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9 Three Areas for
Improving Leader
Development

12 Senior NCO CTC
Mid-Rotation
Success

36 Of Course the Army
Understands
Leadership!

Leader Development

Table of
Contents



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About the Cover:

Aircrew members from the Army Reserve Aviation Command conduct pre-flight and maintenance checks on a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, Aug. 30, 2016 (Photo by Photo by CPT Matthew Roman, Fort Knox Visual Information)

the Command Corner



The highlight of *Aviation Digest* this quarter is Leader Development. It strikes me as such a rich and relevant theme, as the Army currently operates in very uncertain times, relying heavily on leaders, especially junior leaders, to guide our daily operations. Whether trying to execute mission as a widely distributed Regionally Allocated Forces Combat Aviation Brigade in support of European Allies, or taking charge in the train, advise, and assist role in the Middle East, young leaders everywhere are executing mission. The question we must ask ourselves is, “Are we developing our leaders to meet the rigor of the Army mission?”

Leader development comes in many formats. Some lessons are best taught through experience, but some developmental experiences can be reaffirmed through research, professional readings, and effective preparation. We learn well from each other, and this quarter’s issue seeks to impart the knowledge and perspective gained by our comrades in arms. COL Ault contributes as an author once again, analyzing the question of officer development, or potential underdevelopment, citing the current career model as being overwhelmed by the concept of “broadening.” SSG Prunty discusses Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) proficiency and the need for increased Noncommissioned officer development in order to better prepare UAS Soldiers to meet mission. Whatever the article, there is something relevant with respect to leader development and preparation.

I encourage leaders at every level to take note of this issue. It will increase your understanding for better mission preparedness, provide relevant perspectives with regard to leader improvement, and hopefully encourage you all toward refining your approach and perspective on leadership. Remember, leader development starts with you and the future of our branch and more importantly, our Army depends on your development and the development of others!

Above the Best!

William K. Gayler
Major General, USA
Commanding

Notes from the Contributing Editor

We would like to thank Bruce Miller and Henry Williford for their unwavering devotion to the *Aviation Digest*. Their dedication to excellence has contributed immeasurably to the education of our branch over the last 4 years. The care, hard work, and professionalism shown by them both have left an indelible mark on us all. From all of us, thanks so much.

Now, on to the readers. We are obviously going through a period of change. The content of the magazine will be similar to what you are used to, but we are looking to create a fresh presentation. Additionally, we want to urge contributing authors—and even those simply thinking about contributing—to send your articles in. The branch needs your thoughts and ideas in order to grow in capability and knowledge. Remember, this is your branch, and this is your publication!



contents

- 2** The Command Corner
- 4** Overbroadened and Underdeveloped—The Case for Restructuring Army Aviation Officer Development
- 6** The Command Importance of Integrating Junior Aviators in a Defined Mission Readiness Posture
- 9** Three Areas for Improving Leader Development
- 12** Senior NCO CTC Mid-Rotation Success
- 15** FROM THE AVIATION DIGEST ARCHIVES: Hi-Tech Officers—Asset or Liability in Combat Leadership?
- 18** The “Not In My Squad” Program—Making Positive Changes in the Army
- 21** Reframing Deployed Operations—Aviation Expeditionary Advisory Packages
- 26** Educating the Aviation S-2 for Success

- 28** UAS and Common Soldier Task Proficiency
- 30** Standardization Pilots—Motivations, Concerns, and Aviator Development
- 32** Redesigning the UH-60M Aviator Qualification Course
- 34** Aviation Maintenance Company Preparation for CTC Rotations
- 36** Of Course the Army Understands Leadership!
- 40** Toxic Leadership
- 42** What Happened to the Scholar in “Warrior Scholar?”
- 45** Ace of Aces
- 48** A Clarification of the Army Lessons Learned Program
- 50** Turning Pages

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Overbroadened and Underdeveloped:

by COL Robert T. Ault

The Case for Restructuring Army Aviation Officer Development

Army Aviation brings a unique and important capability to the battlefield. However, this capability is built upon competent leaders that possess a deep doctrinal, technical, and tactical understanding of fighting Aviation formations in support of ground forces. It is incredibly difficult and time consuming to develop a pilot-in-command, flight lead, air mission commander, company commander, or a battalion commander. These positions take effort, training, mentorship, and most importantly, time. An effective Army Aviation leader requires repeated exposure to a wide range of experiences to develop the necessary skills to lead. This area is where the current Army Aviation professional development model is not sufficient and will have long lasting negative impacts to the Aviation Enterprise.

A new officer must learn the ever increasingly technical side of being an aviator—not an insignificant challenge. The newly minted Army Aviator must learn not only how to safely perform as a member of a crew, but also how to lead that crew under often challenging environmental conditions such as marginal weather, night, and high altitudes while operating in high-threat conditions. Performance under these conditions is only possible with a solid understanding of the aircraft capabilities and its systems, the proficiency to effectively employ both, and an understanding of the aircraft's role as part of a larger team. This lays the foundation for the new officer's education and

development; however, individual aircraft or crew proficiency is not enough. After leaving flight school, leadership skills and tactical competence requires further development. Army Aviators are expected to maneuver their aircraft as part of larger formations. This collective readiness requires, in large part, a tactical competence that only comes from experience and repetitions of many complex tasks. For the young warrant officer, the repetition develops aircraft and systems expertise and a level of tactical competence that allows his unit to successfully support the ground commander. For the young commissioned officer, this repetitive experience develops a competence that is rooted in a firm understanding of doctrine and how Army Aviation fights at a collective level.

The U.S. Army commissioning sources use basic infantry tactics as the rubric for training and assessing all officers, regardless of branch, for both leadership and doctrinal understanding. The result, for Infantry officers, is that active duty tactics and basic troop-leading procedures look pretty much the same from what they learned in the Reserve Officer's Training Course or at the U.S. Military Academy. However, for the Aviation Branch officers, there is no such comparison. The Aviation lieutenant must face a steeper learning curve to apply Army Aviation doctrine and tactics while operating a complex and technically demanding aircraft. This takes time, task repetition, and exposure from all perspectives

of the operation to gain a strong understanding before advancing to the next level in the organization. Within this exposure is doctrinal training, which is essential to progressing and developing as an Army Aviation leader.

An average commissioned officer will find themselves in company command by their 6th year of service and battalion command on or around their 18th year of service. However, by battalion command, the total time spent within Army Aviation combat formations is less than one third of their total experience. This is not much time to understand and develop the deep competency required at the technical and tactical levels required by an Aviation unit commander. In many ways, the Aviation officer is in a race, not to rank and position, but to competency. Depth of knowledge and technical/ tactical competency require not just a familiarization, but a conceptual and practical understanding of the doctrine necessary to fight Army Aviation formations in combat. This lack of time required to build the essential depth of knowledge and technical/tactical competence is where Army Aviation is falling behind.

Where We Are on the Map

The typical career path of an Aviation lieutenant sees him arrive at his new unit, serve 6–12 months in a staff position, command a platoon for 12–18 months, and return to a staff position before attending the Aviation Captain's Career Course. The challenge for the new

lieutenant is to attain pilot-in-command and air mission commander status before the Captain's Career Course, but it is very unlikely they will. Following the 6-month Captain's Career Course, the newly minted captain will report to his new unit and be placed in command without ever having led an Aviation formation beyond the crew or team level. To make matters worse, once the captain "successfully" completes the 12–18 month company command, he is immediately sent to a host of branch immaterial assignments throughout the Army. These assignments further pull young officers away from learning the doctrine of how to fight Aviation formations and the development of the technical skills to do so. Of course, there are exceptions, but the issue here is the design of the system producing Aviation leaders.

The current trend to "broaden" our officers, while well intentioned, comes at the cost of deep doctrinal competence and a stifling of a professional maturity due to the absence of leaders within Army Aviation units. Throughout the Army, there are approximately 2,800 captains in various graduate-producing programs. Part of the issue is the time allotted for branch qualification at each rank drives permanent change of duty station cycles, not the need to develop technical and tactical expertise. While it seems beneficial on the surface to send captains to Master's programs, since the return should be a more "highly educated" officer that will overcome this gap, the reality is less optimistic.

The impact of creating a culture that over-incentivizes Master's degrees is that it comes at the cost of spending time in the branch learning how battalions and brigades operate, sustain, and fight. Sadly, these officers will go on to become battalion and brigade operations and executive officers without a solid base of experience in Army Aviation operations or logistics. This means they will not have led Aviation missions at anything above the team level. They will not have experienced multiple iterations of Aviation

collective missions. They will not have worked through sustaining an Aviation battalion beyond a few field training exercises. The standard for branch qualification is 18 months (plus or minus 6) in order to get the major out of the "field" Army for "broadening" assignments—especially joint assignments.

Again, this is admirable, but there are consequences. Arguably, majors should be learning the bigger Army processes at places like the Pentagon, Forces Command, or the Aviation Center of Excellence. Without a solid experience base as a lieutenant and captain, these future battalion commanders are likely to take command without even being qualified as Senior Army Aviators and without understanding how to fight, maneuver, and defeat the enemy.



A Better Alternative for the Future

The Army must revisit the unintended consequence of granting commissioned officers time out of line units to attend Master's programs that are not required, due to the nature of their career path. There are exceptions, but the issue is the design of the system that produces Army Aviation professionals. In the place of the 2 years it takes for an advanced non career-related degree, officers should be incentivized to remain in flying assignments to learn how to fight, sustain, and lead battalions and brigades.

There is something to be said for the education that comes from learning and earning an advanced degree. The Army could implement policies to incentivize distance learning. As part of a bolder effort, Army University should have a

provision to help officers earn advanced degrees while remaining on the line. Additionally, the Army G-1 should develop policies that stabilize officers in battalions and brigades longer during the officer's company grade years.

Army Aviation leadership must redefine the current definition of warrant officer, broadening to create a culture of "learning the business." The focus of the Aviation warrant officer should remain within the realm of Aviation operations. This means that warrant officer broadening may take the form of assignments where the technical and tactical expertise supports critical Army Aviation program objectives. These assignments include combat development, materiel improvement, doctrine development, etc. The intent should be, however, to limit the duration of these assignments to keep the warrant officer technical and tactical expertise where it is most needed.

Professional military education is changing to reflect this requirement to focus on Warfighting knowledge and skills—to learn the business. To Army Aviation's advantage, this may mean encouraging multiple career tracks for a warrant officer. While there will always be exceptions, the intent is to remove curricula not focused on this objective.

Conclusion

Army Aviation is a dynamic and powerful branch because of its Soldiers and leaders. The current Army culture of broadening comes at cost of building deep doctrinal and technical/tactical competence in the branch—especially the Aviation Branch. Current policies do not make it possible, nor do they properly incentivize staying in units and learning how to fight for commissioned officers. Across the board, the Army must revisit the consequences, both intentional and unintentional, of pulling Aviation Branch officers out of the cockpit, flight line, or unit to "broaden" at the expense of developing the necessary competence for excellence in their chosen profession.



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The Command Importance of Integrating Junior Aviators in a Defined Mission Readiness Posture

by CPT Peter G. Smith

Photo by Timothy Hale

Do your job and do it well. This is a mantra said at almost all Task Force Rough Riders production control meetings while deployed. By doctrine, every Soldier has a specific role and is expected to execute it with positive results at their respective responsibility level. A unit's overall capacity for success is dependent on each individual service member's propensity to achieve. At year's start, strategic decision makers approve a distinct modification table of organization and equipment effectively prescribing a mission-ready tactical level composition required to achieve higher echelon goals. Theoretically, if everyone performs their job, at their rank, and to standard, doctrine is followed and missions are accomplished. Pragmatically, it becomes the company and battalion level leadership's responsibility to develop their overall Soldier talent and leverage the resources they have to build a long-lasting knowledge base. In the context of Army Aviation officership, a junior Aviator's career success is dependent on early and consistent exposure to the standardization, maintenance, safety, and technological aspects of the profession. Our community, unlike other branches of the Army, is matrixed. Not only are Aviators responsible for the safe execution of flight, as their military occupational specialty and rank suggests, but they also are required to understand the functional roles that facilitate Aviation operations.

The Aviation warrant officer developmental model, prescribed in *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, delineates the various career tracks and institutionalizes the need for a warrant officer's exposure to functional roles. A junior Aviation officer is mostly beholden to the program already established by the company commander and executed by the company standardization instructor pilot (SP). A warrant officer Aviator's career choice is their own but heavily influenced by the efficacy of that established program. A commissioned officer's career is much different, but no less reliant, on their understanding of functional areas. One day, they will establish their own programs and influence the culture that either facilitates knowledge or does not. Therefore, it is imperative that company leadership expose recently onboarded Aviators across the functional spectrum to enable domain knowledge and pursue intellectual interest.

Field Manual 6-22, Leadership Development, discusses the concept of domain knowledge. Basically, it consists of relatively simple theories of technical, tactical, joint, and cultural intelligence. It offers far-reaching consequences for those who do not achieve these, in that such an individual does not possess the required awareness for leadership. This notion is

not negotiable. New Aviators must learn and develop critical skills that facilitate professional knowledge. Warrant officers are technical experts in their field and must develop the ability to apply their skill set in a tactical environment. Commissioned officers, especially junior officers, must internalize tactical expertise while honing technical competence as a prerequisite for leadership as prescribed by *Training Circular 3-04.11, Commander's Aviation Training and Standardization Program*.

During flight school, future Aviators advance to the third level of learning. Able to understand and apply the theory of flight, they are responsible for manipulating flight controls and safely operating aircraft. To correlate knowledge, become a pilot-in-command (PC), and lead others, their awareness and skills must advance beyond the cockpit. It is not enough to become a great pilot, and it is too late to start development of leaders once they have achieved PC status. Rotational exposure to tracks early in their careers teaches Aviators the intricacies of the business of Army Aviation.

A great lesson many people learn too late is that there exists a difference between Aviators and Aviation officers. Perhaps nowhere in the Aviation profession is this truer than in maintenance. Standardization instructor pilots do not always pro-

mote exposure to maintenance programs during an Aviator's progression to PC. This is not intentional but usually occurs in part to the mission focus of the material covered or because of extensive mission-essential task list (METL) training requirements. To clarify, the fault does not lie with SPs but with the general focus on quantitative metrics at the expense of qualitative ones. As a result, junior Aviators see maintenance test pilots (MTPs) working through the "mundane" issues of fixing helicopters and logging low flight hours. They take little interest in this less "romantic" side of Army Aviation and tend to write off the importance of maintenance programs. Before dismissing the notion, consider the shortage of MTPs across the AH-64 and CH-47 fleets. Many junior Aviators are detached from maintenance because low flight hours coupled with long days in the hangar seem antithetical to mission readiness progression. Probably the worst manifestation of this tendency is the creation of field officers who have "grown up" in Army Aviation with this attitude and see maintenance, from a commander or senior staff officer viewpoint, as a distraction from operations rather than an enabler of combat power.

The most effective flight companies leverage instructor pilots (IPs) to facilitate the strategic relationships with other senior tracked Aviators to develop readiness level one (RL-1) Aviators. For example, a CW2 with 350-hours of flight experience in a deployed flight company is accountable for the communication security fills of the company's aircraft. Parenthetically, he is not responsible for the program, as this is the role of the company Aviation mission survivability officer (AMSO). The CW2 supervised by the AMSO and mentored by the unit SP and IPs, works with the battalion S-6 and the delta company avionics shop to manage the program. He delivers reports to the AMSO, S-3, and commander. He builds long lasting habitual relationships, a concept so respected in leadership development that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) specifically addresses the topic in their *Gold Book*.

In these types of programs stateside, unit leaders assign young Aviators additional

duties in flight scheduling, safety, or in a command support program. They become responsible for the success of their program. If they are lucky, an Aviation Resource Management Survey team will evaluate their performance. This provides the Soldier an opportunity to excel while offering leaders the opportunity to grade the Aviator's judgement, organizational skills, willingness to excel, and, last but not least, the Aviator's contribution to the unit's overall readiness. Additional duties are a great foundation for effective exposure programs.

Cross-pollination of knowledge offers the opportunity for unit Aviators to pursue their passion rather than simply fill the needs of others. Recent research by the management-consulting firm CEB, found that one third of top performers feel disengaged from their work. Leaders

potential hazard. The added benefit of rotational exposure programs is that young Aviators will learn, understand the basics of the task, and understand the significance of the additional duty to the unit's overall readiness while not expected to master something too early. Moreover, intellectual stimulation and the ability to pursue their passions tends to guarantee longer-term commitment to the unit and the Army.

Developing an effective company or battalion necessitates the holistic understanding of Aviation operations. In July's Issue of *Army Aviation Magazine*, the Army Aviation Association of America publication, MAJ Trenten J. Short deftly demonstrates the importance of integrating flight simulation into training programs to maintain high levels of readiness. As a Directorate of Evaluation and



must consider their role in the development and trajectory of their subordinates. Keeping great officers involved is difficult without providing them opportunities to own a product and show their skills. Tremendous amounts of research exist suggesting that intellectually challenging tasks increase productivity. Understandably, it is important not to overwork your top performers. Having IPs oversee additional duties for Aviators who have achieved RL-1 alleviates this

Standardization IP, MAJ Short argues, "As training transitions from individual to collective, effective commanders must develop and enforce methods to maximize" training. Although his statement is in the context of collective training with ground forces, it illuminates the benefit for all pilots to see the larger picture. When exposed to various maintenance or safety experiences early in a career, an Aviator is able to draw on gained knowledge, perform better, and proliferate

good judgement as they become first level trainers themselves.

Skeptics may object that formalized rotation programs, such as those suggested in this article, detract from the unit's overall mission-ready posture or training regimen. It is conceivable for a command to overemphasize the rotation or expose individuals who may not be ready for additional responsibility. However, if the unit SP/IPs and other senior warrant officers managed and contextualized the approach in strategic functional relationships in the form of short-term work assignments; these skeptics would understand the value of the new Aviator's exposure to additional duties/experiences. Further, the approach is not to ignore aircrew training programs or the other mandates. Rather, this is an observed method to enhance training and leadership development within the framework

of Army Aviation doctrine. The goal of rotating pilots through the functional areas of Aviation operations is not to develop wide and shallow familiarity but to build deep and long lasting expertise. The program would allow the Aviator to focus on a particular functional area that they have developed a particular interest in and generate domain knowledge across the Aviation enterprise. Junior Aviators should expect support from a mentor who can identify the more esoteric aspects of the professional tracks available to them that their SP or platoon leader may not communicate. These programs will undoubtedly foster closer relationships within the unit and expose young officers' true strengths. Additionally, for junior commissioned officers, it will develop fundamental tactical and technical knowledge about which they will eventually lead and make decisions.

Proper development of Army Aviation officers is essential for the longevity of our business. As economic and technological influences affect the landscape of our chosen career field, leadership is what will make the difference in the future. In the profession of warfighting, one must consider the long-term development of leaders and understand the importance of foundational learning. As flight school produces Aviators, so too do established development programs produce Aviation officers. Unit leadership holds the responsibility of ensuring each Soldier continues to perform at their rank in the respective role and continues to grow as that Soldier's career progresses. The expectation of doing a job well relies on leadership's willingness and ability to challenge subordinates while enabling them with knowledge.



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Acronym Reference

AMSO - aviation mission survivability officer
IP - instructor pilot
METL - mission essential task list
MTP - maintenance test pilots

PC - pilot-in-command
RL-1 - readiness level one
SP - standardization instructor pilot



Photo by SPC Thomas Scaggs

THREE AREAS FOR IMPROVING LEADER DEVELOPMENT

by CW4 Leonard Momeny

Leader development is very important to the Army; however, it is not something the Army can always make time for on its growing list of priorities. Mission accomplishment takes priority, but, the other part of the problem is the pace of military life. Whether preparing for deployments, conducting a rotation at a training center, or dealing with re-deployment, the operational tempo can seem overwhelming. Even day-to-day activities overwhelm our organizational calendars, meaning more requirements and far less time for development. Recently, our leader development has experienced limited, if any, success at all. I feel that we can improve this negligent trend concerning leader development through study and thoughtful application of the following three areas: 1) Emotional Intelligence, 2) Focus of Mentorship Efforts, and 3) Demonstration of Humanity. A word of warning: all three areas require an investment of time, but the investment will pay dividends.

Emotional Intelligence

Emotional Intelligence, or EQ, is something that many of us are not exposed to until we attend our first Professional Military Education (PME) course outside of our basic officer courses. Emotional Intelligence is much like an Intelligence quotient (IQ), but instead of intelligence it focuses on how well a person perceives their own emotional quotient. Think about it for a moment. Have you ever

worked with someone who seemed clueless to the climate that they were creating? Whether it was tempered by anger or mistrust, they simply were oblivious to the consequences of their own emotions. That is just an example of the first of five components of EQ: 1) Self-awareness, 2) Self-regulation, 3) Motivation, 4) Empathy, and 5) Social Skill (Goleman, 1996).

Emotional intelligence is not a trait-based form of leadership, meaning that EQ can be learned. While a healthy EQ may begin with work on self-awareness, as it serves as the foundation for other EQ components, self-regulation becomes a very important facet of our EQ profile. Leaders, at least the great ones, were always able to engage in self-regulation. Leaders are not typically given to emotional outbursts, mostly because it dissuades “buy-in” by subordinates to the vision and direction of the organization. Furthermore, lack of self-regulation can erode that most foundational element of professional relationships: trust.

Motivation is a given in the military—not just the Army—but how many young leaders and aviators in the branch seemed to be turned away by motivation? It’s ok to be motivated, but not Terry Tate, “office linebacker motivated.” There is a balance that must be struck by leaders trying to motivate their formations, or perhaps just their fellow aviators. We must never downplay motivation, or in Army speak,

“hooah,” because motivation is an effort by the leader to achieve their goals and the goals of others. A wonderful partner to motivation is self-awareness, because you can learn to recognize your own motivation level in comparison to others. When executed with forethought, you can more effectively motivate your people. Another important factor of motivation is consistency. You can be motivated all the time if for some reason you happen to struggle with sensing the appropriate time to express motivation. This approach can be tiring, but there is inspirational power in consistency of action and character.

Empathy is such a critical component of EQ. Empathy is not an invitation to a Tony Robbins moment where you gather your whole team up, tell them you understand, and force them into an uncomfortable, broad-grinning group hug. Appropriate empathy—the type that is non-patronizing and non-self-deprecating, but instead a very genuine emotion—is very powerful. True empathy is an ability to reference a “common-core experience,” in which you, the leader, assume a sharing of your subordinate’s feelings, and more importantly, make use of that knowledge when making a leadership decision. Empathy is something that takes time to develop appropriately, and the best way to get started is to know your Soldiers. Be present with them during completion of tasks, eat lunch together, talk to them, and do Physical Training (PT) with them. Noth-



Photo by SFC Thomas Scaggis

ing builds a team quite like the crucible of common suffering. Enough cannot be said about empathy as it builds toward a subordinate's perception of their leader's humanity. More appropriately, it makes you seem more personable in the eyes of the subordinate. Again, I am in no way advocating roundtable sensing sessions where we all hug it out at the end. I do not mean weak empathy, but Spartan empathy, as demonstrated time and again by King Leonidas in the book, *Gates of Fire*. If you have not yet read that book, then I highly recommend it.

The last component of EQ is social skill. At first glance, this is just as off-putting as empathy; however, social skill has its place in the formation. Social skill is not simply walking through a formation, high-fiving all the younger Soldiers and commiserating about your common struggles in *Call of Duty*. Social skill is about the ability to create appropriate relationships—friendly and not mean—and then moving those relationships in a direction with purpose. Within every organization there are fractured subordinate groups with different personalities, much like the body of Congress. Those groups, for all their differences, typically coalesce to form the organizational whole. You do not have to utilize social skill with every person, but key relationships can steer those groups onward toward the common, often larger organizational goal. I hate to say it, but this is the “politics” side of leadership, and it is a very real part of effective leadership, especially within larger organizations.

Focus of Mentorship Efforts

Leaders—especially new leaders—can be overwhelmed at the scope of their audience, or better stated, the size of their organization. It's easy to lapse back into the thought of how wonderful it was to be a squad leader or just a platoon leader. Let's face it, being a leader in an organization that small meant that you could effectively spend time with members of your team. Mentorship and development seemed more appropriate and accessible. However, as our rank increases, so do expectations and responsibilities. As the numbers of your organization increase exponentially, it becomes painfully apparent that the personal relationships that you maintained in a smaller formation are not attainable in a larger one. So how do we manage mentorship and development in this scenario?

You must focus your mentorship efforts. Larger organizations initially appear nearly unmanageable, and many of us tend to envision senior leaders as impersonal, or at least detached from what is really happening. As leaders, we want to avoid such perceptions, we want to ensure that others find us approachable. A judicious method for assuring such results is to focus the majority of your mentorship efforts within your sphere of influence. Every Captain has Lieutenants, a First Sergeant, and most likely, a senior Warrant Officer. This group represents the Captain's sphere of influence, and this is where the brunt of his leadership development and mentorship efforts should occur. If done correctly, and there is trust within the aforementioned relationships, then the mentorship efforts/leadership vision will be duplicated in his subordinates, ultimately being proliferated throughout the organization. This does not preclude the Captain from getting to know his Soldiers; however, this does establish the brunt of his relationship development and mentorship efforts within the sphere that he can most affect.

“Leaders who continue to grow personally and bring growth to their organizations will influence many and develop a successful team around them” (Maxwell, 1993, p. 180). Leadership author, John C. Maxwell, focuses on the importance of staff development in his best-selling work *Developing the Leader Within You*, calling it “the most important lesson of



Photo by SFC Thomas Scaggis

leadership (Maxwell, 1993, p. 179). Developing and mentoring those within your sphere of influence prevents leaders from being overtaxed. Additionally, it allows the leaders conducting the development to attend to mentorship the right way. In this manner, the leader is developing the appropriate sub-team, which will ultimately do the work of developing the organization. Finally, others will take notice of the team that the leader develops and works well with, and because of this they will better know their leader through the efforts of the developed. This is essentially how a common vision and intimacy among teammates is built within a larger organization.

Demonstration of Humanity

Demonstration of humanity is accomplished through mastering the two previously mentioned areas of my proposed leadership development strategy. My intent is not to have leaders become more emotional. In fact, I prefer Army leaders that focus on character, consistency, and competency. However, we cannot ignore the importance of the emotional spectrum that impacts our day-to-day relationships. I am aware that leadership is not “liker-ship” (and my goodness, I hate that saying). Soldiers are human; subject to human stressors, challenges, and struggles. That means that as leaders, we must at least be aware of that fact and work to improve our understanding of the impact of EQ and leadership development within the ranks of our organization. Relationship development and mentorship of subordinate leaders are very important, as they will one day lead an organization much like the one you lead today.

To prepare those leaders, we must not be robotic and statistic-focused officers and Noncommissioned officers. Instead, we must be leaders of character comfortable building rapport with others in an effort to develop our team. We must become masters of our own emotional spectrum, sensitive to impact of our self-regulation—or lack thereof—and better understand what impact that has on our formations. All this to say that we have to be



authentic in our leadership. Demonstrating our humanity is about acknowledging ourselves, sharing that with others through focused mentorship within our own spheres of influence, and allowing those around us to approach when necessary. Personable and authentic leadership communicates a sense of care and belonging subordinates, and speaks to their own motivational structure (e.g., Maslow’s paper “A Theory of Human Motivations [1943]).

Patton was a transactional leader, feared by his men and others more than respected. Now think of Patton in contrast to Omar Bradley, also known as the “Soldier’s General.” Bradley’s men loved him, and would certainly have died for him (as many did). Each demonstrated, or failed to demonstrate, humanity in their own way. Now ask yourself, which General Officer would you have rather worked for, and how does this affect your perception of the importance of leader development? Whom do you think Soldiers trusted more? Finally, how do you want your Soldiers to perceive you?

Closing Comments

We began with a discussion on the components of EQ, Emotional Intelligence. Following that, we briefly touched on the topic of focused mentorship and development efforts. These areas for improving leadership development take time. To actually learn how to engage in learning these leadership development strategies, we have to make an honest effort to identify our own shortcomings and work on improving them. The question is thus, do you think the topic of leadership development is worth the investment of your time? That question cannot be answered in this forum but instead only dealt with in the mind and heart of every Soldier filling the capacity of a leadership role. Are we willing as Army leaders to identify our own faults, expose our humanity as honest brokers to America’s sons and daughters in an effort to better their experience in the military? While all of these areas of leadership development may take time, I am willing to bet that both you and your organizations will be better off because of it.





Senior NCO CTC Mid-Rotation Success

by CSM James Etheridge

My previous article, Pre-Combat Training Center (CTC) Rotation Tips for Aviation Senior Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs), in the July–September issue of the *Aviation Digest* was the first of three articles intended to assist senior NCOs through the CTC experience. This article, the second of three, focuses on gaining success during the mid-rotation portion of the exercise. While the emphasis in each of these articles is on a CTC rotation, each of the points discussed are equally applicable to a theater deployment. Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rotational units consistently make the same errors as preceding units. This article will assist the unit senior NCOs to identify those areas that they can influence to ensure mission success.

The senior NCO is key to an aviation task force success. They are the first sergeants, platoon sergeants, staff NCO Officers-in-Charge (NCOIC), and production control NCOICs. Each has their own distinctive role that, if ignored, can negatively affect the success of a CTC rotation or combat deployment. If senior NCOs are proactive, committed, and think critically, they can be the key to success. Senior NCOs need to be comprehensively involved in the Military Decision Mak-

ing Process (MDMP) in preparation for deployment. They need to know the capabilities of the aviation task force, including those of our multinational partners. Most importantly, they must understand the CTC scenario and the aviation task force commander's training objectives. This article will focus on six areas in a multifunctional aviation task force where the senior NCOs can make a difference during a CTC rotation. The seven areas on which this article will focus are Command Post (CP) operations, aviation maintenance, Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) operations, Aero-medical Evacuation (MEDAVAC) procedures, and aviation sustainment.

Every Task Force, or TF, encounters challenges during a CTC rotation. It is the responsibility of the CTC Observer Coach Trainer (OC/T) to help the unit improve efficiencies within the unit by identifying obstacles blocking the path to success. One of the tools the JMRC uses to do this is the mid-rotation After-Action Review (AAR) that normally follows a major operation or objective.

Command Post Operations

The CP is the nerve center of the task force and is where unit leadership makes plans and decisions for current and fu-

ture operations, whether it takes place at a CTC or deployed forward to Iraq or Afghanistan. Within the CP, some of the obstacles blocking the unit's path to success manifest themselves as broad communication issues or lack of synchronization within current operations. For the senior operations NCOs, gaining success at mid-rotation begins by engaging Soldiers to ensure they understand their function within the CP and their contribution to unit success.

Within the Current Operations (CUOPS) section, everyone seems to have a different perception on missions and task. By the time the mid-rotation point arrives, CUOPS has completely changed the operation orders planned by the future operations section. Thus, if the CUOPS performed their tasks in harmony, rather than chaos, everyone would be working toward a common objective and the planning resources invested in planning not wasted.

The CP is the realm of the S-3 NCOIC. He is responsible for the synchronization of all staff functions for the commander. The S-3 NCOIC is knowledgeable of all Army Battle Command Systems, understands their function and organization within the CP, and supervises and instructs sub-

ordinates in proper work techniques and procedures. The effective NCOIC will be deeply involved in mission execution in support of the S-3. Many of the unit's NCOICs participating in a CTC rotation have no operations experience and no idea of how manage a successful CP. They do not understand the requirement for constant communication coordination between the radio transmitter operator, battle captain, and the battle NCO. The successful CTC rotation is a result of the six principles of mission command; build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, utilize mission orders, and accept prudent risk. All are required for success.

Aviation Maintenance

Aviation maintenance operations of a task force conducting a CTC rotation can be challenging. This is typically the first time that units from different organizations, and even different countries, come together to operate as one team immediately upon arrival. Task force integration and multinational interoperability are key factors in creating and sustaining a successful task force. It is imperative that leadership identify and address the strengths and weaknesses of each unit in order to help mold an effective organization. One of the hurdles that the senior NCOs need to overcome is identifying

who has the authority to delegate maintenance support personnel within the task force. Maintenance personnel from the different units making up the task force need to understand the chain of command and the authority of the first sergeant, platoon sergeants, and production control NCOIC to task out key personnel during combat operations, providing mission support where it is needed the most.

Integration of maintenance assets of the units making up the task force should be a major planning consideration prior to deployment or conducted immediately on the unit's arrival. Typically, most rotational training units arrive and set up their own maintenance areas without regard to the other task force unit maintenance area locations. Senior NCOs should anticipate this and immediately consolidate all maintenance support in one central location to improve overall task force efficiency and continually focus on streamlining all available assets and specialties. Some multinational partners are not equipped to sustain high operational tempo in an austere environment for extended periods and will require additional support and expertise in order to maintain maintenance operations. Key leadership meetings and allowing Soldiers to become familiar with different airframes and support personnel specialties making up the task force

will expedite this process. This weighs heavily on a strong production control NCOIC to provide the required leadership and knowledge to delegate support personnel where and when required to ensure mission success.

Forward Arming and Refueling Point Operations

One of the most important missions for the Multifunctional Aviation Task force (MFATF) or E Company operation and sustainment of the FARP. Aviation units are relatively successful at issuing fuel to aircraft from a main FARP location; however, units struggle with proper procedure for planning and establishing a jump FARP and with proper accountability of fuel and ammunition. Not all aviation units deal with armament on a regular basis; therefore, the knowledge of properly storing and handling the different variants of ammunition is crucial to the success of an attack mission. Many factors go into planning and coordinating a jump FARP. Not only does the platoon leadership need to be involved, but the S-3 and S-2 play an integral role in determining the enemy situation and then selecting the site, route, and configuration of the FARP. Army Publishing Directorate's Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-04.94 (in italics) (Department of the Army, 2012), "ATP for Forward Arming and Refueling Points" identifies the roles and responsibilities of each level of



leadership. Active aircraft movements into and out of FARP locations and the volatile mix of fuel and ammunition create one of the MFATF's most dangerous operations during a deployment. Leaders at every level need to be knowledgeable about FARP operations and ensure safety, situational awareness, quality surveillance, and petroleum accountability procedures are at the forefront of FARP personnel and aircrews.

Many units tend to struggle through the rotational drama of a CTC; however, with proper planning, training, and rehearsals, TF leadership can improve FARP operations. Senior NCOs need to ensure FARP personnel receive the proper rest cycles. Too many times, we observe Soldiers working until 2100 or 2200 and having to be up at 0200 the next morning for a convoy to conduct a jump FARP. Ensuring proper fighter management will increase productivity of Soldiers and contribute to the unit's success.

Aeromedical Evacuation Operations

Forward support MEDEVAC platoon sergeants must assist the commander and platoon leader in analyzing the Hospital Service Support (HSS) plan. As the mission transitions from defensive to offensive operations, MEDEVAC leaders must recognize the need to adjust the HSS plan. As the Role 1 and 2 medical treatment facilities move forward to support offensive operations, planners will need to incorporate Ambulance Exchange Points (AXP) and Air Ambulance Exchange Points (AAXP) as far forward as possible to provide immediate and timely support to the combatant commander's offensive operations. Identification of these exchange points early in anticipation of ground force advances allows for a proactive evacuation plan rather than a reactive hasty plan.

The mid-rotation point provides the unit an opportunity to adjust the current medical common operational picture and incorporate changes into the sustainment annexes of the operations order. The brigade surgeon, support op-

erations officer, or medical operations officer will conduct planning and analysis for medical support for future offensive operations; however, the forward support medical platoon leaders must ensure they have a seat at the table. They should be prepared to discuss current capabilities, Mission Essential Information (MEI) requirements, and be ready to address any issues with utilization and synchronization of air and ground MEDEVAC assets that occurred in the previous phase of the rotation.

Aviation Sustainment

The Logistical Status (LOGSTAT) report is an essential tool reflecting the current logistical and sustainment status of the unit. As importantly, it reflects consumption trends that support future operations. The TF S-4 must consistently contend with units that fail to submit the LOGSTAT or provide inaccurate information. Senior NCO involvement with logistics and sustainment is essential, and emphasis from the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) down is key to ensuring the units deliver their LOGSTAT accurately and on time. A method that has shown success at JMRC is requiring staff NCOs to remove themselves from the confines of the CP to personally collect unit LOGSTAT information. This emphasis demonstrates the level of importance to the line companies and, more times than not, corrects LOGSTAT issues. Additionally, the old-fashioned radio call to the company CP from the CSM is also a method to ensure timely turn-in. If the battalion command teams emphasize a topic of interest, it will become an item of interest to the company command teams.

Rotational units will typically sacrifice a sustainment rehearsal or downplay its significance in order to leverage more time to plan and execute combined arms rehearsals. Sustainment rehearsals provide shared understanding of battalion casualty care; resupply operations of all classes, but especially Class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and Class V (ammunition); equipment repair parts; and the endless other items necessary to keep the unit operational and in the

fight. Sustainment must clearly be the business of senior NCOs if the unit is to be successful. These areas are oftentimes friction points for aviation battalions by the midpoint of the rotation. NCOs are simply uninformed on battalion logistics operations standards due to the lack of proper rehearsal at the start of a rotation. When units take the time to create a rehearsal agenda and formulate a script to ensure smooth sustainment operations, battalion synchronization and shared understanding greatly improves.

Conclusion

The role of the NCO is critical at all levels. Understanding these roles and performing the tasks expected for their position is vital for success. NCOs are the backbone of every organization and they have a tremendous impact. The sergeant first class supervises Soldiers, integrates assets and personnel, and coordinates operations. The first sergeant manages personnel, mentors and develops Soldiers, and oversees sustainment operations. The staff NCOIC plans, synchronizes, and resources. The command sergeant major shapes, influences, and drives the commander's intent. Each role is significant to the operation of the unit. It is essential that the NCOs train Soldiers for combat and ensure they are committed to mission success.



Train To Win!

A special thanks to the following co-authors; SFC Edward Keopuhiwa (CP Operations), SSG Kendrick Robinson (CP Operations), SFC Michael Bishop (Medical Evacuation Operations), SFC Francis Donnelly (FARP), SFC William Johnson (Aviation Maintenance), and CPT Jerad Hoffmann (Aviation Sustainment).



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Hi-Tech Officers— Asset or Liability in Combat Leadership?

Should a combat leader spend more time with his troops and less time obtaining a formal education? Do overly zealous efforts to achieve higher qualified officers inadvertently make them more conformist and less audacious? Is a leader dependent on his group? The author stimulates thoughts on these questions and analyzes a current trend which, he asserts, is having a damaging influence on combat leadership.

Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Azam

LTC Azam was attending the Aviation Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL, in 1990 when he wrote this article.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II era has witnessed a strong surge by all armies to increase the intellectual level of their officers. This is especially true of the officers at junior command level; i.e., company, battalion, and brigade.

This obsession has led almost all armies to over-qualify these midcareer officers in a variety of combat-related and noncombat-related disciplines. It is not uncommon to find a large number of officers well versed in various foreign languages, knowledgeable of the doctrine of other armies, and feeling at home with high-sounding strategic and theater maneuver concepts. This ensuing trend has both its strong supporters and ardent nonsupporters. The author examines the advantages, and highlights the pitfalls and disadvantages, to which this trend is leading armies. He analyzes the effects of the current trend of over-qualifying the officers vis-à-vis the combat efficiency of units. He develops this analysis first by determining established leadership traits and qualities. Then he matches them with the products of overqualification. This match, or comparison, vividly clarifies how useful or damaging the current trend is.

Desired Qualities and Traits of a Combat Leader

The most desired qualities of a *combat* leader, as distilled from the writings of many famous military theorists, are courage; job competence/military knowledge; knowledge of his or her men; battle endurance, mental and physical; capacity to influence his or her men; and boldness.

Current Qualifications Trend—Advantages

Besides completing the basic, advanced, command and general staff, and war college courses, an officer moving in the fast promotion track has ample opportunities to collect or add up a couple of university degrees; for example, a masters in business administration and in international affairs; and to learn several foreign languages.

This trend results in continuous professional growth of officers on par with civilians. An air of contempt was on the increase among civilians, who considered

army officers as semiliterate. Attainment of university degrees by army officers arraigns them at par, and the negative tone of becoming underconfident is arrested.

The logic behind this advantage is understood, but it certainly does not help in increasing the combat efficiency of a unit or office. At the lower levels of command; i.e., company, battalion or regiment, however, such knowledge is often superfluous.

Current Qualifications Trend—Disadvantages

Decreases time with troops. Overqualification robs officers of a very important asset—time with troops. The result of an officer's spending years away from his unit in a civilian university is lack of knowledge of his or her troops.

General William T. Sherman said, "The regiment is the family. The colonel, as the father, should have a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and should instill a feeling of pride and affection for himself so that his officers and men would naturally look to him for personal advice and instruction."

General Omar Bradley said, "The greatest leader in the world could never win a campaign unless he understood the men he had to lead."

This understanding of men comes not from any university degree, but by spending time with men. Officers, having stayed away from units on instructional staff or for formal education, develop a certain kind of shyness and are unsure of themselves in front of men.

Weakens team spirit. The trend towards higher qualifications and "ticket punching" leads officers to unhealthy competition. This also makes the officer too individualistic and elitist in approach and defeats the

whole sense of team spirit. Lord Moram, in his famous book *The Anatomy of Courage*, explains group belonging as one of the basic pillars by which fear is conquered by men in war.

Inculcates timidity. The U.S. Army policy of "up or out" forces officers to become more conformist and avoid mistakes. Similarly, the long struggle to achieve higher qualifications inadvertently makes an officer more conformist and less audacious.

This trend is something very natural and understandable. The officer, having collected a long list of qualifications, starts seeing better assignments and promotions as mere acts of time. He starts hating to make waves or annoy his immediate seniors by disagreeing with them. He tends to become a yes man and is no longer bold. His initiative is blunted by an overcautious attitude. He does not want to make a mistake, and towards this end, assumes a low profile.

Daniel Defoe is credited with an apt axiom, which goes like this, "It is better to have a lion at the head of an army of sheep, than a sheep at the head of an army of lions."

General George S. Patton Jr. also highlighted the importance of boldness when he said, "There are only three principles of warfare—Audacity, Audacity, and AUDACITY."

Decreases combat experience. The large variety of disciplines and fields that are now available for officers in most armies makes it likely that most of these officers may not be available for combat. It also is an established fact that there is no substitute for war experience.

General Maxwell D. Taylor said, "Military men who have spent lives in the uniform of their country acquire a unique experience in preparing for war and

"It is generally believed that we need enlightened and responsible leaders—at every level and in every phase of our national life. But the nature of leadership in our society is very imperfectly understood."
John W. Gardner

Hi-Tech Officers

in waging it. No theoretical studies, no intellectual attainments on the part of the layman, can be a substitute for the experience of having lived and delivered under the stress of war.”

Lowers endurance. An officer having followed an intellectual, but softer, route by attending civilian universities or performing instructional or extraregimental duties is likely to be much less robust as compared to another officer who spends more time with the regiment.

General Napoleon Bonaparte laid great emphasis on physical conditioning of his troops when he said, “The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and hardship. Courage is only the second. Poverty, privation, and want are the school of the good soldier.”


Lowers capacity to influence. Elmar Dinter, in his book *Hero or Coward*, discusses the qualities of a competent *combat* leader and concludes that “The leader is to a certain degree dependent on his group. Hence it is important on the one hand that he understands the group and its members, and on the other hand that he can effectively exert his influence. This can be achieved above all by providing information, by putting his points across by convincing speech or by example, by delegating tasks and by concern for welfare. He should make only reasonable demands on his group—unreasonable or incomprehensible orders lead to reluctance. Further the group must know that it can rely on the leader in any circumstance.”

The question now arises, “How come a soldier (officer) with more qualifications often does not fit into this combat leadership picture?” The answer is simple and, to some extent, has already been pointed out in the earlier part of this article. The main reason why an officer usually more qualified doesn’t normally do well in influencing his troops is because he stays out of contact. He fails to develop sensitivity to that frequency band essential to understanding his men.

The system has not given him sufficient time with his troops.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that higher qualifications, assignments, and exposure raise the intellectual level of officers. However, this trend runs tangent to the requirements of *combat* leadership. Armies in their pursuit to excellence have unwittingly adopted this approach, which is proving more harmful than beneficial.

Having determined the essential qualities of a *combat* leader, we have pitched these criteria to the effects of this trend under discussion and found that it carries a more damaging influence. All armies of the world have taken this highway leading to incompetency. There is still time since this concept is still in its infancy. As Adlai Stephenson said, “The time to stop a revolution is at the beginning, not the end.” 

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THE “NOT IN MY SQUAD” PROGRAM

Making Positive Changes in the Army

by SSG Grady M. Elmore and SFC Tyler P. Hervey

Photo by SPC Robert Douglas

Several professional development courses of training are available on the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) website. One such program is “Not In My Squad (NIMS)”.

Several professional development courses of training are available on the “Center for the Army Profession and Ethic” (CAPE) Web site. One such program is “Not In My Squad (NIMS),” as prefaced by the following statement on the CAPE site:

The Army doctrine of Mission Command is based on building cohesive teams through mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose. The squad is the foundational team upon which the Army builds its formations. As the Squad Leader, you are responsible for all your team

does or fails to do. You are charged with taking the lead in training your squad and instilling discipline and a “winning spirit” in each of your Soldiers. This is your Duty. Your Soldiers, as a cohesive team, must accomplish the mission in the right way (ethically, effectively, and efficiently), striving for excellence, and persevering through adversity, challenge, and setback. To do so, they require inspiration, motivation, and committed leadership. (CAPE, 2017)

As an Army squad leader the ever-changing pace of the Army mission should be easily adaptable by the squad in mutual trust and cohesion within the squad. This is the primary focus of the “Not In My Squad” program. The program shows the effects of decisions made in virtual train-

ing. Additionally, the program gives junior leaders and Soldiers an insight into the decision-making process at the senior leader level of the Army on disciplinary and morale-breaking issues.

Army Profession

“The Army Profession is a unique vocation of experts certified in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of land power, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people” as (Department of the Army [DA], 2015a, p. 1-2). The United States Army promotes “commitment to maintaining the Army as a military profession” (DA, 2015b, p. 1-1). One way to ensure that Soldiers continue to improve upon commitment is through professional development. The NIMS initiative is a professional development course

that is committed to upholding higher standards for junior leaders and enlisted Soldiers. The NIMS course systematically breaks down the five characteristics of the Army profession and shows implementation of these characteristics in Army decision-making processes. The five characteristics include: military expertise, honorable service, trust, Esprit de Corps, and stewards of the profession.

Character

Character in the Army profession is vital to earn and sustain trust amongst junior leaders and Soldiers in the squad. The NIMS course provides real-life interactive modules to demonstrate the effects of how different decisions reflect a Soldier's character. Based on the multichoice modules, choices selected reflect the different ways the scenarios outcomes can change the Soldier's character. The perception of character by other Soldiers directly reflects the type of leader he or she is. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) No. 6-22, "Character is essential to successful leadership. It determines who people are, how they act, helps determine right from wrong, and choose what is right" (DA, 2012a, p. 83). Junior leaders who show good character provide a basis for junior Soldiers to emulate and grow into future leaders with strong character.

Empower Junior Leaders

The virtual simulations in NIMS give junior enlisted Soldiers the ability to see how simple decisions can greatly change the outcome of a training exercise. In addition to outcomes of training, NIMS also shows junior enlisted Soldiers what the effect of the disruption of good order and discipline can do to the morale in the unit.

Competent leaders know the best way to create a solid organization is to empower subordinates. Empowering subordinates does not mean omitting checks and only making necessary corrections. Leaders help subordinates in identifying successes and mistakes by ensuring they sort out what happened and why. (DA, 2012b, p 49)

The NIMS modules teaches junior leaders that communication with junior enlisted

Soldiers is vital in accomplishing mission tasks, and it helps soon to be subordinate leaders to grow and develop trust. "If subordinate leaders are to grow and develop trust, it is best to let them learn through experience. Effective leaders allow space for subordinates to experiment within the bounds of intent-based orders and plans" (DA, 2012c, p. 49).

Junior leaders and subordinates need to be given the chance accomplish the mission, this is empowering. "Leaders empower subordinates by training them to do a job and providing them with necessary task strategies; give them the necessary resources, authority, and clear intent; and then step aside to let them accomplish the mission" (DA, 2012d, p. 160). This empowerment entails a great deal of trust but is necessary in order to allow Soldiers to develop, grow, and take responsibility for their actions

Building Trust and Cohesion

Sergeant Major of the Army, Daniel A. Daily says, "Not in My Squad" is a grassroots initiative focused on building mutual trust and cohesion at the squad and team level" (CAPE, 2016). The squad is the foundation of the Army formation. It is imperative that the squad leader build trust and cohesion within the squad to accomplish the mission ethically, effectively, and efficiently. The NIMS workshop educates Soldiers in effective ways to build cohesion and trust in the team. NIMS provides unique situational modules for the Squad Leader. In these modules, Soldiers take the lead in the training to display whether the decisions

they make will accomplish the missions effectively or ineffectively. According to ADRP 6-22:

Leaders shape cohesive teams by setting and maintaining high standards. Positive climates exist where good, consistent performance is the norm. This differs from a climate where perfectionism is the expectation. The team should appreciate a concentrated, honest effort even when the results are incomplete. They should feel that their leader recognizes value in every opportunity as a means to learn and improve. Effective leaders recognize that reasonable setbacks and failures occur whether the team does everything right or not. Leaders should express the importance of being competent and motivated, but understand weaknesses exist. Mistakes create opportunities to learn. as (DA 2012e, p.223)

Ethics, Values, and Virtues Both Past and Present

The Army Values are one of the first lessons a new recruit receives following the classical head shave and cattle truck ride to their barracks. It's this set of moral principles that guide the Soldier, both recruit and senior, to not only accomplishing their missions, but complete it in a virtuous and positive manner. The continuous implementation of these values reinforce a Soldier's trust in his or her leader. Strong conviction to the Army Values, coupled with top-notch technical expertise, are the recipe for a respectable leader that is ready to lead, fight, and win America's wars. The NIMS program aims to reinforce these ideas to spur the



Photo by SFC Robert Douglas



evolution of junior leaders in the right direction. The Army has neither the time nor the room for vices such as disloyalty, disrespect, selfishness, cowardice, or dishonesty. These traits are contrary to Army Values and warrior ethos and degrade mission readiness in a number of ways.

Before changing a culture, we first need to change ourselves. A wise leader builds upon the works and experience of those that came before him or her, while realizing that we as humans do not have all of the answers. From time to time, we need to look into a mirror and recalibrate our intrinsic values. We must ask ourselves why we decided to serve our country and

what that means to us. If the answer does not align with the Army Values, we need to re-evaluate ourselves as a leader. I have done this many times during basic-decision making in day-to-day life.

The United States Army is not the first military organization to adopt a set of codes or virtues. The ancient Roman Empire existed from 753 BC to 27 BC and then from 64 AD to 1453 AD. Romulus was the founder and first king of Rome. Romulus and his contemporaries laid the foundations for all legal, religious, social, and political institutions that ultimately led to their concrete doctrine and virtues. The word “virtue” itself is derived from the Latin term “virtus,” the personification of the deity ‘Virtus,’ and had connotations related to masculinity, worthiness, strength, and civic duty as both a citizen and a Soldier. This was but one of many virtues that Romans in positions of leadership, whether civilian or military, were expected to uphold and pass on through the generations as part of the “Mos Maiorum,” an ancestral tradition that defined what being a Roman meant.

The primary Roman virtues that drove the greatness and effectiveness of their Soldiers were: Auctoritas (Authority), Comitas (humor, courtesy, sociability), Constantia (perseverance and resilience, both physical and mental), Clementia (mercy), Dignitas (dignity), Disciplina (discipline), Firmitas (tenacity), Frugalitas (frugality), Gravitas (gravity or

sense of responsibility and earnestness), Honestas (respectability), Humanitas (cultured and civilized), Industria (industriousness), Iustitia (justice), Pietas (dutifulness that included patriotism, piety to God, and to society as a whole), Prudentia (prudence), Salubritas (wholesomeness), Severitas (sternness, self-control, and stoicism which is tied to Gravititas directly), Veritas (truthfulness), and Virtus (“manliness” or valorous and courageous. ‘Vir’ is Latin for “man”).

It’s glaringly apparent that the values and virtues of the Roman Soldier were not so different from our own. You can also see that many of the words we use in modern English stem from these ancient terms. We have a lot to learn from them about what it means to serve our country, why it is important, and how fragile freedom really is.

Conclusion

The NIMS workshop is an effective tool to train junior leaders and Soldiers to build cohesion and trust. Through using interactive modules, Soldiers learn ways to communicate, build trust, become empowered, and show good character. The way to shape the Army of the future and to produce effective, efficient, and ethical leaders starts at the lowest levels. The NIMS workshop training needs to be implemented across the Army to build a more effective and productive Army.



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Reframing Deployed Operations

—Aviation Expeditionary Advisory Packages

by 1LT Robert L. Mayville, III and 1SG Bryant D. Macfarlane

“Anticipating the demands of future armed conflict requires an understanding of continuities in the nature of war, as well as an appreciation for changes in the character of armed conflict.”¹

The current reality of foreign commitments is one of lean numbers and increasingly smaller support assets. With the reduced number of forces abroad, it is time to re-evaluate the construct of our task organization in order to better meet mission requirements in a constrained environment. This reality is further compounded with increasingly tighter force-manning levels. A problem set of this sort requires innovation in manning and new command structures that are formed with the decrement to confront such a reality, and the

solution must be organic to the deploying force. One approach that is proving its effectiveness in this resource-constrained environment is the Expeditionary Advisory Package (EAP). This discussion recommends restructuring the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) organization alignment with the EAP construct in order to provide the necessary aviation support. As a result, the potential aviation support will be ready fully meet the challenges of the Train, Advise, and Assist mission. Furthermore, the unit promises to be more expeditionary, sustainable, and flexible to the geographically dynamic traits of counterinsurgency.

Defining the EAP

Though doctrinally undefined, senior leaders have publicly discussed EAPs since at least 2014.² The EAP represents a modern forward posturing

of forces, following historical precedence set by the Truman-Marshall Doctrine of Containment and U.S. law.³ Though no modern standardized doctrine exists regarding the EAP concept, one may extrapolate much by understanding the constraints and limitations of the Commander’s intent and a passing familiarity with the doctrine of *Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.2*, “Foreign Internal Defense” (FID).

The EAP is capable of operating in expeditionary environments with ambiguous, conditions-based metrics for success. The EAP provides tactical and expeditionary advising at the Corps level to areas where a territorial loss by the host nation security force would cause strategic detriment to the host nation’s security. As such, the EAP mission can be defined



Photo by Gertrud Zach

through paraphrasing *ATP 3-05.2* as, “anticipating, precluding, and, as a last resort, countering an internal threat that is likely to require a mix of indirect and direct approaches across the Warfighting functions that span all categories of FID support that span the spectrum of security assistance, to include U.S. combat operations.”⁴

EAPs and Army Aviation

The mission of an Aviation EAP is to enable the ground force commander (GFC) with rotary-wing maneuver and sustainment for combat advisory operations supporting host nation security forces. Since CABs are easily and frequently operating in decentralized mission command (MC) elements, the CAB can easily organize to implement and sustain the EAP.

The construction of each EAP asset is based upon task organizing units under a singular company command—similar to a smaller traditional Task Force organization—exercising all Warfighting functions under the doctrine of MC. Though doctrinally this unitary command should be under a field-grade officer,⁵ smaller EAPs could fall under a senior company commander. Recent comments by senior Joint Force leaders and General Milley⁶ define this need for decentralized decision making, “Throughout operations, unexpected opportunities and threats rapidly present themselves. Operations require responsibility and decision making at the point of action.”⁷

Mission Command should be implemented as both a Warfighting function and a leadership philosophy if it is to succeed in distributed environments. The EAP’s day-to-day operations are simply too remote and too dynamic to do otherwise. A clear task and purpose is essential to these operations. The EAP’s breadth of working relationships mandates that junior leaders are autonomous, competent, and communicative to their combined, joint, and multinational partners. Junior leaders must ensure supported assets are aware of the aviation detachment’s unique capabilities and limitations.⁸ The proposed EAP structure must empower subordinate leaders, integrating strategic thought well within all ranks of the EAP’s formation. In doing so, the EAP



Photo by Cpl Danielle Rodrigues

can maximize its return on the resources it invests to distant operations.


Preparation

1st Infantry Division (ICAB) experienced much success implementing these structures across Afghanistan. Leaders did not anticipate the need for such structures and arrived at EAPs out of operational necessity. Of the five locations in which ICAB implemented EAPs, only one was an enduring location. This initial Heavy EAP was designed and manned from tasking, featuring a field-grade in command, and a First Sergeant counterpart, thereby providing a reasonable command team to assume a warm-base location. Of the other four EAPs, three were tasked under a senior company-grade officer with a Sergeant First Class counterpart. These two Light-, one Medium-, and one Heavy-EAP formations deployed to previously abandoned multinational positions across the battlespace. These unforeseen EAPs operated for periods as short as several weeks to nearly 3 months. The EAPs formed both the need to doctrinally define EAPs and the impetus for this article.

Recommendations

The EAP is designed to force modularity into the planning process and provide forces ready to deploy for a multitude of contingencies in support of the host nation. The recommended EAP structures fulfill the intent of sustainable aviation assets to support the GFC and host nation partners while maximizing manning use. The proposed Rotary-Wing EAP Task Force, or RWEAPTF, is conceptualized under the framework of the

Marine Expeditionary Units and nests within the proposed Train and Advise Brigade.⁹



The proposed organization, RWEAPTF, aligns with and fully supports geographic regional command structures. Under the RWEAPTF configuration, the Task Force retains the ownership of regional geographical command. The traditional Aviation Battalion or Squadron Task Force (ABTF/ASTF) Commander would assume the role of an Assistant Regional Commander for Movement (Air), or referred to in abbreviation as ARC-M (A). This ARC-M (A) role would fulfill the roles and responsibilities of both the G3 Air and of the Brigade Aviation Officer (BAO), into a super role on the Regional Commander’s staff. Though likely not geographically located with the regional combatant command headquarters, this arrangement provides a much more robust aviation capacity across the theater than is currently recognized.

The RWEAPTF Commander retains all air planning, air operations, scheduling, and airspace management for the entire region. Additionally, the RWEAPTF Commander retains the initiative and freedom of maneuver across the battle space with a legacy of shared understanding and unity of purpose from the unit’s

BOG (Boots on the Ground) date without concern for national caveats or capabilities. The ABTF/ASTF Commander is positioned as part of a regional command's primary staff. This positioning creates a larger scope of responsibility for the ABTF/ASTF Commander, while providing better fidelity regarding the CAB's capabilities and limitations to the Regional Commander. This staff function unifies the efforts of the RWEAPTF to optimize combat power to the areas where the Regional Commander most needs Aviation EAPs.


By realigning ownership of the EAP formations under the Brigade Staff, the effort to implement theater priorities can be more easily realized, while better maintaining phase flow and bank time. Command Relationship alignment under the CAB is the most plausible way to manifest a surplus of field-grade officers to lead the EAP formations. Under current manning, this would provide for at least six field-grade officers to lead larger EAPs, supplemented by senior company-grade officers leading smaller EAPs, across the battlespace. The EAPs can be TACON (Tactical Control) under an ABTF/ASTF to provide necessary sustainment support not aligned under the proposed RWEAPTF. This construct allows for the Brigade Aviation Maintenance Officer (BAMO) and the Brigade S3 to synergize operational and sustainment needs across the entire theater, while ensuring that no singular area is reduced in capacity.

Though this construct does reduce the size of the formation of the ABTF/ASTF Commander, the primary concern of providing combat power to the regional GFC is shifted to the Brigade Staff. Without secondary field-grade officers in the ABTF/ASTF formation, the size and scope of the formation must shift away from the outmoded roles and responsibilities of the past. This formation would allow the ABTF/ASTF Commander to assume the roles and responsibilities discussed above, while still providing through his staff the sustainment that a Theater Aviation Support Maintenance (TASM), Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), or Army Sustainment Command (ASC) would have provided in years

past. In addition to this, there would be a more traditional command and control cell to monitor operations. Where plans and MC will now occur between the RWEAPTF and the EAP formations, the ABTF/ASTF staff will continue to provide the necessary sustainment support to the EAPs.


The EAP is modular and possesses its own Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) and Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) assets that sustain, at a minimum, aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and aerial security assets to support the GFC's intent. A reasonable recommendation in support of this strategy would include structuring the CAB RWEAPTF to support three variations on the Aviation EAP, all based on the tactical objectives and GFC's intent for a particular EAP mission. For simplicity's sake, the Aviation EAPs are given nomenclature based on size—begetting the Light, Medium, and Heavy EAPs.

For instance, if the GFC's primary mode of operation is the Ground Assault Force (GAF), where TIC/QRF (Troops in Contact/Quick Reaction Force) support is a primary concern, a Light EAP with MEDEVAC and aerial security assets would be sufficient to support the desired intent of the GFC. Should a mission set require infrequent Helicopter Assault Forces (HAFs), advising over large geographical spaces, or advising through terrain unsuited for GAFs, a Medium EAP may be more practical. For a mobile and expeditionary replication of an ABTF/ASTF, the Heavy EAP will provide the GFC the full capacitance of HAF/GAF projection, aerial security, MEDEVAC, and sustainment functions.




The Light EAP is dependent upon other assets for logistical and sustainment support and is, therefore, best suited for operations lasting a finite period, or to locations where logistical and sustain-

ment support is already in place but lack an organic aviation asset. The platoon-minus formation of AH-64 helicopters can effectively provide aerial reconnaissance, security, maneuver support, and MEDEVAC escort to support GAFs and advising patrols.



The Medium EAP will provide limited logistical and sustainment support to both the GFC and the Aviation EAP. Nonetheless, the addition of a UH-60 section will still mandate that the Medium EAP be heavily dependent upon overland or fixed-wing sources of supply to sustain operations for longer than a brief period of time.



The Heavy EAP is best suited for prolonged forward projection to austere sites, while maintaining both combat power and sustainment. Thorough coordination between the UH-60 and CH-47 sections guarantee effective HAF planning, personnel movement, and sustainment. The robust capabilities of an AH-64 platoon guarantee full maneuver, Close Combat Attack, and aerial reconnaissance through day and night Attack Weapons Teams (AWTs).

The fundamental advantage of realigning under the proposed structure is increased flexibility and modularity, while reducing manpower requirements. Though the reduction in manpower may only result in a relatively small quantity across the board, the increase in rapidly re-deployable expeditionary assets theater-wide will result in a more effective organization that, when employed appropriately, can add capacity and capability far ex-

ceeding those available under the current Task Force alignment. The EAP construct is feasible when re-deploying from the tactical to garrison environment in varying degrees of permanence. Despite these clear benefits, the Aviation EAPs' most consistent and fundamental challenges still persist in both the domain of appropriate command relationships and sustainment.

Commanding EAPs

Command relationships are a challenge, both internally and externally. Internally, the on-demand formation of these assets becomes analogous to the status of a Corporal in the formation. For example, is the Corporal a Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) at all times, or is the Corporal at times a Solider and other times an NCO? The EAP Command Relationships have tested the task-organized relationships arranged in the pre-deployment phase in garrison by necessitated on-order direct support (DS) relationships from one task force area of responsibility to another to form instantaneously. The larger stressing point to these internal command relationships is that the EAP is generally tasked for a conditions-based timeline, which is exceptionally hard to accurately gauge. Communication through mission orders and creating a shared understanding within the formation is imperative to counter the potentially corrosive effects of false expectations.

Externally, these command relationship stressors come from both the multiechelon ground force command structure and the relative ability of the Aviation EAP Commander to synergize and maintain collective efforts with the co-located GFC. Generally speaking, the Aviation EAP Commander is required to educate their ground counterpart on the employment of aviation assets appropriately; providing refined task and purpose, and also insight with respect to the art and science of aviation sustainment maintenance and manning. Just as the charisma and acumen of the Aviation EAP Commander can enrich or poison the relationship, the individual maintainers, operators, and support personnel can easily corrode the fragile DS relationship. When this DS relationship, as doctrinally recommended,¹⁰ becomes unsustainable

through implementation of Aviation assets—either through increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) on maintenance or crew-rest cycles—the local command relationship is further stressed by necessitating the EAP to become tactically and operationally ineffective. If these incongruences cannot be resolved under the DS relationship, the tasking must be shifted to a higher echelon in the general support (GS) structure to alleviate the issue.

Sustainment

A primary logistical challenge for remotely deployed aviation elements is the inability to conduct intermediate and heavy scheduled maintenance. An Aviation EAP lacks the sustainability of mission lines at major airfields such as Kandahar, Bagram, and Jalalabad. Scheduled maintenance is inevitable, and Aviation Commanders must “clearly articulate” scheduled maintenance and associated logistical requirements “early in the integration process.”¹¹ It is incumbent upon the Aviation Task Force Commander to rapidly replace aircraft requiring inspections with fully mission capable (FMC) aircraft at regional hubs.

In doing so, the EAP's Aviation element will have continuous combat effectiveness to maneuver and sustain in support of the GFC. These rapid turnarounds mandate robust heavy maintenance support, be it organic to the CAB or provided by contracted personnel. Under ideal conditions, major airfields would possess a maintenance platoon—either through a composite Aviation Maintenance Company (AMC) or from the CAB's ASB—aligned as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) Task Force's organic maintenance unit. In today's resource-limited environment, however, such maintenance requirements mandate extremely frugal personnel selection.

Sustaining rotary-wing operations at remote EAPs, beyond scheduled maintenance support, requires a continuous inflow of fuel, ammunition, and aircraft parts. The lifeblood of expeditionary operations for ground or air-based operations is unquestionably fuel. Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) often lack the materiel to sustain refuel-



ing operations for extended periods, as their equipment lacks the fidelity to last longer than a few weeks. The Advanced Aviation Forward Area Refueling System (AAFARS) was never designed with prolonged use in mind, and the infrastructure to emplace more robust systems is generally an unsound investment, both economically and in time expended. Class I is eternally a struggle in austere environments, especially since historically, units have left foodservice and field-feeding capacities in garrison. Prolonged field-feeding, though capable through shelf-stable provisions, is a substantial consideration for both sustainment and morale of EAP forces.

Collectively, Task Forces must hold its staff accountable to flexible, quick-reacting, and thorough responses in sustainment of combat power. If EAPs' aviation detachments are to be generally self-sustaining, Task Forces must forecast logistical requirements well in advance of an EAP's onset. If the region's Task Force Commander provides spare aircraft and a robust inventory of spare parts, the EAP can mitigate maintenance contingencies and focus on scheduled maintenance.¹² Thorough joint coordination can provide sufficient fuel and ammunition to minimize rotary-wing aircraft flying self-sustainment operations. Competent and well-staffed FARP teams can communicate and forecast requirements before they limit combat effectiveness. Field grade or senior company grade leadership at the EAP alleviates sustainment risks by empowering the planners best positioned to anticipate supply and maintenance exigencies.

Training

Task organizing the CAB into multifunction EAP detachments well in advance of deployment, similar to the current tech-

nique of organizing into the ABTF/ASTF, will bolster these command relationships internally and externally. Through the Top-Down/Bottom-Up approach to training, the CAB can effectively “adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities” that are inevitable for the multifunctional, remotely deployed Aviation EAP detachment. Internally, the EAP detachment must rely heavily on leaders to identify specific, relevant, and challenging training that will prepare Soldiers at all levels for sustainable, yet expeditionary, missions, maintenance, and movement.¹³ Train and Advise operations include traditional aviation missions, as well as instructing and advising roles to host nation aviation and ground force assets. These missions require practical employment of cultural empathy, realistic expectation management, significant focus on operational security, and exercise of disciplined initiative within the MC tenants. Realistic training and operations mirroring an EAP’s conditions-based goals will prepare these detachments for flexible planning operations, and with appropriate motivation.

When operating in EAP configurations, the traditional static command relationships and roles compound and become increasingly dynamic. While providing the foundation for all seven Aviation Core Competencies and Warfighting

Functions, the dynamic shift in the use of Afghan-tiered assets in both ground and air operations denotes an evolutionary leap not likely experienced in the country for decades. Understanding our Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners, as well as the Afghan people, is an exercise in strategic thinking emphasizing both cultural empathy and self-awareness. Leaders at all levels need to teach the doctrine of strategic thought as outlined in *Field Manual 6-22*¹⁴ as part of their systemic application of analytical processes in order to be successful in the EAP configuration. In order to better understand the challenges in Afghanistan, especially in the Train and Advise roles, self-education is vital to success with our partners. Reading and studying the doctrine of both coalition and host nation partners will not only allow for better mentorship in our Train and Advise roles, but provide a competitive edge in the tactical employment of forces. Training, Advising, and overcoming uncertainties are key to the construct of the Army Operating Concept. It is incumbent upon every leader to build uncertainty into training environments in order to force leaders and Soldiers to be comfortable operating in ambiguous environments and situations successfully.

Summation

The need for the EAP configuration is already manifest in the Afghanistan op-

erational environment. The proposed construct contributes flexibility and adaptability to nearly every operational situation likely to be encountered in the tactical, or SCA, role across the Army, while maximizing the power projection capacity of Army Aviation. Additionally, the construct is both doctrinally founded and supported by public law. EAPs impart more roles and responsibilities upon the EAP and headquartering assets; however, the result is a more capable, professionally broadened force comfortable operating in the ambiguity of the Train and Advise roles, while executing the Warfighting Functions and the Aviation Core Competencies in any capacity that truly spans the spectrum of security assistance, to include U.S. combat operations.

The RWEAPTF configuration, though presented here as a construct for Train, Advise, and Assist, or TAA, missions in Central Command (CENTCOM), is equally viable for TAA operations around the globe. The construct also allows flexibility to the battlefield Commander engaged in a direct-action fight against a future, more conventional foe. The flexibility and scalability of the EAP places multiple, mission-focused, small targets reminiscent of the “little groups of paratroopers” that presented a multifaceted problem for a deeply entrenched enemy in Western Europe throughout WWII.



¹ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 31 October 2014), 8.

² Capt. Jarrod Morris, “Army, USMC Generals Talk Afghan Transition on Expeditionary Advisory Trip”, *U.S. Army*, 20 December 2014, accessed 30 November 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/140436/Army_USMC_generals_talk_Afghanistan_transition_on_expeditionary_advisory_trip; see also Maj. Vance Trenkel, “A Reduced Presence Does Not Equal a Reduced Commitment,” *DVIDS-News*, 10 December 2014, accessed 30 November 2016, <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/150251/reduced-presence-does-not-equal-reduced-commitment>.

³ U.S. Congress, House, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3622, §212, *Initial Review of Combatant Commands*. September 12, 1986, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 99-824, 28, http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsCR.pdf

⁴ Army Techniques Publication 3-05.2, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 19 August 2015), 2-15 – 2-16.

⁵ Field Manual 6-05, *CF-SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integrations, Interoperability, and Interdependence* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 March 2014), 57-58.

⁶ Jen Judson, Milley: Advise-and-Assist Brigade Pilot To Take Shape in a Few Years, *Defense News*, 23 June 2016, accessed 14 December 2016, <https://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/06/23/milley-advise-and-assist-brigade-pilot-take-shape-few-years/86287816/>.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Field Manual 6-05, 47.

⁹ Judson.

¹⁰ Field Manual 6-05, 58.

¹¹ Field Manual 6-05, 47.


¹² Training Circular 3-04.7, *Army Aviation Maintenance* (Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 2 February 2010), 1-2.

¹³ Field Manual 7-0, *Train to Win in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 5 October 2016), 1-4 and 1-7.

¹⁴ Department of the Army. (2015). *U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

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Educating the Aviation S-2 for Success

by CPT Margaret-Elizabeth Troxell

Photos by (Left) PO2 Jacob L. Dillon and (Right) SSG Mary Junell

Military Intelligence (MI) officers are not provided Army Aviation specific intelligence training prior to being assigned as an Aviation battalion S-2. Without the benefit of this training, the S-2 is placed at a disadvantage when accomplishing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and mission analysis (MA) for the Aviation commander.

The Aviation Mission Survivability Officer's (AMSO) Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama provides the prospective S-2 with an invaluable perspective on Aviation specific intelligence concerns. As the insurgent, hybrid, and conventional threats approach near-peer capabilities, the Aviation mission provides a unique operational reach deep into enemy territory for the ground force commander. As Aviation unit S-2s, we are the commander's source of analysis on how the enemy will affect his operational environment during all phases of the unit's mission.

The AMSOs assigned at the company and battalion level, are subject matter experts on their aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) and the threat capabilities that could affect the aircraft as they support the ground force commander's overall mission. The AMSO Course is designed to provide AMSOs the capability to operate at the company level. The course identifies the threats to Army Aviation, threat system capabilities and vulnerabilities, provides an in-depth knowledge of air-

craft survivability equipment installed on each Army airframe, details mission planning considerations, and identifies company level requirements to support personnel recovery. Ultimately, the AMSO Course graduate is expected to provide survivability training and tactical recommendations to the commander based on the threat information provided by the S-2.

Attending the AMSO Course provides S-2s with the insight required to make tailored products that are both relevant and actionable to an Aviation commander and the unit's air crews. Additionally, as an AMSO graduate, the S-2 can serve as a resource for the Aviation unit's ground force S-2 counterpart on utilization of Aviation assets while mitigating risk in a threat-heavy environment during air assault, air movement, medical evacuation, attack, or reconnaissance operations.

The first 3 weeks of the course focuses on establishing a unit Aviation mission survivability program, reviews the capabilities of aircraft survivability equipment, and identifies the current threats to rotary-wing aircraft. As an MI officer, the information presented in the first 3 weeks is key to identifying the specific threats to Aviation operations and what information to highlight during the IPB and MA. Additionally, this portion of the course provides the S-2 with an idea of what to expect as a knowledge base from their

unit's AMSOs. Collaboration between the S-2 and the AMSO is essential in order to provide a complete threat picture that will dictate the selection of optimum threat risk mitigation techniques using the best flight profile and ASE settings. It is with this information that a new S-2 can go to an Aviation unit with a basic understanding of Aviation missions, Aviation-specific Intelligence requirements, and the capability to fully and confidently integrate with the staff during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

The last 2 weeks of the AMSO Course focuses on company and battalion level mission planning, the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS), and personnel recovery (PR). Although these subjects may not immediately seem relevant to the S-2, being aware of the mission planning capabilities down to the company level can pay significant dividends when building products intended for the development and dissemination of the common operating picture. Additionally, in a training environment, the battalion S-2 now has the knowledge base to create AMPS training scenarios to challenge the Aviation company, platoon, and section audiences. The mission planning portion of the AMSO Course also provides a brief overview of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency maps, imagery, and resources which are indispensable in enabling air crews to conduct detailed terrain analysis through map reconnaissance. The PR week brings to

light an aspect of Aviation that an S-2 with an MI background may not initially consider. Knowledge of techniques, tactics, and procedures; Soldier education and documentation requirements; and lessons learned enables the S-2 to further refine products that support PR missions.

Overall, the AMSO Course serves to bridge the gap between Intelligence and all aspects of Aviation mission planning.

The knowledge gained would be a priceless asset to any MI officer assigned to an Aviation unit. As advantageous as it is for the MI officer to attend the AMSO Course prior to an Aviation assignment, the knowledge and insight brought to the course by this skill set adds value to the Aviation students not otherwise included in the program of instruction. The MI officer is able to discuss the realities of the capabilities and limitations of the battalion S-2 shop and discuss ways ahead for better S-2/AMSO cohesion.

Finally, as MI Officers progress through their careers, the experience of the AMSO Course will pay dividends when serving in future positions such as collection manager, brigade combat team S-2, and intelligence planner. In a hybrid threat environment, Aviation assets, when utilized appropriately, can be the difference in success or failure when

shaping the battlefield to the ground force's advantage. Having a thorough knowledge of asset utilization, while being able to speak to the risks associated with the missions, will exponentially improve a ground force commander's ability to make tactical decisions in a timely manner, ultimately leading to the success of the mission.

Although the benefits of sending a newly assigned non-Aviation Branch S-2 to the AMSO course far outweighs the cost, leaders should consider the technical nature of the course. Sending an MI officer to the course with no previous exposure to Aviation puts that officer at risk of failure. In order to mitigate that risk, the new S-2 should be immersed into a 2- to 3-week orientation conducted by company or battalion AMSOs consisting of: aircraft familiarization, introduction to Aviation Intelligence, and introduction to ASE and flight techniques. Aircraft familiarization would include hands-on capabilities and vulnerabilities training in the combat Aviation brigade's assigned aircraft. The S-2 could then receive familiarization flights in the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer. Finally, the commander, S-3, AMSO, or standardization instructor pilot would discuss the unit's mission essential task list with the S-2. The introduction to information sources specifically related to Army Avia-

tion Intelligence and aircraft survivability would consist of access to specialized reports and intelligence summaries and familiarization with the Computer-Based Aircraft Survivability Equipment Training program. Ideally, the AMSO and the S-2 would attend the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command Rotary-Wing Intelligence Symposium at Fort Bragg, NC, which would provide both the Officer and AMSO the opportunity to get the most up-to-date Intelligence and network with other AMSOs and S-2s. All of these tasks should be supervised by the AMSO prior to the S-2's AMSO Course class date. These prerequisites would not only help the Intelligence Officer learn the Aviation language and mission sets but will also promote AMSO/S-2 teaming down to the company level.

All MI officers en route to an Army Aviation S-2 position should attend the AMSO course as soon as possible or ideally, following completion of pre-requisites just discussed. The lessons learned are invaluable and will improve the IPB, MA, and the MDMP, leading to better information for the commander, increased survivability of air crews, and ultimately delivering the support to the ground commander expected of Army Aviation.



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Photo by SFC Vincent Abri

Acronym Reference

AMPS - Aviation Mission Planning System	MA - mission analysis
AMSO - aviation mission survivability officer	MDMP - military decision-making process
ASE - aircraft survivability equipment	MI - Military Intelligence
IPB - intelligence preparation of the battlefield	PR - personnel recovery




Photo by SPC Derrick Tribbey

Many Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Soldiers lack Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) and common task proficiency. The lack of MOS proficiency is academic knowledge, as well as the application and correlation of aviation mission and base tasks. Many UAS operators also lack common Soldier task proficiency for the same reasons they lack MOS proficiency.

The lack of proficiency starts with the reduction of quality training opportunities while stateside. Training opportunities are lost due to inflexible schedules and tasking from higher headquarters. Unmanned Aerial System operations require strict weather conditions to fly at a low risk level; higher echelons have to be willing to adjust a UAS asset's work schedule based on weather trends to ensure that Soldiers get the maximum amount of training opportunities during their duty day. Another lost training opportunity of note is tasking from higher headquarters. These tasks include red and white cycle tasks and can range from checking identification at the traffic gate to working at Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities. The details can range from a couple of days to a year. During this time, UAS operators can be pulled away from training both MOS and common task training. A Washington Post article regarding UAS pilots states:

Army UAS pilots in all of the focus groups we conducted stated that they had difficulty completing UAS pilot

training in units because they spend a significant amount of time performing additional duties such as lawn care, janitorial services, and guard duty (Fung, 2015).

A 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report lists the reason for its study as:

The Department of Defense's (DoD) UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival traditional manned systems, and, as of July 2013, DoD had acquired over 10,000 UAS, according to a 2013 DoD report. Training DoD UAS pilots, most of whom are in the Army or the Air Force, is an integral part of DoD's strategy to accomplish its mission (U.S. GAO, 2015).

Since UAS operators are an integral part of the DoD's strategy to accomplish its mission, leaders must affect change. Our only job as an Army is to fight and win the nation's conflicts. If we accept lackluster training as the standard, we are not able to carry out our part of the Army mission. The way forward to fix lackluster MOS training is to examine these report results and try to understand where the lack of quality training started.

The GAO study found:

A March 2015 Army review showed that pilots in most Army Shadow units did not complete training in their units in fiscal year 2014 (U.S. GAO, 2015).

This study also concluded that:

the Army's Training and Doctrine Command conducted a review from January 2015 through March 2015 and found that 61 of the Army's 65 Shadow units that were not deployed had completed an average of 150 hours of flight training (U.S. GAO, 2015).

These numbers are not sufficient to sustain proficiency for every Soldier within a unit. Low flight hours are problematic to creating a strong populous of quality operators and instructors. Unmanned Aerial System Soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) do not have the required experience and hours for the Instructor Operator Course (IOC), which leads to waivers. The problem was outlined by the GAO as stated:

The Army has taken action to increase the number of UAS pilot instructors, but in doing so, it is using less experienced instructors, which could affect the quality of the training provided to UAS pilots (U.S. GAO, 2015).

The study also outlined:

The Army waived the instructor course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015 (U.S. GAO, 2015).

This number shows that almost half of Army UAS operators in a majority of

units select as being, “the best in their unit.” They either do not have 200 hours, or are not a Sergeant (E-5). An NCO’s sole duty is to lead and train Soldiers. Units should not be identifying a Soldier that is not an NCO as the best candidate to attend the IOC. NCOs in the UAS community must set the standard for young Soldiers to emulate. They must be the subject matter experts in their field and pass that knowledge on to lower enlisted Soldiers. If we identify UAS operators for the IOC and they are not an NCO, then it is the responsibility of NCOs to guide, mentor, and develop those Soldiers to become an NCO. This is because of the correlation between attributes that make a good NCO and attributes that make a good Instructor Operator (IO).

Unmanned Aerial System NCOs and IOs must know their Soldiers and their accompanying personalities. Knowing what motivates a Soldier and how they learn is the cornerstone of effective learning. The Army uses PowerPoint presentations with free talk amongst students as an effective tool in instructing Soldiers. In passing basic information, such as policy and procedures and in educational institutions, this is the most time-effective method. However, at the unit level, NCOs should know each Soldier. This allows NCOs to be more efficient at getting quality training when given time to train. Think back to when you were a young Soldier. What training and experiences stick out? For me, it is the combined exercises and the realistic training. Soldiers want realistic training that is challenging. We must strive to make our training a combination of information dissemination, hands-on application, and common task training. If we do not, Soldiers will not gain and maintain critical knowledge from the training.

Common task proficiency may not be as integral to the DoD’s strategy to accomplish its mission, however, it is vital to all UAS Soldiers. Many UAS Soldiers and leaders believe that common task proficiency is not important. Generally, UAS operators are stationed on a base with set

force protection. Based on this mindset, the UAS community finds common task proficiency a moot point. This is false belief, because there are times when UAS operators occupy forward sites. These sites are often soft targets for armed combatants. Common task proficiency becomes vital to UAS operators in this situation.

The lack of training in common task proficiency begins at Advanced Individual Training (AIT). To save money and get Soldiers to the units quicker, many AIT programs leave out common tasks, AIT units assume this training will be done at the unit level when Soldiers arrive. The problem with this thinking is that currently many Army units are too task saturated to run a quality program for training common tasks. In the past, NCOs were able to accomplish this using Sergeant’s Time Training.

Many units have gone away from Sergeant’s Time Training, which in the past was a steeple to common task proficiency. Senior leaders canceled this designated block of training for common tasks. Online training outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 has replaced many field-training opportunities. Units log common task and required annual training information in the Digital Training Management System (DTMS).

Units use DTMS as a way to track all Soldier training. Many times, training is completed but not logged into DTMS. NCOs must be diligent in using Department of the Army (DA) Form 5164 and

DA Form 5165, as well as DTMS to track Soldiers’ common task proficiency. This ensures leaders can track when Soldiers are due to complete common task training if DTMS is down or out of date. This tracking will allow Soldiers the full spectrum of common task training enabling them to become proficient at all common tasks. Additionally, this allows NCOs to provide training that is due or that Soldiers may be lacking in within the limited training time provided.

Due to balancing tasks, schedules, and staffing issues, we have a finite amount of time to train common Soldier tasks. Therefore, we as NCOs must always be ready to train common tasks by using hip pocket training and the resources we have on hand. Hip pocket training allows us to use our down weather days to train common Soldier tasks. In order to train MOS and common tasks to our Soldiers, we must have the tools and time available to conduct quality training. We can be successful by protecting our training schedule. Higher headquarters must give us the time to train our Soldiers. This is a give and take relationship. As NCOs must provide quality training, leadership provides the time to stick to the training plan. In conclusion, we as NCOs must know how our Soldiers learn. Knowing how they learn will allow us to better cement MOS and common task proficiency. Unmanned will grow exponentially in the next 15 years. We must train the next generation to be competent Soldiers and NCOs, to ensure we meet the demands of the DoD to fight and win the Nation’s wars.



Photo by SPC Derrick Tribbey

SSG Prunty is currently serving as the Standardization Operator for D Company, 9th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3 ID. Previous assignments include Platoon Sergeant for D Company, 9th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd ID, Standardization Operator for Shadow Company 4-2 ARB 2nd ID; and Standardization Operator for A Company 1-1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion 1st ID. He has 10 years of service and is qualified in the RQ-7B.



STANDARDIZATION PILOTS

MOTIVATIONS, CONCERNS, AND AVIATOR DEVELOPMENT

by CW4 James Hill and CW4 Leonard Momeny

Photo by SPC Thomas Scaggs

Aviators, especially older Aviators, have a tendency to reflect on prior experiences and past adventures. In fact, as any Soldier moves through the years of their career there begins a time of reflection, a period where there are questions about motivations for who we have become, why we do what we do, and whether or not it has all been done correctly. Standardization Pilots (SIPs) generally find cause for reflection during moments immediately following close calls, accidents, and incidents. Starting with why is so important for the development of a younger generation, and so, the following text will hopefully provide the reader with a brief look into the mind of the SIP and greater understanding of our deeper concerns, our “whys.”

Motivations of a Standardization Pilot

Why do we do what we do? Not always the simplest question to answer. Why did we choose to serve in the Army? Why did any of us not simply accept status quo, but instead strive for aviation as our profession of choice? Why do we still fly after having so many friends pass away as a result of risks in aviation? As stated earlier, I find that these questions resonate more clearly after an incident or an accident, but I try mainly to reflect on the “Why.” Additionally, why ask why? Well, because if anyone in aviation must justify their actions, decisions, and knowledge it is the SIP. It’s not because we have some sick fascination to remove fun out of everything, there is a much deeper reasoning to our actions. It is because our aviation experi-

ences run deeper than most, and we have been equipped with an inexhaustible desire to pass on our hard-fought lessons learned to others, typically with the hope that disaster can be averted, and mission success can be achieved.

The core motivation for a SIP is this, we fly for the same reason anyone else flies in the Army; being an Army Aviator is a cool job. However, we tend to get caught up in the predictable, and more than acceptable level of risk associated with day-to-day aviation operations. At times, we take for granted the fact that we are doing an inherently dangerous job. We knowingly push the bounds of physics daily, and in the blink of the eye, a situation can go from manageable to out of control. Where is that point at which control is lost, is it mechanical, is it pride, or worst case; is there a moment where an Aviator is blinded by an emotional response? How do we know we are approaching our limits as Aviators, and more importantly when is it too late to do something? Each Aviator should look within and decide what drives them, what their limitations are, and how to know when they are approaching a scenario that promises to be unmanageable. Until a junior Aviator learns how to manage their limits, they can depend on their organization’s SIP to help. Part of our motivation as a SIP is to assist brave Army Aviators to fully develop their craft, thereby enabling them to employ Army aircraft to the maximum capability. The key component to all this is safety.

In its simplest form, the Army pays Aviators to do a job, safely take off, and then land at the desired destination. Simple, right? Instead, we find ways to make it more dangerous than it needs to be. When a mission is “training,” then it is simply that. As SIPs, we regularly hear that “we (Army Aviators) have to push ourselves to get better.” This is a good and bad thing, and that “push” to get better seems to occasionally serve as an excuse for flying with little regard for your safety or that of others. Aviators and organizations alike must ask the question, “Are we pushing ourselves to get better, or are we putting ourselves into a situation that we cannot recover from?” Our limits tend to be defined by our experience. I and other SIPs tend to fly more conservatively based off Afghanistan, where power was at a premium. SIPs tend to avoid unnecessarily aggressive maneuvers because of rotations to Iraq, flying against armed aggressors, where it was demonstrated time and again that aggressive flight is often unnecessary. More often than not, it’s demonstrated that aggressive flight isn’t necessary at all, and instead intelligent flight will typically win the day. A great example includes route planning outside of a potential threat weapon engagement zone. Something as simple as flying higher than the range of a threat weapon system prevented both accidents and engagements. Intelligent flight reduced tactical engagements of Army aircraft and accidents, as well. That sense of conservatism is based on one experience, and not all of us come fixed with the same experiences.

This too, is the reason every organization is assigned a SIP. Furthermore, many of us have seen a trend in Army Aviation where guys are going out and pushing beyond conservative flight. Additionally, this sort of flight seems to be a matter of happenstance, done in the heat of the moment, just for the sake of doing it. The difference is this, a training plan can change the approach to and outcome of a flight. Part of our motivations as SIPs is to pass on the benefit of planning and thinking through every aspect of a flight, thereby producing a predictable, risk-mitigated outcome.

What Aviators Have to Realize

The UH-60M airframe costs roughly \$12 million (easy everyone, it's an estimate). The experience of the crew, plus years in service, have probably cost the Army another \$5 to 6 million. In dollars alone, each time we take off, we do so with about \$15 to 18 million in our left and right hands. The second factor to consider, and something I truly believe must be impressed upon our young officers during initial flight training, are the other human lives that hang in the balance of our performance. If you are a Black Hawk pilot, there can be as many as 11 additional lives that may be riding as passengers in your aircraft. Each Soldier in the aircraft has a family, maybe a wife/husband, kids, parents, etc., and that is the human toll we cannot account for in the case of an accident. Those are the additional lives that a SIP tends to take into consideration when applying various constrictions and considerations to flight training. Others and their families are a motivation.

However, why is this level of responsibility, this trust with human capital not always echoed through our ranks and in everything that we do in our mission set? Why is this human factor alone not driving the ideology of professionalism within our ranks? Is the maturity level required of our Pilots-in-Command (PCs) and pilots sufficient? There will be many who do not agree with this statement; however, how many times have you heard, "the

Aviator is just not ready for PC," or, "who signed you off as PC?" Our ability as mission planners, briefers, mission approval authorities, and finally, as pilots all play a vital role in bringing people back safely to terra firma. When we compromise, or more simply, risk their lives for our own purposes, when we thumb our nose at prudent risk, when we think we can fly harder than others because we are just that good...well, that misplaced sense of arrogance should be an indicator that we no longer belong in the Army as an Aviator. Maturity matters.

The Cost of our Business

Leonard and I both lost friends since 2004, as we both began our Army Aviation career during the same year. Not one of the accidents that took the life of one of our friends was without human error. In one instance, data show that flying aggressively without knowledge of the limits was the difference between life and death. Knowledge of the aircraft limitations, as it directly correlates to the Performance Planning Card (PPC), could have saved the lives of our friends and others onboard. Another instance involved a crew in Afghanistan who flew Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC), and because of errors within the cockpit they are no longer with us today. The professional Aviator takes these issues seriously and studies hard, understanding that their knowledge and application of standardized practices is what can potentially prevent calamity. However, there are some who neither practice professionalism, nor do they take seriously the level of responsibility that they have been entrusted with as Army Aviators, and they are infecting our proud profession. Professionalism is vital.

This is all so much more than an article by a pair of SIPs who want to rant and complain about others and their potential shortcomings. This is not to downplay the effort by the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence to remove useless jargon and data from our aviation education experiences, thereby increasing our

ability to study and retain what really matters. The point to all this is simple, as Army Aviators we must be professional and objective with all our duties. Risk mitigation begins with the individual Aviator and efforts at constantly improving to be the best that they can be, and then, executing their assigned duties, no matter how mundane they may find them to be, as a professional. More importantly, embodying the persona of a professional who values the life of each person who comes to depend on us, the Army Aviation Enterprise. Remember, mission briefers and risk approval authorities put limits on our flights for a reason. It may not be known at the time of the brief, but that Aviator may have an experience that makes them question your flight. That is a good thing. We implement controls not to be killjoys, but because we care. Our motivations demonstrate that care and are therefore, echoed in our actions. Experienced Aviators care about each life in their aircraft. They know that making the conservative call at the right time can be the difference between life and death. The motivations for their actions typically align with those of their SIP. This is why each Aviator must ask themselves, "What are my motivations, and do they align with the experienced Aviators in my career and unit?"

Closing Comments on Development

For the leaders reading this missive from two grumpy CW4 SIPs, do develop your Aviators without fear, but do so while simultaneously encouraging a healthy sense of conservatism. Encourage rigorous training, but establish boundaries that are reasonable for your organizational demographic. Ensure that professionalism is constantly stressed from your Aviators and that standards are never compromised. Train hard, but train with a plan, and do so in accordance with our guiding publications, and the Aviators you train and lead will be fully prepared to carry Army Aviation into the future.



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Redesigning the UH-60M Aviator Qualification Course

by CPT Michael A. Casares

As the Army began implementing the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, a key component of the plan was replacing the TH-67A Creek with the LUH-72A Lakota as the primary aircraft trainer. This was a monumental change for the Army's Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) training program. Student pilots would no longer train on analog instruments, but instead begin their training on a digital instrument and coupled aircraft. The majority of the Army's "Go to War" aircraft are digital and coupled, making this a necessary transition. The implementation of the LUH-72A is a phased approach beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 16 with 25 percent (%) of students flying the Lakota and every year after increasing the number by 25% until completely transitioned in FY19. In early 2016, the 1-212th Aviation Regiment was already drawing up plans to restructure the UH-60A/M IERW track to reverse the course flow and have the M-model portion first in training, followed by the A/L-model. Throughout the spring and summer, the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) held conferences to restructure, improve, and gain efficiencies in all IERW tracks. These meetings resulted in the elimination of A/L training in the UH-60A/M IERW track to become M-model pure. Given only 3 months until the October FY17 implementation date, how would the 1-212th accomplish this new mission?

When the 1-212th received the mission, it began by assembling a course restructuring team led by the battalion S-3. The team was comprised of the S-3 sec-

tion, battalion standardization pilots (SPs), and the IERW company command teams. Also included in the process were many senior Department of the Army Civilians (DACs). The majority of these DACs served a career in the active duty Army and then continued their service at the flight line, training the next generation of Army pilots. Some of these individuals had over 20 years of experience as DACs in 1-212th, which meant they had already been involved in multiple course restructurings, and so they understand how a fiscally constrained environment affects student training.

The S-3 set the priorities and held weekly meetings to evaluate the team's progress, receive comments and recommendations, and discuss potential issues with the course structure. The team completed its recommendations within 5 weeks and briefed the battalion commander, who then took the new course to the brigade for approval. Upon receiving approval, all necessary documents for the course to become an official USAACE program of instruction were submitted to meet the October FY17 deadline.

The condensed timeline from receiving the mission to the FY17 implementation date demonstrated valuable lessons about personnel management. The most significant lesson learned is that it is vital to have experts in the room for every meeting. In the case of Army Aviation, where the commissioned officers are typically not the most experienced aviators, keeping the course restructuring in the S-3 section alone would have meant mission

failure. The SPs took the lead to develop the course, ensuring it met regulatory requirements. The 1-212th had the added benefit of the DACs with their extensive knowledge of flight school, which kept the team from pursuing a plan that they had seen executed poorly in years prior.

The UH-60A/M IERW and the UH-60A IERW track totaled 110 students.¹ This student input required 55 Instructor Pilots (IPs) on the flight line or in the simulator teaching students every training day. The UH-60M IERW track eliminated the requirement for 30 UH-60A/L IPs; however, these IPs needed retraining to become M-model qualified. The restructured M-model track increased in length by 2 training weeks, and the FY17 student load increased six students per class. The increased student load required UH-60A/L IPs to complete M-model advanced qualification course and resident instructor training to become UH-60M IPs. While transitioning these IPs into the UH-60M, the 1-212th still had to support the IP requirement for the FY16 IERW tracks. The 1-212th accomplished this by not conducting the A/L-model portion of the last three UH-60A/M IERW tracks, thereby allowing IPs to complete the UH-60M transition courses. The students who did not receive the A/L-model portion began their M-model training the same day as originally scheduled, keeping them on pace to graduate on time.

Aircraft availability was also an element in planning the course restructure. Here, the Aviation Center Logistics Command ensured aircraft were available to meet the

daily fleet composition requirements as UH-60A/Ls were divested, and UH-60Ms were delivered for training.

This experience demonstrated the need for accurate and early reporting of resources to a higher command when conducting mission analysis. No one knows a unit better than the personnel in it, and a higher command may expect more than what that unit is able to produce. Therefore, if there are limitations, leaders must be able to clearly articulate why their unit cannot accomplish the mission as directed with their given resources. In addition, they must provide a detailed alternate plan of how the mission can be accomplished and the resources required to complete the mission. In this scenario, the 1-212th requested additional courses to transition their UH-60A/L IPs into the UH-60M and detailed how it would still meet the Whitebook student load later in FY17.

The UH-60A/M IERW training served as the basis for the UH-60A/M course. In the UH-60A/M IERW track, students received 66 hours of flight time between the A/L and M-model.² The course revision increased the M-model hours from the previous combined course to 49.1 hours and revised the training day schedule.³

The 1-212th SPs went through a systematic evaluation of each aircrew training manual task to ensure the task proficiency dates correlated with a student's hour level. The team's objective was for the course to produce a qualified aviator ready for service with a Forces Command (FORSCOM) unit.

The majority of the aviators who graduate from the UH-60M IERW track will never fly a UH-60A/L, but for the ones who do, the gaining unit will conduct the transition. Unit IPs will conduct the transition using the UH-60M to UH-60L Qualification Training Support Plan available on the USAACE Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Flight Training Branch Army Knowledge Online Web site at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/691190>.

The UH-60M IERW track continues to be refined. The temptation, during periods of limited resources, is to justify a reduction of flight hours based on a renewed evaluation of flight training programs. However, leaders must recognize that this course was designed by experts with thousands of hours of experience training initial entry students how to master the art of flying, and that reducing the number of flight hours will jeopardize the quality of the aviator.

The reason for implementing Flight School XXI (FSXXI) was to produce an aviator who would reach the FORSCOM unit and progress to readiness level 1 (RL1) in a shorter period of time. A 2010 review by the U.S. Army Audit Agency concluded that FSXXI aviators reached RL1 earlier than graduates of previous training programs.⁴ Further reduction of the flight hours or relying on more simulation time will undoubtedly rob students of valuable aircraft experience, thus burdening the unit with providing the newly assigned aviator with the hands-on experience that he should have obtained while in flight school.

Redesigning how the Army trained its UH-60M pilots was no simple task; the flight school "machine" graduates aviators every 2 weeks. The smallest changes of training days or student loads cause ripple effects that present themselves months later. But the 1-212th, relying on the experienced SPs and DACs in the battalion, made the mission. They eliminated the A/L-model portion, improved the course flow, and completed the redesign in 3 months to be ready for the FY17 implementation date.



¹ "USAACE FY16 Whitebook (Master)," Aviation Knowledge Network, 2016, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/25993242&inline=true>.
² "2-IERW UH-60_UH-60A_M Tracks CMP (10 Mar 16)," Flight Training Integration Branch, 2016, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/designer>.
³ "2-IERW UH-60M Track CMP (3 Jan 17)," Flight Training Integration Branch, 2017, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/designer>.
⁴ "The Army's Flight School XXI Training Program," U.S. Army Audit Agency, September 30, 2010, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/24923247>.

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Acronym Reference

DAC - Department of the Army Civilians	IERW - Initial Entry Rotary Wing
FORSCOM - Forces Command	RL1 - readiness level
FSXXI - Flight School XXI	SP - standardization pilots
FY - fiscal year	USAACE - United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence



AVIATION MAINTENANCE COMPANY PREPARATION FOR CTC ROTATIONS

by MAJ Jeffrey Ferguson,
CPT Jonathan Powell, and
SFC Roger (Wes) Green

Photo by CPT Stephen James

One of the most difficult problems Aviation units routinely encounter is the requirement to task organize as a Multifunctional Aviation Task Force (MFATF) and then deploy and execute operations with a force that has limited experience working together. The difficulty of this task has been amplified over the past few years as the Army transitions its training focus from Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) to the more fast-paced Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). This article will attempt to highlight some of the specific challenges Aviation Maintenance Companies (AMC) face in the DATE based on observations from multiple Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations. While these observations are based on units' experiences at JRTC, these lessons are generally applicable to any unit preparing to deploy to any Combat Training Center (CTC) or an austere operating environment as an MFATF.

1 Lack of integration with nonorganic supported units during maintenance management

Whether for a deployment to JRTC or combat, MFATFs tend to task organize relatively close to the date of deployment, and many AMC leaders feel that they do not have enough time at home station to effectively incorporate nonorganic flight companies into their maintenance processes and battle rhythms. While the ideal solution would be for MFATFs to task organize as early as possible prior to an impending deployment, this is not something that is controllable at the AMC level. As a result, AMCs must accept that a late task organization is an eventuality

that they will most likely have to confront and develop methods to mitigate any negative impacts.

The most significant issue AMC leaders typically list as a result of a late task organization is that they initially have a difficult time establishing open and constant lines of communication with their nonorganic supported companies, which is essential to effective and responsive maintenance operations. During DATE JRTC rotations, it is not uncommon for nonorganic flight companies to habitually "forget" to inform the AMC of changes in their flight status and for AMCs to go upward of 12 hours before they are aware of an aircraft maintenance issue. This breakdown in communication results in hours of wasted time when the AMC could be leveraging its maintenance and logistical resources to fix the issue. In addition to flight companies failing to inform the AMC about changes in the maintenance status of their aircraft, MFATFs and flight companies also often fail to communicate when they will be executing major operations, and AMCs do not surge maintenance and Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) assets to support. This frequently results in degraded mission outcomes that could have easily been avoided.

A solution to this lack of integration is leader emphasis on ensuring that these lines of communication are established early, and the AMC should implement systems that will ensure the AMC is tracking the status of supported unit aircraft and operations. Units that proactively send representatives to the flight companies to pull information are typi-

cally more successful than companies that rely on the flight companies to provide the information to them. In terms of keeping the AMC abreast of upcoming operations, it is imperative that AMC senior leaders take an active role in understanding upcoming aviation operations and forecasting what maintenance resources will be required to effectively support them. While the argument could be made that is the supported flight companies' responsibility to provide information to the AMC, AMC leaders must be cognizant of the fact that flight company leaders are often extremely task saturated during the early days of a deployment, and the AMC can act as backstop to ensure that maintenance operations do not become an afterthought for the task force.

2 Understand what you have brought in terms of Prescribed Load Listing (PLL), bench-stock, and Property Book Listing (PBL) and be deliberate about what you bring

One of the most significant causes of aircraft downtime at JRTC is not having the necessary parts on hand to correct a certain aircraft fault. The status of unit maintenance often suffers because units, 1) are unsure whether or not they have particular part on hand, 2) do not know where parts they have on hand are, and 3) think they have items on hand that they do not actually have.

Solving this issue really begins at home station with first establishing what bench-stock, Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL), PBL, and PLL a specific MFATF requires in order to be success-

ful. The best practice observed at JRTC in order to ensure MFATFs bring the required parts is for production control (PC) to identify the most commonly executed maintenance tasks and then create prepackaged task-specific kits for these tasks. For instance, if PC decided changing an Apache nose gearbox was a task that a unit could expect to execute three times over a month-long JRTC rotation, then PC could have tech supply or the maintenance platoon go into the Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM), identify all of the parts required to execute the task, draw all of these parts from tech supply, and then box up three separate kits. This prevents the Task Force (TF) from forgetting smaller bench-stock items that often delay repairs from being accomplished in accordance with the timelines laid out in the Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC). No matter what technique is used, it is essential that MFATFs put the requisite amount of effort and thought into developing the parts packages they will bring on a deployment.

In addition to bringing the right parts, it is imperative that AMCs pack and track their parts in such a manner that they can immediately locate and access them. The most effective way of tracking the location of a unit's parts is to pack these parts in a central repository (i.e., a container) and then enter these locations into the Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation Enhanced (ULLS-AE) database. The ULLS-AE database containing the part locations and quantities is then maintained by the AMC's tech supply section. In addition to ensuring one's own organic PLL and PBL parts are maintained in ULLS-AE, it is extremely important for AMCs to ensure the same thing happens for the PLL and PBL parts that are furnished by other aviation units, in order to support the attached flight companies that are not organic to the AMC's parent battalion. While this might seem very commonsensical, it is not at all uncommon

for aviation task forces to deploy to JRTC with the only record of their organic tech supply managed parts to be on a printed Excel worksheet and no record of what PLL or PBL parts their nonorganic supported units have brought.

3 Have a plan for how and when you intend to move your parts, POL, and Aviation Ground Support Equipment (AGSE) items around the battlefield

Displacing from one Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) to another, or "jumping," during the course of a campaign is one of the most challenging aspects about the DATE for an AMC. Successfully executing a "jump" requires that the AMC develop a very detailed understanding of which of the above listed items will be needed where during the transition from one TAA to another. An AMC Commander's typical inclination is to pack up their tech supply containers and AGSE as early as possible in preparation for a "jump." This is understandable given the frictions inherent in preparing for these convoys, while simultaneously meeting a large number of other competing requirements; however, the ground convoys from one TAA to another can occur up to 2 days prior to the actual aircraft moving into the new TAA.

This means when aircraft inevitably break during this transition window, they often sit for relatively long periods of time due to a lack of the parts or personnel required to fix them. In order to reduce the possibility of this happening, it is important that the AMC's resident subject matter experts, or SMEs, create a contact box and personnel package that will facilitate the most common repairs for each of an MFATF's respective airframes that will remain at the "old" TAA until all of the aircraft have pushed out. It is important for AMCs to bring this up with the MFATF early in the convoy planning process so the MFATF is able to factor it into its convoy plan. In fact, the

most successful units observed at JRTC typically conduct a movement rehearsal, which includes the packing process. It is surprising how often units realize they are unable to load a container or piece of equipment onto a truck or trailer because the forklift or crane required has already been shipped forward on an earlier serial.

4 Tactical (TAC) server migrations and paper flight packs

Rotational units at JRTC typically have trouble during the initial portion of the rotation integrating nonorganic units into their organic TAC server, which causes most units to suffer significant administrative down time. The preferred method to correct this would be to have all aircraft transferred into the TAC server prior to beginning the movement from home station to JRTC; however, this may not always be possible due to operational constraints. If this is the case, then the next best scenario would be for each supported airframe to bring its own TAC server that can each be migrated separately. Regardless of how a unit attacks the TAC server issue, they should still expect for digital issues to occur and be prepared to go analog, utilizing paper flight packs for at least the first week of a deployment. This means the unit needs to ensure all aircraft coming to the rotation are accompanied by a complete flight pack as listed in *Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 738-751*. The unit should ensure it has an SME to serve as the backstop for this and check each of the flight packs prior to releasing them for onward movement.

Conclusion:

While this article has not covered all of the challenges that an AMC will face during a TC deployment, it has addressed four of the major issues that cause AMCs to fail in executing their primary mission of providing the MFATF Commander with combat power in the form of ready-to-launch aircraft.



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COURSE OF THE ARMY UNDERSTANDS LEADERSHIP!

by MAJ Michael C. Shaw and Mr. Justin M. Witty




Photo by SSG Daniel Love

Why leadership is so complicated

Army leaders view leader development in the same way that the Earth makes diamonds. Place someone in a position of intense pressure, and the system will eventually shape that leader into a harder, sharper, and more valuable commodity; virtually a hands-off process. However, that also means that leaders of great value will surface just as infrequently as diamonds do compared to coal. Moreover, several diamonds may be in the process of transformation, only to be interrupted by outside factors that are ignorant or indifferent to the conversion taking place. The numerous challenges of the 21st century demand that the Army deliberately develop more leaders and not

just wait for the surprising discovery of the occasional diamond.

How hard is leader development really? The Army has a well-defined and highly researched process that describes in detail how to train, mold, counsel, and educate leaders. The Army, as a profession, guides Enlisted, Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), and Officers through a clear and delineated leader development process, though in the operational force something gets lost. Our leadership doctrine consists of *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)* and *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP)* 6-22, “Army Leadership,” and *Field Manual (FM)* 6-22, “Leader Development.” These manuals

provide the “what,” “how,” and the “why” of our leadership development program, explaining that every training event can be an opportunity for leader development. Even with such clear direction, we openly admit to one another that there is never enough time to build leaders deliberately. Even those who try to break this paradigm can become crushed under the sheer weight of the daily bureaucracy. This point is highlighted by a quote in *FM* 6-22 from an anonymous battalion commander:

Coming into command I told myself I was going to do it right. I was going to spend seventy-five percent of my time on training and leader development and twenty-five percent on admin.

*Once in command, no matter how hard I tried, seventy-five percent was admin.*¹

If leadership is what the Army does best, we must make more of a concerted effort to develop leaders. Development means counseling, coaching, and real mentoring. Sharing experiences, or just taking the time to explain to someone why a process is the way it is, can help that person gain perspective, understand the larger puzzle, and potentially change, update, or improve inputs and outputs. We cannot improve things we don't fully understand, and if we don't understand our environment, role, or job, then we are left to plod along with the status quo. We end up flat-out guessing. As a former commander used to say, "Sometimes it is better to be lucky than good," but eventually, the luck runs out. If we are indeed a learning organization, then we must also be a teaching and coaching organization. Building good leaders begins and ends with a deliberate focus on people.

Everyone in the world reads our doctrine, except us

A vital element of the Army that has changed little since its inception is the focus on leaders and their leadership. From our humble beginning as an Army of rag-tag revolutionaries, we often sought to differentiate ourselves as a thinking force. Pushing the leadership and decision-making down so everyone is involved became the cornerstone of our Army. It drives the Army's influence in business culture,² our academic and training curriculum at the military academy,³ and the continued focus of branch centers of excellence;⁴ leadership is always at the forefront. How, then, does this become an afterthought when we reach the operational force? Many leaders today cannot describe the attributes or competencies that our doctrine frames leadership around. Fewer have built a deliberate leadership development program within their organizations. Too broad of a characterization? Ok, let us look strictly at aviation.

How many aviation leaders (we are all leaders, right?) are already expressing disdain with the gross portrayal of the lack of leadership development? How many of us, who are mumbling under our

breath or rolling our eyes, know what the Army literature says about leader development, program development, or what fundamentals can or should be applied? "That is just book knowledge," could be a response. More practically speaking, who among us completed all of our required counseling this past quarter, semiannual, or annual period? How many of our subordinates completed their required counseling, as well? How many aviation leaders have read or even know of the existence of the *Aviation Leader Development Strategy*, written and published by the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence? The aviation branch has spent money and time writing a deliberate strategy to take officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted through expected developmental gates because that is what they want and hope will happen. Reading the branch's leader development strategy⁵ gives a sound approach to leader development at all levels or grades, yet, there is still an ever-growing gap between what we, the Army profession, says it is doing about leader development and what is actually being done.

Understanding our definitions—manage, lead, teach, coach, and mentor; all have specific meanings and requirements

Many of us have heard the following familiar sentiments at Army ceremonies; "thank you for your mentorship," or "honored to have had the opportunity to teach, coach, and mentor." How many in that audience sat back and thought, "I don't recall being taught, coached, or mentored!" Let's start with some essential terms, since leading and managing have similar traits but not identical meanings. For the most part, management is not part

of Army doctrine and lexicon. In its place is the word leadership. The Army is a people organization, not a systems organization. Therefore, people need leaders just as systems and processes need managers. Soldiers require purpose, direction, and motivation, not someone to manage their day-to-day. The ever-mounting administrative requirements are turning our positions from leaders to managers as the focus shifts to administration rather than people. We acknowledge that some positions require more management than leadership, like an executive officer, staff, or many warrant officer positions. We fail as leaders when the focus of the NCO Evaluation Report (ER) or Officer ER shifts from the actual evaluation of our subordinate's performance and potential into ensuring command and staff slides show all green boxes. The counseling is an afterthought, as long as the paperwork is complete. Apply the same thought process to completing leave and pass forms. The intended goal is to gain and share knowledge with a peer or subordinate and help ensure good/safe decisions and travel plans exist. Unfortunately, the process is overtaken by the administrative drudgery of TRiPS forms, vehicle inspections, risk assessments, leave and earning statements, etc. Because of all these regulatory requirements, the interaction between people is utterly and hopelessly lost in the tedium of the task, changing us from leaders to managers.

Teaching and coaching are also very similar in definition, but it is the execution that highlights where leadership comes into practice. Merriam-Webster defines teaching as "to cause to know" or "to guide the studies."⁶ Coaching speaks to "one who instructs or trains."⁷ Teaching



Photo by CPT Stephen James

is more passive and focused on the transfer of information. Coaching is more active and focused on training, where one can expect a more considerable amount of personal investment. A coach is someone who is there for the vicissitudes of the job. They are there to witness the action, help answer questions, and try to increase the person's success. In most instances, the teacher will not be available once the Soldier is doing the job in the field. The coach, however, is the shoulder to lean on when they need help or additional training. Each of these actions is important to Soldiers, but it requires leadership to apply the correct response to the situation. It is not merely because one holds a position that teaching or coaching takes place. The more managing one does, the more they are inclined to teach, whereas, the more leading one does, the more they are inclined to coach.

Both the Army and aviation have missed the mark on mentorship. Mentorship is one of the actions that most leaders assume they are doing or have done but usually have not. All Army leaders have some form of positional authority; they are in charge because the Department of the Army "said so." Just because one has a position of power over another does not mean the act of mentorship is taking place. Positional power, as opposed to actual mentorship, can be seen in the forced mentorship programs that have surfaced over the past 5 or so years, specifically in the NCO Corps. Mentorship, at its core, is a relationship; a give and take between two people. One individual possesses advanced knowledge in specific areas compared to the other person. Mentorship also spans years and bypasses positions. It is primarily the trusted agent

you call for guidance or to share experiences while navigating your career. One informal Officer Professional Development (OPD) session or conversation over a beer is not mentorship. The definition of mentorship is having a relationship that outlasts one's current position/rank and exists due to mutual trust.

The bureaucracy of the machine removes us from building leaders

So, we have the doctrine, we understand the terms, we read the guidance, and we have the organizational structure, but we are still missing something. This article began by describing how the topic of leadership, the core of the professional Army, is so complicated. Perhaps it is because of the organization itself. In a previous *Aviation Digest* article "Is Aviation a Profession," we debated the degree to which Army Aviation was consumed and led by bureaucracy rather than professionalism. Perhaps this same argument holds true for leadership also.

With a strong execution culture, the Army tends to get results, so you might imagine that if we said leadership development was a top priority, then we would make it happen. Sadly, many leaders can never carve out the time, even if they want to spend more time with their Soldiers. Emails demand replies, meetings demand PowerPoint statistics, and all of our systems that are set up to reduce mistakes and failures create such burdensome paperwork that we are drowning in it. Every kneejerk reaction to some minor incident grinds everything slower and slower. Instead of pushing Mission Command, we end up pushing our risk aversion down to the lowest echelon.

We have alluded previously to the lack of counseling within our formations. Many NCOER/OERs have false counseling dates generated because most of those events never occurred, and for submission, we must lie.⁸ This makes evaluations and counseling more of a paper drill than about helping mold and guide subordinates to achieve their full potential. Is it just counseling, or are other administrative statistics like safety briefs, range qualifications, or unit readiness fudged too? The point is that the administrative burden is hurting our formations in many ways; most importantly, it takes away precious time from leadership development.

Even if the Army machine wants all of our color-coded chicklets to shine green, the end result is not always what counts. How we get there, or how long it takes us to get there may be more important. When writing a paper for school, it is always more about the path of self-discovery of the writer than about the resulting paper, which rarely adds knowledge to anyone else. The problem lies in the fact that the final product is the only tangible part that is objectively graded, and thus, the product is all that matters. *FM 6-22* states that the "gets results" aspect of leadership development requires special attention to counter beliefs that "only the end result matters."⁹ The process matters just as much, if not more. If this holds true, then why do we evaluate leadership based on one's current performance and perceived potential? Our relatively short commands, quick permanent change of station cycles, and numerous rungs on the ladder keep us focused on short-term personal successes rather than long-term health of the unit. If one is successful in their job, but once departing the unit that organization collapses, genuinely, how successful was that individual? Longitudinal evaluations are complicated and may not be practical for the size and scale of the Army, but it does beg us to question our priorities, especially surrounding leadership, the cornerstone of our profession.

When we focus on adjusting colors on paper, we miss the opportunity to change paths within individual lives. The bureaucratic machine ensures that the "Army



Photo by SSG Daniel Love



Photo by SSG Daniel Love

goes rolling along,” and the occasional diamond will surface. One must ask oneself, is there a better way? Am I deliberately dedicating the time to developing the remaining precious stones within my sphere of influence, or do I wait and hope to stumble upon that diamond?

What can we do about it?

Leadership is not easy. It requires putting people first. It requires strength of values to keep the bureaucracy at bay, and keep your interactions with your fellow Soldiers a top priority. That is how we make our service better and show a dedication to the profession. Every day, there are actions we can take to help ensure we build leaders for the day after and not rely on chance or luck to build our top leaders.

First, leader development must be deliberate, and it must start with self-development. We must know what our profession asks of us and expects us to accomplish in the realm of leader development. Read the doctrine and see what opportunities you can find to implement leader devel-

opment in your unit. Think through past situations and determine if you were leading or managing. Share what you learn with others. We also need to break free of the negative, “no one mentored or helped me, so why should I?” mentality. Regardless of your own personal ambitions, the selfless service component of the military profession should compel you to invest time and effort into our junior leaders.

Second, accept risk and reduce the number of administrative requirements, when appropriate. If you see that some online training is not meeting its intent, and instead, just wastes people’s time, then change the strategy. As leaders, we set those administrative requirements, from more PowerPoint slides to additional paperwork to get a weekend pass approved; we set ourselves up to be too busy for leadership development. Reduce the administrative burden, and free up your subordinates to be leaders, not managers. Your Soldiers require it.

Last, leaders must habitually devote a percentage of their day toward their subordinate leader’s development. Deliberately designing leader development into your training strategy, whether formal or informal, requires effort and time. Ensure you have that time by devoting a percentage of your day to personnel issues, evaluations, or coaching subordinates at training events. The importance of prioritizing personnel over administrative tasks cannot be overstated.

Leadership is not a passive process. Watching and evaluating is not enough. Whether you are the active contributor to the developmental process, or you design it in such a way that others take a more active approach, what is most important is that there is a plan and that plan is executed to your team’s fullest ability. As famous leadership writer, Henry R. Buckler says, “a leader is one who knows the way, goes the way, and shows the way.”¹⁰ Being a competent and ethical leader who coaches, mentors, and develops other leaders is our professional cornerstone.



¹ Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC (Field Manual 6-22 (Leader Development) 30JUN15, p. 42

² David Slocum, “Six Creative Leadership Lessons from the Military in an Era of VUCA and COIN,” *Forbes* <https://www.forbes.com/sites/berlinschoolofcreativeleadership/2013/10/08/six-creative-leadership-lessons-from-the-military-in-an-era-of-vuca-and-coin/#26c1a87b2a5b>. Accessed 24 Sep. 2017

³ Aliasgar Abuwala, “10 Best Military Academies from Around the World,” *World Atlas*, <http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-best-military-academies-from-around-the-world.html>. Accessed 27 Sep. 2017

⁴ Maneuver Center of Excellence, “Maneuver Self-Study Program,” *Benning*, <https://www.benning.army.mil/MSSP/Military%20Leadership/>. Accessed 25 Sep. 2017

⁵ U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, “U.S. Army Aviation Leader Development Strategy” Ft Rucker Alabama, Oct 2016

⁶ Merriam Webster, “Teach,” *Merriam Webster*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/teach>. Accessed 1 Oct. 2017

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⁸ Wong, Leonard & Gerras, Stephen J., “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, Feb 2015

⁹ Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC Field Manual 6-22 (Leader Development) 30JUN15, p. 13

¹⁰ Buckler, Henry R. (1889). *The Perfection of Man by Charity: A Spiritual Treatise*. New York, NY: Catholic Publication Society Co. pg. 107

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TOXIC LEADERSHIP

by CW4 Joseph H. Pope

Photo by SSG Wesley Parrell

The Impact of toxic leadership on Army aviation could be catastrophic to our Soldiers and our equipment. Leadership of this kind creates stress, decreasing productivity and operation of equipment that could lead to fatalities. Situations like this are extreme, but as we all know with human factors, small mistakes in maintenance and operation can lead to extreme outcomes.

The Soldier is the most important resource we have in our formation today. Soldiers deserve the best leadership that can be provided. Soldiers come into the formations with the desire to be part of something bigger than themselves and to work as a team. Leadership that is disruptive or toxic decays the foundation of the Soldier and the team.

In dealing with this type of leadership, many young Soldiers prefer to leave the Army. Those of us with longer service (greater than 10 years) see retirement approaching and resign ourselves to stick it out, understanding that current leadership will eventually Permanent Change of Station (PCS). Having a leader of this type does not necessarily mean productivity decreases; are you going to stop work because you have a boss you disagree with? But, many of us have worked for a toxic leader, and we know that what happens is a decline in morale, degraded communication, and increased stress levels.

Soldiers stop going that extra mile; a big concern when we ask them to do more with less. Working on aircraft with the philosophy of doing more with less is a concern. Work performed by maintainers that are shorthanded and stressed can lead to a degradation of mission or the loss of life and equipment. Working in an environment like this creates cynicism in the organization. Cynicism, a possible problem with toxic leadership, is another problem the Army is facing. Soldier leaders at all levels, vertical and horizontal, need to take action to eliminate toxic leadership from our formations.

Identifying Toxic Leadership

Understanding toxic leadership is knowing what it is and defining the root causes. In 2012, the Army updated the leadership bible, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22.

ADP 6-22 now states:

Toxic leadership is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. This leader lacks concern for others and the climate of the organization, which leads to short- and long-term negative effects. The toxic leader operates with an inflated sense of self-worth and from acute self-interest. Toxic leaders consistently use dysfunctional behaviors to deceive, intimidate, co-

erce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves. The negative leader completes short-term requirements by operating at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, where followers respond to the positional power of their leader to fulfill requests. This may achieve results in the short term, but ignores the other leader competency categories of leads and develops. Prolonged use of negative leadership to influence followers undermines the followers' will, initiative, and potential and destroys unit morale.

Before the recent update to ADP 6-22, no definition of toxic leadership really existed, but most would agree a toxic leader would have an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of those they supervise, and an interpersonal style that negatively impacts the organizational climate. Does the Soldier feel humiliated, criticized, or rendered ineffective by the leader? Does this leader anger the subordinates, or do the subordinates feel empowered? In 20-plus years of service, I have worked in many leadership positions including squad leader, section Sergeant, platoon sergeant, and platoon leader. I have worked for leaders who have this type of personality, and I can attest to the decrease in morale and communication and the increase in stress. I have also seen leaders be very responsive to their supervisor/leader but treat their subordinates miserably. In these situations, you must

shield the Soldiers by not letting them see this lack of concern and well-being and by keeping them focused on the mission at hand. Regardless of the rank, everyone is a Soldier and deserves to be treated with respect and common courtesy. Updating ADP 6-22 to define toxic leadership shows that the Army recognizes it exists and is a problem.




Photo by David Vergun

Why the Army has Toxic Leaders

I would say toxic leaders don't necessarily start out bad, but that the Army machine unexpectedly generates these types of leaders in our formations. Are toxic leaders the result of the Army's focus on leaders who are confident, decisive, and demonstrate control? In extreme situations, these types of leaders can often be self-serving, arrogant, rigid, unwilling to admit mistakes, reluctant in developing others, and micromanagers. In the absence of reprimand, leaders become more socially aggressive in their actions and continue this path.

The metaphoric model of power states that repeated exercising of power will cause a person to become more arrogant and subsequently start to denigrate

and avoid subordinates. In other words, the more one engages in toxic leadership and is not punished the worse they will become.

I can tell you from experience, when you have toxic leadership, Soldiers are going to eventually just shut down. They'll get to a point where no one will want to put forth any effort toward the task or mission at hand. Soldiers in this environment will not challenge themselves or take risks. Short-term missions may be achieved, but the foundation of your organization to generate combat power will be degraded. I am a maintainer and believe that a good maintenance program starts with leadership support. Rigid, self-interested leaders unwilling to change are not conducive to maintenance. Maintainers are faced with different challenges on the floor every day. We need leaders who are informed, flexible, and creative to help solve problems and not create new ones, especially in our complex work environment.

Ethical relativism is the theory that holds morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong in the society in which it is practiced. I think an environment that allows leaders with unchecked characteristics (i.e., self-serving, arrogant, rigid, unwilling to admit mistakes, and reluctant in developing others) is an example of ethical relativism. By not reprimanding this type of leadership, the Army unknowingly is allowing a new norm to be established within its society. People in the Army are from different cultures, values, and views about what's moral and immoral. Soldiers from different backgrounds have different views about

what's moral and immoral. The Army has its own culture based on seven core values that Soldiers learn during basic combat training. How often do we actually see someone live up to them? Combating toxic leadership starts by making those core values your moral anchor of any grade.

Challenging Toxic Leadership

To combat toxic leadership, organizations need to first realize and acknowledge that it exists and recognize there could be a problem within the ranks. Every organization has some toxicity, and toxicity should be everyone's business. Open communication within the organization will need to take place, and Soldiers need to know that this will not be tolerated and that it will be dealt with. We have to believe change is possible with realistic goals. It's never easy, but training will bring changes to leaders and the Soldiers who work for them. Counseling—having conversations with subordinates one-on-one to improve interpersonal relationships with the addition of peer and subordinate input—is helpful. Education and performance reviews are other helpful correctional steps. Changes require time and the willingness to make them. Command climate assessments modified to focus on components that make up toxic leadership are useful to the Commander. Concentrate on continuing success by observing appropriate concerns with input from subordinates, a top down approach, and reinforcing chain-of-command responsibilities. Identifying toxicity as a moment for transformational change in organizations can be a positive turning point.



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WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SCHOLAR IN “WARRIOR SCHOLAR?”

by MAJ Michael C. Shaw and Mr. Justin M. Witty

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools.”

– Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*

The ancient Spartans thought of themselves as Warrior-Philosophers. The Chinese Tao philosophy stresses a scholar-Warrior mindset. These two cultures both understood the importance of a balance between understanding the military aspects of warfare and the sociological understanding of why people fight. In the Army, we sometimes call it the Art and Science of warfare, but even that is limiting. During the past 15 years of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, Soldiers acted as diplomats, peacekeepers, and strategists, as well as combat Soldiers. With all the various roles that an Army Soldier may find themselves in, we must do more to achieve a balance of skills, not just the Warrior-focused ones.

Many believe that a Warrior is born through an operational education and that is all one needs to be successful in the Army. The operational force will provide for a career’s worth of education and insight, forming Soldiers into the Warriors needed on tomorrow’s battlefield. Some even view this approach as a better hands on learning environment than any classroom. One focused on depth and proficiency rather than breadth. A different Army school of thought is categorized as broadening. Usually a deliberate assignment of various positions outside one’s specific field of expertise; a university-based educational program, training with industry, or a teaching and fellowship opportunity. Some view these op-

portunities to be directly in conflict with the Warrior path. Such opportunities are viewed as “taking a knee” or checked out of the operational fighting Army.

We, as an Army, cannot be so narrow-minded and unbalanced. An old saying goes that “if all you have is a hammer; all your problems look like nails.” If we only know how to “shoot, move, and communicate” in the tactical sense, then that will be our default answer even when dealing in peacekeeping, humanitarian, or diplomatic situations. By focusing too much on the tactical Warrior level, we have potentially atrophied in the strategic scholarly arena. This is most remarkably shown in the inadequacies of 15 years of

COIN strategy, which has reaped countless tactical victories with minimal operational and fewer strategic results. The physical battlefield no longer solely determines the success of the Army. Thus, our future leader's mental fitness requires a more rounded approach, covering multiple aspects and fields of study. We don't have to choose one or the other; we can be both Warrior and Scholar. Maybe it is time we start taking our mental fitness as seriously as we do our physical fitness.

An Army Unbalanced

The pure Warrior exists in the operational environment. Here, rewards materialize for those with experience and expertise in warfare. Think back to those key developmental or leadership assignments. Was the first question people asked you, "Were those assignments in combat?" or, "How many of those hours are combat hours?" We adorn our sleeves with combat patches and our chests with awards so everyone knows we have both experience and knowledge. The combination of both experience and knowledge usually produces perspective and sometimes wisdom. However, many times we use that experience as a safety net, always falling back on it even when the questions asked don't remotely pertain, like applying COIN techniques in a Decisive Action scenario. While we are never expected to have experience in all scenarios, we surely could study and discuss critically how those situations differ from our own experiences and what actions might be necessary to adjust the traditional line of

thinking. This will provide us the ability to think, question, innovate, and problem solve.

The former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker and Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis J. Harvey, believed back in 2004 that the Army required greater Warrior Scholar diversity in our skill sets to meet future challenges. They began searching for and crafting the ability to train the Soldier Pentathlete. Along those lines, Dr. Harvey stated in 2006, "A Pentathlete is a STRONG multi-skilled leader that first and foremost is a strategic and creative thinker. A builder of leaders and teams." While every command team has specific agendas, the overall concept of a tactical and critically thinking Soldier surfaces as a top priority in almost all senior leader philosophies. Yet, the time to execute such a philosophy is arguably nonexistent. The domain of self-development, although truly critical, is relied upon as largely extra-curricular, cutting into people's family and personal time. Can we do better? What would change if for example, physical training every Wednesday was focused on mental acuity with events such as small group discussions, exploration of Army systems/processes, or briefings/talks by business chief executive officers or retired military professionals?

The Army talks of broadening Soldiers throughout the assignments process once they complete their grade-specific branch-qualifying assignment. By broad-

ening, the Army wants to expose Soldiers to other fields, jobs, commands, etc., and introduce them to a much larger Army ecosystem. Perhaps we can do a better job, at the tactical unit level, of leader development, broadening, and of scholarly development as opposed to assuming the assignments process or some form of talent management will do the work. Broadening is so much more than working at Training and Doctrine Command or earning an advanced degree. Civilian education is not the only form of scholarship. Scholarship is learning at a higher level, without regard to subject, level, or echelon. In academia, this is called fostering a lifelong love of learning, and much more can be done to encourage mental agility besides putting out a preferred reading list.

Aviation's Own Track and Balance

All in all, the aviation cohort is an educated bunch. However, most of our civilian degrees and academic courses are acquired prior to joining the Service or serve as a ticket for entry. Once the Army accepts you with the requisite degrees or diplomas, they don't appear to have much need for that previous knowledge and experience because they will train you in everything you need to know for your Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). It seems as though the first half of your career is spent observing, emulating, and just gaining experience. Only after that time period does anyone care what you think or have to say.



Photo by Adam Holguin

It seems as if the Warrior experience is all we are looking for, because operational performance is touted as the end all and be all for advancement. Hours flown, munitions spent, and pounds of cargo hauled have dominated our Officer Evaluation Reports and grade sheets as opposed to the variety of operations attempted or effects of those operations. This may be the mirroring effect of someone choosing to advance people just like them. Those who sit on selection boards very often are looking and evaluating individuals favorably who most mirror them, for it is human nature to believe “I was successful, therefore someone who functions like me must also be.” If we promote subordinates fitting only our image then we will continue to get the same old answers to new questions. Diversity of thought is something that we must strive for and encourage in our search for a balanced force.

Pursuing scholarship for the aviation branch may also be harder than for others. For us, experience really does count. If you don't have the reps, you can't perform the mission. The speed and complexity of aviation requires a high level of understanding and familiarity to complete. That is why aviation has the largest number of Warrant Officers who are expected to have more depth and less breadth. So, does that mean we have no time to broaden? Of course not. Perhaps aviation professional military education (PME) as a broadening tool is even more important and valuable because it does not take our aviation professionals away from the flight line for long. Though it may be more challenging for aviation, we must obtain an increased level of scholarship. We must develop skills outside of the cockpit, train with other branches and Services, have them teach at our schoolhouses, integrate their perspectives in presentations at the unit level, and by all efforts encourage people to read something other than aircraft limitations and emergency procedures (also known as 5&9).



Conclusion

Perhaps we should not be surprised by any of this. Tactical dilemmas are usually far less complicated than formulating a strategic war plan. Additionally, the camaraderie that binds Soldiers is primarily found out “on the line.” Line units develop personalities and generate excitement. Who among us would want to leave that community for the blasé of a staff meeting, or planning cell? The Warriors are the ones seemingly having all the “fun.” However, there should not be a choice to be one or the other, they are not mutually exclusive. The challenge is to be both and to do it with the help of, or in spite of, the jobs and positions the Army gives you.

Within these positions, there are many roles the Army asks us to play. We could be leaders, managers, trainers, Warriors, diplomats, or technicians all in the same day. The mental agility to decide which of these roles is appropriate for the situation is the main challenge. The skills needed for your current position will vary, but it is essential that you continue to refine and strengthen a variety of areas with dedicated study to be the Soldier Pentath-

lete. Be intellectually curious, jump down the rabbit-hole, and muddle through the discourse. We expect people to do more than the minimum on the physical training test. Shouldn't we expect the same for professional knowledge?

The Warrior Scholar is an embodiment of the view that mind, body, and soul are all important. Scholarship and competence are foundational to our force as a profession. If we are not thinkers and problem-solvers, how will we compete with peer (or possibly superior) adversaries? In aviation, we need to outthink the enemy, weather, and our own aircraft systems. We must be critical thinkers and can practice and hone that skill in all areas of our lives, not just our profession. While we may not necessarily need broadening for 3 years at a stretch, there is much to learn from PME, certificate programs, or fellowships for a few months to 1 year. Thinking about other subjects or fields of study can help capture innovation, bring inspiration, or find commonalities in problems we are trying to solve within aviation. To do that is to fully connect the Warrior and Scholar mindsets as one.



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• ACE *of* ACES •

by Laura Pratt

From racetrack to runway, enlisted to officer, Army Captain Edward Rickenbacker was no stranger to danger. Facing his fears and overcoming endless obstacles, Rickenbacker became America's top flying Ace during WWI. Shooting down 26 German planes, America's Ace of Aces achieved more kills than any other American flier during WWI. Though an American hero, his humbleness, humility, and dedication to the mission was evident throughout his life. It would be this character that would serve him well as a leader, and it continues today as a tremendous example in leadership.

The Start

Born in 1890, in Columbus, Ohio, Edward Rickenbacker was one of eight children. Mischievous and rambunctious, Rickenbacker admits he was a "bad boy." Smoking at the age of 5, and leader of the Horsehead Gang in school, young Rickenbacker nevertheless was imbued with family values by his father, who taught him to never procrastinate—a lesson that carries weight even today.

At the age of 12, Rickenbacker lost his father, leaving him no choice but to drop out of school to work. It was during 1906 that Rickenbacker would find a job that

would go on to change his life forever. He became a mechanic for Lee Frayer, a race car driver. During this time, Rickenbacker would discover his love for engines, ultimately leading to racing on his own. He became so good that he eventually set a world speed record of 134 miles per hour at Daytona in 1914.

The Beginning of a Legend

By 1917, Rickenbacker joined the Army with intentions to fly, something at the time that was still considered quite dangerous. At the age of 27, he was denied flying status due to being over-aged, coupled with his lack of a college degree.

Still, he wanted to serve his country and was sworn in as a sergeant to become a driver. While overseas, Rickenbacker managed to gain an assignment driving Colonel William "Billy" Mitchell. During his assignment, he hassled Colonel Mitchell until he was granted permission to apply for flight training. In order to apply for flight school, Rickenbacker lied about his age and subsequently changed it to 25.

Once accepted, Rickenbacker spent 17 days as a student pilot before graduating and commissioning as a lieutenant (this certainly serves as a sharp contrast to the current Army flight school student timeline). Upon completion of his training, he received his first assignment, to the 94th Aero Squadron, affectionately known as the "Hat in the Ring gang," a symbol of their willingness to be a contender in the fight. While assigned to the 94th, Rickenbacker developed his own aerial fighting techniques, consequently earning him his first solo conquest on May 7, 1918. His risky techniques in the air consisted of approaching his target carefully and closer than anyone else dared, ultimately leading him to several wins. As his victories rose, so did his prominence and notoriety in the Army.

On September 25, 1918, Rickenbacker took command of the 94th Aero Squadron. The same day, he volunteered for a solo flight in which he spotted five Fokkers and two Halberstadt CL.II aircraft. Rickenbacker did not turn away, though obviously outnumbered, and in a demonstration of pure duty and courage, he went diving into their group, shooting down one of each type. His daring actions earned him the French Croix de Guerre (Cross of War) and the U.S. Medal of Honor. Promoted to captain within the following month, Rickenbacker became the most successful U.S. Air Service fighter pilot of the war, earning the title America's Ace of Aces.



America's Ace of Aces

Rickenbacker flew a total of 300 combat hours with 134 aerial encounters with the enemy and had a total of 26 victories. He came home as a national hero. Humbled by the war, he refused all endorsements of commercial products and even a role in a motion picture. After leaving active duty, Rickenbacker was promoted to major, a title he never referred to. Rickenbacker said, "I felt that my rank of captain was earned and deserved," using it as his title for the rest of his life. An obvious mark of character and tremendous humility, and certainly a quality worth emulating.

Life after WWI

After leaving active duty, Rickenbacker accomplished many things, from creating a comic strip to publishing a book. He traveled the country giving speeches promoting aviation. Well known and liked, he never failed to attract crowds during his speeches. During his travels, he assisted 25 cities in developing local airports. After the Air Mail Act of 1934, Rickenbacker became the Eastern Air Lines general manager. He strove to make the Air Lines independent of government subsidies. During his time as general manager, Rickenbacker improved working conditions, salaries, maintenance, and passen-



ger services. He later became the airline president, in which he developed the airline into one of the nation's four largest carriers of its time. His dedication to duty, whether military or civil, was evident in every task he took on in life, and excellence was the obvious result.

WWII

When WWII began, Eastern Air Lines gave up half of its fleet to military service, as well as taking the task of military cargo airlift. In 1942, Henry L. Stimson (Secretary of War) asked Rickenbacker to visit England. As an observer, he was sent in order to evaluate equipment and personnel. His selection for such a duty was obvious due to his understanding of aviators and the problems they face while flying in a military capacity. Already in the throes of a wildly successful civilian career, Rickenbacker agreed to the position out of a sense of duty to his country, but only for a salary of \$1 a year. He would go on to pay all of his own expenses. Such behavior is not possible for modern aviators, but it was amazing to see one of the nation's elite serve his country so willingly, and at no cost to the country.

Prior to leaving, Rickenbacker turned down the offered ranks of brigadier general and major general, as he wanted to provide the best feedback without repercussion from the military. Afterward, he returned to the States, only to be immediately sent to the Pacific on a similar mission. This mission included Rickenbacker's memorization of a verbal message from Stimson to General Douglas MacArthur. On his way to Canton Island, the B-17 aircrew tasked with carrying Rickenbacker lost their route and had to eventually ditch the aircraft due to lack of fuel. Finding themselves in the ocean, the crew retrieved rafts, fishing kits, and sur-



vival rations from the sinking aircraft. In an attempt to provide a larger target for search planes, the crew roped their rafts together. Rickenbacker, though the only civilian in the group, immediately took command after realizing the seriousness of the situation. For the next 3 weeks, the crew went into survival mode. Living on fish and oranges, Rickenbacker never gave up on his men, and he continued to lead them through the impossible ordeal.

After weeks of no sign of rescue, it was decided that the rafts would separate in hopes that one might be recovered. All three rafts were shortly rescued. As a result of the whole experience Rickenbacker lost around 60 pounds and was barely alive, but once healthy again he continued on with his mission, eventually passing the secret message to MacArthur. The content of that message is unknown. Few secrets of WWII have survived the revealing light of the decades. Upon his return, Rickenbacker reported back to Stimson, and as a result of the ditching,

he recommended many upgrades to the survival gear provided to pilots during their flight. Since Rickenbacker became one of the strongest advocates for improved Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE) for aviators, there were many immediate improvements. It is impossible to measure the impact of his recommendations and the number of lives he helped or saved.

A True Leader

Leaders seek to better their environment, to know their team and themselves, and to maintain a positive attitude. No matter what Rickenbacker faced, he always pursued his mission, his team, and maintained a positive attitude. Death was knocking at his door, but not once did Rickenbacker think of stopping. Rickenbacker was a true leader, living his life with dignity and character, and it was from examples like this that the Army values were modeled. Throughout his career, he remained loyal to his men and the mission, ultimately fulfilling each of his duties, accomplishing one impossible assignment after another.

Rickenbacker treated people with dignity and respect, as well as holding others accountable to do the same. His best effort was always put forth while maintaining self-respect. Rickenbacker served his country without thought of recognition or gain. He developed habits of being honorable in which he carried out, acted, and lived a life that embodied what would become Army values. He faced fear and danger while maintaining courage, acting upon the things that he knew to be honorable. Captain Rickenbacker is a true example of what it means to be a leader. He never gave up and always put the mission first.



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A CLARIFICATION OF THE ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

by SFC Tyler Hervey



Soldiers often wonder why After-Action reviews (AARs) are important and why they maintain such a strong presence in the Army training model. In a nutshell, this information is collected following deployments, large training exercises, and other key events in order to pass these best practices and to identify systematic issues that could be corrected through changes in training and doctrine. As a lessons learned integration analyst, I rarely encounter fellow Noncommissioned officers who are aware of the lessons learned programs and their importance. There is an entire module in the Structured Self Development IV course dedicated to the education of these programs, their history, and how to navigate them online.

So what are lessons learned? The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) defines lessons learned as “Validated knowledge and experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations.” Most Army personnel don’t realize that these best practices and lessons learned are required by regulation in accordance with *Army Regulation (AR) 11-33*, “Army Lessons Learned.” Still a skeptic on the validity and importance of information sharing? Let’s take a look at two notable stories in military history when lessons learned and best practices shifted the gears of war in favor of allied forces.

During times of war and conflict, the United States military has always striven to ensure that creative ideas and the best practices of Soldiers in one unit were passed on to others. In WWII, the Germans were utilizing Norman hedgerows to their advantage to choke-out and cordon allied forces, preventing many armored vehicles from supporting light infantry. No terrain on planet Earth was better suited for defensive posture with the weapons of the 1940s than the Nor-

man hedgerows. Norman hedgerows date back to the height of the Roman Empire. They were fairly large mounds of dirt adorned by thick hedges to contain livestock and to mark boundaries. Typically, there was only a single entry-point into the field, which was normally irregular in shape. On the unimproved French roads, the brush often met overhead, giving Soldiers a feeling of claustrophobia.

Allied forces were having great difficulty in spotting enemy forces with every view blocked by the massive hedgerows. This was an unforeseen problem that negatively affected allied forces during the invasion on D-Day in WWII. One Noncommissioned officer, SGT Curtis Grubb Culin, III (February 10, 1915–November 20, 1963) was a WWII Soldier credited with the invention of a hedge-breaching device fitted to allied armored vehicles during the Battle of Normandy. Culin was mentioned in one of the last addresses by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a January 10, 1961 speech to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers:

There was a little sergeant. His name was Culin, and he had an idea and his idea was that we could fasten knives, great big steel knives, in front of these tanks, and as they came along they would cut off these banks right at ground level—they would go through on the level keel—would carry with themselves a little bit of camouflage for a while. And this idea was brought to the captain, to the major, to the colonel, and it got high enough that somebody did something about it—and that was General Bradley—and he did it very quickly. Because this seemed like a crazy idea, they did not even go to the engineers very fast, because they were afraid of the technical advice, and then someone did have a big question: “Where are you going to find the steel for all these things?”

Well now, happily the Germans tried to keep us from going on the beaches with great steel “chevaux de frise”—big crosses, there were big bars of steel down on the beach where the Germans left it. And he got it—got these things sharpened up—and it worked fine. The biggest and happiest group I suppose in all the Allied Armies that night were those that knew that this thing worked. And it worked beautifully.




General Bradley saw this equipment in action and immediately ordered the ordnance unit to begin constructing a massive quantity of the devices. During times of conflict, such as the Korean War, Vietnam War, and WWII, the Army had established quite comprehensive lessons learned and best practices systems in order to pass the valuable information down to other units. In peacetime, however, these systems would decay and collapse, only to be reinvented during the next conflict.

An example of a best practice being disseminated and utilized through the CALL occurred early during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army was having major problems with High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle rollovers, many caused by improvised explosive device attacks. The real problem was getting injured Soldiers out of the vehicles when the doors jammed, which happened often. A smart Soldier from the 10th Mountain Division discovered a means to get the jammed doors open. His quick-

fix solution, named the “Rat Claw,” was captured and publicized via the CALL network and spread quickly from the 10th Mountain Division throughout the Army, saving many lives.

There are multiple resources that Soldiers may tap into in order to both receive and disseminate lessons learned and best practices. The first step is understanding the “Army Lessons Learned Program”, or ALLP, through AR 11-33 and enforcing these very basic requirements throughout the formations. *Army Regulation 11-33* gives more specific information about lessons learned from a program perspective. This regulation outlines lessons learned responsibilities across the Army, creates an information sharing culture, places responsibility on units to establish lessons learned internal programs/continuity, places responsibility on commanders to submit unit AARs to CALL, and mandates the use of Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS)—pronounced “jillis,”—for information archiving and sharing across the formations. Joint Lessons Learned Information System is a joint database that includes all U.S. military services, inter-governmental and interagency organizations, and their lessons learned that you could search to assist with your training and real world operations. It is a database that allows you to add observations and be able to search, collate, or further define information requests.

The purpose of the ALLP is two-fold:
(1) To provide the foundational work for all organizations to maximize the benefit of experience to change culture, behavior, and improve combat readiness. Commanders and Noncommissioned officers at all levels must understand the importance of gathering, sharing, and integrating lessons learned and best practices through the ALLP and its kindred platforms, such as CALL and JLLIS.
(2) To have leaders understand the necessity for a fixed lessons learned program in every unit. Units must have the capability to collect, analyze, disseminate, and archive lessons and best practices collaboratively to improve performance.



Once they have gained a thorough understanding of the ALLP, Soldiers may begin to explore and navigate the CALL Web site at <https://call2.army.mil/> where they will be prompted with a two-part authentication requirement to enter via Common Access Card (CAC) login or through a CALL-supplied login. Center for Army Lessons Learned-supplied login access must be requested to gain access and is only available to approved U.S. Government personnel that are not issued a CAC.

So what is CALL and what do they do? The CALL collection agency is for all non-aviation Lessons Learned Integration and is primarily focused on rapid adaptation and dissemination of very important and crucial lessons efficiently. The Army has learned a lot of lessons over the past decade of war and has adapted how it trains, mans, and equips for operations. The Army wants to increase its agility and adaptability. Rapid adaptation (RA) is one way the Army is striving to achieve battlefield superiority using technology, networks, and people to enable the sharing of information. Rapid adaptation allows the Army to streamline the process for capturing lessons learned, accelerate the dissemination of these lessons across the Army, and adapt them into all aspects of how the Army prepares its Soldiers to fight and win on the battlefield.

The CALL Web site features useful resources such as publications, handbooks, and even a course hosted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Under the tab “LESSONS LEARNED LINKS” is a ‘Joint’ column followed by a dropdown list of agencies. In that drop-down, the JLLIS tab can be found, allowing you to access JLLIS. You may have to register in order to see the information contained on the site.

It is the automated knowledge management and information technology suite that supports all phases of the Joint and ALLP. JLLIS facilitates the collection, tracking, management, data-mining, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons. Once you have logged into JLLIS, this will be the screen that you will navigate from. The input tool allows any approved user to submit observations via a Web-enabled interface. We all have a part to play in sharing observations, AARs and best practices to improve our Total Force. You can register and begin using the system by accessing it through the CALL site authentication. It is our responsibility as leaders to share our valuable experience. Thanks to modern technology, this sharing can extend far beyond our organic units and could potentially turn the tide of the battle in favor of allied forces in wars of the future.



SFC Tyler P. Hervey is currently serving as the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) as the Tactics NCOIC. Previous assignments include: 911th Engineer Company, 12th AV BN; 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and USAACE. He served in South Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq as a Unmanned Aircraft Systems operator.

Grant vs. Lee: The Graphic History of the Civil War's Greatest Rivals During the Last Year of the War

Written and Illustrated by Wayne Vansant, Published by Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN 2013. 102 pages

A book review by CW4 Leonard S. Momeny

There are not many Soldiers today who will engage in reading a text that has something to do with military history. Many of us find little to associate with from any time prior to WWII. That probably has something to do with our branch of choice, Aviation. Since pilots and crew alike enjoy talking about their airplanes, we tend to neglect the study of warfare in its most general format. However, there is so much to learn in the pages of military history, especially with respect to the experience of the common Soldier, and more importantly, the profession of waging war.


Now to further complicate matters, imagine if you were to tell the Soldier in question that the topic of the book was the Civil War. Many simply care not to associate with a topic like the Civil War. I suppose it would be due to the simple fact that war is no longer fought in that matter. However, for those of us that find great value in military history, we are constantly on the lookout for books that will somehow capture the attention of Soldiers, especially younger Soldiers. The book has to be something that is easy to consume, historically accurate, relevant to the Army Profession, and hopefully, a book that does not intimidate upon first sight. *Grant vs. Lee*, by Wayne Vansant, provides readers with such a book. It is a fast-paced graphic novel that delivers a powerful history lesson to audiences through a comic book medium, providing readers with lightweight and quick analysis of a critical moment in the Civil War.

This graphic novel opens with a quick synopsis of the War thus far, placing the reader into the spring of 1864, post Gettysburg. The main focus of the book is to capture the decisions of the two famed generals and their

efforts in maneuver of their respective formations in the closing year of the War. Vansant works to not only capture the decisions of the two commanders, but to also illuminate the consequences of their actions. Vansant captures the precious year, in albeit brief, but historically accurate, 14 chapters. The illustrations are detailed and relevant, adding a dimension to the conflict's history that is seldom felt in other countless tomes about the Civil War. This is not Vansant's first effort in telling military tales through the comic medium, as he stunned audiences for 5 years with his work on Marvel Comics' *Nam*.

The most intriguing portion of the book is that Vansant seems to focus his attention on the tactics of the two general's forces; identifying the application of operational art, prefacing certain chapters with relevant maps, and going so far as to identify development of new tactics. A great example of tactics development is seen in the case of Colonel Upton's attack at the "Mule Shoe," during the battle of the wilderness. A creative exploitation of Confederate earthworks, and employment of a new theory of attack, "a hammer blow," at a critical point allowed Union Forces to upend Confederate troops from their fortified position. This effort by Upton serves as an example that can be used to demonstrate the value of ingenuity in the face of a tactical problem. An excellent potential talking point when looking to develop younger Soldiers through reading.

Grant vs. Lee is not simply a robotic analysis of history and tactics. Vansant does take the time to point out the other struggles of war, the emotional side of conflict, and its impact on the Soldiers and leaders alike. No war in history leaves its



participants unscathed, and Vansant expresses the toil of War on the various formations through touching word and illustration. From the fear of uncertainty that surrounded Union miners attempting to conduct a massive breach of a fortified Confederate position during "Battle of the Crater," to the palatable desperation of Confederate forces prior to the conclusion of hostilities, Vansant ensures that the reader experiences the full range of emotions that war offers.

The graphic novel *Grant vs. Lee* offers a new generation of readers an opportunity to learn from a dramatic point in military history. Words can tell us much, however, if a picture is worth a thousand words, then this book overdelivers. Do not let the fact that this book is in a graphic novel format throw you off or prevent you from trying an alternative format. The best part about this read is the fact that the book is quick and consumable, offering readers a chance to experience the benefit of military study without the typical exercise of sorting through hundreds of pages of information. Perhaps you are looking to execute a potential Staff Ride, or you simply look to increase your own professional reading list in a quick manner. If that is the case, this might be the perfect book for you. I highly recommend anyone read this book, both for personal enjoyment and professional development.



Aviation

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[Back to Table of Contents](#)

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Fort Rucker, AL 36362



Look for the January – March, 2018 Issue:

Our Featured Focus Will Be on
Expeditionary Mindset
... and More

Write for the Aviation Digest!

Scheduled Feature Focus Topics are:

April – June 2018: Senior Leader Forum

July – September 2018: Mission Command

Prepare your articles now on these themes or any other topic related to our profession that you would like to share with the Army Aviation Community.

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**Back to Table
of Contents**