marines’ wartime images spoke to these insecurities. Sharply dressed Marines pervaded their own imagery to illustrate how the Corps could make recruits more masculine. A cartoon image entitled “Honest Pride” shows a diminutive Marine private who has just entered the Corps looking up to a sergeant who is taller, has a thicker chest, broader shoulders, and stronger jaw line (figure 1). The new Marine is impressed by the sergeant’s medals and exclaims, “Gosh, I’d never have room on my chest for all them medals.” The old timer replied, “Don’t worry; you’ll have enough chest when you’re with us a while. We guarantee to put a chest on an eel.” This image conveys the physical attributes men supposedly gained while in the Corps. The sergeant’s service in the Great War adds to his masculinity and prestige; in the background is a picture of him wearing the uniform that Marines wore on the western front with combat medals on his chest.

The Test of Manhood

Civilians and Marines argued that the Great War would put their manhood to the ultimate test.
That was how many justified conscripting hundreds of thousands of young men into the military and then sending them overseas to fight the Germans. A preacher who addressed Congress in the spring of 1917 called the draft “legislative action which will prepare, and build up the young manhood of America” so it would be “fit to take its place and to defend American rights and liberties.” Marines understood and used these ideas about manhood as well. “War puts manhood to a tremendous test, and be it said to a man’s credit, that the coward is the exception, not the rule,” a writer for the Marines’ Magazine claimed. For a Marine who runs from battle, “never in his conscious moments can he drive away the specter of his failure to do his manly duty.” The consequences of failure were profound because an unmanly Marine failed not only himself but his comrades and his country.

The challenge of war made men out of those with the courage to face it. Courage was a common aspect of manliness in the Great War era. “Without courage, a man is a poor specimen of a man, hardly worth calling a man,” wrote one civilian author. “Never was there a time in the history of the human race when real sturdy manhood, manly vigor and manly courage counted for as much as they do now,” claimed another. This rhetoric that linked courage with manliness pervaded Marine writings too. “We wanted to test our courage and manhood, facing death by shrapnel, cold steel, ball cartridge and gas,” Marine Sergeant Arthur R. Ganoe wrote. “If he plays a man’s part,” read the Marines’ Magazine in July 1917, “he is consciously the victor over danger, over hardship, over the temptation to avoid the difficult duty, over himself; he can look upon his destiny—yes, upon death itself—with clear eyes, unashamed and unafraid.” Essentially, this author encouraged Marine audiences to live up to the Victorian manly standards and imagery that they promoted among each other.

A former congressman turned enlisted Marine, Sergeant Edwin Denby, made sure recruits at Parris Island, South Carolina, understood what was at stake for their manhood. Marines had to conduct themselves honorably and come back home clean and upright. “Nowhere in the world does a man stand more squarely on his own feet, to make or mar his character, than in the military service,” he said. “If you want to go back worthy to look your women in the face . . . it is up to you, men.” Denby spoke to the deleterious impact that alcohol and sexual contact with diseased women had not just on men’s honor but their health as well. Often, when progressives spoke of “cleanliness,” they meant clean bodies free from not just dirt and grime but also from venereal diseases. Around this time American physicians and preachers associated “clean living” with strong and healthy manhood while “lust, uncleanness, drink, gambling, swearing, lying, dishonesty, irreligion” could “ruin our Christian manhood.” Sergeant Denby drew on these ideas when he spoke with recruits

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32 “Manhood!,” Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada), 3 August 1918, 19.
35 “Former Congressman a Marine,” Recruiters’ Bulletin, May 1917, 32. Perhaps the most famous enlistee the Marine Corps gained was former congressman and successful Detroit attorney Edwin Denby. Nearly 50, and weighing more than 250 pounds, Denby was overage and did not meet the Corps’ physical standards. Nevertheless, MajGen George Barnett could not pass up on the opportunity to enlist a prominent American citizen. The Corps sent Pvt Denby down to the newly established recruit training depot at Parris Island, SC. While there, he served as a motivational speaker for new enlistees. When asked by the press why he enlisted, Denby replied, “The country needs men.”
37 Youard, Showing Ourselves Men, 9. For more on cleanliness and manhood, see Summerbell, Manhood in Its American Type, 99, and John S. P. Tatlock, Why America Fights Germany (Washington, DC: Committee on Public Information, 1918), 11.
about how the Corps and the war would test them. Many Americans perceived the war as a matter of honor. President Woodrow Wilson described the situation as such to persuade the American public of what was at stake:

What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand.38

American writing around this time took on chivalrous tones. The Germans insulted the United States with unrestricted submarine warfare that drowned American civilians. German foreign minister Arthur Zimmerman’s telegram to Mexico City called on Mexicans to invade the United States. To restrain from violence would have meant shrinking in the face of the enemy. That was a decidedly unmanly thing for a nation to do. On the congressional floor, one orator proclaimed:

I regret that we are to have war; but if we are to maintain our self-respect, if we are to encourage the cultivation and development of those virile and patriotic virtues among our citizens, without which our Government cannot and should not survive, if we are to become the laughing stock of mankind, mocked at and reviled by every other nation of the world, if we are not to be derided and sneered at as a Nation of degenerates, of money changers, and of cowards, is anything left to do consistent with a decent self-respect than to acknowledge the unquestioned fact that the German Government has waged war against us, to accept the challenge that has been so recklessly repeated in continued acts of war and aggression against us, and to meet it like and

Germany had thrown down the gauntlet and American manhood would have to accept the challenge or live in disgrace.

Chivalry coursed through Americans’ wartime perceptions of their own manhood.40 Popular conceptions of true manliness consisted of self-control and the courage to sacrifice for the greater good. A man needed courage “to play the man in life, to put his life in for all it is worth—this sort of manliness rings true, and often sounds its clear note of chivalry, nobility and Christian knighthood,” wrote George Walker Fiske.41 Even before America declared war on Germany, writers described American men as chivalrous. One characteristic of this was caring for others and helping people in need. One author wrote, “we . . . must recognize our American man as the knightly soul of the twentieth-century.”42 In the context of World War I, Americans and Marines saw themselves as chivalrous crusaders sent to rescue their allies from German barbarity.

Chivalry, with its emphasis on honor, Christianity, and battlefield prowess, was a much older cultural understanding of manliness that appeared often in Marine wartime imagery. In one image in the Marines’ Magazine, a Marine is depicted charging through a fire- and smoke-licked door of a church. Behind him is a crusader bedecked in armor with his sword drawn (figure 2). The artist saw the Marines as the modern-day equivalent of crusaders of old sent to fight for a high and holy cause (democracy, in this case) in a foreign land against infidels (the Germans).

Two additional images conveyed the same theme of Marines coming to the rescue of Western civilization. The first depicts a small Marine with a bayo-

38 Woodrow Wilson, “Flag Day Address (June 14, 1917),” in Liberty, Peace, and Justice, Riverside Literature Series (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), 86. This speech was delivered in Washington, DC, on 14 June 1917.

39 Congressional Record Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the First Session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, 383–84, emphasis added.
40 Congressional Record Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the First Session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, 383–84; Fiske, Boy Life and Self-Government, 17; and Summerbell, Manhood in Its American Type, 112–13.
41 Fiske, Boy Life and Self-Government, 17.
42 Summerbell, Manhood in Its American Type, 112–13.
neted rifle chasing a caricature of the European war fleeing in terror; above him is a feminine-looking angel of peace (figure 3). The second image again shows a Marine confronting a savage-looking German to save civilization, personified here in the form of a helpless woman on the ground; behind them, Europe burns (figure 4). Both highly romanticized and symbolic images convey the belief that Marines saw themselves as brave men out to save civilization.

This imagery was founded upon the demonization of the German, the feminization of civilization, and the masculinization of Marines. Germans in these images appear barbaric and animalistic. Civilization appears in both images either as a woman supporting or being saved by the hero: the U.S. Marine. The savagery of the German is important in these images because of the stark contrast it creates with the other two figures. In these images, German barbarity enhanced the manliness of the Marine and the femininity of the woman.

This artwork reflects American writings and speeches that demonized German soldiers and painted
them as savages who had lost their manhood to zealous militarism and barbarity. Marines hoped to demonstrate that Americans had not parted ways with their manhood the way the Germans had through their cruelty. They would stand up to the Germans and defeat them, the way knights of old slew monsters in fairy tales.

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels spoke of this quest as a great opportunity for the young men of America. Fate had given them the chance to be heroes and to make the world a better place. To the Naval Academy’s 1918 graduating class he said,

Fortunate youth! Fortunate because it is given you to prove that the age of chivalry is not dead—that chivalry was never more alive than now. The holiest of crusades was motivated by no finer impulse than has brought us into this war. To prove that life means more than force; to prove that principle is still worth fighting for; to prove that freedom means more than dollars; that self-respect is better than compromise; to be ready to sacrifice all so that the world may be made the better—what nobler dedication of himself can a man make?44

The young men going off to war had the chance to demonstrate American valor and honor. An entire American army, and two regiments of Marines in France, were about to get this opportunity.

The Sacrifice of Manhood

Costly attacks across the wheat fields into Belleau Wood and its surroundings hold a strong place in Marine lore in part because the 5th and 6th Regiments suffered 1,087 casualties in one day. One month of combat for those woods yielded more than 4,598 casualties in the 4th Brigade alone.45 These casualties became a testament to Marine character and manhood. Shortly after the Armistice, three veteran Marines, Kemper F. Cowing, Courtney Ryley Cooper, and Morgan Dennis, published “Dear Folks at Home---”: The Glorious Story of the United States Marines in France as Told by Their Letters from the Battlefield.46 The book is full of masculine imagery presented in prose and graphic art. The editors picked letters for public consumption, which transformed them from personal missives into public expressions of Marine masculine culture. Through these letters, “Dear Folks at Home” also captures a carefully curated version of Marines’ combat experience.

For much of the collection, Cowing and Cooper culled letters that contained ripping yarns of combat, danger, and Marine prowess. These letters were full of bravado to show readers the stuff of which Marines were made. Private Walter Scott Hiller expressed this pride to his mother when he wrote home from the front, “Do you think any man would regret being a part of such an organization, that have proven to be real fighters, that can go up against the Kaiser’s best-equipped and well-trained forces and give them the defeat we did? Not this man.”47 There was no cynicism or irony in these letters, which would later become common themes in post–Great War literature.48

These letters from France often expressed notions of manhood and sacrifice. One gets the impres-

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43 Wilson, “Flag Day Address (June 14, 1917),” 87; Tatlock, Why America Fights Germany, 5; and Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Philosophy and the War (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1918), 35.
46 Kemper F. Cowing, comp., and Courtney Ryley Cooper, ed., “Dear Folks at Home---”: The Glorious Story of the United States Marines in France as Told by Their Letters from the Battlefield (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919). 3. Cowing compiled wartime letters penned by Marines, Morgan Dennis provided illustrations, and Cooper served as the editor.
47 Walter Scott Hiller to his family, 16 June 1918, “Dear Folks at Home---,” 116.
sion that Marines fought and died at Belleau Wood with smiles on their faces. Lieutenant Merwin H. Silverthorne told his family that they were happy to go over the top and fight the Germans.

The first time I went “over the top” was on June 6th. Oh, what a happy bunch we were! I and the best friend I had were shaking hands with one another, happy and exultant in the fact that at last we were “going over.”

When Silverthorne’s friend (a Marine he identifies as Steve Sherman) died from machine gun fire during their assault across the wheat field, he referenced his fallen comrade’s manliness explicitly: “He had met his end, but he met it like a hero, an American, and a man.”

Silverthorne’s friend apparently died happy, at least according to the Marines who saw him fall: “They all are unanimous in saying he fell fighting with his face toward the enemy and a smile on his face.”

Corporal John F. Pinson’s letter home also spoke of Marines enjoying the battle because it got them out of the trenches and into open warfare. “It was a real battle, and being in the open through wheat-fields and farm lands, was much to the Americans’ liking,” he claimed. According to Pinson, Marines enjoyed the bayonet charge across the wheat field. “The boys all swung into action,” Pinson wrote, “laughing and kidding each other as they charged the German machine guns as if they were at a drill, dropping every twenty yards or so to rake the German lines with rifle and machine-gun fire.”

The editors of “Dear Folks at Home” must have found this last quotation particularly inspiring. They used a drawing by Morgan Dennis to depict scenes of aggression and bravery that Marines described in their letters. Private E. A. Wahl wrote, “The spirit of our men is wonderful. It is beyond the wildest imagination. They walk right into the rifle and machine-gun fire in the most matter-of-fact way. They have just taken the Boches off their feet.”

Captain George W. Hamilton wrote about the first day of the Battle of Belleau Wood (6 June 1918), when his company assaulted across a wheat field under heavy German machine gun fire. The 49th Company, 5th Regiment, suffered heavy casualties that day. But his telling, accompanied by a drawing of a Marine charging a German machine gun crew, gives the impression that this was just another example of cour-

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49. Merwin H. Silverthorne to his parents, 1 July 1918, “Dear Folks at Home—,” 118, hereafter Silverthorne letter.
50. Silverthorne letter, 118.
51. Silverthorne letter, 119.
52. John F. Pinson to his family [no date given], “Dear Folks at Home—,” 160, hereafter Pinson letter.
54. E. A. Wahl to Ann, 27 June 1918, “Dear Folks at Home—,” 143-44.
age and prowess (figure 6). “It was only because we rushed the positions that we were able to take them,” he claimed, “as there were too many guns to take in any other way.”

Another image depicted a story told by Major Henry N. Manney Jr., the quartermaster of the 6th Regiment. According to Manney, the battle was deadly, but “the Marines lived up to their reputation and even bettered it... This is open warfare, just our style, and nothing could be finer than the way our men went to it.” The image that accompanied Manney’s letter depicts a Marine protecting a wounded comrade. Together, they lay next to a thicket with artillery shells bursting midair in the background. The wounded Marine stares off into the distance, while dogged determination marks the face of his friend, protective but still battling (figure 7).

To the compilers of this collection, tales of bravery and sacrifice meant Marines were exceptional men. Lieutenant Silverthorne wrote of losing some of his friends in combat. “A pang of deep sorrow will always pierce my heart when I think of some of my bosom friends,” he claimed, “men young in years, but men from the ground up, who have made the supreme sacrifice.”

Their sacrifices at Belleau Wood revealed that Marines’ identity went deeper than their warrior image. Cowing and Cooper summed up the Marines of the 4th Brigade when they wrote,

And these letters, with their optimism, with their cheer and their smiles, show that the Marines who were battling against the

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55 George W. Hamilton to his family, 25 June 1918, “Dear Folks at Home---,” 127.
56 Henry N. Manney to his mother, 10 June 1918, “Dear Folks at Home---,” 135-36.
57 Silverthorne letter, 117-18.
Hun were something more than fighters. They were men—men in action and men in thought.58

The level of hope and emotions conveyed in their letters home meant their fighting spirit was restrained enough to hold on to their humanity. They had not given into the barbarism that American propaganda claimed had corrupted Germany’s manhood.

Passing the Test
Sacrificing their own lives, in part, won Marines great acclaim despite official policies regarding press censorship. Army General John J. Pershing’s press policy dictated that no specific information regarding individual units could be reported to the American newspapers. Reporters, however, could label troops as Marines or soldiers if they omitted designations of division, regiment, or battalion. Through that censorship loophole, the American public received joyous news in June 1918 of U.S. Marines defeating the Germans in battle. Floyd Gibbons, a Chicago Tribune correspondent, had much to do with this public relations boon.59 After Marines successfully assaulted Hill 142 in the early morning hours of 6 June, he sent a brief report of it to Paris, which then went on to the United States.60 The front page of the Chicago Tribune that day read, “U.S. Marines Smash Huns: Gain Glory in Brisk Fight on the Marne.”61 That very evening, Gibbons suffered three hits from a German machine gun: two rounds through his left arm and one in the left eye. A few hours later, Gibbons crawled to safety under the cover of darkness.62

While recovering, Gibbons constructed one of the most significant and powerful images of the Great War-era Marine Corps. Unlike Vera Cruz (1914) and the battles that came a generation later in World War II, there were no influential photographs taken of Marines in France. For much of American society, this dearth of iconic imagery from the western front led to a general fading of public remembrance of Belleau Wood and the Great War.63 However, Gibbons’s description of a Marine gunnery sergeant’s words to his men right before they attacked across the machine-gun-swept wheat fields created an indelible image not forgotten by Marines today:

The minute for the Marine advance was approaching. An old gunnery sergeant commanded the platoon in the absence of a lieutenant, who had been shot and was out of the fight. This old sergeant was a Marine veteran. His cheeks were bronzed with the wind and sun of the seven seas. The service bar across his left breast showed that he had fought in the Philippines, in Santo Domingo, at the walls of Pekin, and in the streets of Vera Cruz. I make no apologies for his language. . . . To me his words were classic, if not sacred. As the minute for the advance arrived, he arose from the trees first and jumped out onto the exposed edge of that field that ran with lead, across which he and his men were to charge. Then he turned to give the charge order to the men of his platoon—his mates—the men he loved. He said: “Come on, you sons-o’-bitches! Do you want to live forever?”64

Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly is thought to be the Marine that Gibbons described.65 By 1918, Daly had been in the Marine Corps for 19 years and won two medals of honor. He was the epitome of what a tough

58 Cowing and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home—,” 169.
59 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 303; Lengel, Thunder and Flames, 111–12; Simmons, The United States Marines, 99; and Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, 99–100.
60 Floyd Gibbons, “And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight” (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1918), 298; another version of Gibbons’s report can be found in Abbot, Soldiers of the Sea, 298–300.
63 Licursi, Remembering World War I, xv.
64 Gibbons, “And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight,” 304.
65 Simmons, The United States Marines, 99.
Marine should be. Gibbons’s imagery of this scene would help paint the soldiers of the sea as fearless heroes and men from their boots up.

What happened when news of the U.S. Marines’ victory against the Germans reached America was nothing short of a public relations dream for the Corps. “The United States Marines were the toast of New York yesterday,” the New York Times reported. “Everywhere one went in the cars, on the streets, in hotels or sky scrapers, the topic was on the marines, who are fighting with such glorious success in France.” Finally, the Marines had proven what many Americans wanted to believe: that American manhood could pass the supreme test of battle. “The battle on the entire front has lifted the Americans into the spotlight and convinced everyone that if needed the Americans have the spirit, dash, and tenacity to fight as well as any living soldiers,” read the Times-Picayune. The Marines “have proved that the American can fight, even if he wasn’t brought up to be a soldier,” read another article.

Marine historians tend to agree that World War I did more for bringing positive attention to the Marine Corps than any other event in the Service’s history up to that point. Marine manliness, performed and demonstrated on the battlefields of France, was central to that popularity. “What sort of men are they?” asked Reginald W. Kauffman, a journalist for The Living Age. “The best, they will say—and, after living among them, I am not so sure that they are wrong.” The Marines at Belleau Wood convinced the Germans that Americans were a superior class of men, according to Floyd Gibbons. “The German has met the American on the battlefield of France and knows that man for man, the American soldier is better,” he boasted.

French accolades lent further credence to the notion that American manhood had passed the test of battle. The French government renamed Belleau Wood Le Bois de la Brigade de Marine (Woods of the Marine Brigade) in honor of their victory. These were the woods “where the American Marines vanquished the flower of the Kaiser’s army.” Their success inspired their allies. “The Americans advanced in a solid phalanx, their strong determined faces and great physique an inspiration to their gallant French comrades,” claimed the Washington Post. The famous French painter, Georges Scott, created La Brigade Marine Americaine Au Bois De Belleau to commemorate the American victory there. Full of the detritus and drab colors of modern war, La Brigade Marine presents a powerful scene of Marines driving the Germans before them. The Germans, so often depicted as monsters in other images, are reeling in defeat (figure 8).


69. Don Martin, “U.S. Marines Scored One of Biggest Allied Successes in Marne Fighting,” Washington Post, 8 June 1918; and “Marines Carve Lasting Niche in Fame’s Hall Recruits Flock to Ranks of Corps Whose Slogan Is ‘First to Fight,’” Times-Picayune, 24 June 1918, 7. “When the Marines at Château Thierry surprised their foes by the determination of their advance they evidenced the kind of enthusiasm that is characteristic of all Americans and more intensely characteristic of the Marine than any other branch of the American military establishment,” “Marines Carve Lasting Niche.”

70. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 317; Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, 144; and Marshall, “It Means Something These Days to be a Marine.”

71. For how gender can be understood as a performance, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1990).


For many Marines in France, occupation duty kept them busy along the Rhine until the summer of 1919. Most of them shipped home by August. When they arrived, the war had been over for nine months, and most of the troops had already returned. When the 2d Division reached American shores, the press treated them like heroes.

On 9 August 1919, the 2d Division, comprising both Army infantry and Marines, marched in Washington, DC, in a grand parade. Leading the column was the division commander astride a bay charger, Marine Major General John A. Lejeune. The parade drew huge crowds of people who cheered them on, waved American flags, and pelted the troops with roses. “This beats hand grenades,” a Marine sergeant reportedly said after catching some roses for himself.77 Lejeune greeted the crowds with broad smiles and waves as he led his men down the street and through the throngs of people to where the president, the secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other high-ranking military officers waited to review the troops.

Near the public library stood the reviewing stand and about 500 wounded veterans of the war. The crowds cheered even louder when they saw Lejeune remove his hat and nod in tribute to them. “Here come the Marines!” many cried as the 4th Brigade began to approach the reviewing stand led by Marine Brigadier General William C. Neville. “West Pointers never marched with more dash or vim than did these men,” a reporter claimed. “Everyone agreed that a fin-

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er body of men was never seen in Fifth Avenue than the men commanded by Neville,” the report read. As the column passed the reviewing stand, the wounded Marine veterans standing near the public library “simply went wild.” Major General Commandant Barnett stood next to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt turned to Barnett and said, “I never saw a finer looking body of men and I never witnessed a more inspiring parade.” Barnett replied, “No wonder the Germans lost.”

The Marines became a source of national pride. They did not defeat the Germans on their own, of course. The Army deserved more credit for fighting in the Château-Thierry sector than it received from the press, despite attempts of some Marines and journalists to correct misinformation. But many people associated the Marines with Germany’s defeat. The Washington Post published poems that credited the victory solely to the Marines. Isabel Likens Gates wrote a poem about the Marines fighting at Belleau Wood:

Awful and fierce the combat raged.
As the Huns came, wave on wave,
Against our men, and steel to steel,
Mid shot and shell, they’d break and reel
And at last before us gave
Our loss was great, but it sealed the fate
Of the Huns—and the world esteems
Like Spartans of old this tale will be told
Of Uncle Sam’s marines

Bessie B. Croffut published a poem for the Marines shortly after their return home. The battles of the summer of 1918 were fresh in her mind as she wrote specifically to praise the returning 4th Brigade. She presented the Marines as heroes:

Invincibles, at Belleau Wood who fought
(“Hellwood,” now Wood of the U.S. Marines!)
Who stayed the Hun and there his lesson taught!
Whatever they call you, “leathernecks,” “gyrenes,”
“Go-Getters,” “devil-dogs,” you were the means
Under a righteous God! You inspiration caught
From Freedom’s fount, to end those godless scenes
And immortality with your best life-blood bought!
You have redeemed your boast, that of your corps—
As of your country—first in fight to be
Where brave men battle for the right and true!
You’ve shown the world what you had shown before
Sailors of air and soldiers of the sea!
“There’s not a thing on earth U.S. Marines can’t do!”

Conclusion

Because of Belleau Wood, Marines became the pride of their country briefly, the beau ideal of American manhood. The editors of the Recruiters’ Bulletin asked state governors from around the country to record their thoughts on the Corps, especially their performance in the Great War. Many of their responses were unequivocal. “In the Marine, the bloody Hun met his master,” Frederick D. Gardner of Missouri proclaimed. “The dauntless courage, the intrepidity and the dash of the Marines . . . filled the German soldierly with fear, sent a thrill through the armies

79 Edwin L. James, “Stories of the War that Didn’t Happen: Even the Marines Themselves Admit They Have Received an Oversupply of Credit,” New York Times, 25 May 1919.
of democracy and struck the world with wonder and amazement.”

If American manhood defeated Germany, then Marines were its best examples. “They, the best red blooded, manhood, and flowery youth took the consequences in whatever fashion as they came,” one civilian author wrote. “You see—it was men, wasn’t it, who beat the Germans? Men who became fighters, Marines,” wrote another. Governor Hugh M. Dorsey of Georgia claimed that “the splendid achievements of the Marines in the World War are well known, they were the cleanest and strongest of our young manhood.” Many Americans looked to the Marine Corps now as an institution comprised of good men. “The Marine Corps stands for all that is good in the ideals of manhood—for strength, for loyalty, for fidelity and for cleanliness in mind and body,” Colorado governor Oliver H. Shoup asserted. “If you are a he-man, if you want action—enlist in the Marines!”

Marines began immortalizing the Battle of Belleau Wood immediately after the war. “Dear Folks at Home—” and Catlin’s “With the Help of God and a Few Marines” came out in 1919. Charles Scribner’s Sons published Thomas Boyd’s Through the Wheat in 1923 and John W. Thomason’s Fix Bayonets! two years later. Boyd and Thomason both fought at Belleau Wood. One of Thomason’s lasting contributions to the Corps’ remembrance of the battle was his depiction of the men who fought there:

They were the Leathernecks, the Old Timers. They were the old breed of American regular, regarding the service as home and war as an occupation; and they transmitted their temper and character and viewpoint to the high hearted volunteer mass which filled the ranks of the Marine Brigade.

These Marines were tough, rugged, courageous, and confident. Several years after the battle, a retired Army officer who witnessed the Marines march up the Paris-Metz highway toward the fight remarked to Thomason that “they looked fine, coming in there. . . . Tall fellows, healthy and fit—they looked hard and competent. We watched you going in . . . and we all felt better.”

Near the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Belleau Wood, one Marine claimed that “recollection of those days of strife stirs all that is best in us; pride in the manhood of America, pride in the achievement of our Corps, pride in possession of our noble traditions.” The pride in themselves needed channeling into determination, “determination to be men, determination to keep bright the reputation won for us.” They tried to persuade people that they were elite warriors. But, deeper than that, they convinced themselves and many others that they were men. “The Marine Corps has made a wonderful name for itself,” wrote Arthur J. Burks, a Marine recruiter. He argued that when people described Marines they used descriptions in the following order: “cream of American manhood, ‘he-men,’ and the like.”

Historians have stood clear of a gender analysis of the Corps, however. Regarding the Great War era, historians of gender have largely ignored the military, and military historians have largely ignored gender. Marion Sturkey’s Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines probably speaks for many on the military side when he wrote, “Gender? Who knows? Who Cares? . . . Therefore, with respect to gender this book contains no de-ranged psycho-babble. . . . Any wacko liberal wimps who dislike this Warrior Culture ethos should find

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85 Dorsey, “Governors Endorse the Marine Corps.”
88 Thomason, Fix Bayonets!, xiii.
something else to read.91 He, like many military historians, does not see the value of studying manhood and masculinity in the Marine Corps.

What they all have missed is that Marines often communicated with each other and with the American public using shared ideas of manhood and masculinity. Americans praised the Marines using those notions. Battles like Belleau Wood became proof that Marines were good for the manhood of the country and that they gave American men the opportunity to be courageous, chivalrous, and battle-tested. Americans understood this message, and many believed it.

Manhood continued to be important to Marines in the decades following the Great War. In 1930, a writer for Leatherneck claimed that Marines made men into gentlemen. Marines had “evolved from the mere waterfront brawlers of a former day to gentlemen of the first order,” and “it has not sapped their manhood or their ability to fight in the least.”92 During World War II, Captain Edward B. Irving claimed that the Marine Corps had reached the “full stature of its military manhood” and still made “gentlemen who can fight like hell!”93 In 1955, First Lieutenant Walter K. Wilson claimed that a man “should be sent to boot camp with the understanding that he is not only undergoing training and toughening up, but that he is encountering a test of manhood as well and is expected to face up to it.” Once he becomes a Marine, “he should feel that he is accepted as a man and that he is capable of shouldering his responsibilities.”94 The July 1975 issue of Leatherneck published Victor Krulak’s letter to General Randolph M. Pate, where he claimed “that our Corps is downright good for the manhood of our country.”95 In the late 1970s, Marine General Robert H. Barrow wrote,

The opportunity for legitimate proving of one’s manliness is shrinking. A notable exception is the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’ reputation, richly deserved, for physical toughness, courage and demands on mind and body, attracts those who want to prove their manliness. Here too their search ends.96

Battles like Belleau Wood became prima facie evidence in support of the Marines’ image and appeal throughout the twentieth century.

A study of manhood in the Marine Corps uncovers another rich layer of the institution’s past. It further reveals that the Corps flexed strong cultural muscles that would contribute to its staying power throughout the twentieth century. It also shows that there is still a great deal of work to do to fully understand and appreciate the history of America’s Great War-era Marines and the significance of the battles they fought.

91 Marion F. Sturkey, Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines, 3d ed. (Plumb Branch, SC: Heritage Press, 2010), xii.
The U.S. Army’s Influence on Marine Corps Tank Doctrine

by Major Joseph DiDomenico, USA

Doctrine provides solutions to tactical or operational problems. It is the frame of reference used by soldiers and leaders to organize, train, and fight. Over time, these principles become the paradigm for how units function, enabling troops and commanders to act quickly against foreseeable threats. In November 1943, crisis shifted the doctrinal paradigm for the U.S. Marine Corps at the Battle of Tarawa. When the battle ended, it cost the 2d Marine Division 3,301 casualties in only three days of combat. Armored forces in particular took upwards of 86 percent losses—the result of poor communication, poor planning, and ineffective firepower. The American public demanded that Marine Corps leaders be held accountable for what they considered a catastrophic military failure. Commanding officers in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) acknowledged improvements must be made to correct the problems encountered on Betio Island, among them the ineffective employment of tanks. These failures were the catalyst for doctrinal and technological changes that affected future Marine Corps campaigns in the Pacific theater of operations.

After World War I and throughout the interwar period, the leadership of the Marine Corps recognized that armored forces would be an important factor to support the seizure of advanced bases and islands. Of higher priority, however, were developing systems to synchronize naval gunfire and developing an amphibious tractor to land troops. After the outrage over losses during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, these two problems had to be solved, and they overshadowed the incorporation of tanks into amphibious operations. As a quick and economic solution, the Marine Corps Equipment Board purchased tank technology from the U.S. Army in 1938.

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4 A. H. Nobel, “Brief Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture of the Gilbert Islands,” 6 January 1943, Record Group (RG) 38, Box 8, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; and “Brief on Tarawa Operation,” CINCLUS Plans Division, 5 December 1943, RG 38, Box 8, NARA.


7 Chief Ordnance to CMC, 26 April 1938, and minutes of MCEB meeting 31 May 1938, RG 127, Box 76, NARA; and LTC Lemuel C. Shepherd memo to CMC, 31 May 1938, RG 127, Box 154, NARA.
With this procurement of technology, the Army provided the Marine Corps its tactical and organizational doctrine and training at the Army’s tank school. The Army’s way of armored warfare became the foundation of Marine Corps tank unit structure and education. The Army’s armored tactics, however, were not designed to operate in the Pacific theater, where close infantry coordination was necessary, but rather were designed for independent armored formations.\(^8\) The shortcomings of the Army’s tank doctrine to support the seizure of advanced bases resulted in a dramatic resource- and casualty-intensive progression of Marine Corps tank doctrine throughout operations in the Pacific theater that started at the Battle of Tarawa.

At the start of fighting in the Pacific, Marine Corps doctrine regarding the role of tanks in an amphibious assault—outlined in the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* of 1934—was vague.\(^9\) As a result, the first Marine tank crews were trained to operate in independent armored formations. Army units were organized into units that extended from the four-tank armored platoon up to an entire armored division, as dictated by the recently published Army doctrine. This tactic was designed for Army units fighting in the terrain of Europe and North Africa, where an enemy armored threat was more prevalent. The Marine Corps later recognized that independent tank operations in restricted island terrain against an entrenched enemy was fatal for many tankers. During the Battle of Tarawa, coordination between infantry and armor was essential to survival. It forced the Marine Corps to modify its tactics and techniques. Tarawa, therefore, became the single point at which the Marine Corps’ doctrine and principles of tank warfare began to develop differently from the Army’s concept of armored warfare.

This article discusses how Army technology purchased by the Marine Corps Equipment Board in 1938 hastily forced the Corps to also implement tank doctrine on Army operational principles. The actions of Marine Corps units in the central Pacific campaign are used as the sample for this assessment. This selection, while small, allows us to consider the effects of armor doctrine at every echelon of tactical command from the company level to the FMF by reviewing ad hoc lower-level adjustments to doctrine from the platoon to the battalion.\(^10\) From the regiment to the division, administrative standard operating procedures (SOPs) were established by the command to offset unclear or ineffective procedures.\(^11\) Above the division, organizational change was codified by the Marine Corps in the wake of the significant public pressure as a result of losses at Tarawa. This is seen in unit tables of organization and the tactical field manuals that were codified at the Tank Matters Conference in 1945.\(^12\)

**Context: The Interwar Period**

By the close of World War I, the methods used to wage war were dramatically different than in previous

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\(^9\) *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1934), Historical Amphibious File (HAF) 39, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.


\(^11\) R. M. Pate, enclosure A in report of conference, FMF PAC (Pacific) draft SOP Tank-Infantry Coordination, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; and FMF PAC draft SOP Tank-Infantry Coordination, RG 127, Box 18, NARA.

\(^12\) Report of conference for C/S FMF PAC, 3 May 1945, Conference on Tank Matters, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; R. K. Schmidt, report of conference for C/S FMF PAC, 3 May 1945, Conference on Tank Matters, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; R. L. Hall, memo for Tank Conference Report, 8 June 1945, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; USMC T/O E-80, Tank Battalion, Marine Division, approved 15 April 1943, Subject Files: Tables of Organization, (E-80), Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; USMC T/O F-80, Tank Company, Marine Division, approved 4 May 1944, Subject Files: Tables of Organization, (F-80), Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division; USMC T/O G-76, Tank Company, Marine Division, approved 1 May 1945, Subject Files: Tables of Organization, (G-76), Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division; USMC T/O G-80, Tank Company, Marine Division, approved 1 May 1945, Subject Files: Tables of Organization, (G-80), Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division; and Amphibious Operations, Employment of Tanks, Phib 18, 1948, HAF 234, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division.
conflicts. New technologies and capabilities like the tank, aircraft, accurate indirect fire, and new mechanized lift capabilities as well as the scope of how units organized, trained, and deployed were undergoing a revolutionary change. Synchronization and combined arms became foundational elements for wargames and exercises executed during the interwar period.13

Limitations, however, plagued the use of tanks during World War I, particularly speed and the considerable amounts of maintenance and logistics support required to ensure they were operational.14 Despite these shortcomings, there remained a lot of potential for the tank in battle. Its primary role was as an infantry support vehicle that had heavy and light capabilities. Light tanks boasted more maneuverability and speed and therefore offered the ability to exploit weaknesses in enemy lines quickly. Heavy tanks, however, had the primary mission to protect the infantry during a frontal assault on an entrenched position. This protection offered dismounted infantry an opportunity to get far enough through the deadly no-man’s-land that they would be able to breach the enemy position.15 This new capability gave ground forces breaching and outflanking options when assaulting enemy positions across a wide breadth of terrain. Ideally, this technology would avoid stagnant trench warfare.

In 1920, the National Defense Act also played a role in the development of armored vehicles for both the Marine Corps and the Army. The act assimilated the Army tank corps into the infantry branch to preclude overspending by the Army. Simultaneously, the Marine Corps focused its efforts on developing mechanized vehicles to move troops and seize advanced naval bases in amphibious operations. Throughout the interwar period, the Marine Corps closely monitored the Army’s mechanization process to help advance its small force technologically while under generally tight fiscal limitations.

In 1931, the mechanization of the Army became a critical point for the new chief of staff, General Douglas MacArthur. His guidance, with direction from the War Department, placed the lead effort for mechanization on the Army’s Cavalry branch. By 1933, the cavalry school published the mechanized manual to establish an initial draft of this experimental doctrine.16 In 1939, Brigadier General Adna Romanza Chaffee Jr., an influential leader in mechanized cavalry forces, began to analyze options for organization, doctrine, and technology of this force. As the analysis progressed, some leaders believed the use of independent armored divisions would play a dominant role in modern warfare. Between 1938 and 1941, the Army experimented with this concept in the first mechanized training operation known as the “Louisiana Maneuvers.”17

The field training exercises confirmed that mechanized forces could play a decisive role on the battlefield. With never-before-seen maneuverability and the overwhelming shock of their available combat power, it became clear that independent armored formations could provide operational and strategic impacts from the tactical level of war. Poland and France were invaded in 1940 with armored formations that broke through Polish and French defenses. This consequently prompted leaders to split the Army’s cavalry corps into two branches: cavalry and armor. The cavalry branch focused on reconnaissance and security while the armor branch emphasized decisive action to defeat an opposing all-armored force. The Army prepared its armored force to compete with tank divisions sweeping across Europe.18 As a result, the Army

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began to document its tactics in a series of field manuals. The initial copies of the 17 series of field manuals included *The Armored Force, Tactics and Techniques*, Field Manual (FM) 17-10; *Tank Platoon*, FM 17-30; *Tank Company, Light and Medium*, FM 17-32; and *The Armored Battalion, Light and Medium*, FM 17-33. These manuals served as the foundation for tank doctrine and were developed throughout the late 1930s. Between 1940 and 1942, most of the Army’s armored manuals were officially published and used to train its units. They included lessons of the Louisiana maneuvers and offered methods that could exploit the armored capabilities and maneuverability of the tank.

With technological advances and war looming on the horizon, the 1930s became one of the most doctrinally prolific periods in all of American military history. The Army developed its mechanized force throughout the 1920s and established an all-armored force with complex training maneuvers, approved tables of organization, and an entire series of manuals by the late 1930s. The Marine Corps, conversely, although it provided observers to the maneuvers, would not consider developing or organizing any armored units until the middle of the decade because of its focus on amphibious landings.

In 1933, the Marine Corps established the Fleet Marine Force. This expeditionary force was organized to plan, support, and conduct amphibious operations in any environment. Within these complex operations, delineating roles and responsibilities for land, sea, and air forces was a critical concern for the FMF. By 1934, the Marine Corps drafted the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, and much like the Army’s 17 series field manuals, it provided structure and clarity to much of the complexity in amphibious operations for the FMF. It comprehensively covered command relationships, naval gunfire support, aerial support, ship-to-shore movement, establishment of the beachhead, logistical activities, and the employment of tanks. To validate this doctrine, the Marine Corps conducted a series of fleet landing exercises (FLEXs). To avoid disasters such as those seen in the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, the Marine Corps knew it must synchronize combat power to efficiently land forces on an enemy-held beach, and it practiced these techniques during the FLEXs.

The FLEXs used the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* as the protocol for organization and execution of amphibious maneuvers. While the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* was incredibly detailed in some ways, in others it was not. It recognized the importance of tanks but was relatively vague about how to employ them, and it explicitly identified light tanks as being the most suitable for amphibious operations. Using this regulation as a guideline for amphibious operations, the Marine Corps organized its formations with tanks that could both meet the expectations of supporting infantry and the weight limits for transport by available naval shipping.

To show some critical flaws of this older doctrine, the chapter on employment of tanks deserves scrutiny. The section acknowledged the role of tanks as an element that can be used to reduce friction at the beachhead and assist the infantry advance beyond the initial landing zone. The manual gives some guidance for the tactical employment of tanks in a variety of roles. They can support infantry in landings or drive forward without infantry support to seize key terrain or attack specific objectives that are important to the mission at hand.

This portion of the manual is important because it parallels doctrinal employment of Army tanks. In the Army, tanks were fundamentally designed to combat armored divisions using mobility to seize terrain that was vital for the survival and tactical success of an

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operation. The Marine tentative manual clearly supports this opinion.

In addition, the tactical principles described in the manual were considered critical for the employment of tanks. Tanks should be made available in large numbers to deliver a concentrated blow to the enemy and draw fire or be employed individually to draw fire from enemy defenses.25 This expresses the importance of mutual support among tanks. Massing the effects of armored forces to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy as described in the manual would thereby provide mobility to the accompanying infantry forces. This type of operation is also very similar to the Army’s theory and doctrine for fighting with armored forces.

Ultimately, the meager two pages on tanks provided by the Tentative Landing Operations Manual were inadequate and the manual overall lacked detail on tank employment for amphibious operations. The Marine Corps’ tentative manual demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the organization of tank units. Furthermore, tank technology had simply not been tested and would not be evaluated until the FLEXs commenced to validate the use of armor in amphibious assaults. As Marine tank units organized, a lack of Marine Corps tank doctrine to guide leaders led to a reliance on the Army’s armored force doctrine and training.

In January 1935, the Marine Corps conducted FLEX 1. This exercise did not include any of the Corps’ tank units due to a shortage of funds. New budgetary resources allowed for tank procurement the following year and on 1 March 1937, the 1st Tank Company, 1st Marine Brigade, was activated at Quantico, Virginia. It was armed with five new Marmon-Herrington combat tanks, light (CTL), because they were the only armored vehicles at the time capable of meeting the weight limitations for transport on board naval artillery lighters.26 While the rest of the FMF continued to FLEXs 2 and 3, the newly organized tank company conducted organizational training to develop further the technical and tactical needs of the unit.

In January 1938, FLEX 4 took place and became the first to include the Marine tankers in an operational role. Although transporting the vehicles to shore proved difficult—because only one lighter with the capability to carry heavy vehicles was available—the tactical employment of the tanks was a relative success. The tanks landed with the assault force and assisted in eliminating resistance on the beach. Conversely, tanks used in the defense provided an outstanding counterattack capability without infantry support. A report of the FLEX recounts their success as a “brilliant use of tanks made in a counterattack.”27 The initial success of the tanks was promising, but a lack of infantry support was considered a success by many commanders. This compounded the flaws of armor doctrine not only among the armor units but also among operational-level staff that were coordinating and planning the employment of tanks in an amphibious operation.

After FLEX 4, technological advances improved the effectiveness of the current Marmon-Herrington CTL tanks, which were known to consistently throw tracks. After FLEX 5 in 1938, the newer CTL models suffered different mechanical issues from stresses induced by speed and lubrication of the vehicle.28 Although the Army’s M2 medium tanks outperformed the Marine Corps’ CTLs, the M2s weighed nearly 10 tons, far too heavy for naval landing craft of the time.29 This forced the Navy to contact a private boat builder in New Orleans, Andrew Higgins, to assist in developing landing craft that were capable of giving an amphibious force a heavy lift capacity for newer tanks.30 The Marmon-Herrington manufacturers continued to make upgrades and lighten the CTL. However, in 1938, the Marine Corps Equipment Board met to discuss the future of Marine tanks. They concluded that the Marine Corps would purchase some tanks from

[27] Fleet Landing Exercise No. 4 Reports, CG, 1st Marine Brigade, 12 March 1938, RG 127, Box 2, NARA.
the Army’s arsenal of M2A4 light tanks and test their abilities during FLEX 6 in January 1940.

Following FLEX 6, the Corps’ leadership considered the Army’s M2A4 far superior to the CTL. It offered more firepower and maneuverability, although its suspension was susceptible to weakness due to the effects of saltwater. Despite this vulnerability, the Marine Corps approved funding to purchase 18–20 of the Army's M2A4 tanks. While the Marines monitored the progress of the Army’s tank development, they became aware of the unique and detailed doctrine that the Army developed after some lengthy armored maneuvers.

The Army and Marine Corps developed their respective doctrines to support their new armored and amphibious missions. Although they developed their concepts separately, the two forces shared critical aspects of their technology and theory. Between 1934 and 1941, significant training took place between both organizations with the objective to refine their tactics. Simultaneously, the two organizations shared technological and doctrinal innovations to facilitate preparations for the increasingly imminent threat in Europe and the Pacific. The Army and the Marine Corps also provided cross-training in amphibious doctrine as well as armor doctrine. The Army used the Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine, Fleet Training Publication (FTP) 167 (1938), almost verbatim to formulate its Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, FM 31-5 (1941).

The interwar period saw aggressive mechanized training programs develop across the Army. In July 1940, General Adna Chaffee was appointed as the chief of the Army’s armor branch and was given complete control over its doctrine, organization, and equipment. Chaffee, raised as a cavalry officer, became a staunch supporter of an independent armored force. The War Department accepted his general view of establishing an armored force and published it as doctrine in Field Service Regulations: Operations, FM 100-5. It described the armored division as the basic unit of the combined arms that can conduct independent operations. It is organized specifically to perform missions that require mobility and firepower and achieve decisive effects, particularly in the rear and support areas of the enemy. This description shows how much independence the Army believes its tank units should retain. An armored force organized for independent operations served as the foundation for the Army’s 17 series field manuals used for training Army tank units. Those tactics were being taught to Marine armor units after FLEX 6 took place in 1940.

In late 1942, the Army’s new armored force manuals were published: The Armored Force Field Manual, Tactics and Techniques, FM 17-10, in March 1942; The Tank Company, Light and Medium, FM 17-32, in August 1942; The Armored Battalion, Light and Medium, FM 17-33, in September 1942; and The Tank Platoon, FM 17-30, in October 1942. These manuals became fundamental parts of training in both the Army and Marine Corps. While they stressed the maneuverability and independence offered by tank organizations, they provided guidelines and other combined arms parameters that should be used by armored force commanders. This would negatively impact the employment of tanks in the Pacific because of the different operating environment encountered. Deeply entrenched forces that were primarily dismounted, compounded by restricted island terrain, were a vast difference from the Army’s expected environment and the threat the Army would fight in Europe.

It was efficient to share these aspects of their operations, however, the transfer of information between the Army and the Marine Corps without an accompanying analysis reduced the understanding of armor’s capabilities and came at a cost. Marine First Lieutenant Robert M. Neiman served as a tank officer in command of Company D, 2d Tank Battalion. While his light tank company organized at Camp Pendleton, California, he reflected on the lack of doctrinal information. Tank models differed each month and there were no tactical manuals, only technical manuals, and therefore much of their training revolved around maintenance. To receive tactical training, Lieutenant

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31 F. M. Andrews memo to Adjutant General, G-3, 5 July 1940, RG127, Box 8, NARA.
Neiman had to send his officers and sergeants to the Army’s armor course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Neiman described an important reality for many Marine tank officers. Because no systematic tactical training was available in the Corps’ tank training center at Jacques Farm at Camp Pendleton, they often received their schooling at the Army’s tank course at Fort Knox. The fundamental tactics they learned came from Army doctrine that was refined at the general headquarters maneuvers of 1941 and published in the 17 series manuals. Marine tanker training at Jacques Farm allowed units to practice their tactics, but it included an inordinate amount of mechanical driving and technical training. It compounded the primary difference in Army and Marine doctrine and would negatively impact many Marine Corps tank organizations.

Meanwhile, the amphibious doctrine was codified when the U.S. Navy published the *Landing Operations Doctrine*, FTP-167, in 1938. This document served as the reference for all amphibious operations conducted by the Navy. The manual drew heavily on the vague armor tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined in the Marine Corps’ own *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* of 1934. As the Corps continued to focus on amphibious operations, it struggled to develop an amphibious tank that possessed sufficient maneuverability to be useful in a land battle. Much of the Corps’ effort went into developing tracked transports that were capable of carrying troops and equipment quickly during the ship-to-shore phase and that provided some protection and maneuverability on land. As the Marine Corps received tank technology and doctrinal training from the Army, flaws crept into the development of its tank corps; they were exposed only when they became employed in the Pacific theater.

### Armor Operations 1941–1943: The Testing Grounds

At the outbreak of war, many Marine tank battalions and companies were activated quickly and saw limited training before shipping out, while the Army had many more armored units organized and in the field. Furthermore, a rush in equipping units with tanks created an environment in which multiple variants of tanks with different maintenance and support requirements resided in the same company or platoon, making it a logistical nightmare to sustain. Some tanks arrived at units across the theater without radios, periscopes, and other critical items, adding to the challenges encountered in the physical environment.

In August 1942, the Marine-led offensive at the island of Guadalcanal began and became the testing ground for Marine armored units of the 1st and 2d Tank Battalions. Guadalcanal offered restricted terrain that exposed vulnerabilities in tanks when employed in dense jungles and along terrain with severe slopes. The tanks were landed following the infantry assault and given the primary task to expand the beachhead and defend Henderson Field, both areas of relatively open ground. In most cases, they were employed precisely as the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* directed. Tanks helped to secure victory at a critical point of the battle: at the engagement along Tenaru Ridge on 21 August 1942. Tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion integrated into an infantry counterattack force that engaged a pocket of die-hard Japanese defenders. Although the tank-led counterattack was extremely successful in this instance, this was not always the case.

On 14 September, an unsupported platoon of six tanks advanced past a ridge occupied by Company K, 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. Japanese forces ambushed the independent tank platoon, and as the platoon leader reacted, the tanks were unable to effectively coordinate movement through the dense jungle underbrush. The tanks struggled to communicate and maneuver to support one another, giving the Japanese an opportunity to destroy two tanks, disable a third,

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35 The *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* describes the use of tanks according to section 2-1002 and explains that “tanks may provide assistance step by step against defensive installations as they are successively encountered or they may drive forward to a definite objective without regard to the progress of the infantry.”
and cause a fourth to capsize in a river, drowning the crew.\(^\text{36}\)

The counterattack at Henderson Field and Tenaru Ridge offered both success and failure for the two Marine tank battalions. It showed great potential for tanks when used as they were trained to fight, but it also revealed their vulnerability in some terrain. According to the Tentative Landing Operations Manual and the Army’s Armored Battalion, Light and Medium, FM 17-33, the actions on 21 August were precisely in line with the doctrine while those of 14 September were not. By the completion of the battle on Guadalcanal, Marines presumed that the mutual support with infantry was key in dense jungle terrain, but there was no significant effort to capture this in any kind of doctrine. Furthermore, tanks in support of an amphibious force had yet to be tested.

Armor played a limited role in the overall success of the Guadalcanal campaign because of the restricted jungle terrain, but the use of tanks provided foreshadowing of ways to more effectively employ tanks in the Marine Corps. Although the environment confined tank units, the doctrine they were trained on only discussed the role of tanks in a beach landing. Guadalcanal opened an entirely new perspective on the employment of tanks as an exploitation force. Exploitation of the lodgment in restricted jungle terrain was an alien concept to Marine tankers. Tank and infantry cooperation took place in some units, but overall it was almost nonexistent in the campaign. The Army-influenced armor operations at the platoon and company level became the primary concern. By the end of the Solomon Islands campaign—although combined infantry-armor tactics was a new concept being discussed—capturing and employing those lessons was not taken seriously above the battalion level. Tank tactics were therefore left unrefined except for minor task organization changes that were taken directly from the Army table of organization for tank battalions operating in North Africa. Richard Tregaskis, a veteran journalist covering Guadalcanal, wrote in his book Guadalcanal Diary about his experience with tanks that functioned without infantry support; he described tanks fighting in the jungle as vicious and in independent formations without much coordination.\(^\text{37}\)

After Guadalcanal, operations across the Solomon Islands and New Britain allowed tanks and infantry to test their mettle and tactics in a jungle environment but not during amphibious landings. Many Marine battalion-level leaders had a general concern about the light tanks adopted by the Army and their effectiveness in the jungle terrain. Light tanks had much less armor and were vulnerable to antitank attacks by up-close Japanese soldiers. They clearly required additional support from infantry, but Marines continued to plan operations in independent units as prescribed by the 1942 armored force field manuals and training courses. Combined with the inability of higher-echelon leaders to recognize the importance of organizational and doctrinal change, this eventually led to catastrophe at Tarawa, where close infantry and armor synchronization early on could have prevented substantial losses.

By 1942, the landing ship, tank (LST) and landing ship, medium (LSM) were introduced, allowing heavier vehicles to be transported much closer to the beach landing. The M4 Sherman medium tank also was introduced to the FMF, and together these new assets made armor in the Pacific much more versatile. The Army’s newly developed M4A2 had heavier armor, a larger main gun, and a stronger dual diesel engine.\(^\text{38}\)

The boost in sealift capability also provided versatility, expanding the types of armored vehicles that could be moved ashore. Other technological innovations emerged that increased the flexibility of tank units, including the EE-8 tank telephone, the dismounted flamethrower, and armored bulldozer. This gear contributed to previous successful Marine operations in New Guinea and the isolation of the Japanese fortress

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of Rabaul, yet the units bound for Tarawa received only minimal equipment and training on it.

**Armor in the Battle of Tarawa: The Proving Grounds**

Operation Galvanic was the first large-scale opposed landing of forces in the Pacific theater to test armor in opposed amphibious doctrine. Like any military operation, it began with an in-depth assessment of the terrain and the enemy on the objective. The topographical assessment of the island revealed an average elevation of 8 to 10 feet, gradual slopes, and beaches of coral and sand.39 The contour of the terrain gave defensive machine gun fire and prepared positions the upper hand but seemingly offered an edge to armored units. There would be little protection for assault troops, making it more important to ensure tanks and other armored vehicles became integrated into the initial landing.

Accordingly, based on the situation, the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* described a purpose for tanks in every wave. In the leading assault wave, tanks would destroy beach defenses, and tanks in the following waves would be prepared to outflank identified enemy positions. Tanks as part of the reserve element could only focus on land warfare and could likely not affect actions on the beach.40 This engagement as part of a reserve, compounded by relative success in previous campaigns, made it seem that independent armor operations taught in Army doctrine would serve well on Tarawa. It directly correlated with the independent maneuver expectations of tank companies and platoons as outlined in the Army’s armored force field manuals.

The 2d Marine Division had not yet used medium tanks in action.41 The division had one organic light tank battalion: the 2d Tank Battalion consisted of M3 Stuart light tanks, and for this operation it was reinforced with Company C of the 1st Corps Medium Tank Battalion, which included the new M4 Medium Sherman tank. This augmentation became one of many table of organization changes for the Marine Corps. It reduced the number of light tank companies from four to three, and the fourth became a medium tank company.42

Company C, commanded by First Lieutenant Edward L. Bale Jr., included 14 M4 tanks. As the staff sequenced the assault of Tarawa, this would be the only company of armor available in the initial phase of the landing. The 18 remaining M3s of the 2d Tank Battalion would only come ashore as part of the reserve. First Lieutenant Bale’s tanks were scheduled as part of the fifth wave and assisted in exploiting a deeper penetration into the island after initial forces secured the lodgment.43 According to Marine Corps amphibious doctrine and the Army’s independent armor operations, the tanks would be most useful outflanking the Japanese defenders encountered on the beach. This would therefore provide the landing force an opportunity to secure the airfield farther into the island. What they encountered, however, was certainly not the ability to outflank identified Japanese defenses.

Japanese defenses included eight coastal defense guns, 23 75mm guns, and 56 37mm antitank guns, as identified by photoreconnaissance. Marine planners believed that the Japanese would stubbornly defend their positions as part of their mission to cause as many casualties as possible to protect the airfield. Considering the restrictions of terrain and the enemy heavy weapons emplacements and pillboxes on the island, it seemed that Company C of the 1st Corps Tank Battalion (Medium) provided sufficient support to the division for the initial assault on the island. The tankers were trained to maneuver in relatively open terrain and armed with heavier armor and weaponry. If they were employed as they had prepared to fight, their mission on Tarawa seemed fairly easy.

The integration of the newly assigned M4 tanks,

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42 USMC T/O E-80, approved 15 April 1943.

however, was extremely inadequate. While the division task force conducted detailed rehearsals on the island of Éfaté, French New Hebrides, Bale’s company of Sherman tanks held its rehearsals separate from the rest of the division at Nouméa, New Caledonia.44 “There was no training with the infantry. None at all,” explained Bale.45 The division rehearsal focused almost entirely on the ship-to-shore movement of troops and did not include critical enablers, such as the amphibious tractor battalions and aviation support assets.

This indicated an institutional ignorance in the operational art of combined arms. Junior leaders involved in the operation, without any form of rehearsal or any doctrinal training on employing combined arms, were doomed from the beginning. No joint plan to properly synchronize use of the tanks existed in the Marine Corps. Worse still, there was no clear objective for the armor because the published doctrine instructed tanks to be used as an independent reserve and an exploitation force. Unfortunately, the guidance for tanks at the company level and below was similar to interwar Army doctrine, junior leaders learned. Tank battalions were organized as independent units at the division level, and their training and capabilities did not coincide with any training conducted with other forces, such as the infantry, amphibious tractor battalions, artillery, or air forces.

Unfortunately, after the Solomon Islands, some concerns of independently employing tank units had already been pointed out. Close infantry support and prior planning may have mitigated the failures that resulted in heavy tank losses, but no one in the FMF staff considered this necessary prior to Tarawa. The development of the tank telephone and combined infantry tactics were discussed extensively among leaders; however, the fundamental lessons were not applied to any consolidated doctrine.

D-Day on Betio Island
The Tarawa Atoll was a small island chain surrounded by a coral reef that formed a lagoon protected from strong ocean waves. Betio Island was the southernmost island in the atoll and the primary objective for Operation Galvanic because of the airfield it maintained. This allowed the island to serve as a jumping-off point to attack and seize the Marshall Islands.46 As the invasion force positioned its ships for the pre-assault bombardment and as transports entered the lagoon, the assault operation immediately began to go wrong. The fringing coral reef, covered by at most four feet of water, allowed tanks to maneuver where landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVPs), and landing craft, mechanized (LCMs), could not.47 The water levels only permitted a four-hour window for landing craft to land on the lagoon side of Betio. Additionally, a combined wire and coconut-log wall along the southern and western shores of the island channeled armor to approach elsewhere.

The first report hinting at serious problems with the assault came from an LCVP in the first wave. The crew explained that their craft could not maneuver to the shore because it was striking the coral reef. During the hydrographic assessment of the island during planning, analysts had not recognized that a neap tide would restrict landing craft in crossing over the reef, even at the highest tidal period.48

Once on shore, more problems occurred. The newly assigned regimental commander of the 2d Marines, Colonel David M. Shoup, landed after the first wave and immediately encountered heavy fire, stiff resistance, and mounting casualties on the beach. He called for earlier tank support, believing that the tanks would be able to suppress the accurate enemy fire. As the LCMs carrying the tanks circled outside the reef awaiting their prescribed landing time, they received

45 Alexander, Utmost Savagery, 61.
46 Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 198.
48 A neap tide occurs when the sun and moon are at right angles to the Earth. Since the gravitational pull on the water comes from opposite directions, the tide becomes lower or higher than normal. The neap tide that occurred at Betio, known as “dodging tides” by the Tarawa locals, was lower than expected for more than 24 hours, which continued to hamper resupply of troops and equipment to shore and made them susceptible to heavy Japanese machine gun fire.
an order to land the tanks on the coral reef and send them to the landing zone. During the approach, Bale ordered six of his tanks to Red Beach 1 on the western side of the landing zone, while the remaining eight headed to Red Beach 3 on the eastern side. The movement to the beaches, however, proved to be difficult. Massive craters in the coral reef, caused by short-falling shells of the naval and aerial bombardments, swallowed seven tanks and their crewmen before they could even get to the beachhead. Additionally, two M4s were destroyed en route by Japanese guns, and an American dive-bomber accidentally struck another after it reached the shore.49

After successfully maneuvering across the reef, the remaining four tanks made landfall. Without radio communications available to talk to infantry units on the ground, the tankers received only a vague order to “knock out all enemy positions encountered.”50 Although in line with the doctrine that many of them were trained on, this proved lethal for some tank crews. Because the tanks would maneuver forward independently without infantry support, they were virtually blind and vulnerable to Japanese counterattacks. By the end of the first day’s fighting, only two of the M4s remained operational and a third was severely damaged. The surviving armor forces gathered ammunition and organized with pockets of surviving infantrymen for the night.

The next two days of combat on Betio consisted of ad hoc tactics. Small groups of infantrymen and tankers coordinated with unofficial methods of communication. The infantrymen and tankers quickly established a series of hand and arm signals to corre-

49 Estes, Marines Under Armor, 72-73.

50 Alexander, Across the Reef, 17.
spond with their actions. When not possible, infantrymen would often ride on the turrets of the tanks to converse with the tank commander. This allowed troops to speak with tank commanders, but it placed many lives at risk. Talking with the infantry support was critical for tank commanders. This enabled them to support one another through maneuver and direct fire. The reserve M3 tanks arrived on 21 November 1943 to assist in securing the island. During numerous engagements that day and on 22 November, the 37mm cannon of the M3 light tanks proved ineffective against Japanese pillboxes. Only the power of the M4’s 75mm cannon could neutralize dug-in enemy positions. On the final day of the battle, after a massive Japanese counterattack, a combined force of tanks, combat engineers, flamethrowers, and infantry from the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, attacked the dwindling Japanese resistance. The troops maneuvered rapidly and, with close coordination, quickly rolled up the remaining Japanese elements.

On 23 November, the Marines finally secured the island, marking the end of the battle—but at a significant cost. With 3,133 total casualties, this was nearly the same amount of losses experienced on Guadalcanal. Since Tarawa lasted only 76 hours and Guadalcanal lasted almost six months, public officials

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93 Alexander, Across the Reef, 39.
demanded an explanation. The carnage of Tarawa was unparalleled compared with other battles up to this point in the war, and senior leaders were called on to respond.

In an after action report on the battle for Tarawa, the atoll attack was said to resemble “in many respects the assault of a fort with the added complication of having to initiate the assault by a ship-to-shore movement” due to much more heavily defended enemy bunkers than expected. Sadly, photoreconnaissance had not previously revealed these emplacements, which caused a significant number of casualties, and

the M3 light tanks, although maneuverable and fast, could not actually destroy them.

The M4, with its heavier cannon and additional armor, was able to penetrate fortified Japanese bunkers. It became the tank of choice for the Marine Corps after Tarawa. In the face of losing 10 tanks during the initial landing, the two Company C tanks that survived, both M4s, outgunned every remaining enemy bunker. The Marines also recognized the effectiveness of the flamethrower and requested it be added as a tank weapon to increase the M4’s effectiveness.

A lack of accurate intelligence and joint training was responsible for many losses at Tarawa, but most fatalities could have been prevented if combined tank and infantry tactics adapted to the environment car-

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54 Brief Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture of the Gilbert Islands, 6 January 1943, RG 38, Box 8, NARA.
55 A. H. Nobel, “Brief on Tarawa Operation,” CINCLUS Plans Division, 5 December 1943, RG 38, Box 8, NARA.
lier. Veterans of the battle realized that establishing a common communication platform between infantry and armor would have also reduced casualties, especially among tank units. The tactics developed on Betio often required tanks to maneuver in front of the advancing infantry. A lack of radio communications forced tank commanders to expose themselves often to communicate with the infantrymen, incurring unnecessary risk. Following the Solomon Islands campaign, the lessons learned called for equipping all tanks with the EE-8 tank infantry telephone. After Tarawa, it was no longer a discussion; close supporting tank infantry tactics were applied to all future campaigns.56

Ultimately, the Army’s armored forces doctrine, used to train and equip Marine tank battalions since 1938, had failed the Marine Corps on Tarawa. At the staff level, there was a lack of understanding of tank battalion vulnerabilities and capabilities. Leaders failed to capture tactical lessons of the Solomon Islands campaign that would have offered insight on how to use tanks in a more appropriate manner during an amphibious assault of a heavily defended area. If tank battalions were given a directive to act in an infantry support role, many tactical and organizational problems could have been dealt with during the preparations for the invasion.

The ineffective employment of armor on Tarawa revealed other important issues that were not consid-

56 Estes, Marines Under Armor, 74.
umered during the planning phase. The night of 21 November, a tank with a severely damaged main gun was repaired after mechanics cannibalized other disabled tanks. The responsive maintenance of damaged tanks was critical to the tactical accomplishments of tanks and infantry on 21 and 22 November. Tank rounds also were not readily available due to challenges establishing supply points on the highly contested beach. This forced many tanks to return to the beach and scour destroyed tanks for remaining main gun ammunition. Further debriefings revealed that heavy fire damaged tank periscopes, limiting the visibility of the entire crew. With limited communications abilities, periscopes proved critical in allowing tanks to provide accurate fire throughout the fight. Replacement periscopes also were scavenged from damaged tanks since additional periscopes were not on hand.

Armor Operations 1943–1945: Codifying New Doctrine
The lessons from Tarawa were applied to units across the Pacific theater almost immediately. In the next year and a half, units fighting in the Pacific theater adjusted their tactics through local unit SOPs. These SOPs were the temporary fix for the flawed doctrine tank units were taught to fight with. The procedures were modified to be suited to the expected adversary and the terrain they prepared to fight in. This is first seen in the invasion of Kwajalein Island in the Marshall Islands campaign on 31 January 1945, during which unit commanders reduced independent tank maneuvers to protect their vulnerable infantry. By 1945, Marine Corps units completely reorganized tank battalions, trained crews differently, and armed their tanks with a variety of more capable weapons to defeat entrenched Japanese forces.

As the campaign in the central Pacific progressed north, the island of Saipan became the target in early summer of 1944. The battle presented another opportunity to expand on lessons from Tarawa. It was the first operation in which tank units used the new Table of Organization F-80. This included other innovations, notably the flame tank. First Lieutenant Bale, the commander of Company C that assaulted Tarawa, also saw combat on Saipan. He recognized a critical training deficiency among his tankers before Tarawa but saw dramatic changes in his company by the Battle of Saipan. After landing on the beaches, his tanks had to maneuver through 500–600 yards of water. Despite heavy mortar and artillery fire, his tanks maneuvered across the beaches, contacted the infantry, and immediately began to fight alongside them.

The Battle of Okinawa was the culminating point of the war in the central Pacific. Okinawa saw the implementation of all the changes that tankers and leaders desired at Tarawa. The result was the deadly and systematic use of tanks and infantry on challenging terrain against a bitter enemy. Unlike any employment of tanks that took place in Europe at the same time, the Battle of Okinawa mirrored how tanks were employed nearly 30 years earlier in World War I. Operating strictly to support the maneuver of infantry forces engaging a heavily entrenched enemy, tanks gave maneuverability to a battlefield with otherwise restricted terrain. While the landing was unopposed,
the battle provided a valuable representation of how the use of armor had changed since Tarawa.

By the end of the Second World War, an important conference brought together commanders from nearly every Marine tank battalion, amphibious tractor battalion, and staff for corps and division headquarters. This conference was the first formal event to modify armor doctrine. They met at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, on 26–29 April 1945 to discuss “tank matters.” The commanders reviewed and tentatively approved tank battalion organization, the *FMF PAC Tank Infantry SOP* (FMF Pacific [FMFPac]), flame-thrower employment, and extensive tank modifications.\(^{62}\) The attendees addressed the vague interwar doctrine in the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* and the inadequate prewar 17 series field manuals published by the Army. It began a process of developing sound techniques to use tanks in amphibious operations and general land operations for the Marine Corps.

\(^{62}\) Memo from CG, FMFPAC, to the CGs of VAC, 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, serial number 00920-45, RG 127, Box 18, NARA.
During the first two days of the conference, leaders discussed the future of armor and solidified the doctrine that Marine tank units would use.\textsuperscript{63} They spent a significant amount of time discussing the current SOP and possible revisions concerning the role of engineering and artillery assets during tank-infantry operations. By the third day, a draft SOP was developed, and the leaders discussed task organizational changes that might be necessary. The selection of an appropriate table of organization lasted two days and included a recommendation to acquire new Army M26 Pershing and M24 Chaffee tanks. By the fifth and final day, a new SOP and table of organization were developed. The discussion at the conference closed with a debate on the current M4 series tanks. They decided to increase its armor and communication capabilities and to replace the 75mm main gun with a

\textsuperscript{63} Schmidt, report of conference for C/S FMF PAC, 2.
new main gun based on tactical engagements at the Battle of Iwo Jima.  

Modifications to the tables of organization included ammunition, weapons and equipment, personnel, and general task organization of platoons, companies, and battalions. Before the Battle of Tarawa, the Marine table of organization for a tank battalion closely resembled the Army’s tank forces in Europe. After Tarawa, the first changes reflected a shift in the use of tanks. By the end of the conference, the new organization in general supported complete integration of tanks with infantry. Company headquarters were authorized jeeps, which were utilized to coordinate and move tanks throughout their zone of operation.  

The revised FMFPac SOP for tank-infantry coordination became the replacement for the Army’s Employment of Tanks with Infantry, FM 17-36. Developed in June 1944, it was a collection of revised tactics derived from after action reports from the Mediterranean theater and replaced the Army’s Tactics and Technique (FM 17-10) and The Armored Battalion, Light and Medium (FM 17-33). The new manual included logistical requirements and command and control techniques for operating with an infantry battalion. While this was important, it also discussed modifications to the task organization of these units at the company and platoon levels. Task organization modifications were discouraged throughout the manual. The manual still supported operations no lower than an organic company when attacking a pillbox, or even in jungle terrain. This new doctrine was disseminated to the armor community, including the Marine Corps.  

The conference members moved on to tackling the problems that plagued training. During the conference, commanders addressed the deficiency in training identified by Lieutenant Bale prior to Betio. Betio illustrated the necessity of tank-infantry training, which leaders incorporated into their operations in the following campaigns to prevent uncoordinated support. Training, then, was also an addition to the new SOP. The conference ensured that the SOP captured the requirement for complete tank integration in all rehearsals. This would prevent confusion with landing craft during ship-to-shore movement and improve responsive tank support once the vehicles got ashore.  

The conference adjourned on 29 April 1945 and the FMFPac staff published the revised SOP and organizational charts. The draft—with its summary of all tentative changes to the table of organization recommendations on modifying the M4 and specialized equipment capabilities—was sent to every division commander and tank battalion for review. Between July and August 1945, comments concerning the outcome of the conference filtered back to the FMFPac staff. Commanders were almost unanimous in accepting the revisions and updates to tank matters from the conference. Some comments called for slight changes in organization and communication, but the final revision provided the table of organization and SOP that would serve as the foundation of armor employment in amphibious operations for the next series of Marine doctrine.  

Conclusion  

As the Pacific war ended, the use of tanks proved a decisive aspect of ground operations against the Japanese. The ”storm landings” by Marine and Army forces against stubbornly defended Japanese-held islands were like no other in history. By 1945, the Marine Corps tank no longer operated independently, as it did on Guadalcanal. Armor units were embedded with infantry battalions and had developed joint doctrine that efficiently processed Japanese defend-

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64 Schmidt, report of conference for C/S FMF PAC, 1–3.  
65 USMC T/O G-76, approved 1 May 1945.  
67 Employment of Tanks with Infantry, 28–30, 37–41.  
68 Employment of Tanks with Infantry, 1–2.  
69 P. A. Devalle, memorandum for Comments Concerning Report of Conference on Tank Matters, 29 June 1945, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; R. L. Hall, memorandum for Tank Conference Report, 8 June 1945, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; G. B. Erskine, memorandum for Tank Conference Report, 22 June 1945, RG 127, Box 18, NARA; and C. A. Laster, memorandum for Communication Comments of Tank Conference Report, 4 June 1945, RG 127, Box 18, NARA.
ers. Reflecting on the employment of tanks in World War I, the utilization of tanks for the Marine Corps throughout the Pacific showed some strikingly similar characteristics to the use of tanks on the western front. Tanks were used in a direct support role for infantry assaulting a heavily entrenched enemy. They provided protection, maneuverability, and counterattack forces that supplemented the main assault.

While Marine Corps tank doctrine changed between 1942 and 1945, it was clear that its foundation lies in the U.S. Army Armor School. The catalysts that drove the realization that Army doctrine was flawed in the use of tanks for the Marines were the lessons learned by the 2d Marine Division on Tarawa in 1943. The 2d Marine Division received a harsh and tragic education on the beaches of Betio, and it had a tremendous effect on strategic-level leaders in the Marine Corps and the Army. The primary lessons from Tarawa included enhancing communication and maneuver techniques for tank-infantry units, reorganizing and utilizing special equipment like the flamethrower and bulldozer to augment the mobility and effectiveness of tanks, and the overall need for improved rehearsals and training.

The doctrine created during the interwar period overlooked critical vulnerabilities for armor supporting amphibious operations. The Marine Corps focused primarily on developing amphibious doctrine to allow infantry to efficiently assault a beach and thereby failed to synthesize the Army’s tank doctrine and apply it to Marine Corps operations. The impact that the short, violent Battle of Tarawa had on tank-infantry operations is captured in the tank matters conference and the postwar Amphibious Operations: Employment of Tanks, Phib-18, Marine Corps doctrine published in 1946. The modifications to doctrine were a valuable correction to the flaws of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1934.

Mobilization of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve for World War II

by Bryan J. Dickerson

In fall 1940, the world was in the grips of its second global war. As part of America’s efforts to prepare for war, the Organized U.S. Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized for active duty by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in November and December 1940. Despite comprising only 2.5 percent of the Marine Corps’ total strength in World War II, these mobilized Reserve Marines made important contributions to the defense of the nation and the Allied victory in the Pacific. Yet the manner in which these Marines were mobilized and utilized during the war ensured that their achievements and sacrifices would be lost in the overall history of the Corps in World War II.

1940: A Nation Unprepared for War

Throughout the 1930s, totalitarian regimes in Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Soviet Union aggressively expanded throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia. By summer 1940, war raged across the globe. Due to its Great Depression and fierce isolationist sentiments, the United States was woefully unprepared for war. On 30 June 1940, the active duty U.S. Army numbered only 267,767 soldiers with another 300,000 serving in the National Guard and an additional 120,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve. The U.S. Navy numbered only 160,997 sailors and had only six aircraft carriers in commission. The active duty Marine Corps numbered only 28,277. Expecting that the United States would be dragged into the war, President Roosevelt and many other U.S. leaders worked prudently to prepare the nation while not antagonizing the public. Roosevelt’s task was complicated further because he was also seeking an unprecedented third term as president.

The stunning Nazi German victories in spring 1940 provided major justification for a rapid and immediate American military build-up. The Army Reserve began mobilizing individual members that summer. On 19 July 1940, Congress enacted the Vinson-Walsh Act (a.k.a. the Two-Ocean Navy Act) to expand and prepare the U.S. Navy for World War II. This act included expanding the combat ship strength of the Navy by 70 percent (1.325 million tons). As authorized by Congress, President Roosevelt called the National Guard to federal service in September and

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October 1940 and enacted the nation’s first peacetime draft. Also in October, the president authorized the mobilization of the entire U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR). Thus, the mobilization of the USMCR in late 1940 and into 1941 took place within the historical context of a nation hastily trying to prepare itself for a truly global war.3

The Marine Corps Reserve in 1940
The USMCR had been in existence since 1916. Its members were mobilized for World War I and served with distinction alongside their active duty counterparts. Immediately following the war, the USMCR went through several years of downsizing and neglect. In February 1925, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that made sweeping improvements to the Navy Reserve and the USMCR and authorized aviation units for the latter. The following year, Commandant of the Marine Corps Major General John A. Lejeune authorized the formation of several independent rifle companies; within a year, 16 had been organized. The USMCR quickly expanded, so much so that a regiment/battalion system was employed from 1929 to 1935. In 1935, that system was abandoned in favor of independent battalions and squadrons.4

By fall 1940, the USMCR comprised three main components: the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR), the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR), and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve (VMCR). The FMCR consisted of nondrilling reservists with at least four years of active duty service, and the VMCR consisted of nondrilling reservists with little or no active duty service. Together, the FMCR and the VMCR constituted the inactive Reserve, which had more than 9,000 members. The OMCR constituted the active Reserve and consisted of a ground component of 23 battalions and an aviation component of 13 aviation squadrons. Members of the OMCR performed weekly training events at their reserve centers and annual field training at military installations across the country. Altogether, the USMCR had 16,477 members at the end of October 1940 (table 1).5

By fall 1940, the OMCR had grown to 23 battalions and 13 aviation squadrons. The ground component consisted of 21 infantry battalions and two field artillery battalions. Geographically they were

Table 1. Status of the Marine Corps Reserve, October 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>16,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive Reserve</td>
<td>9,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>2,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>7,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>7,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground component</td>
<td>6,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation component</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Marine Corps Reserve: A History


5 Fegan, “M-Day for the Reserves,” 27–29; Malone, “The Reserves Turn 75,” 60–61; The Marine Corps Reserve, 50–51; “Reserves,” Leatherneck, January 1941, 37–41; and Tallent, “In Reserve,” 78–79. The modern equivalent for the FMCR and VMCR is the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR), and the modern equivalent of the OMCR is the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR).
located from Boston, Massachusetts, to Spokane, Washington (table 2). Though designated as battalions, these OMCR units in reality were well below the table of organization and equipment strength of a Marine Corps battalion, averaging only 250 Marines and sailors.

The 23 battalion commanders represented a diverse range of age and military experience. Except for four lieutenant colonels and two captains, all of the battalion commanders were majors. Several had served during World War I, including Lieutenant Colonel Clark W. Thompson of the 15th Battalion (Galveston, Texas), Major Joseph R. Knowlan of the 7th Battalion (Field Artillery) (Philadelphia), and Major Edward Simmonds of the 6th Battalion (Philadelphia). The oldest battalion commanders were 52-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Harvey L. Miller of the 5th Battalion (Washington, DC) and 51-year-old Major Woodbridge S. Van Dyke II of the 22d Battalion (Field Artillery) (Los Angeles). The youngest battalion commanders were 33-year-old Major William P. Carey of the 3rd Battalion (New York City, NY), and 34-year-old Major Burdette Hagerman of the 17th Battalion (Detroit). The remaining battalion commanders were ages 36 to 49. Two battalion commanders had been in command for more than nine years, but conversely, 9 of the 23 battalion commanders (39 percent) had assumed command in 1940.6

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6 Fegan, “M-Day for the Reserves,” 27.
There also was much diversity in the battalion commanders’ civilian occupations and experience. Lieutenant Colonel Miller was secretary of the District Boxing Commission. Lieutenant Colonel Thompson had served as a congressman for Texas. Major Knowlan worked in the insurance industry. Major Simmonds was superintendent of the Overbrook School for the Blind and president of the Springfield Township School Board in Pennsylvania. Major Van Dyke was a Hollywood movie director whose credits included *Tarzan the Ape Man* (1932). He also had been one of California’s delegates to the 1940 Democratic National Convention.7

The aviation component comprised 13 aviation squadrons that, like the battalions, were located across the country from New York to California (table 3). Eleven of the squadrons were Marine Reserve Scouting Squadrons; the remaining two were Marine Reserve Service Squadrons. In 1940, these squadrons were almost exclusively equipped with the Vought SB2U Vindicator dive-bomber.

The commanding officers of these 13 Marine aviation squadrons were among the leaders in aviation in the United States. Major Alton N. Parker of Marine Reserve Scouting Squadron 10 (VMS-10R) had flown in combat during World War I. As a member of Navy Captain Richard E. Byrd’s first Antarctica expedition, Major Parker was the first person to fly over the frozen continent on 29 December 1929. Major William J. Fox commanded VMS-7R; in civilian life, he was chief engineer for the Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission and stood in for actor Errol Flynn as a stunt pilot in the 1941 movie *Dive Bomber.* Colonel Melvin J. Maas, commanding officer of VMS-6R, enlisted in the Marine Corps during World War I and learned to fly as an enlisted Marine; he was commissioned in the OMCR in 1925 and also served as a U.S. representative for Minnesota. Major Bernard Lewis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Home station</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Commanding officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMS-1R</td>
<td>NRAB Scuantum</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Capt Nathaniel S. Clifford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-2R</td>
<td>NRAB Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Maj S. A. McClellan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-3R</td>
<td>NRAB Anacostia</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Capt John B. Jacob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-4R</td>
<td>NAS Miami</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Maj Bernard L. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-5R</td>
<td>NRAB Grosse Il</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Capt Charles E. Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-6R</td>
<td>NRAB Minneapolis</td>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Col Melvin J. Maas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-7R</td>
<td>NRAB Long Beach</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Maj William J. Fox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-8R</td>
<td>NRAB Oakland</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Maj Raymond W. Conroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-9R</td>
<td>NRAB Seattle</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Capt Joseph P. Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-10R</td>
<td>NRAB Kansas City</td>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Maj Alton N. Parker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS-11R</td>
<td>NRAB Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Maj Karl S. Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-2MR</td>
<td>NRAB Grosse Il</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Capt George E. Congdon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-3MR</td>
<td>NRAB Seattle</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Capt Valentine Gephardt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: SS = Service Squadron; MR = Marine Reserve Service Squadron; VMS = Marine Reserve Scouting Squadron; NRAB = Naval Reserve Aviation Base; and NAS = Naval Air Station.


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Smith of VMS-4R was the second Marine Corps aviator right after Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham. During World War I, Smith served as a naval intelligence attaché with the French Armée de l’Air, and studied lighter-than-air craft with them. The commander of VMS-11R, Major Karl S. Day, had earned the Navy Cross while flying bombers during World War I. After the war, he worked for American Airlines and was a pioneer in instrument flight.8

Mobilizing the USMCR

Though mobilization of the USMCR had been discussed during summer 1940, the key decisions for its implementation were made and executed in October. The mobilization of both the Navy Reserves and USMCR was done under President Roosevelt’s Presidential Order No. 8245, which had declared a limited national emergency the previous year. On 5 October 1940, Secretary of the Navy William Franklin Knox issued orders notifying Navy and Marine reservists to be prepared for mobilization on short notice. On 7 October 1940, Commandant Major General Thomas Holcomb sent a Reserve mobilization plan to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark for approval. Two days later, the Commandant sent directives to the Marine Corps bases at San Diego, California; Quantico, Virginia; and the Marine Barracks at Navy Yards Philadelphia; Norfolk; Puget Sound/Bremerton; Washington; and Mare Island, California, to prepare to receive members of the OMGCR battalions in early November. Table 4 shows the reported strength of each battalion in October 1940 and their planned initial duty stations. The next day, the Navy Department announced that the OMGCR battalions would be mobilized on or about 7 November 1940. On 15 October 1940, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier General Alexander A. Vandegrift issued the orders to mobilize all 23 Reserve battalions. Exactly one month later, Vandegrift ordered the aviation units

and 1,000 members of the FMCR mobilized as well.\(^9\)

One particular paragraph of Commandant Holcomb’s directive to the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force would have a tremendous impact on the mobilized reservists. Commandant Holcomb wrote, “It is desired that, after a period necessary for completing administrative matters, the personnel of Reserve Battalions be absorbed in units of the Fleet Marine Force so that all units of the Fleet Marine Force will have a proportionate part of regular and reserve personnel.” While Holcomb’s directive would ensure a full integration of active duty and Reserve Marines as the Fleet Marine Force expanded to meet expected wartime contingencies, the Commandant also ensured that the OMCR and the inactive components of the USMCR would cease to function for the foreseeable future.\(^10\)

The mobilization paradigm for the USMCR in 1940 was very much different than it is today. Today, USMCR units mobilize as units or provide detachments or individuals to augment other active and Reserve units. When the whole unit mobilizes, rear parties continue to function at the home training centers (HTCs). This was not the case in 1940. The purpose of the USMCR of 1940 was to provide trained Marines to augment the active duty forces. Once its members were mobilized, OMCR units were deactivated and remained in a dormant state throughout the war. OMCR units were neither intended to mobilize and deploy as units nor did the units maintain rear parties at the Reserve centers to continue operating while their Marines were mobilized. Furthermore, OMCR reservists were mobilized for the duration of the national emergency.

Within days of Roosevelt’s reelection, OMCR battalions began reporting to their HTCs for mobilization. Nearly all of them then travelled on to their initial duty stations at major Marine Corps and Navy installations on the East and West Coasts. Indianapolis’s 16th Battalion and several other battalions had to travel halfway across the country to reach their duty stations in San Diego. Other battalions had relatively short distances to travel to their duty stations. This included the 5th Battalion of Washington, DC, which reported to Quantico, and the 23d Battalion of Roanoke, Virginia, which reported to Navy Yard Norfolk. The 6th Battalion, based at the Marine Barracks, Phil-


\(^10\) CMC memo to CG FMF MCB San Diego, 9 October 1940.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Home station</th>
<th>October 1940 strength</th>
<th>Reporting duty station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>New York City, NY</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d</td>
<td>New York City, NY</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Newark, NJ</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>MB Philadelphia</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>NY Philadelphia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th (FA)</td>
<td>MB Philadelphia</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Toledo, OH</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Seattle, WA</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>NY Mare Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Spokane, WA</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Galveston, TX</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Indianapolis, IN</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Detroit, MI</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>MB Quantico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>St. Paul, MN</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Augusta, GA</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>NY Norfolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>Portland, OR</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>NY Bremerton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Charlotte, NC</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>NY Norfolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d (FA)</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>MCB San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d</td>
<td>Roanoke, VA</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>NY Norfolk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: MB = Marine Barracks; MCB = Marine Corps Base; and NY = Naval Yard.

Sources: CMC memo to CO MB Quantico, 9 October 1940; CMC memo to CO MB NY Philadelphia, 9 October 1940; CMC memo to CG FMF MCB San Diego, 9 October 1940; CMC memo to CO MB NY Mare Island, 9 October 1940; CMC memo to CO MB NY Norfolk, 9 October 1940; and CMC memo to CO MB NY Bremerton, 9 October 1940, all: Correspondence Files, Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.
adelphia Navy Yard, merely had to report to its HTC as its initial duty station was the Philadelphia Navy Yard.11

By 9 November 1940, all of the Reserve infantry and field artillery battalions had been mobilized. The cost of mobilizing these 23 battalions was $177,764 with an average cost per battalion of $7,729 and average cost per reservist of $31. Altogether, 239 officers and 6,192 enlisted men were mobilized from the ground forces. Seven officers and 1,183 enlisted Marines were disqualified for physical or hardship reasons or for holding vital jobs in the national defense industries. Remarkably, only 22 enlisted Marines that did not fall into one of the aforementioned categories failed to report for duty.12

Seventeen of the mobilized battalions reported to the Marine Corps bases in either San Diego or Quantico. In San Diego, nine OMCR battalions were deactivated and their Marines were assigned to active duty units in the 2d Marine Brigade. After a period of training, most of these Marines were integrated into existing active duty units or helped form new ones. In the case of the latter, a cadre of active duty Marines was combined with mobilized reservists and new recruits to activate the new unit. The eight OMCR battalions that reported to Quantico were sent to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in January 1941. In Cuba, the battalions were deactivated and their members became part of the 1st Marine Brigade. By the end of January 1941, nearly all of the mobilized Reserve battalions had been deactivated and their members absorbed into active duty units.13

The experiences of three mobilized OMCR battalions are illustrative of how OMCR reservists were integrated into the active duty forces. After arriving at San Diego, most of the Marines of 14th Infantry Battalion (Spokane, Washington) were reassigned to 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. The battalion’s former commanding officer, Major Edwin D. Partridge, became the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines’ operations (S-3) officer. The 7th Reserve Battalion (Field Artillery) from Philadelphia reported to Quantico with its 75mm pack howitzers. Two months later, the battalion was deactivated and most of its members became the nucleus of the newly activated 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, at Guantánamo Bay. Major Joseph Knowlan, the former commander of the 7th Reserve Battalion, became commander of the new 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Not long after, Knowlan and many of his Marines were transferred to 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, with Knowlan assuming command of this battalion. The 6th Infantry Battalion of Marine Barracks Philadelphia remained intact far longer than nearly all of the other mobilized OMCR battalions. The 6th Battalion mobilized at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 7 November. For reasons that are unclear, the 6th Battalion remained at the Navy Yard for the next six months, performing security, training for war, and working in various departments there. Meanwhile its members, including its commander, Major Edward Simmonds, were steadily being transferred to other units. On 1 April 1941, the battalion was downgraded to the 6th Reserve Company. A month later, all remaining personnel were reassigned and the unit was deactivated—one of the last, if not the last—Reserve units to do so.14

Between December 1940 and May 1941, the remainder of the USMCR was mobilized. On 16 Decem-

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ber, the 13 Marine Reserve aviation squadrons with their 92 officers and 670 enlisted men were mobilized. The four West Coast squadrons, VMS-6R from Minneapolis, and VMS-10R from Kansas City all went to San Diego for their initial duty station; the other seven OMCRs went to Quantico. Like their ground component counterparts, the OMCR aviation units were deactivated and their members reassigned to active duty units. After completing the mobilization of its ground and aviation units in mid-1941, the OMCR became inactive and the director of the USMCR, Colonel Joseph C. Fegan, was reassigned to other duties. Also in December 1940, 1,000 members of the FMCR were mobilized. The VMCR underwent two phases of mobilization. The first group of VMCR Marine reservists was mobilized on 14 December 1940. Six months later on 12 May 1941, the second group was mobilized. By the end of May 1941, all available Marine reservists—OMCR, FMCR, and VMCR—had been mobilized, placing a total of 15,927 reservists on active duty.15

The mobilization of the OMCR was an important part of the Marine Corps’ overall expansion to meet the increasing challenges of a world at war. The influx of the ground component Marines helped the Marine Corps to expand its two existing brigades and ultimately upgrade them to divisions. Accordingly, the 1st Marine Division was activated at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, from the 1st Marine Brigade and the 2d Marine Division was activated at Marine Corps Base San Diego from the 2d Marine Brigade. Mobilization of the OMCR squadrons also aided in the activation of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing in July 1941.16

First Overseas Duty: Iceland

Despite overwhelming odds, Great Britain had staved off defeat by the Third Reich in 1940. The following year, the situation was still dismal, particularly in North Africa, where British forces suffered a series of major defeats. At British prime minister Winston Churchill’s request, President Roosevelt ordered U.S. forces to Iceland to protect the strategically vital North Atlantic island and free up British forces for employment elsewhere. The 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) was formed from units of the 2d Marine Division with Brigadier General John Marston in command. The Marines were chosen for the Iceland mission because they were not prohibited from overseas service, unlike the mobilized National Guard members and recent Army draftees.18

In July 1941, the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) relieved British forces on Iceland and took over defense of the island. The brigade included Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P. Smith (future commanding general of the 1st Marine Division in the Korean War), Major David M. Shoup (future Commandant of the Marine Corps), and many mobilized Marine reservists. Captain Robert J. Kennedy (formerly of the 18th Battalion [St. Paul, Minnesota]) served as battalion S-3 (operations) for 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Captain Harry A. Traffert Jr. (formerly of the 14th Battalion) served as

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17 The 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) was a new creation specific to the Iceland operation, unrelated to the 1st Marine Brigade, which had been expanded to become the 1st Marine Division in February 1941.

battalion S-4 (logistics) for 2d Battalion, 10th Marines. Mobilized reservist Major Joseph F. Hankins served as executive officer of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. The former commander of the 11th Battalion (Seattle), Major Clarence H. Baldwin, served as executive officer and battalion operations officer (S-3) for 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. The 1st Marine Brigade served in Iceland until being relieved by units of the U.S. Army in March 1942.19

Wartime Utilization of OMCR Marines

Initially, the Marine Corps made some efforts to keep the mobilized OMCR Marines together with others from their Reserve units, even if their Reserve units had been deactivated after mobilization. Most of the mobilized reservists were from infantry units, so initially they were assigned to infantry units. However, the manpower needs of the rapidly expanding Marine Corps ultimately determined how and where these mobilized reservists served. This became of even greater importance once the United States entered World War II in December 1941. Thus, the wartime experiences of mobilized reservists were often in military occupational specialties much different from their Reserve experiences. This was especially true among the mobilized Reserve officers.

When the ground component of the OMCR was mobilized in November 1940, there were 23 battalion commanders then serving. Since every mobilized Reserve battalion was ultimately deactivated, every one of these officers was reassigned to other command and staff positions throughout the Marine Corps. Major Edward Simmonds served in a succession of stateside logistics assignments. Promoted to colonel, he served as commanding officer, Base Depot, and depot quartermaster at Camp Elliott, San Diego, from January 1944 to August 1946. Major Joseph R. Knowlan commanded 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division’s field artillery battalion during the Guadalcanal campaign. Medically evacuated in October 1942, Knowlan served as commanding officer, Marine Barracks, Naval Air Training Base Corpus Christi, Texas, from February 1943 to April 1945 and was discharged from active duty at the rank of colonel. Lieutenant Colonel Clark W. Thompson commanded Special Troops, 2d Marine Brigade, and 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, in Samoa in 1942–43. He then returned to the United States and became director of the USMCR. As director, now-Colonel Thompson oversaw planning for the reconstitution of the USMCR that would occur after the war. Table 5 illustrates some of the notable wartime assignments of the mobilized OMCR battalion commanders.20

The mobilized OMCR squadron commanders also had varied wartime experiences. Major Bernard L. Smith helped organize the Marine Corps’ Barrage Balloon Training School and its Barrage Balloon Squadrons. Major Karl S. Day was instrumental in organizing the Navy/Marine Corps’ instrument flight school in Atlanta, Georgia. During 1943, he organized and commanded Operational Training Squadron 8 at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina, which trained pilots to fly the North American PBJ-1 twin-engine bomber—the Navy/Marine Corps version of the North American B-25 Mitchell. In 1944–45, he was the base commander of Marine Air Base Peleliu Island. Major William J. Fox supervised the reconstruction of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and commanded Marine Air Base Guadalcanal until being wounded during a Japanese air raid on 31 January 1943. He also oversaw the construction of five airfields in southern California, including MCAS El Toro, which he also commanded. Colonel Melvin J. Maas flew combat missions in the south Pacific and earned the Silver Star while flying as an ob-

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19 Smith commanded 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and Shoup was R-3 (operations) officer for the 6th Marine Regiment. For the mobilized reservists’ assignments, see “Staff and Command List,” in Donovan, Outpost in the North Atlantic, 32; see also The Marine Corps Reserve, 97.

server/aerial gunner with the U.S. Army Air Force in September 1942. In May 1945, he assumed command of the Akawase Airbase on Okinawa. The following month, he suffered serious shrapnel wounds to his face; due to damage to his optic nerve, he became blind after the war.  

As stated earlier, the Marine Corps initially made some efforts to keep mobilized members of OMCR battalions together. It is difficult to determine how long OMCR reservists stayed together after their battalions were deactivated and they were reassigned to newly forming active duty units. Some members of one mobilized OMCR battalion (Philadelphia’s 7th Battalion) remained together through the Guadalcanal campaign (August–December 1942) as part of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. This included Lieutenant Colonel Knowlan, who served as commander of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and Captain Harry Zimmer, who served first as a battery commander and later as battalion executive officer. The commander of the 11th

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**Table 5. Notable assignments of mobilized OMCR battalion commanders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion commander</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin, Clarence H.</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Battalion commanding officer (colonel)</td>
<td>2d Service Battalion, 2d Marine Division</td>
<td>Gilberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barr, Walter W.</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Battalion commanding officer (lieutenant colonel)</td>
<td>1st AMTRAC Battalion, 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalfant, William III</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Battalion executive officer (major)</td>
<td>2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagerman, Burdette</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Battalion executive officer (major)</td>
<td>3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowlan, Joseph R.</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Battalion commanding officer (lieutenant colonel)</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partridge, Edwin O.</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Regimental executive officer (lieutenant colonel)</td>
<td>7th Service Regiment, III Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simmonds, Edward P.</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Commanding officer (colonel)</td>
<td>Base Depot</td>
<td>Camp Elliott, San Diego, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, Clark W.</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>Director (colonel)</td>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watters, Alfred A.</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Regimental executive officer (lieutenant colonel)</td>
<td>6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marines, Colonel Pedro A. del Valle, later reported, "I noted an artillery battalion on Guadalcanal, largely Reserves from Philadelphia, who did a superb job—outstanding." 

Prior to mobilization, most OMCR officers served with either infantry or field artillery battalions. After mobilization, many OMCR officers remained with these branches. Major Justice Marion Chambers of the 5th Infantry Battalion served with the 1st Marine Raider Battalion during the Tulagi invasion in August 1942 and commanded the 3d Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, during the Marshall Islands, Marianas Islands, and Iwo Jima invasions. He was wounded on Tulagi, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. For his heroic leadership on Iwo Jima, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. 

Due to the manpower needs of the wartime Marine Corps, however, many other mobilized Reserve officers often found themselves in very different career fields. President Roosevelt's son, James, mobilized with the 22d Battalion (Field Artillery) from Los Angeles. Yet he is best remembered for his role as executive officer of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion and for earning the Navy Cross during the battalion’s August 1942 raid on Makin Island. First Lieutenant Gooderham L. McCormick and Captain Charles H. Cox of the 6th Battalion (Philadelphia) both attended the British Royal Air Force photographic interpretation school in 1941 and learned how to use aerial photography for intelligence purposes. Returning to the United States in November, they helped Navy Lieutenant Commander Robert S. Quackenbush Jr. establish the U.S. Navy School of Photographic Interpretation at Naval Air Station Anacostia, Washington, DC. Afterward, Cox served as assistant air intelligence officer on the staff of the commander, South Pacific Area, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. McCormick served as the division intelligence (D-2) officer for the 4th Marine Division for the Marshalls, Marianas, and Iwo Jima invasions.

Mobilized Marine aviators tended to stay within aviation for the war. While flying Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters with Marine Fighter Squadron 121 (VMF-121) during the Guadalcanal Campaign, Captain Joseph J. Foss shot down 26 Japanese aircraft. That achievement made him the second leading Marine Corps ace of the war and earned him the Medal of Honor. Major Joseph Sailer Jr., formerly of VMS-2R at Naval Reserve Aviation Base (NRAB) Brooklyn, commanded Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 132 (VMSB-132) and flew 25 combat missions during the Guadalcanal campaign. While piloting Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, he scored hits on the Japanese battleship Hiei, two cruisers, a destroyer, and several
### Table 6. OMCR officers' noteworthy assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Highest rank</th>
<th>Noteworthy assignments</th>
<th>Campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambers, Justice M.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Commanding officer, 3d Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division</td>
<td>Marshalls, Marianas (WIA), Iwo Jima (WIA) (MOH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox, Charles H.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>Assistant Air Intelligence Officer, Commander, South Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
<td>Solomons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donovan, James A.</td>
<td>Second lieutenant</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Executive officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division</td>
<td>Marianas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krulewitch, Melvin L.</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, Division Support Group, 4th Marine Division</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layer, Walter</td>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division</td>
<td>Marianas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick, Gooderham</td>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>D-2 (Intelligence), 4th Marine Division</td>
<td>Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meek, Harold</td>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>Communications officer, 9th Defense Battalion</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt, James</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>22d</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Marine Raider Battalion</td>
<td>Makin Raid (Navy Cross)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott, John W.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>G-2 (Intelligence), 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmer, Harry</td>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>Commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division</td>
<td>Saipan, Tinian (KIA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: WIA = wounded in action; KIA = killed in action; MOH = Medal of Honor.

Sources: Chambers biography; Cox personnel file; Donovan, Outpost in the North Atlantic, back cover. Donovan later fought in the Korean War with the 1st Marine Division and retired in November 1963 as a colonel; MajGen Melvin L. Krulewitch, USMCR, Now That You Mention It (New York: Quadrangle, 1973); LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1954), 175; Military personnel file of Col Walter F. Layer, USMCR (Dec.), NPRC-NARA (Layer commanded the 6th Infantry Battalion when it was mobilized for the Korean War and later commanded the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, in Korea in the summer of 1952); McCormick personnel file; Military personnel file of Col Harold B. Meek, USMCR (Dec.), NPRC-NARA; Roosevelt biography; “John W. Scott Leads Marines,” Alumni News (University of Maryland), June 1944. Scott ended the war as a lieutenant colonel; Parry, Three War Marine, 43, 46; Brown, A Brief History of the 14th Marines, 42; and Harwood, A Close Encounter, 19.
transports. He was lost in action on 7 December 1942 and posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. The former commander of VMS-1R, NRAB Squantum, Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel S. Clifford, served in the Solomon Islands with Marine Aircraft Group 21 and was lost in action on 3 August 1943.\textsuperscript{25}

Mobilized enlisted members of the OMCR also served throughout the war in a variety of assignments. The mobilized members of the 16th Battalion are illustrative of this. Private Floyd Henry Davis and Corporal Albert Powhatann Rickert were part of the 1st Defense Battalion that gallantly defended Wake Island against overwhelming Japanese forces. Captured when the garrison was forced to surrender, Rickert and Davis survived several years of horrific treatment by the Japanese until being liberated at the war’s end. Private First Class James E. Hightshue of Company B served with the 2d Marine Division on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Okinawa. Brothers Nelson C. and Frederick A. Roetter served in the 16th Battalion together and were both mobilized in 1940. Staff Sergeant Nelson C. Roetter fought on Tulagi and Guadalcanal during the Solomon Islands campaign. Second Lieutenant Frederick A. Roetter earned an officer’s commission and served with 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, in New Zealand, where he died from a noncombat accident. Field Cook Paul C. Phillips served with the Marine Detachment aboard the battleship USS Colorado (BB 45). Sergeant Harry H. Walter was wounded while serving with 1st Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, 5th Marine Division, on Iwo Jima. Sergeant Robert W. Edwards was wounded while serving with a field artillery battalion (3d Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division) on Saipan. Corporal John A. Kraig was killed while serving with Anti-Aircraft Group, 3d Defense Battalion, in the Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{26}

One can get a sense of where and how mobilized OMCR members served during the war through casualty records. With mobilized members of the OMCR serving in nearly every battle and campaign in the Pacific theater, it was inevitable that some would become casualties. While it is difficult to quantify exactly how many mobilized reservists became casualties, one can get a sense of the casualties suffered by comparing mobilization rosters with Marine Corps casualty cards and casualty lists prepared by the Department of the Navy.

The experiences of the 16th Battalion from Indianapolis illustrate the sacrifices suffered by mobilized OMCR reservists during World War II. The battalion’s mobilized members suffered casualties in battles across the Pacific theater beginning with the defense of Wake Island and ending with the capture of Okinawa some three and a half years later. As previously mentioned, two of its former members—Floyd Davis and Albert Rickert—became prisoners of war when Wake Island was captured by the Japanese in December 1941. Three former 16th Battalion members were killed in action and three others died as a result of noncombat accidents. Four former members were evacuated as a result of what was termed at the time as

\textsuperscript{25} The Marine Corps Reserve, 85, 90, 92; “Brigadier General Joseph J. Foss, ANG (Dec.),” biography, Marine Corps History Division; Alexander S. White, Dauntless Marine: Joseph Salter Jr., Dive-Bombing Ace of Guadalcanal (Fairfax Station, VA: White Knight Press, 1996), 104–16; Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, 120, 140, 441, 444; casualty cards of Nathaniel S. Clifford, Marine Corps History Division, accessed 21 June 2017; and “Nathaniel S. Clifford,” American Battle Monuments Commission, accessed 21 June 2017. After the war, Foss joined the South Dakota National Guard and rose to the rank of brigadier general.

\textsuperscript{26} “History of the 16th Battalion, United States Marine Corps Reserve,” Collection on the 16th Battalion United States Marine Corps Reserve, 1939 to 1990, S1242, Indiana State Library Special Collections; U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 16th Battalion, Change Sheet 333, 8 November 1940, Collection on the 16th Battalion United States Marine Corps Reserve, 1939 to 1990, S1242, Indiana State Library Special Collections; and Welton W. Harris II, “Broomstick Brigade Rides Again,” Indianapolis News, November 1940, E-1, Collection on the 16th Battalion United States Marine Corps Reserve, 1939 to 1990, S1242, Indiana State Library Special Collections. My thanks to Laura Eliason of the Indiana State Library for her assistance in obtaining the preceding documents. “Nelson C. Roetter Obituary,” Indianapolis Star, 3 February 2013; and “James ‘Eddie’ Hightshue Obituary,” Flanner and Buchanan Funeral Centers, Zionsville, IN, 30 January 2014. The information on Floyd H. Davis, John A. Kraig, Harry H. Walter, Robert W. Edwards, Paul C. Phillips, Frederick A. Roetter, and Albert P. Rickert was obtained by comparing the 16th Battalion’s mobilization roster with the Marine Corps History Division’s casualty cards database, accessed 12 July 2017. The 16th Infantry Battalion’s mobilization roster was obtained from the Indiana State Library Special Collections.
shell shock or combat fatigue. A total of 18 former members suffered casualties in combat. Table 7 summarizes casualties suffered by former 16th Infantry Battalion members during World War II.

The rapid expansion of the Marine Corps due to wartime requirements opened up opportunities for enlisted Marines to earn officer commissions. This included mobilized OMCR enlisted members. Three members of the 6th Battalion (Philadelphia) all earned officer commissions, each by a different route. Edward B. Meyer was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1943 and earned a commission as a second lieutenant in 1946. Norman J. E. Murken earned an officer commission through Officer Candidate School and then served as intelligence (S-2) officer for the 4th Pioneer Battalion, 4th Marine Division, during the Iwo Jima invasion. Anthony D. Davitt earned a Bronze Star and was meritoriously commissioned as a second lieutenant for his exemplary performance while supervising radio communications for Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 20th Marine Regiment (Engineers), 4th Marine Division, during the Marianas invasion.

The OMCR was designed to rapidly bring trained Marine reservists into active duty during a time of national emergency. In November and December of 1940, the OMCR performed exactly as it was intended. In doing so, the OMCR helped the Marine Corps to activate the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions and the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings in 1941. As demonstrated above, these mobilized OMCR members served with distinction throughout the Pacific campaigns and in important stateside assignments.

Even before mobilization, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps had decided that the mobilized battalions and squadrons would be deactivated and their members absorbed into the expanding active duty Marine Corps. The mobilized OMCR Marines were then combined with active duty Marines and new recruits to bring active duty units up to strength or to activate new ones. With every OMCR battalion and squadron well below table of organization and equipment strength, it is hard to argue against this practice. The Marine Corps could have brought the OMCR units up to strength, but it appears that this would have been administratively more difficult.

There were significant downsides to this approach of deactivating the OMCR units and absorbing their Marines into the active duty Corps. “The Reserve Battalions lost their identities when they merged with the brigade units,” Major Edward Partridge, commander of the 14th Battalion, recalled years later. “Individuals, also, quickly lost their identities as Reserves, becoming indistinguishable from the career Marines with whom they trained side by side,” he continued. With the OMCR units now deactivated and all of their members on active duty, the USMCR went dormant for the duration of the war. Unlike today, there were no rear detachments continuing to operate when the unit was mobilized. This meant that the entire USMCR had to be rebuilt when the war was over. Finally, the achievements and sacrifices of the OMCR members have largely been overlooked by...
### Table 7. 16th Infantry Battalion casualty list, World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1940 company</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Date of casualty</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, John Einar</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2dLt</td>
<td>22 November 1943</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Tarawa</td>
<td>Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauer, Edward Francis Henry</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>6 March 1945</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>24th Replacement Battalion, 4th MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baukat, Robert William</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>31 July 1942</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>H&amp;S Bty, 2d Special Weapons Battalion, 2d MarDiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowers, Noble Lester</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>21 February 1945</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, 4th MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyd, Paul Thomas</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>PltSgt</td>
<td>8 July 1944</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldwell, James W.</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>26 June 1944</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 29th Marines, 2d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crawford, Paul Richard</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>June or July 1944</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>Company K, 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, 1st Prov Marine Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Floyd Henry</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>23 December 1941</td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Wake Island</td>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, 3d MarDiv, 1st Defense Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon, David Joseph</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>1 July 1944</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, 3d MarDiv, HQ Battery, 3d Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards, Robert Welch</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>7 July 1944</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>10th Marines, 2d MarDiv, HQ, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, 5th MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargis, Saul Estal</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>GySgt</td>
<td>22 February 1945</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussion, Alan Earl</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>3 August 1944</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d MarDiv, Marine Detachment, UISS Colorado (BB 45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraig, John August</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>20 November 1943</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>AA Group, 3d Defense Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pendergast, Dallas Edward</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>21 November 1943</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Tarawa</td>
<td>Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, 2d MarDiv, Naval Air Gunnery School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips, Paul Carl</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Field cook</td>
<td>22 July 1944</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Marianas</td>
<td>Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds, Bliss Robert</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1stSgt</td>
<td>19 December 1944</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Purcell, OK</td>
<td>Naval Air Gunnery School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickert, Albert Powhatan</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>23 December 1941</td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Wake Island</td>
<td>Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roetter, Frederick Arthur</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2dLt</td>
<td>11 June 1943</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stinson, Marvin Odie</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>PltSgt</td>
<td>5 May 1945</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter, Harry Hill</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>19 February 1945</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>HQ, 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th MarDiv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: SS (CF) = shell shock (combat fatigue); KIA = killed in action; WIA = wounded in action; AD = Accidental Death; POW = prisoner of war.

Sources: To prepare this table, the 16th Battalion’s mobilization roster was cross-referenced with Marine Corps History Division’s Casualty Cards online database, the American Battle Monuments Commission Burials and Memorials online database, and the Department of the Navy’s State Summary of War. Casualties from World War II for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Personnel from Indiana, 1946. This was done to ensure accuracy in identifying those battalion members who became casualties during World War II. See footnote 27 for detailed source citation.
history because of the manner in which they served.29

Historiography

The contributions of the OMCR before and during World War II have largely been overlooked by historians of the titanic global struggle. For example, the Navy’s official 15-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, written by preeminent historian Samuel Eliot Morison, does not mention the mobilization of either the USMCR or the Navy Reserve. David J. Ulbrich’s Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943 is a comprehensive analysis of Holcomb’s tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps, but it contains only a few brief mentions of the USMCR. While a very comprehensive account, Robert Sherrod’s History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II contains details of several prominent reservists but no mention about the mobilization of the Marine Reserve squadrons at all. Harry I. Shaw Jr.’s Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up for War was written as part of the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series. Shaw’s work describes the Marine Corps’ efforts to prepare for World War II but only briefly mentions the mobilization of the USMCR. Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, volume one of History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, contains two sentences acknowledging that the mobilization of the OMCR was an important factor in the Marine Corps’ expansion in 1940–41 and in the formation of two Marine divisions in February 1941.30

Two works in particular do devote significant attention to the mobilization of the USMCR for World War II. Of the official Marine Corps publications, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II contains the most information about the Reserve mobilization. The Marine Corps Reserve: A History was written and published by the reserve officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1 in 1966. The book’s third chapter is devoted to World War II, and at 41 pages long, it was the longest chapter in the book.31

Several publications state that approximately 70 percent of the nearly 590,000 Marines who served in World War II were reservists. That figure is misleading because the entire USMCR in 1940 numbered only 16,400 or so, and only about 15,000 were actually mobilized in 1940–41. Following the 1940–41 mobilization, the USMCR went into a period of inactivation that lasted until 1946. Limited by the authorized strengths for its active duty forces, the Marine Corps classified the vast majority of its World War II officers and a great many of its enlisted Marines as reservists. Therefore, of the nearly 590,000 Marines who served in World War II, only 15,000 or about 2.5 percent were prewar reservists mobilized for war. Therein lies the problem. These mobilized reservists have literally become swallowed up in the massive World War II Marine Corps and lost within its history. Even the otherwise comprehensive The Marine Corps Reserve tends to lump prewar Marine reservists with those who joined after Pearl Harbor when discussing the wartime service of Marine reservists. Consequently, one of the purposes of this article is to highlight the contributions of those Marine reservists mobilized from the OMCR and to fill this significant gap in the historical record of World War II.32

Lessons Learned

The mobilization of the OMCR in 1940 was a significant learning experience for the Marine Corps. One of the most important lessons learned was that the OMCR needed a greater diversification in its Reserve units. The prewar Marine Corps Reserve consisted of

29 The Marine Corps Reserve.
31 Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II; and The Marine Corps Reserve, chapter 3.
32 For example, see The Marine Corps Reserve, 59. The remaining reservists were not mobilized due to being physically disqualified or having vital defense jobs.
just four types of Reserve units: infantry battalion, field artillery battalion, scout bomber squadron, and aviation service squadron. Most of the Reserve units were infantry. While other military occupational specialties (MOSs) were represented in the units, the predominant MOSs were infantry related. As the active duty Marine Corps rapidly expanded in 1940–41, it quickly became apparent that more than just infantry MOSs were needed.

Accordingly, the USMCR leadership planned for diversification of units as they conducted the process of rebuilding the dormant OMCR in the later stages of World War II. These efforts were led by officer-in-charge of the Division of Reserve Colonel Clark W. Thompson and Colonel Melvin J. Maas. Together, they drafted plans to activate 18 infantry battalions; seven field artillery battalions; a battalion each of tanks, amphibious tractors, and antiaircraft artillery; five signal companies; three engineer companies; two weapons companies; and 24 aviation squadrons. Reserve units would be reestablished in most of the cities that hosted units before the war.

The vigorous efforts to reestablish the USMCR and its active component paid off in 1946. By year’s end, there were some 2,630 officers and 29,829 enlisted Marines serving in the Reserves. There was an enormous pool of discharged veteran Marines who had served during the war, which enabled the USMCR to rapidly rebuild its manpower with experienced former active duty Marines. Altogether, the new OMCR consisted of 11 infantry battalions, two 105mm howitzer battalions, one 155mm howitzer battalion, one tank battalion, and six fighter squadrons at the end of 1946. This included the reactivated OMCR battalions at Marine Barracks Philadelphia: the 6th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Battalion (Artillery), which had been reestablished as the 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion. Within a couple years, Women’s Reserve platoons were added to many OMCR units.

There was one important lesson that the Marine Corps failed to learn after World War II, which was the need to continue to operate the USMCR after its units and personnel had been mobilized. Less than five years after World War II's end, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. In response, the USMCR was mobilized for war for the second time in 10 years. The mobilization paradigm of 1940 was used again, albeit under much more exigent circumstances. Again, the Marine Corps activated the OMCR units and personnel, relocated them to active duty bases, deactivated the units, and reassigned their personnel to active duty units. Again, the OMCR units went dormant during wartime.

This time the Marine Corps leadership belatedly realized the drawbacks of having its Reserve component go dormant. Accordingly, in 1952, mobilized Marine Corps Reserve members were demobilized, OMCR units were reactivated, and the Reserve component was hastily rebuilt. The fact that the United States was also engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union was a factor in this rapid reconstitution of the USMCR. As was the case after World War II, the USMCR adopted greater diversification of its units. After more than 26 years of service as an infantry unit, the 6th Battalion was reactivated as the 2d Depot Supply Battalion.

The USMCR was not mobilized for the Vietnam War. When next called upon, the Reserves would not adopt the mobilization practices of 1940 and 1950. Marine units were mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–91 and for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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33 The Marine Corps Reserve, 102–3.


in the new millennium. Marine Reserve units mobilized either as detachments to augment other units or whole unit mobilizations. In both cases, the USMCR (renamed Marine Forces Reserve in 1994) continued to function with rear detachments operating when the whole unit was mobilized and deployed. This paradigm has ensured that unit integrity remains, the Reserve force in general continues to operate, and mobilized Reserve units receive the recognition for their service due to them.

Conclusion
The mobilization of the OMCR in November and December 1940 was the second mobilization of the force in its history. The OMCR functioned exactly as it was intended to, providing more than 7,300 trained Marines to help rapidly expand the active duty Marine Corps for war. The mobilization of the OMCR and the utilization of its members brought significant benefits to a Marine Corps attempting to quickly expand in the face of a rapidly deteriorating world situation. The influx of trained reservists helped the Marine Corps to activate the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions. These reservists then served with distinction in the Pacific campaigns and in stateside assignments. The manner in which OMCR members were mobilized also had certain drawbacks. The OMCR went dormant for the duration of the war and had to be completely rebuilt afterwards. Since the OMCR members were absorbed into the larger Marine Corps, their achievements and sacrifices have largely been lost in the larger history of the Marine Corps in World War II.
A handful of Marines played a mostly forgotten but nevertheless pivotal role in one of Ernest Hemingway’s legendary exploits. They helped him conceive and run something he called “Operation Friendless,” which was a quixotic search for German submarines in the Caribbean during World War II. Without the Marines, the writer and his crew might never have been put to sea as U.S. Navy auxiliaries in 1942.

The story goes back to June 1941 when Hemingway and his third wife, Martha Gellhorn, found themselves in a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel John W. Thomason Jr. at “Main Navy” in Washington, DC, one of the many plain concrete temporary structures, or “tempos,” erected during World War I that had taken over the National Mall between the far more elegant Lincoln and Washington Memorials. The tempos had little to offer apart from shelter and rudimentary offices that were hard to heat in the winter and impossible to cool in the summer.

Thomason had a reputation for being impec-
The stiff-looking New Yorker, who almost always wore a coat and tie, even to go deep-sea fishing, was, however, blessed with the ability to bond with his charges and connect them with each other. Another mutual friend was the swashbuckling soldier of fortune Charles Sweeny, whom Hemingway had first met in Europe in the 1920s and later described as “a very old pal and soldier in various armies, Venezuelan, against [President Cipriano] Castro, Mexican, with [President Francisco] Madero, Foreign Legion, U.S., Moroccan, R.A.F.” It was Sweeny who took the Hemingways to meet Thomason on that summer day in 1941.4

Detailed to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), where his principal duty was to run the Latin America Desk, Thomason was still eager to hear what Hemingway and Gellhorn had to say about their recent trip to China, where the couple had gone to report on the Second Sino-Japanese War. That conflict had been going on for so long that many Americans could not remember when and why it had started, but it was an important precursor to World War II. The couple travelled widely in the war zone, speaking to the British in Hong Kong and both Chinese nationalists and Chinese Communists on the mainland. The resulting information was solid and useful, just the kind of background information that ONI wanted. After the meeting, Hemingway and Gellhorn returned to Finca Vigia, the home they were making for themselves on a hill a few miles outside Havana, Cuba.

The visit to Washington set the stage for a good relationship between Thomason and Hemingway. The Marine reported to Perkins that he was happy to meet “the very sensible and decent Hemingway” and hoped to see more of him.5 For his part, Hemingway would later write that he quickly came to believe that Thomason possessed one of “the most intelligent minds I have ever talked to.”6

A few months later, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor finally propelled the United States into World War II, Hemingway remembered Thomason as he cast about for ways to make himself useful to his country. He wanted to fight at sea from his Brooklyn-built cabin cruiser, Pilar, which he had lovingly outfitted for deep-sea fishing. It was, one crewman remembered, “beautiful . . . with a black hull, a green roof, and varnished mahogany in the big cockpit and along the sides.”7 The writer’s vision was to use Pilar to patrol the north coast of Cuba in search of German submarines, which were preying on shipping off the East Coast of the United States and in the Caribbean and finding it blissfully easy to sink, since the

5 Quoted in Reynolds, Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy, 107.
6 Quoted in Reynolds, Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy, 134.
United States had not been well prepared for the war at sea. One of the Germans’ happy hunting grounds ran between the Florida Keys and the northern coast of Cuba—home waters for Hemingway.

Hemingway’s concept was in line with other U.S. Navy initiatives, which amounted to mobilizing civilian boat owners and asking them to keep a lookout for the enemy as they went about their business. The civilians were to report any sightings by radio, and the Navy would take it from there. The unofficial name for the civilian auxiliaries was the Hooligan Navy, many of whose members searched for the Germans for hours, days, and even weeks on end, working hard, if not always effectively. But Hemingway wanted to do more than find the enemy. The refinement on the basic plan that he proposed put him in a class by himself. After sighting and reporting the contact, he wanted to lure the U-boat alongside and then sink it.

His assumption was that the Germans would see a fishing boat going about its business and approach to buy or seize fresh water and fish. Once the (hopefully unsuspecting) Germans were close, the crew of the Pilar would let loose with fragmentation grenades—pull the pin, wait a few seconds while smoke spurted from the top, and then toss—along with Thompson submachine guns, the heavy .45-caliber weapon favored by American gangster John Dillinger. They would even use a satchel charge with rope handles that was the size of a small footlocker. The Basque jai alai players who would crew for Hemingway and were so adept at throwing fast-moving balls would, at least in theory, be able to lob the hand grenades down the open hatches of the submarine, while other crewmen manhandled the explosive charge. If even one grenade, let alone the satchel charge, found its mark the result could be devastating.

The problem was that Pilar and the average long-range U-boat were so mismatched. Pilar measured 38 feet long and weighed less than five tons. Her prey could be up to 250 feet long and weigh something like 750 tons. One was made of wood, built for pleasure and style in 1934, while the other was a state-of-the-art warship recently built out of German steel. One boasted handheld weapons, the other a 9.5cm or 10cm deck gun and sometimes two powerful 20mm antiaircraft machine guns mounted on the back of the conning tower (to say nothing of its primary weapon, torpedoes, which no German skipper would have wasted on a wooden cabin cruiser). Pilar would have a crew of 6–10 of Hemingway’s sporting friends. They would prove themselves to be dedicated, hard working, and loyal, but they were never more than gifted amateurs. The average U-boat crew, however, comprised about 50 well-trained officers and men.

The writer knew that to realize his vision he would need official help from a kindred spirit such as Thomason. By now, Thomason was traveling in Latin

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9 *Jai alai* is a dangerous sport, similar to squash or racquetball, played on an indoor court with a hard, fast-moving ball and a handheld cesta, or basket, something like a shorter lacrosse stick. It was popular in Cuba among Basque exiles from fascist Spain.

America for ONI, and in mid-1942 the American embassy summoned him to Havana for consultations. He showed up suitably attired for a meeting at the chancery, which was then housed in a turn-of-the-century mansion on the fringes of Old Havana. Along with his World War I ribbons, Thomason sported a nonregulation black silk ribbon for his eyeglasses. The American ambassador to Cuba, Spruille Braden, presided while Hemingway outlined his concept of operations. He evoked the World War I precedent set by Q-boats, well-armed raiders masquerading as unarmed merchantmen, while Thomason twirled his eyeglasses and drained at least two tumblers of some kind of drink. The Marine knew the likely outcome of Hemingway’s plan was death with honor. He pronounced it not impossible, “only crazy.”11 It would take only one round from the U-boat’s deck gun to turn Pilar and its crew into a memory. But there was also a chance, however slim, of an unimaginably glorious victory. If Hemingway somehow pulled it off, it would be a tremendous boost to morale, something that the United States desperately needed at the time as it struggled to build up the strength to take on the Japanese in the Pacific and defend itself from U-boats in home waters.

Ambassador Braden liked Hemingway and his irregular approach to fighting the Germans. Though the proposal went “against all regulations,” the envoy gave his assent to what Hemingway named Operation Friendless after one of his many cats. 12 As the Cuban government was unlikely to turn a blind eye to an armed privateer in home waters, and since Pilar’s identity and mission were meant to come as a surprise to the enemy, this operation would be secret. This was acceptable to Hemingway, a man who enjoyed wearing the mantle of secrecy and the insider advantage that it conferred.

Thomason arranged for Hemingway to work through the naval attaché at the embassy in Havana, a Marine colonel named Hayne D. Boyden, who, not unlike Thomason, was an original. Boyden was a tall, thin man with a pointed nose, which gave him a birdlike aspect and probably explained his nickname or call sign rendered by Hemingway as “Cucu” or “Cuckoo.” Boyden’s record suggests that he was a devil-may-care pilot from the early days of Marine Corps aviation who took risks every time he got into the cockpit. In the early 1920s, he flew aircraft like the de Havilland DH-4B two-seater over Hispaniola. The DH-4B was a slightly improved British leftover from World War I whose original design flaws had earned it the nickname “Flying Coffin.”13 In 1927, Boyden earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for singlehandedly providing close air support to a besieged and outnumbered Marine detachment in Nicaragua. A note in the December 1933 issue of Leatherneck concluded that Boyden was “one of the most interesting personalities in Marine Aviation.”

He has spent a great part of his time in the Marine Corps in the warm tropical climes, flying in Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti, his present station. He likes . . . the romantic, alluring and mysterious tropics and is alive to all their fantastic influences.14

Hemingway would have agreed. His letters suggest that he liked Boyden, but sometimes found the colonel better suited to flying than running an office. As Operation Friendless evolved, the writer would comment that his dealings with the colonel sometimes got a little too “sketchy” for his comfort, so he asked a third party for help in drafting a written plan that would specify who was supposed to do what.15

Thomason and Boyden eventually arranged for Hemingway to receive radio gear, along with the munitions that Hemingway needed to realize his plan. ONI shipped the gear to the embassy in Havana in the diplomatic pouch, and it was then smuggled aboard Pilar. The hand grenades went over the transom in egg cartons, the disassembled guns in small pieces among other more innocent gear. The boat’s communica-

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11 Briggs, Shots Heard Round the World, x, 57.
12 Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 284.
15 EH to Robert Joyce, 9 November 1942, Outgoing Correspondence, Ernest Hemingway Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston.
The Marine pilot Hayne D. Boyden, also known as “Cucu,” here as a first lieutenant flanked by his crew. While serving as the U.S. naval attaché in Cuba, he functioned as the link between Thomason and Hemingway.
tor, detailed by Thomason and Boyden, would be a 24-year-old Marine warrant officer. Donald B. Saxon was a graduate of the Radio School at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, who had served with the 4th Marines in China and risen quickly through the ranks in the years since his enlistment in December 1936. An American diplomat described him as “a lovely uninhibited character,” and more than one source recorded that he had a bad case of jungle rot eating away at his feet, which some attributed to his service overseas. Saxon’s main pastimes were said to be hard drinking and bar fights.7

Boyden also did his best to support Hemingway’s flimsy cover story, designed to ward off any inquisitive Cuban officials, which was that he was conducting research on fish specimens for the American Museum of Natural History. Boyden prepared what might be called a “get out of jail free” note on official letterhead in an odd mix of English and Spanish that asked the reader to believe that Pilar needed “the radio apparatus” for its work, which was “arreglado” (in order) and “not subversive in any way.”8 If the letter failed to deter a full search, there would, presumably, be no way to explain why a fishing boat was also outfitted for war, and Hemingway might wind up in a Cuban jail until the embassy could intercede on his behalf.

There was yet another Marine—or more accurately a future Marine—serving on board. He was Hemingway’s de facto executive officer, Winston F. C. Guest, whom Hemingway first met in Africa in 1933 on safari. A celebrated sportsman and socialite, Guest was one of a few polo players ever to have earned the 10-goal designation. But he was more than an athlete; he had also earned a law degree from Columbia University, and he was a patriot. Guest wanted very badly to join the armed forces, but in the first part of the war his sports injuries kept him out of the Service, leaving him free to live and work with Hemingway in Cuba.9 Still, his accomplishments and personality made him an ideal deputy. Well-groomed, intelligent, and hardworking, he was also easygoing and eager to serve. Seven years younger than Hemingway, Guest deferred to his senior—and considerably more famous—friend, who bestowed on him the affectionate nickname “Wolfie” after finding that he looked like the actor Lon Cheney in the 1941 movie Wolf Man.

Pilar’s wartime service began during the summer of 1942, first with short-range outings into the waters around Havana. As summer edged into fall, more ONI equipment made its way aboard, and there followed training exercises and something like a shakedown cruise. Hemingway and his men spent time getting to know their weapons. This included a good deal of target practice (often to the detriment of some otherwise perfectly good navigation buoys) and continued to the point where the embassy’s coordinator of intelligence, the foreign service officer Robert P. Joyce, judged that “Pilar was . . . a camouflaged floating arsenal with a tough crew of experienced and highly trained machine-gunners and grenade throwers,” ready for combat.10

After the shakedown period, Pilar ranged farther afield for longer periods, from the northwest coast of Cuba to the Old Bahama Channel hundreds of miles to the east. At least two deployments ran close to three months. In the spring of 1943, Pilar operated for a while out of a makeshift camp on a barren spit of sand known as Cayo Confites, where the crew appears to have displayed a more-or-less cheerful tolerance for hardship. Guest maintained contact with the nearby American consular outpost at Nuevitas, useful for ONI to funnel supplies and information. Through such intermediaries as well as a direct coded channel, Pilar stayed in touch with the embassy in Havana.

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66 Donald B. Saxon biographical material, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
68 Hayne D. Boyden to Whom It May Concern, 18 May 1943, Incoming Correspondence, Museo Ernest Hemingway, Ernest Hemingway Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

9 “Robert Joyce Memoirs,” unpublished manuscript, Robert P. Joyce Papers, MS 1901, Box 1, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT, 51. The 6-foot-5-inch-tall Guest would, in any case, have required a waiver of the Marines’ wartime height limit of 6 feet and 2 inches.
which relayed messages to the Gulf and Caribbean Sea frontiers of the U.S. Navy.

It was a frustrating business. Embassy Havana passed the most recent Navy intelligence on U-boat sightings and suspected locations to Hemingway and his crew. *Pilar*’s own radio gear intercepted some enemy transmissions. Hemingway would remember hearing German voices over the radio, especially late at night. By day, *Pilar* looked for the enemy, usually without any success. But there was at least one sighting, which occurred on 9 December 1942, of a probable U-boat. On that calm, clear day, Hemingway saw “a gray painted vessel” six to eight miles away, and sailed toward it to investigate.21 When the gray vessel turned broadside to Hemingway, it presented the silhouette of a conning tower on a long, gray deck. Gliding over the dead-calm sea, it was so large that it looked like an

aircraft carrier to Guest. Hemingway would famously claim to have replied, “No, Wolfie, unfortunately she is a submarine and pass the word for everyone to be ready to close.” But as Pilar steered toward the intruder, the vessel put on speed and was soon out of range. The message went out immediately from Pilar’s tiny communications shack, presumably from the hand of Don Saxon, to the embassy in Havana, which in turn retransmitted the message to the Navy and the Fleet. The Navy paid Hemingway and Guest a small compliment that it did not pay to all members of the Hooligan Navy:

HAVANA REPORTS SUBMARINE BELIEVED TO BE GERMAN 740 TON TYPE IN SIGHT FROM 1210 Q TO 1340 Q 22-58 N 83-26 W X INFORMANTS TWO RELIABLE AMERICANS ACCOMPANIED BY FOUR CUBANS.

This submarine got away from both Hemingway and the Navy. But Operation Friendless continued well into 1943. In early June, intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were sending submarines back into the area after a hiatus of a few months, and Hemingway was ordered to scour obscure keys and bays for signs of the enemy, a nerve-wracking but ultimately unproductive task. Then, after what appeared to be a successful attack by a U.S. Navy plane in nearby waters on 14 June, the pressure eased. By 9 July, Saxon had broken out the coded transmission ending the patrol, and Pilar started the weeklong cruise back to Havana.

It was just as well: the boat needed to go into the yard for an overhaul. Not designed for wartime service, her engine showed the signs of the long hours of patrolling, from loose valves to worn piston rings and a damaged propeller. Once on dry land, Hemingway ordered a new engine, and Don Saxon ordered round after round of drinks and wound up in jail.

Despite the frustrations, Hemingway was reluctant to give up on his private war, conducted in his own way and with his own resources. He liked being captain of his own ship and hoped to resume the unconventional war patrols once Pilar emerged from the yard. But it was not to be. By now the threat had receded from Cuban waters, and Hemingway waited in vain for the Navy to renew his letter of marque. Christmas 1943 was depressingly quiet for him—without a mission and without a wife. Ever the aggressive reporter, Martha Gellhorn was thousands of miles away on assignment for Collier’s, covering a war whose focus had clearly shifted to the other side of the Atlantic. In November 1942, the U.S. Army had invaded North Africa and by May 1943 joined with the British Army to defeat the once-formidable Afrika Korps and its Italian confederates. It was now just a matter of time before the Allies invaded the mainland of Europe. By January 1944, Hemingway admitted as much...
to himself and to Gellhorn. 26 Pilar’s war was over, and its crew was free to go on to other adventures.

Hemingway went to Europe, where he watched the fighting on D-Day from a landing craft in the surf, flew on combat missions with the RAF, and helped to liberate Paris. Saxon presumably returned to duty with ONI and then went on to a more conventional Marine posting at Camp Pendleton, California, in 1945. After the war, he settled in Florida, occasionally corresponding with Hemingway, who invited him to visit his island home outside the Cuban capital. In 1944, Guest was finally able to enlist in the Marine Corps at a recruiting station in Jacksonville, Florida, which earned him a trip to Parris Island, South Carolina, as a private. A few weeks later, he was able to become a second lieutenant on a waiver (presumably for his previous sports injuries and height) that was entered in his record as a “special order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.” After commissioning, he joined one of the Marine air wings but apparently not as an aviator. 27 A newspaper article describes that he went on to serve with distinction in China in the closing weeks of the war; he received the U.S. Army Soldier’s Medal for landing on a heavily mined airfield on 19 August to deliver badly needed humanitarian aid before the Japanese Army had officially surrendered and its soldiers were still ready and willing to kill Americans. 28

Thomason and Boyden also shipped out to the Pacific. Boyden detached from the embassy in Havana in September 1943, and after a few months found himself in the Pacific theater in the summer of 1944. From December 1944 to June 1945, he did solid work as chief of staff and acting wing commander for the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing committed to the fighting in and around Okinawa. The Marine Corps recognized his service with a Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” Upon retirement in June 1949, he was promoted to brigadier general on account of his combat service. 29 Thomason was not quite as lucky. After detaching from ONI in spring 1943, he joined a fellow Texan, Navy Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at his headquarters in Pearl Harbor for service as a war plans officer and inspector of Marine Corps bases in the Pacific theater. Worn out by years of hard living, to say nothing of his love for strong drink, he literally stumbled in the performance of his duties—falling off a pier while on an inspection tour near the front lines. Hospitalized in theater for pneumonia and then twice again after returning home for what he described as “my stomach affliction,” he died at San Diego Naval Hospital on 12 March 1944 at age 51. 30

Hemingway published little about his exploits during World War II in his lifetime. But off and on after 1945 he worked on a war novel that his estate published after his death—the three-part Islands in the Stream. The main character, Thomas Hudson, sounds and acts so much like Hemingway himself that one scholar called it “the clearest roman a clef [sic] in American literature.” 31 There are many parallels between Hemingway and Hudson’s lives—in their families, activities, and likes and dislikes. The description of the nameless boat in Islands—“not big enough to be called a ship except in the mind of the man who was her master”—could have been used to describe Pilar. 32 Taken together, the parallels are so striking that it is fair to look to Hudson’s words for insights into Hemingway’s own mind-set.

The third part of the novel is about hunting German submarines in Cuban waters. The major difference between what actually happened and the fic-

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26 Ernest Hemingway to Martha Gellhorn, 13 January 1944, in Reynolds, Hemingway, 88–89. The letter’s reproduction is set within an excellent overview of the issues in the writer’s life during this period.
27 Winston F. C. Guest, service record, National Personnel Records Center, NARA, St. Louis, MO; and Winston F. C. Guest, biographical material, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
29 Hayne D. Boyden, biographical file, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
30 Turner, The World of Col. John W. Thomason, USMC, 340–41. The Thomasons had a home in La Jolla, CA, and Thomason was assigned to Camp Elliott, a Marine base that, by 1960, was turned over to the city of San Diego.
31 Ernest Hemingway, Islands in the Stream (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970); and Thomas Fensch, Behind Islands in the Stream: Hemingway, Cuba, the FBI and the Crook Factory (New York: iUniverse, 2010), 119.
32 Hemingway, Islands in the Stream, 332.
national version is that the novel’s long and frustrating search for the enemy leads to a series of firefights with shipwrecked German submariners on remote keys in Cuban waters. The novel is interesting for what it seems to say about Hemingway’s attitudes toward Marines—attitudes that have been drowned out by the far more numerous (and usually positive) comments in his correspondence about the soldiers he served alongside in Italy and France. Some of his letters hint at his respect for Marines and the Corps, as does his selection of essays by Thomason for the anthology on war that Hemingway edited in 1942.33 But it is only in Islands in the Stream that he writes directly about Marines, seemingly expressing himself through the voice of Hudson.

Islands gives pride of place to the Marine radioman, Peters, who is almost certainly based on Saxon. The many paragraphs about Peters reveal how this particular Marine tests the narrator’s generally positive views of Marines. More than once Hemingway/Hudson questions Peters’s skill and his fitness for duty. Peters has trouble maintaining the communications equipment, much to the frustration of Hemingway/Hudson: “That damned Peters with his radio out... I don’t know how he has f——ed it.”34 Peters also drinks when he should not. The nameless boat in Islands did not have rules about drinking at sea except for the unwritten rule that every man must be able to do his job, which Peters violates by being drunk on duty. Mirroring the doubts that Hemingway/Hudson expressed, at least one crewmember is not sure that he wants to be in a firefight alongside Peters. Other members of the crew share their captain’s frustration with him. But Peters also has good traits; for the most part he works hard at fixing his radios when they break. Hemingway writes that Peters “always held himself as a Marine even when he was not at his best and he was proudest of the real discipline without the formalities of discipline which was the rule of the ship.”35 At least in the novel, Peters speaks German and proves his worth when he calls out to the enemy: “Peters spoke so it sounded like the voice of all German doom. His voice holds up magnificently, Thomas Hudson thought.”36 When Peters is killed in the firefight, the crew mourns his loss.

That leaves one Marine character, Willie, who appears to be loosely based on Winston Guest. In—

33 See, for example, the reference to “honest Don” Saxon in Hemingway to Patrick Hemingway, 30 October 1943, in Baker, ed., Ernest Hemingway Selected Letters, 551–52; and Ernest Hemingway, ed., Men at War: The Best War Stories of All Time (New York: Bramhall House, 1942). Hemingway chose four selections by Thomason for this anthology.
34 Hemingway, Islands in the Stream, 343.
35 Hemingway, Islands in the Stream, 367.
36 Hemingway, Islands in the Stream, 424.
stead of being physically unqualified to join the Service, Willie is “one expendable, medically discharged Marine.” But he is still willing to go in harm’s way to fight the remaining Germans. Hemingway/Hudson views Willie as a “good, brave . . . son of a b——h,” who can be decisive when his captain is not. “He made up my mind for me when I was starting to put things off,” Hudson recounts. Willie finds and defeats the enemy in the climactic encounter, justifying Hemingway/Hudson’s conviction that he “would rather have a good Marine, even a ruined Marine, than anything in the world when there are chips down.”

This was high praise for the small sea Service and its men who helped Hemingway to fight his private war at sea in 1942 and 1943. It was an unusual kind of independent duty, well away from the mainline Fleet Marine Force. But it was still duty, sanctioned by two senior ONI Marines who placed men and equipment at Hemingway’s disposal. This small band of warriors may not have actually engaged any German sailors in combat, but they all discharged their duty and earned an honorable place in a footnote to the history of World War II.

37 Hemingway, Islands in the Stream, 431.
Fighting within the A2/AD Bubble

THE 1982 FALKLANDS WAR AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

by Major Brandon H. Turner

There are significant parallels between the 1982 Falklands War and future conflicts the U.S. military will face. Although 30 years have passed and technology has changed, the Falklands War provides critical insight to the U.S. military as it develops ways to counter the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threat. Leading up to Operation Corporate, Great Britain’s military was slowly ending a protracted counterinsurgency conflict in Ireland, facing budget and force reductions, and focused on defending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from a potential Soviet invasion. In April, with little warning to the British military headquarters, Northwood, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Britain was caught off guard and unprepared to face a near peer threat 8,000 miles from the British Isles and without assistance from NATO. Argentina, with a sizeable force that included modern air and ground systems, opposed British forces with a modern A2/AD threat.

Fast forward to today, when the focus for the U.S. military is a withdrawal from counterinsurgency, reduction in forces and budgets, and a renewed focus against potential Chinese and Russian threats. The United States’ focus today, just as it was for Great Britain in 1982, is preparing for the most dangerous course of action. While China and Russia do pose a threat to U.S. interests, a war with either is not the most likely course of action in the near term. The United States will continue to face conflicts in the arc of instability with adversaries that pose formidable A2/AD threats to smaller Marine Corps units, such as an Expeditionary Strike Group/Marine Expeditionary

The Falklands invasion was nearly two centuries in the making. The Malvinas, as the Falklands are called by Argentina, were once claimed by not only Britain but also France, Spain, and Argentina. It was not until 1873 that ownership was solidified by Great Britain. During the 1970s, the Falklands were used in a diplomatic game: being held by Great Britain while at the same time being “offered” to Argentina. As diplomacy faltered, Argentina developed plans to seize the islands between July and October 1982; this window was manpower-, equipment-, and weather-dependent. In late March 1982, scrap metal workers on South Georgia Island raised an Argentinean flag over their work site. This move prompted Great Britain to send the HMS Endurance (1967) with 22 Royal Marines to South Georgia to remove the flag and observe the workers. Using the South Georgia incident as cause to regain Argentinean honor, Argentina advanced its invasion timeline for the Malvinas. The UK received various signals an invasion was underway, but little could be done from 8,000 miles away to stop the invasion.
 Brigades (ESG/MEB) and Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU). Despite advancements in today’s A2/AD weapons technology, the 1982 Falklands War offers critical insights to how U.S. naval forces can counter modern-day threats and prepare for future threats to an amphibious force.

The Dawn of Modern A2/AD Warfare: Establishing the A2/AD Environment

By the early 1980s, Argentina, as compared to the rest of Latin America, possessed a modern, well-equipped and trained military force. The United States and other NATO countries, including the UK, supplied Argentina with some of the most modern equipment for the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the context of A2/AD, Argentina possessed excessive amounts of antipersonnel, antitank, and antiship mines; modern night vision optics; antitank missile systems; antiaircraft missile and gun systems; and heavy towed howitzers. Furthermore, their air and naval components possessed a variety of modern fast attack aircraft, with one of those platforms capable of carrying the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface antiship cruise missile system. Last, Argentina was a strong ally to the United States against the Soviet Union; for a Latin American country, this represented a strong bargaining piece. Leading up to the spring of 1982, Argentina held a strong diplomatic and military position in the south Atlantic.

Argentinean military forces invaded the Falkland Islands, 300 miles east of Argentina and 8,000 miles south of Great Britain, on 2 April 1982 with an invasion force of 2,000 soldiers and marines. The invasion was a strategic move by the Argentinean government to gain national solidarity and install popularity in Argentina’s president and leader of its military junta, General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri. The Argentines focused their invasion at the population center of Port Stanley on East Falkland. They faced little opposition from a small garrison of 70 Royal Marines and a small contingent of local defenders. During most of April, the Argentinean force increased to around 13,000 military personnel with a majority placed in a defensive posture around Port Stanley (figure 1).

Argentina placed eight infantry regiments on East and West Falkland: two regiments on West Falkland and six regiments on East Falkland, with five of those centered around Port Stanley and supported by an artillery regiment. Protecting the skies with antiaircraft weapon systems around Port Stanley, the Argentine Army and Air Force defended with twelve 30mm Hispano Suiza guns, six Tiger Cat missile launchers, eight 35mm Oerlikons, eleven 20mm Rheinmetall guns, and one Roland twin missile launcher. Additionally, the Argentineans possessed AN/TPS-43 and AN/TPS-44 radar units, vital in their ability to...

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4 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 80–84.
6 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 5–11.
see beyond the horizon. Ground antiair units alone presented a formidable protective shield against British air and naval forces.

In addition to the ground forces on the Falklands, Argentina possessed one of the most sizeable naval fleets and air forces in Latin America. Their naval forces included not only cruisers, corvettes, amphibious shipping, and a battleship but also submarines and an aircraft carrier. In total, Argentina possessed 17 combatant ships and three submarines to maintain maritime superiority. Although relatively large, the Argentinean fleet was an aging fleet with World War II-era ships, or at best ships built in the 1960s without modernization, besides the MM-38 Exocet.

Due to the Falklands’ close proximity to Argentina, Argentinean air components stationed modern fighter-attack and fighter-bomber aircraft on the Falklands or near the coast of Argentina well within range.

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14 David Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falklands War* (New York: Pen and Sword, 1987), 371–74. Argentina conducted its amphibious landing with 31 total ships: one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, six destroyers, three submarines, three corvettes, five patrol crafts, one landing ship, tank (LST), one oiler, four naval and three merchant transports, and three “spy” trawlers.
of the Falklands. From the Argentinean mainland, Argentine air elements could strike targets in and around the Falklands with their assortment of Dassault Mirage IIIEA’s, Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Neshers (Daggers), and McDonnell Douglas AQ-4 Skyhawks with extended range and time on station via aerial refueling provided by Lockheed C-130 Hercules. Positioned on the Falklands, Argentina placed 34 Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) IA-58A Pucara, Beechcraft T-34C Turbo-Mentor, and Aermacchi MB-160

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339 light attack aircraft (figures 2A and 2B). While these aircraft may have been small and not nearly as fast as other aircraft, the British still considered them a viable threat. The most dangerous Argentinean aircraft to the British task force was the French-made Dassault Super Etendard with the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface antiship cruise missile. In total, Argentina possessed 130 operational fixed-wing attack aircraft for the defense of the Falklands.18

By the end of April 1982, Argentina constructed a defense at the water’s edge with an air-mobile reserve, supported by a navy and air force to maintain superiority of the Falklands. Argentina had a well-established A2/AD environment that extended from the Argentinean coast to about 150 miles east of East Falkland. If the Battle of Gallipoli is considered the dawn of modern amphibious warfare, Argentina’s occupation of the Falkland Islands can be considered the dawn of the modern A2/AD warfare.

Movement to the Amphibious Objective Area:
The Task Force Sets Sail
From the British standpoint, the 1982 Falklands War

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17 Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, 26.
18 Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, 26. In total, Argentina possessed 247 fixed-wing aircraft, but only about 130 were able to offer support due to maintenance readiness or not operational due to lack of parts or qualified pilots and ground crews.
was not only unexpected, it also was “unplanned.”

No operational plan existed in the event of war over the Falklands, nor were there substantial forces in the south Atlantic to provide a swift or effective response. From the start of the scrap metal incident on South Georgia Island in mid-March to preinvasion on 1 April, the British government and military commanders held planning meetings to discuss and debate diplomatic and military responses to a possible Argentinean invasion, but these discussions yielded very little detail, nor did they provide guidance to commanders. With the invasion underway and news arriving to the British public on 2 April, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced the following day before the House of Commons, “a large task force will sail as soon as preparations are complete.”

With her public statement, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord, designated Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse as commander in chief Fleet, commander Task Force (CTF) 317/CTF 324 (figure 3). The Royal Navy was no longer planning but instead embarking a force that had not been seen in scope and size since the Suez Crisis of 1956. Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication 3-02, dictates the five phases of an amphibious operation as planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action (PERMA). These phases can be looked at as subphases within the Joint Phasing Model. Due to the relative surprise of the Argentine invasion and the political and strategic need to show British resolve, the British task force used the nonstandard phases of an amphibious operation: embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and action (EMPRA). Typically, a U.S. amphibious force will execute PERMA or EMPRA during Phases 0–3 under the geographic combatant commander’s or Joint Force commander’s operational plan. EMPRA played a large role in the many difficulties the British faced in the following weeks, the first of which was what units to assign CTF 317.

Outside of plans designed for supporting NATO within Europe, the British military headquarters at Northwood did not possess plans that encompassed a brigade-size deployment. Instead, the embarkation plans used for Operation Corporate were based on Norway’s contingency plans for countering a Soviet

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19 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 67; Michael Clapp, Amphibious Assault, Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 35; and Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 3, 11–14, 54–55. It was no surprise to the British that Argentina wanted to claim or reclaim the Falkland Islands. The British were not only ambivalent to the Falklands but also were very much focused on domestic issues and the Cold War in 1982. Indications and warnings of pending aggression were first realized in mid-March 1982. Even though small indications existed, it was never believed that an invasion would actually occur. Although small planning meetings were held, nothing substantial was ever produced to acquire manpower, ships, heavy equipment, and gear. On 31 March 1982, Adm Sir Henry Leach told the prime minister that he could mobilize a task force by the weekend. With this proclamation and approval by the prime minister, the Royal Navy and Royal Marines had their orders. The only units available to respond to the Argentinean invasion were the Royal Marines stationed on the Falklands, the Antarctic patrol vessel HMS Endurance, and two nuclear powered submarines (SSNs) located within the south Atlantic. The HMS Endurance, underway at the time, could do little after supporting operations on South Georgia Island, so the ship turned north for Ascension Island and away from the Argentinean navy and air power. The two SSNs were given the order to move south and observe the area until given further instructions.

20 Clapp, Amphibious Assault, Falklands, 35.

21 O’Sullivan, The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister, 144–47.

22 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 78.


24 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 29, and O’Sullivan, The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister, 148.


27 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 15–20; and Joint Forcible Entry, JP 3-18 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), I-5–I-6. EMPRA is nonstandard doctrine for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) taught by the Expeditionary Warfare School and Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups Atlantic and Pacific. During the past 30-plus years, MEUs have been forced to embark at a moment’s notice with little warning. Under such circumstances, planning must be conducted while underway to the objective area and well after embarkation has been completed.

This plan would account for the type of supplies needed for a cold-weather environment but not the ships and antiair systems needed to oppose Argentinean forces in the air and on the seas 8,000 miles from the British homeland. In response to the diverse threat posed by Argentina, the task force was correspondingly diverse, and assembled with ships and ground units not typically accustomed to operating with each other.

A larger force than that assigned to the Norway plan was required due to the increasing Argentinean ground force on the Falklands. The Royal Marines’ 3 Commando Brigade (3CDO), commanded by Brigadier General Julian H. A. Thompson, was the assigned force for the Norway contingency plan. 3CDO’s yearly training in Norway, combined with its Arctic Warfare Cadre, made 3CDO the ideal choice for the austere, cold-weather environment of the Falklands. Yet 3CDO—the premier British ground force—was not enough in the face of a larger, modern force.

Royal Marine commandos, by their nature, are extremely fit, agile, and above all expeditionary. Any unit assigned directly to 3CDO needed to conform to this model. The best option were the British Army’s paratrooper battalions. In the end, 3d Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3PARA) and 2PARA reinforced 3CDO. Furthermore, 3CDO received an artillery battalion, a Rapier antiaircraft battery, additional communications and signals equipment and personnel, and Commando Logistics Regiment 3 (CLR3). This brought the initial landing force, 3CDO, to around 5,500 marines and paratroopers. This was a substantial force to penetrate the A2/AD bubble and land successfully.

To fracture the A2/AD bubble, the task group was comprised of more than 100 ships and submarines, with the majority of them embarking from Great Britain and Gibraltar or already underway from the mid-Atlantic. Operational control was placed in the hands of Rear Admiral John F. “Sandy” Woodward, desig-

Figure 3. Chain of command / task organization, 9 April–28 May 1982.

*Once Operation Paraquet was complete, most of the ships assigned to CTG 317.9 rejoined CTG 317.8 for the remainder of Operation Corporate.

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30 Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in The Falklands: No Picnic (London: Pen and Sword, 2009), 1–16, 27.

31 Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 284. 3CDO reinforced stood at 5,500 troops, plus or minus. Later during the land campaign, 5th Infantry Brigade joined 3CDO, bringing the total landing force to approximately 9,000 troops. For the purposes of this article, the focus is closing the force (3CDO) in San Carlos Water at the height of fighting within the A2/AD bubble.
nated commander of Task Group (TG) 317.8. Of the 100-plus ships, warships were the smaller percentage of the task force as compared to support ships. Combatant ships included two aircraft carriers, eight guided missile destroyers, 15 frigates, one diesel and five nuclear powered submarines, two amphibious assault ships, three mine sweepers, and five small vessels. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) supported the carrier group and the amphibious task force, providing 23 ships, while the British commercial merchant fleet provided an additional 40 ships classified as ships-taken-up-from-trade (STUFT).

Gaining and maintaining control of the sea by Royal Navy combatants was only half of the solution to the maritime problem. The task force embarked 74 aircraft, both rotary and fixed-wing. As with any operation, aircraft conducted not only combat air patrols (CAP) to maintain air superiority but also antisurface and antisubsurface operations to maintain sea superiority. The most decisive of these aircraft were the 33 Royal Navy British Aerospace Sea Harrier FRS.Mk 1s and Royal Air Force (RAF) Hawker Siddeley GR.Mk3 Harriers. These Harriers were used to protect the fleet against air and surface threats and for close air and deep air support (CAS and DAS) provided to special operations and the landing force. Additionally, to protect the fleet against the Argentine submarine threat, the task force embarked 25 antisubmarine helicopters. Finally, the task force possessed 28 helicopters for assault support.

As for landing force logistics, the task force loaded its complement of ships as items appeared at their ports of embarkation. To meet the prime minister’s intent, the majority of combatants sailed in 72 hours, with the last few underway by 7 April. Due to the impromptu loading of ships, identification and reorganization of cargo for debarkation took nearly three weeks. This reorganization was done while underway and at Ascension Island, the intermediate staging base for the task force halfway between Great Britain and the Falklands. Restow of supplies and equipment became the priority for the task force to have a timely off-load in the Falklands, but it came at the cost of more effective planning and rehearsals. EMPRA and the task force’s haphazard means of embarkation would cause additional problems as the force closed on the Falklands.

Shaping the Amphibious Operations Area

Rather than conducting shaping operations for months or multiple weeks, only 20 days of shaping operations were available in support of Operation Corporate. The task force was under a very tight timeline because of the coming south Atlantic winter, and the carriers were expected to operate until the Northern Hemisphere’s fall before they would be needed to conduct critical in-port maintenance. Operationally, the task force accomplished little in the immediate weeks following the Argentinean invasion due to the 8,000 miles of separation between the two opposing forces. At midnight on 12/13 April, the British government announced a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland Islands enforced by three Royal Navy nuclear submarines, HMS Spartan (S 105), Splendid (S 106), and Conqueror (S 48). Drawing first blood at this point could have prevented a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Instead of attacking the

30 Ratio of Royal Navy “warships” to support ships from the RFA and STUFT: 40 : 60.
32 Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, 365–70.
34 Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, 233.
35 Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, 233.
37 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War, 76–77.
38 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 88; and Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, 84. The zone was “defined as a circle of 200 nautical miles from latitude 51° 41’ South and longitude 59° 39’ West, approximately the center of the [Falkland] Islands.” Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 88. The first forces to arrive at the MEZ around the Falklands were three of the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarines, HMS Spartan (S 105), Splendid (S 106), and Conqueror (S 48).
Argentine Navy, the British submarines observed the opposing naval forces. Not only were the submarines able to gather accurate intelligence concerning the movement and locations of the Argentine Navy, but they were also able to ascertain that sea mines were in fact being placed off the coast of Port Stanley and that coastal defenses were in place.\(^4\) With British submarines providing real-time intelligence, the task force could turn to more detailed planning.

As the task force gathered around Ascension Island, Admiral Fieldhouse flew to the intermediate staging base and transferred to the HMS Hermes (R 12), Woodward’s flagship, to meet with his commanders on 17 April.\(^4\) Fieldhouse had two main goals for this meeting. One was to stress the need to close in on the Falklands as soon as possible before popular support in the UK was lost. The other was to review and provide recommendations to the landing plan. The commander, Amphibious Task Force (ATF), Commodore Michael C. Clapp, designated commander of Task Unit (TU) 317.0, and the commander, Landing Force, Brigadier General Thompson, designated TU 317.1, could not provide a definitive answer for a landing site at that time, but they were able to determine the following requirements for shaping operations to successfully land the landing force regardless of the location:

\( \begin{align*} 
\text{a)} & \quad \text{The total MEZ must be effective and remain so throughout Operation Corporate.} \\
\text{b)} & \quad \text{The threat of the Argentine aircraft carrier must be removed.} \\
\text{c)} & \quad \text{Air and sea superiority must be established and held over East and West Falkland and the surrounding area.} \\
\text{d)} & \quad \text{Port Stanley airfield must be neutralized (including air defense weapons) and the Argentine air assets (both fixed wing and helicopter) stationed on East and West Falkland must be destroyed.} \\
\text{e)} & \quad \text{Accurate intelligence of beaches, terrain, and enemy positions is essential.} \\
\text{f)} & \quad \text{Argentine logistic dumps must be harassed and their effectiveness reduced.}^{45} 
\end{align*} \)

Out of the six requirements for shaping operations, four pertained to gaining and maintaining access. The need to control the air and sea prior to the ATF’s arrival was not lost on Woodward, Clapp, or Thompson.

With political pressure gathering each day, and regardless of the task force’s readiness, it was time to close on the Falklands.\(^4\) Woodward’s carrier battle group departed Ascension Island on 18 April, arriving in range of the MEZ for the group’s Harriers by 30 April, thus turning the MEZ into a total exclusion zone (TEZ).\(^4\) Concurrent with TG 317.8 commencing operations to gain access, Clapp’s amphibious force (TU 317.0) with Thompson’s reinforced 3CDO (TU 317.1) started its 4,000-mile movement from Ascension Island to the Falklands.\(^4\)

Gain and Maintain Access: Enforcing the TEZ

Woodward’s battle group had a multitude of objectives to accomplish before the amphibious landing, with the most important of those being to gain air and sea superiority. With South Georgia Island secured and some of the ships from the South Georgia Group returning to Woodward, TG 317.8 consisted of 12 combatant ships, the majority of the helicopters for antisubmarine warfare, assault support for special operations, and the Harriers for CAP and CAS/DAS.\(^4\) Additionally, the submarine force (TG 324.3) possessed six submarines in the south Atlantic, with some of those submarines responsible for enforcing the TEZ.\(^5\)

Securing the sea and air were simultaneous missions, but it was securing the air that proved most

\(^{4} \text{Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, 84–85. Sea mines were seen being placed within Cape Pembroke, and 105mm howitzers were placed near the shores to prevent naval fires and an amphibious landing.} \\
^{44} \text{Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 203.} \\
^{45} \text{Clapp, Amphibious Assault, Falklands, 86.} \\
^{46} \text{Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 210–11.} \\
^{47} \text{Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands Campaign, 107–12.} \\
^{48} \text{Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 203.} \\
^{49} \text{Martin Middlebrook, The Falklands War (London: Pen and Sword Military, 2012), 113.} \\
^{50} \text{Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 89–91.}
difficult throughout the operation. Identifying the route from Ascension to the Falklands was not hard considering the British task force was under political pressure to make its presence known in the south Atlantic as soon as possible, and the Argentineans were well aware of this pressure. The task force had only one choice: to travel the fastest possible route to the Falklands in a straight line.

On 21 April, well before the task force arrived at the exclusion zone, an Argentine Air Force Boeing 707, the first of many, located Woodward’s carrier battle group. The sighting of 707s would continue over the following days as the task force maneuvered south. Considering the Argentinean 707s were unarmed and well north of the TEZ, there was little the task force could do besides launch Harriers to intercept and observe. After such actions became daily occurrences, the British government released a statement declaring that the British task force would engage any Argentinean military aircraft coming within 25 nautical miles of British ships. Encountering “nonhostile” Argentinean aircraft at 25,000 feet and noncombatant shipping outside of the TEZ raised issues for the task force’s rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement were a continuous topic of discussion with very open-ended answers during the conflict. Within the TEZ, rules of engagement were not an issue. It was outside of the TEZ where issues arose as soon as the task force arrived at Ascension Island. As with any military operation, the element of surprise is a must. Although the task force went to great lengths to disguise its movement, it was still extremely difficult to conceal more than 100 ships relatively massed together in the south Atlantic. Throughout the operation, commanders debated whether the task force could and should engage Argentinean forces outside of the TEZ.

Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority: The Unseen Power of the Submarine Force
Woodward’s carrier battle group entering the TEZ was the forcing function to apply more liberal action within the rules of engagement constraints. On 2 May, the Argentinean cruiser ARA General Belgrano (C 4), escorted by two destroyers, was underway 40 nautical miles southwest of the TEZ. Although the cruiser was well outside of the TEZ, it was declared an imminent threat to the British task force and was sunk by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror (figure 4).

This action was controversial because the Argentinean cruiser was outside of the TEZ, on the opposite side of the Falklands from the British task force, and 368 Argentinean lives were lost at sea. On the same day, Woodward’s TG 317.8, via antisurface/subsurface helicopters, attacked two small Argentinean naval vessels, sinking one and permanently disabling the other. With the sinking of the General Belgrano and two other vessels neutralized, the task force had its needed effect. Argentinean leadership pulled back nearly all surface combatants, to include the Argentinean aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V 2). With one move, the British obtained maritime supremacy.

Gain and Maintain Air Superiority: The Unattainable Goal
During the Falklands campaign, neither side maintained air supremacy, but considering that the British task force lost 10 percent of its shipping due to enemy air actions, it was the task force that paid the highest price. From the start, the Argentineans possessed a 1-to-4 advantage over British Harriers. The Argentineans chose to use their aircraft in a CAS/DAS role, compared to the British task force’s choice to use its Harriers for DAS, CAS, and CAP, with the

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52 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 146–50.
54 Middlebrook, The Falklands War, 150–53.
55 English and Watts, Battle for the Falklands (2) Naval Forces, 21–22.
majority of aircraft tasked to defend the task force.\footnote{Chant, \textit{Air War in the Falklands, 1982}, 86. There were two types of Harriers used in the 1982 Falklands War: the Sea Harrier and the GR Mk.3 Harrier. The Sea Harrier was flown by the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm Squadrons 800, 801, and 809. The Sea Harrier was both air-to-air and air-to-ground capable. The Fleet Air Arm provided the majority of Harriers to the task force. Adding to the total number of Harriers were those provided by the Royal Air Force Squadron Number 1 who flew the GR Mk.3 in an air-to-ground role for both CAS and DAS.}

Additionally, the RAF had the Avro Vulcan B.Mk 2A bomber. The Vulcan bomber, like much of the British military inventory, was a Cold War-era aircraft meant to conduct bombing missions from home bases in England and Europe; it did not have the range needed for deep strategic bombing. Regardless of this shortcoming, on 1 May, a Vulcan bomber at 10,000 feet attacked the Port Stanley airfield with 21 of its 1,000-pound bombs.\footnote{Chant, \textit{Air War in the Falklands, 1982}, 40–41.} Although Operation Black

\[\text{Maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) established on 12 April}\]

\[\text{Total exclusion zone (TEZ) established on 30 April}\]

\[\text{Location of CTG 317.8 on 2 May}\]

\[\text{HMS Conqueror (S 48) torpedoes and sinks ARA General Belgrano (C 4) on 2 May}\]

Figure 4. Sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, 2 May 1982.
Buck had little effect and the Port Stanley airfield was operational shortly after the bombing, the “Vulcan Air Raid” was a strategic move for British forces. It proved that if worse came to worst, the RAF could strike targets on the Argentinean mainland. This may have been unlikely due to British political statements and diplomatic relations with allied nations and the United Nations, but the Vulcan bombing did prove the point. Finally, the Vulcan bombing gave yet another win to the British people back home, the first being South Georgia Island, and the next being the sinking of the General Belgrano. With three consecutive wins by the British, it was Argentina’s turn at the scoreboard.

Argentina Scores a Hit
The AM-39 Exocet was new to the Argentinean military and to the world. The year prior to the invasion, Argentineans fielded the French-built antiship cruise missile along with the aircraft to carry it, the Dassault Super Etendard. Originally, the Falklands invasion was to occur in the South Atlantic’s late winter/early spring. One reason for the later invasion date was the need to properly train crews and fit the Super Etendard for the Exocet. Unfortunately for the Argentine Naval Aviation Command (Comando de la Aviacion Naval Argentina), after the South Georgia incident General Galtieri advanced the invasion date by nearly six months without the Super Etendard crews and aircraft fully operational.

By April, the 2d Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron possessed four operational Super Etendards and 10 trained pilots for that aircraft. Furthermore, Argentina possessed just five AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface antiship cruise missiles. The odds were not in favor of the Super Etendard pilots, but they just needed one missile to make an impact on the British task force. As is still true today, in 1982 the ultimate target for the Super Etendard pilots was always a task force aircraft carrier. Although striking, or better yet sinking, a British aircraft carrier could “win the war,” this was unlikely considering how few Exocets the Argentineans possessed. Considering the limited number of Super Etendards, any ship within the task force could be a potential target, not just aircraft carriers. On 4 May, after the Super Etendard squadron aborted two previous attempts, an Argentine Super Etendard launched an AM-39 Exocet at the British task force. This was the first combat test for the Exocet, a textbook maneuver, and it went quite well.

The British destroyer HMS Sheffield (D 80) was hit and suffered significant damage with 24 wounded and 20 killed. If there was ever a time that diplomacy would have stopped the coming British assault, it had just passed. Strategically, all cards were on the table from this point forward, and the British were not backing down. Tactically, the attack showed that the task force was not impregnable, and that gaining air superiority was more vital than ever before.

During the next six weeks, the Argentine Air Force and naval fighter attack and bomber aircraft made runs at the task force and later on 3CDO with considerable success. The majority of attacks occurred from aircraft stationed within Argentina. British intelligence knew the Argentineans would attack from both the mainland and from the Falklands. Their two biggest concerns were the Exocet and the positioning of aircraft on the Falklands.

These were two separate problems with different solutions. First, for aircraft departing Argentina, the British assumed that Argentina did not have a reliable air-to-air refueling system. This was a mistake. By making this assumption, the task force discounted the amount of on-station time aircraft would have to loiter and attack a target or group of targets of choice. Initially CAPs defended around Woodward’s carrier group, and then later the limited number of Harri-
ers was split between defending the carrier group, the amphibious task force, and the landing force. The Argentineans made their land-based runs on the ATF and LF, while the air-to-air refueled aircraft focused on the carrier group at sea. Consequently, the number of Harriers were lessened for the CAP, and the Argentineans exploited this weakness.

The second concern was the Argentinean aircraft positioned on the Falklands. This was dealt with by the use of Harriers and special operations. Most notable of these actions was the Special Air Service (SAS) raid on Pebble Island. Pebble Island, located on the northern edge of West Falkland, possessed a 1,600-foot-long grass airfield. Grass airfields were not uncommon on the Falkland Islands because they lacked a road network connecting the many villages. Also, considering that the islands are around 100 miles by 160 miles, traveling from settlement to settlement took a considerable amount of time by vehicle. Instead, the various villages possessed grass airstrips for postal services and delivery of supplies via small, privately owned aircraft.

Argentinean planners were well aware of the many grass airstrips available. The Argentine Air Force forward deployed light attack aircraft to Port Stanley, Goose Green, and Pebble Island. The British believed that, after runway improvements were conducted, Argentinean air elements would use Port Stanley and other airfields—specifically, that they would try to use Port Stanley for fast attack aircraft like the Skyhawks, Mirages, or (best case for the Argentineans) the Super Etendard.64 Although fast attack aircraft never deployed to the Falklands, light attack aircraft did.

**Woodward’s Advance Amphibious Force Opens the Gate**

Pebble Island was vital to the Argentineans for two reasons: 1) early warning radar coverage and 2) the positioning of troops and aircraft to protect their northern flank. TPS-44 and TPS-43 radar sets were positioned near the homes on the outskirts of Port Stanley.65 These positions were not ideal, but they were still effective for identifying the incoming British task force, both air and sea. The only downside was that Port Stanley is surrounded by mountains except in one direction, so radar coverage was only able to look east. The Argentineans needed to fill this gap in coverage.

Additionally, the Argentinean air force needed to spread its forces to cover East Falkland from the north, south, and east. To fill both gaps, Pebble Island (named Base Aérea Militar [BAM] Borbon) was the logical choice; it would provide a greater range of radar coverage and prevent a northern approach by the task force.66 For reasons unknown, during April and into May, the additional TPS-44 and TPS-43 radar sets available never made their way to BAM Borbon to fill in the radar gap. The establishment of the MEZ/TEZ may have prevented filling the gap, or perhaps a radar set was disabled in Port Stanley due to high winds and was replaced with the spare TPS set.67 Although a radar system never made its way to BAM Borbon, the aircraft and troops to protect it did. Positioned on Pebble Island were around 100 troops armed with small arms, antitank weapons, and 60mm and 81mm mortars.68 Just as important as the reinforced company on the island were the light attack aircraft. BAM Borbon maintained six Pucaras, four Turbo Mentors, and one Short SC.7 Skyvan 3M-400.69

Just like the Argentineans, British planners iden-

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64 Ethell and Price, *Air War South Atlantic*, 2. The Argentine Air Force never used Stanley for fast attack aircraft for two reasons: First, the airfield was too short in a wet environment. The Falklands receives high winds and rain quite often, and the wet airstrip could not support fast flying aircraft. Second, the Argentineans had considered extending the airfield. The British knew Argentinean engineers had the matting for this extension. Argentine Air Force planners chose not to extend the airfield because Stanley did not have the facilities, both hangars and fuel storage, for their fast attack aircraft.


66 Pebble Island was known to the Argentineans as Isle Borbon. Thus, the name for the Pebble Island forward airfield was BAM Borbon.


69 MacKay and Cooksey, *Pebble Island*, 84.
tified Pebble Island as a good choice for both radar and aircraft positioning. This was later confirmed in May when British ships and aircraft picked up Argentinean aircraft departing and landing in the vicinity of Pebble Island. Harriers were focused on bombing Port Stanley and Goose Green, while Vulcan raids focused on Port Stanley. The threat on Pebble Island was assigned to the SAS.

In a daring raid on the night of 15–16 May, 45 men from D Squadron SAS were inserted via Westland WS-61 Sea King helicopters from the HMS Hermes and supported by the HMS Broadsword (F 88) and Glamorgan (D 19). In the next five hours, from insert to extraction, the SAS element was able to destroy 11 aircraft, crater the airfield, and confirm that a radar station was not located on Pebble Island. This limited short-duration raid opened the gate for Clapp’s amphibious task force.

**Landing Site Selection: The Best of Bad Options**

The amphibious landing of 3CDO, Operation Sutton, was set for 21 May. Thompson and Clapp narrowed down the landing sites and beaches from 50 to a possible 3, and then finally selected San Carlos Water. Not a single landing site on East or West Falkland was ideal for an amphibious landing. Each landing site had its problems: either being too close to the enemy’s defensive positions, too narrow, too shallow, or too far away from the objective area. Although San Carlos Water had its drawbacks, it was the best landing site for fighting within the A2/AD bubble.

San Carlos Water is a bay that sits on the western side of East Falkland; its only access point is the Falkland Sound, which splits the two main islands. The task force would have to approach the island either from the north or from the south, thus closing some of the distance between the British ships and Argentinean aircraft stationed on the mainland. An approach into San Carlos Water via the sound would be slow regardless of a movement from the north or the south. Additionally, an approach from the north would push the ships into radar range of land-based radar units around Port Stanley. Although Pebble Island had been neutralized, the threat of an unidentified radar unit still existed, especially around the northeastern portion of East Falkland near the Argentinean defensive positions. Although there were drawbacks with movement toward and the location of the bay, the bay itself made up for them.

At San Carlos Water’s opening, ships have to pass through a gap no larger than 1.5 kilometers (km). Then the bay opens up to 3.5 km and then narrows down from there. Although San Carlos Water is an extremely tight fit for a group of ships, it has calm waters and multiple beaches. Surrounded by high hills and mountains, San Carlos Water is relatively ideal for the defense of a landing and amphibious task force. Having such high terrain surrounding the area negates the use of air-to-surface missiles (i.e., the Exocet) and forces attacking aircraft into a very short target identification-to-engagement timeline. San Carlos was not the ideal landing site, but it was the best one available to the amphibious task force.

As the task force crept closer to the landing date, it was obvious that air superiority could not be obtained in time. The best Woodward could do was mitigate the threat through deception operations. Deception operations are a must in warfare, and Operation Corporate was no different (figure 5). Woodward and Clapp devised a deception plan, named Operation Tornado, to draw attention away from the San Carlos Water landing.

At 0400 Zulu time zone, the same time the actual landing at San Carlos Water commenced, the cruisers HMS Ardent (F 184) and Glamorgan positioned themselves off the coasts of Goose Green and Port Stanley.

70 Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 84, 190–91. HMS Broadsword was assigned as the antiair defense ship for HMS Hermes. HMS Glamorgan was to provide fire support to the SAS during their raid on Pebble Island. Glamorgan went within seven miles of Pebble Island. Varying accounts exist concerning how many aircraft were destroyed. Some accounts state 11 and others state 10. Due to a hard landing, one Pucara was down for maintenance. Thus, the British did destroy 11 aircraft, though 1 was already disabled.


72 Woodward, *One Hundred Days*, 189.
respectively.73 Under naval gunfire provided by the cruisers, SAS forces raided Goose Green. Off the coast of Port Stanley, the Glamorgan conducted radio transmissions simulating a coming invasion. Additionally, Special Boat Service (SBS) troops were inserted near the town and made contact with locals to spread the word that the task force was about to land. Operation Tornado, a seemingly small act, drew enough attention away from San Carlos Water and bought sufficient time for the task force to start its landing unimpeded.74

Deception operations, an early morning nautical twilight landing, and SBS securing the landing site prior to 3CDO’s landing enabled the initial waves to land unopposed. If there was a significant delay in their movement, or any other factor not in favor of the landing force, this could have turned Operation Sutton into an opposed landing.75 Through detailed planning, intelligence, and sheer will, Commodore Clapp was able to fit the majority of his amphibious task force in and around San Carlos Water by the early daylight hours of 21 May.76 Although the day started off without incident, it was only a matter of time before Argentina’s fixed-wing assets attacked the amphibious task force.

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73 Middlebrook, The Falklands War, 208; and Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 467–69. Zulu time, or Universal Time Coordinated (UTC), refers to the time at the prime meridian and is primarily used in military and civil aviation.

74 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 244–45; and Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 469.

75 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 470. The landing was delayed by one hour due to a malfunction in the satellite navigation system for the HMS Fearless, but this was a minor issue, as stated by Thompson.

76 Clapp, Amphibious Assault, Falklands, 132–43.
Defending the Landing Force: Fighting within the Bubble

Clapp and Thompson knew that the most dangerous spots for the landing force during an air attack would be on the ships in San Carlos Water or in transit to the shore. Getting the landing force ashore during the early hours of 21 May was paramount to mitigate the air threat’s potential. Additionally, the 3CDO’s defensive posture had to be set in the event that enemy forces counterattacked from Goose Green or Port Stanley, via the regimental air-assault reserve. With 3CDO’s battalions set, 40, 42, and 45 Commando with 2PARA and 3PARA, the chances of stopping or pushing the landing force back into the sea were slim. Although Argentinean ground forces could do little harm to the landing force at San Carlos Water, the Argentineans could strike hard at the landing force with their air components.

The amphibious task force and 3CDO were well inside the A2/AD bubble with aircraft attacking from the Argentinean mainland and Port Stanley. The coming days were referred to as “Bomb Alley” for the amount of ordnance delivered from Argentinean aircraft. From 21 to 25 May, the Argentine Air Force and Navy produced 180 sorties with about 80 operational fast attack aircraft. Out of the 180 sorties, 117 sorties reached their targets, with 19 Argentinean aircraft being destroyed, a loss rate of 1 in 4. Compare this to the British task force, which with 33 Harriers produced 300 sorties, about 2 sorties per day per Harrier. Of the 33 Harriers, 4 were operational losses due to surface-to-air antiaircraft fire, a loss rate of 1 in 8. Although sortie generation and sustainment of aircraft were higher for the Harriers, their part in the defense of the ATF could only do so much. Defense of the ATF also fell upon the ships within the ATF, the antiair battery, and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) within 3CDO.

Although the high surrounding terrain mitigated the air-to-surface threat, it also hampered the ATF’s surface-to-air weapon systems. Some of the ships within the ATF had the latest antiair missile systems. Due to the hills and bluffs surrounding San Carlos Water, those systems were unable to acquire, identify, and prosecute targets in an effective manner. By choosing this terrain, the ATF took a risk in being unable to use their antiair missile systems.

Meant to aid in antiair defense, 3CDO had two Rapier antiaircraft batteries attached. These units were neither organic to the landing force, nor were they systems/units 3CDO was accustomed to operating with in training. Unfamiliarity and misuse of the weapon system led to its ineffective use during Bomb Alley and follow-on point defenses during the campaign.

The first problem occurred during embarkation. The Rapier systems were organic to the RAF and Army and not meant for travel via amphibious ships, where exposure to saltwater and rough seas are common. To protect the sensitive components to the missile systems, they were placed below deck, well away from sea exposure; however, these components were never reorganized for immediate debarkation as the ATF closed on San Carlos Water. Considering the air threat, these items should have been in wave two or three, rather than some of the last waves on the afternoon of 21 May. As a result, the Rapier systems were out of commission for most of 21 May.

The second problem with the Rapier was its misuse around San Carlos Water. The Rapier was intended for a point defense (e.g., a bridge, headquarters, or a small sensitive site). San Carlos Water was an area defense spread out over nearly 60 square miles. Instead of preparing to engage aircraft aimed at one

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79 Ethell and Price, *Air War South Atlantic*, 152–56, 234–36. One-hundred eighty sorties were flown by Skyhawks, Daggers, and Super Etendards; operational aircraft at the start of the conflict were 6 Canberras, 11 Mirages, 46 air force Skyhawks and 11 navy Skyhawks, and 34 Daggers. Argentina lost some aircraft by 21 May, but these losses were minimal.
small area, the task force ineffectively employed the Rapier to engage aircraft attacking multiple areas, flying low and fast, and spread over a large surface. Compounding this problem, the Rapier was extremely difficult to move, requiring helicopter support to lift each system and reset or reposition it. Even after 21 May, systems were continuously reset by Sea King helicopters. Logistically, the Rapier was a burden. For each day of use during the ground campaign, the Rapier air-defense battery required 1 Sea King helicopter out of the 11 dedicated to 3CDO to refuel and conduct maintenance on the systems. This taxed 3CDO’s helicopter support, exposed these helicopters to aircraft attacks, and again, meant that Rapier systems were out of commission during the resetting.

Additionally, the key radar for the system was left in the UK, so each system had to rely on the organic surveillance systems or in many cases to resort to optical tracking. The only air defense weapons organic and attached to 3CDO were the Blowpipe MANPADS provided by 3CDO Air Defense Troop and 43 Battery, 32d Guided Weapons Regiment (Royal Army). The Blowpipe was a 42-pound, shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile with a range of 1.5 nautical miles. Out of 95 missiles fired during the ground assault, nearly one-half malfunctioned, and only 1 shot down an enemy aircraft. For the time, the Blowpipe was the best 3CDO had for its own internal defense against the low, fast-flying Argentinean aircraft.

The Cost of Amphibious Operations in the A2/AD Environment

Separate from Clapp’s ATF, on 25 May the container ship SS Atlantic Conveyor was struck by an Exocet. As with every attack upon Woodward’s TG 317.8, the intended target was an aircraft carrier, either HMS Invincible (R 05) or Hermes. Soon after the missile strike, the Atlantic Conveyor sank, and with it not only supplies for 3CDO, but more importantly, 3CDO’s heavy-lift helicopters. With the loss of four Boeing CH-47 Chinooks, 3CDO was forced to make its movement across the Falklands by foot. Although not directly part of the ATF, the Atlantic Conveyor’s sinking proved how complex and interconnected the A2/AD environment is for both the attacker and defender.

By the end of Bomb Alley, Clapp’s ATF suffered damage to six ships and lost three. Considering Clapp’s TU-317.0 consisted of 20 ships, 45 percent of his ATF suffered from attacks within San Carlos Bay. Due to ordnance malfunctions and survivability of the ships, those damaged continued to fight. Clapp’s ATF lost 15 percent of its fleet. Thompson’s landing force suffered fewer casualties due to its twilight landing and digging-in around the areas surrounding San Carlos Bay. Operation Sutton ended with the movement of 3CDO to its objectives at Port Stanley and Goose Green. Essentially, 3CDO fought within the A2/AD bubble and successfully fought out of it. Although 3CDO made its movement toward its objectives inland and Argentinean air had been significantly reduced, the A2/AD fight was not over.

During the next two weeks, attacks occurred against British naval and ground forces, although they were not as intense as Bomb Alley had been. The next and most significant of all air attacks in terms of lives lost was against the RFA Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad at Fitzroy. During the off-load of 5th Infantry Brigade

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83 Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands, 88.
84 Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands, 68–70.
85 “The DN181 Blindfire radar trackers were left in the UK, obliging the crews to depend on the organic surveillance systems or in many cases to resort to optical tracking.” Fremont-Barnes, A Companion to the Falklands War, 204.
86 Fremont-Barnes, A Companion to the Falklands War, 52.
88 Fremont-Barnes, A Companion to the Falklands War, 58–59; and Clapp, Amphibious Assault, Falklands, 172. HMS ships damaged: Broadsword (F 88), Argonaut (F 56), Antrim (D 18), RFA Sir Lancelot (L 3029), RFA Sir Tristram (L 3505), and RFA Sir Galahad (1966). Ships sunk: Ardent (F 184), Antelope (F 170), and Coventry (D 118).
units on the early afternoon of 8 June, two Mirages and two Skyhawks attacked in broad daylight. Although the beach at Fitzroy was undefended, the Argentineans held Mount Harriet 10 miles due east with a clear view of the landing site. In this attack, the British lost 2 men on the *Sir Tristram* and 48 killed and 57 wounded on board the *Sir Galahad*. Once again, neither the Rapiers, which were in the process of being emplaced, nor the CAP over the landing force were able to prevent this attack.

Additionally, on 8 June, LCU “Foxtrot-4” from the HMS *Fearless* (L 10) was sunk while in Choiseul Sound near Goose Green, resulting in the loss of six crew members. Although minor, it proves that any target, regardless of size and task, is considered a threat to a defending force. Sections of Daggers and Skyhawks attacked the HMS *Plymouth* (F 126), positioned north of Falkland Sound within the radar picket for TU 317.0, resulting in five wounded and the ship suffering limited damage. Due to the overtaxing of Argentinean aircraft, weather, and a change to conducting night attacks by British ground forces, 8 June was the end of air attacks, but threats still remained to the task force.

In the early hours of 11 June, a land-based MM-38 Exocet struck the HMS *Glamorgan*. At the time, the *Glamorgan* was providing fire support to 45 Commando in the attack of Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. As the sun rose, the *Glamorgan* stayed on station for as long as possible, supporting the commandos before turning seaward. With the *Glamorgan* crossing in front of the modified trailer-mounted MM-38’s line of sight, this sea surface-to-surface Exocet launched and detonated above the stern of the ship. The *Glamorgan* suffered severe damage with 13 killed, but continued to fight a few days later on 13–14 June, just in time to see the end of the war.

The Falklands campaign came to an end on 14 June 1982, with all objectives secured by ground forces and the subsequent Argentinean surrender. The re-capture of the islands came at a very high price. For TF 317, it suffered a total of 253 killed in action; of those, 131 were killed on ship or at sea. British ground forces suffered 80 killed in action and 269 wounded in action. 3CDO being reinforced by 5th Infantry Brigade helped in many ways, but what enabled the lower killed-in-action list was the medical team placed at Ajax Bay in San Carlos Water. “The Big Green Machine,” as it was termed by the hospital staff, was able to keep alive every single British casualty that it received. This was a time before the “one hour golden rule,” and it proved how effective self-aid and buddy-aid can be in such a conflict. Additionally, this was a phenomenal feat considering the field hospital was located in Bomb Alley.

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90 Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 304.
93 Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, 550. The MM-38 was delivered via air transport into Stanley Airport during Operation Corporate. Although the airstrip had been attacked by Vulcan bombers and Harriers, the airstrip stayed open to most transport aircraft, one of those being an aircraft that delivered MM-38s to the Argentinean battlefield. Indirectly, it was the inability of the British task force to gain air supremacy that led to this successful attack.
94 Clapp, *Amphibious Assault, Falklands*, 263; and Fremont-Barnes, *A Companion to the Falklands War*, 106. The HMS *Glamorgan* survived this Exocet attack; it was the only ship to suffer an Exocet strike and survive. Despite the damage from the Exocet, the *Glamorgan* would provide future fire support to the Scots Guards in their attack on Mount Tumbledown, 13–14 June.
98 Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, 616, 782, 783. Not classified as wounded in action but rather injured in action were a total of 147 paratroopers and commandos; the majority of those injuries were cold weather injuries (i.e., hypothermia, trench foot, or frostbite). Typically, U.S. and British forces aim to have an injured person at a Role III medical facility within one hour of the injury to save life and/or limb.
Conclusion: The Falklands War as a Blueprint for Today’s Amphibious Force

According to the recently published Marine Corps Operating Concept, the key drivers of change influencing the future operating environment are complex terrain, technology proliferation, information as a weapon, battle signatures, and an increasingly contested maritime domain. Excluding information as a weapon, the 1982 Falklands War offers potential solutions or starting points in minimizing the effects of these key drivers. Technology has significantly improved during the past three decades not only for the United States but also its adversaries. The same can be said for the opposing forces in 1982. Each side had strengths and weaknesses, but the consensus going in was that it would not be a costly war due to the slight technological advances held by British forces and their overall better conditioning. Argentina was grossly underestimated and proved to be a near peer competitor to the United Kingdom.

British forces held a slight technological edge very similar to that held by the United States today. Many of our foes already have or will have near peer capabilities that counter our offensive and defensive capabilities. Additionally, the Falklands campaign provides an example of a force comparable in size to today’s Marine Corps ESG/MEB. Some, if not all, of the problems seen by the British task force will be seen by our ESG/MEBs in future conflicts.

There is never a perfect solution to any problem, especially one involving military operations. The fog of war combined with political end states will cause unforeseen consequences to any plan. The 1982 Falklands War is—more than any other—as close to a perfect campaign as possible to study amphibious operations in the A2/AD environment.

It is not beyond belief that the United States could end up in a Falklands-type situation. In the future, the United States could enter into a high-intensity conflict that takes the ESG/MEB into an area where there are few allies and increasing logistical burdens. China, Russia, and Iran supply U.S. adversaries with technologies that will test our forces to their limits. These technological advances in A2/AD, coupled with an amphibious task force that lacks allies and safe havens, will sound all-too similar to the 1982 Falklands War.

The U.S. military’s focus today, just as it was for Britain in 1982, is preparing for the most dangerous course of action. Preparing for the most dangerous course of action is a requirement that cannot be overlooked. However, thinking that the A2/AD environment only exists around China and Russia creates a false sense of security. While China and Russia do pose a threat to U.S. interests, a war with either of them is not the most likely course of action in the near term. The United States will continue to face conflicts in the arc of instability with adversaries that pose formidable A2/AD threats to smaller units such as an ESG/MEB and ARG/MEU. Despite advancements in today’s A2/AD weapons technology, the 1982 Falklands war offers critical insights to how U.S. naval forces can counter modern-day threats to an amphibious force and prepare for future threats.

100 Information operations (IO), as with most twentieth-century warfare, was present in the 1982 Falklands War, but was contained to limited press releases and statements at the United Nations. IO was held at the strategic level and its effects on operations were minimal during the campaign.
North Korea lies at the center of the most dangerous flashpoint in contemporary international affairs. Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War 68 years ago, every presidential administration has struggled to maintain peace on the peninsula while, since the 1980s, aiming at complete denuclearization of North Korea. How can we help prepare the next generation of strategic leaders to deal with the North Korea problem? Or, for that matter, any current international challenge?

This article explains how we use case studies in the Diplomacy and Statecraft (DS) course at the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), where our desired educational outcome is enabling students to acquire insights and analytical approaches useful in evaluating and skillfully responding to today’s global challenges. Noting that students respond best to interesting, compelling topics, the DS program uses a case study on the atomic bombings of Japan to generate helpful takeaways. Rather than allow this case study to stand alone, instructors reinforce it with other case-based seminars sequenced during the academic year, ending with an assessment of student learning in the form of a graded exercise: a policy recommendation memorandum about North Korea. That graded assessment requires student mastery of factual material about North Korea but, more importantly, it measures student ability to apply critical thinking and analytical techniques to create a new or revised American policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This ability will be useful for students as they become generals, ambassadors, and senior advisors, and as they face challenges similar to those posed by the DPRK.

The DS course is only part of the overall curriculum. Our other core courses are: War, Policy and Strategy; Leadership and Ethics; Joint Warfare; and National Security. All enable student insights and takeaways from varied angles and on varied topics. We make extensive use of matrix games, role-playing exercises, and field studies. Such diverse course offerings increase the integration and complementarity across the entire curriculum. It is important to note that MCWAR offers more than a hundred seminars, each emphasizing several insights or takeaways.

1 William M. Morgan is a professor of strategic studies and director of the Diplomacy and Statecraft course at U.S. Marine Corps War College. A former Marine, Dr. Morgan spent more than 30 years in the Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State.

2 Diplomacy and Statecraft (DS) is one of five MCWAR core courses. Composing roughly one-quarter of the curriculum, DS explores the D in DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—the four instruments of national power) with historical case studies, theoretical seminars, and many seminars analyzing U.S. relations with specific countries, such as China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, and Mexico.

3 When we create a specific class—whether a case study, discussion seminar, matrix game, role-play, etc.—we start with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) Joint Learning Outcomes (JLOs), making sure the educational objectives for the class mesh with the JLOs. We also shape the class to address the four MCWAR Program Outcomes and the four DS Learning Objectives. Given that thousands of analysts have worked on DPRK policy for decades, we expect the students to construct policy revisions that are new for them, though not necessarily something completely original.
What Kind of Case Study?

Scholars note two categories of cases. Retrospective cases place students as outsiders examining an entire episode, including actors, competing interests, and eventual outcomes. Students analyze what did happen and what might have happened if other paths were taken. A second category, decision-forcing cases, place students as leaders at the decision point, knowing only what the decision maker knows. Students analyze possible options for action. Only at the end is the real-world outcome revealed and analyzed.4

Within these two categories, the many varieties of case studies share common characteristics.5 They focus on a discrete event, crisis, or turning point. The case study goal is acquisition of insights from disciplinary content by critical thinking and application of analytical techniques. Insights, or takeaways, are not school solutions or even “truth.” Vicki L. Golich of the California State University San Marcos notes that although so-called discussion seminars and case studies share traits, such as Socratic questioning and robust student preclass preparation, they are not identical. For example, discussion seminars might compare and contrast international relations theories, but cases anchor “academic instruction in reality by engaging students in the analysis of specific situations.”6

In my role as a MCWAR instructor, I prefer cases that tell stories of a real-world crisis, turning point, or crucial policy decision. The best stories portray people in emotionally charged conflict. Conflict lies at the heart of a compelling case: conflict among decision makers, conflict among options, and conflict among estimates of outcomes. Students will remember these compelling stories much longer than dry facts. And the stories can be memory joggers, unlocking related memories. Golich stresses the storytelling aspect of case studies: “They recount . . . real events and problems so that students experience the complexities, ambiguities, and uncertainties confronted by the original participants. Most cases reveal key moments or conversations in a major event.”7 By evaluating issues and factors present in the case study that are also present in contemporary challenges, students can jump-start their analysis of present-day concerns.

I teach cases two ways. The chief difference between them is curriculum time and a writing exercise. Regular cases consist of two to three contact hours and four to six preengagement hours with a seminar group of 15.8 Alternatively, in a portion of MCWAR’s curriculum called the Advanced Studies Program (ASP), I teach 10 deep-dive seminars for approximately five to seven students. Each ASP case requires four contact hours, 20 hours of preengagement, and a 750-word paper that the students present and defend during the first 90 minutes. The paper must address a fundamental question of the case. For example, during this year’s seminar on Pearl Harbor and the origins of the Pacific War, students wrote on the question: What was the chief cause of the Pacific War? That paper forced students—prior to class—to evaluate inherent subtopics, such as the role of Japanese militarism, prewar foreign policies, and immediate precipitating factors like the American oil embargo. Second, it compelled them to synthesize a coherent point of view from disparate, sometimes conflicting, data. The ASP deep dives, triple the intensity of regular seminars, are akin to second- or third-year doctoral seminars. Longer case studies allow more variety and detail in the preengagement

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4 Abundant information on case studies can be found at The Case Method in Professional Military Education, the website and blog of Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, director of the Case Method Project at Marine Corps University. For an excellent example of preparing a case study at the tactical level, see 1stLt Zachary Schwartz, “Case Method PME,” Marine Corps Gazette 100, no. 4 (April 2016): 65–67. The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University have vast collections of case studies in international affairs.


7 Golich, The ABCs of Case Teaching, 12.

8 MCWAR seminar groups are similar to conference groups in other professional military education (PME) schools. However, at MCWAR, we re-form the seminar groups every two months.
material, while the lengthier Socratic discussion generates more insights and takeaways.

A virtue of a decision-forcing case is that the students identify with or become the decision maker. In retrospective cases, some of the same effect can be achieved by examining a decision point and asking whether there were better options. A question such as whether there were better alternatives to President John F. Kennedy’s naval quarantine of Cuba gets students intimately involved in the decision maker’s dilemma. Students also tend to buy into a case if each of them is required to orally present a sophisticated answer to the same key question. This kicks in the competitive juices as everyone wants to impress their peers. In the longer but smaller ASP seminars, there is time for students to distribute, present, and defend their short essays.

Case instructors gently guide the discussion using a thorough knowledge of the topic coupled with careful preparation. They prepare a lesson plan or “questioning plan” to shepherd the students, via Socratic dialogue, toward critical thinking and generating rich takeaways. Experiencing content evaluation through critical thinking and creating insights help students retain such skills long after they depart the classroom. In the longer but smaller ASP seminars, there is time for students to distribute, present, and defend their short essays.

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Socratic questioning requires of the student at least a basic level of domain or disciplinary knowledge. In a case seminar on the origins of the Pacific War, we usually begin with big-picture questions. For students who failed to preengage the assigned material, the Socratic dialogue might go something like this:

Q: What was the main cause of the war?
A: The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q: Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
A: Because the militarists decided to.

Q: What goals or desires motivated their attack?
A: I guess they wanted to conquer Asia.

Q: Why did they think that such aggressive expansion was in Japan’s interest?
A: I am not sure.

Q: Did the idea of controlling Northeast Asia evolve over time or appear suddenly?
A: (Guessing) Maybe it evolved over time?

Q: If so, what were the major turning points in that evolution?
A: I am not sure.

At this point, we have reached a level where Socratic questioning simply illuminates the gaps in student ability to evaluate key questions because of a shallow knowledge base.

Meaningful critical thinking rests on factual (disciplinary) knowledge. Even the best critical thinkers cannot parse the causes of the Pacific War without knowing something about U.S.-Japan relations before Pearl Harbor. Nothing kills a Socratic dialogue faster than ill-prepared students, though an ill-prepared instructor comes close. This leads us to preengagement, the absolutely indispensable precursor to a rewarding case study.

Preengagement
The popular buzzword flipped classroom is sometimes taken to mean merely abandoning the one-way data transmission of lectures for acquiring information before class. But listening to a recorded lecture is hardly an advance over attending a lecture. It is simply a change in the timing of data acquisition. What makes a real pedagogical difference is student preengagement with those assigned study materials before class.

Like most instructors, I match the preengagement materials (e.g., readings, documents, videos, etc.) to student capabilities and to my case seminar goals. The materials must provide an overview of the topic but also enough material to elicit capable responses at
the desired Socratic level. I am fortunate to teach at the senior school of the Marine Corps to students at the O5/O6 (lieutenant colonel and colonel) and GS-14–15 ranks. Their wealth of life and career experiences, coupled with the work habits that got them where they are, ensure they arrive in class prepared.

Preengagement is much more than just doing the reading, listening to a lecture, or watching a documentary film and then showing up for class expecting the instructor to sort it all out. Graduate students must meaningfully preengage, evaluating the material using key analytical questions, perhaps suggested by the instructor in a preclass handout or, ideally, developed by the student. These questions are not simple extractions of fact from memory, as in, “When was the Tokyo firebombing?” A key analytical question might be: What were the short- and long-term impacts of firebombing on Japanese leadership? The latter is worth pondering before class and reexamining in seminar.

Preengagement means posing key questions, thinking through the answers, and formulating sophisticated interpretations or judgments. Early in the academic year, I model this required behavior by providing extensive key-question lists or issues for consideration, as our lesson card template describes them. A bit later in the year, students often are required to turn in short lists of key questions. In smaller classes, to jumpstart the discussion, each student is asked to voice a key question, which is then written on the board. Or they can vote for a key question already on the board. After all students have weighed in, we start the discussion with the key questions on the board. The goal is to instill in the students the habit of developing and addressing key questions on their own. Instructors must take up key questions in the Socratic conversation. Nothing annoys students more than preparing for serious discussion and having the instructor veer into valueless ratholes or pet topics.

Case seminars do not produce “school solutions” or answers in the sense of unquestioned truth. But all answers are not equal. Simply trading opinions produces an atmosphere in which all answers are “right” answers. Instructors encourage better answers by asking students to prioritize or rank-order the arguments, query the underlying assumptions, and evaluate the importance and reliability of the evidence.

The best topics contain good arguments for several interpretations. Students end up on various sides of an issue—a desired result because it generates an enthusiastic give-and-take. In some future job, when someone dumps a mass of murky, contradictory information on their desk, they need to be able to evaluate the issues and formulate the necessary policy recommendation, intelligence assessment, or military course of action—and pack it into a concise memo, as in the real world.

A Sample Case: The Atomic Bombings of Japan

The atomic bombings case study kicks off the Diplomacy and Statecraft course. The topic is compelling, lends itself to many analytical approaches, and serves as a nice introduction to several abilities that students need to practice in later seminars. As noted above, the most important graded assessment of the course occurs near the end of the spring semester. Role-playing as the National Security Council senior director for Asia, students write a policy recommendation memo for the president on whether policy objectives and policy actions toward North Korea should be revised, and if so, how. They must display mastery of concepts and techniques they studied during the year. There are a number of these, but a critical one is the concept of empathy—not sympathy, but the ability to understand all aspects of the adversary’s environment and decision-making context. Another critical one is the ability to evaluate the mind-set and will of the adversary’s leader or leadership group.

For this initial 15-person seminar, students are allotted three contact hours and seven hours for preparation. Six of the preparation hours consist of reading 125 to 150 pages. Some instructors assign a specially prepared case study—perhaps a 35-page overview of the topic. I prefer journal articles, book chapters, documents, and video segments that together give a detailed overview, albeit with conflicting interpretations of the final months of the war and the surrender deliberations. Included in the reading are three
U.S. documents bearing on Operation Olympic (the
planned November 1945 invasion of Kyushu), Ameri-

can casualty estimates, and a detailed timeline of
the chaotic surrender deliberations among Japanese
leaders. For the seventh preparation hour, students
prepare (and turn in) five to eight key questions they
developed to parse the required reading.

Students warm up with a big-picture question
previously distributed; for example, “Why did Japan
surrender on 14 August and not earlier or later?”
Each student must comment. This results in a useful,
wide-ranging discussion on key questions of para-
mount interest to the students.

Then we explore three aspects of the atomic
bombings. First, we examine the uniqueness of the
military-dominated Japanese decision-making struc-
ture. By a decades-old practice called “The Right of
Supreme Command” the army and navy ministers had
to be serving, active-duty officers. Should a minister
leave office, only the relevant service could nominate
a successor. Thus if Army Minister Korechika Anami
resigned and the army refused to put forward a re-
placement, the government would collapse. With no
government to implement policy, Japan could not sur-
render, even if, as ultimately happened, the emperor
commanded it. Politicians tended, therefore, to defer
to military recommendations on foreign and domes-
tic policy.

The army and navy ministers did not command
the forces themselves. In the Meiji Era, when the idea

of a prime minister and a national legislature formed
by political parties first appeared, the military in-

sisted that politicians could not be trusted to place
national interest above corrupt politics and therefore
should not control the armed forces. Thus, both the
army and the navy general staffs were placed under
the emperor’s authority instead of the civilian cabinet’s.
By war’s end, the Supreme War Council, dubbed the “Big Six,” managed day-to-day strategic decisions.
The prime minister, foreign minister, and army and
navy ministers were members, joined by the army and
navy chiefs of staff. The chiefs were not cabinet min-
isters.

Most military officers and many civilians in the
top leadership felt themselves charged with assuring
Japan’s destiny to become Great Japan, an autono-
mous resource and security zone stretching across
East Asia. Its two most familiar names are “A New
Order in East Asia” and “The Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.” These leaders deeply absorbed
traditional cultural concepts from the Shinto religi-

on and the cult of noble samurai. They believed
that fighting spirit and resolve would overcome tac-
tical and resource deficiencies. They were proud that
Japan had overcome the helpless vulnerability of the
mid-nineteenth century, when Western intrusions
collapsed the weak Shogunate and imposed the hated
unequal treaties. Many leaders would rather die than
give up the dream of a powerful, impregnable Great
Japan, even as the real Japan was reduced to rubble.

Despite the constraints of their mind-set, Japa-

nese leaders knew they had lost the war, but they
hoped to avoid an unconditional surrender resulting
in humiliating occupation and political reordering.
Their unfounded assumption was that, if they could
inflict enough pain on American forces, a conditional
surrender might be possible. As the bloody Iwo Jima

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9 For details on Operation Olympic, see “‘Downfall’ The Plan
for the Invasion of Japan,” in Reports of General MacArthur: The
Army Center of Military History, 1994), 407.
10 Emperor Hirohito’s imperial rescript accepting the Potsdam
Declaration was broadcast to the Japanese people at noon, 15
August 1945, Japan Time. However, 14 August is a better date
for Japan’s surrender. On that day, the emperor’s intervention
during an Imperial Conference led to a cabinet decision to sur-
render. The Foreign Ministry swiftly cabled this news to its em-
bassies in Sweden and Switzerland for transmission to the Allies.
Washington received the surrender reply shortly before 0900 on
14 August. The formal surrender occurred on the battleship USS
Missouri (BB 63) on 2 September.
11 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese
12 William M. Morgan, “Pacific Dominance: The United States
versus Japan,” in Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World
to the Cold War, ed. James Lacey (New York: Oxford University
13 For the development of the autonomous resource zone, see
Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for
1987).
and Okinawa campaigns failed to soften the Americans, the militarists did not abandon the assumption, they doubled down. They planned to continue the war for months, gambling that defeating or significantly damaging the first landing on the home islands, which they correctly calculated would come in Kyushu, might bring negotiations. They called this “decisive battle” plan Ketsu-Go (Operation Decisive).14

By the summer of 1945, American leaders were more aware than on the eve of Pearl Harbor of the special mind-set of most military and civilian leaders in Japan. Years of fighting to the death in island battles, enduring strangulation by American submarines, and suffering the devastating firebombings demonstrated that Japanese leaders as a group were not rational actors as Americans thought of rationality. Immense pressure had not brought the Japanese to surrender by 6 August, when the Enola Gay (a Boeing B-29 Superfortress) bombed Hiroshima. Indeed, they built up in Kyushu twice the force levels expected by U.S. planners—so much so that in mid-August top planners considered canceling Operation Olympic or landing elsewhere. The Japanese surrender mooted the issue.15

Analyzing Japan’s internal surrender deliberations can be eye-opening for students. They are surprised by how the dogged unwillingness to surrender diverged so sharply from rational actor theory. Many believe that pressure inevitably forces adversaries down a predictable path. If the adversary is not moving fast enough down the path, increase the pressure. If we do X, the enemy will surely do Y, goes the simplistic assumption. The important variable is the pressure level, not the adversary’s will and manner of thinking, that will influence the reaction to the pressure. That reaction may be quite unpredictable and appear irrational.

Rational actor theory postulates that leaders rationally weigh the pros and cons of options and choose the value-maximizing one, that is, the predictable and rational path. Many historians agree that Japan had lost the war and should have surrendered after Saipan fell in July 1944. That disaster forced General Hideki Tojo to resign as prime minister but did not trigger consideration of surrender. Japan suffered devastating defeats in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in late 1944 and early 1945. The firebombing campaign started with Tokyo on 9–10 March and by summer 1945 obliterated more than 40 percent of Japan’s 66 major cities, making about 9 million people homeless.16 No oil tanker reached mainland Japan after March 1945. The rail network and intracoastal shipping suffered enormous damage. Food imports from mainland Asia plummeted. The population in 1941 consumed barely enough food for subsistence and, by 1945, consumed roughly 200 daily calories below maintenance level, meaning people were losing one and a half to two pounds per month.17 The cabinet foresaw starvation in the wake of an expected scanty rice harvest, estimated to be the worst in 14 years. Indeed, during 1946, the United States had to bring in substantial food supplies. After mid-1944, the value-maximizing option for Japan was ending the war, hopefully by conditional surrender.

Defeat was crystal clear, yet Japan fought on. Why? Because the Japanese decision-making structure placed the surrender decision in the hands of people whose values, beliefs, ideals, traditions, and spirit prevented them from surrendering the concept of Great Japan that had driven prewar expansion and the war itself. Many officers would rather die than surrender that ideal and identity.18 The preengagement material and a film clip shown in class offer insights into the mind-set of Japanese decision makers.19

14 Frank, Downfall, chapters 11–13, 164–213.
17 Frank, Downfall, 350–52.
18 This unique mind-set also underlay Japan’s 7 December 1941 attack on the far stronger United States, despite awareness that Japan would lose a long war. See Morgan, “Pacific Dominance,” 499–502.
19 Rather than use the film as a preclass assignment, I find that this particular film clip is best discussed immediately after viewing. It also breaks up the seminar with a different activity.
The film clip comes from *Japan’s Longest Day*, a compelling dramatization of the contentious and delicate internal deliberations that finally brought surrender. Made in 1967, the film closely follows the multivolume history by the respected Japanese historians of the Pacific War Research Society. Famous postwar movie stars filled the cast, among them Toshiro Mifune, brilliantly playing the key role of the conflicted Army Minister Korechika Anami. General Anami wished to fight the war to the death but also felt a martial duty to follow the emperor’s desire to end the war by accepting the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes Note. Anami could have scuttled surrender by resigning his post, collapsing the government, and thereby removing the legal mechanism to implement the emperor’s wish. Instead, he went along, assailed by doubt, torn between obligations to the emperor and to hardline younger officers. He committed suicide as Japan surrendered. Other hardliners never agreed to surrender. Army Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and Navy Chief of Staff Soemu Toyoda, like Anami, were Big Six members who opposed surrender. The deputy chief of the naval staff, Admiral Takijiro Onishi, father of the kamikazes, lectured Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo that Japan could still win by committing 20 million people to suicide missions. Fortunately, Onishi’s view did not prevail. Onishi also committed suicide at the end of the war.

What moved the Japanese decision-making cadre? This is the second aspect of the case: an analysis of immediate triggers that enabled the surrender decision. Was it the 6 August Hiroshima bomb? The 9 August Nagasaki bomb? Were both bombs required? Was it the 9 August Soviet entry into the war? Were both bombs plus Soviet entry needed?

On 9 August, the Big Six met in the prime minister’s underground bomb shelter to evaluate the scary and confusing early reports from Hiroshima. While finally digesting that a single atomic weapon obliterated the city, they learned that another atomic weapon had just destroyed Nagasaki. Concurrently, they received reliable reports that at midnight—about 12 hours earlier—the Soviets launched a massive blitzkrieg against the shrunken Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

Given the incalculable pressure level at that moment, one might think that the Big Six would decide to surrender. But the best they could do was agree to attempt a negotiated surrender via a conditional reply to the Potsdam Declaration, which called for unconditional surrender but promised that ultimately Japan’s government would be shaped by the Japanese people. The Big Six considered four desirable conditions: 1) preservation of the imperial house and emperor as Japan’s supreme authority, 2) no occupation, 3) self-disarmament, and 4) identification and prosecution of war criminals by the Japanese. All Big Six members supported retention of the imperial house. Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, and Navy Minister Mitumasa Yonai sought only this course, called the “one-condition surrender.” Army Minister Anami, Army Chief Umezu, and Navy Chief Toyoda wanted multiple conditions, or the “four-condition surrender.” Deadlocked after arguing for hours, the Big Six adjourned around 1330 on 9 August. The cabinet then convened with Suzuki presiding and Togo, Anami, and Yonai present. The same argument, one or multiple conditions, deadlocked the cabinet until its adjournment at 2200.

Early that morning of 9 August, Emperor Hirohito sent his close advisor Marquis Koichi Kido, lord keeper of the privy seal, to inform Prime Minister Su-
zuki that he wished to end the war by using the Potsdam Declaration. Suzuki could not bring either the Big Six or the cabinet to that consensual decision. In the afternoon, as the cabinet meeting made no progress, former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe and former foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu pushed Kido to persuade the emperor to make a “sacred decision” (seidan) to break the deadlock. The emperor agreed to appear at an Imperial Conference. This was an extraordinary step, especially if the emperor intended to make a decision. In the past, it was highly unusual to convene an imperial conference without a clear agenda and premeeting consensus on the policy that would receive the emperor’s blessing. As one member of the inner circle put it, Imperial Conferences were staged to preserve the fiction that the emperor personally approved the recommended course of action. Accordingly, the emperor did not participate in the scripted discussion and indeed almost never spoke.24

Late on 9 August, the first Imperial Conference convened in the form of the emperor, the Big Six, and a few invited officials. The Big Six divided as before, with Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda urging multiple conditions. Togo explained the one-condition surrender. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, head of the Privy Council, suggested a toughening of Togo’s single condition from “preservation of the status of the emperor within the national laws” to Allied acceptance of “the understanding that the Allied Proclamation would not comprise any demand that would prejudice the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” This language revision changed no minds. The deadlock continued. Ignoring Anami’s call, Prime Minister Suzuki positioned himself before the emperor and asked for the emperor’s decision between one or four conditions. Hirohito replied that he supported Togo’s one-condition idea. Anami and the diehards must have been shocked by the monarch’s intervention. The Foreign Ministry quickly sent a message, using Hiranuma’s language, to the Allies via Japanese embassies in Sweden and Switzerland. The Japanese awaited the Allied reaction.25

In Washington, policy makers debated whether Japan’s condition was significant enough to alter how the United States would occupy, reform, and administer Japan. They did not know the exact political stances of the various Japanese leaders, but they knew some kind of accommodation regarding the imperial house might bring surrender. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes crafted a reply, called the Byrnes Note, which offered weak reassurance about the imperial institution without tying American hands.

On 12 August, international radio announced the Byrnes Note, which simply stated that “the authority of the Emperor and the said Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.”26 Disappointed, Togo and Suzuki nevertheless decided to recommend cabinet acceptance. The emperor told Togo that he supported acceptance. The emperor conferred that afternoon with his relatives, 13 princes from five houses, and gained their support. Army Chief Umezu and Navy Chief Toyoda met with the emperor—he was their immediate superior, as they reported directly to the throne—and urged rejection of the Byrnes Note. The emperor reprimanded them, saying his mind was made up.

On 13 August, the Big Six and the cabinet once more deadlocked over the Byrnes Note. Coup plotting began among mid-level officers, including Anami’s brother-in-law. The emperor again passed word to Prime Minister Suzuki that he wanted acceptance of the Byrnes Note. At 1600 on 13 August, the cabinet deadlocked one last time, unable to reach the required consensus, but only one civilian minister joined Anami and Navy Chief Toyoda in urging rejection. Twelve

24 Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950), 234–35. When the emperor committed to surrender is the subject of considerable debate, though the consensus is that it was probably in June 1945, when Okinawa was clearly lost.

25 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, 238–39. For the text of the Japanese note—with Hiranuma’s proposed language—see Magic Diplomatic Summary, 10 August 1945, National Security Archive Briefing Book Number 162, Document 64-a, National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC.

cabinet ministers supported accepting the note. Suzuki announced that he would again ask the emperor to break the deadlock and scheduled an Imperial Conference for the following morning. That night, the coup plotters showed Anami their plan, but he said and did nothing.

On 14 August, Anami arranged to delay the second Imperial Conference so that several of the most senior officers could lobby the emperor. Admiral of the Fleet Osami Nagano and Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama urged continuing the war, but Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, who commanded the defenses in Kyushu, frankly stated that he had no confidence in repelling an invasion. The emperor declared that the military situation had changed suddenly. The Soviet Union entered the war. Suicide attacks could not compete with the “power of science.” He saw no alternative but to accept the Potsdam terms.\(^{27}\)

The 25-minute film segment ends with the final Imperial Conference of the Japanese Empire. At 1050, the Imperial Conference began. Remarkably, the Big Six joined the cabinet ministers for the gathering. This allowed Army Chief Umezu and Navy Chief Toyoda to attend. Prime Minister Suzuki summarized the inconclusive deliberations of the Supreme War Council and cabinet and regretted that the government could not reach a consensus decision. He asked the emperor to hear minority views and render his decision. Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda in turn urged rejection of the Byrnes Note. Suzuki asked for the emperor’s decision. Hirohito slowly rose amid dead silence. In emotional remarks, wiping his eyes at one point, he explained why the war could not continue. He asked all present to respect his decision. He offered to personally explain surrender to the troops or undertake any task that would end the war. The emotional shock of his words and his resolute intervention brought some ministers to their knees, sobbing. The emperor turned to the prime minister: “Suzuki, prepare the documents to end the war.”\(^{28}\) He walked slowly from the room. The war was over.

Historians robustly debate how the atomic bombings (singly or together) and the dreaded Soviet entry influenced the emperor’s decision to intervene and the strength of the so-called peace and war factions among the extended leadership group.\(^{29}\) What is clear is that, in the end, pressure worked. “Ah-ha!” rational actor advocates sometimes say. Not so fast.

Equally clear is that pressure was tremendously inefficient and slow. If Japan had surrendered in August 1944, when ultimate defeat was obvious, the Philippine, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa campaigns would not have been necessary. Japanese cities would not have been firebombed or hit with atomic weapons. Tens of thousands of American military casualties, hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians, perhaps an equal number of Chinese soldiers and civilians from the entire Asian combat theatre would have survived the war. Very likely, the benign American occupation would have played out the same way. Pressure had won the war by August 1944 but could not bring surrender for another horrible, bloody year.

To get its way, America had to apply an additional, almost unimaginable level of pressure. Why? Because of the will and mind-set of the Japanese, especially the leadership. A takeaway here is that, in future situations, a decent understanding of adversary will and mind-set is essential to a prudent evaluation of how the adversary will react to pressure, particularly if, unlike the Japanese in August 1945, the adversary can inflict catastrophic damage on the United States. Moreover, adversary will and mind-set should be considered at the earliest stage of planning, even during

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\(^{27}\) Frank, *Downfall*, 314.

\(^{28}\) Learning of the decision for surrender, ultranationalist mid-level officers immediately attempted a coup, seizing the Tokyo Imperial Palace and other facilities. Shizuichi Tanaka, general of the Eastern Army, stormed over to the palace with troops and squelched the revolt. Within a day or two, the military rooted out the rebels everywhere. This allowed the surrender to proceed. Like Anami, Tanaka committed suicide at the end of the war.

the determination of national goals or objectives, but certainly at the strategic level where the necessary force structure, estimated time to complete the mission, and acceptable casualty and resource levels are considered. Due to events at Pearl Harbor, the Pacific War was not an optional war. Where war is optional, however, proper understanding of adversary will and mind-set will help prevent an unexpected quagmire. How much pressure will be needed? Can we apply it hard enough and long enough? Might our pressure result in a lashing out?

A third aspect of the atomic bombings that we briefly explore is how American leaders considered the moral-ethical dilemma posed by the new nuclear weapon. I neither offer my view nor do I expect the students to generate one acceptable to the group. Rather, each person formulates their own answer. When responses regarding the moral-ethical angle are solicited, several people usually observe that atomic bombs were nothing special, just bigger bombs. Dead is dead, they say. They assert the nuclear bombings were no different than killing roughly the same number with a thousand-plane raid, as in the 9–10 March 1945 Tokyo firebombing that killed a hundred thousand people, the vast majority civilians.

In class, we note two previous examples of the use of new weapons. In World War I, mustard gas was widely used. In 1917, Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare violated the common understandings of traditional cruiser warfare and precipitated American intervention. But in World War II, unrestricted submarine warfare was the norm. On the other hand, poison gas was not used, though several nations maintained deterrent stocks. What thinking deemed unrestricted submarine warfare acceptable and poison gas unacceptable?

Here, I introduce new information. During World War II, several new weapons were considered, such as a “dirty” bomb scattering radiological material across a city—or base or airfield—killing the inhabitants over several days or weeks and rendering the area uninhabitable. Another idea was poisoning Nazi water reservoirs, perhaps with radioactive material. A third idea was an anthrax bomb to spew deadly powder across enemy cities. Though murky, the historical record suggests the British ordered but never used anthrax bombs from a factory in Indiana. Allied decision makers and strategic leaders declined to use radiological weapons, poison in reservoirs, or anthrax bombs. Why was the atomic fission weapon acceptable and other new and deadly weapons unacceptable? Keeping in mind the search for insights, not school solutions, the moral-ethical aspect generates an energetic give-and-take. Students reflect on how to construct personal guidelines should they face such a decision.

**Sequencing Case Studies**

We next take up several other case studies and seminars and explain how they connect to the atomic bombings case and to the graded policy recommendation memo on North Korea.

Class number two, a discussion seminar on international relations theory, includes a look at Constructivism, which remains much less familiar to students than Realism. Constructivism suggests that state behavior, especially in the long term, emerges from the leadership and population’s values, beliefs, traditions, and ideas, similar to the factors shaping the mind-set of the Japanese leadership.

Next, students play a prisoner’s dilemma game in class. One of the takeaways is what might be called the “last-round danger.” In real-world diplomacy, interactions go on for years, akin to a game of hundreds of rounds. In a tense negotiation, the last-round danger occurs when one side has secretly abandoned diplomacy and plans an attack. The other side does not recognize that diplomacy is in the final round and is thus blindsided. Pearl Harbor is an example of an unrecognized last-round danger.

Third, the students scrutinize before class a com-

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30 As my colleague James Lacey has noted, Adolf Hitler was gassed in World War I.

pelling new essay by Janice Gross Stein on emotion in threat perception. Students are prone to think—given the justifiable popularity of Daniel Kahneman’s *Thinking Fast and Slow* (2011) and similar books—that our perceptions of adversary threats are processed through two distinct cognitive processes. The first is heuristics: rules of thumb, emotions, and quick gut reactions. The second is calm, logical, evidence-heavy deliberation. Stein persuasively argues that emotions infuse not just the “system one” heuristics but also the supposedly logical, rational “system two” deliberations. Her article has significant implications for policy makers who must judge how an adversary will perceive a policy action, emotionally or rationally. 32

Our third and fourth classes focus on a two-part case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Students read chunks of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s classic, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971), and all of *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (2006) by Don Munton and David Welch. They become familiar with Allison’s three analytical paradigms: Rational Actor (Model One), Organizational Behavior (Model Two), and Governmental Politics (Model Three). 33 They evaluate Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Kennedy’s understanding of the decision-making context of the adversary. As Munton and Welch argue, the two leaders initially lacked empathy but gained it during the crisis. They finally negotiated a deal that met the basic needs of each man. Last, students explore the amazing Castro letter. During the crisis, when Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro sensed that Khrushchev was weakening, turning away from confrontation to deal making, he dragooned Soviet ambassador Alexander Alexeyev into shaping his rants into a passionate letter to the Soviet premier, transmitted 26 October 1962. Rather than live under occupation after the expected American invasion, Castro would rather die. Use the nuclear weapons, he urged. In a 1992 conference in Havana with former American, Russian, and Cuban officials, Castro admitted to Robert S. McNamara that he would rather, as McNamara described it, bring the temple down on his head than give up his revolutionary dream. 34

Our fifth class, “Analytical Techniques for Policy-makers,” is a short review of proven techniques, some from the intelligence community, such as questioning key assumptions, analysis of competing hypotheses, and evaluating analogies. A lengthy practical application focuses on placement, Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May’s technique of sophisticated biographical analysis. Students create placements of Khrushchev, whom they have studied in the two previous classes, and of a significant contemporary figure, General Qassem Suleimani, head of the Iranian Qods Force. Placement is a key skill for evaluating how a decision maker will react in various contexts. 35

**Kim Jong Un and North Korea Policy**

In the spring semester, students participate in seminars on Chinese leadership trends, Chinese foreign policy, the People’s Liberation Army, the South China Sea dispute, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and security issues on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK issue is deeply explored. After the five foundational seminars

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35 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986). Their placement concept assesses an individual from the time of parents’ adolescence, with special attention given to times of extreme emotion, domestic political change, and career shocks and successes. Other systems for collecting and analyzing leader biographies exist in the intelligence and foreign policy worlds. Access to classified material may supply additional data on a subject, but placement is a skill or technique that evaluates data regardless of the classification level. Hence it is useful in both classified and unclassified settings.
at the beginning of the year and the six East Asia seminars, the students are well prepared to think their way through a policy recommendation memo similar to one that might be written in the real world. The memo requires them to evaluate whether American policy objectives (ends) and policy actions (ways and means) are realistic, proportional, and achievable. Then they recommend any necessary revisions to those policy objectives and policy measures.

During the evaluation and recommendation process, they pose (and investigate) key questions needed to fully evaluate the issues. By this time in the academic year, students have developed similar questions many times. Among many important questions and observations useful in evaluating North Korea policy are the following:

- Remembering the importance of understanding Japan’s unique decision-making structure, do we understand the DPRK decision-making structure and Kim’s role in it? Can he act without regard to the effect his actions have on his power? Or does he feel he can never act in a way that looks weak?
- Recalling the spirit and powerful self-image of General Anami, who prided himself on military rectitude and preferred death to what he saw as dishonor, how should we engage Kim? Just as with Anami, is his behavior motivated by beliefs, values, desire for respect, fear, etc.? If so, what beliefs, what fear, and what values? Is a proportional or prudent act on our part likely to be misunderstood and perhaps even trigger a disproportionate reaction?
- Do we understand how he thinks, including any information on his thinking processes in any previous crises? Is he so invested in his position that any threat to it—from a U.S. preemptive strike or an internal coup or even an escalating border clash—might cause him to use nuclear weapons, as Castro had urged in the Cuban crisis, not caring that it would mean his death?
- If persuasion or inducements are our tactics, what do empathy, analysis of his decision-making context, and Neustadt and May’s placement technique tell us about what might be persuasive or serve as inducements?
- Have we matched our objectives with the pressure, persuasion, and inducements that we can (or should) apply? Certain objectives will require a lot more pressure, persuasion, or inducements than others. Incalculable pressure on the Japanese did not work for a long, long time, and even then it was touch and go inside the leadership hierarchy. Could we generate that much pressure on North Korea and maintain it?
- Will Kim accede to pressure in the end, or will he pull the temple down upon his head, as Castro was ready to do? Unlike the Japanese, who, at the end of the war, could not seriously wound the United States, Kim may be able to inflict great damage on the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan right now. In the near future, he may be able to damage the United States as well.
- Though the United States did not locate the bunkers storing the warheads for the medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency prudently assumed that missile warheads were present on the island. But American analysts could not imagine that dozens of tactical nukes were also in Cuba. Those weapons would have decimated the invasion urged by Air Force General Curtis LeMay and other senior military and civilian leaders. Accordingly, do we know everything Kim has and where it is located? Is it possible that he could load a crude nuclear bomb on a midget sub or onto a shipping container and detonate the bomb in a South Korean or Japanese port?
- What eventualities or situations might trigger a last-round move by Kim? How would we know when he reached this point? What indications might there be? Will his thinking about that situation parallel ours?
- In a tit-for-tat situation, might he react un-
predictably and disproportionally to what we consider a prudent, proportional response? Said another way, should there be a naval clash along the Northern Limit Line or shelling of islands (similar to the Yeonpyeong Islands bombardment in 2010), and the ROK-U.S. leadership crafts a kinetic response, do we have a reasonable idea of how the escalatory chain will play out?

Conclusion
Though historical case studies can be useful in strengthening student abilities, they are not answers or lessons that we can directly apply to contemporary policy challenges. A historical episode is unique, a one-off event. We should be humble about the insights and assessments we glean from case studies. We might have it wrong. We might ask, what happens if we follow a certain course and it goes wrong? If we cannot anticipate and cope with likely second- and third-order effects, we should be very cautious about making a highly risky move or a move with completely unknown risk levels. That said, decision makers must decide. They cannot let themselves be paralyzed by the complexities of unclear data, unpredictable risk, and the inevitable uncertainty of intelligence assessments. Case studies allow students to experience those complexities in real situations, polish critical thinking skills, and prepare themselves to make crucial decisions or skillfully advise those who do. Case studies do not lead to perfect judgments, but they often lead to better ones. Former national security advisor Samuel R. Berger pointed out: “History is written through a rear-view mirror but it unfolds through a foggy windshield.” Perhaps case studies can help wipe a bit of the fog off the glass.

36 The Northern Limit Line refers to a line drawn approximately mid-channel between the North Korean coast and five islands.

37 Hearing before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, eighth public hearing (24 May 2004) (testimony of Samuel L. Berger, former assistant to the president for national security affairs).
Art can be found in almost every location humans have existed. We are drawn to leaving our mark. While times change, people remain relatively the same. Not surprisingly, as archaeologists uncover warriors in every clime and place, from numerous eras, they also find artistic elements on artifacts and in living spaces that decorate, inspire, and communicate. The well-known Bayeux Tapestry, for example, is a hand-stitched graphic novel of the Norman conquest of England, culminating with the Battle of Hastings in 1066. Images tell stories, whether they are scratched on cave walls, sewn on tapestries, pieced from glass, or painted on canvas. During the past 150 years, artists have done much to document their countrymen’s endeavors on the battlefield. Some attempted to record victories, glories, and achievements, whereas others tried to document simple truths through image. In the United States, artists such as Winslow Homer, Harvey Dunn, George Harding, Kerr Eby, and John W. Thomason Jr. went to war and produced artwork of their experiences. Their work emerged alongside the development of daguerreotypes and modern film photography. The interest in hand-created imagery among modern audiences did not wane from the late 1800s through the early 1900s but instead increased. This was in part due to technological limitations with cameras and emulsions, which required very long exposures. Art also endured because of its emotive quality, the artist’s ability to distill scenes down to their essence.

Fast forward to World War II, during which countries around the world fielded artists and cameramen. Both visual disciplines continue to coexist and complement one another. Marine Corps Brigadier General Robert L. Denig was tasked by the Commandant to keep the Marines’ stories during the war in front of the American public. To that end, he recruited photojournalists, photographers, motion picture cameramen, and artists. This group of talented professionals underwent training, donned uniforms, and set off for the Pacific with general orders to: “Go to war; do art.” Denig trusted the artists to tell authentic stories with their drawings and paintings, rather than create propaganda. By the end of the war, the work created by the artists had been used in publications, war bond advertisements, recruiting posters, and public exhibitions around the country.

Because of my love of reading and history, I grew up with a basic understanding of works created by the artists who documented the Civil War, World War I

1 Charles Grow serves as deputy director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Quantico, VA. He served a career in the Marines as a combat artist and combat photographer. He worked as an adjunct professor for five years with Strayer University. Author’s statement: combat art should inspire thought, questioning, or an emotional response. The viewer should be challenged to empathize with the Marines and their circumstances. What would the viewer do or feel if they were asked to do the Marine’s mission, endure their hardships, etc.?

(Thomason in particular), World War II, and Vietnam. Thomason’s work illustrated books like *Fix Bayonets*, which I checked out of the library. These souls endured great hardships to experience one of mankind’s most horrific and incredible endeavors and to relate those experiences in sculpture and painting. Learning about them led to more reading and more learning about combat artists. Their work spoke of people who

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3 Capt John W. Thomason Jr., *Fix Bayonets* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926).
persevered and stories that mattered. I wanted my artwork to matter, to resonate with people intellectually, historically, and emotionally. When faced with going to art school to learn how to paint better, which I could not entirely afford, or living a life that would result in stories worth telling, I chose the latter and in 1982 I enlisted in the Marines. Practice and study could replace things learned in art school, but only life experience would inform what I chose to paint. I approached my recruiter with a much deeper understanding of the combat art program than he had, and to his credit, he listened. He offered no guarantees and suggested that I pack a portfolio for my trip to Parris Island, South Carolina. I signed up for an open contract enlistment, assured that my work would speak for itself. It was not until a few years later that I realized how slim the odds were for me to become a U.S. Marine Corps combat artist. There had only been a handful of enlisted combat artists between 1942 and the early 1980s. Tom Lovell, John Clymer, Harry Jackson, Richard M. Gibney, Paul T. Arlt, John DeGrasse, Richard Yaco, Henry Casselli, James Butcher, and James Fairfax were primary enlisted artists to document the period between World War II and Vietnam. Subsequent to Vietnam, the numbers of enlisted artists reduced even more, with Arturo Alejandro and

*Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* by Charles Waterhouse. Acrylic on untempered Masonite. As a rifleman on Iwo Jima, the artist, Cpl Charles Waterhouse, received a gunshot wound to the left arm on 21 February 1945. Col Raymond Henri, head of the Combat Art Program, was later cited as having said, “Thank God they did not hit his drawing arm!”
Jorge Benitez being the primary enlisted participants. I was blessed to be in the right place at the right time and with a portfolio to help pry the door open.

Toward the end of boot camp, my senior drill instructor and his “heavy” called me to the duty hut. They reviewed my test scores and suggested that I consider a number of military occupational specialties (MOSs), such as intelligence or translator. Then, against their better judgment, they marched me down to the graphic shop, where I was interviewed by Gunnery Sergeant Donald D. Moore, staff noncommissioned officer in charge (SNCOIC) of the Graphics Section. Moore’s artwork was everywhere in those days, including pencil portraits of Dan Daly, Chesty Puller, and others. He reviewed my portfolio and put me in contact with the Combat Art curator, Jack Dyer. Both gentlemen were impressed with my work and both were instrumental in getting me to draw and paint for the Marine Corps—but not immediately. Combat art was an additional duty, not a fulltime MOS. There was an MOS titled combat artist (officer), but there was no enlisted equivalent. In a sad twist of fate, I was assigned

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4 The “heavy” drill instructor is the one who rides recruits the hardest—the loudest, roughest, most harsh of the drill instructor team.

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Last Man by Henry Casselli. Acrylic on canvas. This acrylic painting shows three Marines at a checkpoint in Hue City, Vietnam, ca. March 1968.

Corpsman by Henry Casselli. Pencil on paper. The artist’s caption reads: “A Corpsman is often called ‘Doc.’ He is everyone’s friend, especially when the going gets tough giving not only physical aid but often a spiritual boost. Although a Navy man we feel he’s as much a Marine as we are.”

Fire Support Base Dick by Richard Yaco. Watercolor on paper. The artillery fire support base “DICK” was built by the 9th Marines in 48 hours. Six 105mm howitzers sit in a cutaway position on this high mountain peak position operated by Company E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines.
MOS for basic photographer, and stationed at Parris Island as permanent personnel. Dreams of deployment, doing Marine things, and living a life worth painting evaporated quickly. So I started drawing and painting everything I could and figured that I would serve an honorable enlistment and return to civilian life as a more seasoned artist.

A few years later, I was lucky enough to be headed to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Desert Storm. Jack Dyer had been in communication with my SNCOIC and officer in charge (OIC); my primary assignment was to be a combat artist. Colonel H. Avery Chenoweth, an infantry officer who served in Korea and Vietnam, was tasked with being the OIC of the Marine Corps Combat Art Team. We both reported to History Division, which at the time also included the Museums Branch, where Jack Dyer managed the art collection. I spent a few days going through the art collection with Dyer. He showed me works by Lovell, Clymer, and Jackson—all of whom created artwork as enlisted Marines during World War II. I perused pieces created by Howard Terpning, who had served as an enlisted Marine in China after World War II and went to Vietnam as a civilian combat artist for the Marine Corps. Two of the most impressive collections I reviewed were created by former Sergeants Casselli and Yaco. Both men enlisted to become combat artists, and both got to do that in Vietnam. Poring over hundreds of works, I saw that war through their eyes. They had unfettered access to enlisted Marines, and their art told timeless stories of an unvarnished truth. I also spent a little time talking with two of my heroes, Colonels Peter Michael Gish and Charles Waterhouse. Both of these esteemed gentlemen were veterans of multiple wars, both had primary MOSs other than art, and each gave me solid insight into what to expect, look for, and consider as I charted my own course as a Marine and an artist. Neither violated the prime di-
rective: go to war, do art. What I chose to cover was up to me, as it had been for all the artists before me. The Marine Corps did not want propaganda, it wanted an authentic visual record of my experiences.

During Desert Shield, I was initially attached to 2d Marine Division, then I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), and finally 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv). I spent the entirety of Desert Storm with 1st MarDiv. I was fortunate enough to fall under the wing of two senior Marines who helped me understand the operations plan and move around the battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton was the field historian for 1st MarDiv. Master Sergeant Alexander Ortiz was the combat camera chief for 1stMarDiv. I learned much from both Marines. Both leaders imbued me with a better understanding of the broader Marine Corps from a historical, operational, and practical perspective. Each of them pushed me to see different perspectives and to be as productive as possible; this was a rare opportunity for a sergeant of Marines. Thanks to the mentorship and access afforded by Cureton and Ortiz, I was privileged to document preparations for war, planning efforts, combat service support, reconnaissance, tactical deception, and almost every major element of the division. It was a dream come true. It was also one of the only times in my career that art was a primary focus. The majority of the rest of my career required me to do artwork on my own time, after hours, once my primary mission and other additional duties were complete.

During my time in the first Gulf War, I learned that artists could do things that cameras could not. For some of the time we were shrouded in darkness, as oil fires blackened the skies and droplets stained our uniforms and skin. On a couple of occasions, I was tasked with doing tactical sketches, at least in part because the heat of the desert prevented clear intel-

HM-3 Corpsman R. R. Coyle, USN 2/2 by Charles Grow. Pen and ink on paper. HM 3 R. R. Coyle, USN, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, aid station, carries an elderly Haitian woman to her quarters near a feeding site in Cape Haitien. The woman got dizzy and fell. Coyle put her in the shade and cooled her off in October 1994.

There were a few occasions when the camera was useless and the only visual record of an event was my notes and sketches. For instance, when the intelligence Marines and interrogators/translators marked enemy prisoners of war after dark, there was sufficient light to make out shapes, but not enough for the fastest film. When we engaged in firefights enveloped in pitch black, getting a photographic exposure was impossible. I also was able to composite memories into a single canvas—something that would have been pretty difficult in the film days of camera work. For instance, when traveling through the wide-open desert, I saw an interesting contrast of East and West, low tech and high tech, peace and war. A flight of Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters passed overhead with cargo slung below, a logistics convoy rolled by, and a Bedouin herded his camels; they were there at the same time, but not in a way that would make a single good photograph. The objects would have appeared as mere specks on a wide panoramic photo. I merged these elements into a scene that depicted events that I repeatedly saw in Saudi Arabia.

About a year and a half later, I deployed to Somalia as a combat camera officer for Marine Forces Somalia, which largely comprised Marines from I MEF and 1stMarDiv. This deployment had two combat artists, both of whom were attached to I MEF. Colonels Peter Michael Gish and Donna Neary roamed the theater creating artwork. The artists produced an incredible body of drawings and paintings. Meanwhile, I dispatched photographers and videographers on air and ground missions. Combat Camera supported the immediate needs for a largely local military audience. By contrast, the artists’ imagery continues to tell sto-
Both missions were important, as are both audiences.

Roughly 18 months later, I was deployed to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and to Haiti. Jack Dyer’s petition with my chain of command resulted in my being dispatched as a combat artist attached to 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. This time I was a chief warrant officer, so getting access to plans and operations was relatively easy. I was able to identify with and engage with the enlisted Marines, and it was easy to talk with the officers. My approach to this deployment was different. I kept a journal, made sketches, and engaged in as many activities as possible. I wanted to feel what the Marines felt, and I wanted those feelings to come through the work I created. When I returned to Camp Pendleton, California, I found that my command’s offer to provide a little studio time was quickly overcome by more pressing matters. So the work I produced about Haiti was limited to what I could create after duty hours, when I got home from college, and before physical training the next morning.

I submitted for retirement from the Marine Corps in June 2001, and learned that my preretirement physical would serve as my deployment physical three months later in September 2001. The Corps’ leadership wanted to quickly dispatch a Marine Corps Combat Assessment Team (MCAT) to support Operation Enduring Freedom, and my name was on the roster for Afghanistan. Jack Dyer also wanted to send a combat artist and asked if I would be able to create anything for the collection. Luckily for us, then-Staff Sergeant Michael D. Fay was attached to the MCAT for the sole purpose of being a combat artist. Fay was able to focus entirely on living the Marine experience from which he created artwork. I primarily analyzed and evaluated processes to expedite support for the warfighters and sketched on rare occasion. When I returned from deployment, I eventually created a painting based on one of my experiences. Upon retirement from the Marines, I joined Dyer in curating the art collection at the Museums Branch.

After being associated with the program for 36 years, I see more value in the role of combat art. Although our society has become saturated with digital cameras and web-based media, combat art continues to play a role in our nation’s strategic communication. Art makes the Marine experience accessible to people who have no connection to, or perhaps interest in, the military. Art creates an opportunity for dialogue between disparate elements of the American public. It is broadly accepted that roughly 1 percent of the country’s citizens serve in the military. That means an overwhelming majority of Americans have no real connection to the men and women defending their freedom. Art has bridged and will continue to bridge that gap. Over the years, the art in our collection has been on public display in spaces as varied...
as the Rayburn House Office Building (U.S. House of Representatives), the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, and at college campuses and regional museums around the country. Artwork was one of the elements that the Commandant used to engage with more African American college students as the Corps pushed for greater diversity in the officer ranks. One of the artists whose work was used for outreach was Master Sergeant James Fairfax, himself an African American. Fairfax understood how poorly the first African American Marines had been treated, and he was able to help young college students understand that the Corps was trying hard to change and desperately needed some of them to serve as Marine officers. Fairfax's experience in and paintings of Vietnam helped to create a starting point for discussions. His work included images of combat and of more humanitarian endeavors, which made the Marines seem more human to the college students whose only personal perspective of the Corps was filtered by the overwhelmingly negative experience of the Montford Point Marines some 25 years earlier in North Carolina.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, we expected and experienced a few protestors. Forty years later, we experienced more protestors at the Farnsworth Art Museum in Rockland, Maine. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Fay's *Fire and Ice* exhibit opened to a number of protestors who collectively felt that the exhibit “glorified” war. Fay, dressed in his service uniform with ribbons and badges, went outside and welcomed them in. They walked through the exhibit and saw a number of psychological portraits of young people doing difficult things in austere environments. Within a couple of hours, all but one of the protestors had a changed perspective; they could support the warrior without having to support the war.

Artwork can distill an experience, leaving just the bare essence of what happened for subsequent generations to ponder and consider. A group of uniformed and civilian artists created an exhibit in 2011 titled *The Joe Bonham Project*, which focuses on wounded service-members. This exhibit contained more than 100 works by 17 artists, and it earned critical acclaim with audiences in Washington, DC, and in locales around the country and on the internet. The artists created visceral drawings and paintings from life while sitting in the hospital rooms of recovering wounded warriors. Each piece makes an incredible statement about the grit

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6 Sent to boot camp at Montford Point (now Camp Gilbert H. Johnson, Jacksonville, NC), the first African American Marines were segregated from all-white boot camps. They experienced significant racial prejudice from their fellow Marines and the local community surrounding Montford Point.
and resilience of the mostly young people who came home physically changed. Taken in its entirety, the exhibit can be emotionally overwhelming. Freedom has a high price, and the art makes that abundantly clear. The Joe Bonham Project has since been exhibited in multiple cities during the following years.7 Today, I am the deputy director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps. One of my recently assigned additional duties is to manage the Combat Art Program. In this capacity, I recruit, train, equip, and deploy artists. I am now the person who tells them, “Go to war; do art.” I am also faced with opportunities to make the program more reflective of the face of the Corps and to get the artwork in front of a broader range of audiences. Learning from the past, we are working to create an MOS for enlisted combat artists. Like the officer MOS, it will be a “free” MOS, which is tantamount to a skill designator that can be earned by any Marine. In retrospect, one of the strengths of the collection is that the works are produced by infantry, pilots, communicators, logisticians, engineers, and other MOSs. These various perspectives weave together to tell a more complete and objective story of the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force. During World War I, World War II, and Vietnam, the Services benefited from very talented artists who deployed as uniformed and civilian artists. Today, we are taking a hybrid approach and relying on both uniformed and civilian artists. Our recent artists include Chief Warrant Officer 2 Fay, Staff Sergeant Kristopher J. Battles, Colonel Craig H. Streeter, Sergeant Elize McKelvey, and civilians Victor Juhasz, Richard Johnson, John Deckert, and Jenna Chew. Collectively, these artists have experienced and documented more than a dozen operations for the Marine Corps, Navy, and the Canadian forces. Their work is represented in three national collections and has been featured in several major publications and exhibits. Additionally, the more experienced artists have been actively engaged in the recruitment, screening, and training of new artists. The more experienced artists lead and support artistic critiques and motivate the younger or newer artists to push themselves, develop their artistic skills, and hone their ability to see with creative minds.

After I retire from civil service, I will likely spend some time painting and sculpting other Marine

experiences. After his own retirement, Charles Waterhouse continued to paint and sculpt from his experiences at Iwo Jima and in Vietnam. In the 1990s, Richard Gibney created more than 50 paintings based on his time in the Pacific. Mike Gish has painted other images from his experiences in Vietnam, Somalia, and northern Iraq. These artist warriors reinforced my belief that art is not something you do, it is something you are.
Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps at the end of World War II and was called to active duty in 1946. Private Trainor attended recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. Later, he was selected for officer training under the Holloway Program (later Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps [NROTC]) and assigned to College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, as a midshipman Marine option. Upon graduation, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant and attended The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, until December 1951. He then joined the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) in Korea, where he served as an infantry platoon leader with Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

Returning from overseas, his next assignment was as assistant S3 (operations) with the 8th Marines, 2d Marine Division, followed by a tour of sea duty on USS Columbus (CA 74). He was promoted to captain and was detachment commander until 1955. He then served as a staff officer with Headquarters Marine Corps. Captain Trainor next served on exchange duty with the British Royal Marine Commandos, where he commanded Alpha Troop, 45 Commando, on the island of Malta. In 1959, he rejoined 1st MarDiv and served successively as a company commander in reconnaissance, antitank, and infantry battalions (3d Battalion, 5th Marines).

His Fleet Marine Force tour was followed by NROTC duty at the University of Colorado. Major Trainor then attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico in 1964. Upon graduation and before going to Vietnam, he attended a Special Forces course at the U.S. Army installation at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In Vietnam, he served in an unconventional warfare unit (special operations group...
The unit’s operations remained classified until publicly recognized in 2001 by award of a Presidential Unit Citation for heroism. Returning from Vietnam, Trainor taught at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College until 1969, at which time he attended the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. Upon graduation as a distinguished graduate and recipient of the Air University’s Anderson Memorial Award for politico-military thought, Lieutenant Colonel Trainor returned to Vietnam where he commanded 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and subsequently the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. He had the honor of returning the latter’s battalion colors to the United States and presented them before President Richard M. Nixon as part of 1st MarDiv’s homecoming parade in 1971.

He then reported to Headquarters Marine Corps as a joint plans officer and was promoted to colonel. In 1974, he was reassigned to New York City as director of the 1st Marine District, responsible for recruiting and reserve matters in the northeastern states. Selected for brigadier general in 1976, he reported to Parris Island as assistant depot commander, until ordered to Quantico in 1978 as director of the Marine Corps Education Center as a major general. In 1981, he assumed the duties of director of plans at Headquarters Marine Corps until his appointment to lieutenant general as deputy chief of staff for plans, policies, and Operations and Marine Corps deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1983. He retired from active duty on 30 June 1985.

Lieutenant General Trainor was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, two Legions of Merit, a Bronze Star, and two Navy Commendation Medals—all with combat “V”—as well as the Combat Action Ribbon, Presidential and Navy Unit Citations, three Vietnam Crosses of Gallantry with silver stars, and the Vietnamese Honor Medal (First Class). He earned the Navy-Marine parachute wings and held two campaign stars for Korea and four for Vietnam.


In 2001, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service for matters relating to Korea. Lieutenant General Trainor also held a master’s degree in history and did advanced study for a PhD while at the University of Colorado. In 2013, he received the American Veterans Center’s Goodpaster Prize for military thought and performance, and in 2017 he was honored by the establishment of the Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor USMC Veterans Fellowship by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

He lived with his wife Margaret “Peggy” Trainor in Potomac Falls, Virginia, with their four daughters. Lieutenant General Trainor passed away at his home on 2 June 2018 at age 89 due to cancer, according to his wife. Funeral services were held on 15 June 2018 in Sterling, Virginia, and Bernard E. Trainor will be interred at Arlington National Cemetery.
REVIEW ESSAY

Miles Kitts, PhD


Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win by Peter Krause is an intriguing and insightful book that studies why national independence movements succeed or fail in securing national independence.

Krause argues that the key determinant for success or failure is the number of groups within the broader movement as well as the relative strength between these groups. Krause calls his argument movement structure theory. Krause finds that one powerful group that dominates the entire movement is most likely to secure a nation’s independence, while a national movement that is divided among many weak groups is least likely to achieve this goal. Relative strength between groups is determined by the number of members belonging to the group, the group’s wealth, and the extent of popular support for the group.

A group’s position within the movement’s power structure determines that group’s behavior. The stronger the group the more likely it is to engage in risk-averse behavior to avoid jeopardizing its position, while the weaker the group the more likely it is to engage in risky behavior in an attempt to ascend the ladder of power within the movement. Krause discusses at length the various interactions between groups as being based on the strength and behavior of these groups.

Rebel Power does not clearly identify its subject of focus until late in the first chapter. At times, the writing becomes difficult to understand due to the complexity of the topic, particularly when describing the positions of groups within a movement’s power structure hierarchy. This may require readers to reread certain passages several times to understand the author’s message.

The case study chapters yield some interesting insights. The Palestine case study shows how a fractious national independence movement is its own worst enemy. The Israel case study’s most illuminating aspect is the little-known 1948 Altalena incident, when Jews fought each other while Arabs invaded their newly created State of Israel. The Algeria case study shows how a national independence movement can employ violence outside of its desired territory; this is shown in how the violence inside Algeria spilled over into the French metropole. The Ireland case study adds a depth of complexity to the theory by showing the possibility of subdividing movements; it does this by splitting the movement’s groups into being either Irish Nationalists or Republicans.

The concluding chapter reiterates the strengths of movement structure theory and then provides a list of issues for further research. Krause recommends that governments should decide whether to make enemies.
or friends of groups within national independence movements based upon each group’s strength and not its ideology.

Movement structure theory is basically a structuralist approach to the international balance of power between countries applied to groups within a national independence movement at the substate level. By relying on balance of power theory, movement structure theory inherits the weakness of its benefactor: how to measure a group’s strength. Though Rebel Power identifies a group’s strength as comprising a combination of the number of its members, its wealth, and the extent of its popular support, the book does not mention how strength is determined when groups vary in these factors. Is a group with many members but little wealth and popular support stronger than another group with fewer members but greater wealth and popular support? The book’s second limitation is that it does not elaborate on the rival theories to movement structure theory. Krause makes several references to movement structure theory being a better theory for explaining the behavior of national independence movements than other theories, but it does not specify or explain those other theories. These limitations could be overcome through further research.

All in all, Rebel Power is an insightful book that expands our understanding of national independence movements. This reviewer recommends it for academics; lay readers will probably find it rather unengaging.

Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat by Douglas Little looks at how the United States has approached relations with the Middle East during the Cold War and afterward. Little begins with a description of the American public’s hostility toward Islam and Muslims and includes background information about the history of the Islamic world. He then gives an account of U.S./Middle East policy during the Cold War. The Cold War chapter asserts that the main focus of this policy was to counter Soviet involvement in the region rather than directly address matters relating to the region’s Muslims. Little argues that keeping attention on the Soviets led the United States to misunderstand the interests and motives of the region’s Muslims, which resulted in problematic dealings.

The next four chapters are devoted to U.S./Middle East policy from the presidency of George H. W. Bush through that of Barack H. Obama, with each chapter focusing on each U.S. president’s Middle East policy. However, the chapter on Obama only covers his first term, with his second term being covered in the concluding chapter.

The argument Little makes is that throughout its history America has engaged in a competitive “us versus them” mentality toward a range of perceived “others,” and now the United States has turned such behavior toward Muslims.

In the concluding chapter, Little touches on how the Middle East’s Muslims also engage in their own us versus them behavior toward non-Muslims, but then quickly moves on to other matters.

By way of lessons learned, Little concludes that the Cold War shows that the best way to deal with radical Islam is to contain it while also being willing to reach out to radical Muslims to make peace deals. Furthermore, Little argues that the lessons of the Middle East since 1989 are that the United States has been too supportive of repressive governments within the region and that too many civilians have died from America’s use of force. Little asserts that America must turn away from its Islamophobic tendencies.

Us versus Them has its limitations. The first is that it presents a one-sided account of the unsympathetic dynamic between America and the Islamic world. By not looking at the Muslim side of the ledger, the book undermines its perspicacity on the subject.

Another limitation is that the historical narrative running throughout the book is largely unoriginal and at times questionable, as with its claim that President Ronald W. Reagan’s Cold War policies were ineffective until Mikhail Gorbachev essentially saved Reagan with Perestroika (economic and political restructuring) and Glasnost (open discussion of political and social issues).

The book’s most problematic part is its concluding chapter. In it, Little invokes the thinking
of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr as the basis for overcoming America’s adversarial mentality toward Muslims. However, Little does not acknowledge that the basis for Neibuhr’s own thinking is the us versus them worldview of good versus evil.

Apart from the issue of Little’s practical recommendations being implemented (i.e., how can nebulous, evasive transnational terrorist networks actually be contained?), there is the problem of the book’s narrow focus generating a narrow conclusion. Specifically, by looking only at how America views the Muslim world, Little inevitably reaches the conclusion that it is the United States that must change its views and actions. This is a simplistic conclusion, as the Islamic world plays a part in the interactive dynamic of intercommunal conflicts.

The greatest strength of *Us versus Them* is that it accounts America’s involvement in the American-Muslim conflict dynamic, and its greatest weakness is that it reinforces that dynamic by blaming America for generating the dynamic. This reviewer recommends reading this book along with others for a more balanced view on the subject.

Reading *Rebel Power* and *Us versus Them* in combination reveals to this reviewer that the United States will be fighting radical Muslims for a long time, and that strategies to combat them must be based on clear assessments of each radical Muslim group’s strength relative to each other.

• 1775 •
In *Remembering America: How We Have Told Our Past*, Lawrence R. Samuel provides a thoughtful and engaging analysis of the evolution of American history—as both an academic discipline and a subject of public interest—over the course of the twentieth century. In his opening paragraph, Samuel notes that “no cultural history of American history currently exists” and thereby sets the ambitious goal of filling this perceived void in the literature (p. 1). Though such scholars as Michael Kammen, David Thelen, and Roy Rosenzweig produced superlative histories that chronicle the cultural history and public memories of the American past, Samuel sets his study apart by focusing on the ways in which historical pedagogy in secondary education and at the collegiate level have adapted to trends and developments in both the academy and in public culture.

Samuel organizes his book into six chronological chapters, which begin in the 1920s, move through the end of the century, and reflect the various ways in which the story of the national past has been narrated and revised in accordance with social and political shifts in the United States. Throughout, Samuel is strongest in his examination of the intersection of American history and education, particularly the ways in which young Americans have learned about their nation’s past in high school and college classrooms. Educators in the early twentieth century asked which events and moral lessons should be taught to children as they debated whether the country’s youth could navigate historical complexities and contradictions. Discussions of whether to teach students that several of the Founding Fathers were slave owners, for example, revolved around a larger central question: Should educators protect the nation’s mythic narratives or strive to provide students with a more complete (albeit morally ambiguous) perspective of the national past?

In response to questions like these, Samuel skillfully summarizes and synthesizes the perspectives of professional historians in the academy with their counterparts in primary and secondary schools. Though attention is paid to familiar figures such as Charles A. Beard, Daniel J. Boorstin, and Howard Zinn, Samuel enlivens these conversations by introducing readers to lesser-known individuals. For instance, when describing the debate about how American military history should be taught, Samuel features the reflections of U.S. Army Captain Elbridge Colby and Colonel Oliver L. Spaulding Jr. As early as the 1920s, Samuel explains, Colby and Spaulding “argued that the beautification of our military history was doing more damage than good” by offering children a false or incomplete representation of the realities of modern warfare (p. 17). In this sense, *Remembering America* not only traces historiographical trends during the past 100 years, but it explains how these shifts were reflected in pedagogical
objectives and thus provides readers with a nuanced understanding of the discipline and its place in the American educational system.

In line with the book’s strong emphasis on education and pedagogy, Samuel observes that concerns about the “historical illiteracy” of adolescents and young adults existed throughout the twentieth century. Yet, as educators worried about how failings in civic instruction might affect the nation’s future, public interest in American history, as presented through popular culture, only increased. Though nostalgic representations of the past continued to captivate moviegoers, young Americans’ knowledge of pivotal historic events was alarmingly inadequate. In 1943, a survey conducted by the New York Times confirmed the suspicion that Americans were historically illiterate when it revealed that 25 percent of college freshmen could not recall who was president during the Civil War; an even larger percentage were unsure of who led the nation during World War I (p. 30). By describing how cultural changes related to war, the Depression, and foreign relations influenced the types of narratives—patriotic, progressive, critical, consensus—that dominated remembrance of the national past, Samuel effectively highlights the tension between public interest in, and actual knowledge of, American history.

Nevertheless, Samuel does not give equal consideration to pedagogy and popular culture, and at times, his examination of the latter fails to provide the same depth as the former. Discussions of popular culture gain strength as the book moves into the post–World War II era and explores the role of film, television, literature, and popular attractions like Disneyland’s Main Street U.S.A. and Frontierland in educating the American public. Even so, Samuel frequently offers examples of movies, books, or museum exhibits that would benefit from additional context. For example, when discussing the contentious political climate of the 1990s, Samuel rightly asserts that “the acrimonious row over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution . . . was emblematic of the decade’s culture wars” (p. 128). Yet, for those unfamiliar with said exhibit and controversy, a few sentences describing the nature of the dispute at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, along with the perspectives of those involved, would go a long way in illustrating his larger point about the politics of narrating the American past.

In the final chapters and conclusion, Samuel moves beyond the geographic borders of the United States to explore the globalization of American history. Whereas the latter half of the twentieth century saw educators attempting to incorporate histories of previously marginalized populations into the dominant narrative of the American past, Samuel explains that today, historians are working to further expand the subject by positioning it in a global context. Samuel offers a compelling conclusion as he urges historians to embrace new pedagogical methods that enliven the discipline and emphasize its contemporary relevance instead of sending “the message to students that it is dead and irrelevant” (p. 170). In our current era, in which diverse and divisive perspectives fight for top billing on the evening news, Remembering America reminds us of the necessity of understanding not only “how we have told our past” but how we have taught it.
The title of the book *The Case for Auschwitz* raises eyebrows, but the contributions of Robert Jan van Pelt’s work are important, not only for the field of Holocaust studies but for the field of historiography and its role in humanity.

*The Case for Auschwitz* is derived from a libel suit that David Irving, a well-known Holocaust denier, launched against Deborah Lipstadt in the United Kingdom. Lipstadt labeled Irving for what he was and still is: a denier of the Holocaust as historical fact. Irving took great offense to this characterization and brought the court case against Lipstadt. In the United Kingdom, the burden of proof in libel cases rests with the defendant, which meant that Lipstadt and her team had to prove that Irving was a Holocaust denier and by extension that the Holocaust happened.

*The Case for Auschwitz* speaks predominantly of the evidence for the Holocaust but also casts the Holocaust in other historiographical and even spiritual terms. In Judaism, there is a special place for grandparents and grandchildren that signifies life. In the Nazi extermination camps, it was the old people and children who were always chosen to be murdered and separated from the few who were allowed to live. The camps were much more than extermination camps—they were places of annihilation, where survivors were few and the numbers of murdered prevailed.

The Holocaust continued long after it became apparent that Germany had lost the war, leading one to the conclusion that the war was not Germany’s primary objective but rather a means to an end for the killing of Jews. The trains kept coming, and when the Russians approached, the Germans moved the inmates westward on death marches.

The Auschwitz extermination camp represents the moral and spiritual epicenter of the most violent crime ever perpetuated against the Jewish people. More Jews were murdered at Auschwitz than any other place in human history. It is the battleship, the end of the line, and the foundation of Holocaust literature and litigation. To prove the Holocaust, one must prove Auschwitz—to be “for” it.

In *The Case for Auschwitz*, Robert Jan van Pelt does just that. Van Pelt is an architectural historian, a field not often thought of in terms of Holocaust historiography. Yet, it was this very background that van Pelt used as an expert witness in the Irving trial to systematically destroy Irving’s arguments that Auschwitz was never a factory of death.

Using his background as an architectural historian, van Pelt’s discussions about chimneys, gas chambers, construction plans, and other related matters destroy the latest arguments of Holocaust deniers and prove they have no basis in fact.

It is a shame that he had to do so, for as van Pelt points out, there is a plethora of other evidence that Auschwitz was an extermination camp. There were witnesses to the gassings who escaped, gas chambers and gas discovered at a similarly large camp, contractor documents, drawings by inmates (that later matched archeological digs and witness testimony), extensive cyanide residue in the gas chamber ventilator covers, orders of Zyklon B gas, the accounts of Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzlar who escaped from Auschwitz in April 1944, the 1945 Polish forensic investigation, and confessions by perpetrators such as Rudolf Hoss who

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*Lawrence Provost*

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2 Larry Provost served in Iraq and Afghanistan in the U.S. Army. He is currently pursuing a master of legislative affairs degree at George Washington University.
served as commandant of Auschwitz. All of this evidence was shared at the Irving trial. In fact, Irving once acknowledged the Holocaust as a historical fact.

The Case for Auschwitz is a hard read—not because of van Pelt's prose but because any argument about Auschwitz is not possible without wrangling through debates of how many people could be killed per hour, per day, per month, etc. The reader can become numb reading about the monstrosity of the Nazis' crimes, which is perhaps a response the Third Reich counted on. Van Pelt senses this almost two-thirds through the book and, immediately before a page that discusses the mathematics of total number of Jews killed at Auschwitz, inserts a picture of Jewish women and children disembarking from an Auschwitz train. Van Pelt wrote under the picture, “When considering the numbers mentioned on the opposite page, it is good to remember that they concern people who were murdered because they were considered mere figures.”

The Case for Auschwitz also shows the sickening arguments of Holocaust deniers; for example, Irving's defenders compared the execution of inmates in the United States in a prison gas chamber with the gassing of Jews. The Holocaust deniers have said that the level of gas residue left does not match what would correspond to normal standards. As van Pelt points out, it is rather important to remember that the Nazis did not adhere to U.S. public health standards of the gassing of a single prison inmate in a controlled environment when they executed hundreds of men, women, and children in the gas chambers of Auschwitz.

In the end, Lipstadt was found not guilty and Irving was found to have willingly engaged in Holocaust denial by not conducting proper research and trusting unverifiable sources as well as ignoring a plethora of evidence for the existence of Auschwitz and its use as an extermination camp.

While reviewing The Case for Auschwitz, this author traveled to Europe to include Berchtesgaden, Nuremberg, and Dachau. A chance to visit Auschwitz did not present itself, but the totality of what the Nazis did to the Jewish people was impressed upon me based on these visits while reading The Case for Auschwitz.

The Case for Auschwitz is a very important and well-written book. Though the text flows seamlessly from one chapter to the next, and van Pelt presents often-complex material in an easy-to-understand format, The Case for Auschwitz is emotionally difficult reading. There is nothing pleasurable about reading this book. Finishing it may be the only relief the reader finds. However, The Case for Auschwitz is more than an ordinary history. It serves a public purpose by providing a text that is meticulously researched and documented with extensive footnotes.

The meaning and purpose of history is very important to van Pelt. He realizes the historian is objective and that objectivity means recognizing good and evil. He writes “that interpretations of history that ignore evil were doomed to remain shallow and ultimately meaningless” (p. 67). While historians are not scientists and deal with imperfection in accounts (much like police do with even the best of witnesses), being a historian does not preclude a historian from judgment. Regarding Auschwitz, a convergence of many pieces of evidence from a variety of sources prove that the Holocaust happened, even if the Hoss confession is taken away.

The Case for Auschwitz will serve, for decades to come, as an important text in the study of the Holocaust as well as the meaning and role of the historian.
In mid-December 1950, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, Major General Oliver P. Smith, wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton Cates, about his division’s recent operations near the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir. After recounting the herculean efforts and heroic actions of his Marines, he closed the letter with the following three sentences: “The officers and men were magnificent. They came down the mountains bearded, foot-sore, and physically exhausted, but their spirits were high. They were still a fighting division.” A veteran of some of the worst fighting in World War II, General Smith possessed an understated and subdued personality. It is difficult to imagine him capable of articulating a more heartfelt tribute to his division. In a similar vein, modern authors and historians have difficulty capturing the enormity of the division’s accomplishments during its six-week-long campaign in North Korea. The intensity of the battles, each more severe than the one preceding, was such that they demand center stage in most accounts. However, the tactical focus often robs the campaign of its strategic significance in the larger Cold War, and to the Marine Corps’ survival as a separate Service. A recent addition to the literature of the campaign, Thomas McKelvey Cleaver’s The Frozen Chosen: The 1st Marine Division and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, attempts to weave the tactical and strategic together into a single story and illuminate the tactical impacts of strategic incompetence.

Cleaver comes to this task through personal experience; as a child, he met a distant cousin who had just returned from the Chosin campaign. This youthful brush with a veteran of the battle inspired a lifelong interest in the Korean War and inspired him to connect with many veterans of the campaign. His personal interviews with veterans offer a fresh narrative thread, a viewpoint becoming more rare as Korean War veterans fade into history. Cleaver combines his interviews with extensive use of secondary sources, making The Frozen Chosen an engaging and thought-provoking account of a critical era in twentieth-century history, albeit an account that contains little new research or analysis.

Placing the Korean War in context requires understanding the global challenges faced by the United States after the Second World War. By 1946, the United States and its allies recognized that the Soviet Union intended to check the spread of Western-style democracy, and where possible, advance a Soviet ideological agenda. In response, the United States developed a strategy to contain Soviet advances. Effective containment meant the democracies of the West must answer Soviet challenges everywhere they occurred, resisting Soviet efforts through political or economic means, and in rare circumstances via military operations. Containment did not mean the rollback of the Soviets from ground already gained; rather, it meant the prevention of any further loss of nations to Soviet control. Implementation of this strategy required the United States to keep a credible level of both nuclear weapons and conventional military power. Nuclear weapons created an umbrella that placed both the western and eastern blocs under an existential threat,
but under that umbrella localized conflict raged as the Soviets sought to exploit the vulnerability of post-war Europe and the end of colonialism. Civil wars in Greece and China as well as the French Indochina War became early flash points to test the resolve of the West. U.S. leaders in Washington accepted the idea of containment in principle, but domestic political reality did not support the strategy and left the U.S. military ill-prepared to respond to this new era of global security challenges.

World War II left the U.S. government in debt and the public exhausted by war and sacrifice. For various reasons, President Harry S. Truman found common ground across the political spectrum for his policy of demobilization of the conventional military. The U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy saw significant reductions in budgets, troop strength, and equipment. Only nuclear weapons research and aircraft development received any substantial postwar investment. This mismatch of strategic ways and means left the United States in an untenable position of having nuclear superiority but having limited means to address military problems occurring below the threshold of nuclear war. Cleaver explains the problem well, drawing a connection between strategic and budgetary decisions made in Washington and the general unpreparedness of the land force for a major theater war.

The story of American unpreparedness is even more compelling when told from the viewpoint of the Marine Corps. In 1950, the Service was a shadow of the six-division, 500,000-member force that broke the back of Imperial Japan just five years before. During this period, the Marine Corps fought bureaucratic battles in the Service unification struggles that followed victory and survived as an independent military branch only through the intervention of Congress. Even with congressional backing, on the day the North Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, there were less than 75,000 active duty Marines. The Marines who remained possessed World War II-era weapons and equipment and their units were staffed at peacetime strengths, relying on reserve augmentation to reach full strength. Marine amphibious doctrine developed during the war was still the basis of its training and structure as was the Service's commitment to air-ground integration and combined arms. Nonetheless, when the war started, the successful deployment of the 1st Marine Division required aggregation of units, rapid mobilization of the reserve, and reliance on an existing cadre of combat-experienced leaders. This cobbled-together force turned the tide in Korea, and through a series of dramatic battles, culminating in the landings at Inchon and the seizure of Seoul, opened the door for United Nations (UN) forces to take the offensive into the North.

After the initial North Korean attack, UN forces in Korea were pushed south to the Pusan Perimeter. At several points, it looked as if the UN troops might have to evacuate the peninsula to avoid capture by the advancing North Korean troops. One reason this did not occur was the rapid buildup and effective employment of carrier and shore-based aviation assets. Cleaver's background as a pilot and aviation writer comes through clearly as his narrative demonstrates the deadly effectiveness of close air support and interdiction. The British and American carriers proved their worth in the summer of 1950, and their aircraft, along with Japan-based planes of the U.S. Air Force, dropped tons of bombs on targets throughout Korea, preventing the North Koreans from completing their planned seizure of the south.

Throughout the book, Cleaver returns to strategic issues as he unfolds the tactical situation. He describes the command dynamic between President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the UN commander, Army General Douglas MacArthur. He takes on the relationship between MacArthur and his subordinates, including Major General Edward M. Almond, who commanded X Corps, to which the 1st Marine Division belonged. In war, personalities matter, and Cleaver's narrative provides a strong description of how this dynamic shaped tactical decision making among senior commanders. These dysfunctional relationships and personal biases played a key role in the decision to move UN forces deeper into North Korea, despite the overwhelming evidence that doing so might trigger Chinese intervention.

The Frozen Chosen is, at its core, a chronicle of
Marines at war. Cleaver does not disappoint in his description of close-in fighting and the conditions faced by the combatants. He includes aspects of the Chinese experience to illustrate the size of the battle, its ferocity, and the magnitude of suffering on both sides. In a manner similar to earlier works on the campaign, he focuses on Captain William E. Barber’s Fox Company (Company F), 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and their struggle to hold Fox Hill, the high ground in the Toktong Pass. The pass became the choke point along the main supply route between Yudam-ni and Hagarurip. Both the 5th Marines and 7th Marines needed to transit the pass to unite with the rest of the division at Hagaruri. Cleaver leavens his descriptions of the battles to hold Fox Hill and break out from Yudam-ni with individual veterans’ stories. The combination of these stories with a more traditional recounting of combat actions creates an effective description of the division’s fight on the reservoir.

Cleaver incorporates the story of the Army’s Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT 31, often referred to as Task Force Faith) into his account of the campaign. The chain of events that left this regiment isolated on the east side of the reservoir is worthy of close study by every military officer. This tragic episode has essential lessons on command and control, combat leadership, and training. Facing overwhelming numbers and without effective communications, RCT 31 fought and delayed two Chinese divisions east of Chosin. Cleaver’s recounting of this incident leaves no doubt that the successful withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division owed much to the valor and sacrifice of these soldiers.

The Frozen Chosen is an overview; it whets the reader’s appetite for more information and analysis but moves on without quenching the provoked hunger. Minor style issues appear, including the naming convention of Marine organizations. Cleaver misses a minor detail about the life of Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, who commanded the Army’s 82d Airborne Division in World War II, not the 101st. Although this error in the life of a key leader is significant, it does not detract from the narrative.

Students of the Korean War or Marine Corps history will find few surprises in this book. Those new to the era and its events will find it an excellent starting point for further research and study. Readers should view The Frozen Chosen as an introduction to a fascinating era of American military history and a haunting reminder of the costs of unpreparedness.
Since the start of the Cold War, many American historians have told the story of that four-decade-long struggle as a bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with only passing or occasional mention of any of the other countries in or affected by the conflict. Moreover, far too many American researchers still use almost exclusively American sources—State Department cables, newspaper accounts, institutional and governmental records, and oral interviews with American policy makers—that afforded ample insight into American decision making but offer very little on Russian and Chinese motivations and actions. And unsurprisingly, because American scholars have worked primarily from their own records, they have found that just about everything, even Soviet-Chinese competition in Africa, seemed to be a response to things happening in their own society. They were, to paraphrase Carly Simon, so vain that they thought every war was about them, even the ones that the United States was totally uninvolved in.

Jeremy Friedman’s *Shadow Cold War* moves us far beyond that myopic approach and offers a fresh perspective that understands the Cold War for what it was—a truly global conflict. With research from more than a dozen archives in 10 countries, Friedman’s account of the Sino-Soviet competition for influence across Asia and Africa covers the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s with perspectives from the Soviets, the Chinese, and the developing countries each was trying to shape. Friedman shows us that, for all the talk of a worldwide threat from a hierarchically controlled Communist monolith (a common refrain from the political right in Cold War America), there were real and persistent ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union—divisions that almost propel the two countries into a full-scale war in 1969.

Much has been written on the Sino-Soviet split in the past: What caused it? When did it start? How serious was it and when did it become so? Friedman’s greatest contribution to the literature is not so much to settle those questions but to test out a new hypothesis on how Sino-Soviet competition affected aid, development, and foreign policy in the Third World. He posits that China and the Soviet Union had widely divergent ideologies about the purpose and goals of world Communism—differences that could have been put aside but were not. The Soviets, already invested in the global order through their UN Security Council membership and victory in World War II, were the more pragmatic and moderate at the outset. The Chinese, occupied and humiliated by imperial powers for much of the earlier century and unacknowledged by the UN until 1971, were more militant and uncompromising. As a result, the Soviets found themselves under constant criticism from their Chinese Communist brethren for being too accommodating and, in words that were probably uttered daily by Chairman Mao Zedong about any number of groups both inside and outside of China, “insufficiently revolutionary.”

The Chinese had the luxury of militancy; the Soviet Union did not. As the only Communist nuclear power in the early Cold War, it needed to keep Eastern European Communist parties in political alignment, stave off nuclear war with the West, and repair...
the damage of Stalinist excesses at home—all priorities that put interventions in the decolonizing world on their grand strategic back burner. Under the constant pressure from the Chinese, the Soviet Union responded by tacking to the left and toward extremism, appropriating some of China's more militant positions and eventually providing direct, extensive, and expensive military aid to insurgencies in Africa and Asia. This helped the Soviet Union win the competition over influence with China, but in Friedman's words, it was “a Pyrrhic victory” that threatened to destabilize détente with the West and saddled the Soviet Union with expensive aid and support programs it could not afford (p. 218). China, on the other hand, fared better in the long run. Its foreign policy may have collapsed in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, but ceding the mantle of Communist leadership to the Soviets helped it avoid the financial and military overcommitments that ruined the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

For Friedman, the reasons for the Communist powers' radically different worldviews stemmed from each nation's history and those histories led to interpretations of Marxism that drove—or at a minimum, shaped—policy. For the Russians, imperialists in their own right until World War I, the primary objective of foreign policy was always anticapitalism: hastening to the arrival of worldwide socialism by convincing governments to seize control of the means of production and advance through the stages of noncapitalist development. For China, a victim of imperialism throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the principal goal was not anticapitalism but anti-imperialism, which naturally led them to support decolonizing movements in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the rest of the Third World.

These differences put the two Communist partners on a collision course. Even in the early and still cooperative years of the 1950s, the Soviets focused mostly on the economic preconditions for Communist government and hawked the pseudoscience of Karl Marx's historical materialism. The Chinese focused on more aggressive responses to the West, supported anticolonial governments, and took actions that would strengthen the Chinese state even when they bore no relation to Marx's vision of a coming end of history. For Friedman, these ideological differences were much more than political rhetoric or propaganda; they formed foreign policy frames that filtered options and shaped programs on the ground.

This book is adapted from Friedman's doctoral dissertation at Princeton University, and as such it is well documented with a truly impressive source base. Dissertations typically draw their evidence from four to five archives in one country; at better-funded research universities, occasionally, a student may find funding to visit one or two foreign archives. The research for Shadow Cold War is in another league altogether. Friedman visited archives in 10 countries, including Russia, China, Portugal, South Africa, Mozambique, Serbia, Romania, Chile, and others. Some of these archives are no longer open, which makes the book even more valuable as a window into a still-tightly guarded area of Cold War history and memory.

The book also makes good on a promise that has become fashionable in Cold War history but is rarely accomplished well: “globalizing” the Cold War by shifting attention away from the bipolar confrontation between the United States and Russia and exploring the broader effects of the superpowers' competition over models of government in the decolonizing world. Friedman's narrative is sometimes dizzying; in any given chapter, he is just as likely to narrate actions in Indonesia, Ghana, Vietnam, and Algeria as he is to explain the details of Russian and Chinese negotiating positions, all with occasionally hasty transitions, but that can be forgiven as a necessary choice in an extremely ambitious and impressive first book. This work is recommended for university libraries, scholars of decolonization, and Cold War history scholars.
In *Blinking Red*, Michael Allen carefully navigates the waters of government bureaucracy to unravel the intricacies of changes in the intelligence community after the tragic attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Allen states, “The aim of the book is to be the definitive history of this chapter of the tremendous change in our government after September 11, 2001” (p. xvi). The author seeks to evaluate “whether the intelligence failures on 9/11 and in Iraq have been addressed” (p. xi). To accomplish this, he studied the bill responsible for the creation of the director of national intelligence position and the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center, focusing on determining how the “national-security enterprise fully operates today” (p. xi). From an insider’s perspective, Allen takes the reader on a journey through the complex process of changing the Intelligence Community. This book will benefit any Marine who is interested in better understanding the process of legislative change.

Michael Allen served as the legislative affairs officer for the Homeland Security Council in the White House in 2004. While in this position, Allen observed the White House’s response to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9-11 Commission) and was a key participant in the follow-on actions, gaining firsthand knowledge of the process. Leveraging his own experiences and memories, as well as consulting with other members of the proceedings and numerous White House and congressional documents, Allen provides unique insights into the complexities of enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Allen writes, “I have tried to paint a portrait of the personalities and pressures that impact legislation, while also seeking to illuminate aspects of the legislative process that are typically unseen, particularly the machinations of the congressional leadership and the role of the White House in influencing legislative outcomes” (p. xvi).

Allen’s detailed approach to providing this history is commendable but also somewhat confusing at times. This book requires a fundamental understanding of how the government enacts legislation, specifically the roles of the executive and legislative branches. The use of names throughout the book make it a bit difficult to follow, but the author provides a detailed index and list of references that makes it more easily navigable. Despite this one minor difficulty, anyone who reads the book will benefit from a more thorough understanding of the changes derived from the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.

For Marines seeking to better understand the post–9/11 changes implemented in the intelligence enterprise, this book provides a detailed picture of the difficulties encountered by policy makers. It focuses on the 9-11 Commission’s proposal to create a new leader for the Intelligence Community, specifically a director of national intelligence, and to establish a National Counterterrorism Center. Prior to 9/11, the senior leader of the Intelligence Community was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. While this sounds like a fairly simple change to an organizational chart, there were quite a few hurdles that policy makers had to overcome, specifically those posed by Congressman Duncan D. Hunter (R–CA) and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R–WI). Allen details the personality conflicts that do not typically appear in news articles on this topic, providing the
reader with a clearer understanding of the challenges faced by those who advocated drastic changes to the intelligence community.

In *Blinking Red*, Allen manages to take the reader into the private rooms where senators, congressmen, and countless congressional staffers debated and negotiated their way to an intelligence bill. Allen's insight into how President George W. Bush intervened with congressional leaders when necessary gives the reader an understanding of the significant efforts behind the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. He clearly articulates the challenges coming from both the Democratic and Republican sides, as well as the compromises that occurred to get the bill successfully through the House of Representatives. Marines who read this book will gain a new perspective and understanding of why changes at this level seem cumbersome and slow at times.

While the author focuses on the strategic level of government, Marine Corps readers will gain an appreciation for the level of difficulty and effort that goes into enacting policy changes. While the process may seem simple from the outside perspective, Allen's book builds the reader's understanding of the associated complexities. With the specific focus on Congressman Hunter, a former U.S. Marine, and his endeavors to ensure the bill's language facilitated continuous intelligence support to the Department of Defense, *Blinking Red* sheds light on how former servicemembers now serving in the legislative branch can advocate for the U.S. military's interests.

The events of 9/11 drove changes to the construct of the Intelligence Community. While readers may still debate whether those changes were beneficial to the community, Allen provides his readers an opportunity to better understand the process of how those changes came to fruition. His perspectives on this significant legislative action will help Marines better understand those changes and what our policy makers were thinking after 9/11.
On 2 August 1943, in the early morning darkness of the Blackett Strait in the Solomon Islands, the Imperial Japanese destroyer *Amagiri* suddenly loomed into view and ran through the American patrol torpedo boat 109 (PT 109), commanded by U.S. Navy Lieutenant (junior grade) John F. Kennedy. As the Japanese cruised to a safe port, Kennedy and 10 of his surviving crew collected themselves and managed to reach small uninhabited islands. For seven days, the survivors of PT 109 evaded nearby Japanese forces and strove to establish communication with friendly forces. Kennedy and his men were ultimately rescued with the aid of an Australian Coastwatcher, Solomon Island natives, and fellow PT boat comrades. Author William Doyle’s book contends that the loss of PT 109 and the ordeal of survival and rescue “made John F. Kennedy—both the man and the myth,” and forever shaped the future president’s view of the world and himself (p. xii).

The book is organized into 14 chapters, 9 of which center on Kennedy’s service in the Solomons from April to December 1943. The initial two chapters provide a brief introductory overview of Kennedy’s youth prior to the war, the use of his father’s influence to obtain assignment to PT boats, his training as a PT officer, and deployment overseas. The latter chapters focus on author John Hersey’s magazine article about PT 109’s story to a national audience in 1944 and how this complemented his father’s influence to boost the younger Kennedy’s political career. The later chapters provide interesting vignettes about a 1951 trip to Asia and efforts to locate Kohei Hanami, the commander of the destroyer *Amagiri*, and Hanami’s correspondence and friendship with Kennedy. The final chapter and epilogue examine the 1960 presidential campaign through the lens of PT 109’s story, the Kennedy family connection with postwar Japan, and the legacy of PT 109 in the decades after the president’s assassination. Three succinct appendices at the end of the book reproduce a lost 1946 narrative of the incident by Kennedy, letters exchanged between Kennedy and Hanami, and Kennedy’s 1957 writings about his memories of the two islanders who helped rescue the young officer and his men. Illustrations are placed throughout the manuscript to complement the text and three nicely illustrated maps placed after the introduction outline the Battle of Blackett Strait, the loss of PT 109, the movement of the survivors, and their subsequent rescue.

Doyle’s account flows along at a crisp, even pace, and his chronological organization of events allows readers to orient themselves with the subject matter. Doyle’s control of technical detail and broader context of the Pacific War enables readers with only a passing knowledge of the war and of Kennedy to comprehend and digest the text. Doyle, currently a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Eastern Finland, began his career in the business world, first with marketing firm J. Walter Thompson and later as director of original programming and executive producer at HBO. He is author or coauthor of several *New York Times* best sellers, notably *American Gun* (2013), coauthored with Chris Kyle, *A Soldier’s Dream* (2011), and *An American Insurrection* (2001). In *PT 109*, the subject matter is personal, with Doyle acknowledging how “I grew up in the America that was shaped by John F. Kennedy,” (p. xiv) and how his mother served in the 1960 Kennedy
presidential campaign office. In his writing, Doyle makes efforts to retain objectivity with his main subject, although the writing and presentation invariably leads a reader to be pulled into the Kennedy charm and mystique. While not a hagiography, there is certainly a strong undercurrent of affection for Kennedy.

Neither the argument nor subject matter are new ground for historical examination. Kennedy and PT 109 are both subjects of numerous other books, articles, and even a 1963 film featuring actor Cliff Robertson as the future president. Doyle draws his material from the previous efforts to document the man and machine, notably Robert J. Donovan’s *PT 109: John F. Kennedy in World War II* (1961); Joan Blair and Clay Blair Jr.’s *The Search for JFK* (1976); John Hersey’s 17 June 1944 article in the *New Yorker*, “A Reporter at Large: Survival”; and Nigel Hamilton’s 1992 biography, *JFK: Reckless Youth*. The author conducted archival research at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston and at archives in Japan, Australia, and the Solomon Islands. Doyle apparently did not research at Naval History and Heritage Command or the National Archives, the former possessing rather extensive records on PT 109. He did not make an exhaustive review of all available sources, which would have generated a deeper analysis, and certainly other books are available that take this approach, notably John J. Domagalski’s account of PT 109 and its three commanding officers, *Into the Dark Water* (2014). Doyle interviewed 16 contemporaries of Kennedy regarding PT boats, Kennedy, and his naval service. There are no specific citations used in the chapters, but there are chapter endnotes referencing cited material and delving deeper into particular questions or details. Scholars desiring a bibliography will be disappointed and have to contend with searching the chapter endnotes, written at times as an annotated bibliography, to locate individual sources. A review of Doyle’s endnotes and sources demonstrates the author examined the primary works on the subject matter together with period secondary publications.

Although the thesis and subject matter are not new, Doyle has done due diligence with his source material. Regarding previous scholarship, Doyle’s account is in essence a post-revisionist analysis. His research offers a few new details from Kennedy’s own hand and uses these and other scholarship to guide his analysis and conclusions. The analysis strikes a balance between previous examinations regarding Kennedy’s actions immediately prior to and following the loss of his boat and the subsequent survival of Kennedy and his crew. Doyle seeks a middle ground and ostensibly places the collision as “probably a one-in-a million, fluke event that Kennedy had no way to defend against in time,” adding, “a different PT boat skipper with more combat experience might have operated that night in a way that avoided the collision” (p. 295). Although this analysis might disrupt Doyle’s well-written narrative, it is frustrating to find the author’s conclusions on Kennedy’s actions hidden among chapter endnotes.

With crisp writing and a journalistic, narrative style, Doyle’s balanced work reintroduces—and perhaps inspires—new generations of Americans to an example of how the cauldron of war can shape the future individual and collective destinies. The author achieves his objectives in this regard, and the book will be an enjoyable read for anyone unacquainted with this formative period in the future president’s life.
The history of the U.S. Marine Corps is framed by those who served, fought in the Corps’ illustrious battles, or simply fulfilled a calling to support their country. Their stories make up the history—a history that flourishes when another Marine’s story is revealed. Often it is coincidence that affords an opportunity to add to the legacy of the Marine Corps with the tale of another Marine’s service. It was coincidence, an inquisitive nature, and personal initiative, combined with a penchant for maintaining records, that brings the tale of an individual Marine, serving in some of America’s most turbulent times, to the fore in We Were Going to Win, or Die There: With the Marines at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan. This is the story of retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Roy H. Elrod, raised on a small farm near Muleshoe, Texas, who caught the attention of the head of the Marine Corps’ oral history program, retired Marine Major Fred H. Allison, who also grew up in Muleshoe.

Allison joined the Corps and later earned his PhD in military history from Texas Tech University in Lubbock. He had never heard of Elrod, but a family member in Muleshoe mentioned the World War II veteran, who was living in Fredericksburg, Virginia, Allison’s home at the time. That’s when initiative kicked in. Allison met Elrod, finding a proud Marine who kept meticulous records and a detailed, accurate recollection of his life and time in the Corps, beginning prior to World War II. For an oral historian, Roy Elrod was a true gift. There followed hours of recorded and transcribed interviews, and although Elrod has now passed on, his impressive legacy lives through Allison’s efforts and the University of North Texas Press.

For the Marine veteran or anyone interested in life as an enlisted Marine in the pre–World War II Marine Corps, this book is a boon. Elrod’s experiences, from recruiting to recruit training, military occupational specialty assignment, follow-on training, and deployment to the Pacific area as one of the very first Marines sent overseas in the war provide a fantastic education of enduring value—a ready reference for a Marine’s personal library. Elrod’s recollections of combat in three of the bloodiest battles of World War II add significant value.

Growing up in the Great Depression era, Elrod focused on personal improvement, leaving the family farm to attend Texas A&M University in College Station. Like most young men of the time, paying for a university education posed significant hardship. With war looming, Elrod left school after one year, shipping off to recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego in September 1940 (prior to the base name being changed to Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego). In the opening chapters, Elrod describes the enlisted promotion examination system, pay, daily life in the barracks, and training, including a one-day, 50-mile platoon hike and a 180-mile regimental training hike. He also details the Marine Corps’ rapid wartime expansion and his deployment to American Samoa as a 37mm antitank gun section leader in the 8th Marines, 2d Marine Brigade, and his unit’s being sent to rein-

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6 Col Ford is a former editor of Leatherneck magazine and publisher for the Marine Corps Association. He authored three Marine Corps History magazine articles on the Marine Corps Reserve in World War I and a pamphlet on the Marines in the September 1918 Battle of Saint-Mihiel, one of the pamphlets in the forthcoming Marine Corps History Division’s Marines in World War I centennial series.
force the exhausted 1st Marine Division in the Battle of Guadalcanal.

On Guadalcanal, Elrod's antitank unit often fought as infantry, fending off fanatical attacks by a well-trained Japanese enemy heretofore undefeated. His descriptions of living and fighting amid the jungle rot, malaria, and dysentery, all while on near-starvation rations and with ragged uniforms and overused equipment, bring home the intensity of the fighting; his recollections point to just how close the battle came to being lost. On Guadalcanal in January 1943, Elrod led his men in driving back a Japanese attack, for which he would later be awarded a Silver Star.

Guadalcanal was followed by rest and refit in New Zealand, which Elrod describes in some detail. His story then moves to the battle for Betio, Tarawa Atoll, which he describes as “hell realized” (p. 159). By this time, Elrod was experienced with embarking, unloading, and employing his 37mm antitank gun in amphibious operations. His expertise paid dividends at Tarawa, where his was the sole 37mm gun to get into action, crossing the barrier reefs and coconut tree-log seawall. He rigged ropes, slings, and harnesses, and his Marines pulled the guns while others pushed through mid-chest to thigh-deep water to get his gun over the seawall and into action. Elrod notes that enemy fire was so intense on Tarawa that if you stood, you were hit, so attacking or even moving wounded was a real challenge. Hard decisions were made, as operating the gun was the critical mission. He tells that he knew they were winning when more Japanese bodies littered the ground than Marines.

After Tarawa, Elrod relates the recovery, rebuilding, and training in Hawaii and then the June 1944 attack against the Japanese on Saipan. Now a captain, Elrod commanded a halftrack platoon in this combat operation (his third). Logistics worked at Saipan better than in his previous amphibious operations; food, water, ammunition, and repair parts were more readily available. For the first time, as he describes, civilians on the battlefield impacted tactics—the Chamorro people caught between two deadly armies. His luck ran out on Saipan; Japanese artillery fire near the end of the battle caused his medical evacuation to Hawaii and then San Diego.

An experienced historian, Allison scrupulously screened Elrod's recollections, using his knowledge and official records to ensure accuracy. Each of Elrod's chapters are prefaced with historical insights into the coming story, and detailed endnotes at the close of each chapter provide the reader more opportunities for learning. Allison surrounds Elrod's chapters with the detailed history of the time, giving the reader an even greater appreciation for Elrod's contributions to Corps and country and his deeds of valor.

Elrod served with distinction as a private, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, and captain in combat, all in the same unit: Weapons Platoon, 8th Marines. His detailed recollections of the varied responsibilities and experiences as he rose through the ranks provide invaluable insight into life as a combat Marine. Equally important, oral historian Allison does a superb job of placing all the action in perspective with a fast-paced, concise, and easily read history of each of the battles marking Elrod's service.

Elrod retired from active duty in 1961 and passed away at his home in December 2016 before he could see his story in print. But Allison's exceptional work ensures Elrod's sacrifices and experiences as a Marine will be remembered.
Readers interested in studying strategy are advised to read Andrew Buchanan’s *American Grand Strategy*. Buchanan, a history lecturer at the University of Vermont, advances a convincing reinterpretation of American involvement in the Mediterranean theater during World War II. As Buchanan notes in a thorough historiographical survey, most historians treat American involvement in the Mediterranean as coerced and unwilling. Well-documented objections raised by key American military leaders, such as Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, are used to support this assertion. United States participation, so the conventional story goes, was largely due to the politically astute manipulation of British prime minister Winston Churchill.

Buchanan challenges that simplistic notion, arguing instead for a broad reinterpretation based on all the elements of national power, not just military strategy. Buchanan unpacks his thesis in the opening chapter, arguing that the Americans willingly adopted a broader approach based on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “grand strategic notions” (p. 9). He notes that Roosevelt’s pragmatic and opportunistic blending of the efforts of all instruments of national power is obscured or downplayed in prior historiography; in part, as Buchanan notes, “Roosevelt’s decision-making process was notoriously opaque, with numerous and often conflicting lines of command concentrated in his own well-concealed hands.” To better understand the development of American grand strategy, then, involves “evaluating results and outcomes in an effort to deduce goals and intentions. . . . From this viewpoint it becomes clear that, far from being a diversionary theater . . . Washington’s intervention [in the Mediterranean] was an indispensable element in the overall process by which America’s postwar hegemony in Europe and beyond was established” (p. 10–11).

Buchanan identifies two foundational ideas that framed and shaped Roosevelt’s efforts to form American national strategy in fighting World War II. First was the nagging fear of popular insurrection, and the corresponding disorder and bloodshed (as was seen during and after the 1917 Russian Revolution). This deep concern often drove Roosevelt, who publicly espoused freedom and democracy, to pragmatically embrace collaboration of convenience with ex-Vichy and Fascist officials as a way of avoiding a power vacuum in recently liberated territories. The second aspect of Roosevelt’s approach was the desire to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the Old World powers to establish a new Pax Americana in the Mediterranean, but on a peaceful economic and political basis beginning with the presence of a victorious American army.

Buchanan’s thorough research reveals that Roosevelt’s strategy did not spring forth fully developed but evolved over time, shaped as positive circumstances and opportunities arose with the weakening of the formerly dominant European powers. Buchanan advances the idea that Roosevelt’s grand strategy approach arose from his study of Alfred Thayer Mah-
an's theories and experiences as undersecretary of the Navy during the First World War. Consequently, Roosevelt “drew grand strategic conclusions that were at odds with their [George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower’s] cherished, if simplistic, notions of mass and concentration” (p. 269).

In the first chapter, Buchanan delves deeply into the question of Roosevelt’s personal influence on Winston Churchill in fashioning Mediterranean grand strategy. Instead of being a naïve dupe, Roosevelt exercised an increasingly dominant role in the making of strategy as he realized the waning power of the British Empire. Overmatched by the Axis powers and facing the loss of much of their overseas holdings, the British were in a quandary: “London desperately needed U.S. assistance in the struggle with Germany and the Churchill government’s entire strategic outlook was premised in securing it. . . . In essence, this dilemma highlighted the fact that London both needed and feared U.S. involvement in the war, and it encapsulated the contradiction at the heart of the ‘special relationship’” (p. 23).

In the subsequent chapters, Buchanan traces the deepening involvement of the United States in the Mediterranean, all done over the strenuous attempts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to divert Roosevelt’s attention away from proposals to introduce American combat forces into North Africa. Instead, Roosevelt became deeply enmeshed in covert political action, contacts with sympathetic French and Spanish officials in North Africa in an opening bid to establish an American influence in the postwar Mediterranean. Roosevelt employed a carrot-and-stick approach, combining economic, political, and diplomatic initiatives in a way to reduce Axis influence in the region. As Buchanan points out, Roosevelt’s pragmatic approach in the political and economic aspects of the Mediterranean theater, often criticized at the time, paid great dividends in the relatively smooth pacification of North Africa. After the ground combat phase of Operation Gymnast (November 1942), short-lived deals with the collaborationist Vichy French regime paved the way for cooperation with the Free French, and the eventual establishment of a functioning government in exile under Charles de Gaulle: “But with its path smoothed by the provision of trade and military aid, Washington shifted its relation from [Henri-Philippe] Pétain, to [François] Darlan . . . and finally to de Gaulle without crippling breakdowns and disjunctures. . . . The provision of U.S. civil and military supplies thus helped establish a connection between Washington and the new French regime taking shape in the physical and political space cleared by Allied arms” (p. 87).

Later chapters trace the maturation of American grand strategy through the course of the Mediterranean campaign. In particular, Buchanan describes how the shift of power in the Mediterranean to the Americans increased the broader strategy of the European war, as Roosevelt’s newly acquired influence was used in the settling of postwar spheres of influence with Joseph Stalin. Of particular interest to civil affairs specialists is a concise history of the establishment of the Army’s Civil Affairs branch and School of Military Government in May 1942.

Buchanan’s research is thorough, and he does a superb job of clarifying Roosevelt’s goals and intentions through details culled from primary sources including public and private papers and correspondence of both Roosevelt and Churchill, published official documents, and press conference summaries. Buchanan further clarifies the “notoriously opaque” decision-making process with details drawn from 47 different diaries and personal memoirs and a robust selection of journal articles and other secondary works. Moreover, Buchanan supports his narrative with detailed endnotes and maps and a good selection of contemporary photographs. In closing, Buchanan and the editors at Cambridge University Press are to be commended for their production of a high-quality scholarly book that compellingly reinterprets the history of the Mediterranean campaign during World War II.

Toxic Exposures: Mustard Gas and the Health Consequences of World War II in the United States is a sweeping study of the unintended outcomes of mustard gas testing and disposal from World War II through the present day. While the story of mustard gas and its health effects is told here from the perspective of the United States, Susan Smith makes clear that it is best understood as a global story, and appropriate attention is given to other contextual events happening around the world, particularly in Canada and the United Kingdom. The wartime allies conducted the largest-scale research and development project related to mustard gas in history, causing aftereffects that can still be felt today.

World War II was not the first time that the U.S. Army tested the effects of mustard gas on human subjects, of course; researchers tested mustard gas during World War I as well. Additionally, physicians could make observations about mustard gas’s effects as it was used on the battlefield and by examining the injuries it caused the personnel assigned to manufacture it. But the mustard gas testing that occurred during the Second World War was conducted on a grander scale, and—ironically, as it turned out—with little benefit to the war effort, since mustard gas was not used as a weapon by or against the United States during the conflict. None should be tempted to dismiss World War II mustard gas research as trivial because, as Smith writes, “the mustard gas experiments were part of the history of ‘big science,’ which is often associated with the wartime Manhattan Project and later Cold War scientific research projects that involved government funding of large research teams” (p. 22).

Part one of Toxic Exposures deals with wartime mustard gas testing and the role of race in these medical experiments. Smith’s previous books, Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Black Women’s Health Activism in America, 1890–1950 (1995) and Japanese American Midwives: Culture, Community, and Health Politics, 1880–1950 (2005), both dealt with the subject of race in early twentieth-century medicine, and the analysis in Toxic Exposures benefits from her expertise. Performed on military recruits who were insufficiently aware of the risks, some mustard gas experiments were designed to investigate whether assumed biological differences between members of different racial groups would make some more vulnerable to mustard gas than others.

In part two, Toxic Exposures moves forward on two tracks: investigating the postwar consequences of mustard gas disposal at sea and the long-term effects of the mustard gas experiments on the veterans who served as test subjects. Smith provides a comprehensive overview of recent media attention focused on World War II veterans affected by mustard gas testing, as well as a discussion of how the administration of mustard gas came to be regarded as an effective treatment for some types of cancer. Veterans who were subjected to these tests continued to experience a range of health complications for decades after the war. There is much material here for anyone interested in the history of medical ethics to digest.

Smith titles a chapter “Mustard Gas in the Sea Around Us” but spends comparatively little time on the impacts of land-based mustard gas disposal. The

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health consequences and threat to public safety posed by mustard gas ordnance that remained in storage in the United States or buried in pits after World War II are arguably more significant than those represented by mustard gas at the bottom of the ocean. Smith’s perspective on controversies surrounding land-based mustard gas disposal methods in communities near disposal sites would be valuable. The uneasy balance maintained by the Department of Defense between disposing of mustard gas stockpiles quickly and cheaply while minimizing the risks to personnel, nearby communities, and the environment, would dovetail well with Smith’s analysis in her book’s second part.

The narrative in *Toxic Exposures* is painted with broad strokes, and at times more quantitative information and direct quotations would have been useful to give the reader a better sense of the scope, purpose, and progress of U.S. mustard gas experimentation. Recognizing the difficulty of locating source material on this subject, this book offers the reader an overview of the consequences resulting from what researchers and physicians were trying to accomplish, and a comprehensive account of these experiments unfortunately may never be possible. Overall, this is a valuable work on a significant and understudied aspect of military, medical, and scientific history. Smith concludes *Toxic Exposures* writing, “Surely, the history of the mustard gas experiments during World War II provides a powerful lesson in why such medical experimentation necessitates public scrutiny and public debate” (p. 130). Readers of her work will no doubt agree.
The popular website HistoryIsAWeapon.com declares that history is not a record of what happened but an interpretation of what happened and therefore open to multiple opinions to be pitted against each other in debate. Traditional historians are often uncomfortable with that definition because instead of serving as a telling of the past with objectivity, history becomes an argument. Of course, airing and publishing different interpretations is critical to awareness and makes history a dynamic and exciting field. That said, differing interpretations can become vituperative. Since the 1960s, it has become intellectually chic to adopt a deconstructive interpretation of history. Instead of constructing an objective approach by proving a thesis with support and showing how that thesis is stronger than its alternative, deconstruction presents criticism.

Hence, authors like Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn have built careers writing books that criticize U.S. history. Contrary to the more commonly held thesis that, with all of its faults and inconsistencies, the United States is predominantly a land of opportunity and freedom, the deconstructive approach puts forth the antithesis that America and its history represent a story of exploitation and oppression. Anyone who has read Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (1980) experiences its skillful writing and clever argumentation but comes away shaken regarding the brutality and hypocrisy that seems to characterize the narrative of U.S. history. That being said, closer scrutiny of most deconstruction—and this is especially true of Zinn’s work—shows unscholarly bias and convenient omissions of facts and events (counterargument) that make the author’s position less tenable.

Add to this deconstructive literature Nick Fischer’s Spider Web: The Birth of American Anticommunism. An adjunct research associate at Monash University in Australia, Fischer criticizes the thesis that the United States sought to combat the spread of Communism at home and abroad while seeking to maintain its commitment to liberty and civil rights. Instead, Fischer argues that American anticommunism was conjured up by ruthless politicians and businessmen as a device to divide societal elements through fear and thus protect the power elites’ ability to control all political, social, cultural, and economic activities at the expense of what he calls throughout the work the “great majority.” Extremely well written and full of historical events cleverly aligned to support the author’s assertions, Spider Web is mostly a denunciation of the United States and its history.

Fischer contends that the threat of Communism itself was more a product of paranoia, propaganda, and manipulation and had nothing to do with Communist seizures of power in “the USSR or anywhere else” (p. 9). Much of Fischer’s research comes from secondary sources written by the deconstructionist academics who share his apparently low opinion of the United States, including Corey Robin, Jack Beatty, H. W. Brands, and of course Howard Zinn. Instead of any new or groundbreaking primary research, however, Fischer reinterprets historical events to redefine American political and economic history and charac-

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Vance Skarstedt serves as Marine Corps University’s Defense Intelligence Agency chair.
terize the concept of economic mobility in American society as a myth.

The blame for the capitalists’ ruthless behavior falls specifically on conservatives and reactionaries, though Fischer fails to adequately define these parameters. His supporting examples wander back and forth across the U.S. political spectrum. In his discussion of the post–World War I Red Scare, Fischer accuses President Woodrow Wilson’s administration of ignorance and solipsism, and charges that Wilson tried to exterminate Bolshevik doctrine and the Bolsheviks themselves through the support of the Allied invasion of Russia just three weeks after the Bolsheviks seized power. Fischer later denounces the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)—an organization whose leaders have been recognized by the American Communist Party for their work—for Cold War activities against progressive socialist governments in Latin America. He also berates Ronald Reagan for working with J. Edgar Hoover to “derail the careers of several noted actors whose political views and associations he found objectionable” (p. 263). Unfortunately, Fischer does not provide a single example of such an unfortunate “noted actor.”

Wilson, Reagan, the AFL-CIO, and other examples Fischer discusses represent the range of American politics from left to right. This dismissal of the American political spectrum would not be an issue were it not for Fischer’s contention that anticommunism is still a tool used by Republicans against Democrats, even though that red herring died with the implosion of the Soviet Union more than a quarter-century ago. Historically inconsistent, he fails to mention that the antisedition legislation of World War I was signed by a Democratic president and a Democratic Senate, and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was created during the Roosevelt administration with a legislative branch completely controlled by the Democrats.

Apparently, if anyone, regardless of their views in American politics, criticizes Socialism, or for that matter Communism, they are reactionary and oppressive. And any steps taken to expose and deconstruct Socialism or Communism constitutes oppression, even though the actors in the examples he cites were far less drastic in their actions than those taken by Socialists and Communists against their detractors. Many of Fischer’s demons are vague references—“the government” and “business interests”—when he describes the agents of anticommunist oppression. Spider Web is full of nameless villains and nameless victims, for that matter. When he delves into specifics, he focuses mostly on midlevel actors, such as John Bond Trevor and Jacob Spolansky, whose impact on the national debate was minimal and whose “oppression” does not hold a candle to that of enforcers of Communism such as Lavrentiy Beria and Che Guevara. He puts forth the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Seditious Activities (also known as the Lusk Committee after its head, Senator Clayton R. Lusk) as a key indicator of tyranny but barely mentions that it was a New York State committee called for by citizens’ groups, and not a comprehensive top-down persecution like that seen in Socialist governments of the twentieth century. He also fails to mention that nobody lost their civil rights or went to prison as a result of Lusk Committee activities. In fact, its recommendations, including the teaching of patriotism in New York schools, were vetoed by the New York governor. It seems that as far as Fischer is concerned, local groups joined by citizens on a volunteer basis, such as the Better America Foundation (and yes, in this country, businessmen are citizens), are immediately transformed into nefarious exploiters of the poor once they make their distaste of radical Socialism or Communism known.

Still, all of this fits neatly into Fischer’s storyline that American anticommunism is like a complex spider web. The various nodes by themselves do not impact a large group of dissidents. Collectively, though, these nodes and their hard-to-see connecting strands oppress working-class citizens, progressives, and like-minded politicians across the nation. This is also a literary ruse that excuses the author from having to reveal any specific organized suppression of his protagonists and allows him to draw any group
he suspects as “reactionary” into his spider web of rightist conspiracy. Fischer is also short on exposing the victimization he infers. Yes, there are the predictable examples of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as well as Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, who were tried by juries and convicted of actual crimes, but he does not produce an American version of the gulags, work camps, forced collectivization, and show trials that characterized the Socialist and Communist governments of the period he covers. He briefly alludes to the Molly Maguires and that some were executed but fails to mention that these were individuals who had been tried and convicted of civil crimes. Whether or not they were “framed” is a great point for debate but has yet to be confirmed by any widely accepted findings. In fact, the very existence of the Molly Maguires within the mining industry is still not uniformly accepted.

Fischer glosses over the historic reality that Socialism and Communism, as practiced in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Cambodia, etc., did utilize real oppression and collectively slaughtered many millions more innocent victims than Adolf Hitler’s Nazi (National Socialist) death camps. From the turn-of-the-century anarchy movement that in a period of 10 years assassinated seven heads of state, including an American president, to the mass starvation of Vladimir Lenin’s War Communism to Joseph Stalin’s Gulag to Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, to Pol Pot’s Killing Fields, millions of innocents have been starved, executed, imprisoned, and brutalized in the name of Socialism, Communism, and economic justice. In the United States and other nations, politicians, community leaders, ordinary citizens, and businessmen saw these examples of radicalism, and despite the wistful musings of some academics about economic fairness, did not want that type of political violence here. Many of the organizations and actors that formed and led the numerous anticommunist efforts were, again, spontaneous grassroot and state organizations, and were not created by a pervasively ruthless central government. Yes, some of these were outspoken and aggressive, but the U.S. Constitution and its change of power every two years helped American society leaven the extremes and avoid the bloodshed seen in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. This antithesis is not effectively deconstructed in Spider Web.

Reading through Spider Web, this reviewer looked for any sign of objectivity or counterargument that would lend credence to Fischer’s denunciations of American history with little success. Fischer grudgingly mentioned that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) counterintelligence program “weakened” the Ku Klux Klan, and he referred in brief passing to the excesses of Soviet Communists including the “deportation of Kulaks” (this qualifies as an understatement of the year, given that millions of Kulaks were uprooted, starved, and worked to death in labor camps). However, he does not present the historical record of what actually concerned those Americans in government and business who looked upon collectivist movements and the governments that supported them as threats to freedom. Fischer ignores post–Cold War findings by historians that many of the actors who were suspected of being Communist sympathizers actually turned out to be Communist sympathizers. He does not mention the Venona Project and its counterintelligence bent or the slew of books written by former Soviet officials that openly admit to many of the strategies that caused concern in the United States before and during the Cold War. In KGB officer Victor Cherkashin’s memoir, Spy Handler (2004), he relates that the first time an American was recruited by Soviet intelligence to spy for them was 1923, a quarter-century and a world war before the United States even created its own permanent intelligence agency. Addressing this evidence would have gone a long way toward strengthening Fischer’s thesis, but he did not even try. In deconstruction, all that matters is the attack, and there is no regard for counterarguments.

This reviewer was distracted by inaccurate characterizations. For example, Fischer referred to Alger Hiss as a convicted spy. No, Hiss was convicted on two counts of lying under oath. He was never convicted of
being Communist, of spying, or of espionage. This is a minor point, but it is factually wrong and could lead a knowledgeable reader to suspect that despite Fischer’s claims of extended research, many of his conclusions are instead based on the narrative of his fellow deconstructionists than on any new findings. There were no smoking guns of proof uncovered by deep research in this book. This is unfortunate. Selective use of historic events while ignoring counterarguments takes an author away from scholarship and toward propaganda. While I would not go so far as to call Spider Web propaganda, I believe it would be more useful to an Oliver Stone movie script than to a useful historiography on Cold War or American history.

• 1775 •
In 1987, the movie *Hamburger Hill*, directed by John Irvin, was released. It describes the story of a company from the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division that attempted and ultimately succeeded in the conquest of Hill 937 in the A-Shu Valley, as part of Operation Apache Snow in May 1969. The movie focuses on the military effort in conquering the post, which was held by the North Vietnamese Army. However, between the rounds of fighting, the viewer is exposed to the social dynamics taking place between the American soldiers: the homesickness; the soldiers’ attitudes toward the high command giving orders from far away; racial tensions between the soldiers; and their response to the growing protest against the war back home. This movie deals with ordinary foot soldiers rather than generals, in a battle that—although it received some public attention—was in essence no different than hundreds of similar battles during the Vietnam War. The issues brought up by viewing the movie have been reflected in hundreds of memoirs written by Vietnam veterans. This is the subject of John Wood’s important book, *Veteran Narratives and the Collective Memory of the Vietnam War*, which analyzes 58 Vietnam memoirs written by veterans about their experiences in the war. Each one of the seven chapters deals with a different aspect of this experience, such as issues of race and gender, homecoming, and naturally, the experience of fighting an elusive, lethal enemy. Additionally, Wood integrates the memoirs into a wider framework, placing them within a historical and political context that provides a better understanding of the background for their writing.

The first chapter presents a view of the social background of the writers by providing demographic data about age, socioeconomic background, education levels, and duration of military service in general and in Vietnam in particular. Wood maintains, justifiably, that this chapter allows the reader to understand subjective and objective factors that influenced the memoir writers’ experiences during the war, thus directly influencing writings after the war.

The second chapter gives a combined view of the fighting and the perception of the Vietnamese by the writers of memoirs. Wood’s analysis in this chapter clarifies the essential difference between memoirs and novels describing the war. War and fighting are described as a chaotic, frustrating, and unheroic activity. The chapter also reviews the perception of the non-combatant Vietnamese by the writers. Wood points out that this perception was mostly narrow, racist, and stereotypic, which, in his opinion, was motivated by a total lack of understanding of the Vietnamese culture by the American soldier.

Interracial tension within the American Army units was a prominent issue during the war. Surprisingly, this issue hardly appears in memoirs written by white soldiers. Therefore, in the third chapter, Wood chose to analyze memoirs written by African American soldiers, although they were not included in the initial memoir group. Clearly, racial issues form a significant part of these memoirs. These take two directions: the first line is a description of the writer’s part in the military activities of the unit and pride in his
military service and achievement; and the second emphasizes the racism to which the African American soldier has been exposed, his way of coping with the racist incidents, and the influence that the Black Power movement had over him. This is the time to review Wood’s selection of these 58 memoirs, although he is aware of additional hundreds of veterans who had also written about their war experiences. Wood provides a clear and persuasive explanation of his choice of books. These books, published between 1967 and 2005, became best sellers; their writers have been awarded various literary honors and enjoyed significant media and public exposure. Hence Wood’s claim that “only titles that achieved recognition could have had a significant impact on collective memory” (p. 5).

The fourth chapter deals with gender and sex issues, albeit from a male point of view. In spite of the significant contribution of female soldiers to the American war effort (Wood also reviews several books written by women), this chapter’s point of view looks through the eyes of those who have experienced battle directly. Although recent years have seen much research about women’s role in the war, Wood did not turn to that research, and it seems like his purpose is to focus on the fighters.

The issue of the soldiers’ homecoming and their attempt to return to normal life is discussed in the fifth and sixth chapters. These chapters emphasize the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder and the alienated attitude by those who did not serve in Vietnam. The attitude of the veterans toward the antiwar movement is also discussed; Wood indicates that while the veterans expressed negative attitudes toward the management of the war, they also had negative attitudes toward the antiwar movement. Veterans overwhelmingly consider themselves and their brothers in arms as patriots who responded to the call to arms and went out to defend the United States and the American way of life. Thus, in spite of the criticism against the war, the soldiers are proud of their military service and express severe criticism against the harsh reception they experienced upon returning to the United States, particularly to accusations of war crimes.

The first six chapters of the book deal directly with the military and combat experience of those who fought in Vietnam. Indubitably, many veterans who did not serve in Vietnam will also find a reflection of their personal experiences in this work. Wood demonstrates this in the seventh chapter, where he compares the Vietnam veterans’ narratives to those of American veterans who fought before and after Vietnam. His conclusion is that in spite of the essential differences between the wars in which the United States has been involved since World War II—up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—and in spite of the different character of the soldiers, there is a significant resemblance between stories told by veterans of these various wars. This reviewer would like to take Wood’s conclusion even further and to maintain that the soldier’s experience is timeless and universal. Reading memoirs and stories written by soldiers who belonged to different armies and fought in different wars draws an almost identical picture.

For example, the (scarce) literature describing the stories of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in the Security Zone that Israel maintained in southern Lebanon (1985–2000) draws a very similar picture. Recently, Matti Friedman, an Israeli-Canadian journalist and writer, published Pumpkinflowers: A Soldier’s Story of a Forgotten War (2016), a book describing the author’s experience as a combatant in DLAAT (pumpkin) military fire base in South Lebanon in the years 1998–99. Friedman gives an excellent description of the stressful and exhausting operational routine of the fighters in the post, as well as in other posts deep in the south of Lebanon. He does this through his personal story and interviews with other soldiers who served in South Lebanon in the years before Israel’s withdrawal from the Security Zone (May 2000). Not surprisingly, we can find in his book many of the topics mentioned in Wood’s book. Although the IDF control of South Lebanon was the cause of strong public criticism, including protest movements (e.g., the Four Mothers Movement), all the criticism and protests were directed toward the political leadership, and none toward the soldiers, as was the case with the Vietnam War. I have found the last part of the book, in which Friedman describes his visit to the site of the
post in 2002, especially fascinating. It would be very interesting to compare the description of his visit to that of other war veterans who visited the old battlefields where they fought.

Wood's book is not a military history research in the classical sense. It focuses on social history but adds an important layer to the research of the Vietnam War. Veteran Narratives can also be classified as a work that examines the creation and formulation of a collective national memory. A third framework into which Wood's book fits (the most important one, in this reviewer's opinion) is a descriptive analysis of the war from the point of view of the foot soldier. Veteran Narratives joins a series of research works focusing on the story of the fighter rather than that of the general. This is a different point of view that, while lacking the wider view of the war, provides an invaluable insight about the everyday life of the fighter in the battlefield. This type of literature can also teach about everyday tactics used in the war versus the training the soldiers received, and it can examine whether this training was indeed relevant and effective.

One could argue about Wood's selection of the specific 58 memoirs, but any different selection would have raised some criticism. As mentioned, Wood provides a persuasive explanation for his selections. This book should be treated as a qualitative rather than as a quantitative research.

It would be interesting to examine other memoirs along the lines suggested by Wood. In addition, a comparative research of memoirs by soldiers from other armies written about other wars would also be of interest.

The book is well-written and is based on a large variety of relevant secondary sources that support the author's lines of reasoning and his analyses of the memoirs, which in this case serve as primary sources. This is an important book, as it provides significant insights into the experiences of the foot soldier and the junior officer in a nonconsensual war, the goals of which have never been precisely defined by political leadership. Furthermore, Wood's work adds an important layer to the research of the experience of the microtactical level not just in the Vietnam War but in military history in general.
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**SEPTEMBER 1918**  
Colonel Walter G. Ford

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