

THE WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1987

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For Uncle Freddy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the years, many people and organizations have been very influential in my life and work. It is not possible to acknowledge or even to remember them all, but I want to recognize the special few who have had the greatest impact on this project.

Institutional support was provided by several sources. The data utilized were made available in part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and by the National Archives of the United States in Washington, D.C. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the suppliers bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

Funding was provided in part by a grant from the Army Research Institute that was made available by the Science Research Laboratory of the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York. The Computer Systems Division, USMA, funded the ICPSR membership and the purchase of several data sets from the National Archives. Additional financial support was provided by a grant from the Military Educational Foundation, a nonprofit association of faculty members in the Department of Social Sciences, USMA. The

views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of any agency of the United States government.

I am particularly grateful for the research opportunities afforded me by the Military Academy. During the summer of 1986 and the spring semester of 1987, I was freed from any teaching or departmental responsibilities and was allowed to work unhindered on this book. Special thanks go to Colonel Lee D. Olvey, Professor and Head of the Department of Social Sciences, for making these opportunities possible.

I wish to acknowledge with special appreciation and affection the contributions made by my wife, my children, and my parents. I owe Kalli untold gratitude for the understanding, love, and support she has provided throughout this very long and difficult task. It is not trite to say this book would not have been possible without her. Special thanks go to my daughters, Rebekah and Rachel, for being so patient with me. To my parents, Andy and Audrey Ziegler, I owe a great deal; they have been and will continue to be my personal and professional role models, whose values and examples I strive to follow every day.

Conscientious mentors are invaluable in any learning endeavor. I have had the privilege of being guided by two, David P. Conradt and Augustus R. Norton, whose scholarly advice and practical exhortations have been indispensable to me during my academic apprenticeship.

Space does not allow me to detail the very significant contributions of the following people. They have each influenced this book in a major way, and I extend my thanks to them all: Alan Agresti, George Edwards, Warren Heyman, Keith Legg, Hazel Pridgen, John Spanier, Barbara Thomas, Ken Wald, Katherine Williams, and Jim and Shirley Ziegler.

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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May 1987

Chairman: David P. Conradt
Major Department: Political Science

Using original and previously published survey data, this study explores West European public attitudes about Atlantic cooperation in general and NATO in particular. Alternative viewpoints are categorized into a typology that is used to describe the conceptual nature of European beliefs and to measure the level of public support for the different viewpoints. Long-term trends in these attitudes and causal determinants are also examined.

A distinguishing feature of this study is that it is truly comparative. The analysis relies on identical survey items administered in four European countries: Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. This enables cross-national generalizations to be made with confidence; for example, one of the conclusions reached is that among the nations observed, the West German public is clearly the most "Atlanticist" in outlook.

The longitudinal data examined indicate that some fundamental changes have occurred in European security beliefs. Anti-Americanism has increased dramatically at the same time that attitudes toward the Soviet Union have become more favorable, and the fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war has increased substantially. Explanations for these shifts in opinion are not found in sociological factors, such as changes in generational experiences, educational levels, or social classes; but instead, European attitudes appear to reflect broad changes in international politics, such as the Vietnam War, nuclear parity, and detente.

Favorable opinion for NATO tends to be high, yet specific defense-related measures receive much less support. In other words, "NATO" in an abstract sense is popular, but there is no European consensus on various security policies, and in some cases there is widespread opposition. In Britain and West Germany the parliamentary debate over NATO policies has become particularly intense.

Thus, the picture that emerges of European support for the Alliance is complex. Western governments will have to tread a delicate path in attempting to structure security policies that form a credible deterrent on the one hand but that reassure the West European public on the other.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: ATTITUDES, POLITICS, AND THE ALLIANCE

Political cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance seems to be threatened continually (Cohen, 1982/83; Joffe, 1981). In the early 1980s, the political mobilization of the West European public over security affairs presented a new challenge to Western unity (Stoppa-Liebl and Laqueur, 1985). The implications for Euro-American harmony raised by the politicization of Alliance decisions create the need for a more adequate conceptual understanding of the public's attitudes in this issue area (Flynn and Rattinger, 1985:381).

This study examines the mass attitudes of West Europeans toward Atlantic cooperation in general and the NATO Alliance in particular. A comprehensive profile is developed of the structure, content, distribution, determinants, trends, and cross-national variation of European beliefs in these areas. The nations of Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy are studied. This analysis also clarifies many of the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues that have plagued previous empirical research on this topic.

The principal concept, or analytical variable, is Atlantic cooperation. Attitudes that are favorably disposed

toward Atlantic cooperation would support a common Euro-American policy perspective along a wide range of issues, including defense policy, economic policy, and other aspects of foreign affairs. The intent is to examine European attitudes on NATO and military security within a large conceptual context. The focus of this study is on fundamental values and underlying constructs rather than on opinions about specific policies. This approach is intentionally broad in an effort to tap into underlying "affective" orientations (Hovland and Rosenberg, 1960), rather than the fleeting, impressionistic opinions generated by current publicized debates on various policies.

This introductory chapter and the research design chapter that follows outline the framework within which this analysis takes place. The political setting in Western Europe and some of the analytical and theoretical issues prevalent in the scholarly literature are examined in this chapter. The model which guides the substance of the study is presented in Chapter II.

The Political Setting

European publics and governments have had to adjust to major changes in the configuration of world politics that emerged following World War II. Most visible of these was the shift in the balance of world power away from the European continent as the two new superpowers became the principal players in world events. Second, the nature of

strategic military decisions changed fundamentally as the importance of massive nuclear forces became apparent. Third, decolonization and the diffusion of power, resulting from the increased number of international actors, proportionately reduced Europe's influence in the world. And finally, the globalization of the international economy has increased the economic interdependence of Western nations. The domestic politics and national foreign policies of West European nations have varied in responding to these changes in the international system.

The nations of Western Europe differ in their national traditions, interests, and options. Historical events and circumstances have shaped these characteristics into distinct political cultures. The political environments of Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy are unique, and the nature and role of public attitudes are heavily influenced by these various national factors.

The following section briefly traces the divergent foreign policy goals and constraints of these four nations. The subsequent section discusses a phenomenon common to each: the politicization of foreign policy decision making.

Foreign Policy Directions

The postwar history of Great Britain has been influenced primarily by the need to adapt to its decline in national economic and political power (Lieber, 1985:1). Following World War II, Britain remained the only major

European nation which was not invaded, occupied, or defeated. Victorious and relatively unscathed, the British people could continue to look upon themselves as a great world power: one of the Big Three responsible for piecing together the international system. This victorious status hid for some time Britain's weakened international position that was the result of the drastic changes in the structure of global power. This gap between Britain's relative weakness and its continued claim to great-power status has been explained by the "cognitive lag" concept (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:179-180). This view accuses British leaders of failing to adjust to the postwar realities because of a faulty conception of the world.

Recognition that Britain's postwar status and power had diminished became clear as events unfolded. In 1947, Britain ceased being the guardian of the continental balance of power by withdrawing its military and economic support from Greece and Turkey; the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan followed, signalling that the United States had assumed Britain's traditional role. Decolonization began in the late 1940s, and the British learned to live with the idea that their vast imperial possessions were being relinquished. (This was accomplished peacefully and pragmatically for the most part, in contrast to the French experience.) The humiliating withdrawal of the British and French forces from the Suez expedition, in 1956, in response to widespread international criticism and the political and

financial pressure imposed by the United States, clearly illustrated the reduced world role of Britain. This episode marked the last time Britain would mount an independent military operation of any consequence without being assured of American support (Lieber, 1985:4).

Britain's relationship with the other West European nations was strained in the decades following the Second World War. Having emerged from the war as one of the Big Three, Britain resisted the early attempts at creating a unified Europe (Lieber, 1970). The notion of joining with defeated, second-rank nations was unacceptable to a great power. Additionally, Britain was unwilling to break or jeopardize its "special" relationship with the United States or its ties with the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, by 1961, it seemed clear that entry into the Common Market was in Britain's interests; however, the process of joining proved to be protracted and humiliating. French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application, and formal accession was not completed until 1974, five years after de Gaulle's death. This experience left the British resentful, and there remains "a lingering doubt about long-term British commitment to the Common Market" (Lieber, 1985:7).

The "prime foreign policy goal" of Great Britain following the war was to achieve a permanent American commitment to the security of Western Europe (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:189, 190). As the lines of East-West confrontation solidified in the late 1940s, British leaders perceived

a growing military threat from the Soviet Union. The Prague coup in February 1948, the Berlin blockade in June 1948, and the Korean War in 1950, prompted Britain to seek American assistance in maintaining a stable balance of power in Europe. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was one of the principal architects of the Atlantic Alliance, and the establishment of NATO represented the realization of Britain's primary postwar goal.

For France, the pursuit of great-power status and influence has dominated its postwar foreign policy experience. Having been defeated in 1940 and occupied for five years, French national self-definition required an assertive restoration of its former prominent position in world affairs. Although the nation was drastically weakened following the war, "the aspirations of greatness and rank have persisted" (Macridis, 1985:23).

French ambitions included a leadership role among West European nations, independence from the East-West conflict, and the maintenance of colonial possessions. These goals were clearly articulated by General de Gaulle in his Memoirs, referring to the period immediately following the defeat of Germany:

I intended to assure France primacy in Western Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten her safety; to cooperate with the East and West and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or another without ever accepting any kind of dependency; to transform the French Union into a free association in order to avoid the as yet unspecified dangers of upheaval. (1960:204; cited in Macridis, 1985:24)

Within Western Europe, de Gaulle achieved limited success. After being excluded from the Yalta Conference in 1945, de Gaulle ensured French inclusion in the Big Four by insisting on a French zone of occupation in Germany and a French seat on the Allied Control Council (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:98). French statesmen, especially Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, were the driving force in establishing the institutions of the European Community: The European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market (Grosser, 1982:101-128). Within this European framework, de Gaulle asserted French influence by vetoing Britain's application for membership into the Common Market. However, one of his principal goals--security from Germany by French control over the Saar and a disarmed Germany--was not achieved because of the overriding effects of the Cold War and the establishment of NATO.

France asserted itself most dramatically within the East-West arena. The French objective was to remain independent of both blocs. To this end, national nuclear forces, the force de frappe, were produced, and eventually, de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military command structure of NATO in 1966. De Gaulle, in 1968, summed up his policies toward the superpowers as follows: "We French have never ceased to work in order to put an end to the regime of the two blocs" (cited in Macridis, 1985:43).

The "futility of French efforts to retain control over the empire" was illustrated by their complete defeat in Indochina in 1954 (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:139). Later, the war in Algeria brought down the French Fourth Republic in 1958. The losses incurred by France in fighting these colonial wars were devastating--politically, militarily, and morally--at a time when French influence was beginning to return in other areas of world politics. Compared to Indochina and Algeria, there was little French resistance to the decolonization of most remaining possessions. Within this sphere of French postwar goals, maintaining the empire, there was little success.

The establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany was in some ways a historical accident. Its existence was the result of "Allied fiat . . . an offspring of bipolarity" (Joffe, 1985:77). Rather than a harsh occupation followed by a "super-Versailles," the Cold War realities made a reconstituted Germany a prize for both East and West. Since neither bloc could obtain control over all of Germany, the client states of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic were established in their respective zones of occupation (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:50). Within this unique setting, the foreign policy goals and perspectives of West Germany evolved.

Initially, the reestablishment of national sovereignty--the right and power to conduct foreign policy at all--was the overriding objective. Deprived of armed

forces, economic strength, and moral credibility, West Germany in 1949 needed resources it could leverage into political influence. In pursuit of international respectability, the first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, became a "compulsive joiner," reasoning that membership in any international organization would create the appearances of equality as well as offer real chances to influence events (Joffe, 1985:79). This tactic reversed the logic of the European integrationists, such as Jean Monnet, who viewed integration as a means to reduce the effects of sovereignty. Adenauer used each membership as an incentive for the Allies to lift restraints upon German statehood and sovereignty.

West Germany became the most integrationist of the West European nations. The Federal Republic was a charter member and leading advocate of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market. Additionally, Adenauer at one time proposed a complete Franco-German union (this was actually a tactic to deflect French intentions to detach the Saarland from Germany).

The Korean War and its resultant increase in Cold War tensions forced the Allies to resolve the issue of German rearmament. France proposed but later defeated the European Defense Community which was designed to unite European (including German) military forces under supranational control. Eventually, the Anglo-American desire to rearm West Germany as a member of NATO prevailed. In 1955, the Federal Republic was admitted into NATO, and the foreign

occupation forces became Alliance forces, thus officially ending the period of occupation. Its entrance into NATO exemplified the realization of West Germany's principal postwar goal: "sovereignty through integration" (Joffe, 1985:78-81).

In Italy, foreign policy decisions have been manipulated for domestic political consumption (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:87). There were no postwar aspirations or claims for great-power status as in France and Britain. Additionally, Italy was spared the dismemberment and dramatic loss of sovereignty suffered by Germany. The twin fears of an economic disaster and a radical shift in domestic political alignments were more important factors in Italy's postwar foreign policy than were fears of Soviet aggression or the ideals of integration. With the political climate deeply polarized between the pro-Soviet Left and the pro-Western Right, the ruling Christian Democrats committed Italy to its two fundamental "pillars" of foreign policy: the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community (Bonvicini, 1983:71).

Italy's initial decision to join NATO was made reluctantly (Putnam, 1977:295). However, faced with American diplomatic pressure, Italian dependence on Marshall Plan aid, and a desire for international guarantees of the domestic order, Italy became an unenthusiastic member. Throughout its tenure of membership, Italy's material contribution to NATO has been remarkably low.

Gradually, the Italian Socialist and Communist parties have come to accept both of these two postwar foreign policy choices of Italy. Support for NATO and the EEC are in large measure prerequisites for legitimate participation in governing Italy. In this respect the Socialist party has succeeded for some time, but questions remain about the legitimacy of the PCI. However, about a third of the Italian electorate remain loyal to the Italian Communist party.

Thus, the foreign policy directions of these countries have been guided largely by the particular "identity problems" experienced by each (Grosser, 1982:324-326). The most severe identity "crisis" was undergone by the Federal Republic which owes its existence primarily to American power. Concern with international identity was least serious in Italy; however, internal social change and development represent more significant issues for Italy than for the other cases. France and Great Britain each had to deal with their declining status and power, especially in relation to the United States. France has pursued an independent, reassertive course, while Britain has attempted to retain influence through its "special" Anglo-American relationship.

Mass Politicization

The politicization of foreign and defense policy making in Western societies is one of the more significant

political developments of the postwar era (Bertram, 1983; Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983). Once the domain of political elites, issues relating to alliances, national security, the international economy, and other foreign policy concerns are now well within the matrix of political attitudes and interests of the mass public in Western democracies. Bertram argues that this politicization has been accompanied by the decline of consensus and an increasing skepticism: "An important part of the public in [Western] societies is no longer willing to trust governments or experts or even the media on matters of defense policy" (1983:1).

In Western Europe, the increased role of the public in foreign and security affairs is substantial (Howard, 1983; Schneider, 1983). In 1975, a referendum in Britain was necessary to legitimize its membership in the Common Market, and in 1986, the public in Spain voiced its approval of membership in NATO also by referendum. The 1983 elections in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany were contested largely over NATO, missiles, and foreign policy.

In general, the greater politicization reflects opposition to established Alliance policies. Peace movements are active, with varying degrees of success, in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy (Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff, 1985). Opposition to NATO's decision to modernize its intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) served as a catalyst for mass demonstrations

and protests across Europe in the early 1980s. The Dutch Parliament delayed its vote on INF emplacement following massive public resistance. In West Germany, disagreement over INF deployment within the Social Democratic Party (SPD) contributed to the fall of Helmut Schmidt's government in 1982 (Joffe, 1985:110).

Within the Atlantic Alliance, the threat of disunity among the member nations has long been a principal concern of policy makers (Grosser, 1982; Kissinger, 1966); however, with increasing mass participation in the foreign policy arena, decision makers are increasingly worried about the level of domestic support for security policies. According to Richard Eichenberg: "The growing importance of the public has led many observers to conclude that domestic consensus is now the primary task of the Alliance" (1985a:4). In the future, as with the 1979 dual-track decision on INF, "the viability of NATO policies will depend on the level of support that they receive among attentive publics and in national legislatures" (Sloan, 1985:135).

The Analytical Setting

Political scientists and policy makers have realized for some time the importance of public support in the United States for foreign policy and national security affairs (Mueller, 1973; Rosenau, 1961; Verba et al., 1967). The Vietnam War more than anything else highlighted the challenges that can arise within this policy arena from a lack

of public consensus and acceptance. Considerable empirical research at the mass and elite levels has been directed at the content, structure, changes, and determinants of American foreign policy attitudes (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Holsti, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984; Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979; Wittkopf, 1981, 1983; Wittkopf and Kegley, 1982, 1983; Wittkopf and Maggiotto, 1981, 1983a, 1983b).

Only recently have West European foreign policy attitudes received similar attention. In view of the extent and intensity of the protest against NATO's 1979 dual-track decision and against the subsequent preparations for INF deployment, security analysts in many countries "discovered" public opinion and survey research which were formerly not central to their attention (Rattinger, 1986:1, 2). According to Bertram: "As long as domestic consensus on these matters existed, there was no real pressure to address them; that idyllic state of affairs no longer exists" (1983:1).

Research into European foreign policy and defense attitudes thus far has not produced a consistent and cumulative body of knowledge. Many substantive, methodological, and theoretical issues remain unresolved. The impression received from the existing literature is that some rather broad generalizations have been derived from a few rudimentary analyses of opinion data.

The substantive issue of whether or not European attitudes have changed at all is not clear, although several authors make this claim. Feld and Wildgen state that "in

Western Europe support for NATO appears to be slipping" (1982:182); however, they commit the cross-sectional fallacy in that they reach this conclusion on the basis of data from only one time period. From the same data they reach a rather dramatic conclusion: "The total trend picture of public opinion in Western Europe appears to be producing a widening gulf between the two sides of the Atlantic that eventually could endanger both NATO and the Atlantic defense in general" (133).

Other authors reach similar conclusions. Alting von Geusau in a nonempirical analysis claims: "At stake is the survival itself of the North Atlantic Alliance, formed in 1949. . . . [There is] a climate in which the need for sustaining the partnership itself is now being questioned [in Europe]" (1982:153). Haseler (1983), Adler and Wertman (1981), Schneider (1983), Inglehart (1984b), and Russett and DeLuca (1981, 1983) all claim in one manner or another that values in Western Europe have changed in regard to foreign policy and defense issues, and that this change is away from the traditional consensus on Atlantic, Euro-American cooperation.

This is not to say that these conclusions are wrong; the point is that there appears to have been little in-depth, systematic data analysis in these studies. Conclusions were reached based upon one or two opinion items, and trends inferred. In a recent paper, Eichenberg argued that in regard to fundamental attitudes toward

military force and national security in Europe, "there remains a substantial base of general consensus" (1985:11).

Other studies support the notion of there being little attitudinal change in Europe in this area. According to Capitanchik and Eichenberg: "Public support for NATO remains high in all the European member states" (1983:388). Flynn and Rattinger write of the current "high level of popular consensus over national security issues at the mass level" (1985:388). Similar findings of European support for Atlantic cooperation can be seen in Noelle-Neuman (1981a, 1981b, 1983), Putnam (1977), Schweigler (1984), and Szabo (1983b).

A significant methodological issue is that there has been no effort to map these attitudes toward NATO or Euro-American cooperation in regard to conceptual structure or internal consistency. Such a descriptive analysis is a necessary first step to a systematic study of changes and causal relationships. Specifically, this is the principal analytical variable, and it must receive a considerable amount of attention. Can European foreign policy values be arrayed unidimensionally, or are they more complex? In what manner do Europeans set priorities and structure these issues? Existing studies tend to look only at single survey items and then generalize well beyond their scope with no effort to relate groups of items into more descriptive measures. According to Flynn and Rattinger: "Perhaps the most urgent task for future research is the construction of

a more adequate conceptual breakdown of the types of attitudes we are dealing with in this issue area" (1985:381).

The methods used to analyze the social and political correlates of attitudes raises another issue. Previous studies have relied on the cross-tabulation of univariate relationships to measure the effect of variables such as age, sex, political party, and so on. No attempts have been made to apply multivariate techniques to distinguish the relative effects of several variables. A comprehensive understanding of attitude formation and change requires a multivariate explanation.

A final methodological issue is about the very nature of comparative analysis. Many existing studies of European security attitudes are not truly comparative, but instead they employ some type of case study method (as distinguished from the comparative method by Lijphart, 1975). For example, Flynn and Rattinger (1985), Kaltefleiter and Pfaltzgraff (1985), and Szabo (1983b) have edited volumes each comprising several country studies written by separate authors. Capitanchik and Eichenberg (1983) organize their book into chapters, each dealing with a separate country and drawing on an assortment of data. Other books and separately published articles are also about single countries, such as Crewe (1984), Dackiw (1985), Dalton and Duval (1986), Deutsch and Edinger (1959), Gress (1983), Hill (1981), Noelle-Neuman (1981a, 1981b, and 1983), Rattinger (1986), Schweigler (1984), and Thompson and Netlig (1984).

There are only a few truly comparative analyses of European foreign policy attitudes in which identical survey items are compared cross-nationally; these are Adler and Wertman (1981), Eichenberg (1985a), Feld and Wildgen (1982), Inglehart (1984b), Merritt and Puchala (1968), and Shaffer (1982).

This study intends to overcome the difficulties discussed above. The research methods to be employed will allow for accurate longitudinal conclusions to be reached, as well as for an analysis of the conceptual structure of the European belief system. Additionally, the multivariate techniques to be used should provide for greater understanding of the correlates of European attitudes. Finally, the study will be truly comparative with identical survey questions being observed cross-nationally.

The Theoretical Setting

Several theoretical alternatives have been offered as explanations for the public mobilization over national security issues and the attitudinal shifts away from established Atlantic defense policies. One such explanation was borrowed from political sociology and holds that generational replacement is producing a long-term value change (Atlantic Council, 1981; Szabo, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). This Successor Generation argument is based on the effect of changing historical perspectives and socialization experiences of succeeding age cohorts. Several studies support

this view (Adler and Wertman, 1981; Lacqueur, 1985; Levi, 1982; Russett and DeLuca, 1983).

A closely related explanation is found within the Postmaterialist school of thought (Inglehart, 1977). This view combines the socialization effects of generational change with a scarcity hypothesis based roughly on the psychological formulation of a hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954). The Postmaterialist argument is that as a result of unprecedented economic prosperity and military security in the postwar era, the younger generations are placing less emphasis on economic growth and military security and paying greater attention to a new Postmaterialist agenda: quality of life, the environment, anti-nuclear power, and cultural issues. Inglehart (1984b) presents some preliminary findings linking Postmaterialist values with anti-Americanism, the peace movements, and opposition to a common Euro-American foreign policy.

Two additional theoretical interpretations are presented by Flynn and Rattinger (1985:2). In the first, the increased politicization of defense issues is placed within the broader processes of modernization and democratization. The postwar growth of comprehensive mass education in Europe is seen as having stimulated increased public awareness of and interest in the politics of a wide range of new issues. Enlarged media networks and improved transport and communication technology have similarly encouraged the active

political participation of larger portions of the public (Deutsch, 1963; Huntington, 1974).

Within this view, increased popular participation in determining defense priorities is seen as being natural and irreversible. The current tendency for partisan politics to divide along the various lines of the security debate is seen as a natural response to the increased information and interest within the public. Governments and parties, therefore, must adjust policies and policy making to take account of these new political realities. This is the view of Kurt Biedenkopf who argues for Alliance policies that are plausible, that "make sense to a well-educated public" (1983:8).

The other theoretical assessment mentioned by Flynn and Rattinger (1985:2) explains the public involvement in national security affairs and the attitudinal trends away from Atlanticism as the result of alienation and anxiety in the face of profound changes in the international state system. These changes include nuclear parity between the superpowers and Western Europe's robust postwar economic recovery yet continued dependence on the United States for military security. In this view, public activism and opinions are not permanent, and may be mitigated by policies and rhetoric that seek to "reassure" in the midst of changing international politics (Howard, 1983; Huntington, 1983).

To summarize, there are at least four theoretical explanations for the politicization of and changes in West European attitudes about defense and security: the Successor Generation, Postmaterialism, modernization, and international politics. The first three of these will be examined simultaneously in Chapter IV, but the impact of international politics will be examined separately in a more descriptive approach in Chapter VI.

The Research Agenda

This study is organized into seven chapters. This chapter introduced the topic and its importance; framed the political, analytical, and the theoretical settings; and reviewed some of the relevant literature.

Chapter II will present the research design for the main body of the research. This will include a detailed specification of the model of attitude formation, changes, and political linkages that will be developed throughout the remaining chapters. The data, methods, and cases to be used will also be discussed.

In Chapter III, an analysis of original, machine-readable survey data will explore the conceptual structure of European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. Attempts will be made to aggregate the data into scales or typologies to allow for generalizations to be made. The results of this step will serve as the dependent variable for Chapter IV in which several determinants of attitudes,

corresponding to the alternative theoretical explanations discussed above, will be examined. These determinants (or correlates) will be compared and combined to seek a multivariate model of attitude formation. Cross-national comparisons of the aggregate measures developed in Chapter III and the correlates examined in Chapter IV will also be observed.

Chapter V will seek to determine the extent of change that has occurred in European foreign policy and defense beliefs. Published accounts of existing opinion data will be used in this chapter to assess the trends in public support for several assumptions fundamental to the Alliance. These trends will then be juxtaposed to changes in the international system in Chapter VI to examine the effects of international politics on European attitudes.

The final chapter, Chapter VII, will draw some tentative conclusions about the linkages between European attitudes and broad national policy orientations. The goal will be to observe possible indications of future Alliance cohesion or disunity. A brief examination of American foreign policy attitudes will also be included, along with a summary of major findings from the entire study.

The research agenda for this project grows out of the concern that foreign policy attitudes are becoming linked more and more directly to Western harmony (Eichenberg, 1985a:4; Sloan, 1985:135). In other words, the future cohesion or disunity of the Alliance will be influenced in large measure by the West European public. Therefore, a

better understanding of the nature of West European security beliefs, their conceptual structure, determinants, and trends, should provide an indication of things to come, or at least help theorists and policy makers better understand events as they occur within the arena of Euro-American relations.

CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN: A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS

The goal of this research is to assess the potential contribution of West European mass attitudes on the future cohesion or disunity of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, European attitudes will be examined within a comprehensive model of attitude formation, change, and political linkage. This chapter discusses the various components of this model. The assumption is that mass attitudes favorable to Atlantic cooperation will foster national policies conducive to Alliance cohesion.

Systematic empirical research into mass attitudes as a component of political culture is a relatively new field of inquiry. However, the notion of political culture and many of its central concepts--like socialization, subculture, and values--have been around for some time and are even evident in classical writings, such as Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics. Recently, the postwar technological advances in survey research methodology, along with the inter-disciplinary influences of sociology, social psychology, and anthropology, created a "revolution" in political science research into political culture and attitudes (Almond, 1980:1-16). These technical and conceptual

advances enabled research to move from relatively loose and speculative inferences to more systematic and reliable measures. The path-breaking comparative study in this field was The Civic Culture, by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 1963.

This examination of West European foreign policy attitudes belongs within this broad tradition of political inquiry. Political culture is "the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" (Almond and Powell, 1978:25). The focus for research is on the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis. It is the individual, through perceptions, interests, and ideologies, who develops a belief system by imposing some sense of consistency and constraint across various political phenomena (Converse, 1964). The attitudes of individuals, when aggregated for a population (or sample), can provide a conceptual map or image of the belief structure of a multi-country region, a single nation, or a subculture within a nation. This research observes attitudes in Western Europe as a region and also makes cross-national comparisons of separate national samples.

Attitudes toward political objects can be distinguished by three components: cognitive, affective, and behavioral (Hovland and Rosenberg, 1960:1-16). Knowledge of the political system, its leading figures, and current policy problems is the cognitive aspect. Deeply-held feelings of rejection or support toward the system or politics comprise

the affective component; these feelings often are the result of long-held cues received from family, class, and other attributes. The third aspect is that of political action and involvement: the behavioral component.¹ The focus in this study is on the affective, in an effort to tap into fundamental values and underlying constructs.

Several factors combine to influence political attitudes. These elements (or agents) of the socialization process include a myriad of social, political, cultural, and international stimuli (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Dennis, 1973). The relative significance of these various determinants in regard to attitude formation and change is a recurring subject for comparative research. This study explores several determinants to assess their influence on the formation and change of European attitudes.

The political significance of West European mass attitudes, as discussed in the previous chapter, is considerable. Several distinct research tasks are necessary for a thorough examination of these attitudes. In the sections that follow, these tasks are presented within the framework of a comprehensive model of attitude formation, change, and linkage.

Components of the Model

The model which guides this study contains several components. The first is the conceptual orientation of West Europeans toward Atlantic cooperation. In other words, this

concerns the attitudes themselves. How do Europeans view the Alliance, a coordinated economic policy, military issues outside of Europe, and other foreign policy concerns? Are these issues all linked conceptually? Or, are they structured in a more complex manner?

The second element involves the forces active in determining the nature of attitudes. There are three types or levels of determinants (independent variables) that affect the formation and change of attitudes. These are individual level variables, national level variables, and international level variables.

The third aspect of the model is the extent to which European attitudes and support for Atlantic cooperation have changed. Is there more or less European support for Atlantic cooperation? Finally, the last element concerns the linkages between attitudes and national policies. To what extent do attitudes and policies cohere together? Is there a causal pattern, and if so in what direction? What are the indications for future Alliance cohesion or disunity?

Attitude Structure, Content, and Distribution

Chapter III will first attempt to develop a typology describing West European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation, and second to make some generalizations about the distribution of European support in regard to the categories. As a result, opinion on NATO and national security will be examined in a broader perspective, and a more

theoretical understanding of European attitudes and policies will result. Several survey items will be aggregated in an effort to discover the conceptual constructs that underlie the attitudes, thus avoiding the inherent instability of single-item indicators.

Previous attempts to categorize European beliefs on these issues have been less than satisfactory. Feld and Wildgen (1982) used one survey item to dicotomize their European sample into "Euro-hawks" and "Euro-doves," but this provided no depth of understanding in regard to the relationship between various aspects of the security and foreign policy arena. An earlier attempt was made by Deutsch et al. to devise a tentative typology of attitude positions based on elite interviews (1967:87-91). Three types were identified: Nationals, Europeans, and Atlantics. The Nationals were those who favored the resurgence of the unqualified nation-state, and for whom Europe was only a camouflage to hide national aspirations. The typical Nationals were French Gaullists. The Europeans were those who favored some sort of European political union, whether it be confederal or federal. The Atlantics viewed close ties with the United States as being essential. Although not supportive of an Atlantic federation, NATO was strongly backed by the Atlantics as well as increased cultural, political, and economic ties among Atlantic nations. These profiles developed by Deutsch et al. (1967) are useful for broad generalizations, but the underlying dimensions are not

known, and the concepts of military policy, economic policy, and integration policy are blurred together.

There are four aspects to Chapter III. The first is to determine the number of dimensions necessary to describe the conceptual structure. The second is to impute substantive meaning to each dimension. The third is to measure the distribution of European opinion in regard to the different dimensions, and the fourth is to observe cross-national variation.

To determine the number of conceptual dimensions, a factor analysis of survey data will be used. Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to identify a relatively small number of factors (or dimensions) underlying a larger set of variables. Groups of survey items identified with the separate factors can be interpreted as representing different attitudinal dimensions. The meaning usually associated with the concept "dimension" is that of a cluster or group of highly intercorrelated characteristics, and factor analysis "can uncover unsuspected relationships which may at first seem startling but later appear to be common sense" (Rummel, 1970:31). Factor analysis is based on the assumption that underlying dimensions exist, and that they can be used to explain complex phenomena (Norusis, 1985).

There are several forms of factor analysis available. The principal components technique will be used because it generates the eigenvalue statistic which "serves as the most widely used practical means of solving the number-of-factors

question" (Kim and Mueller, 1976b:21). Additionally, principal components analysis is the common choice of analysts using research designs similar to this one for American attitudes (see Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Wittkopf, 1981, 1983; Wittkopf and Maggiotto, 1981, 1983a, 1983b; Wittkopf and Kegley, 1982, 1983).

There are four possible results to the number of dimensions question in regard to European attitudes. The first is a unidimensional structure in which all or most of the survey items load on one factor, and only one factor achieves an eigenvalue greater than 1. This would provide for ease of theoretical interpretation, and politically it would indicate limited policy alternatives and potential polarization. The second possible structure is bidimensional in which there are two distinct conceptual underpinnings to European attitudes represented by two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. This case may reflect policy makers having more latitude than in the first, and this structure, if orthogonal, may lend itself conceptually to the construction of a four-cell typology as in Wittkopf (1981).

The remaining two possibilities are more complex. A multidimensional structure would have three or more dimensions indicating a rather complex belief system. This result may preclude generalizing beyond the individual factors. A fragmented result with no interpretable dimensions would indicate that West Europeans do not interrelate

foreign policy issues at all, that there are either no conceptual constraints underlying mass opinion, or else the constructs are too complex or vague to be identified through empirical analysis.

The second step in Chapter III will be to interpret the substantive content of the dimensions discovered in the first step. This involves affixing descriptive labels to the factors. These labels

are concepts from the substantive area of concern and reflect or embody the pattern of interrelationships defined by the factors. The descriptive label is meant to be typological--to categorize the conceptual characteristics of the findings. (Rummel, 1970:175)

This is a somewhat subjective process, and it requires comparing the survey items belonging to each dimension to determine what relates them together conceptually. As a result of this evaluation, labels are chosen to serve as readily understood concepts to ease communication and discussion.

There are several substantive labels that may emerge from this interpretive step. One is the concept of Atlantic cooperation which embodies the goals of the study. This could be used to describe a unidimensional structure in which respondents seem to evaluate issues and policies in regard to their fundamental attitude toward cooperation. Respondents could perhaps be categorized as internationalists and isolationists. However, there could be two cooperative dimensions with one representing cooperation with the United States and the other reflecting European

cooperation. Or, rather than regional distinctions there may be substantive ones in which perhaps military and economic issues represent dimensions of cooperation. Additional factors may relate to constructs such as neutralism, protectionism, and interventionism.

The expectations for this study are that a unidimensional belief system representing a cooperative-noncooperative continuum in regard to relations among the Atlantic community of nations will be uncovered. The hypothesized structure seems to be the best representation of European attitudes in the midst of the new developments of the 1980s. Specifically, the economic difficulties arising since 1973 are believed to have blurred the distinctions between security and economic issues such that Europeans seem now to be either favorably or unfavorably disposed toward Atlantic cooperation in general.

The third part of Chapter III will be to measure the distribution of European opinion for each of the dimensions. The labels affixed in the previous step can be regarded as assertions, so that the task here is to determine the level of support for each assertion. For example, for a dimension regarding neutralism, percentages must be calculated for those portions of the sample that favor neutralism and oppose it. Inferences can then be made for the population as a whole.

To do this, scaling techniques will be employed. The survey items comprising each dimension as determined by the

factor analysis will be used to construct Likert scales, which is to say that for each respondent, responses will be summed to produce a composite score for a set of items. This requires that the items be monotonically related to the underlying attitudinal continuum; in other words, the coding must be uniform such that a high score represents a favorable response on all items and a low score represents an unfavorable response on all items (or vice versa, but usually high scores indicate favorable responses). No effort will be made to vary the weight assigned to the items because it has been found that little is to be gained since unweighted and weighted summative scores regularly correlate quite highly (McIver and Carmines, 1981).

The reliability of any constructed scale must be assessed statistically. Cronbach's (1951) alpha coefficient is the preferred estimate of scale reliability (McIver and Carmines, 1981). This statistic provides an estimate of reliability based upon the inter-item correlation matrix.

The final step in Chapter III will be to measure cross-national variation. Whatever scales or categories are devised from the earlier steps will be applied to the separate national samples and the percentages of favorable and unfavorable opinion compared across nations. Thus, Chapter III will be a complex, descriptive analysis of the conceptual structure, content, and distribution of West European attitudes.

Determinants

Once the structure and content of West European attitudes have been established in Chapter III, the various influences, or determinants, affecting these attitudes will be assessed in the following chapters. These determinants, or independent variables, are categorized for this study into three levels: individual attributes, national cultures, and international events. The individual attributes are subdivided further into social and political characteristics. The social variables are generation, value orientations, class, and education. The political variables are partisanship, ideology, and participation. Figure 2-1 depicts these individual attributes. Chapter IV examines the individual and national level variables, and Chapter VI analyzes the influence of international events.

The individual attributes will each be discussed at length in Chapter IV in regard to their theoretical relevance and empirical effects on West European security and foreign policy views. These seven factors are assumed to contribute to an explanation of the variation of opinion within Europe. Specific hypotheses will be developed and tested for each.

The analyses in Chapter IV will go well beyond previous studies of these attributes and their effect on security attitudes. In the past, univariate relationships using tables of cross-tabulations of percentages have been used (see for example, Feld and Wildgen, 1982; and Flynn and

Social Variables
> Generation
> Value
 Orientations
> Class
> Education

Political Variables
> Partisanship
> Ideology
> Participation

Figure 2-1. Individual level attributes.

Rattinger, 1985). This descriptive method fails to provide useful explanatory statistics for comparing the relative significance of variables, and more importantly, it prohibits multivariate analyses in which separate effects can be observed after adjusting, or controlling, for the effects of other variables.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques provide the capability for more sophisticated analyses and these will be used in Chapter IV. ANOVA is designed to test the statistical significance of the differences among a set of group means on an interval dependent variable (Agresti and Agresti, 1979:417). The groups can represent survey respondents within various social classes, generations, political parties, and so on. The interval dependent variables for Chapter IV will be the scales or typologies derived from the analyses presented in Chapter III.

There are two types of ANOVA. One-way ANOVA examines the relationship between the mean of an interval dependent variable and the levels of a single categorical variable. Two-way ANOVA, however, simultaneously controls for the effects of one or more independent variables and thus produces in effect a multivariate model. The various statistics and coefficients associated with ANOVA are discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

Chapter IV includes several steps. Initially, each of the individual attributes listed in Figure 2-1 will be assessed separately using one-way ANOVA. Then, these

variables will be combined using two-way ANOVA to examine the effects of each while adjusting for the others. Each of these techniques will be applied to both the European sample as a whole as well as to the separate national samples. Cross-national comparisons will provide an initial examination of the effects of nationality.

The effects of the second level variable, national character, will also be examined more directly. Using the national identity of respondents as a nominal variable, the separate national samples can be compared by applying ANOVA to the combined European sample. In this way the differences between the means for the separate national samples can be observed. Additionally, the national identity variable will be entered into the multivariate analysis of the two-way ANOVA. Thus, the relative strength of national identity can be compared to the individual level attributes.

Chapter IV (as well as Chapter III) begins with the premise that the European sample can be treated in a homogeneous manner. This is an attempt to achieve some universal theoretical understanding of the influences affecting European attitudes. "To the extent that general statements can be validly formulated without regard to the social system from which the samples were drawn, systemic [national] factors can be disregarded" (Przeworski and Teune, 1970:36). The amount of variation between the separate samples will indicate the extent to which the

second level variable, national character, can be given a special place among the predictors of European beliefs.

The final level of determinants, international events, will be examined in Chapter VI. This will follow an assessment of the extent to which European attitudes toward Atlanticism have changed. (Chapter V explores the amount and nature of attitudinal change in Europe.) The assertion that beliefs are affected by the international arena assumes that attitudes have changed. For this reason, the chapter on the nature and extent of any shift in European security views will precede the examination of international events.

The study of international events and their influence on attitudes is also known as "period effects" (Adler, 1983). These are broad, historic changes in the international system--such as, war and peace, depression and prosperity, or shifts in the balance of power--as well as specific critical incidents, like the Cuban missile crisis. Many such international events will be observed and categorized in Chapter VI in an effort to uncover patterns and linkages that relate to attitudinal changes.

Disentangling period effects from the other determinants, especially generational influences, is difficult. The technique of cohort analysis will be employed in an attempt to distinguish between them (Glen, 1977).

Thus, three types or levels of determinants will be examined in an effort to explain the formation and change in European security attitudes. These are individual

attributes, national political cultures, and international events.

Changes and Linkages

Chapter V seeks to assess changes in European attitudes about some fundamental assumptions upon which the Alliance is based. These assumptions are the following: (1) the Soviet Union poses a military and political threat to the security of Western Europe; (2) a collective security policy is the only way to deter and defend against the Soviet threat; and (3) the United States must be a leading member of the joint defense effort to balance Soviet power. After discussing and operationalizing these assumptions, Chapter V will draw upon previously published opinion data from a multitude of sources to assess trends in the level of European support for each.

There are inherent difficulties in attempting a cross-national and longitudinal analysis of this type. The available data are scarce and are often not comparable either between countries or time periods. The result is that the analyst is forced to jump from one survey question or source to another, constantly confronting interpretations of promising time series or modifications in item construction. These difficulties illustrate the complexity of the task, but they do not preclude it. Chapter V should be able to offer some indications of how European mass attitudes on security matters have evolved.

The hypothesis guiding Chapter V is that attitudes in Europe have changed in the direction of being less favorably disposed toward the Alliance and Atlantic cooperation. This is the assessment of several of the analysts mentioned in Chapter I: Adler and Wertman (1981), Bertram (1983), Feld and Wildgen (1982), Geusau (1982), Haseler (1983), Inglehart (1984b), Russett and DeLuca (1981, 1983), and Schneider (1983). The emergence of the peace movement and the apparent prevalence of anti-Americanism in Europe would seem to support this view, although other authors disagree: Capitanchik and Eichenberg (1983), Flynn and Rattinger (1985), Noelle-Neuman (1981a, 1981b, 1983), Putnam (1977), Schweigler (1984), and Szabo (1983b).

The concluding chapter of this study will explore (among other things) some tentative linkages between European attitudes, national policies, and the prospect for future Alliance cohesion or disunity. Various national policies, Alliance decisions, and mass support or opposition will be observed for evidence of coherence. This will be a subjective appraisal. No rigorous quantitative methods will be employed, because none are suitable.

This topic of linkage between attitudes and policies is the "Achilles heel" of attitudinal studies. "One of the most ambiguous, imprecise, and elusive aspects of security [is] that of the domestic political factors influencing defense policies, doctrines, and burdens" (Bertram, 1983:1). This is why the subject has generally been unexplored in

most studies; although the existence of a relationship is always assumed or inferred, sometimes implicitly. Therefore, Chapter VII will be cautious in its attempt to relate the attitudinal findings from the earlier chapters with the broad policy orientations of European nations.

Summary

The foregoing discussion has presented the various components of a comprehensive model of attitude formation, change, and linkage. Figure 2-2 depicts the complete model that guides the analysis in the following chapters.

Each chapter that follows focuses on some aspect of the model. Chapter III develops some aggregate measures for the structure, content, and distribution of European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. Chapter IV examines the effects of individual and national level variables on the formation of these attitudes. Chapter V assesses the nature and extent of any changes in European security attitudes. Chapter VI observes the influences of international politics to explain the trends in European attitudes. And finally, Chapter VII explores the linkages between attitudes, policies, and Alliance cohesion.

Cases and Data

The nations selected for this study are Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. These four were chosen because they possess the bulk of the European resources




Figure 2-2. A model of attitude formation, change, and linkage.

available to the Alliance and because of their obviously critical importance to Western solidarity. Any shift in the relationship between these nations and the Atlantic security posture might result in some fundamental multilateral realignment.²

It is recognized that other interesting cases have been excluded from the analysis. For example, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark would be obvious candidates for inclusion in any future studies of this sort. Data are lacking, however, for any substantial analysis of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, or Norway. Thus, to keep this project manageable and focused on key nations, the cases were limited to the four countries listed above.

The data set used in Chapters III and IV is the Eurobarometer 14 survey. The Eurobarometers are a series of semiannual surveys administered in EEC countries and sponsored by the Commission of the European Community. The data are in their original, machine-readable form, making sophisticated analyses possible. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research of the University of Michigan.

The quality of the Eurobarometers is excellent and equal to that of most American surveys. Stratified national quota samples of approximately 1000 respondents are drawn in each nation, taking into account region and the size of localities. Respondents are chosen within selected sampling points to provide a regionally representative sample with

respect to sex, age, and occupation. Some of the sampling may in fact be superior to that conducted in the United States because the availability of very complete and up-to-date electoral lists in Europe permits excellent probability sampling. Further, all the data are based on personal interviews in the home, while many American public opinion polls, such as ABC-Louis Harris and CBS-New York Times, are conducted by telephone (Adler, 1983).

Original multi-country data sets other than the Eurobarometers are rarely available for the kind of analysis performed here. This is why most studies in this field have relied on a secondary analysis of single items from published opinion polls such as Gallup and Harris. Another difficulty is that the number of foreign policy and security items included in any one survey is usually very limited, thus preventing a meaningful analysis of underlying dimensions. Eurobarometer 14 was chosen for this project, despite its being somewhat dated (October 1980), because among the Eurobarometers it contains the largest selection of foreign policy items.³

Other potential sources for machine-readable data sets are those produced by the United States Information Agency (USIA). These are available from the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and the Roper Center in New Haven, Connecticut. However, the documentation and code books provided are often incomplete and inaccurate, and the data are not "cleaned" adequately.⁴

In comparison with the rather limited supply of data on European foreign policy attitudes, analysts of American foreign policy beliefs have available the surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. These surveys, administered periodically since 1974, each contain over 200 questionnaire items specifically on foreign policy issues. Currently, there are no data sets on European attitudes remotely equivalent to this rich source.

The data used in Chapters V and VI are drawn from a multitude of previously published sources. These are not original, machine-readable data but instead are reproduced figures (usually percentages of marginals) from both scholarly and journalistic publications. Many of the difficulties inherent in relying on data of this type are discussed in Chapter V.

This chapter has presented the research design for the analysis of West European security attitudes that follows. The model guiding the analysis was discussed in detail, and the cases selected for observation and the data to be used were also discussed.

Notes

¹Almond and Powell (1978:26) substitute "evaluative" for the third component of attitudes. This refers to any moral judgment of political objects in terms of ideology or ethics.

²This assertion takes into account the current status of France within the Alliance: a member but not part of the integrated military command structure. Despite this position, France plays an essential role in Western security plans and assumptions.

³ Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980) contains 11 questionnaire items suitable for a factor analysis within the conceptual boundaries of "Atlantic cooperation." Other Eurobarometer surveys with foreign policy items contain the following numbers of items:

- Eurobarometer 6 (October 1976) - 7 items,
- Eurobarometer 8 (October 1977) - 4 items,
- Eurobarometer 10 (October 1978) - 7 items,
- Eurobarometer 11 (April 1979) - 8 items,
- Eurobarometer 13 (April 1980) - 5 items,
- Eurobarometer 16 (October 1981) - 6 items,
- Eurobarometer 17 (April 1982) - 13 items (7 deal only with the U.S. and none are on NATO),
- Eurobarometer 18 (October 1982) - 4 items,
- Eurobarometer 19 (April 1983) - 6 items.

⁴ Four USIA data sets were obtained from the National Archives by the author. These were the following: Alliance/Security Survey (1981), International Attitudes Survey (1976), International Survey (1955), and International Survey (1969). Each of these purported to include samples from several European nations and to contain 20 to 30 foreign policy questionnaire items. However, the documentation and code books were very sketchy, and the data on the tapes were not interpretable by any computer routine at the United States Military Academy at West Point or the University of Florida. Extensive efforts by the author and others to use these data in their machine-readable form were unsuccessful. Russell Dalton (Florida State University), Richard Eichenberg (Tufts University), and Mark Dehaven (University of Florida) concur that these data in their current condition are not usable. This leaves only the Eurobarometer surveys available for original, machine-readable data analysis of European foreign policy attitudes.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE, CONTENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ATLANTIC COOPERATION

American and European policy makers (as well as those in the Soviet Union) are vitally interested in the public support in the West for security policies, because in today's Western, pluralistic societies the electorate in large measure establishes at least the margins if not the outlines for policy alternatives. The increasing importance of public opinion and mass attitudes on national security and foreign policy decision making in the postwar era has been clearly documented (Bertram, 1983; Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983; Flynn and Rattinger, 1985). In regard to the Atlantic Alliance, West European attitudes are critical to the future cohesion or disunity among the member nations.

This chapter examines how Europeans structure their system of beliefs about Atlantic cooperation. These attitudes can be defined as diffuse affectivity toward other West European nations and the United States and can be favorable or unfavorable.¹ Atlantic cooperation is operationalized by aggregating survey items that deal with broad goals and fundamental beliefs. This concept is used

in an effort to generalize beyond specific issues and policy opinions to determine the structure of the underlying belief system.

This research agenda grows out of the concern that attitudinal structure may be related to Western harmony. The cohesion within the Alliance is increasingly believed to be under great strain. This perception has existed for about a decade, since the mid to late 1970s when the East-West detente started to erode. Concern over Western unity is nothing new.² However, intra-Alliance policy debates have tended to become disputes about fundamental issues (Cohen, 1982-83; Hoffmann, 1981; Joffe, 1981). These have included questions about the extent of Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, the nature of the Soviet threat, and the value and desirability of cooperation in areas other than the defense of Western Europe. An understanding of how these and other issues are arrayed within the matrix of beliefs held by European publics should provide some insight into the nature and extent of the underlying support for the Alliance.

Goals and Expectations

Analysts differ in regard to their theoretical expectations about the structure of belief systems. Some look for simplicity, others look for complexity, and in differing degrees both groups find empirical support for their expectations. These contending views have been labeled the

"unidimensionalist" and "multidimensionalist" (Stimson, 1975). The first of these is represented by Philip Converse who emphasizes consistency and simplicity, in which a single powerful liberal-conservative axis should be sufficient to orient beliefs. People whose attitudes display such a pattern of constraint are labeled "ideologues" (Converse, 1964).

The alternative view is that people structure their political attitudes in a manner too complex to be explained unidimensionally. This multidimensional approach challenges the value placed on parsimony by Converse. Marcus et al. argue for the necessity of distinguishing between the structure and the content of belief systems. "Without knowing the general principles one uses in forming his opinions, we cannot classify any one individual on the basis of his responses to specific political issues as demonstrating high or low levels of structure" (1974:407). Thus, they allow for the existence of complex belief systems structured in any number of ways. It becomes the task of the analyst to discover the structure rather than find the ideologues.

The intent of this chapter is to develop a conceptual map for the constructs underlying the European belief system toward Atlantic cooperation. Are the attitudes toward the EEC and NATO related? If so, perhaps some sort of an internationalist-isolationist continuum exists. Are the views of Europeans toward the United States affected by their views toward defense spending or the military

Alliance? In this case a hawk-dove dimension may be the best explanation. How many of these conceptual dimensions must be created to describe European attitudes adequately? Is there any structure at all? Perhaps European attitudes toward these issues are fragmented with no systematic, conceptual connectedness.

Understanding the manner in which Europeans structure their attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation is essential for furthering our theoretical knowledge of European political culture and for providing the basis for informed policy initiatives. With a unidimensional continuum underlying these beliefs, interpretation and measurement are relatively easy; however, policy makers may have little room for alternatives, depending on the distribution of opinion. In this case, all foreign policy issue areas would be viewed by the public in terms of a single ideological construct, and opinion could easily become polarized, with compromise difficult and ideological disputes probable.

On the other hand, with a bi- or multidimensional structure, Europeans would distinguish between types of issues, perhaps based upon regional, military, economic, or other conceptual criteria, and the distribution of opinion for these various constructs would be independent and crosscutting rather than overlapping. As a result, conceptual interpretation would be more complex; however, policy elites might have more latitude to build or draw upon support in one issue area without affecting others.

Observers of American mass opinion have engaged in a rich empirical dialogue over the manner in which the American public structures its attitudes toward foreign policy. There is agreement among these analysts that the traditional unidimensional (internationalist-isolationist) structure of foreign policy opinion ended with Vietnam, and that a new multidimensional belief system has emerged. The focus of the current debate is on the number of conceptual dimensions necessary to explain adequately the new structure of American foreign policy attitudes.³

A similar debate about the structure of European foreign policy beliefs has not occurred. Existing studies of European attitudes toward foreign policy seem to concentrate on current events and politicized issues rather than on underlying constructs. For example, Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen (1982), in their extensive examination of European opinion on foreign policy and security issues, NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions, interpreted a number of cross-national comparisons of single survey items. Kenneth P. Adler and Douglas Wertman (1981) as well as David Capitanchik and Richard Eichenberg (1983) reported on similar data in which respondents from several West European countries were compared with regard to their support for NATO, defense spending, and other concerns. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger's (1985) edited volume, The Public and Atlantic Defense, includes contributions for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and

Norway, and it contains over 200 tables and figures of European opinion data, but all are of single questionnaire items. Studies of this type are essential for discerning European opinion and trends on specific issues, but they do not address the broader questions of the nature and structure of belief systems.

The employment of scaling and modeling techniques to examine public support for underlying constructs distinguishes this study from others preceding it. As just mentioned, existing studies of European foreign policy attitudes rely almost exclusively on single-item measures, such as support for defense spending, support for the new missiles in Europe, opinions on NATO, and so on; however, there are important reasons why the multi-item scales used here are superior to single-item indicators. First, it is very unlikely that a single survey question can fully represent a complex theoretical concept. Second, single-item indicators lack the precision to discriminate among fine degrees of an attitude; and third, they are usually less reliable than multi-item scales because single items are more prone to random error.⁴ For these reasons, the methods employed here should result in a considerable advance in our theoretical understanding of European attitudes.

Findings and Analyses

To examine the structure of West European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation the survey Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980) was used. The Eurobarometers are a continuous, semiannual series of sample surveys administered in Europe. Eurobarometer 14 was chosen for this study, despite its being somewhat dated, because among the Eurobarometers it contains the largest selection of foreign policy items. Of the approximately 50 substantive questionnaire items, 11 dealt with international affairs and foreign policy concerns suitable for this study. Table 3-1 lists these items. Each is identified by an abbreviation followed by a simple assertion that summarizes it.

The responses to these items required recoding to achieve the uniformity and monotonic, ordinal ranking necessary for eventual Likert scaling. Responses were given a higher numerical score the more strongly they agreed with the assertion, and a lower numerical score the more strongly they disagreed with it. Scores for all items were recoded to range from 1 to 7 to ensure that items and responses were weighted equally for eventual scaling.⁵ The original question wordings and the coded response categories are provided in Appendix A.

The variables listed in Table 3-1 cover a wide range of attitudes suitable for placing security issues into the broader perspective of Atlantic cooperation. The items on the unification of Europe and EEC membership (UNIEUR and

TABLE 3-1

SURVEY ITEMS MEASURING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD ATLANTIC COOPERATION

INTLEXP: (International Expectations). The coming year will be one troubled with much international discord.

DEFPRI: (Defense Priority). Maintaining strong defense forces should be given top or second priority within our nation for the next 10 years.

UNIEUR: (Unify Europe). Efforts being made to unify Europe should be pursued.

EECMEM: (EEC Membership). Membership in the Common Market by our nation is a good thing.

NATOESS: (NATO Essential). NATO is still essential to our country's security.

NATOSPT: (Support of NATO). Our defense spending in support of NATO should be increased.

TRUSTUS: (Trustworthiness of Americans). The Americans are very trustworthy.

FORPOL: (Foreign Policy). In the conduct of its foreign policy, our country should join with the other EEC member states and the United States to develop a common Atlantic foreign policy.

ECPOL: (Economic Policy). In the conduct of its economic policy, our country should develop a common economic policy by working closely with the other EEC member states, the United States, and Japan.

SCTYPOL: (Security Policy). Our country should provide for its security in the 1980s by continuing in NATO with the countries of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

EECMEM) focus specifically on regional cooperation. The defense priority variable (DEFPRI) measures support for domestic defense efforts as distinct from the defense of the Alliance. Economic concerns are addressed by two questions, those on economic coordination and the Common Market (ECPOL and EECMEM). The Alliance is not mentioned at all in seven of the questions, so these should provide particularly good indicators of the relationship between attitudes on NATO and other Western cooperation issues. The variable measuring trust for the United States (TRUSTUS) is essential to this research, because views of the United States are fundamental to what was defined earlier as Atlantic cooperation. Respondents believing the United States to be untrustworthy would probably have low support for Atlantic cooperation. The question on international expectations (INTLEXP) is a broad variable which asks for a prediction of the level of international tension in the coming year. Attitudes on this question may be related to cooperation; for example, respondents expecting a high level of international tension may be more inclined to support a higher level of Western cooperation.

Structure and Content

To determine the number of conceptual dimensions, a factor analysis of survey data was used as an exploratory guide. The widespread use of factor analysis in similar research throughout the social sciences, and its readily

interpretable results, testify to its appropriateness for this task, although other techniques, such as cluster analysis and LISREL, would also be applicable. Groups of survey items identified with the separate factors can be interpreted as representing different attitudinal dimensions. Since no preconceived ideas about the structures existed, nor was there any a priori reason to believe that the dimensions should be orthogonal, the principal components method of factor analysis with both varimax and oblique rotation was used (Kim and Mueller, 1978).

The results of the principal components factor analysis of the variables just discussed are displayed in Table 3-2. Respondents from four countries were included: France, West Germany, Italy, and Britain. The samples from each of these countries were weighted to reflect their proportions of the aggregate population.⁶

Table 3-2 reflects varimax orthogonal rotation. Only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were rotated.⁷ The center column (h2) displays the communalities.⁸ The orthogonal (uncorrelated factors) solution is actually a subcase of the oblique (correlated factors). If orthogonality empirically exists between the clusters of variables, then an oblique rotation will result in an orthogonal solution and the two sets of computer output would be identical (Rummel, 1970:386). A separate oblique solution was generated which displayed the same factor

TABLE 3-2
 THE DIMENSIONALITY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
 (Principal Components Factor Analysis)

	Unrotated Factors			h ²	Orthogonally Rotated Factors ^a		
	I	II	III		I	II	III
NATOSPT	<u>.61</u>	<u>-.44</u>	.04	.57	<u>.75</u>	.00	.03
NATOESS	<u>.70</u>	-.27	-.06	.57	<u>.73</u>	.18	-.08
SCTYPOL	<u>.66</u>	-.16	.06	.46	<u>.63</u>	.26	.03
DEFPRI	.30	<u>-.53</u>	.05	.37	<u>.55</u>	-.24	.07
TRUSTUS	<u>.54</u>	-.08	-.15	.32	<u>.48</u>	.23	-.19
EECMEM	<u>.41</u>	<u>.67</u>	-.01	.61	-.07	<u>.78</u>	-.08
UNIEUR	<u>.50</u>	<u>.52</u>	.04	.51	.10	<u>.71</u>	-.03
ECPOL	<u>.44</u>	.39	.11	.35	.12	<u>.58</u>	.05
FORPOL	<u>.55</u>	.12	.11	.33	.38	<u>.43</u>	.07
INTLEXP	-.08	-.05	<u>.98</u>	.96	-.03	.01	<u>.98</u>

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

^aVarimax rotation. Only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 have been rotated. (Eigenvalues: Factor I=2.59; II=1.46; III=1.01.)

Note:

- Mean substitution of missing data (N=4234).
- Four nations: Britain, France, West Germany, Italy. National samples weighted to reflect their proportion of the aggregate population.
- The total variation accounted for by the 3 factors is 50.6%.
- All loadings rounded to two places.
- Loadings equal to or greater than an absolute value of .40 are underlined.

structure with only minor deviations in the loadings from those on Table 3-2, so the factors can be accepted as being orthogonal.⁹

The first two orthogonally rotated factors in Table 3-2 each contain several variables and appear to be distinct attitudinal dimensions based on the .40 criterion for loadings.¹⁰ Factor I is comprised of primarily military items and could perhaps be labeled military cooperation. This dimension includes both of the NATO variables, the security policy question, the defense priority variable, and the question on trust for the United States. The second rotated factor is broader in scope and could perhaps be labeled nonmilitary cooperation. It includes the two regional questions dealing with membership in the EEC and the unification of Europe, as well as the two general variables regarding collective Atlantic economic and foreign policies. International expectations (INTLEXP) are not related to either the military or nonmilitary cooperation factors. Whether one is optimistic or pessimistic about future international tensions is not related to one's views on Atlantic cooperation, so for the purposes of this study, INTLEXP and the third factor will not be considered further.

The variables loading on the factors form distinct conceptual clusters. In regard to military security and defense, respondents scoring high on the military cooperation dimension are likely to support NATO (NATOSPT and NATOESS), to hold the United States in high esteem

(TRUSTUS), and to place a high priority on strong defense forces within their country (DEFPRI), as opposed to preferring a purely European, independent, or neutralist security posture. Those scoring highest on the nonmilitary cooperation dimension place a high value on economic and foreign policy cooperation among Western nations (ECPOL and FORPOL), support regional cooperation (EECMEM), and favor European unification (UNIEUR).

The results displayed in Table 3-2 indicate a bidimensional structure for European attitudes along two distinct aspects of Atlantic cooperation. (Separate analyses by nation support this conclusion.¹¹) The two dimensions can be interpreted as distinguishing between both the ends and means of policy. Military and nonmilitary issues are different policy ends, so Europeans discriminate between these policies and formulate their attitudes accordingly. However, if Atlantic cooperation is viewed as a unifying concept, then the means of cooperation appear to be determinants of how beliefs are structured, with military cooperation and nonmilitary cooperation being supported or opposed for quite different reasons. At present, European beliefs seem to be avoiding the potential polarization that could result from a unidimensional structure. However, this bidimensional structure is relatively parsimonious and contains considerable explanatory value.

Europeans appear to place domestic military priorities within the context of Atlantic military cooperation. If

domestic military concerns were evaluated apart from the Alliance, the defense priority variable (DEFPRI) would have loaded onto a unique factor much the same as the question on international expectations. However, DEFPRI is strongly related to the military cooperation factor. Thus, when Europeans consider their defense budgets and force allocations, they do so as if from the perspective of Western cooperation and Atlantic defense, rather than from a strictly nationalistic, independent perspective. In other words, this suggests that Europeans may view their armies as if they were Atlantic (or perhaps European) entities. This may be stretching a point, and certainly cross-national variations exist (one wonders to what extent Frenchmen consider the force de frappe an Atlantic rather than French force); however, this relationship between domestic military priorities and Atlantic military cooperation is a notable finding with major implications for Alliance decision makers to consider.

The variable measuring trust for the United States (TRUSTUS) is also suggestive. Apparently, when military security and the defense of Europe are at issue, the United States is highly trusted among those who support military cooperation; but on other items dealing with economics, internal European affairs, or foreign affairs in general, views toward the United States are less consistent. Respondents can favor nonmilitary cooperation without trusting the United States and vice versa. Perhaps this helps to explain

why European publics see no contradiction in opposing United States policy in Central America or the Middle East while at the same time continuing to support the Western Alliance. Military cooperation refers primarily to the defense of Europe.

Thus, the bidimensional structure of European foreign policy attitudes provides some novel insights into the European belief system. Europeans perceive military affairs as conceptually distinct from cooperation in other areas of foreign policy. National military forces are considered elements of the Alliance rather than as independent entities. Attitudes toward the United States are related primarily to the American role of defender of Europe rather than that of world leader. The two dimensions, military and nonmilitary cooperation, are orthogonal: while Europeans may score high on both factors or low on both, they may also diverge their thinking by supporting one and opposing the other.

Distribution of Opinion

Based on the results of the factor analysis, the numerically coded responses to the items loading on the two rotated factors were summed for each respondent to create two Likert type scales: military cooperation (MILCOOP) and nonmilitary cooperation (NONMIL).¹² These scales represent the two orthogonal attitudinal dimensions discussed above. In this way the data were aggregated and

respondents were scored along a range of values from 5 to 35 for MILCOOP and from 4 to 28 for NONMIL.¹³ High scores represent support for the dimensional concept, and low scores represent opposition.

Cronback's alpha coefficient was used to assess the reliability of the scales.¹⁴ MILCOOP achieved an alpha = .70 and NONMIL an alpha = .60. These are relatively high values. Additionally, no item unduly depressed the value of alpha; in other words, the deletion of any item from either scale would not have substantially increased the value of alpha for that scale. For these reasons, along with the clear indications received from the factor analysis, both scales are accepted as reliable measures.¹⁵

Interpreting scores along a summated scale raises problems. The scale represents an underlying attitudinal continuum; however, one cannot provide an absolute interpretation of a respondent's score in terms of that continuum because the Likert technique, unlike the Guttman method, does not rank the survey items. The interpretation of a score anywhere along a summated scale is dependent on the distribution of the scores of the group of respondents. In other words, scores can be defined as being favorable or unfavorable toward the underlying concept only relative to the other scores of the group. This is because the "neutral" point on the continuum is not known, and there is no evidence to suggest that it corresponds to the midpoint of the scale values (McIver and Carmines, 1981:27,28).

The interpretation of scores is possible, however, when made relative to the mean. With the mean score for the group as the point of origin, the scores for individual respondents can be expressed as deviations from the mean. By assuming that the mean represents the typical or average attitude of the sample, scores that are higher than the mean can be interpreted as being more favorable to the measured concept than the average for the group, and scores that are lower than the mean can be interpreted as being less favorable than the average (McIver and Carmines, 1981:28). In this way the sample of respondents can be dichotomized along each scale into those who support and oppose the concept.¹⁶

This technique was applied to the European sample. Table 3-3 displays the distribution of the sample in relation to the mean of each scale. Respondents' positions on these dimensions relative to the scale means were used to partition the sample into four mutually exclusive categories. This joint distribution of the sample allows for generalizations to be made about attitudinal types.¹⁷

Figure 3-1 labels and depicts attitudinal types and their percentage distribution within a four-cell model. Atlanticists score positively on both dimensions. They support the Western military Alliance and other security measures, and they also favor Atlantic and European cooperation in areas such as the economy, foreign policy, and the Common Market. Isolationists on the other hand oppose both military and nonmilitary Atlantic cooperation. A third

TABLE 3-3
 DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
 ALONG TWO DIMENSIONS
 (Percentages)


	Military Cooperation (MILCOOP)	Nonmilitary Cooperation (NONMIL)
Support	55%	54%
Oppose	45	46

Total	100%	100%
N =	4234	4234

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note:

- Four nations: France, West Germany, Italy, Great Britain.
- National samples weighted to reflect their proportions of the aggregate population.
- Percentages represent sample distribution above and below the mean for each scale.



Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note:

- Four nations: Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy.
- Original N = 4234; national samples weighted to reflect their proportions of the aggregate population.
- Categories derived from the joint distribution along the two orthogonal attitudinal dimensions: military and nonmilitary cooperation.

Figure 3-1. Structure and distribution of European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation: A typology.

group, the Dovish Partners, disagree with the need for defense alliances and military preparations; however, they welcome Atlantic cooperation in nonmilitary areas. Those in the final category, the Military Allies, see a need for cooperation to ensure their military security, but beyond that they are less cooperative and more independent; they are less willing to contribute to the EEC or forge a common Western economic policy, but instead see greater opportunities arising from independent efforts in these nonmilitary areas.

The distribution of respondents among the four attitudinal types is revealing. The largest single category is that of the Atlanticists with only 34%. Nevertheless, the overall message conveyed by this model is clear; West Europeans overwhelmingly support cooperation of one type or another (the Isolationists account for only 25% of the sample), but Europeans are far from united about the nature or type of Atlantic cooperation that should be pursued. There is sufficient opposition within each of the two attitudinal dimensions, as Table 3-3 illustrated, to stir up the public debate on specific issues despite the large percentage of the population that is not categorized as being Isolationist.

There is obviously considerable variation among the individuals constituting each of the categories that cannot be accounted for. Respondents may be positioned on vectors very close to adjacent categories blurring distinctions, or

there may also be differences in intensity of opinion among respondents in the same category as defined by their distance from the origin. However, problems of this nature exist whenever data are being aggregated and must be endured in some measure to achieve the research goal of generalization.

Cross-National Variation

The four national samples were each dichotomized on both scales using the means derived from the European sample. The national samples no longer required weighting since they were being analyzed separately. Support and opposition for the two dimensions of Atlantic cooperation are presented in Table 3-4 by nation.

West Germans display the highest support for both types of cooperation. This is significant because "much of the current concern about a 'crisis' in the Atlantic Alliance can be traced to worries about developments in the Federal Republic of Germany" (Capitanichik and Eighenberg, 1983:57). Given the large peace demonstrations, the growth of the unilateralist Green party, the defense program of the SPD, serious questions have been raised about the future role of West Germany within the Alliance. Policy makers in other Western nations are not accustomed to being concerned with pacifism in West Germany. In the past, the fear of German militarism guided much of European diplomacy; thus, "as Willy Brandt and others have observed, it is novel indeed to

TABLE 3-4
 DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
 ALONG TWO DIMENSIONS BY NATION
 (Percentages)

	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
<hr/>				
<u>Military Cooperation</u>				
Support	19%	79%	41%	72%
Oppose	81	21	59	28
<hr/>				
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	983	995	1108	1131
<hr/>				
<u>Nonmilitary Cooperation</u>				
Support	47	71	70	34
Oppose	53	30	29	67
<hr/>				
Total	100%	101%	99%	101%
N =	986	1008	1108	1132
<hr/>				

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note: Percentages represent sample distribution above and below the mean for each dimension.

hear complaints about Germans marching for peace" (Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983:57). Although the concerns about West German sentiment might continue, Table 3-4 is clear in showing a substantial reservoir of support for Atlantic cooperation among the West German public.

The bifurcated national samples were also cross-tabulated as in the previous section to create the four attitudinal classifications. These sample distributions by type for each nation are displayed in Table 3-5. The largest single group among the four countries is West Germany's Atlanticists who comprise 58% of the German sample. The French have the smallest percentage of Atlanticists and the largest percentage of Isolationists. The British are largely Military Allies and the Italians Dovish Partners.

The Atlanticist outlook of the West German respondents may have resulted from the unique circumstances in which the Federal Republic evolved and from the diplomatic strategy it has undertaken. Upon its establishment in 1949, the Federal Republic enjoyed little international legitimacy and possessed no military power or diplomatic influence. With an absolute security deficit initially, West Germany had to be dependent on the United States to balance the power of the Soviet Union. In pursuit of respectability and national sovereignty, Chancellor Adenauer became a "compulsive joiner," believing that membership in international organizations would create the appearance of equality and

TABLE 3-5
 DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
 BY TYPE OF NATION
 (Percentages)

	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
Atlanticists	12%	58%	33%	29%
Military Allies	7	21	8	43
Dovish Partners	35	12	37	5
Isolationists	46	9	22	23
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>				
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	983	995	1108	1131

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note: Categories derived from the joint distribution of the sample along the two orthogonal attitudinal dimensions: military and nonmilitary cooperation.

provide opportunities to influence events (Joffe, 1985:79). West Germany became the most integrationist of the European nations.

While pursuing the policies of integration abroad, Adenauer also cultivated the legitimizing ideologies of Europeanism and anti-Communism at home. Following the catastrophic results of the Third Reich's ultranationalism, the notion of a "European fatherland" provided a necessary and legitimate outlet for the demoralized population (Joffe, 1985:88). It is within this framework of dependence and transnationalism that the high level of Atlanticist sentiment in West Germany has been fostered.

The Isolationists must be interpreted carefully. This group is not to be viewed as being necessarily pacifist or neutralist. Although respondents holding those views would be in this category, the survey items do not specifically measure those positions. The Isolationists are probably a rather heterogeneous grouping of Gaullists, neutralists, independents, and pacifists who share only the attitudinal trait of opposing Atlantic cooperation for one reason or another. For example, in a 1982 poll in France, only 16% held the view that France should abandon all armaments and adopt an absolutely neutral position in world affairs (Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983:56). This is much smaller than the 46% of the French sample seen in Table 3-5 to be the Isolationist category; these respondents are apparently not all neutralists.

The foreign policy orientations of the French depicted in Tables 3-4 and 3-5 reflect the goals and interests of postwar France. If Adenauer was a "compulsive joiner," General de Gaulle and his predecessors in the Fourth Republic clearly were not. France initially proposed the European Defense Community but then ended it by refusing to join in 1954; de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application to the EEC in 1963 on the grounds that Britain was too closely aligned with the United States; and in 1966 he withdrew French forces from the integrated military command of NATO. The General aspired to revive France's former rank and status as a great power. To do this he demanded for France the ability to decide its own fate in international relations, independent of any limiting arrangements. He also pursued for France the role of maintaining a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union by not being singularly aligned to either. Long after de Gaulle's departure, his views in large measure continue to underlie French attitudes.

The British appear in Table 3-5 to be predominantly Military Allies, supporters of NATO and coordinated defense planning but opposed to other forms of cooperation. Geography and history have created within the British a traditionally weak "European" identity. This, together with the recent memory of being denied membership into the EEC by France until 1973 and the continuing quarrel between Britain and all the other Common Market countries about EEC budgets

and disbursements, may explain the British distaste for nonmilitary cooperation. On the other hand, the high support (72%) for military cooperation among the British respondents seen in Table 3-4 may be a result of the generally favorable experiences of Anglo-American cooperation during World War II and the postwar circumstance in which Britain was the only major European nation which was neither defeated nor occupied. This condition enabled Britain to retain for some time its great power status and explains the absence of any deep-seated need for national reassertiveness of the kind felt by the French.

Italy's categorization as Dovish Partners (37% in Table 3-5) seems to fit its distinctive relationship with the Alliance. Originally a reluctant participant, it was Allied diplomatic pressure and Italy's dependence on the Marshall Plan that compelled Italy to become a member. This lack of support for military cooperation is reflected in Italy's remarkably low material contribution to NATO: defense spending that is well below the NATO average and one of the lowest levels of military manpower as a percentage of males aged 18 to 45 (Putnam, 1977:296). At the same time, Italy enthusiastically supports the Common Market, shows no signs of desiring a Gaullist type of foreign policy, and seems content to remain dependent on the American presence as its security guarantee at very little cost to Italians. Pierre Hassner's description of Italian attitudes as

"pacifist Atlanticism" appropriately fits the data from Italy in Tables 3-4 and 3-5 (cited in Putnam, 1977:296).

The model presented here offers empirical support at the mass level for distinctive national characteristics. The typology of attitudinal categories describes four alternative views of Western cooperation, each of which seems to correspond to one of the four nations selected for this study. These representations are validated to some extent by national traditions, interests, and options. Linkages between this attitudinal model and political behavior, along with the implications raised by this research for the Alliance's cohesion, represent a substantial agenda for future research.

Conclusion

The primary finding of this chapter is that the European public is capable of structuring its foreign policy attitudes in a relatively parsimonious manner. The European belief system is not overly complex and as such allows for ease of interpretation and measurement.¹⁸ A bidimensional attitudinal structure appears to exist along the lines of Atlantic military and nonmilitary cooperation. This structure avoids the potential dangers of political polarization inherent in a unidimensional belief system. Presently, it appears that Europeans consider military matters to be qualitatively different from other types of Atlantic

cooperation. Additionally, beliefs on one dimension do not automatically affect those on the other.

The analytical approach used demonstrates that it is possible to generalize about the dimensions of European public attitudes underlying various issues and policy disputes.¹⁹ The method of probing the data with factor analysis and using Likert techniques to measure support for attitudinal dimensions offers distinct advantages over the single-indicator approach with its inherent instability as a measure of underlying constructs. A maximum amount of information is preserved and combined to create measures of a higher order than individual survey items.

The descriptive purpose of this research--examining the conceptual structure of European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation--has been accomplished. What remains is to link the data and the model to some general notions about what has been happening to public attitudes and European politics over the past few years.

Support for the general concept of Atlantic cooperation does not translate into support for specific policies. The data in Figure 3-1 depict the Isolationists as comprising only 25% of the population. This would seem to indicate a large majority favoring some form of cooperation, yet there is considerable opposition to spending more on defense, despite the fact that there has been a specific Alliance policy calling for an annual 3% increase. There continues to be distaste for the deployment of the new intermediate

range nuclear weapons as part of the December 1979 dual-track decision. Disputes also exist over the Common Agricultural Policy and the admittance of new members into the EEC, and there appears to be little European support for United States policies in Central America and elsewhere.

These divergent tendencies appear to be between general goals and specific policies; a "goals versus instruments" dilemma (Flynn and Rattinger, 1985:382,383). Political goals comprising positive affective evaluations are endorsed, such as Atlantic cooperation, deterrence, European unity, and economic growth. However, the specific means required to promote these goals, such as military spending, particular weapons systems, and economic austerity programs, are normally unpopular with the general public and are therefore opposed. The analytical problem thus becomes determining whether goals or instruments are the correct operational measure; the focus in this chapter has been on the general goal of Atlantic cooperation. The political problem lies in trying to convert the broad support for goals, which this project seems to have uncovered in part, into support for specific policies.

Just as broad affective support for goals does not lead to policy consensus, policy disputes do not portend the imminent peril of the Alliance. The past 40 years are evidence of this reality. However, one can only speculate at what point continued intra-Alliance conflicts, combined

with uncertain international pressures, begin to erode the underlying support for general goals.

The peace movements in Europe reflect in part the political tensions that challenge Western unity. Generally, these movements seem strongest in West Germany and Britain. France and Italy have experienced nothing resembling the level of protest and political activism over security issues that exists in Britain and Germany.²⁰ Additionally, the British Labour party and the SPD in Germany have developed positions which strongly challenge NATO policies. The parties of the Left in France and Italy, however, have not taken up these issues. And of course there is no protest party as successful as the German Greens in either France or Italy, although there is an Ecology party in France and the Italian Radicals are very similar to the Greens in social base and program.

This research reveals that these different levels of protest are highest in those countries with the most support for military cooperation (as shown in Table 3-4). Large majorities in both Britain and West Germany score high on the military cooperation scale, while in Italy and France military cooperation tends to be opposed.

The finding appears to be anomalous. One would intuitively expect the peace movements to be greatest in those countries with the lowest levels of underlying support for Atlantic military affairs, but that is not the case. The Socialists tenure of power from 1981 to 1986 may explain the

French case. The leaders of the bourgeois opposition parties in France were not likely to promote anti-Western proposals and Mitterand's government supported Alliance policies. Additionally, within France the force de frappe has become an object of national pride not criticism, thus deflecting anti-nuclear sentiment (Dumont, 1985). In Italy, the close association of the Communist party with the peace movement as well as the perceived absence of genuine Italian roots in the movement may have contributed to its small following (Rossi and Ilari, 1985). The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has been firmly established for many years in Britain and has become a big organization with large resources (Boyd, 1985). It remains capable of generating considerable political activity among its many supporters. Traditional German angst, a contentious younger generation, and the unique geographic situation of the Federal Republic seem likely explanations for the strength of the peace movement there, despite the large amount of Atlanticist sentiment evident in Table 3-5.

There are several possible scenarios which may develop out of this anomalous condition. The one most favorable to the Western Alliance would be a decline in the levels of public protest in Britain and West Germany combined with an increase in the affective support for Atlantic cooperation in France and Italy. The outcome most unfavorable would be an erosion of the high levels of underlying support that exists in Britain and West Germany as a result of continuous

political pressure by the mobilized activists who oppose military cooperation, along with the politicization of these issues among those in France and Italy who currently harbor latent opposition to military cooperation. These alternative possibilities underscore the substantial effects that European mass attitudes can have on the future cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

Notes

¹"Affectivity" is used in the psychological sense to refer to subjective emotions and feelings. The other psychological components of attitudes are the "cognitive" (objective evaluations) and the "behavioral"; see Carl I. Hovland and Milton J. Rosenberg, Attitude Organization and Change (1960:1-14).

²The list of "crises" within the Alliance is long. For an early assessment of some of the disputes, see Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1966); a more recent analysis is Alfred Grosser, The Atlantic Alliance (1982).

³There are several contending descriptions for this new American multidimensional belief system. A relatively complex multidimensional structure with five interpretable dimensions is presented in Barbara Bardes and Robert Oldendick, "Beyond Internationalism: A Case for Multiple Dimensions in the Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes" (1978). American respondents are categorized as conservative internationalists, liberal internationalists, and noninternationalists in Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalism" (1979). American attitudes are described with a four-cell typology with the categories of internationalists, accommodationists, hardliners, and isolationists in Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View" (1981).

⁴For a discussion of the advantages and techniques of various scaling methods, see John P. McIver and Edward G. Carmines, Unidimensional Scaling (1981).

⁵The number of response categories varied between items. A range of 1 to 7 was used to recode the numerical values of the responses so that the range of values would be

equivalent for all items. For example, items with three responses--(1), (2), and (3)--were recoded (1), (4), and (7); and items with four responses--(1), (2), (3), and (4)--were recoded (1), (3), (5), and (7). In each case the higher numbers reflect greater support for Atlantic cooperation. For the factor analysis this recoding is not necessary; however, for the summative scales discussed in the next section it is essential.

⁶Missing data on any questions were automatically recoded to the mean for that item. In this way no respondents were deleted from the analysis. Additional analyses using pairwise and listwise deletion of missing data yielded essentially identical factor solutions.

⁷Eigenvalues are produced by the principal components method and are useful in determining the number of relevant dimensions. This statistic is computed for each of the factors generated by the analysis up to the number of variables entered, and it can be interpreted as the total variance explained by each factor. In a principal components analysis, factors are standardized such that total variance equals the number of variables, and each variable has a variance of 1. For this reason, factors with eigenvalues less than 1 are no better than a single variable, and the normal criterion is to accept as valid conceptual dimensions only those factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. See Marija I. Norusis, SPSSx Advanced Statistics Guide (1985).

⁸Communalities can be interpreted as the proportion of a variable's total variance that is accounted for by all of the factors, and it is derived from the sum of the squared loadings for a variable. These values do not change with rotation. The percent of variance in a variable accounted for by all of the factors is $h^2 \times 100$. Variables with extremely low communalities would be deleted because of their limited contribution to the model. The sum of h^2 values $\times 100$ equals the percent of total variance in all of the variables accounted for by the factors. See R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (1970).

⁹The correlations between the rotated factors in the oblique solution are listed below. These low coefficients support the conclusion for orthogonality.

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Factor I	1.00		
Factor II	.20	1.00	
Factor III	-.01	-.09	1.00

¹⁰The figures entered in the factor columns are the "loadings." These measure the degree to which variables are related to the factors. Specifically, they are correlation

coefficients between variables and factors. The square of the loading times 100 equals the percent of a variable's variance accounted for by the factor. Normally, according to Rummel (1970:139), factors are interpreted as consisting only of those variables with loadings equal to or greater than an absolute value of .40; that is, those variables with 16% or more of their variation explained by the factor. Factor loadings meeting the criterion have been underscored, and they can be used to identify which variables belong to which factors. The communalities and loadings together show at a glance how the data are ordered and explained by the factors.

¹¹In separate analyses for each national sample, a two-factor solution produced the loadings listed below. The international expectations item was not included because of its independent effects indicated in Table 3-2.

	France		W. Ger.		Italy		Britain	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
NATOSPT	<u>.72</u>	.07	<u>.66</u>	.09	<u>.70</u>	-.05	<u>.79</u>	.12
NATOESS	<u>.72</u>	.08	<u>.55</u>	<u>.41</u>	<u>.76</u>	.12	<u>.72</u>	.23
SCTYPOL	<u>.53</u>	.29	<u>.54</u>	.23	<u>.67</u>	.18	<u>.61</u>	.24
DEFPRI	<u>.43</u>	.26	<u>.54</u>	<u>-.48</u>	<u>.44</u>	<u>-.48</u>	<u>.59</u>	<u>-.08</u>
TRUSTUS	<u>.33</u>	.33	<u>.54</u>	<u>.15</u>	<u>.65</u>	<u>.09</u>	<u>.11</u>	.30
EECMEM	.10	<u>.70</u>	<u>.09</u>	<u>.71</u>	<u>.21</u>	<u>.79</u>	<u>-.02</u>	<u>.74</u>
UNIEUR	.10	<u>.68</u>	.18	<u>.72</u>	.27	<u>.70</u>	.07	<u>.67</u>
ECPOL	.02	<u>.66</u>	<u>.09</u>	<u>.33</u>	<u>.40</u>	<u>.21</u>	.05	<u>.67</u>
FORPOL	.39	<u>.31</u>	<u>.49</u>	.02	<u>.56</u>	.27	.26	<u>.54</u>

The interpretation from the aggregate sample is generally supported. The items tend to load on the same factors representing military and nonmilitary cooperation (I and II respectively); however, there are some exceptions. The item measuring trust for the United States (TRUSTUS) is associated strongly with neither factor for the French and the British. Also, the question on foreign policy orientation (FORPOL) for the West Germans and the Italians loads on Factor I, military cooperation, rather than on the nonmilitary dimension as with the European sample.

¹²Another method would be to use factor scores to construct "factor scales." Factor scores are estimates for respondents on a factor computed by various types of differential weighing of variables based on the factor loadings. However, if the factor analysis is used primarily as a heuristic device for sorting out major clusters of variables, the simpler method of summative scales is preferred. For a comparison of "factor scales" with "factor-based scales," see Jao-On Kim and Charles W. Mueller, Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues (1985:60-73).

¹³No effort was made to vary the weight assigned to the items because it has been found that little is to be gained; unweighted and weighted summative scores regularly correlate quite highly according to McIver and Carmines (1981:27).

¹⁴Cronbach's alpha coefficient is the preferred estimate of scale reliability according to McIver and Carmines (1981:29). This statistic provides an estimate of reliability based upon the inter-item correlation matrix. Computer routines that test for reliability with alpha also indicate the effects upon the value of alpha if individual items are deleted from the scale. This item analysis provides another source for checking reliability.

¹⁵For similar decision rules, see Eugene R. Wittkopf and Michael A. Maggiotto, "American Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy" (1981); and Eugene R. Wittkopf and Michael A. Maggiotto, "Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis Toward America's World Role" (1983a).

¹⁶This is the technique used by Wittkopf (1981) and Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1981).

¹⁷This again borrows from the techniques used by Wittkopf (1981) and Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1981).

¹⁸A note of caution should be raised here. The structure derived from exploratory factor analysis is obviously a function of the items entered. There are many other foreign policy issues related to Atlantic cooperation not available in the data set analyzed. As such, the conclusion in regard to the apparent simplicity of the structure of European foreign policy attitudes at the mass level could be exaggerated. Additionally, there is some uncertainty as to the precise interpretation of the second factor. The nature of the items included may indicate support for European or regional cooperation rather than Atlantic cooperation.

¹⁹Another note of caution is necessary here and it concerns the issue of equivalence in cross-cultural survey research. It is possible that survey items may not be perfectly translatable from one language to another. While there is not much that can be done about this when using existing data sets, cognizance of this possibility is necessary.

²⁰For a brief comparison of the origins, activities, and achievements of the peace movements in several countries, see Werner Kaltefleiter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States (1985).

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND NATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

Fundamental social and political changes are occurring in Western Europe. Traditional power relationships and decision-making patterns are being altered by the spread of mass education, increased social mobility, generational conflict, new forms of interest intermediation, a new agenda of political issues, new forms of political participation, and the realignment of electoral coalitions (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton et al., 1984; Inglehart, 1977; Schmitter and Lehbruch, 1979; Szabo, 1983b). In the midst of these changes, the specific traditions, interests, and crises of individual nations might undercut any broad social or political generalizations (Verba, 1980:400). This chapter assesses the effects of social attributes, political attributes, and national identity on European mass attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation.

An essential task in the analysis of political attitudes is to break down the societal aggregate into its more tangible component parts. It is then possible to distinguish the way in which the attitudes of each part vary from the views of the others. As the size and power of

these societal segments vary, the relative importance of their respective group attitudes varies also. There is a tendency when observing pluralist societies to err by confusing the views of a segment of society with those of the entire society; in other words, to confuse a part with the whole. The media and policy makers often see the will of the majority in a stormy parliamentary debate or a persistent interest group organization. The concern is that "the articulate and the noisy are liable to monopolize the attention of policy makers, and certainly to claim for themselves wider representative status" (Hill, 1981:57).

A related task is to explain the formation of political attitudes. This reflects the ultimate concern for causality which is an underlying or implicit motivation for more sophisticated forms of data analysis in political science. Determining those factors most influential in producing attitudes contributes greatly to the understanding of political behavior and political culture.

Caution is necessary when deciding what kinds of group and variable differences merit attention. While there is an intrinsic interest in political science with correlations and causal analysis, some findings of such correlations often fail to serve any serious theoretical or practical purpose and may in fact border on the trivial. Moreover, statistical significance does not mean substantive significance; attitudinal variations of a few percentage points may signify more about the relative uniformity of opinion across

segments of society than about the minor differences between them.

To disentangle important from trivial group differences Crewe (1985:47,48) suggests three questions be kept in mind. First, are the groups being compared on the same side or on opposing sides of the issue? It matters whether the majority in each group take divergent or convergent positions. If divisions of opinion cut across rather than run with social cleavages the result may also be trivial. Second, how big and how important (in the sense of being able to influence wider opinion) is the social group in question? It is often possible to identify parts of society whose views are in marked contrast with the large majority of society, but this may be of little political significance. Third, are the distinctive attitudes of a particular group held because of the distinctive attributes of that group? It is tempting, but not necessarily correct, to assume that they are. An example would be differences of opinion between social classes that occur only because of differences in party loyalty between classes; these opinions may have nothing to do with the interests or consciousness of the classes; in other words, the correlation between class and attitudes in this case would be spurious.

The preceding chapter presented a typology of four European viewpoints toward Atlantic cooperation. These types are: the Atlanticists, who support NATO and the United States as well as cooperation in nonmilitary areas;

the Military Allies, who also support NATO and a strong national defense, but who oppose the EEC and other nonmilitary cooperation measures; the Dovish Partners, who oppose military cooperation, but who favor nonmilitary cooperation in areas such as economic policy; and the Isolationists, who oppose both dimensions of Atlantic cooperation.

This chapter builds upon this typology by analyzing the relationship between disaggregated component parts of European society and European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. The military and nonmilitary aspects of Atlantic cooperation will be assessed separately; these are operationalized by the two Likert-type summative scales from Chapter III. The intent is to determine which specific variables are associated with the attitudes and together which variables form the best multivariate causal model.

Goals and Expectations

Seven individual level attributes will be examined. These can be identified as either social or political variables. The social variables are: generational influences, value orientations, class cleavages, and educational influences. The political variables are: partisanship, ideology, and political participation. Together, these represent three of the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter II: the Successor Generation, Postmaterialism, and modernization. Additionally, national cultural influences will be examined by using the national identity of

respondents as a variable. If these variables empirically reflect consistent relationships with given attitudes, and if the relationships are further validated by theories in scholarly literature and expectations on attribute to attitude relationships based on environmental circumstances, the model's independent variables will have been essentially established. Figure 4-1 illustrates this model of causal relationships between determinants and attitudes.

Generational Influences

The political consequences of intergenerational attitude change are potentially dramatic. A political generation is identified by shared and politically relevant experiences of the same age group. Accordingly, the values and attitudes formed early in life through political socialization remain dominant and determine the attitudes of the age cohort throughout adulthood. According to Karl Mannheim, the first modern scholar to write about political generations, a political generation is a set of persons occupying "a common location in the social and historical process, predisposing them to a certain characteristic type of historically relevant action" (1952:291). As childhood socialization experiences vary, so will the adult political attitudes and behavior.

Recently, an intense interest has developed in the attitudes of the West European Successor Generation and the




Figure 4-1. A model of attitude formation and structure.

implications of these for the Atlantic Alliance (The Atlantic Council, 1981; Fotheringham, 1983; Harrison, 1983; Laqueur, 1985; Levi, 1982; Szabo, 1983a, 1983b, 1984; Wertman, 1983). The Successor Generation concept refers to postwar Europeans. The concern is that the younger generation, born since World War II, has internalized a different set of attitudes than those of the older generations. Life experiences of economic prosperity, political stability, and military security have replaced those of depression, instability, and war.

Postwar Europeans have matured in a new Europe in which the European Community and NATO, affluence and political stability are givens. . . . America does not connote the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift, or even John Kennedy; rather it means the Vietnam War and Watergate. (Szabo, 1983b:1)

Specifically, younger Europeans are viewed as possessing values that are less Atlantic and more anti-American than those of the older cohorts. The emergence of the European peace movement, a growing distrust of the United States, and the rise of environmental and New Left political parties are contemporary West European political phenomena dominated by younger citizens.

Middle aged Europeans, the second generation of analytical interest, have childhood memories distinctly different from the postwar generation. They remember World War II but probably not the Depression. They have acquired responsibility for managing the postwar West European recovery, and their most influential socialization experience is the dramatic economic turn around from devastation to affluence,

known as the Wirtschaftswunder in West Germany. Detente, Ostpolitik, and the arms control process have demonstrated that marginal accommodation with the Soviet Union is possible, although the Berlin airlift, the Cold War, and containment were also salient issues for this cohort. This generation has contributed to engineering peace for four decades, and they probably have greater faith in its continuance than those who experienced the 1930s and 1940s as mature adults (Deutsch, 1967). Together, these experiences may perhaps produce ambivalent attitudes toward the superpowers and Western military cooperation and security.

Older Europeans, those who can be labeled the prewar generation, present a marked contrast to the postwar cohort. Having endured the Great Depression, fought and survived World War II, and successfully recovered from the war's catastrophic effects, the prewar generation can be expected to possess a world view considerably less sanguine than the others. In the immediate postwar decade, the period when these Europeans were reestablishing their peacetime lives, Soviet aggression was the principal threat to stability. The United States was the principal guarantor of that peace and stability by such means as the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the establishment of NATO. A high perception of threat in the international environment and the felt need for national and Western measures to counteract such threats are probably the result of the acculturation experience of this age cohort.

Expectations of cross-national differences in regard to the attitudes of these three generations are not clear. There is some indication in the literature that the extent or degree of discontinuity in political history will affect generational differences in political attitudes (Inglehart, 1977; Kriegel, 1978). Thus, a society whose intergenerational political experiences have been similar will have similar attitudes across generations, and one with abrupt and dramatic discontinuities will produce sharp generational attitude differences.

Accordingly, the British and West Germans would seem to be at opposite ends of the longitudinal stability dimension. The British having the benefit of a relatively stable political order, and the Germans having been wrenched from the Weimer Republic to National Socialism and into the current pluralist democracy. The French and Italians both have traumatized memories of World War II--its antecedents and consequences--that would place them at points somewhere between those of the British and the West Germans in regard to intergenerational differences.

Operationalizing the span of birth years for specific generations is somewhat subjective. Disagreement exists concerning the identification of the formative years during which a common experience can have an impact on political views. Traditionally, socialization theory viewed childhood and early adolescence as the times of maximum receptiveness to external political influences. Davies represents this

view: "By twelve a world picture is there and solid. By then the basic items in the political kit are assembled" (1973:105). However, there is evidence that people are just as malleable during the early years of adulthood (Beck, 1984). Analysts of foreign policy attitudes usually take the second position by holding that these views are acquired later in life beyond adolescence, perhaps between the ages of 17 and 25.

Because this period encompasses for many the beginning of eligibility for military service, consciousness of and interest in foreign affairs may be enhanced when the prospect of personal involvement hinges upon the outcome of foreign policy undertakings. (Holsti and Rosenau, 1980:8)

The critical events which define the parameters for the three generations are World War II and its immediate aftermath. The dramatic events of the 1940s create the single strongest generational cleavage affecting European foreign policy attitudes in the 1980s. "Most of the authors would agree that the postwar generation in Europe begins with those born in 1950 or afterwards. . . . Europeans born in the 1940s are clearly transitional in the sense that they had direct experience of the Cold War" (Szabo, 1983b:169). Thus, three cohorts will be established for analytical purposes. They can be labeled the postwar generation (born since 1950), the World War II/Cold War generation (birth years 1925-1950), the prewar generation (born prior to 1925).

Attitudinal differences between age cohorts can be the result of either generational change, which has been assumed thus far, or the result of life-cycle effects. This second theory regards the values of young people as transitory, and that with maturation and the assumption of adult roles, values change (Eisenstadt, 1956). Additionally, a third influence on value change is period effects which result from historical events that affect more than one generation. To attempt to sort out these various effects, longitudinal data must be used. This task will be undertaken in later chapters, which examine long-term changes in European Atlantic attitudes. In this chapter, cross-sectional data from one time period will be observed as a first step to see to what extent generational differences exist.

Two hypotheses express the expected relationships between generational cohorts and attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation:

H.1 Among generations: the postwar generation will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; the prewar generation will have the highest; and the WWII/Cold War cohort will have some level of support between the others.

H.2 West Germany will have the largest range of intergenerational attitudinal differences; Britain will have the lowest; and France and Italy will have intergenerational differences at ranges between those of Germany and Britain.

Value Orientations

There is considerable agreement among analysts on one type of postwar value change; specifically, the increase in Postmaterial or New Politics values (Baker et al., 1981; Dalton, 1980; Inglehart, 1977).¹ Two propositions underlie this shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values. The first is that people value most highly those things that are relatively scarce (Maslow, 1954). This scarcity hypothesis implies short-term changes, or period effects. An individual's priorities reflect one's socioeconomic environment; if conditions improve, values shift toward "higher level" or Postmaterial concerns. The second proposition is that to a large extent one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's formative, preadult years (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969). This socialization hypothesis implies that long-term cohort effects also exist, and that the values of a given generation tend to reflect the conditions experienced during the formative, preadult years.

Inglehart (1977) reasons that Materialists are those who belong to the older age cohorts who experienced the wars and scarcities of the era preceding the West European postwar economic miracle. As a result, Materialists accord a relatively high priority to economic matters or to what Maslow terms the security needs. For the younger cohorts, on the other hand, a set of "postbourgeois" or Postmaterial values, relating to the need for belonging and to aesthetic,

cultural, and intellectual needs, are more likely to take top priority.

Postmaterialism, therefore, is a generational phenomenon, and as such, it is linked to the Successor Generation effects discussed above. There is disagreement on some of the underlying aspects of the Postmaterial value orientation. Inglehart believes that a rise in affluence is a direct cause of Postmaterial values. He regards the change as being a single dimensional shift from Material to Postmaterial. Flanagan (1982) contends that functional constraints or social norms account for the shift, and that Inglehart's single dimension mistakenly fuses two dimensions. There may be a marked shift from authoritarian to libertarian preferences; but a shift away from Material priorities is more in doubt. Obviously, Flanagan's materialistic libertarian is more likely to support the need for Atlantic military and economic cooperation than is Inglehart's unidimensional New Politics individual.

The analytical question here concerns the extent to which Postmaterialism is related to Atlantic cooperation. Inglehart believes there are indications that anti-Americanism may be linked with the long-term shift toward Postmaterialism in Western Europe. "The linkage between Postmaterialism and anti-Americanism suggests that the two variables may be following a common trajectory" (1984b:535). Anti-Americanism is clearly a functional equivalent for nonsupport of Atlantic cooperation.

Theoretically, the same propositions used to explain the development of the Postmaterial set of values, which are primarily economic and military security, may be applied as attitudes toward international cooperation as well. In the late 1940s, Western cooperation was necessary both to rebuild West European economies and to reflect united resolve against Soviet military encroachment (Grosser, 1980). For the prewar Europeans, predominantly Materialists, Western cooperation means the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and NATO. Yet for the postwar, Postmaterialists, international cooperation means the European Economic Community, the new European Parliament, the United Nations, Ostpolitik, and Detente. Thus, to the Materialist the focus is on the Western community of nations, but to the Postmaterialist it is on the world community of nations.

Similarly, views of what is threatening vary. To the prewar Materialist, traditional power relationships within the state system identify the Soviet Union as the principal threat. To the Postmaterialist, however, with a global agenda of reforms, it is the system itself, the weapons, and the leaders of both East and West, that constitute the threat. These contrasting views obviously will produce varying attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation.

It would seem plausible, therefore, that theoretically and practically the shift in value orientations toward Postmaterialism includes an aspect of declining support for

Atlantic military cooperation. In regard to Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation, the effects of Postmaterialism may not be as strong, yet the expectation is that here also Postmaterialists would support cooperation less than Materialists because of the global perspective of Postmaterialists. The hypothesis relating Postmaterialism to Atlantic attitudes is as follows:

H.3 Postmaterialists will have lower support for Atlantic cooperation than will Materialists.

Class Cleavages

There has been strong support in the findings of empirical political research that politics in industrial societies is influenced considerably by social class. Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) in his classic and influential work, Political Man, asserted that social class is the most important single political fact. Alford (1963) calculated a "class voting index" (obtained by subtracting the percentage of nonmanual respondents voting for the Left from the percentage of manual respondents voting for the Left) from data on four English-speaking democracies and found that in virtually every available survey, manual workers were more likely to vote for parties of the Left than nonmanual workers. Other empirical analyses have confirmed that social class is one of the most powerful bases of political cleavage in Western Europe, towering above other variables,

when it is not dominated by ethnic cleavages such as religion, language, or race (Lijphart, 1979; Rose, 1974).

More recently, there is a new view that the influence of social class on political attitudes and behavior is declining. As industrializing society gives way to advanced industrial society, there seems to be a growing tendency for politics to polarize along a new dimension that cuts across conventional class cleavages as well as across the traditional Left-Right axis. Increasingly, the most controversial political issues and important political debates reflect what is known as the New Politics dimension. The environmentalist movement, the peace movement, the women's movement, opposition to nuclear power, and the limits to growth movement are not class based but instead reflect the New Politics or Postmaterialist agenda (Baker et al., 1981; Dalton, 1980, 1984; Inglehart, 1984a).

The analytical question of interest here is to what extent class cleavages influence political attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. The studies cited above use primarily voting behavior and partisanship as dependent variables in assessing the political impact of social class. There are no existing studies attempting to link class with foreign policy attitudes, and there is little a priori basis for forming hypotheses regarding the nature of any relationship. Collective military security and international economic security are obviously not class issues in the sense that the tax structure or welfare policies are. Nuclear bombs

and invading armies do not discriminate among the classes. Particular class interests are only indirectly materially affected by defense policies, for example, by the potential trade-off between spending on defense as against social services.

To the extent that class consciousness exists, and it clearly varies among West European nations, the working class would be aware of its relative economic and social disadvantage. This awareness may translate into a sense of little control over events. A high level of xenophobia would be expected along with a lack of comprehension about or interest in international affairs except that foreigners and neighboring nations are not to be trusted. This image may be somewhat anachronistic but it presents the case for an hypothesis that the working classes may shun the prospect of Atlantic cooperation.

In his study of the New Politics agenda, Dalton (1984) found the phenomenon to be present largely in certain occupational groups, specifically in the service sector and white collar jobs of what has been termed the new middle class. To the extent that this agenda includes the peace movement, anti-nuclear groups, and so on, then it may have a class component that supports the hypothesis that the new middle class opposes Atlantic cooperation.

The traditional, bourgeois middle class (business, executives, and professionals) presents a different image. Having friends and contacts across the nation and even

Europe, being exposed to major urban publications and other elite media, and possessing a sense of civic responsibility to the community and nation, may combine to create a high level of awareness of, involvement in, and concern for international affairs. Perspectives on East-West relations, collective military security, and the international economy would probably be the result of informed opinion and first-hand experiences rather than of simplistic working class or idealistic new middle class attitudinal stereotypes. Such attitudes it can be hypothesized should result in support for Atlantic military and nonmilitary cooperation.

Thus, the hypothesis for the effects of class cleavage on Atlantic attitudes is as follows:

H.4 Among classes: the new middle class will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; the bourgeois middle class will have the highest; and the working class will have some level of support midway between the other two.

Educational Influences

The importance of various educational levels to political attitudes is well known. In his pioneering study of belief systems, Converse (1964) found "ideologues," those with highly constrained political beliefs, only among the highly educated segment of society. However, the concern here is not with how mass publics organize their beliefs but rather with what they believe and how education affects it.

There is some evidence from published studies that Europeans with the most education tend to oppose policies aimed at strengthening defense and military security, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. In Britain, "the limited data available confirm the visible impression that it is the intelligentsia who are the most apprehensive and informed about nuclear defense issues and the most likely to take an antinuclear position" (Crewe, 1985:53). In Germany, "respondents with low formal education attributed much more importance to military protection and were far less convinced of the necessity of the peace movement" (Rattinger, 1985:160). These preliminary findings would support the hypothesis that increasing education should decrease support for Atlantic military cooperation, but it does not relate directly to nonmilitary cooperation.

There is an educational element to the New Politics agenda. "Interest in New Politics issues is related to educational level. Respondents with a Gymnasium or university education (Abitur or more) place considerably more emphasis on New Politics goals by a wide margin" (Dalton, 1984:112). Again, these goals generally focus on qualitative, reformist, and life-style issues along with concern for the complexities of a technological society and increased international interdependence. Increased education may therefore lead to support for nonmilitary Atlantic cooperation in which nations are perceived as having to combine resources to address international problems.

There is support for this proposition in the literature on regional integration and supranationalism in which education was considered to be a direct contributor to increasing support for supranational political activity (Haas, 1970; Puchala, 1973). Undoubtedly, increasing education both clarifies the transnational nature of solutions to problems which trouble postwar Western Europe, and it opens access to vocations which require travel among neighboring Europeans and dealing with international issues. The more educated have both a greater opportunity to know neighboring nationals first-hand and a greater need to be aware of region-wide commonalities and problems.

Thus, increasing education should lead to greater support for Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation. These two hypotheses divide Atlantic cooperation into its two conceptual dimensions with education appearing to have an opposite effect on each. These hypotheses can be stated as follows:

H.5 Increased education will result in lower support for Atlantic military cooperation.

H.6. Increased education will result in greater support for Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation.

Partisanship and Ideology

Partisan politics in Western Europe over the past two decades have shed all pretenses that the future holds an end to ideological conflict. These years have been a period

of dramatic political change and struggle. While theorists at one point predicted an era of consensual politics and an end to ideology (Bell, 1960), concerns are now with partisan realignment and dealignment and a crisis of liberal democracy (Beer, 1982; Dalton et al., 1984; Habermas, 1973). Parties and programmatic differences remain at the center of politics in Western Europe.

As the focus shifts from social variables to political influences in this section, the first two political attributes will be considered together. The concepts of partisanship (political party identification) and ideology (placement on the left-right spectrum) are closely linked in West European politics where, unlike the United States, parties occupy clear ideological positions. The Social Democrats (SPD) of West Germany, the Socialist parties of France (PSF) and Italy (PSI), and the Labour Party in Britain are obviously parties of the Left as are the Communist parties of France (PCF) and Italy (PCI), also. On the Right are the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) of West Germany (habitual coalition partners), the Christian Democrats of Italy (CDI), the Conservative Party in Britain, and the Union for French Democracy (UDF) and the Rally for the Republic (RPR) in France. There are also centrist parties: in Britain the Liberals and the new Social Democrats (SDP), in West Germany the Free Democrats (FDP), and in France and Italy several

smaller parties attempting to occupy the political center, but given the polarized ideological political culture of these two nations, the center holds little attraction for the French and Italian electorates.

All of this is in sharp contrast to parties in the United States. Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats routinely blur any ideological meaning to American party labels, and the nominating systems are such that candidates and office holders need not ever answer to the party organization at all (Ladd, 1978; Eldersveld, 1982). Although it is common to say that the United States has two centrist parties, in reality it has two parties both to the right of center. There has never been any Socialist tradition (much less Communist) in American political culture.

There is mounting evidence that stable party loyalties in West European nations are declining. The Greens in West Germany threaten to split the Left at the same time that the conservative parties are losing popularity. It is not clear whether the Alliance Party in Britain, a loose joining of the Liberals and Social Democrats that received 26% of the vote in 1983, will become a major political party or will fade away. Despite its 1986 electoral victory, the coalition on the Right in France remains split and holds power by only a slim margin, and the Christian Democrats in Italy together with the Socialists continue to govern in what is the most fragile of coalitions. Analysts write specifically

of party realignment in West Germany (Dalton, 1984) and Italy (Barnes, 1984), along with party dealignment in Britain (Alt, 1984) and a stalled electorate in France (Lewis-Beck, 1984).

There are also indications that the traditional socio-psychological bonds between voters and parties are weakening. The May Revolts in France, the antiwar marches in Germany, the CND in Britain, and the continued strength of the Italian Communists reflect a new political agenda, an agenda of the New Politics that has stimulated new political conflict over the past two decades. In addition, the 1970s and early 1980s increasingly have witnessed the emergence of a conservative counterattack around the issues raised by the New Left during the 1960s. A New Right has surfaced in many countries to reassert traditional values as reflected in movements against abortion, women's rights, gay rights, and life-style issues. Many nations have experienced the growth of private church schools and mass political assaults on the welfare state, usually through efforts to reduce spending and taxation. "The New Left has drawn disproportionate support from the new middle class, while the New Right has attracted various blue-color and previously apolitical Fundamentalists" (Dalton et al., 1984:4).

These shifting issues and alignments serve to confuse traditional partisan and ideological formulas complicating the research task at hand, which is to identify relationships between partisan identities and views toward Atlantic

cooperation. Historically, pro-Atlanticist sympathies were to be found in greatest abundance among social democratic politicians and parties. The Left, unlike its conservative opponents, possessed no lingering imperial ambitions following World War II. In Britain, it was the Labour administration of Prime Minister Clement Atlee and his Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that took the lead in opening the way for American reentry into Western Europe and in supporting the American-led action in Korea. Also, "the left of center politicians of the French Fourth Republic were veritable Americanophiles compared to the right of center de Gaulle who followed them" (Haseler, 1983:3).

This historical insight provides a sharp backdrop for what appears to be the complete rejection of Atlanticism by the modern European Left. Concerned observers in the United States question the commitment to NATO and Atlantic cooperation of leaders such as Britain's Michael Foot and Neal Kinnock of the Labour Party, and Germany's Hans-Jochen Vogel and Johannes Rau of the SPD.

That these quite valid questions can be put is, in itself, an interesting revelation. Imagine a serious observer asking the same question some time ago about Britain's Bevin and Gaitskell, or Germany's Schmidt and Ollenhaur, or France's Defferre and Mollet. (Haseler, 1983:3)

The reasons for this shift are many and varied and beyond the scope of this section. For now the intent is to form hypotheses for the correlational analyses of this chapter. In regard to Britain, the Conservatives take a

pro-NATO position on almost all aspects of the Atlantic Alliance and nuclear defense while a clear majority of Labour supporters take an anti-NATO line on many defense issues. Supporters of the Liberal/SDP Alliance usually position themselves between those of the two established parties (Crewe, 1985). French opinion is not as defined as British, there being a large percentage of "don't know" type of responses, but the data from Fritsch-Bournazel (1985) indicate that the parties of the Right, the UDF and the RPR, tend to be more supportive of NATO and pro-American than their opponents on the Left. The pattern is the same for West Germany (Rattinger, 1985) and Italy (Rossi, 1985).

The focus of this study, however, is broader. The conclusions just cited were derived from analyses of individual survey items of very specific policy questions. The attitudes represented by the concept used here of Atlantic cooperation are more fundamental and include components on collective security policy, collective economic policy, collective foreign policy, the EEC, trust for the United States, support for a politically unified Western Europe, NATO, and national defense. This complex attitudinal construct should avoid being affected by opinions on hot and timely policy debates and tap into the underlying beliefs instead.

Nonetheless, as indicated by the studies cited above, it can be expected that European attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation will follow party lines in the same manner.

Issues of anti-Americanism and NATO were a matter of party conflict in the 1983 British and West German elections; and in Britain, they were second only to unemployment in importance to voters, and they were the most prominent of all issues in the media coverage of the campaigns (Crewe, 1985:58). Interesting, however, is the fact that these issues received no attention in the 1986 French election.

Additionally, the effects of these political variables should exceed those of the social variables discussed previously. Parties are mobilizing institutions, equipped and intended to educate and recruit supporters to a particular ideological or programmatic line. Also, people cannot change their age, rarely change their educational level, and only very slowly change their social class if at all. For these reasons, it is expected that these political influences of party and ideology will reflect stronger relationships with Atlantic attitudes than the social variables of generation, education, and class. This may not be the case for Postmaterialists values which should be as pliable as these political influences.

The hypothesis regarding these two political variables is as follows:

H.7 Among partisan and ideological identities: those on the Left will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; those associated with the Right will have the highest; and those in the Center will

have some level of support midway between the Left and the Right.

Political Participation

Political participation refers to citizen involvement in political activity. It would be expected that such participation would be relatively high in Western Europe with its systems of mass education, virtual 100% literacy, and active media, and the proliferation of adult participant groups in addition to established political parties. Examples of these alternative political groups are labor unions in Britain and France, citizen initiative groups in West Germany, and groups affiliated with the Catholic Church in Italy. On a broader basis, the urban setting of Western Europe constitutes an environment for development of a high level of participation. These multiple avenues of mass interaction and compact settlement patterns work against the isolation of any sizeable societal segment and promote political action.

Yet not all Europeans participate equally. Education levels vary considerably, and the level at which the public is encouraged to participate in political governance varies from nation to nation. Expectations of system responsiveness, individual perceptions of efficacy, personal wealth, along with the level of education have all been shown to affect the likelihood and amount of political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978).

In addition to the changes in the political agenda and partisan alignments discussed previously, another broad area of change involves the style of political participation. There is an increased desire for participation that extends into new avenues that include a greater acceptance for unconventional participation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Greater public participation in political decision-making has become an important social goal and political reality. This development is closely tied to the spread of protest movements, citizen action groups, and unconventional participation in the 1960s and 1970s, but it involves more. In general, "citizens are less likely to be passive subjects and more likely to insist on being participants in the decisions that effect their lives" (Dalton et al., 1984:4).

This increased political participation has affected security and foreign policy decision-making. Public reaction to official policy is no longer acquiescent, but rather is questioning and challenging of the doctrines and the elites who make them. Antiwar protest movements have existed now for a quarter of a century, changing their focus from Vietnam, to nuclear weapons, to nuclear energy, and finally to the fundamentals of NATO and Western collective security (Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983). Who participates? What is the connection between political activism and attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation? These are the questions being asked here.

Observers of American politics have noted that levels of participation are related to extreme ideological positions (Ladd, 1978). Those citizens most likely to vote, assist with campaigns, and become involved with political movements tend to be considered ideologues rather than pragmatists. The results have been substantial in that with low voter turnouts for primary elections and little interest in local party politics, the ideologues have a disproportionate amount of political influence. This phenomenon has been credited with the nomination of ideological candidates such as McGovern and Goldwater. It has also enabled campaign organizations to be "captured" by ideological activists whose views are not representative of the public at large.

Similar trends can be expected for Western Europe with one distinction. The participation of interest here is that of protest movements and other unconventional types of participation; these appear to be one-sided in Europe. Naturally, there are no demonstrations in favor of war or nuclear weapons or even in support of nuclear deterrence or NATO. The activists appear to be largely all on the anti-American side leading to the hypothesis that political activism is associated with opposition to Atlantic cooperation. If, as in the case of the United States, political activists have opportunities and capabilities to have a disproportionate effect on politics and policy, then this

relationship is potentially significant. This hypothesis can be stated as follows:

H.8 Increased political participation is associated with lower support for Atlantic cooperation.

National Identity

Western Europe does not possess a common will, does not speak with one voice, does not have a clear idea of its identity and goals, and does not pursue a single foreign policy in its own collective interest (Barzini, 1983:23). The histories and characters of the separate nations persist and in large measure have arrested further steps toward the political unification of Western Europe into a solid whole. The analytical task here is to determine the extent to which national identity is an independent influence on European attitudes. Do the British view foreign policy matters fundamentally differently than the French, and so on?

The hypotheses about social and political variables discussed above are made as universal statements, applying across nations. The expectation is that similar patterns of relationships will be found in all or most of the countries observed. These individual attributes, as with those in the Barnes and Kaase study, "can be expected to be relatively invariate across political systems" (1979:20). According to Przeworski and Teune: "Most recent comparative studies of political behavior seem to discover that relationships among

individual attitudes are the same regardless of political system" (1970:43).

The existence of universal relationships between variables does not mean that the frequencies of variable characteristics are the same for different political systems. For example, if Postmaterialist values are found to contribute to attitudes that oppose Atlantic cooperation in all four of the countries in this study, substantially different levels of both Postmaterialism and anti-Atlantic sentiment might be found in these nations as well. The question is whether the different levels of support for Atlantic cooperation are best explained by the different levels of Postmaterialism (along with the other individual attributes) or by the different national identities. The extent to which it is the latter represents the systemic differences that are attributable to national cultural influences.

Chapter III provides some indication of how the separate national populations view Atlantic cooperation. Table 3-4 shows that the West Germans have the highest support for both military and nonmilitary cooperation, and the French have the lowest for both. Italians support nonmilitary and oppose military cooperation, while the British support military and oppose nonmilitary cooperation. Whether these national differences are independent effects or the result of varying levels of the individual attributes

will be determined by multivariate techniques using national identity as an analytic variable.

Any hypothesis of the effects of national identity relative to the individual attributes must be speculative. There are no previous studies of this nature to serve as guides. The differences between the nations observed in Table 3-4 appear too large to be accounted for by variations in social and political attributes, which leads to the following hypothesis:

H.9 National identity is a stronger influence on European attributes than are the social and political attributes.

Summary

This section has uncovered some of the major political trends in Western Europe, and it has tried to relate these trends to the foreign policy issues of Atlantic cooperation. In some cases there is a clear theoretical connection and hypotheses can be made with confidence. In other areas there are no signals, the hypotheses are tentative, and perhaps no relationships will be found. The linkages between generational influences, Postmaterialism, and the new middle class were discussed above, and care must be taken to avoid making spurious conclusions. Education may be linked to these as well. As hypothesized, the young, better educated members of the new middle class, along with those identifying with the left of the political spectrum,

constitute the constituency most likely to oppose Atlantic cooperation. This is the same segment of society according to Inglehart (1977) and Dalton (1984), most likely to hold Postmaterial and New Politics values. If the relationships between these attributes and Atlantic Cooperation are supported empirically as hypothesized, then anti-Atlantic attitudes can be included in the broader phenomenon of Postmaterialism and New Politics attitudes. This would be a substantial connection with many implications.

Each of the hypothesized relationships portend difficulties for trans-Atlantic relations. Intergenerational population replacement contributes to eventual societal level value change as the process continues and to the extent that younger cohorts develop new anti-Atlantic values. The extent to which Postmaterialism is linked to anti-Atlanticism magnifies this generational effect. Some segments of society may be better placed within the polity to influence foreign policy decision-making; specifically, the better educated and the politically active, which are hypothesized to have low levels of Atlantic cooperation. Additionally, certain parts of society may provide strong mobilizing identities that can be translated into considerable political influence through voting and other means of participation. For example, political parties and social classes may act as these mobilizing agents, and to the extent that established parties or distinct classes take up an anti-Atlantic agenda, the implications for the Alliance

would be substantial. Table 4-1 lists each of the hypotheses discussed above.

Methods of Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effects of social, political, and national influences on the attitudes of mass publics in Western Europe toward Atlanticism. This will be approached by first considering the various attributes discussed above separately, for the European sample as a whole as well as for individual national samples; and second, by examining the attributes simultaneously, adjusting for their effect on each other, and attempting to develop a multivariate causal model.

The analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques are appropriate for these purposes. It is a method for comparing the means of several groups within a categorical variable. ANOVA is designed to test the statistical significance of the differences among a set of group means on an interval scale. If there is sufficient evidence, then the sizes of the differences between the means can be estimated (Agresti and Agresti, 1979). The analysis is similar in logic to making inferences in multiple regression except that the residuals in regression analysis are measured as deviations from the regression line, whereas the residuals in analysis of variance are measured as deviations from the group means (Iversen and Norpoth, 1976).

TABLE 4-1

HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
DETERMINANTS AND ATTITUDES

H.1 Among generations: the postwar generation will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; the prewar generation will have the highest; and the WW II/Cold War generation will have some level of support between the other two.

H.2 West Germany will have the largest range of intergenerational attitudinal differences; Britain will have the lowest; and France and Italy will have intergenerational differences at ranges between those of West Germany and Britain.

H.3 Postmaterialists will have lower support for Atlantic cooperation than will Materialists.

H.4 Among classes: the new middle class will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; the bourgeois middle class will have the highest; and the working class will have some level of support between the other two.

H.5 Increased education will result in lower support for Atlantic military cooperation.

H.6 Increased education will result in greater support for Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation.

H.7 Among partisan and ideological identities: those associated with the Left will have the lowest level of support for Atlantic cooperation; those associated with the Right will have the highest; and those in the center will have some level of support between the Left and the Right.

H.8 Increased political participation is associated with lower support for Atlantic cooperation.

H.9 National identity is a stronger influence on European attitudes than are the social and political attributes.

The interval dependent variables in this analysis will be the two scales developed in Chapter III: the Atlantic military cooperation scale and the Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation scale; the categorical independent variables will be each of the eight discussed in the previous section. The null hypothesis (H_0) in ANOVA is that the group means of the categorical variable are equal. For example, to determine if the effects of social class influence attitudes toward Atlantic military cooperation, the mean scale scores for each of the three classes (the categorical groups) would be tested against the null hypothesis that they are equal.

The F statistic is used to test the statistical significance of the differences in means.² The F statistic generates the attained significance level. For example, if a large F value produced an attained significance level of .032, it would be reported as $p=.032$. (Or it could be reported as $p<.05$, if .05 is the criterion.) A significance level is interpreted as the probability that a difference between the sample means at least as large as the observed difference would have occurred if the population means were really equal.

Selecting the significance level to be used as the criterion for evaluating empirical research is based on the type of study being conducted. Most researchers select the .05, .01, or .001 levels of significance in assessing their research results (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981). The level of significance can be interpreted as the probability of

rejecting a null hypothesis that is true (Type I error). In cases where such an error would have severe practical consequences, the significance level should be minimized, to perhaps the .001 level. However, the probability of accepting a false null hypothesis (Type II error) would then be proportionately increased (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981). For the purposes of this study, proper balance between these types of errors is best provided by the .05 significance level which will be the criterion used.

Statistical significance, however, does not always equate to substantive importance. The two must be considered separately. The SPSSx routine that performs analysis of variance, in addition to providing F statistics and the corresponding significance levels, also generates a multiple classification analysis (MCA) table. This table prints the deviations from the mean for each category of the variables entered into the analysis. These deviations are sometimes termed "treatment effects." However, when comparing the effects of an independent variable on two or more scales with different ranges, unstandardized deviations have no frame of reference with which to assess the separate effects. For this reason, individual scale scores will be converted to z-scores by subtracting the grand mean from the individual score and dividing by the standard deviation of the scale. As a result, the entries in the MCA tables will be standard deviations. Thus, the category means expressed

as standard deviations will convey the magnitude of the effect of each category within an independent variable (Andrews et al., 1973). This should be particularly useful for separating statistical significance from substantive importance. This procedure will be necessary for the European sample as well as for each of the national samples for cross-national comparisons.³

The eta statistic can also assist with determining substantive as opposed to statistical significance. Eta is a bivariate measure of association produced by the SPSSx ANOVA routine for each of the independent variables. It is a correlation coefficient interpreted the same as Pearson's r , and the square of eta indicates the proportion of variance explained by a given categorical variable apart from the effects of the other variables (SPSSx User's Guide, 1983). In this way, the square of eta is identical to the square of Multiple R.

The discussion up to this point has been of the one-way ANOVA procedure which is used to analyze the relationships between the mean of an interval dependent variable and the levels of a single categorical variable. It is also intended in this chapter to perform this type of analysis while simultaneously controlling for the effects of one or more of the independent variables and in this way develop a multivariate causal model.

There are inherent difficulties in establishing causation among variables. Asher (1983) specifies

three conditions that must be met in order to infer the existence of a causal relationship between two variables X and Y. The first is that there must be covariation between X and Y, and the second condition is that there must be a time ordering between the two. According to Asher:

These two conditions are not very troublesome for we can often measure covariation and observe or impose a temporal sequence between two variables. The third condition is more problematic, requiring the elimination of other possible causal factors that may be producing the observed relationship between X and Y. (1983:12)

In other words, this third condition requires that we rule out all other possible causal factors. There being a potentially infinite universe of other possible causal variables, this condition would seem to be a paralyzing obstacle; however, Blalock argues: "No matter how elaborate the design, certain simplifying assumptions must always be made. In particular, we must at some point assume that the effects of confounding factors are negligible" (1964:26). Asher (1983) calls this proceeding on an "as if" basis--"as if" confounding variables presented no problems.

The ANOVA method also enables the effects of two or more independent categorical variables to be taken into account simultaneously, while adjusting for each other. The MCA table of standard deviations is produced for the groups within the independent variables, and the values displayed are adjusted (controlled) for the effects of all of the other variables. The adjusted values show the effect of a certain category within a given variable after the variation

due to all of the other variables has been taken into account. In this way, the third condition of causation, that of considering all of the other causes of variation, can be addressed. Obviously, this still falls short of considering all possible causes, but the utility of a multivariate mode in sorting out relative effects should surpass that of a series of bivariate relationships, as in previous studies.

Other statistics are provided by the SPSSx ANOVA routine that assist with this multivariate analysis. Rather than the eta statistic, beta coefficients are produced for each of the independent variables entered in the model. As used here, beta is a statistic associated with the adjusted category effects for each independent variable. It is a standardized coefficient that is interpreted in the same sense as when used in multiple regression (SPSSx User's Guide, 1983).⁴ Additionally, the multiple R is provided. Just as in multiple regression, this R can be squared to indicate the variance in the dependent variable accounted for by all of the variables entered in the model.

Missing data will be handled in different ways. In most cases the mean for a variable can be substituted. However, for variables such as party and class, cases with missing values will be lost because of the nominal nature of the data. When running analyses for separate nations, the mean values of variables must be recomputed for each national sample and the data recoded as necessary.

It will also be necessary to test for interaction. This exists when the strength of association between two variables varies according to the levels of a third variable. This would create spurious relationships if it exists. The SPSSx routine provides for this by creating interaction terms as the products of the independent variables, and producing F statistics and probability levels to test the null hypothesis that interaction does not exist.

This section has discussed the two methods and the various statistics and tests to be used in the analysis of the effects of various influences on attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. The one-way and two-way analysis of variance are the technical procedures to be used. The F statistic will provide for tests of statistical significance, and the eta statistic will indicate the strengths of the bivariate associations. For multivariate analysis, beta coefficients and multiple R squared will be used to assess the explanatory power of the causal models.

Findings and Analyses

Data

To examine the effects of the social, political, and national influences on European attitudes toward Atlanticism the survey Eurobarometer 14, (October, 1980) was used once again. It was chosen as before because among the Eurobarometers it contains the largest selection of foreign

policy items, and because it was used in Chapter III to construct the two scales, Atlantic military cooperation and Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation, which will be the dependent variables for this analysis. Again, the four European nations of interest are: Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy.

To briefly review the scales, Atlantic military cooperation is a Likert summative scale created from five variables: NATOESS, NATOSPT, SCTYPOL, DEFPRI, and TRUSTUS. The range of responses is from 1 to 7 for each item and from 5 to 35 for the scale with the higher scores indicating higher support for military cooperation. The nonmilitary cooperation scale is constructed from four items: EECMEM, UNIEUR, ECPOL, and FORPOL. The range of responses on these items is also 1 to 7, and for the scale it is from 4 to 28 with the higher scores indicating higher support for nonmilitary cooperation. Each of these variables are summarized in Table 3-1, and more specific comments on the actual scale construction and statistical tests for reliability are also contained in Chapter III.

The independent variables are the social and political attributes and national identity, which were discussed in the previous section. The specific empirical operationalization of each will now be examined. To create the generational categories, respondents were grouped according to their age in the following manner:

Postwar generation - age below 30 (birth year after
1950)

WW II/Cold War gen - ages 30-55 (birth years 1925 to 1950)

Prewar generation - age above 55 (birth year before 1925).

The value orientation variable for measuring Postmaterialism was constructed from responses to two questions. The first is: "There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of these you, yourself, would consider the most important in the long run?"

- (1) maintaining order in the nation
- (2) giving people more say in important government decisions
- (3) fighting rising prices
- (4) protecting freedom of speech.

The second question listed the same responses as above but asked respondents to choose which would be the second most important goal. Those respondents selecting responses 1 or 3 on the first question and again 1 or 3 on the second questions were coded Materialists. Respondents selecting 2 or 4 on the first question, and again 2 or 4 on the second were coded Postmaterialists. Any other combination was coded mixed or neither. In this way the New Politics or Postmaterialist agenda of higher level new issues is contrasted with that of the Old Politics of economics and order. For a detailed discussion of this variable see

Inglehart (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics.

Class cleavages were operationalized using occupation of the head of the family. The category labeled working class includes the respondents who classified themselves as manual workers. The new middle class consists of those who identified themselves as white collar. And the bourgeois middle class included the occupations of: professionals, business-owners, and top management, executives. Some categories were not included in the analysis, such as, farmers, retired, housewives, students, soldiers, and the unemployed. An alternative measure would have been to use the occupation of the respondents themselves, but this produced almost 50% missing data because housewives and students were not included. Additionally, it probably does not give as clear a picture of class status for many respondents as does the item asking for occupation of the head of the household.

The survey item used for education in the Eurobarometers asks respondents their age upon completing full-time education. This makes it difficult to construct precise categories based upon the completion of specific types of schools because of cross-national and individual variations in the age of entry into the school system. Nonetheless, categories were imposed based upon the traditional European educational system and labels attached to represent different schools as follows:

Primary--up to 14 years old

Middle--15 to 16 years old

High School--17 to 19 years old

College--20 years and above.

The category "still studying" was not included in the analysis because there was no way to predict when the respondent would finish. The levels listed above coincide with natural breaking points in the frequency distributions across the years for the four nations.

Partisanship was determined by responses to the following question: "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?" Small, fringe parties were not included in the analysis because of their small sample size and their uncertain ideological alignments. Also, responses of "other party" and "don't know" were not included.

Respondents were categorized in regard to political ideology based on their answer to the question which asks them to place themselves on the political spectrum. They were presented with a 10-point scale with 1 being far left and 10 being far right. The responses were collapsed to form three discrete categories:

Left--responses 1 to 4

Center--responses 5 and 6

Right--responses 7 to 10.

The political participation variable was formed by combining two survey items. The first was "When you,

yourself, hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, or follow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen often, from time to time, or rarely?"

- (1) often
- (2) from time to time
- (3) rarely
- (4) never.

The second question was "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?"

- (1) frequently
- (2) occasionally
- (3) never.

Respondents who selected responses 1 or 2 on the first question and 1 on the second were coded "activists." All others were coded "nonactivists." This variable is derived from a constructed index within the ICPSR data labeled "cognitive mobilization." While it does not tap into specific behaviors, such as, protests, campaigns, or demonstrations, it does provide a reasonable functional equivalent to identify those respondents most likely to participate actively in politics, both by conventional and unconventional means.

Effects of Social and Political Attributes

Among the four social variables, the value orientations of Materialism and Postmaterialism have the greatest effect on Atlantic attitudes. As Table 4-2 shows, close to one standard deviation separates the group means for Postmaterialists and Materialists on military cooperation. In regard to nonmilitary cooperation the relationship is not as strong but it is still evident. Postmaterialists clearly oppose Atlantic cooperation in any form as was hypothesized earlier (H.3).

The substantive importance of the relationship between Postmaterialism and Atlantic attitudes requires careful interpretation. While the statistical indicators show it to be significant and relatively large ($\eta = .21$ for military cooperation), the percentage of the sample identified with the Postmaterialist group is less than 10% of the whole. This small percentage is unable to directly effect the outcomes of elections and policies by itself. However, to the extent that Postmaterialists are the political activists and demonstrators, those who capture the media's attention and the headlines, then perhaps this small group possesses political importance disproportionate to its size. Additionally, Postmaterialist theory attributes generational change as one of the main sources of value change. To the extent that this process takes place and continues, the overall percentage of Postmaterialists and their political strength should increase (Inglehart, 1977).

TABLE 4-2

EFFECTS OF SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES
(Generation, Values, Class, and Education)

	<u>N</u>	<u>Military Cooperation</u>	<u>Nonmilitary Cooperation</u>
<u>GENERATION</u>			
Postwar	1159	-.16	-.02
WW II/Cold War	1936	.01	.01
Prewar	1121	.14	.00
eta		.12	.02
p <		(.01)	(.01)
<u>VALUES</u>			
Postmaterialist	365	-.56	-.09
Neither/mixed	2105	.05	-.04
Materialist	1764	.18	.07
eta		.21	.06
p <		(.01)	(.01)
<u>CLASS</u>			
Working	1258	-.00	-.18
New Middle	985	-.00	.11
Bourgeois	789	.01	.17
eta		.00	.16
p <		(.27)	(.01)
<u>EDUCATION</u>			
Primary	1507	-.02	-.07
Middle	1151	.20	-.15
High School	809	-.10	.15
College	520	-.22	.28
eta		.14	.16
p <		(.01)	(.01)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the mean for each attitudinal scale. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results were produced by One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient. Results are from four nations: Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. Samples weighted to reflect national populations.

The generational effects are not as strong, yet the relationship is as hypothesized for military cooperation with the younger cohorts having less support than the older ones (Table 4-2). For nonmilitary cooperation there are no substantial differences between the generational categories ($\eta = .02$), so age is not a factor in forming attitudes toward the EEC, an Atlantic economic policy, and foreign policy. The findings on military cooperation support the Successor Generation literature and the hypothesis discussed previously (H.1).

The extent to which the intergenerational differences are in fact generational changes and not life-cycle effects will indicate future difficulties for Alliance cohesion. As intergenerational population replacement occurs, the level of support for Atlantic cooperation can be expected to decrease. The various effects of generation, life-cycle, and period effects will be examined separately in a later chapter to determine which, if any, predominates.

The effects of class are more prominent for nonmilitary cooperation than military (Table 4-2). The differences between classes are not even statistically significant on the military cooperation scale ($p < .27$). The working class displays the lowest support for nonmilitary Atlantic cooperation. This does not support the hypothesis (H.4) discussed earlier in which it was proposed that the new middle class would have the lowest level of support for Atlanticism. The hypothesis was based on Dalton's (1984) assertion

that the New Politics and Postmaterialist values are associated mostly with the new middle class. While that may be true, Postmaterialists account for less than 10% of the sample, while the new middle class represents about a third of the population (32%). This leaves sufficient room within the new middle class for other views to predominate. This class is not opposed to Atlantic cooperation. The working class opposition may be a reflection of the ethnocentrism and distrust for other nationalities stemming from little contact or knowledge of others. The bourgeois middle class, as hypothesized, has the most support for Atlantic cooperation.

Educational levels have opposite effects on the two scales (Table 4-2). Higher education produces less support for military cooperation and more support for nonmilitary cooperation. These findings verify H.5 and H.6. The strength of the effects of education on the two scales is about equal ($\eta = .14$ and $.16$, respectively) which contrasts with the other three variables in which effects are usually higher on one scale or the other. In regard to the attitude typology, based on the signs of the deviations, respondents with higher education would be classified as Dovish Partners, those of the middle school level would be Military Allies, and those with the least education would be Isolationists. In overall terms of sample distribution, statistical significance, combined effects on both scales,

and the strength of eta, education may have the most substantial effects on attitudes.

Thus, the effects of social attributes vary for the two dimensions. In regard to military cooperation, the postwar generation, Postmaterialists, and the better educated have the lower levels of support (with class not being a discriminator). For nonmilitary cooperation, it is the working class and the less educated who are the opponents (age and values not discriminating; eta = .02 and .06, respectively). These two images seem to fit together well in that higher education, Postmaterialism, and the postwar generation, tend to be treated as overlapping influences in the literature on New Politics and value change. Similarly, the working class would be expected to have less education, so those effects overlap as well.

Table 4-3 displays the effects of political attributes on Atlantic attitudes. Political ideology is related to military cooperation even more strongly than Postmaterialism. The relationship between political ideology and military cooperation is the strongest of all the social and political bivariate relationships (eta = .34). Unlike the Postmaterialist group, those on the Left and the Right each account for about 25% of the sample, so these group differences are substantively more meaningful as well. One cannot conclude, however, that polarization has occurred, because about 50% of the sample places itself in the political Center, between the Left and the Right. The political Left

TABLE 4-3

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES
(Ideology and Participation)

	<u>N</u>	<u>Military Cooperation</u>	<u>Nonmilitary Cooperation</u>
<u>IDEOLOGY</u>			
Left	1186	-.54	-.15
Center	2026	.15	.01
Right	1022	.30	.14
eta		.34	.11
p <		(.01)	(.01)
<u>PARTICIPATION</u>			
Activist	528	-.12	.07
Nonactivist	3706	.02	-.01
eta		.05	.03
p <		(.01)	(.01)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the mean for each attitudinal scale. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results are produced by the One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient. Results are from four nations: Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. Samples weighted to reflect national populations.

strongly opposes military cooperation and also opposes nonmilitary cooperation, though not as strongly. These effects support the hypothesis H.7.

The effects of political activism are similar to those of higher education. The political activist tends to oppose military cooperation and support nonmilitary cooperation (Table 4-3). However, the statistical strength of these relationships is weak ($\eta = .05$ and $.03$, respectively). Additionally, the group categorized as activist represents only about 12% of the sample. While this size is similar to that of the Postmaterialists, the activists are not as extreme in their views. Hypothesis H.8 is partially accepted. However, the importance of participation as an influence on Atlantic attitudes must be questioned; this particular measure of participation should be questioned also (see Appendix B for a discussion of the participation variable). As operationalized here, whether one is politically active in Europe is not as useful a predictor of attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation as any of the other variables.

Political party identification will be examined later in the discussion of cross-national comparisons. It was not feasible to include it in this section on the European sample, because of the varieties of party systems in these countries.

The social and political characteristics just discussed are illustrated within the attitude typology in Figure 4-2.

	Support Military Coop Oppose Nonmil Coop	Support Military Coop Support Nonmil Coop
Generation Values Class Education Participa Ideology	<p>MILITARY ALLIES</p> <p>Neither/mixed</p> <p>Middle School</p> <p>Nonactivists</p>	<p>ATLANTICISTS</p> <p>Older Generations</p> <p>Materialist</p> <p>Bourgeois Middle Class</p> <p>Center, Right</p>
Generation Values Class Education Participa Ideology	<p>ISOLATIONISTS</p> <p>Postwar Generation</p> <p>Postmaterialists</p> <p>Working Class</p> <p>Primary School</p> <p>Left</p>	<p>DOVISH PARTNERS</p> <p>New Middle Class</p> <p>High School, College</p> <p>Activists</p>
	Oppose Military Coop Oppose Nonmil Coop	Oppose Military Coop Support Nonmil Coop

Note: Categories placed in cells based upon the signs of their scores in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. For example, negative signs on both the Military Cooperation and the Nonmilitary Cooperation scales place a category in the Isolationists cell.

Figure 4-2. Social and political correlates of attitude types.

Attributes were placed into one of the four cells based upon the signs of their scores on the two scales in Tables 4-2 and 4-3. Because the characteristics as illustrated are neither mutually exclusive nor statistically independent, it cannot be determined which are most intimately associated with the four attitudinal classifications. These conclusions are meant to be suggestive only. However, when viewed as "ideal types," general images can be formed for the respondents in each of the cells.

As Figure 4-2 indicates, it is possible to discriminate between the attitude types of the model on the basis of their respective social and political attributes. Atlantists tend to be older, more conservative politically, materialist, and from the bourgeois middle class. The well educated respondents make up the Dovish Partners. These respondents also tend to be more politically active. They have an internationalist perspective but oppose efforts to coordinate defenses or build up militarily. The Isolationists appear to be young, Postmaterialist, and associated with the political Left. But, the Isolationists also draw from the working class and the least educated, illustrating the heterogeneous nature of the category. Those with a middle school education and who are neither Materialists or Postmaterialists comprise the Military Allies, distrustful of international cooperation in most areas except security.

Cross-National Comparisons

The general trends for the social and political effects in the four nations tend to mirror those for the European sample. However, there are some notable exceptions.

Table 4-4 displays the effects of the social attributes by nation. Generational groups have no statistically significant differences in West Germany. Additionally, the generational effects in Britain are about the same as those in France and Italy. These results clearly refute H.2 which hypothesized that the greater the degree of discontinuity in political experiences, the greater the attitudinal differences between generations. That is not the case. A theoretical explanation may be that with the most extreme case of political discontinuity resulting in complete resocialization (as occurred in West Germany), the period effects are felt across all generations for an extended time producing very similar intergenerational attitudinal patterns. The conclusion, nonetheless, is that generational differences are not a factor in West Germany.

This presents a bit of a puzzle. The Successor Generation argument is made most persuasively in regard to the Federal Republic (see especially Szabo, 1983b). Yet, the results here provide no evidence for the importance of generation on West German attitudes toward Atlanticism.

For Britain, France, and Italy, the generational effects are roughly equivalent. There are no significant

TABLE 4-4
 EFFECTS OF SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES,
 BY NATION
 (Generation, Values, Class, and Education)

	<u>FRANCE</u>			<u>WEST GERMANY</u>		
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
<u>GENERATION</u>						
Postwar	300	-.12	.06	253	.03	.01
WWII	421	-.09	-.05	471	.02	.01
Prewar	260	.28	.01	284	-.05	-.03
eta		.17	.05		.03	.02
p <		(.01)	(.32)		(.57)	(.84)
<u>VALUES</u>						
Postmat	112	-.62	.01	82	-.79	-.05
Neither/mixed	454	-.10	.04	497	-.03	.06
Materialists	420	.27	-.05	429	.19	-.08
eta		.28	.04		.26	.06
p <		(.01)	(.43)		(.01)	(.22)
<u>CLASS</u>						
Working	276	-.02	-.16	263	.03	.02
New Middle	268	.01	.09	278	-.02	-.07
Bourgeois	155	.01	.13	172	-.02	.10
eta		.01	.13		.02	.07
p <		(.93)	(.01)		(.83)	(.21)
<u>EDUCATION</u>						
Primary	334	.07	-.14	234	.18	-.02
Middle	165	.13	-.13	373	.07	-.12
High School	268	-.03	.07	223	-.19	.08
College	152	-.26	.33	102	-.25	.28
eta		.13	.18		.16	.13
p <		(.01)	(.01)		(.01)	(.01)

Continued

TABLE 4-4
CONTINUED

	<u>ITALY</u>			<u>BRITAIN</u>		
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
<u>GENERATION</u>						
Postwar	302	-.23	-.04	304	-.18	-.05
WWII	540	.06	.03	504	-.01	.02
Prewar	266	.14	-.02	311	.19	.02
eta		.15	.03		.13	.03
p <		(.01)	(.57)		(.01)	(.54)
<u>VALUES</u>						
Postmat	60	-.81	-.26	111	-.29	.01
Neither/mixed	480	-.19	-.07	674	-.03	-.05
Materialists	568	.25	.09	347	.15	.09
eta		.29	.10		.12	.06
p <		(.01)	(.01)		(.01)	(.14)
<u>CLASS</u>						
Working	266	-.07	-.18	453	-.03	-.19
New Middle	245	.02	.07	194	.01	.24
Bourgeois	262	.09	.12	200	.05	.19
eta		.06	.13		.03	.20
p <		(.20)	(.01)		(.66)	(.01)
<u>EDUCATION</u>						
Primary	622	.01	-.10	317	.07	-.18
Middle	103	.02	.13	510	-.01	-.08
High School	133	-.01	.21	185	.01	.33
College	175	-.03	.13	91	-.19	.41
eta		.01	.13		.07	.21
p <		(.98)	(.01)		(.11)	(.01)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the mean for each attitude scale. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results are produced by the One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient.

differences between generations on the nonmilitary cooperation scale, while in regard to military cooperation, the younger cohorts express the greatest opposition, as was expected (H.1).

The effects of Postmaterialism vary across nations. They appear strongest in Italy and West Germany, the two countries with the smallest percentages of Postmaterialists in the sample. In only Italy are these values statistically significant on the nonmilitary cooperation scale. On military cooperation, Postmaterialism has the least effect in Britain ($\eta = .12$).

The effects of social class are strongest in Britain, where on the nonmilitary cooperation scale $\eta = .20$. Class is not statistically significant in any of the four countries on military cooperation. In West Germany it is not significant for either scale reflecting the extent to which class has declined as a factor in West German society. The strength of the relationship in Britain (at least on nonmilitary cooperation) fits well with traditional generalizations about the class-based nature of British society (Beer, 1982).

The effects of different educational levels produce consistent relationships for all four nations. Higher education results in less support for military cooperation and greater support for nonmilitary cooperation.

To summarize the major findings of this cross-national comparison of social attributes: generational differences

are not statistically significant in West Germany. Among these four variables, the value orientation of Postmaterialism produces the largest deviations in the group means (only on the military cooperation scale), with these being the largest in Italy. Social class is not a discriminator for West German attitudes, but it is a major one for British attitudes on the nonmilitary scale. Because of the more equal distribution of the sample across the educational groups (as compared with Postmaterialism), the effects of education appear to be the most substantively meaningful social variable. The strongest relationship with education is seen in Britain on the nonmilitary cooperation scale ($\eta = .21$), which also surpasses the effects of social class on the nonmilitary scale in Britain.

A final comment on Tables 4-2 and 4-4 is to point out how the data illustrate the varying effects of the social variables on the two scales. The effects of generation and values are primarily directed toward military cooperation while those of class and education are strongest on nonmilitary cooperation. Each pair of variables is reinforcing: the younger cohorts and Postmaterialists oppose military cooperation, while the less educated and working class oppose nonmilitary cooperation. Those are socially distinct groupings. These combinations of effects would be expected from social science theory, and at the same time they indicate a cross-cutting nature to these social attributes. The varying effects of these influences may tend to diffuse

conflict and inhibit polarization. This cross-cutting aspect was discussed in Chapter III as an expected result from a bidimensional structure, and that seems to be confirmed by these data.

Table 4-5 displays the effects of the two political variables for each nation. Ideology is consistently significantly and substantively related to Atlantic attitudes on both scales in all four countries. This relationship is strongest in Italy ($\eta = .42$ on military cooperation). Interestingly, the nation with the smallest range of ideological differences between Left and Right is France. This may not have been expected given the noted ideological nature of the French political culture (Safran, 1977). The explanation may be in a distinction between foreign policy and domestic issues among the French public. Old politics, those traditional economic issues, may be the source of ideological confrontation in France, but in regard to French policy toward other nations, perhaps these data point to a closing of the ranks and a less ideological content to debate. Additionally, France is not part of the military structure of NATO (although still a member of the Alliance); this may have mitigated any ideological debate over military cooperation, since the issue was largely settled by de Gaulle. This finding helps explain the absence of any peace movement in France. In West Germany, Britain, and Italy, attitudes toward foreign policy and Atlanticism appear to be very ideologically oriented.

TABLE 4-5

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES,
BY NATION
(Ideology and Participation)

	<u>FRANCE</u>			<u>WEST GERMANY</u>		
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
<u>IDEOLOGY</u>						
Left	317	-.40	-.22	211	-.52	-.12
Center	361	.20	.13	488	.06	-.01
Right	308	.18	.08	309	.26	.10
eta		.28	.16		.28	.08
p <		(.01)	(.01)		(.01)	(.05)
<u>PARTICIPATION</u>						
Activist	102	-.23	-.10	135	.01	.17
Nonactivist	884	.03	.01	873	-.00	-.03
eta		.08	.04		.00	.07
p <		(.02)	(.27)		(.91)	(.04)
<u>ITALY</u>						
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
<u>IDEOLOGY</u>						
Left	479	-.47	-.25	179	-.46	-.29
Center	518	.32	.14	659	-.01	-.04
Right	111	.55	.43	294	.31	.27
eta		.42	.24		.24	.18
p <		(.01)	(.01)		(.01)	(.01)
<u>PARTICIPATION</u>						
Activist	157	-.15	.01	134	-.24	.14
Nonactivist	951	.03	-.00	998	.03	-.02
eta		.06	.00		.09	.05
p <		(.04)	(.95)		(.01)	(.09)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the mean for each attitudinal scale. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results are produced by the One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient.

The participation variable is the weakest of the six (largest eta is only .09). Activists tend to oppose military cooperation, and on nonmilitary matters, only in Germany is there a statistically significant result where activists tend to support cooperation.

Combining the effects of ideology from Table 4-5 with the partisan comparisons displayed in Table 4-6 allows for several conclusions to be made. Obviously, the political Left opposes Atlantic cooperation and the Right supports it. This evidence allows for H.8 to be accepted. Additionally, the strength of the political effects is considerably greater than the social variables. In regard to partisanship, except for West Germany on the nonmilitary cooperation scale, all correlations are greater than $\eta = .30$, and for Italy, $\eta = .57$ on military cooperation. The Greens in Germany (a very small group) are almost one and a half standard deviations from the mean on military cooperation. This is the largest deviation for any variable in any country. Thus, political variables are a stronger influence on the formation of Atlantic attitudes than are the social variables.

The political parties of the Left offer some provocative comparisons. The British Labour Party, with no alternative on its left, has firmly staked out the anticooperation position on both scales. The West German Social Democrats with the Greens being somewhat of an

TABLE 4-6
EFFECTS OF PARTISANSHIP ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES

<u>FRANCE</u>				<u>WEST GERMANY</u>			
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
PCF	78	-.69	-.68	Greens	38	-1.40	-.40
PSF	256	-.09	.00	SPD	417	-.10	-.06
UDF	116	.40	.35	FDP	109	-.06	.02
RPR	68	.45	.19	CDU/CSU	318	.32	.12
eta		.35	.31	eta		.36	.11
p <		(.01)	(.01)	p <		(.01)	(.01)
 <u>ITALY</u>				 <u>BRITAIN</u>			
	<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mil Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil Coop</u>
PCI	178	-.79	-.61	Labour	398	-.30	-.35
PSI	143	-.23	.08	Liberal	130	-.19	-.00
DCI	313	.55	.31	Tory	379	.38	.37
eta		.57	.40	eta		.33	.33
p <		(.01)	(.01)	p <		(.01)	(.01)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Entries are standard deviations from the mean of zero for each attitude scale for each nation; this precludes precise cross-national comparisons of the cell entries of specific parties. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results are produced by the One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient. Party abbreviations derived as follows: for France: PCF is the French Communist Party, PSF is the French Socialist Party, UDF is the French Union for Democracy, and RPR is the Rally for the Republic (Gaullist). For West Germany: SPD is the Social Democrat Party, FDP is the Free Democrat Party, CDU/CSU is the coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union. For Italy: PCI is the Italian Communist Party, PSI is the Italian Socialist Party, and DCI is the Italian Christian Democrat Party. For Britain: Tory refers to the Conservative Party.

alternative on their left, appear to oppose Atlantic cooperation less stridently, especially in regard to nonmilitary matters. These observations are supported by the campaign rhetoric of 1983 for these two parties. In the French and Italian cases as well, the Socialist parties with legitimate Communist parties to their left seem positioned close to the center of the political spectrum on these attitudinal dimensions within their respective countries. The Italian Socialist Party and perhaps also the French Socialists would be classified Dovish Partners on the typology rather than Isolationist. The foreign policy record of these two parties in government reinforces this finding. Thus, concerning Atlantic cooperation, there are considerable differences between the British Labour Party and the other major parties on the Left in Germany, France, and Italy.

A comment on the French "Gaullists" is necessary. The popular image of the Gaullist Frenchman is that of a nationalist, an independent, a believer in the realist school of power politics of Hans Morgenthau (1978). According to this image, the Gaullist would consider trust and cooperation to be signs of weakness and national naivete. Reviewing Table 3-5 from the previous chapter, the large percentage of Isolationists in France could be interpreted as being part of this Gaullist tradition; however, the data from Table 4-6 show otherwise. The Gaullist party (the RPR) is firmly Atlanticist in outlook, as is the other party on the Right, the UDF. The large percentage of Isolationists in France

comes from the Socialist and Communist parties as Table 4-6 indicates. Isolationism in this case should perhaps not be regarded only as Gaullism but in addition as some form of withdrawal or neutralism, as well.

One observation in Table 4-5 illustrates some remnants of the Gaullist image. In contrast to the other three countries, in France, the respondents in the Center of the political spectrum are more supportive of Atlantic cooperation than those on the Right. This supports the notion of the traditional Gaullist conservative: nationalistic and independent on the Right. However, this association appears to be only an artifact, or a matter of degree, because Table 4-6 is clear in showing the Gaullists and the UDF to be Atlanticist in orientation.

Multivariate Analysis of Effects

The considerable variation across the four nations in regard to the effects of social and political attributes indicates that cross-national differences in general may exist. Different political histories, political cultures, and circumstances may have produced distinctive attitudinal patterns for each of the four countries as hypothesized (H.9). In Table 3-5 of the previous chapter, the percentage distributions among the four attitude types for each nation enabled generalizations to be made about the relative strength of each attitude type within each country.

Table 4-7 contains data that support the earlier conclusions reached in Table 3-5. Again, scale scores for individuals were converted to Z-scores, and the results in the table were produced by the ANOVA technique. The standard deviations from the mean on each scale for each country allow the national samples to be categorized based on the signs of the deviations. In this way the French again appear to be Isolationists, opposing both types of cooperation. The West Germans are Atlanticists, favoring both military and nonmilitary cooperation. The Italians can be labeled Dovish Partners, and the British Military Allies. Compared to the differences between the categories of the social and political variables, national identity is a stronger influence ($\eta^2 = .39$ for military cooperation and $.35$ for nonmilitary).

The results of a multivariate analysis for the European sample are displayed in Table 4-8. The variable NATION (national identity) has also been included, and it appears to have the greatest effect on attitudes toward Atlantic cooperation. Since the beta coefficients entered in the table are standardized values, they represent the relative weights attached to the various independent variables in contributing to the mean of the dependent variable after controlling for all of the other variables.

Ideology is the second strongest influence. Partisanship is not included; however, ideology is a reasonable equivalent in that the previous findings showed ideology and

TABLE 4-7

EFFECTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES

	<u>N</u>	<u>Military Cooperation</u>	<u>Nonmilitary Cooperation</u>
France	986	-.49	-.13
W. Germany	1008	.43	.33
Italy	1108	-.32	.28
Britain	1132	.30	-.54
eta		.39	.35
p <		(.01)	(.01)

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the mean for each attitude scale. Positive scores indicate support for a scale. Results are produced by the One-Way ANOVA procedure, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. The eta statistic is a correlation coefficient.

TABLE 4-8
 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
 NATIONAL EFFECTS ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES

	<u>Military Cooperation</u>	<u>Nonmilitary Cooperation</u>
Generation	.04*	.03*
Values	.16*	.02*
Class	.03*	.06*
Education	.05*	.14*
Ideology	.26*	.16*
Participation	.00	.02*
Nation	.35*	.35*
Multiple R	.52	.41
Multiple R Squared	.27	.17

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

* Significant at .01.

Note: Cell entries are beta coefficients. Results were produced by ANOVA, and the significance levels are based on the F statistic. Interaction was determined to be significant for participation (see Appendix B). Results are from four nations: Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy (N=4234). Samples weighted to reflect national populations.

partisanship to have almost identical effects. Variables that have little or no impact on either scale after adjusting for the other effects are generation, class, and participation. Postmaterialism is strongest on the military cooperation scale and education on the nonmilitary scale.

The effects of nationality are particularly suggestive. Given that these findings were from a weighted European sample with the effects controlled for all variables, national identity far surpasses all other attributes (Table 4-8). This means that there is something about being a Frenchman, or a German, and so on, that produced an independent causal influence on Atlantic attitudes. Italians think differently about foreign policy than do the British, even after controlling for all of these other effects. This supports the notion of distinctive national characters or political cultures. Through socialization, these attitudes are transmitted and reinforced.

Overall, the model has moderate predictive capability. Twenty-seven percent of the variance on the military cooperation scale and 17% on the nonmilitary cooperation scale can be explained by the variables entered into the analysis. Additionally, as discussed above, the relative contribution of the different independent variables varies substantially in accounting for the variance explained. Nationality, political party, ideology, education, and value orientations account for most of the explained variance.

Separate multivariate analyses for each nation are displayed in Table 4-9. Party and ideology are the most consistent and substantial variables in the model. This supports the conclusion that political attributes are more influential in forming Atlantic attitudes than are social attributes. Postmaterialist values tend to be significant in regard to military cooperation and education to nonmilitary cooperation. The beta values for party in the French sample point again to the relatively low partisan nature to these attitudes in France. Generation, class, and participation prove to be uniformly unimportant to forming attitudes on Atlanticism.⁵

Conclusion

The most suggestive finding in this chapter is the weight attributed to nationality in the multivariate analysis of Table 4-8. Perhaps in retrospect this should not be so enlightening given the distinctive histories and cultures represented within these separate nations; however, its magnitude was just not anticipated. Surely, it was hypothesized, explanations for anti-Atlantic sentiment can be found in social and political theories, such as, Postmaterialism, the Successor Generation, class conflict, ideological cleavage, the New Politics agenda, and modernization. While each of these has its independent effect, they are over shadowed by that of nationality.

TABLE 4-9

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS
ON ATLANTIC ATTITUDES, BY NATION

	<u>FRANCE</u> (N=986)		<u>WEST GERMANY</u> (N=1008)	
	<u>Mil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Mil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil</u> <u>Coop</u>
Generation	.07	.04	.05	.02
Values	.20*	.05	.16*	.06
Class	.06	.03	.05	.06
Education	.07	.21*	.13*	.12*
Ideology	.17*	.11*	.16*	.05
Participation	.03	.02	.02	.06
Party	.16*	.19*	.24*	.09
Mult R	.41	.33	.43	.20
Mult R Sqr	.17	.11	.19	.04
	<u>ITALY</u> (N=1108)		<u>BRITAIN</u> (N=1132)	
	<u>Mil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Mil</u> <u>Coop</u>	<u>Nonmil</u> <u>Coop</u>
Generation	.06	.02	.09*	.09*
Values	.19*	.07	.04	.02
Class	.05	.07	.04	.06
Education	.03	.11*	.04	.22*
Ideology	.20*	.12*	.12*	.08*
Participation	.01	.02	.07*	.04
Party	.30*	.24*	.24*	.24*
Mult R	.53	.35	.35	.38
Mult R Sqr	.28	.13	.12	.15

Source: Eurobarometer 14, October 1980.

* Significant to .05.

Note: Cell entries are beta coefficients. Results were produced by ANOVA, and significance levels are based on the F statistic. Interaction was determined to be significant for participation (see Appendix B).

This empirical evidence supports the notion that "Western Europe" as an entity does not exist. In this context Europe means the separate governments and societies of Europe, with their unique attitudes, interests, and priorities in regard to the Atlantic Alliance. "A united Europe does not, of course, exist--only a loose functional confederation, meaning an imperfect common market complemented by certain other activities such as communal listening to the traditional Johann Strauss concerts . . . each New Year's day" (Laqueur, 1979:v).

For the nationality variable to be weaker, national interests would have to converge more. Clearly, respondents view the issues of Atlantic cooperation through the eyes of "Frenchmen," "Italians," and so on, instead of through the eyes of "Europeans." As such, the varying goals, priorities, and interests of these nations are reflected in the attitudes of their populations. For example, given the geographical proximity of the Federal Republic to the Soviet Union and its existence being the result of postwar Allied decisions, it is in the interests of West Germany to be Atlantic in outlook. At the same time, the experiences of Britain with other European countries and the EEC have colored British perceptions negatively in regard to nonmilitary cooperation.

Apart from the effects of nationality, however, other influences are also meaningful. The strength of the partisanship and ideology variables (indicators of modernization)

suggests the extent to which these attitudes are politicized in Europe. The choice of dependent variables in this study was an attempt to avoid "hot" current topics that may be expected to be politicized; however, the broad fundamental constructs used here appear to be ideologically ordered as well. This Left-Right cleavage is notable for its intensity and continuity in all four nations. Two cross-national observations are that the British Labour Party appears to be the most extremely anti-Atlantic party, and the French respondents appear less ideologically inclined toward these issues as might be expected.

The primacy of politics over social processes is evident. Age, class, and education are not the keys to understanding European politics on these foreign policy issues. If the political attributes were surrogates for the social variables, the beta coefficients in Tables 4-8 and 4-9 would have been stronger for the social variables instead of for the political. Political party loyalties and ideological inclinations surpass in importance the social variables.

Unlike the United States, party government in Western Europe provides the electorate with the opportunity to make dramatic shifts in policy. The mechanism by which mass attitudes in Western societies are linked to public policy is the party system (Eldersveld, 1982; Sartori, 1976). Political parties remain the central intermediary structures between society and government. Some of the Old Politics

issues of wages, incomes, and prices have been assumed by corporatist institutions and bargaining (Lehmbruch, 1979); however, the New Politics agenda is controlled by mass movements and political parties. The British Labour Party in 1983 practically pledged itself to unilateral nuclear disarmament, and the SPD in Germany advocated removal of the new missiles. Both parties have moderated these positions somewhat, yet their programmatic orientation is clear as is that of their rank and file as the findings in this chapter indicated. One must conclude that the future election of either of these two parties would place new strains on Alliance cohesion and harmony.

The constituencies evident from the social variables appear to have a cross-cutting effect on these attitudes. The Isolationist category, not large to begin with, contains disparate elements of European society. On the one hand it attracts the postwar generation and the Postmaterialists, a grouping normally associated with the effects of relative affluence, political awareness, and the New Politics agenda. However, the Isolationists also include those with the least amount of education and those in the working class. This would seem to be an unusual combination, but it illustrates the difficulty in generalizing about this category, unlike the others. Additionally, higher education and political activism (indicators of modernization) have the effect of promoting less support for military cooperation but higher support for other types of Atlantic cooperation.

The impact of these attitudes and attributes on national and Alliance policies will be explored in Chapter VII. Next, however, evidence of continuity or change in European Atlantic attitudes will be examined in Chapter V.

Notes

¹The most comprehensive development of the Postmaterialist concept and the value changes associated with it is found in the research of Ronald Inglehart (1972, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, and 1985).

²The F statistic is based on the ratio of the variability of the group means about the overall mean and the variability of the sample observations about their particular group mean. The greater the variability between the group means relative to the variability within each set of group observations, the greater confidence there is that the null hypothesis (that the group means are equal) is false. These two estimates are called the between (groups) estimate and the within (groups) estimate. If H_0 is false, the between estimate tends to be larger than the within estimate and the ratio of the two tends to be considerably larger than one. Hence, large F values lead to small attained significance (or probability) levels (Agresti and Agresti, 1979:419).

³For example, the following table illustrates hypothetical data on two variables. Both are statistically significant at the .05 level; however, the differences between the means of the groups in Variable 1 are substantially greater than those of Variable 2. For this reason one must conclude that the effects of Variable 1 on the dependent variable are considerably greater than those of Variable 2.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF ANOVA

Std. Deviations of Group Means
on the Dependent variable

Variable 1		
Group A	-.75	
Group B	.50	
Group C	.25	
Group D	-.25	
p <		(.05)

Variable 2		
Group X		-.05
Group Y		-.02
Group Z		.06
p <		(.05)

⁴The beta coefficients must be interpreted with caution and are useful only for indicating the relative importance of the various predictors (Andrews et al., 1973:47). Beta provides a measure of the ability of the independent variable to explain variation in the dependent variable after adjusting for the effects of all other predictors. This is not, however, in terms of percent of variance explained as with a standard regression coefficient. The beta statistic as produced here by the MCA analysis of ANOVA is useful only as an approximate measure of the relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable while controlling for all other independent variables.

⁵A comment on the effects of interaction is necessary. Interaction is said to exist when the strength of association between two variables varies according to the levels of a third variable (Agresti and Agresti, 1979). It is not meaningful to consider the differences in means between the levels of a categorical variable, if the levels vary according to the levels of another categorical variable. If interaction exists, apparent effects may be spurious. Several tests were applied to the multivariate model in Tables 4-8 and 4-9, leading to the conclusion that for all variables except participation, interaction was not important. The weak effects attributable to participation can be explained by interaction. The details of these tests are the subject of Appendix B.

CHAPTER V

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

The erosion of popular support for the Atlantic Alliance in Western Europe would profoundly affect international politics. America might retreat into global isolationism or seek to develop stronger ties with the Pacific Basin countries. Soviet influence over Western Europe would certainly increase, especially in the absence of a politically united Europe with its own centralized military command. The result could be a Europe neutralized, Finlandized, or even engulfed at some point within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Such extreme developments seem unlikely. NATO has produced a cluster of permanent institutions and large bureaucracies that have existed and expanded for more than 35 years, acquiring a momentum of their own. It is the first peacetime integrated military structure in history. There are over 300,000 American troops in Europe along with their families and supporting personnel. The British Army of the Rhine is positioned in West Germany. There are NATO publications, NATO conferences, and even NATO colleges and

scholarships. Thus, "the Atlantic Alliance as a set of institutions, budgets, personnel, multilateral political and military councils, and periodic joint maneuvers, is here to stay at least in the near future" (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:2).

Moreover, the Alliance is more than a set of unsentimental calculations of national self-interest. A recurrent theme in the negotiations that preceded the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was the hope that the Alliance would evolve into something more than a "mere military alliance" (Thies, 1986:26). It is "The Alliance" which joins together most of the world's major democracies. It "depends on some amorphous but vital shared ideas about man, government, and society . . . with roots in the hearts as well as in the minds of the partners" (Sloan, 1985:3).

This chapter examines current European public support for the Alliance in light of previous levels. The analytical focus continues to be on broad themes instead of narrow issues. Changes in European support, a decline of Atlantism, may portend future developments which could threaten Alliance cohesion. NATO is, after all, a voluntary pact that can be maintained, renegotiated, or terminated. Intra-Alliance political conditions can change dramatically as when de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military command structure in 1966 (although not out of the Alliance itself). European attitudes will play a key role in

sustaining or altering NATO in the midst of future difficulties or crises.

Assumptions Intrinsic to the Alliance

A framework is necessary to organize this investigation into the change or continuity of European security attitudes. This chapter relies on previously published opinion data, and there have been countless survey questions administered over the years by various polling agencies. The guideposts for this study will be three assumptions fundamental to the establishment of the Alliance. Each will be introduced briefly in the sections that follow.

The Threat From the Soviet Union

The principal assumption upon which NATO was founded was that the Soviet Union posed a military threat to the security of Western Europe. The end of World War II saw a shift in the balance of world power away from Western Europe. After 1945, the dominant continental power was the Soviet Union. Domestic political and economic weakness, primarily in Britain and France, following the war threatened to create a power vacuum in Western Europe into which it was feared Soviet influence would expand and "endanger broader international instability" (Smith, 1984:10).

Soviet policies and perceived intentions provided the political momentum required to bring about the Alliance.

The initial concern of the French following the war was to prevent the military resurgence of Germany; however, the fears aroused by Soviet actions convinced the French government to give up its reservations about Germany (Sloan, 1985). The Soviet installed and dominated regimes in Poland and Romania prompted Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in 1946; and events in Turkey and Greece in 1947 expanded United States involvement in Europe and resulted in the Truman Doctrine. The Soviet backed coup d'etat in Prague in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade and airlift in the summer of 1948 created a sense of "immediate military threat" in Western Europe (Grosser, 1983:85). The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949.

There were two other aspects to this view of the Soviet threat. One was that the threat was global in nature. The Korean War and later events in Indochina prompted this view (Sloan, 1985). The other aspect involved the political-psychological nature of the contest in which it was feared the Soviet Union would attempt to use the fear of war and its consequences to intimidate the countries of Western Europe into positions of accommodation and acceptance of Soviet influence: in other words, political blackmail (Thies, 1986).

This initial assumption of NATO viewed the Soviet Union as a pressing threat to the security of Western Europe because of its preponderance of military power, its global

expansionist designs, and its campaign of domestic political-psychological intimidation.

Collective Security

The view that Soviet power could be balanced only through collective security was another assumption. "The official aim of NATO was a more rational organization of the joint defense efforts" (Grosser, 1982:87). It was to be a multilateral security arrangement with the members pledged to a process of continual self-help and mutual assistance in which the costs and benefits were to be shared equitably (Smith, 1984). United States ground forces were initially intended to provide additional protection to Europe during the difficult years of reconstruction until Europe would be able to protect itself (Stoppa-Liebl and Laqueur, 1985). This was reflected in the ambitious goals that were set for raising European force levels, known as "the Lisbon Goals." These proposals, adopted by NATO ministers at a meeting of the NATO Council in Lisbon, Portugal in 1952, set force goals of 50 allied divisions, 4000 aircraft, and substantial additional targets for future years (Sloan, 1984:16).

Implicit within this notion of multilateralism is that West Europeans have a willingness to defend themselves or at least a willingness to contribute equitably to their security. This includes the acceptance of certain costs and preparations as well as the willingness to use military forces. Theorists recognize the crucial aspect of national

will as a necessary component, along with capability, for successful deterrence (George and Smoke, 1974: Kissinger, 1966).

The opposite of such a willingness is illustrated by what has become known as Finlandization, a concept describing postwar conditions in Finland. It is "a process of a state of affairs in which under the cloak of friendly and good neighborly relations the sovereignty of a nation is reduced" (Laqueur, 1979:233-234). This includes accommodating a nation's foreign policy either to the dictates of the Soviet Union or to what it feels Russia really wants. This accommodation gradually saps the energy of the nation making it no longer able or willing to resist further pressures (Laqueur, 1979). Thus, the creation of NATO assumed the necessity of a collective security effort and that its members valued national sovereignty sufficiently to resist the Soviet Union militarily and politically.

The Role of the United States

An essential part of the collective security policy was the participation and leadership of the United States. Perceiving the need for an American commitment to the defense of Western Europe was the third assumption. Europe's military weakness and inability to defend itself without foreign assistance shaped the character of NATO; it was an Atlantic, not a European alliance. American economic and diplomatic assistance, however, would not be sufficient;

the United States would not only have to join the European defense organization, it would have to take "the leading part in it" (Laqueur, 1982:131).

The decision in Washington to take a leading role in the politics and defense of Western Europe was not made at once, and it was reached with reluctance. The general feeling after the war was to withdraw and cut commitments in Europe as soon and as much as possible (Spanier, 1983). The power vacuum that existed in Western Europe and the precariousness of the situation became evident when British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin informed Washington in February 1947 that Britain could no longer assist Greece and Turkey economically or militarily. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan followed, and eventually America was the leading partner in NATO. Soviet power could be matched only by that of the United States. "The old European equilibrium was replaced by the global balance of power between America and Russia" (Laqueur, 1982:32).

American involvement was very much desired by West European governments. "For the Europeans--primarily the French and the English--NATO was an indirect means of securing a total commitment by the Americans" (Grosser, 1982:87). Initially, this commitment was envisioned to consist of rapid reinforcement and strategic bombing. With the Korean War and the perception of an increased threat, this commitment was expanded to include substantial American ground forces. Finally, Eisenhower's "New Look" policy that

relied on "massive retaliation" by nuclear weapons was incorporated into NATO policy in 1954 (Sloan, 1985; Smith, 1984). Each of these were calculated efforts to make the American commitment appear more credible.

Other assumptions could also be mentioned. For instance, the Alliance was intended to be defensive in outlook, democratic in nature, and regional in scope. However, for the purpose of this chapter, which is to assess changes in public attitudes in regard to some fundamental concepts, the three discussed above are appropriate. These can be summarized as follows:

A.1 The Soviet Union poses a military and political threat to the security of Western Europe, and to other regions as well.

A.2 A collective security policy is the only way to deter and defend against the Soviet threat.

A.3 The United States must be a leading member of the joint defense effort to balance Soviet power.

These assumptions will provide the focus for examining the change or continuity of Western European attitudes.

Goals and Methods

Analyses in the previous two chapters were cross-sectional. The focus was on one time period, 1980, because of the large number of defense and foreign policy questionnaire items contained in the Eurobarometer 14 survey.

Cross-sectional techniques were necessary to observe the

dimensional structure and the various correlates of these attitudes.

The methods for this chapter will be different since the goal is to observe attitudes over time. The available data, however, contain limitations. A comprehensive longitudinal analysis would require comparably stated questions on a wide range of foreign policy and security matters put to the European people of all nations at periodic intervals since the Second World War. Ideally, the data would be available in machine-readable form enabling repeated applications of the statistical techniques of Chapters III and IV. Data meeting these conditions do not exist, as evidenced by the nature of current published empirical research on European attitudes. Most published analyses contain two or three public opinion items obtained from journalistic sources.¹

The method used here, therefore, is to draw from all available sources of survey data in an effort to reach some conclusions on the change or continuity of West European defense beliefs. These sources will include scholarly studies, popular publications, and some machine-readable data sets. One goal is to avoid jumping to far-reaching conclusions on the basis of a few isolated survey results; to this end, multiple supportive or contradictory sources will be sought. This approach runs the risk of including an indiscriminant number of tables and measures of opinion, especially those dealing with specific, current

policies. By concentrating on the assumptions discussed above, any aimless meandering through opinion data should be avoided.

Even within this alternative approach, there are severe limits to the extent to which this chapter can produce a coherent and comparative longitudinal analysis. A sufficient inventory of survey questions from the 1950s and 1960s, and even the 1970s, does not exist. This is in stark contrast to the relative abundance of current data that have become available in the 1980s. In the sixties and seventies national security was largely uncontroversial; there was little public interest or involvement; therefore, there was little incentive to include foreign policy questions in opinion surveys (Flynn and Rattinger, 1985). Additionally, there has been little systematic empirical research on foreign policy related mass attitudes, since the accepted theoretical notion has long been that foreign affairs and international relations are issue areas that are very remote for the average citizen (Rosenau, 1961).

Several technical difficulties must be confronted when using multiple sources of opinion data. Most sources for the earlier polls, such as Gallup and Harris, include no breakdown for the analysis of subgroups by age, education, and so on. Often the sample size is not given, decreasing the confidence with which inferences can be made about the population from the sample. The "don't know" responses are treated differently in different sources: sometimes they

are displayed, often they are not, and at other times the substantive responses are repercentaged after subtracting the "don't knows" from the N. There is little use of filter questions to determine the familiarity of respondents with the issues. For instance, respondents may have never heard of the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces), ERW (Enhanced Radiation Weapon), or the "dual-track" decision. Finally, authors vary in their presentations of data; for example, some display partial results, such as indexes of percentage differences rather than the actual cell percentages and counts.

Plotting trends in these attitudes over time presents the analyst with an additional set of problems. The same questions are not asked repeatedly, or else there are large gaps between the time periods when they are asked. Different wordings or responses often render questions uncomparable. Questions asked in one country are not asked in another. (West Germany is by far the most surveyed country in Europe, and France appears to be the least.) As a result, one is forced to jump from one question or source to another, constantly confronting interruptions of promising time series and modifications in item construction.

Differences in national contexts affect comparison as well. Each nation possesses a unique set of cultural and political circumstances that alter the interpretation of items. The translation of the identical question into different languages may influence the results. The

significance of national identity was discussed in Chapter IV. The West German border with Eastern bloc nations, the unique French relationship with NATO, the Italian Communist Party, and the geographical separation of Britain, all affect the stimuli with which respondents are presented. They are hearing the same words, but they may be answering different questions.

The upshot of these difficulties is that in many cases it cannot be determined whether the mass attitudes observed now are any different from those of earlier years. It is possible that some of the attitudes causing political concern today might actually not be new at all, but that previously we were not aware of these attitudes, because there were no systematic efforts being made to measure them.

A final issue is the question of the salience of foreign policy matters. Sizeable segments of populations might have little interest in and information about foreign policy and might rate it rather low in personal importance. This has been the traditional view articulated by Rosenau (1961). Table 5-1 displays some possible indicators of low salience for West Germany and Italy. Majorities in both countries recently expressed no interest in foreign policy or international relations. The French, according to Fritsch-Bournazel, "still remain indifferent or skeptical about certain aspects that concern the activities and

TABLE 5-1
INDICATIONS OF THE SALIENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
IN WEST GERMANY AND ITALY

(percentages)

1. "Most important problem"

(percent selecting either foreign policy,
national security, or peace as most important)

	<u>11/1976</u>	<u>11/1980</u>	<u>2/1982</u>	
West Germany	2	9	15	

2. "Interested in foreign policy and international politics"

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>		
West Germany (1980)	47	53	=	100%
Italy (1983)	35	63	=	98%

Source: For West German Question 1: Rattinger (1985:108);
Question 2: Noelle-Neumann (1981:410). For Italy: Rossi
(1985:176).

capacity of the military or the understanding of deterrence strategy" (1985:97). It is conceivable that large numbers of survey respondents are asked to indicate perceptions or evaluations of matters on which they have almost no knowledge and about which they have never before been required to form an opinion.

Applying forced response measures in a situation of little knowledge and low salience invariably provokes a certain number of "non-attitudes" (Converse, 1970). Respondents may choose randomly from the alternatives they are offered, or they may reply on the basis of what they think is socially desirable. Of course, they could refuse to reply by saying they "don't know," but perhaps they choose not to, in order, for example, not to appear ignorant or to please the interviewer. Responses to single-item measures are not the same as genuine attitudes, that is, stable convictions, based on knowledge and experience, that can be maintained against contradictory opinions and counter-evidence (Crewe, 1985:13).

This illustrates the different methodological approach in this chapter as compared to Chapters III and IV. There, attitudes were measured by multi-item scales that provide more precise and valid indicators of deeply held values and beliefs. Responses to public opinion questions, which will be observed here, are much more subject to nuances of transient events and ephemeral factors. They are more

changeable over time and less consistent than a series of logically linked questions as used previously.

In Britain, interest in foreign and defense matters is increasing (Table 5-2). This is also occurring in West Germany as Table 5-1 indicated. Previously, from the mid sixties when the deep-seated nature of Britain's economic problems became generally apparent, security and international affairs "barely loomed in the public consciousness at all" (Crewe, 1985:12). The current increased interest in security affairs can be attributed to the mass movement of protest against NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new intermediate-ranged nuclear missiles in Western Europe. By the 1983 general election, following a campaign in which the major parties were polarized over these issues, defense ranked as the second most urgent problem in Britain, surpassed only by the economy.

Several analysts and policy makers believe that across Western Europe public awareness of and political involvement with security questions have increased dramatically (Capitanchik and Eichenberg, 1983; Flynn and Rattinger, 1985; Laqueur, 1981; Russett and Deluca, 1983). This was a major theme of Chapter I. Table 5-3 displays how Europeans evaluate the relative importance of several issues. The combined importance of inflation and unemployment lead the list; however, the threat of war along with the concern about nuclear weapons account for about a quarter of the

TABLE 5-2
SALIENCE OF DEFENSE IN GREAT BRITAIN

Question: "What would you say is the most urgent problem facing the country at the present time? And what would you say is the next most urgent problem?"

	Percent mentioning defense as one of the two most urgent problems	Rank of defense among other problems
1979 General Election	2	14
3rd quarter	a	b
4th "	a	b
1980 1st "	a	b
2nd "	3	12
3rd "	3	10
4th "	4	6
1981 1st "	1	8
2nd "	6	4
3rd "	6	6
4th "	8	4
1982 1st "	6	4
2nd "	5	5
3rd "	5	6
4th "	10	3
1983 1st "	15	3
General Election	38	2

Source: Crewe (1985:25); original cited: Gallup.

[a] Less than 2%

[b] Data not available

Note: The question was asked every month. The figures given for each quarter are the means across each of the three months.

TABLE 5-3
 ISSUE SALIENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1984
 (Percentages)

Question: "What is the most important issue for you and your country at the present time?"

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
Threat of War	47	(15)	14	(10)	56	(16)	40	(14)
Energy Crisis	15	(5)	4	(3)	19	(5)	15	(5)
Inflation	39	(12)	9	(7)	38	(11)	18	(6)
Insufficient Defense Capability	7	(2)	2	(1)	7	(2)	11	(4)
High Unemployment	78	(25)	52	(39)	69	(19)	60	(22)
Social Inequality	27	(9)	12	(9)	28	(8)	23	(8)
Crime	30	(9)	10	(7)	58	(16)	36	(13)
Nuclear Weapons	26	(8)	15	(11)	39	(11)	43	(15)
Government Deficit	21	(7)	5	(4)	19	(5)	12	(4)
Poor Political Leadership	24	(8)	7	(5)	25	(7)	19	(7)
Other/Don't Know	2	(1)	5	(4)	3	(1)	1	(1)
TOTAL	316%	101%	135%	100%	361%	101%	278%	99%

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1985:689); original cited: Harris.

Note: Multiple responses were possible. Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total responses. N=1000 (approximately) for each national sample.

responses. Security issues, therefore, are the second most urgent problem for European publics, ahead of crime, energy, government, deficits, political leadership, and social inequality. This contrasts sharply with the conventional view that the public is generally disinterested in foreign policy. Although interest in foreign and security matters is increasing now, a condition of low salience and the presence of non-attitudes during the previous three decades must temper interpretations of the data gathered during those years.

Several of the circumstances discussed in this section as impediments exist in all survey research. Concern with national contexts, equivalent items, non-attitudes, and salience are not unique to this study but pervade empirical social research. The point is that in relying on multiple previously published sources, one is not able to control for these and the other technical matters mentioned. One is, so to speak, at the mercy of someone else's methods, techniques, and data.

These methodological issues do not preclude conclusions from being reached on the patterns and trends of European attitudes over time, but these technical concerns should point out the complexity of the task. It is doubtful that these analyses will provide perfect consistency or allow for the construction of elaborate explanations of continuity or change. Nonetheless, the goal is to present some indication

of how West European mass attitudes on national security matters have evolved over time.

Findings and Analyses

This section is organized into three discrete parts. Attitudes toward the three assumptions discussed previously will be examined under the following headings: the threat to Western Europe, attitudes toward European security, and images of the United States.

The Threat to Western Europe

The Alliance was a response to a Soviet threat that was perceived by the governments and publics of Western Europe. Events in Eastern Europe, ideological rhetoric, Soviet power, and West European weakness combined to bring Western Europe and the United States into a common defense arrangement. Since then, West European attitudes toward the Soviet Threat have eased considerably. According to Donald Puchala: "Perceptions of great danger from the East that stimulated European defensive instincts in the past are no longer prevalent, and American attempts to arouse these instincts are somewhat resented" (1984:22).

Table 5-4 displays the changes in German perceptions of the Soviet Union. The data presented represent responses favorable to Russia. For each of the questions the trend is a consistently improving view. According to Questions 2 and 3, majorities in West Germany no longer view the Soviet

TABLE 5-4
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Question 1: "Do you feel that the Russians are basically committed to seeking a reconciliation with the West at present, or don't you think so?"				
Question 2: "Do you think that the USSR (the East) is a threat to us or don't you think so?"				
Question 3: "Do you think the Communist threat is . . .?"				
Question 4: "Does the USSR have the goodwill to come to terms with the West?"				
	<u>Question 1</u>	<u>Question 2</u>	<u>Question 3</u>	<u>Question 4</u>
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
	"yes"	"no threat"	"not great/ not serious"	"yes"
'52	a	19	a	a
'54	a	a	a	a
'56	a	a	a	a
'58	a	35	a	a
'59	17	a	a	23
'62	a	a	22	a
'64	a	49	a	a
'65	23	a	33	29
'66	26	a	a	33
'67	a	a	49	a
'68	a	37	29	a
'69	a	63	44	a
'70	33	a	46	42

Continued

TABLE 5-4
CONTINUED

	<u>Question 1</u> Percent "yes"	<u>Question 2</u> Percent "no threat"	<u>Question 3</u> Percent "not great/ not serious"	<u>Question 4</u> Percent "yes"	
'71	35	62	56	40	'71
'72	a	a	56	a	'72
'73	a	a	51	a	'73
'74	29	a	41	35	'74
'75	a	a	41	a	'75
'76	a	a	36	a	'76
'77	27	a	40	31	'77
'78	a	a	50	a	'78
'79	a	a	56	a	'79
'80	16	a	48	10	'80
'81	36	63	48	43	'81
'82	a	56	50	a	'82
'83	45	53	52	a	'83

Source: For Questions 1 and 3, Schweigler (1984:107,117). For Question 2 and 4, Rattinger (1985:118,120).

[a] Data not available.

Note: Higher percentages reflect more favorable attitudes toward the USSR.

Union or "communism" as threatening. On another question asked in 1983, 52% of the West Germans did not view the Soviet Union as a military threat (Rattinger, 1985:57).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Italian perceptions of the Soviet Union gradually became more favorable, with this trend peaking in 1978 (Table 5-5). In the 1980s, however, there has been a return of the negative feelings about the Soviet Union, caused perhaps by events in Afghanistan and Poland. This adjustment was not as pronounced among Germans (Table 5-4). The shift in Italian opinion in 1983, 12 percentage points more favorable, may indicate a return to the historical trend of a more favorable view of the Soviet Union.

More favorable views of the Soviet Union are held at the same time that Europeans are perceiving a marked shift in the balance of military power away from the United States (Table 5-6).² With Britain there is little shift, since the British have viewed Soviet power as superior to that of the United States for some time. However, for Italy, France, and West Germany, the United States was believed to be strong until the 1970s, but these views have changed.

Additionally, European attitudes toward the possibility of war appear antithetic. Although perceptions are that the military balance has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union, Tables 5-7 and 5-8 indicate that concerns over the possibility of war have eased a bit. Europeans clearly viewed a Soviet attack upon Western Europe as very unlikely

TABLE 5-5
 ITALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

(percent favorable minus unfavorable responses)

10/54	-30
12/55	-29
11/56	-60
11/57	-34
10/58	-14
12/59	+ 2
7/60	-19
7/61	- 7
6/62	-20
2/63	-15
3/64	-15
7/65	-19
11/69	- 9
4/72	- 8
4/73	- 1
10/78	+ 5
10/81	-52
2/82	-55
4/83	-43

Source: Rossi (1985:185); original cited: Doxa Institute.

TABLE 5-6
 EUROPEAN PERCEPTION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE
 (percentages)

Question: Who is ahead in total military strength, the United States (NATO or the West) or the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact or the East)?

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
1957	17	25	38	23	34	22	19	50
1958	19	29	24	23	38	23	26	41
1960	25	40	26	23	30	22	12	55
1961	12	43	26	38	22	29	15	56
1963	24	28	50	16	39	19	26	41
1969	40	26	41	26	44	13	33	34
1973	a	a	17	27	a	a	a	a
1977	16	34	13	34	22	17	10	50
1979	a	a	11	42	a	a	12	64
1980	a	a	10	39	a	a	13	59
1981	15	34	10	51	22	28	10	52
1982	a	a	9	54	a	a	a	a
1983	a	a	11	47	a	a	17	55

Source: Merritt and Puchala (1968:210,211); Rattinger (1985:114); Rossi (1985:180); Crewe (1985:17); Shaffer (1982:36); Russett and Deluca (1983:190); Eichenberg (1983: Table 2).

[a] Data not available.

Note: Wording varied from year to year in regard to "United States," "NATO," or the "West" and the "Soviet Union," "USSR," "the East," or the "Warsaw Pact." Responses of "neither" and "don't know" are not displayed.

TABLE 5-7
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR
 (percentages)

Question: "Here is a sort of scale. [Respondents are shown a 10 point scale.] Would you tell me how you would assess the chances of a world war breaking out in the next 3 or 4 years?" [For 1971-84 it was "in the next 10 years?"]

(percent responding that there is a 50% chance or better)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
France	27	43	44	28	31	31	27	30	38	33
W. Germany	31	40	32	33	29	41	23	23	40	25
Italy	19	36	32	39	19	28	21	23	46	23
Britain	26	44	31	34	31	31	a	24	55	26

Source: For 1955-61, Merritt and Puchala (1968:190-191); original cited: USICA. For 1971-84, Hastings and Hastings (1985:452; 1986:683).

[a] Data not available.

Note: On years question was asked twice the responses were averaged.

N = 1000 (approximately) for each national sample for each time period.

TABLE 5-8
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT
 (percentages)

Question 1: (1952) "Are you personally worried much about the possibility of a war breaking out or not?"

Question 2: (1982) "How likely do you think it is that the Soviet Union will attack West Europe within the next five years?"

	<u>Question 1 (1952)</u>			
	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
Worry a lot	29	29	38	15
Somewhat	31	24	25	17
A Little	19	14	15	20
Don't Worry	18	32	22	48
Don't Know	3	1	0	0
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1+2 - 3+4)	+23	+ 7	+26	-36
N =	(1345)	(1591)	(1505)	(1503)

	<u>Question 2 (1982)</u>			
	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
Very/Fairly Likely	29	14	23	22
Unlikely	61	70	69	68
Don't Know	19	17	9	10
TOTAL	99%	101%	101%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	-32	-56	-46	-46

Source: For Question 1, Merritt and Puchala (1968:189); original cited: USICA. For Question 2, Shaffer (1982:44); original cited: USICA.

in 1982, despite the invasion of Afghanistan (Question 2, Table 5-8). However, the invasion of Afghanistan probably triggered the surge of concern in 1980 for a possible world war (Table 5-7). Large increases in concern for the likelihood of war were seen in all four countries in 1980, with the British respondents more than doubling their aggregate view. Also, the threat of war was one of the most mentioned important issues in 1984; Italy 56%, France 47%, and Britain 40% (Table 5-3).

The fear of war, therefore, is linked more to super-power confrontation over a dispute such as Afghanistan than to Soviet aggression directed specifically against Western Europe. Table 5-9 shows that increased Soviet military capability is the most stated cause for international tension in three of the countries; however, this was not an overwhelmingly decisive factor as only among the Germans did up to 50% select this response, and multiple responses were possible. Only 31% of the French and 37% of the Italians viewed increased Soviet military capability as a major problem. Most notable is that the increased military capability of the United States was also considered a major cause of international tension (by 41% of the West Germans and 37% of the British). United States economic policy was considered the most important factor by the French, ahead of all military and other items. In another survey, 43% of French respondents viewed United States monetary policies as

TABLE 5-9
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CAUSES OF
 INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, 1984

(percentages)

Question: "What do you think is the major cause for the present tension in international relations?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
Increased USSR Military Capability	31 (14)	50 (19)	37 (18)	47 (20)
Increased U.S. Military Capability	20 (9)	41 (16)	26 (13)	37 (16)
U.S. Interest Rates and Exchange Rates	38 (17)	26 (10)	22 (11)	10 (4)
Increased USSR Influence	24 (11)	19 (7)	14 (7)	20 (9)
Superpower Activi- ties in the 3d World	29 (13)	32 (12)	20 (10)	32 (14)
Insufficient Unity Among W. European Nations	25 (11)	32 (12)	26 (13)	19 (8)
Excessive Yielding to the USSR by W. Europe	12 (5)	12 (5)	7 (3)	10 (4)
U.S. Aggressive Policy Toward the USSR	12 (5)	26 (10)	25 (12)	36 (16)
Increased Neutralism and Pacifism in W. Europe	10 (5)	6 (2)	4 (2)	10 (4)
Other/Don't Know	19 (9)	14 (5)	25 (12)	11 (5)
TOTAL	220% 99%	258% 98%	206% 101%	232% 101%

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1985:691; 1986:720-721);
 original: Harris.

Note: Multiple responses were possible. Figures in paren-
 thesis are percentages based on the total responses.
 N = 1000 (approximately) for each nation.

the principal threat to France as compared to 24% who felt the USSR and its military policies were the greater threat (Fritsch-Bournazel, 1985:92). Additionally, significantly large minorities blamed aggressive United States policies toward Russia as the principal cause of international tension (36% in Britain, 26% in West Germany, and 25% in Italy; from Table 5-9). In this view, it is the United States, not the Soviet Union, that is threatening the security of Western Europe.

Fear of nuclear war, apart from a fear of either superpower, explains the simultaneous attitudes of being threatened by war but not by a Soviet attack upon Western Europe. West German opinion illustrates this. Substantial majorities are willing to defend the Federal Republic even if the war is to be fought in Germany (Questions 1 and 2, Table 5-10); however, only 15% are willing to defend their country if nuclear weapons are to be used (Question 3).

Similar views are held by the British. According to Table 5-11, the fear that a nuclear war will occur is growing in Britain, almost 50% responded in 1983 that a nuclear war is likely. In 1963, following the Cuban missile crisis, only 16% believed this. Additionally, in 1981, only 14 percentage points separated those who felt Soviet missiles were a greater threat than American missiles, and in 1982, more of the British public thought American missiles increase the chances of attack (42%) rather than provide for greater protection (29%).

TABLE 5-10
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(percentages)

Question 1: "Do you think that the Federal Republic should defend itself against a military attack on its territory by using military force?"

Question 2: "Are you in every case for the defense of the FRG against a military attack, even if the war occurs primarily on the territory of the FRG?"

Question 3: "In case of war, NATO also has nuclear weapons at its disposal. Are you for the defense of the FRG, even if nuclear weapons have to be used on the territory of the FRG?"

	<u>Question 1</u> (percent "yes")	<u>Question 2</u> (percent "yes')	<u>Question 3</u> (percent "yes")
1977	58	57	19
1979	57	50	14
1980	64	53	15

Question 4: "What is more important, defending democracy--even if this involves a nuclear war--or avoiding war--even if this means living under a communist government?"

	<u>5/55</u>	<u>5/56</u>	<u>3/59</u>	<u>7/60</u>	<u>12/75</u>	<u>3/76</u>	<u>2/79</u>	<u>5/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>
Defend Democracy	48	51	49	44	34	35	31	36	40
Avoid War	52	49	51	56	66	65	69	64	60
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	-4	+2	-2	-12	-32	-30	-38	-28	-20

Source: Schweigler (1984:115,116); Rattinger (1985:125).

TABLE 5-11

BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(percentages)

Question 1: "Do you think it is likely or not that there is ever going to be a nuclear war?"

	<u>4/63</u>	<u>9/80</u>	<u>11/81</u>	<u>11/82</u>	<u>2/83</u>
Yes/Likely	16	39	42	38	49
No/Not Likely	59	45	42	44	36
Don't Know	25	16	16	18	16
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	-43	- 6	0	- 6	+ 7

Question 2: "Which represents the greater threat to the security of Britain?"

	<u>11/81</u>
The presence of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe	43
The proposed installation of American missiles in Western Europe	29
Don't Know	28
TOTAL	100%

Question 3: "What is the effect of having American nuclear missiles stationed in Western Europe?"

	<u>2/82</u>
Increases the chances of attack	42
Has no effect	24
Provides greater protection	29
Don't Know	5
TOTAL	100%

Source: Crewe (1985:20,23,36); original cited: Gallup.
Russett and Deluca (1983:192); original cited: Gallup.

The conclusion from these various survey results is that the European perception of what is threatening is changing. The fear of the Soviet Union that prompted the formation of the Atlantic Alliance is being replaced by new fear: a fear of nuclear war. This threat appears to be attributed to the weapons themselves rather than to specific nations. Thus, the Soviet Union itself is no longer so much the threat as compared to the nuclear arsenals in Russia and the United States. The likelihood of war is being based on the existence and presence in Europe of nuclear weapons, especially those of the Americans. Local attitudes toward the British nuclear deterrent and the French force de frappe are generally more favorable (Crewe, 1985; Fritsch-Bournazel, 1985). This represents a subtle, implicit shift in assumptions. Weapons rather than politics, missiles rather than men, nukes rather than nations are becoming the threat, and these are possessed by both NATO and the USSR who therefore become equally threatening.

These views, complex and usually not coherent, are seldom voiced openly, but instead are manifested in the arguments over particular issues. The Euro-American bickering on the Siberian pipeline is a case in point. Ostensibly the argument was about energy dependence and helping the Russian economy. But the real issue, from the view of the United States administration, was that such a deal would enhance a state of psychological dependence on the Soviet Union. The Europeans would then have an additional reason

for not disagreeing with the Russians on matters other than energy. In this view, the issue was not trade with the Soviet Union, but its political implications. It has been the policy of the United States to encourage concerted actions by the West to avoid strengthening Soviet power through trade. Many of these efforts are dismissed by European governments as not being in their interests economically. However, when the Europeans protest against restrictions on the sale of machinery or technology to the Soviet Union or to other Eastern bloc countries, they are doing more than disputing the relevance of a particular computer or piece of equipment. More importantly, they are implicitly denying "the underlying assumption of U.S. policy: namely, that the Soviet Union is an enemy" (Stoppa-Liebl and Laqueur, 1985:74).

Another example is the European anti-missile campaign in the early 1980s. The NATO decision to deploy new missiles was debated and opposed by a cluster of multicolored factions who ultimately failed to achieve their political objective of preventing deployment. But the movement managed to modify the political climate and to spread the seeds of an anti-defense and anti-American viewpoint based on fundamentally different assumptions of the international state system. Specifically, it is a utopian view in which weapons are bad and people are good.

Thus, it appears that the traditional conceptual boundaries around the notion of threat are eroding in

Europe. What is threatening now is perceived to be as much internal to the Alliance as external; as much economic as military; and as much technical as political. The implications for NATO are obvious; for example, during periods of economic difficulty, defense policies may become relegated to the more immediate threats as perceived by Western publics: namely, inflation and unemployment.

Attitudes Toward Security

A prominent feature of European postwar security attitudes is the consistently high level of public support for the Atlantic Alliance. Tables 5-12 and 5-13 present data from 1955 to 1982, and in 1982 healthy majorities continued to favor NATO in each country. Even in France 62% favored NATO in 1982, the highest level ever for that country.

The trend in West Germany has been for support for the Western Alliance to increase (Tables 5-14 and 5-15). There has been a steady increase in favorable responses to questions dealing with being allied with the United States, NATO, and the presence of American troops. Responses are more positive to the question wording in Table 5-15 which presents the alternative of "NATO," than in Table 5-14 which asks respondents to choose between an alliance with the

TABLE 5-12
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO
 (percentages)

Question: (In 1955) "Do you think (country) should continue its membership or withdraw from NATO?"

Question: (in 1980) "Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?"

	<u>France</u>			<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1980</u>
NATO Essential (Remain in NATO)	60	49	43	80	87	70	59	94	78
Not Essential (Withdraw)	17	13	34	13	8	20	24	4	13
Don't Know	23	38	23	7	5	10	15	2	9
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	+43	+36	+ 9	+67	+79	+50	+35	+90	+65

Source: For 1955 data, Merritt and Puchala (1968:345); original cited: USICA. For French 1967 data, Gallup, France (1976:623). For 1980 data, Eurobarometer 14.

Note: N=1000 (approximately) for each national sample for each year. Percentages based on respondents who had "heard of NATO" as determined by a filter question (except for France in 1967).

TABLE 5-13
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO AND NEUTRALISM
 (percentages)

Question: "All things considered, do you think it is better for (survey country) to belong to NATO, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?"

	<u>France</u>				<u>West Germany</u>			
	<u>3/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>2/82</u>	<u>4/82</u>	<u>3/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>1/82</u>	<u>2/82</u>
Better to belong	45	33	46	62	67	64	65	70
Better to get out	40	51	20	29	14	18	17	13
Don't Know	15	16	34	10	19	19	17	17
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	99%	100%
(Row 1 - 2)	+ 5	-18	+26	+33	+53	+46	+48	+57

	<u>Italy</u>			<u>Britain</u>			
	<u>3/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>4/82</u>	<u>3/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>2/82</u>	<u>4/82</u>
Better to belong	60	49	59	67	59	63	73
Better to get out	30	42	34	20	29	25	21
Don't Know	9	8	7	12	12	12	6
TOTAL	99%	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - 2)	+30	+ 7	+25	+47	+30	+38	+52

Source: Shaffer (1982:51); original cited: USICA.

TABLE 5-14

WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ALLIANCE AND NEUTRALISM

(percentages)

Question: "Which do you think would be the better foreign policy, should we remain militarily allied with the United States or should we attempt to be neutral?"

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>
Militarily Allied w/ US	40	46	44	41	49	57	54
Neutral	42	37	38	42	36	27	27
Undecided	18	17	18	17	15	16	19
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	- 2	+ 9	+ 6	- 1	+13	+30	+27

Source: Noelle-Neumann (1982:418). Original cited: Allensbach.

N = approximately 2000 for each time period.

TABLE 5-15
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO AND U.S. TROOPS
(percentages)

Question 1: "Should we remain in NATO essentially unchanged, should we aim to belong to a NATO either more loosely or more firmly structured, or do you think it is better to leave NATO?"

Question 2: "Does the presence of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic tend to increase the maintenance of peace, or does the presence of American soldiers tend to endanger peace?"

	Question 1 (percent "NATO")	Question 2 (percent "increase peace")
1968	63	a
1969	63	a
1970	63	48
1971	75	79
1972	68	57
1973	70	59
1974	65	61
1975	64	64
1976	61	61
1977	71	68
1978	80	87
1979	81	84
1980	81	84
1981	78	82
1982	76	81
1983	79	78

Source: Schweigler (1984:110,111,118); original cited: EMNID.

[a] Data not available.

Note: For Question 1, responses to "a more firm NATO," "a looser NATO," "quit NATO," "other," and "don't know" are not displayed. For Question 2, responses to "endanger peace" and "don't know" are not displayed.

"United States" and neutrality. For instance, in 1980, 81% of the German respondents favored NATO but only 54% favored an alliance with the United States. This may be an artifact of item construction, or else it illustrates the extent to which the notion of "NATO" has become ingrained into the German vocabulary eliciting favorable images that are almost automatic. Views of the United States, however, are not as favorable.

The evidence presented above on support for NATO has been based upon essentially dichotomous responses. When presented with several specific alternative security arrangements, however, Europeans appear to be a bit less favorably disposed toward NATO, at least in its current form. There are sizeable minorities interested in some form of separate European military command either within or outside of NATO (Table 5-16). In 1979 and 1980 in France, pluralities favored no alliance at all, but preferred to rely on their own defense. These French views clearly fit the image from Chapter III of the French as Isolationists. The "no alliance" response receives no support in the other countries. Also in line with the images from Chapter III, the West Germans, as Atlanticists, have little interest in a separate European military structure, and they have the highest level of support for NATO in its present form.

The relative importance attached to national defense in general is another issue on which Europeans differ. The DEFPRI variable, used in Chapter III, categorizes

TABLE 5-16
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY POLICY
 (percentages)

Question: "Which of these statements on this card comes closest to your own view of how (country) should provide for its security?"

	<u>France</u>				<u>Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1983</u>
NATO unchanged	34	42	19	21	57	27	31	43	37
Separate Eur Cmd w/i NATO	a	a	a	a	18	29	17	24	20
W/d from NATO Form Separate Eur Command	25	17	28	28	10	16	15	8	15
No Alliance Rely on Own Defense	18	22	30	36	3	6	7	9	11
Reduce Military Def and Rely on Accommodation w/USSR	a	a	2	1	2	5	4	5	5
Don't Know	23	19	21	14	11	18	26	11	12
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%

Sources: For France: Gallup, France (1976:627,692) and Fritsch-Bournazel (1985:94). For Italy: Eurobarometer 14 and Rossi (1985:213). For Germany: Eurobarometer 14. For Britain: Eurobarometer 14 and Crewe (1985:45).

[a] Alternative was not available as a response.

respondents into those who place a high priority on national defense and those who do not.³ Table 5-17 displays responses to this measure from four time periods. The British and the Germans place considerably greater emphasis on the importance of national defense than do the French or the Italians. Additionally, this perception of the importance of defense is increasing more in Britain and West Germany than in France and Italy.

The increase in the priority given to national defense is not reproduced in the more specific question of whether Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defense. Table 5-18 shows decreases in the support for a stronger military defense by the British and the Germans, although the British support remains the highest of the four countries (60% in 1983). Among the French and the Italians, on the other hand, support is increasing a bit. The question in Table 5-18 is still somewhat broad and externally oriented. When asked, in 1982, if they favored increasing expenditures for defense in their country, only in Britain was a plurality supportive (44%); this policy alternative received minimal support in France, West Germany and Italy: 16%, 15%, and 16%, respectively (Shaffer, 1982:53).

Thus, apart from the general acceptance of NATO as the preferred defense arrangement, there is wide disagreement among Europeans over more specific questions dealing with

TABLE 5-17

PERCENT CATEGORIZED AS PLACING A HIGH PRIORITY
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE (DEFPRI)

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>Change</u>
France	17	12	12	24	+ 7
W. Germany	21	36	36	52	+31
Italy	13	13	12	19	+ 4
Britain	23	41	34	50	+27

Source: 1973 European Community Study and Eurobarometers 10, 11, and 14.

Note: Percentages are those who chose "strong defense forces" as either the first or second most important goal for their country.

N=1000 (approximately) for each national sample each year.

TABLE 5-18
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE EFFORTS
 (percentages)

Question: "Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defense."

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1983</u>
Strongly Agree	9	16	17	8	9	13	23	15
Agree	24	27	37	36	21	24	42	45
Disagree	21	17	22	30	22	21	14	20
Str Disagree	17	15	8	13	30	26	4	5
No Reply	29	25	16	13	18	16	17	15
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1+2 - 3+4)	-5	+11	+24	+ 1	-32	-10	+47	+35

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1985:563). Original cited: EEC.

N= 1000 (approximately) for each nation for each time period.

national priorities, increasing defense efforts, and military spending. This reflects a discontinuity between general security principals and specific defense measures.

Concern for the unwillingness of Europe to contribute equitably to its own defense is a familiar topic (Bull, 1983; Joffe, 1982). The Lisbon goals were established in 1952 to systematically raise European force levels to a point believed to be adequate. But "such objectives were never even remotely approached" (Stoppa-Liebl and Laqueur, 1984:10). The United States, apparently reluctant to precipitate a political crisis, made up the difference. American troops became largely a substitute for rather than an integration of European defense. Since conventional forces appeared to be too expensive, NATO's defense was entrusted primarily to the nuclear weapons of the United States.

The data on attitudes toward nuclear deterrence reflect a pattern of support for the general concept but ambivalence when it is applied to specifics. Large pluralities and in some cases majorities support the notion that nuclear weapons help to prevent a Soviet attack (Table 5-19). The brief period for which the trend data are available show some ups and downs that reveal little about a long-term trend. These adjustments may indicate some uncertainty and confusion on the part of the public, or they may reflect the nature of the domestic debate occurring at the time. There

TABLE 5-19
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 (percentages)

Question: "Do you think that having nuclear weapons in Western Europe helps to prevent a Soviet attack on Western Europe or makes a Soviet attack on Western Europe more likely?"

	<u>France</u>			<u>West Germany</u>				
	<u>7/81</u>	<u>10/81</u>	<u>4/82</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>10/81</u>	<u>12/81</u>	<u>1/82</u>	<u>4/82</u>
Helps prevent attack	49	44	55	46	39	31	36	47
Makes attack more likely	17	20	27	23	24	32	30	21
Don't know	34	37	18	31	36	37	33	32
TOTAL	100%	101%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	+32	+24	+28	+23	+15	- 1	+ 6	+26

	<u>Italy</u>			<u>Britain</u>			
	<u>7/81</u>	<u>10/81</u>	<u>4/82</u>	<u>3/81</u>	<u>7/81</u>	<u>12/81</u>	<u>4/82</u>
Helps prevent attack	52	47	48	61	52	48	56
Makes attack more likely	29	37	33	20	28	28	22
Don't know	19	16	19	18	20	23	22
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	+23	+10	+15	+41	+24	+20	+34

Source: Shaffer (1982:76); original cited: USICA.

is no enthusiasm or consensus evident in these data, and the large percentage of "don't knows" also point to some difficulty with the concept.

The logic of deterrence requires that military forces be usable to deter. Accordingly, "deterrence is as much a psychological as a military problem" (Kissinger, 1966:19). Within the European public, however, there is a widespread rejection of the NATO policy on nuclear weapons (Question 2, Table 5-20). These weapons are perceived as being not usable.

Additionally, Question 1 in Table 5-20 shows a rejection of one of the fundamental tenets of collective security, that of mutual support and assistance if one alliance member is attacked. This is an integral part of any joint defense relationship. A plurality in France and large minorities in West Germany and Italy disclaim the use of military force under any circumstances.

These concepts are becoming inextricably linked. The percentages advocating that nuclear weapons should never be used under any circumstances are very close to those responding that military force in general should never be used, and in France they are identical. This may indicate that distinctions about types of warfare are becoming blurred and that the notion of a nuclear threshold is losing meaning as well. People seem to believe that the existence of nuclear weapons has made war impossible.

TABLE 5-20

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AND THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, July 1981

(percentages)

Question 1: "Under which of the circumstances on this card, if any, would you favor (country) using military force, or should military force never be used?"

Question 2: "There are different opinions about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe by NATO. Which one of the following opinions is closest to your own?"

<u>Question 1</u> [a]	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
(1) Military force should never be used	44	(42)	26	(24)	33	(31)	20	(18)
(2) If (survey country) is attacked by USSR	35	(33)	48	(44)	41	(39)	54	(48)
(3) If another NATO country is attacked by USSR	13	(12)	18	(17)	25	(24)	30	(27)
(4) Don't know	14	(13)	16	(15)	7	(7)	9	(8)
TOTAL	106%	100%	108%	100%	106%	101%	106%	101%

<u>Question 2</u>	<u>France</u>		<u>W.Ger</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
(1) NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances	44		29		42		24	
(2) NATO should use nuclear weapons only if the USSR uses them first in attacking West Europe	32		37		38		47	
(3) NATO should use nuclear weapons to defend itself if a Soviet attack by conventional forces threatens to overwhelm NATO forces	17		17		12		19	

Continued

TABLE 5-20

CONTINUED

<u>Question 2</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>W.Ger</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
(4) Don't know	7	17	7	10
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	100%

Source: Shaffer (1982:56,57); original cited: USICA.

[a] Multiple responses were possible for question 1.
 Figures in parentheses are percentages of total responses.

Longitudinal data are not available for the questions in Table 5-20. The extent to which fundamental changes in attitudes about nuclear weapons have occurred cannot be directly assessed. It is doubtful that many people ever liked these weapons. But what may be new is a more generalized fear and confusion about Western defenses and strategy resulting from an increased awareness of as well as the growth of nuclear stockpiles and capabilities. This greater fear and awareness, coupled with the increased tendency for political activism, pose real dilemmas for European governments in their efforts to structure security policies that both deter the Soviet Union and reassure the public.

Indications of these general predispositions about war and peace are contained in Table 5-21. A dramatic reversal of opinion over the almost 30-year period is reflected in the data. Except in Britain, where the successful Falklands War was probably very much in mind, overwhelming majorities in 1983 responded that peace is more important than anything. This reversal may be attributable to concern with nuclear weapons.

In summary, there is widespread support for the generic notion of NATO, but disarray in regard to what the specific components of collective security should be. Affirmations of the Atlantic Alliance have become "knee jerk" responses, in which Western policy makers should take little comfort. These periodic superficial endorsements disguise conflicting

TABLE 5-21
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR
 (percentages)

Question: (In 1955) "Of course, almost everyone wants peace. But there are some things that people say are worth fighting for. What about a threat to the individual liberty of (country's) people? Which would you choose--stay at peace or fight for it?"

Question: (In 1983) "Some people think that peace is more important than anything else, such as our standard of living, liberty, or human rights. Others think that some things are sufficiently important to be fought for, even if this risks going to war. What is your opinion of this?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>1983</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1983</u>
Fight for some things	13	57	12	57	10	82	40
Peace is most important	82	24	78	22	85	10	48
Don't know	5	19	10	21	5	8	12
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	-69	+33	-66	+35	-75	+22	- 8
N =	(1011)	(857)	(1049)	(826)	(1031)	(800)	(1350)

Source: For 1955, Merritt and Puchala (1968:199); original cited: USICA. For 1983, Eurobarometer 19 (April 1983).

sentiments that point to attitudinal changes away from some of the fundamentals upon which the collective security of NATO is based.

Just as the concept of threat has changed, the concept of security has also changed. Initially, security meant a joint, coordinated Western effort to balance Soviet power. Currently, the specific requirements of this initial assumption are frequently being perceived as threatening peace, "a concept that has reached the pinnacle in the hierarchy of values" (Flynn and Rattinger, 1985:372). "Security" now refers to the political measures necessary to maintain peace rather than to the military requirements necessary to balance Soviet power. Peace has become the ultimate goal.

These shifting perceptions of security are reflected in other data. The principal requirements for increased security are viewed as being efforts to reduce confrontation, such as, arms control and continued dialogue and contact with the Soviet Union. Arms control is preferred to a strengthening of NATO (Table 5-22). In West Germany, Italy, and Britain, a dialogue with the Russians is perceived as being more important than a balance of military capability (Table 5-23). The concern in 1947 was not with establishing a dialogue with the Soviet Union, it was with raising up credible Western forces and developing an integrated defense structure. The assumptions have changed.

TABLE 5-22

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON HOW TO BEST IMPROVE SECURITY, 1981

(percentages)

Question 1: "How do you think (survey country) can best improve its security: by strengthening its military forces to help NATO maintain a balance of military power with the East, or by pushing harder for arms control negotiations to try to reduce military forces on both sides?"

Question 2: "Which of the following possible policies do you think would be best for (survey country's) security?"

<u>Question 1</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
(1) Strengthen NATO	18	21	22	31
(2) Push for arms control	50	35	60	40
(3) Do both (volunteered)	13	25	7	5
(4) Don't know	19	19	11	24
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

<u>Question 2</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>Ger</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Br</u>
(1) Seek to strengthen NATO before beginning arms control negotiations with the USSR	12	14	14	25
(2) Begin arms control negotiations with USSR as soon as possible and not try first to strengthen NATO's nuclear forces	35	42	45	29
(3) Seek to strengthen NATO's nuclear forces and begin arms control negotiations	24	23	26	30
(4) Don't know	28	21	14	16
TOTAL	99%	100%	99%	100%

Source: Shaffer (1982:66,67); original cited: USICA.

TABLE 5-23

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY IN THE FUTURE, 1984

(percentages)

Question: "Which of the following do you think are most important for the future safety with the Western bloc nations?"

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
Balance of Military Capability with USSR	21	(11)	33	(15)	13	(7)	32	(16)
Cooperation Between U.S. and W. Europe	19	(10)	34	(15)	20	(11)	23	(12)
Improve Relations with 3d World	28	(14)	14	(6)	11	(6)	26	(13)
Strengthen Economic Cooperation Among W. Europe	33	(17)	32	(14)	35	(20)	14	(7)
Continue Dialogue and Contact with USSR	18	(9)	43	(19)	18	(10)	36	(18)
Effective Arms Limitation Talks	40	(20)	40	(18)	30	(17)	42	(21)
Strengthening the Defense Cooperation Among W. Europe	19	(10)	18	(8)	23	(13)	17	(9)
Other/Don't Know	18	(9)	11	(5)	25	(14)	8	(4)
TOTAL	196%	100%	225%	100%	175%	98%	198%	100%

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1985:691,692; 1986:721); Original cited: Harris.

Note: Multiple responses were possible. Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total responses. N = 1000 (approximately) for each national sample.

Images of the United States

European perceptions of the United States are complex and inconsistent. In some respects these attitudes are similar to those discussed above in that there are favorable views of the United States on the general level, but as the questions become more specific the responses become less favorable.

The United States is viewed as a reliable ally by West Europeans. Table 5-24 indicates that healthy majorities in all four countries in the early 1980s believed the United States would come to their defense in the event of Soviet aggression. Only one comparable question was found for time series analysis; it was asked in 1961, but it allowed only three rather than four responses. The data are suggestive, however, that these attitudes have changed little. In 1961, the proportion responding that if attacked they could rely on the United States a "great deal" were 49% in France, 62% in Germany, 50% in Italy, and 56% in Britain (Merritt and Puchala, 1968:230). These are very similar percentages to those in Table 5-24.

Initially, a principal concern of European governments was this question of America's reliability. However, "European fears of being abandoned by the United States in a crisis with the Soviets--in other words, the traditional fear that the Alliance won't work--have been on the wane in recent years" (Flynn and Rattinger, 1985:375).

TABLE 5-24

EUROPEAN VIEW OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

(percentages)

Question: (In France, May (1980) "If the USSR attempted to occupy Western Europe, do you believe the U.S. would intervene in Europe's defense?"

Question: (In West Germany, February 1980) "To what extent could we rely upon the U.S. in case of conflict?"

Question: (In Italy, April 1982) Confidence in U.S. willingness to defend Italy.

Question: (In Britain, February 1982) "If Britain's security was threatened by a Russian attack, how much confidence do you have in the U.S. to do whatever is necessary to defend Britain, even if this risked a direct attack against the U.S. itself?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
Great Deal/Fair Amount	64	59	56	56
Not Much/None	14	35	39	40
Don't Know	22	7	5	3
TOTAL	100%	101%	100%	99%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	+50	+24	+17	+16

Source: French data, Fritsch-Bournazel (1985:96); original cited: Institut Francais d' Opinion Publique. German data, Rattinger (1985:145); original cited: Bundeswehr. Italian data, Rossi (1985:200); original cited: Doxa Institute. British data, Crewe (1985:46); original cited: Gallup.

Europeans also tend to like and have positive feelings toward Americans in general. In 1980, when asked whether they trusted Americans, 70% of the British respondents answered yes (Crewe, 1985:41). Table 5-25 shows that consistently high and even increasing percentages of Germans "like the Americans." In the mid 1970s, with Vietnam and Watergate being prominent events, German attitudes declined a bit, but they are increasing in favorable responses in the eighties.

The majority of Italians have a favorable opinion of the United States. In 1982, 65% of the Italians polled responded favorably to a question on their opinion of the United States (Rossi, 1985:198). Table 5-26 displays the long term evolution of Italian views. Until 1973 the generally favorable responses oscillated between 57% and 76%. Recently, these favorable percentages have eroded. The influence of political events on this decline is evident. As in Germany, the Vietnam War and Watergate produced by 1976 an all-time postwar low of only 41% having a favorable opinion. However, a modest recovery has taken place, and Italian images of the United States may have stabilized.

On another measure which asks respondents how much respect they have for the United States, decreases have been considerable over a 10-year period, except for in Italy (Table 5-27). Majorities still respond that they have "great" or "considerable" respect for the United States, but

TABLE 5-25
 GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICANS
 (percentages)

Question: "Generally speaking, do you like the Americans, or don't you like them particularly?"

	<u>Like Them</u>	<u>Don't Like</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Col 1 minus Col 2</u>
1957	39	24	37	+15
1961	51	16	33	+35
1962	54	18	28	+36
1965	58	19	23	+39
1967	47	24	29	+23
1973	48	24	28	+24
1975	42	21	37	+21
1978	50	23	27	+27
1979	50	23	27	+27
1980	51	22	27	+29
1981	56	18	26	+36
1982	53	22	25	+31

Source: Noelle-Neumann (1981:420). Original cited:
 Allenbach. Schweigler (1984:97).

TABLE 5-26
 ITALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES
 (percentages)

Question: What is your opinion of the United States?

	<u>Very Good/ Good</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Bad Very Bad</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Col 1 minus Columns 2 and 3</u>
1954	59	16	10	15	+33
1955	67	15	6	12	+46
1956	73	12	6	9	+55
1957	70	12	9	9	+49
1958	67	12	14	7	+41
1959	71	13	5	11	+53
1960	58	18	6	18	+34
1961	59	20	6	15	+33
1962	64	14	3	19	+47
1963	71	12	3	14	+56
1964	76	9	2	13	+65
1965	65	12	3	20	+50
1969	57	21	5	17	+31
1972	68	21	8	3	+39
1973	66	20	9	5	+37
1976	41	35	16	9	- 9
1981	52	38	9	1	+ 5

Source: Rossi (1985:197). Original cited: Doxa Institute.

TABLE 5-27
 EUROPEAN RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES
 (percentages)

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>1972</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1981</u>
Great/ Considerable	81	62	82	56	80	75	70	54
Little/ Very Little	16	23	14	28	17	22	19	42
No Answer	3	15	4	16	3	3	11	4
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Row 1 - Row 2)	+65	+39	+68	+28	+63	+53	+51	+12

Source: Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl (1984:118). Original cited: National Journal.

Note: Question wording was not provided.

the margins are reduced, especially in West Germany and Britain.

The one dimension in which there has been a large decrease in favorable opinion is in European confidence in the ability of the United States to provide leadership for dealing with world problems. There is no comparable data available for France, but Table 5-28 displays the trends for West Germany, Italy, and Britain. The effects are not as great in Italy where a majority are still confident in the leadership of the United States, but in West Germany only 35% and in Britain only 20% continue to have confidence in the ability of the United States to deal with world problems.

These data indicate that Europeans distinguish between the American people and the United States government, and between the United States and its policies. In other words, they "continue to like the United States . . . they have come to distrust United States leadership and judgment" (Schneider, 1983:6). In 1961 almost 80% of the West Germans and a majority of the British responded that they trusted the leadership of the United States, and in Italy in 1972 over 70% felt the same; these levels of confidence have declined considerably (Table 5-28).

This lack of confidence by the public is a reflection of the increasing willingness of European governments to pursue policies different from those espoused by the United States. The justification is that national interests vary.

TABLE 5-28
 EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
 (percentages)

Question: How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to provide wise leadership for the West in dealing with present world problems?

Column A: Vary Great/Considerable
 Column B: Not Very Much/None
 Column C: Column A minus Column B

	<u>West Germany</u>			<u>Italy</u>			<u>Britain</u>		
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
1960	57	22	+35	46	29	+17	35	51	+16
1961	79	11	+68	53	18	+35	53	32	+21
1962	72	22	+50	55	22	+33	43	44	- 1
1963	75	9	+66	61	15	+46	51	33	+18
1970	a	a	a	a	a	a	29	55	-26
1972	a	a	a	71	23	+48	30	57	-27
1973	a	a	a	69	23	+46	29	59	-30
1974	a	a	a	a	a	a	33	57	-24
1975	a	a	a	a	a	a	32	56	-24
1976	a	a	a	a	a	a	33	53	-20
1977	a	a	a	a	a	a	49	43	+ 6
1978	a	a	a	a	a	a	36	51	-15
1979	35	54	-18	a	a	a	28	60	-32
1980	34	56	-22	a	a	a	29	60	-31
1981	42	47	- 5	61	35	+26	30	60	-30
1982	57	40	+17	53	28	+25	27	67	-40
1983	43	55	-12	55	34	+21	24	70	-46
1984	35	55	-20	a	a	a	22	73	-51
1985	a	a	a	a	a	a	20	74	-54

Sources:

All: 1960-1963, Merritt and Puchala (1968:259); original cited: USICA.

Germany: 1979-1981, Noelle-Neumann (1982:419-420); original cited: Allensbach. 1982-1983, Schweigler (1984:99); original cited: EMNID. 1985, Hastings and Hastings (1986:591); original cited: Gallup.

Italy: Rossi (1985:198); original cited: Doxa Institute.

Britain: 1970-1984, Crewe (1984:49); original cited: Gallup. 1985, Hastings and Hastings (1986:234); original cited: Gallup.

Note: "Don't Know" responses not displayed.

The European position is often that they do not share the global interests of the United States. The subjects of disagreement are familiar: the lack of an agreed response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; disappointment over the failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty; the series of arguments surrounding economic relations with the East, most notably the Siberian gas pipeline; uncertainty regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative; and most recently alarm over plans by the United States to exceed the SALT II arms limits.

The perception is that the United States, in its dealings with the Soviet Union, is putting European interests and security at risk. Within this context, it is not the reliability of the United States, but instead its political judgment that is being called into question. The United States may be viewed as an ally that is too dependable, and overly aggressive and confrontational. Looking back at Table 5-9, sizeable minorities in West Germany, Italy, and Britain responded that "U.S. aggressive policy toward the USSR" was the major cause of international tension.

These attitudes and policies have led to the desire of Europeans to distance themselves somewhat from the United States. Increasingly, Europeans prefer to stay out of any East-West competition (Table 5-29). By 1981, majorities in France, Italy, and Britain preferred to avoid disputes

TABLE 5-29
 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP
 (percentages)

Question: (1952) "Do you personally think that (country) should be on the side of the West at this time, on the side of the East, or not be on either side?"

Question: (1963) "In the present world situation, do you personally think that, on the whole, (country) should side with the United States, with the USSR, or with neither?"

Question: (1981) "Should our government generally side with the United States in disputes between the United States and the USSR if they involve (survey country's) important interests or should it do everything possible to stay out of disputes between the United States and the USSR?"

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	'52	'63 '81	'52	'63 '81	'52	'63 '81	'52	'63 '81
West/US	42	27 26	58	77 45	40	49 32	57	49 29
Neither	43	54 58	31	16 41	42	38 65	28	38 64
East	4	5 a	0	1 a	3	2 a	0	2 a
Don't Know	11	14 16	11	6 14	15	11 3	15	11 7
TOTALS	100%	100% 100%	100%	100% 100%	100%	100% 100%	100%	100% 100%
(Row 1 - 2+3)	-5	-32 -32	+27	+60 +4	-5	+9 -33	+29	+9 -35

Source: Questions 1 and 2, Merritt and Puchala (1968:220,221,222); original cited: USICA. Question 3, Shaffer (1982:46); original cited: USICA.

[a] Response not offered.

instead of support the United States. There is a fear of being tied to the United States too firmly and, as a result, of being drawn into an unwanted confrontation. According to this view, the military relationship with the United States, which ensures its reliability in a crisis, is believed to make a crisis for Europe more likely. These contradictory tendencies portend continued difficulties between the United States and Europe.

Four features of European attitudes toward the United States are apparent. First, as a reliable military ally, the United States receives high marks; there is little change in the European belief in the American willingness to defend them. Second, there are generally favorable views of the United States; Europeans continue to like Americans. The third feature, however, is the broad decline in European respect and confidence in the ability of the United States to handle world problems and to provide leadership for the West. The result of this change has brought about the fourth feature: a desire on the part of Europeans to distance themselves from United States policies and any East-West competition.

These attitudes toward the United States are related to the changes in the other assumptions discussed previously. As images of the Soviet threat decline, so also must the perceived need for United States leadership and assistance decline proportionately. Additionally, as perceptions of security become increasingly identical with maintaining

peace and an East-West dialogue, efforts by the United States to maintain a European military balance and to contain Soviet influence elsewhere will become increasingly viewed as being provocative and confrontational. The seeds of two opposing world views are evident in West European attitudes. One reflects the original assumptions. The other perceives a less threatening Soviet Union, a more threatening United States, and a security system based on diplomacy. If these discontinuities continue to grow, they will create increasing difficulties within Euro-American relations.

Conclusion

Three broad generalizations are evident from the mass of opinion data presented above. First, a fear of the Soviet Union is subsiding and is being replaced by an increasing fear of the consequences of war. Second, support for NATO in an abstract, general sense remains high, but there is no consensus on what the components of security should be, especially in regard to nuclear weapons. Third, anti-Americanism is increasing dramatically in regard to the roles of the United States as defender of Europe and as leader of the Alliance. That which was once seen as necessary for European security--the commitment of United States power and leadership to the defense of Europe--is now viewed as that which is threatening the security of Western Europe.

The future implications of the attitudinal trends observed in this chapter depend on whether they represent broad secular changes or temporary fluctuations. The longitudinal data presented indicate fundamental changes in European attitudes. The extent to which these attitudes continue along their current course will influence proportionately intra-Alliance cohesion. Additional diplomatic and domestic political confrontations such as those with the Euro-missile issue cannot be sustained indefinitely.

For the near term, a sense of frustration will surround European security attitudes. If the Soviet Union is viewed as threatening, the Europeans have two realistic options: continue to rely on the United States or defend themselves. The first is becoming less attractive as the anti-American sentiment shows, and the second receives very little support at all. In the midst of this dilemma, many Europeans are denying the premise of a Soviet threat altogether, or at least they are perceiving a greatly reduced threat. The promise of arms control and East-West negotiations are also being embraced as a means of providing security. According to the former NATO commander, General Rogers: "The biggest challenge we face in NATO is getting the message across to our people that there is a threat to their freedom down the road" (cited in Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:5-6).

The manner in which Western governments attempt to get such a message across to their citizens, however, will greatly affect how the message is received. Renewed efforts

to modernize or increase nuclear forces, intrasigence in the face of Soviet proposals that appear reasonable, and indications of an open-ended arms race may result at some point in a well-spring of anti-American and anti-NATO dissent in Europe.

Currently, many of the attitudinal trends observed in this chapter remain minority positions. If future policies of NATO and the United States fail to reassure the public, eventually not only the policies but the Alliance itself may become a source of controversy. Issues may become sufficiently salient to foment increased political activism which might challenge established security policies.

Notes

¹Exceptions are Feld and Wildgen (1982), Flynn and Rattinger (1985), Merritt and Puchala (1966), Noelle-Neumann (1981a), and Schweigler (1984).

²In cases where the exact wording of a question is either not known or it is being paraphrased, the question wording in the tables will not be placed within quotation marks. Question wordings in the tables within quotation marks are exact as reported by the sources.

³The construction of this variable is explained in Appendix A.

CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

It is essential to develop an understanding of why the West European public has altered its perceptions of security affairs. If broad, unidirectional shifts of opinion are occurring, the future cohesion of the Alliance must be questioned. If, on the other hand, the changes represent temporary fluctuations, the prospects for continued or improved Euro-American harmony are better. Decision makers and analysts need to comprehend the nature of these attitudinal changes in order to formulate sound policies.

Four theoretical explanations were introduced in Chapter I. Three of these--the Successor Generation, Postmaterialism, and Modernization--were examined with cross-sectional data in Chapter IV and found to have only marginal explanatory values (using high education and the new middle class as indicators of modernization). These sociological influences are not negligible, and they each contribute to an understanding of attitude change, but they are not sufficient. The results in Chapter IV pointed to partisanship, ideology, and national identity as the more important attitudinal determinants.

This chapter initially examines the fourth theoretical argument: that events in international politics (period effects) have caused Europeans to alter their security beliefs. (This represents the third level of determinants from the model presented in Figure 2-2.) Patterns of conflict and cooperation within the arenas of East-West relations and Euro-American relations are used to subjectively correlate international events with the trends in European opinion. The chapter also addresses some of the other political and social explanations for attitude change.

International Politics

Several fundamental changes have occurred within the international system since World War II that, along with some key events, may have had more to do with attitude change than any of the political or social variables discussed previously. A considerable body of research exists linking events with opinion (Dalton and Duval, 1986; Deutsch and Merritt, 1965; Mueller, 1965; Rosenau, 1962). These and other studies attempt to establish that foreign policy beliefs reflect the impact of events and the changing international environment.

This section makes some impressionistic observations of the effects of international events on European security beliefs. Opinion trends are plotted from which the impact of events are inferred. More rigorous, empirical methods are preferred but are beyond the limitations of this study.

An example of the rigorous techniques is Dalton and Duval (1986). They developed a quantitative model explaining British opinion on EEC membership as a function of media reported events. The model demonstrated that political events systematically altered support for EEC membership in Britain. Such methods enable one to confidently measure the degree of effect and the dynamics of the events-opinion relationship. Again, this is not attempted here.

Tables 6-1 and 6-2 depict prominent events of the postwar era. The first contains those relevant to East-West relations and the second to Euro-American relations. Events are categorized as either conflictual or cooperative, realizing that these concepts have different connotations in each environment. For example, East-West conflict usually involves crises and the implicit threat of war, while Euro-American conflict involves policy disputes or disillusionments.

Initially, East-West relations were extremely conflictual. Soviet involvement in Greece and Turkey was met with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Communist coup in Prague, the Berlin Blockade, and the Korean War were critical events in the Cold War. European and Euro-American relations were highly cooperative in the face of the Soviet threat. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed, United States forces were deployed to Europe, West Germany was admitted into NATO, and the EEC was formed.

TABLE 6-1
EVENTS IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP

<u>Conflictual</u>	<u>Cooperative</u>
Churchill's "iron curtain" speech	1946
Greece and Turkey; Truman Doctrine	1947
Coup in Prague; Berlin blockade	1948
N. Atlantic Treaty	1949
Korean War	1950
US Forces to Europe	1951
	1952
	1953
	1954
E. German revolt	1955
W. Ger. joins NATO; Warsaw Pact est.	1956
Revolt in Hungary	1957
Sputnik	1958
	1959
	1960
USSR shoots 2 US spy planes	1961
Berlin Wall; Bay of Pigs	1962
Cuban missile crisis	1963
	1964
	1965
	1966
	1967
Vietnam	1968
Invasion of Czechoslovakia	1969
	1970
	"Hotline"; Test Ban Treaty
	Fall of Khrushchev
	Nuke Non-proliferation Treaty
	W. Ger. Ostpolitik begins

Continued

TABLE 6-1

CONTINUED

<u>Conflictual</u>	<u>Cooperative</u>
	1971 Berlin Settlement
	1972 SALT I; ABM Treaty; Nixon to Moscow
Mideast War	1973 MBFR Talks
	1974 Vladivostok Guidelines
Jackson-Vanik Admendment	1975 Helsinki Agreements
Communist regime in Angola	1976
	1977
	1978
USSR aids Ethiopia; SS20s arrive	1979 Carter-Brezhnev meet; SALT II
USSR invades Afghanistan	1980
SALT II "withdrawn"; embargo	1981
Martial law in Poland; sanctions	1982
Reagan military buildup	1983
Grenada; SDI	1984
Nicaragua; START ends	1985 START resumes; Geneva Summit
Libya; US drops SALT II limits	1986 USSR moratorium on nuke testing

TABLE 6-2

EVENTS IN THE EURO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

<u>Conflictual</u>	<u>Cooperative</u>
	1946
	1947
	1948
	1949
	1950
	1951
	1952
	1953
	1954
	1955
	1956
	1957
	1958
	1959
	1960
	1961
	1962
	1963
	1964
	1965
	1966
	1967
	1968
	1969
	1970
Anglo-French Suez Crisis	Marshall Plan
	Berlin Airlift
	N. Atlantic Treaty
	US Forces to Europe
	W. Ger. Joins NATO
	EEC
Bay of Pigs	Cuban missile crisis
French vetoes entry of UK into EEC	
US Forces to Vietnam; bombing in N.	
France withdraws from NATO	
Tet Offensive	
My Lai	
US invades Cambodia; Kent State	
	Continued

TABLE 6-2

CONTINUED

<u>Conflictual</u>	<u>Cooperative</u>
	1971
Mideast War; OPEC	1972
Watergate	1973 UK joins EEC
	1974
	1975
	1976
Schmidt's comments on nuclear weapons	1977
Neutron Bomb issue	1978
Iran; US Embassy; Oil Shock II	1979 NATO "Dual-Track" Decision on INF
Failed rescue mission	1980
Reagan buildup; economic recession	1981
INF protest; pipeline issue	1982 Falklands
Grenada; SDI	1983 Elections in Germany and Britain
US policy in Central America	1984 INF deployment
	1985
Libya; US drops SALT II limits	1986
Iran Arms Scandal	1987

This initial pattern of conflictual East-West relations and cooperative Euro-American relations provided an international environment in which European attitudes were highly consensual and supportive of joint Western defense policies as Chapter V indicated.

Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, East-West relations thawed and the Cold War more or less ended (Table 6-1). Many cooperative events now characterized the East-West relationship: the "hotline" was established between Moscow and Washington, the Test Ban Treaty was signed, West Germany's Ostpolitik began, and the centerpiece of the second period, SALT I, was signed in 1972.

During the period after the Cuban missile crisis, however, trans-Atlantic tensions arose as seen in Table 6-2. (The pressure applied by the United States on Britain and France to withdraw from their Suez expedition, in 1956, presaged the conflictual events of the 1960s and 1970s.) France withdrew from the military structure of NATO, America's support of Israel in the 1973 Mideast war was blamed for OPEC's quadrupling the price of oil, and Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany began to publically question the effect of superpower arms control on European security.

The principal event in regard to Euro-American relations during this second period was America's involvement in Vietnam. Demonstrations and protests in Europe rivaled those in the United States. "On October 21, 1967, the international Vietnam Day, protest demonstrations streamed

through London, Paris, Berlin, Rome . . ." (Grosser, 1982:246). More than just seen as a wrongheaded policy, Vietnam profoundly altered the image of the United States in Europe. In the eyes of many Europeans, the war was "unmasking the true face, the true nature of America" (Grosser, 1982:246).

This pattern of cooperative East-West encounters and negative Euro-American relations explains the shift in European attitudes observed in Chapter V. Support for the United States and traditional security measures was eroding during this period. The Soviet Union no longer appeared as threatening, the image of the United States was tarnished, and the prospect of arms control and of negotiations as a means to security was promising. This second period was one of transition; events and attitudes were changing but a new baseline had not been reached.

Two events occurred in 1979 which mark it as the turning point for a third pattern, just as the Cuban missile crisis delineates the first two. Of greatest importance was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which jolted European attitudes about the nature of the USSR and created renewed East-West tensions. The other key event was NATO's dual-track decision regarding INF; this apparently cooperative event proved to be the cause for the extensive protest and anti-American movements that occurred in Britain, Holland, West Germany, and elsewhere in Western Europe.

East-West relations reverted to being conflictual following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Martial law being declared in Poland, the Soviets walking out on the START talks, Reagan's military buildup, Grenada, SDI, the Libyan bombing, and other events created what has been termed "Cold War II" (Spanier, 1983). However, in the midst of this East-West conflict, Euro-American relations did not improve and in some ways appear to have deteriorated further. Mass protests in Europe over INF, the Siberian pipeline issue, SDI, Grenada, Reagan's Central American policies, the Libyan raid, the United States exceeding the limits of SALT II, and the Iranian arms scandal, have all contributed to a worsening of trans-Atlantic relations.

This third period, therefore, is characterized by a new pattern of events: conflict in both the East-West and the Euro-American arenas. Europeans are faced with the dilemma of two, in their view, unsavory prospects. The USSR is once again appearing as a threat, but United States policies are not reassuring either. In this post-1979 environment, as seen in Chapter V, European attitudes toward the United States and Atlantic security policy continued to deteriorate rather than recover.

The three patterns evident in the discussion above can be labeled as follows:

1946-1962 Cold War Consensus


1963-1978 Vietnam-Detente Interlude

1979-1987 Reagan-Afghanistan Dilemma

In the first, East-West relations were conflictual, Euro-American ties were cooperative, and European public support for Atlanticism was high. In the second period, one of transition, East-West interactions were cooperative, but Euro-American relations were deteriorating, thus causing shifts to occur in European public perceptions. The third period is characterized by conflictual relationships in both arenas and a continued decline in European Atlanticist sentiment.

Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 depict attitudes toward the United States over time in three European countries. They all illustrate the large decline in favorable views of the United States that occurred during the second period, 1963-1978. The German attitudes reflect the ambivalence of the third period with large swings, but no overall recovery to the level of the first period. Britain illustrates the consistent decline in confidence in the United States during the third period despite increased East-West tensions.


The three periods are also evident in the longitudinal data on the fear of war (Figure 6-4). The first period is marked by a high level of fear but this decreases and levels out during the second period. In 1980, in each case, the fear of war increases to extremely high levels in each country as a result of Afghanistan (this rapidly decreases by 1985, however). Comparing Figure 6-4 to the first three figures, the absence in 1980 of a comparable shift in attitudes toward the United States is notable. There was



Source: Table 5-28.

Note: The Y-axis represents the difference between the percentage of respondents who are "very/fairly" confident in the United States and those who are "not very/not at all" confident of the United States.


Figure 6-1. West German attitudes toward the United States.



Source: Table 5-26.

Note: The Y-axis represents the difference between the percentage of respondents who have a "very good/good" opinion of the United States and those who have a "bad/very bad" opinion.


Figure 6-2. Italian attitudes toward the United States.



Source: Table 5-28.

Note: The Y-axis represents the difference between the percentage of respondents who have a "very great/considerable" amount of confidence in the United States and those who have "not very much/very little/none."

Figure 6-3. British attitudes toward the United States.



Source: Table 5-7.


Note: The Y-axis represents the percentage of respondents responding that there is a 50% chance or better of war.

Figure 6-4. European attitudes toward the possibility of war.

no connection. Renewed fears of war in 1980 along with increased conflictual East-West events were not converted into renewed confidence in the United States. This is the distinctive characteristic of the third period: negative events in both spheres of relationships along with negative European Atlantic attitudes.

The nature of this third and current period is made more complex because throughout the second period the balance of power in the world shifted gradually to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The SALT I agreement was a sort of official recognition of the existence of nuclear parity between the superpowers. European recognition came a bit later with Schmidt's comments in 1977 that eventually led to the 1979 INF decision. The condition of parity casts doubts on the deterrent effect of United States nuclear weapons and highlights the degree to which European conventional forces may be inadequate. This adds to the European dilemma and fosters attitudes of frustration. Simultaneously, they are unwilling to spend more for larger conventional forces, and they also tend to oppose nuclear modernization.

The European public is aware of the shifting military balance. In all four countries, the perception is that the military standing of the United States (and NATO) has declined throughout the second and third periods (Figure 6-5).



Source: Table 5-6.

Note: The Y-axis represents the difference between the percentage of respondents who feel the United States (NATO or the West) is ahead of the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact or the East) in military strength from those who feel the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact or the East) is ahead.

Figure 6-5. European perceptions of the military balance.

The chief consequence of this shift in the strategic balance is as much psychological and political as military (Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984:5). The growth of Soviet power increases the risks and costs of responding to Soviet challenges around the world and in Europe. Since a miscalculation during a crisis might result in the nuclear devastation of Europe, the European public is hesitant to encourage the United States to confront the Soviet Union abroad. Therefore, measures the United States views as being responses to the Soviet Union (for example, in Central America), Europeans perceive as being provocative or reckless.

Another aspect of this third period is Soviet intrusion into West European domestic politics. Open, advanced industrial societies are known to be susceptible to "penetration" by the political participation of nonmembers (Rosenau, 1966). Russian policies and offers have come to be known as "peace offensives." Some of these include the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, their resumption of arms control negotiations, and various proposals regarding strategic arms limitations. Some of these were Soviet efforts to influence the 1983 elections in Britain and West Germany. These cooperative efforts increased in 1985 and 1986 under the Gorbachev regime as Table 6-1 indicates. Possibly, a fourth phase of East-West relations may have been ushered in with Gorbachev. These Soviet moves, once considered heavy-handed, are becoming

more sophisticated, and in the future they may have increased influence on West European opinion and long-term attitude change.

The patterns discerned in the events considered here seem to explain the broad changes in European attitudes observed earlier. Initially, conflictual East-West relations and cooperative Euro-American relations produced the Cold War consensus during which NATO was created and the assumptions of the Atlantic Alliance were formed. Cooperative East-West relations, the recognition of nuclear parity, and disgruntled trans-Atlantic relations during the Vietnam-Detente interlude challenged the initial assumptions of NATO, and European attitudes gradually changed. Currently, negative events dominate both arenas, and European attitudes continue to shift away from the immediate postwar Atlantic consensus. Thus, trends in international politics (period effects) contribute to an explanation for the shift in European opinion.

Alternative Explanations for Attitudinal Change

This section examines partisanship, Postmaterialism, and the Successor Generation as alternative explanations for attitudinal change. Longitudinal data are not available for observing the long-term effects of increasing education and changing class structure.

Partisanship

The cross-sectional data in Chapter IV provided an initial analysis of some hypothesized causal factors. The findings largely minimized the relative effects of class, education, and political participation. Of the political and social variables observed, ideology and partisanship were associated most strongly with the attitudes being tested. There are no earlier data cross-tabulated by ideology or party available to determine whether this relationship has increased or decreased.

Although partisanship and ideology may have substantial discriminating power at a single point in time, their ability to explain broad aggregate attitude change over time must be questioned for two reasons. First, if people feel strongly about an issue, especially if it dominates their political outlook, they will tend to seek out and identify with the party whose position on this issue is closest to their own. The rapid rise of the SDP-Liberal Alliance in Britain in the 1980s can be explained in part by the disenchantment of many voters with the anti-NATO and unilateral proposals of the Labour Party (Lieber, 1985:11).

Second, if new issues emerge within public opinion without being led by a major party, one or more parties may alter their platforms and attempt to co-opt the issue to capitalize electorally on popular emotion. This pattern was seen in the anti-missile and anti-American positions of the

SPD in West Germany as it tried to win back votes it felt it would lose to the Greens in 1983 (Conradt, 1983).

Both of these types of shifts will tend to increase the association between party preference and issue positions, but they do not explain aggregate attitudinal change over time. To the extent, however, that parties clarify positions and educate their loyalists, they can contribute to shifts in opinion. People who care less intensely about particular issues will thus receive information about how "their" party views a problem, and if they have not held any opinions on the issue before, they may adopt the party's position. This mobilizing function of parties can influence longitudinal trends in aggregate opinion. Although these mobilizing effects cannot be assessed here, this is not to discount the very substantial political implications of the partisan nature of these attitudes.

Postmaterialism

The hypothesized relationship between Postmaterialism and anti-Atlanticism was tested in Chapter IV, and a substantial association was observed. Inglehart (1984b) has proposed that a linkage between Postmaterialism and anti-Americanism exists. On a specific question relating to anti-Americanism in 1982, there was a large distinction between the responses of Postmaterialists and Materialists (Table 6-3). The question here, however, is to determine to

TABLE 6-3
 ANTI-AMERICANISM AND POSTMATERIALISM IN EUROPE, 1982
 (percentages)

Question: "Recently there have been some expressions of anti-American feelings among West Europeans. How would you describe your own feelings? Strongly anti-American, somewhat anti-American, somewhat pro-American, or strongly pro-American?"

(percentage "strongly" or "somewhat" anti-American)

	<u>France</u>	<u>W. Ger.</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>
Materialist	26	16	13	25
Mixed	29	19	19	37
Postmaterialist	44	41	42	43

Source: Inglehart (1984b:532); original cited:
Eurobarometer 17, April 1982.

what extent Postmaterialism can explain the large aggregate change in Atlantic attitudes.

There are no data available to observe the long-term relationship between Postmaterialism and defense attitudes. However, trends in the prevalence of Postmaterial values since 1970 are available (Table 6-4). Although the absolute numbers of Postmaterialists have not increased that much (+8% in Britain is the largest overall increase), the percent difference between the Materialists and the Postmaterialists has changed considerably. The largest changes are in West Germany and Britain where there are now almost as many of one type as the other; however, Materialists exceed Postmaterialists by wide margins in France and Italy, illustrating the large cross-national variations.

These findings suggest an explanation for one of the more puzzling aspects of West European political behavior. It was noted previously that France and Italy have not experienced the massive anti-missile and anti-American demonstrations that have become familiar in West Germany and Britain. According to Table 6-4, Postmaterial values are substantially more prevalent in those countries where the demonstrations have taken place. Deep-seated value change, in Britain and West Germany, produced by unique national and economic conditions could contribute to an understanding of these cross-national differences.

TABLE 6-4

CHANGES IN PREVALENCE OF MATERIALIST AND POSTMATERIALIST
VALUE TYPES, 1970-1984

(percentage falling into the two types)

	<u>France</u>			<u>West Germany</u>			<u>Italy</u>			<u>Britain</u>		
	<u>Mat</u>	<u>P-M</u>	<u>PDI[a]</u>	<u>Mat</u>	<u>P-M</u>	<u>PDI</u>	<u>Mat</u>	<u>P-M</u>	<u>PDI</u>	<u>Mat</u>	<u>P-M</u>	<u>PDI</u>
1970	38%	11%	-27	43%	10%	-33	35%	13%	-22	36%	8%	-28
1973	35	12	-23	42	8	-34	40	9	-31	32	8	-24
1976	41	12	-29	41	11	-30	41	11	-30	35	8	-28
1979	36	15	-21	37	11	-26	47	10	-37	27	11	-16
1980	43	10	-33	43	8	-35	51	5	-46	31	10	-21
1981	43	8	-35	36	6	-30	53	5	-48	33	7	-26
1982	33	11	-22	29	12	-17	44	6	-38	25	13	-12
1983	32	12	-20	22	17	-5	47	6	-41	26	11	-15
1984	35	12	-23	19	17	-2	43	9	-34	23	16	-7
Change	-3	+1	+4	-24	+7	+31	+8	-4	-12	-13	+8	+21

Source: Inglehart (1981:888). Eurobarometers 14, 16, 18, 20, and 21.

[a] Percent Difference Index. The percentage Post-materialist minus the percentage Materialist.

Note: The categories "neither" and "don't know" are not displayed. Construction of the variable for measuring Postmaterialism is explained in Chapter IV.

Additionally, West German and British attitudes seem to have become more anti-American than those of the French and Italians (Tables 5-27 and 5-28). Anti-Americanism may be more strongly associated with Postmaterialism than the other attitudes observed earlier.

These suggestions of a casual relationship between Postmaterialism and a decline in Atlantic attitudes are based upon indirect inferences. Insufficient data prevent more sophisticated analysis, but the logic and findings are complementary. Postmaterialism may eventually prove to be a substantial explanation for broader changes in European attitudes.

The Successor Generation

Generational change is a compelling theory for explaining attitudinal change. In this view, the values and attitudes formed early in life remain dominant throughout adulthood. Different circumstances and conditions encountered during early socialization produce distinctive values from one generation to the next. According to those who apply this theory to security attitudes, the post-World War II generation in Europe is substantially more anti-American and anti-NATO than others because it was socialized during the Vietnam War, detente, and the era of mutual assured destruction (Szabo, 1983b).

The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. The data in Chapter IV produced relatively weak associations between age

and Atlantic attitudes. Nonetheless, some published findings of cross-sectional data present some persuasive indicators of the presence of a relationship. Table 6-5 displays German responses to four questions by age. These data, especially Questions 1 and 3, reflect significant differences between age groups.

The variables of age and education are often combined to demonstrate stronger generational effects (Adler and Wertman, 1981; Russett and DeLuca, 1983; Szabo, 1983b). Table 6-6 displays the responses of university educated Italians to five questions. Again, there are significant differences between age groups. According to Table 6-7, given the choice between NATO and neutralism, younger Europeans with university educations in all four countries favor NATO substantially less than the older age groups.

Extended time series data are necessary to perform proper cohort analyses to reach conclusions of any certainty regarding the ability of the Successor Generation argument to explain attitude change. The observed distinctions in Tables 6-5, 6-6, and 6-7 could be the result of life-cycle effects. In commenting on similar data, Flynn and Rattinger note: "This is not at all new or exciting: the younger and better-educated have long been a driving force of protest at least since the student unrest in the sixties" (1985:378).

The available machine-readable data from the Eurobarometer series contain only one appropriate question

TABLE 6-5
 THE EFFECTS OF AGE ON WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES
 TOWARD NATO AND THE U.S.

(percentages)

	<u>Age Groups</u>						<u>AVG</u>
	<u>18-24</u>	<u>25-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-</u>	
1. Percent "relations between US and FRG are bad" (August 1982)	51	43	40	39	42	38	41

2. Percent "NATO is not necessary" (May 1983)	18	15	10	8	10	7	10

	<u>Age Groups</u>				<u>AVG</u>		
	<u>16-29</u>	<u>30-44</u>	<u>45-59</u>	<u>60+</u>			
3. Percent with "little or no" confidence in US leadership (May 1981)	51	53	49	33	47		

4. Percent favoring "neutrality" over NATO (July 1980)	33	25	27	23	27		

Source: For Questions 1 and 2, Rattinger (1985:166);
 original cited: ZDF-Politbarometer. For Questions 3 and 4,
 Noelle-Neumann (1981:418, 420); original cited: Allensbach.

TABLE 6-6
 THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND EDUCATION ON ITALIAN ATTITUDES, 1981
 (percentages)

-
- Question 1: Attitudes toward defense expenditures.
 Question 2: Attitudes toward deployment of intermediate nuclear forces.
 Question 3: Attitudes toward the United States.
 Question 4: The desirability of U.S. leadership.
 Question 5: Support for neutralism.
-

(responses are only from those with a university education)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Age Groups</u>				<u>Average</u>
	<u>-34</u>	<u>35-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55+</u>	
1. Percent "decrease"	47	40	36	27	39
2. Percent "against"	69	58	48	34	55
3. Percent "unfavorable"	45	38	29	19	35
4. Percent "a little/none"	66	60	52	35	55
5. Percent "favoring"	40	31	24	12	29

Source: Rossi (1985:205, 206, 208, 209, 214); original cited: Doxa.

TABLE 6-7

PERCENTAGE OF UNIVERSITY-EDUCATED PEOPLE WHO FAVOR NATO
OVER NEUTRALISM, BY AGE, MARCH 1981

Question: "All things considered, do you think it is better for our country to belong to NATO, the Western defense alliance, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?"

	(percentage favoring NATO)		
	<u>18-34</u>	<u>35-49</u>	<u>50 and older</u>
West Germany	59	63	95
Britain	62	70	86
France	53	61	79
Italy	56	82	81

Source: Adler and Wertman (1981:10); original cited, USICA.

with sufficient elapsed time between the time periods it was asked to allow for a cohort analysis. Table 6-8 displays the data for a cohort analysis of a question concerning "trust for the United States."¹ In each case the aggregate trust for the United States decreased, so the question is to what extent did generational change contribute to this shift. In France, generational influences explain nothing about a decrease in trust because the Tau B statistic indicates the association is negative for the French; the younger cohorts have greater trust for the United States than the older ones. In West Germany and Italy the values for Tau B are slight, indicating that the generational effects (whether cohort or life-cycle) exist, but that they are weak.

In a condition in which all of the variation between time periods is due to cohort (generational change) effects, there will be no variation within individual cohorts across time periods; also, the variation from the younger to the older age levels will be in opposite direction from the aggregate variation between time periods (Glenn, 1984). The first condition cannot be met in any of the countries but the second one is evident in West Germany and Italy.²

A rough estimate of the cohort and period effects can be achieved by comparing the mean intracohort variation with the aggregate change (Glenn, 1984).³ For Germany, the mean intracohort variation (for the nine cohorts with two time

TABLE 6-8
 EUROPEAN TRUST FOR THE UNITED STATES:
 A COHORT ANALYSIS

(percent with very much/some trust)								
Cohorts: (birth yrs)	Ages		France		W. Ger.		Italy	
	1970	1982	1970	1982	1970	1982	1970-1982	1970-1982
-----Postwar Generation-----								
1960-1964	na	18-22	na	66	na	64	na	55
1955-1959	na	23-27	na	60	na	63	na	56
1950-1954	16-20	28-32	70	61	79	64	72	61
-----Cold War Generation-----								
1946-1949	21-24	33-36	69	51	79	76	72	66
1941-1945	25-29	37-41	70	62	85	77	72	70
-----WW II Generation-----								
1936-1940	30-34	42-46	61	52	85	85	71	64
1931-1935	35-39	47-51	66	45	83	77	74	55
1926-1930	40-44	52-56	63	55	82	75	74	61
-----Depression Generation-----								
1921-1925	45-49	57-61	73	53	79	83	67	60
1916-1920	50-54	62-66	52	58	87	63	75	60
-----WW I Generation-----								
1906-1915	55-64	67+	59	57	80	71	75	60
-1905	65+	na	63	na	78	na	78	na

Aggregate Average			65%	58%	82%	70%	74%	60%
Aggregate Change				-7		-12		-14
N =			1849	980	1896	1207	1669	1108
Tau B =			-.04	-.05	.01	.10	.10	.04
p <			(.02)	(.02)	(.27)	(.01)	(.01)	(.05)

Source: European Community Study (1970); Eurobarometer 17 (1982).

Note: 1970 data not available for Britain.

periods) is -8. Thus, of the 12 points of aggregate change, 8 (or 66%) can be attributed to period effects, and 4 (33%) to cohort effects. For Italy, the mean intracohort variation is -11. So, of the -14 points of aggregate change in Italy, 11 (79%) are the result of period effects, and 3 (21%) of cohort effects.

These computations assume there are no life-cycle effects. To the extent that they are present they would contribute to the intracohort variation. Estimates of the intracohort change to be attributed to life-cycle effects can be computed (Glenn, 1984).⁴ For both Germany and Italy, the estimated life-cycle effects are in the opposite direction of the observed mean intracohort variation. This means that the two influences (period effects and life-cycle) are working against each other. For Germany, the estimated life-cycle effect is a +2 mean intracohort change, which means that to achieve a -8 intracohort change, period effects had to be substantially stronger. Similarly in Italy, the estimated life-cycle effect is a +1.5 mean intracohort change, so to achieve a -11 mean intracohort change, period effects would again have to be much stronger. Also, in a pure environment of only life-cycle effects, there would be no aggregate change. Thus, period effects appear to have completely overshadowed life-cycle effects in producing intracohort change.

These computations provide only suggestions of the relative effects. They are not precise measurements. The

difficulty is that only two effects can be compared at any one time (Glenn, 1984). Nonetheless, for the data in Table 6-8 the conclusion is that period effects provide the best explanation for the aggregate shift to less trust for the United States. This reinforces the earlier findings in this chapter on the importance of international events. More complete time series data are necessary to reach any definitive answers regarding the applicability of generational theory to account for the changes in Atlantic attitudes.

Conclusion

Politics more than sociological processes accounts for the decline in Atlanticism among the West European public. The changes in the international system and the patterns of political events outlined in this chapter explain more about the attitudinal trends in Europe than do the variables of age, class, Postmaterialism, and education. The sociological variables are useful for understanding the cross-sectional composition of various issue publics, but they do not sufficiently explain the longitudinal changes in European security beliefs. Additionally, the political variables of partisanship and ideology along with the cultural variable of nationality reveal more substantive cross-sectional information on these issues than do the sociological factors (from Chapter IV).

Other international political phenomena, for which data were not provided in this chapter, also support the conclusion of the importance of period effects. The world has changed significantly since the early 1960s. The birth of a large number of new non-Western states, the multiplication of regional rivalries, and the rise of national assertiveness are evident in all regions of the Third World, especially the Middle East, Southwest and Southeast Asia. These changes have drastically altered the nature of superpower relations, which following World War II were best characterized as being bipolar but now are better described by the concept bipolycentric (Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984:1-8). These systemic changes have contributed to European concerns with the ability of the United States to prevent crises in other regions from spilling over into and threatening Europe. The fear among Europeans of nuclear war erupting as a result of escalation from a region outside of Europe outweighs any fear of Soviet aggression directed primarily against Western Europe (from Chapter V; and Howard, 1983:120).

Additionally, Western Europe, during the 1960s, recovered fully from its economically devastated postwar condition. This economic strength, however, has not been converted into political or military power. While no longer dependent on the United States economically, Western Europe remains a large importer of security. This condition, in which the decision for peace or war (especially nuclear war)

appears to lie with a group of remote and uncontrolled decision makers, has fueled anti-Americanism. It also promotes the notion that the foreigners, the Americans with their bases and nuclear weapons in Europe, are actually provoking rather than deterring war (Howard, 1983:119).

Because there are no transcending sociological forces responsible for European security beliefs, the attitudinal changes observed in Chapter V may not be unidirectional or necessarily permanently entrenched. The diminished European confidence in the United States, the magnified fear of nuclear war, and the public doubt about the entire collective security and deterrent apparatus, may reflect an interim period of public anxiety about the future, which is induced by a particular set of political circumstances. Efforts by Western governments to recreate a viable Euro-American consensus may, therefore, be possible.

Such efforts will not be easy. Government rhetoric and policy that fails to correspond to the altered realities of international politics will continue to increase the fear and alienation of the European public. The current state of European opinion and political activism must be considered as well, because the public has already limited the options available to policy makers. The partisan nature of the security debate in Britain and West Germany will continue to amplify differences rather than promote consensus. Additionally, the recent foreign policy record of the United States in the Middle East and Central America has

contributed little to rebuilding European confidence. Most pressing is the need to direct Euro-American relations toward a pattern of cooperative events rather than conflictual (Table 6-2).

Notes

¹A 12-year time span is achieved in Table 6-8, but the 1970 data are coded in fixed age groups preventing the construction of a "standard cohort table," in which the intervals between dates for which there are data are the same as the intervals used to delineate the cohorts (Glenn, 1984:10). The birth years of the 1970 age groups were used to code the 1982 data allowing for identical cohorts to be observed as the table is read horizontally.

²Pure cohort effects are unlikely in any event, and the analytical task is to disentangle cohort effects from those of period and life-cycle (aging). Available techniques rely generally on "eyeballing" and simple manipulations of cross-tabular data. "Cohort analysis can, at this stage in its development, benefit little from application of the available 'rigorous' techniques" (Glenn, 1984:57).

³If the mean intracohort variation (the average change between time periods for all age groups) equals the aggregate change, then cohort effects are nil. The degree of difference, however, is a measure of cohort effects (Glenn, 1984). For example, if the aggregate change between the two time periods is -10, and the mean intracohort change is -4, then period effects (the amount of overlap between the intracohort variation and the aggregate variation) account for 40% of the aggregate change, and cohort effects (the difference between intracohort variation and aggregate change) account for 60% of the aggregate change.

⁴Life-cycle effects are estimated by computing the expected annual rate of intracohort change needed to account for the variation from the younger age groups to the older. It is necessary "to compute the required annual rate of change from the age level at which the positive association begins" (Glenn, 1984:57). In Table 6-8, for Germany, the between cohort range in 1970 is +8 (79 to 87), and in 1982 it is also +8 (63 to 71), so the mean is +8. Using a 45-year life-cycle (Glenn, 1984), an annual increase of .17 ($8/45$) is required to account for the +8 points of variation. For the 12-year period covered by the data, an intracohort increase of 2.0 ($.17 * 12$) would be estimated to be the result of life-cycle effects. For Italy, the mean

variation between youngest and oldest cohorts is +6. Thus, $6/45=.13$ for the annual increase, and $.13 * 12 = 1.5$ for the estimated 12-year intracohort change.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: ATTITUDES, POLICIES, AND ALLIANCE COHESION

Political cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance is crucial to the Western deterrent. In an international system of superpowers and nuclear weapons, the Clausewitzian definition of war as the continuation of politics by other means is turned on its head. In the nuclear era, politics becomes the conduct of war by other means: "When it is too dangerous to fight, political maneuver becomes the substitute for military battles" (Shoemaker and Spanier, 1984:3). Accordingly, NATO leaders must be sensitive to the dangers of political disarray within the Alliance that could result from public disaffection.

An alliance that appears cohesive, capable, and resolved presents an adversary with little temptation to attack or probe politically. If the interests and priorities of alliance members begin to diverge, however, the temptation to exploit the rift arises. Thus, as West Europeans took to the streets to protest INF, the Soviet Union stepped up its political campaign against NATO by threatening extreme retribution against those states that accepted the new missiles and less drastic consequences for

nuclear-free states. West Germany received the special attention of heavy (but clumsy and eventually counter-productive) Soviet intervention in the March 1983 federal elections. Similarly, President Reagan enthusiastically supported strikes by the Polish trade union Solidarity (even as he denounced the air traffic controller strike in the United States), because industrial unrest in Poland could possibly undermine Soviet control throughout Eastern Europe (Sharp, 1985b:40).

The West European public, as one of the key "domestic sources of foreign policy," will contribute significantly to the future political cohesion or disunity within NATO.¹ If the Spanish electorate had rejected NATO in their 1986 referendum, if the Dutch citizenry had forced their government to refuse INF deployment, if the British Labour party had won in 1983 and implemented its unilateralist program, or if the SPD had won in West Germany in 1987 and implemented its "second Ostpolitik," Alliance unity would have suffered. The public often acts as the legitimizer of government actions abroad, but in Western democracies the public can also set limits and in some cases can also initiate or direct government external behavior. "The growing importance of the public has led many observers to conclude that domestic consensus is now the primary task of the Alliance" (Eichenberg, 1985a:4).

This chapter examines some of the political implications evident from the empirical findings of this study.

Following a summary of the major findings, the linkages between attitudes and policies are explored. Next, American foreign policy attitudes are briefly observed, and finally, some suggestions are offered for strengthening Alliance cohesion by restoring confidence within the West European public.

Summary of Major Findings

There are indications from the analyses in the earlier chapters that the notion of Atlantic cooperation and NATO itself continue to receive widespread support from among West Europeans. The typology developed in Chapter III identified only 25% of the European sample as Isolationists (Figure 3-1). Similarly, Europeans favor continued membership in NATO by large majorities (Tables 5-12, 5-13, and 5-14). These findings would appear to auger well for public support of the Alliance.

This broad support for NATO must be examined closely. European attitudes toward NATO resemble American views of apple pie: everyone loves it. Even among the French, the images evoked by the Atlantic Alliance are generally favorable, just like those for democracy, social security, and freedom. As a general construct, NATO is not controversial. Specific proposals intended to strengthen the Alliance, however, are controversial: such as, INF, increased defense spending, longer terms of conscription, acquisition of the

Trident ballistic missile submarine by Britain, nuclear war-fighting plans, and SDI.

This is the goals versus instruments dilemma discussed earlier. Political goals comprising positive affective evaluations are endorsed, such as Atlantic cooperation, deterrence, European unity, and economic growth; however, the specific means required to promote these goals, such as military spending, new weapons systems, and economic austerity programs are normally unpopular with the general public and are therefore opposed.

The structure of European attitudes is revealing. Two attitudinal dimensions, military and nonmilitary cooperation, were uncovered in Chapter III. This means that Europeans make a distinction between foreign policy issue areas, which are no longer linked together. Rudolf Wildenmann shares this view: "The combined policy goals which seem to have been linked and fundamental in the late 1940s and 1950s--namely, stable economic conditions, social security, European integration, and defense--seem today neither to be linked nor any longer to be fundamental" (1983:25). Support by individuals for cooperative Atlantic efforts in one policy area does not necessarily mean that they endorse cooperative efforts in other areas.

European-wide generalizations must be qualified, because there is considerable cross-national variation. West Germans are clearly the most Atlanticist of the four nations observed; they favor NATO and Atlantic

non-military cooperation in much greater numbers than the others. The French, with their Gaullist tradition, are the Isolationists, not enthusiastic about any cooperative entanglements that might limit their sovereignty. The British, labeled Military Allies, support military cooperation but not nonmilitary. And the Italians earned their title Dovish Partners for their endorsement of nonmilitary cooperation and their hesitancy toward military cooperation. (These national labels are derived from Table 3-5.)

Anti-Americanism and the fear of nuclear weapons are two additional challenges to Atlantic unity. Together, these trends are undermining some of the original assumptions of NATO. Weapons rather than politics, missiles rather than men, and nuclear arsenals rather than nations are being viewed increasingly as threats to peace. Since nuclear weapons are largely beyond the control of European leaders, the tendency is to view the United States and the Soviet Union as equally threatening. (These attitudes were highlighted in Tables 5-8 and 5-28.)

Chapters IV and VI demonstrated the primacy of political influences and events over sociological processes as determinants of European foreign policy attitudes. Additionally, the national level variable of political culture or national identity was more significant than any of the individual level variables in accounting for views toward Atlanticism; British, French, Italians, and Germans perceive these issues qualitatively differently. Social process

variables suggest direction and continuity; thus, the minimal importance attributed to these effects (age, education, class, and Postmaterialism) means that the European attitudinal shifts away from Atlanticism should not be interpreted as secular changes but as trends whose course may change again.

Attitudes and Policies: Patterns of Linkage

Public opinion surveys are becoming an institutionalized part of the policy making process in Western democracies (Eichenberg, 1985a:5). This development has perhaps advanced farthest in the United States because of its systemic characteristics.²

Strobe Talbott's account of the INF negotiations in Geneva in 1982 contains an enlightening illustration. At one point, Ambassador Paul Nitze was arguing with Washington for alternatives to Reagan's "zero-zero" proposal: "We have a political problem in Europe. . . . A considerable percentage of European public opinion is not satisfied with our zero-zero position. . . . The first thing we've got to do is start exploring . . . solutions so that it becomes more likely that the requisite percentage will support deployment" (1984:163). This episode is significant for showing not only that officials in the United States government are concerned about public opinion, but that they are concerned about European public opinion. This illustrates a direct linkage between the public and the policy making process.

In the sections that follow, each of the four nations is examined for patterns of linkage between attitudes and policies. The issue of European integration and the role of political elites are also discussed within separate sections.

Britain

Since the beginning of NATO, Great Britain has been one of its strongest and most loyal members. British policies and statements since the war reflect the high level of support the British public has for military cooperation seen in Table 3-4. Currently, with the exceptions of Greece and Turkey, Britain devotes the highest percentage of GNP (5.5%) to defense among the European NATO countries (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:72). The United States stations close to 27,000 servicemen at 11 air bases in Britain, along with about 2500 American civilians and 28,000 family members (New York Times, 16 April 1986). The British Army of the Rhine, with close to 68,000 troops, is deployed in northern West Germany. Britain also maintains an independent nuclear deterrent, and the current government is committed to modernizing this force by acquiring four American-made Trident ballistic missile submarines.

Anglo-American relations have been particularly close. "Postwar leaders saw the Atlantic tie . . . [as] the most important of Britain's international relationships" (Lieber, 1985:5). In the 1980s, the "special relationship" between

Britain and the United States has been converted into a personal relationship between the British Prime Minister and the American President. According to Martin Edmonds of the University of Lancaster, the values and convictions of Thatcher and Reagan are virtually identical: "They hold similar convictions regarding monetarist economic policies, have a common view toward notions of freedom and democracy and, in rather bald terms, condemn the nature of the Soviet system and warn of the extent and the imminence of the Soviet military threat to the West" (1984:158).

On security matters they are likewise very close: "Over such issues as the control of theater nuclear forces, the need for a third generation of an independent British nuclear deterrent, sanctions against Poland, and Britain's involvement in rapid deployment forces outside the NATO area, the two have displayed an exceptional degree of accord" (Edmonds, 1984:158). Evidence of Anglo-American military cooperation is seen in the United States support of Britain in the 1982 Falklands conflict (an operation not possible without American military logistic and intelligence help) and Britain's approval for the United States to use bases in Britain to launch its raid on Libya in 1986.

In comparison with its relationship to NATO, Britain's foreign relations in matters other than security and defense have been less uniformly cooperative. Britain's initial reluctance to participate in the Common Market and the

subsequent differences over the terms of membership (especially the amount of support payments to the EEC's agricultural policy) underscore the ambivalence with which Britain views cooperative nonmilitary affairs. Differences with the United States (in episodes such as the 1973 Mideast war, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the natural gas pipeline) also illustrate the economic constraints that impede British cooperation in areas viewed as not being vital to European security interests.

British political parties are polarized over defense issues to a greater extent than are the parties in other West European nations. The division is over nuclear weapons, not NATO. Since its party conference in 1980, the Labour party has been explicitly antinuclear. Its program calls for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, the removal of all American nuclear weapons and bases from Britain, and a nuclear-free zone from Poland to Portugal (Economist, 2 April 1983). Thatcher's Conservative party, on the other hand, remains committed to Britain's independent nuclear force and to its modernization, as well as to the stationing of United States nuclear forces in Britain.

A new third party, the Alliance, is attempting to establish itself in the center of British politics on economic as well as defense issues. It is a union between the old free-market Liberal party and the new Social Democrats who are primarily moderate ex-Labour members of Parliament. The Alliance party is opposed to both Labour's

unilateralist proposals and to Thatcher's nuclear modernization program.

The British single-member districts electoral law makes it unlikely the Alliance party can establish itself as a credible political force. The two major parties win seats in Parliament because their support is concentrated along social class and regional factors: Labour has safe seats in the north and the inner cities, and the Conservatives in the south and the countryside. By coming in second almost everywhere, the Alliance party wins few seats, as in 1983.

Officials in the United States do not try to hide their concern about a Labour victory and the implementation of its antinuclear program. Defense Secretary Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Perle have been particularly outspoken in their criticism of Labour's proposals.

A Labour government intent on carrying out its anti-nuclear promises would create severe difficulties for NATO. The resulting effect on the Alliance could be greater than French President Charles de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to leave NATO's military organization. A policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament in Britain could encourage the return to power of West Germany's Social Democrats, also somewhat antinuclear, and also boost the various peace movements throughout Western Europe as well as the Greens in West Germany.

Traditionally, British policies have reflected the image of Military Allies attached to British respondents in

Chapter III. The trends in British opinion away from some of the assumptions of the NATO Alliance uncovered in Chapter V appear to be concentrated in the Labour party with its historical ties with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). If the trends observed in Chapter V become majority viewpoints that are firmly entrenched and sufficiently salient, then the likelihood of a Labour government being elected and moving toward keeping its antinuclear promises is very high.

France

The interaction between the government and the public on defense policy in France is highlighted by the debate over the European Defense Community (EDC). In the immediate postwar period, the foreign policy aim of France was to keep Germany dismembered, occupied, and weak. With the onset of the Cold War, the British and the Americans wanted a politically and economically united and rearmed Germany on their side. The French government proposed the creation of a West European Army under the EDC as an alternative to an independently rearmed Germany within NATO. No sooner had the EDC been announced and formulated, however, than "it provoked a storm of protest in France" (Macridis, 1985:31). This manifestation of French public opinion illustrates the strength and the continuity of the preference among the French public for independence and freedom of action in foreign affairs, because the EDC was viewed as "a direct

challenge to French sovereignty, clearly spelling the end of France's aspirations to remain a leading European nation" (Macridis, 1985:31). After much debate in the National Assembly, the French government reversed itself in 1954 and refused to ratify the plan it had proposed.

The posturing over grandeur and independence by France is often associated with de Gaulle; however, the policies reflecting these goals have their roots in traditional French political culture and as such supercede the influence of one leader. For example, the government's acquiescence to the public on the EDC issue preceded de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. The leaders of the Fourth Republic also initiated the French nuclear weapons program and "did not accept any genuine integration of military command within NATO and . . . insisted on maintaining autonomy over their military forces" (Macridis, 1985:34,35). The Fourth Republic also opposed the establishment of American nuclear launching sites and nuclear stockpiles on French soil.

Nonetheless, the French Isolationist character is best illustrated by de Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's military command in 1966. This action, along with the French independent nuclear deterrent, fulfills the public's desire for France to possess international rank, power, and prestige.

De Gaulle's abhorrence of integrated military forces was demonstrated much earlier. In January 1945, General Eisenhower reacted to the German offensive in the Ardennes

by ordering the French Army to evacuate Strasbourg. De Gaulle, fearing German reprisals against the Strasbourg population, disobeyed and ordered the French Army to remain, and he eventually won Eisenhower's approval. The lesson for de Gaulle was that allied generals, especially Americans, could not be trusted to take French interests sufficiently into account when formulating military policy (Grant, 1985:412).

Although the French public and government prefer an independent foreign policy, that does not mean France is a weak or pacifist state. France is considered the world's top military power after the United States and the Soviet Union. France maintains the third largest nuclear force, a land army twice the size of Britain, 50,000 troops positioned inside West Germany, and 23,000 stationed in eight overseas bases (Wall Street Journal, 21 March 1984). Additionally, at 4.2% of GNP, France is second only to Britain in Europe for defense spending (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:85).

There are several recent initiatives that may signal a more cooperative posture by France with respect to European defense. France is creating a conventionally armed rapid assistance force (FAR) of five divisions, which will be able to intervene alongside NATO forces during a European conflict. The purpose of the FAR, according to official statements, is "to eliminate all ambiguity concerning the ability of French conventional forces to contribute to West

European defense" (Grant, 1985:418). Additionally, the largest joint French-West German exercise in 20 years is planned for Spring 1987, discussions are underway with the United States on the use of France as an entry point and staging area for NATO reinforcement, and Prime Minister Chirac suggested in September 1986 that French tactical nuclear weapons might be used in a battle on NATO's central front earlier than expected under current doctrine, in effect providing West Germany a bit of protection under a French nuclear umbrella (Economist, 25 October 1986).

There is no partisan debate in France, as in Britain, over security policies. "France's independent nuclear deterrent . . . is not challenged today by any of the major political forces, left or right. Even when still in opposition, both the PCF (French Communist party) and the PS (Socialist party) endorsed the independent nuclear force" (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:77). Socialist President Francois Mitterand is reputed to hold "visceral anti-Soviet feelings" (Grant, 1984:416), and it was the Socialists who initiated the uncontroversial five-year rearmament program that included the FAR. President Mitterand also forcefully supported NATO's new Cruise and Pershing II missiles (none of which are going to France, of course).

Alongside the absence of any partisan conflict over security issues is an insignificant peace movement and little evidence of anti-Americanism (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:77,81). Tables 4-5 and 4-6 showed the French to

be less ideologically split on the issue of military cooperation, and Tables 5-24 and 5-27 showed the French to have less anti-American leanings than the others. Several reasons may account for these characteristics. France has its own nuclear weapons, the the French public feels reassured knowing there is French control over the nuclear trigger. Britain also has its own nuclear deterrent, but France, unlike Britain, has no American bases, missiles, or troops on its soil. France is also not a part of the United States-dominated NATO military command.

An additional reason for the failure of the peace movement in France is that the PCF has total control over it. Therefore, in France, peace campaigns are equated with communist designs, which appear to the public to be in the interest of Soviet positions. This is unlike the situation in Britain and West Germany where to be for disarmament does not necessarily mean to be against "the system." The CND in Britain is a well-respected, legitimate organization that can count the latest two leaders of the Labour party, Michael Foote and Neil Kinnock, among its membership.

There appears to be a consensus among the French public, the political parties, and the government about defense matters. This represents a powerful union capable of shaping a lasting and distinctive role for the nation. If France were part of NATO's military structure, it would enhance unity, eliminate ambiguity, improve planning, streamline logistics, and possibly decrease Alliance costs.

However, given the nature of French opinion and traditions, it is extremely unlikely that any French government would attempt to reintegrate France into NATO's military command in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the current posture of French forces and leanings of the government are not necessarily disadvantageous to the interests of Western security.

West Germany

Successive governments in West Germany have supported the Atlantic Alliance and Western democratic values (Schweigler, 1984). "Continuing commitment to the NATO Alliance, confidence in American leadership, general agreement with the United States on defense issues, and coolness toward the Soviet Union have been, and remain, the official positions of the West German government" (Puchala, 1984:6). In these policy orientations the government in Bonn has clearly reflected the Atlanticist sentiment of the German public identified in Chapter III.

Comments by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his farewell speech to the Bundestag attest to the pro-American character of the current Kohl government. In his speech, given on 10 September 1986, Schmidt criticized Kohl for following United States policy too closely: "The Federal Republic must remain the friend and partner of the United States, but not a client" (Time, 22 September 1986). Since

regaining power in 1982, the CDU/CSU led center-right coalition has been a pillar of Atlantic cooperation.

West Germany has continued over the years to increase its military contribution to NATO. In the 1960s and 1970s the German army, the Bundeswehr, was enlarged and modernized to make it the most powerful conventional force in Western Europe. "Unlike other Western countries, including the United States, West Germany continued its defense efforts during the detente period. . . . Bundeswehr defense expenditures were consistently increased by about 3% in real terms annually between 1969 and 1980" (Gortemaker, 1982:68). Moreover, West Germany extended its compulsory military service obligation from 15 to 18 months in 1985, to avoid acute manpower shortages in the 1990s likely to be caused by sagging birth rates (New York Times, 3 October 1985).

Western analysts are sometimes troubled by various "isms" often attributed to West Germany, such as pacifism, neutralism, and nationalism. Ostpolitik, initiated by SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, led to considerable mistrust in the West (Grosser, 1982:252). There was fear of neutralist leanings that may lead to a secret deal with the Soviet Union: a new Rapallo or self-Finlandization.

A different interpretation of Ostpolitik is that it was not possible without a strong, firmly committed, and Atlantic oriented West Germany (Gortemaker, 1982:66). The treaties of 1970-1972 accepted the territorial status quo and its implications: the partition of Europe and the

existence of military blocs. At the same time, Ostpolitik attempted and succeeded to improve relations and decrease tensions with the divided parts of Europe. This second view is that Ostpolitik has promoted stability, not neutralism or irredentism.

Concern with pacifism in West Germany is the result of political activism and partisan politics. There were massive political rallies staged in West Germany in the early 1980s to protest the deployment of Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles. It is estimated that between 40% and 50% of the West German public are passive supporters of the peace movement (Grewe, 1985:107).

As in Britain, the political parties of West Germany are polarized over these issues. The Greens, a coalition of ecologists and counter-culture proponents, are pacifist, anti-American, and anti-NATO. Significant elements within the Social Democrats now favor the withdrawal of all NATO missiles from West Europe, cuts in conventional defense spending, the adoption of a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, the formation of "partnerships for peace" with the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and the reorganization of the West German army in order to render it incapable of offensive action. These measures comprise the SPD's "second Ostpolitik" policy, and they represent a near-total rejection of the policies of the Schmidt era (Asmus, 1987).

The party chairman, Willy Brandt, openly claims that any threat of war in Europe stems from the presence of United States nuclear weapons in West Germany. According to Brandt: "The interests of our people are not served by people who say 'amen' when Washington prays" (Time, 8 September 1986). Comments like these tend to blur the distinction between neutralism and nationalism, instincts that have common roots.

Recently, the West German voters confirmed Helmut Kohl's center-right coalition in office with 44.3% of the vote for his CDU/CSU and 9.1% for the FDP. His campaign theme was familiar: strengthen NATO, work for a West European union, and keep relations with the neighbors to the east as relaxed as possible.

Traditionally, the foreign policy orientations of the major West German political parties have been based on a broad consensus, unlike the situation today. At times, however, the consensus has broken down, as with the rearmament debate in the early 1950s and with the debate over Ostpolitik in the early 1970s. In these two cases the parties out of power adjusted to new realities (the SPD accepted rearmament and the CDU/CSU accepted Ostpolitik) and the consensus was reestablished.

The current proposals made by the SPD under the rubric of a "second Ostpolitik" could be a similar experience (Asmus, 1987:52). Out of power in 1982, the SPD succumbed to the pressure to adopt even more radical foreign policy

positions in the hope of attracting voters of the peace movement. As the 1987 election results seem to indicate, however, the road back to electoral power probably lies with moderation not radicalization. For this reason, the partisan debate over INF and nuclear policy may subside as the consensus is reestablished.

The potential remains, however, for a problem that could still undermine Atlantic cohesion. The concern with German pacifism and neutralism would be intensified, "if radical SPD opposition to INF deployment were to legitimize extra-parliamentary opposition and thus encourage a shift of the political debate from the houses of parliament to the streets of West Germany" (Schweigler, 1984:84). These possibilities apply to Britain, as well.

Italy

The foreign policy of Italy since World War II has been described as resting upon the two "pillars" of NATO and the EEC (Bonvicini, 1983:71). Throughout the postwar period Italy has been a loyal, if not enthusiastic, member of the NATO Alliance. But in regard to the EEC, there is a deep commitment, because "Italy's well-being is clearly dependent on continued integration with the world economy, and most especially with the industrial nations of Western Europe" (Putnam, 1977:292).

The importance of Italy to the Alliance was rediscovered just before the NATO INF decision was to be made in

December 1979. Chancellor Schmidt made West Germany's approval to the stationing of American missiles contingent upon the concurrent approval of at least one other European continental NATO member. Italy's consent to deployment reinforced Schmidt's position at home and allowed for the debate to be continued with a resultant decision favorable to INF. "Italy's support practically saved the day" (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:86).

In other areas, Italy's low material contribution to NATO reflects the Dovish Partner image presented in Chapter III. In defense spending and military manpower, Italy ranks among the lowest of NATO's members (Putnam, 1977:296). Italy's value to NATO lies primarily in where it is rather than in what it does. The provision of bases and logistic support for American naval and nuclear forces is essential for NATO. The role Italy has adopted within the Alliance is inconsistent with its formal obligations, but it does reflect the public's desires.

The central tension in Italy's political system is the absence of any alterations in power between distinct political forces (Garner, 1984:182). This is because Italy's large Communist party (PCF) is widely perceived as being antisystem and not worthy of participating in the government, despite its record for the efficient management of several municipalities. The leading coalition partner in every postwar government has been the Christian Democrats (DCI), which is actually more of a clientelistic machine for

dispensing patronage than it is an instrument for representation and policy innovation. Within this political climate the foreign policy debate has been somewhat muted, and the PCI's traditional hostility and distrust for the United States and NATO have been overshadowed by the overriding domestic agenda.

In Italy, there is no significant peace movement. There is no Italian equivalent of the German Easter marches or of the women camping outside of Greenham Common in Britain. This is explained partially by the low salience on foreign policy issues just mentioned and partially by the close association of the PCI with the peace movement (as with the PCF in France) and the perceived absence of any genuine Italian roots in the peace movement (Rossi and Ilari, 1985).

The debut of a Socialist premier in 1983 did not resolve the central political tension or heighten the foreign policy debate in Italy. The Socialists had been part of the ruling coalition for some time, and their electoral gains (up to 11%) along with the DCI's losses (down to 33%) made Craxi's premiership possible. To establish itself as a fully respectable party, the PSI put on display all of its Atlantic trappings: strong support for the installation of Cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily and solid backing for the Italian military contingent sent to Lebanon in conjunction with the American "peace keeping" mission (Garner, 1984:162).

There is a remarkable similarity between the Italian Communists and the British Labour party and West Germany's SPD. On issues of disarmament, East-West relations, Geneva negotiations, and so on, there is "an almost total coincidence of views" (Laqueur and Stoppa-Liebl, 1984:90). The only difference being that in Britain and West Germany the Leftist parties are legitimate and are not considered a challenge to "the system." (The French Socialist party does not fit this generalization because of the existence of the French Communist party to its left.) Should the PCI overcome its pariah status and gain sufficient electoral strength to enter the government, the debate over security and defense issues can be expected to heat up dramatically and pose a significant challenge to Western unity.

European Integration

The political unification of Western Europe would have a significant effect on trans-Atlantic relations. The nature of its effect, however, is not clear: "European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic differences. In many respects it may magnify rather than reduce differences" (Kissinger, 1965:230).

Attitudes about and efforts toward integration are associated with the conceptual dimension of nonmilitary cooperation analyzed in Chapters III and IV. Although Atlantic nonmilitary cooperation is obviously a distinct notion from European integration, many of the attitudinal

predispositions overlap; such as, a trust in other Western nations and the belief in mutual benefits to be attained as a result of joint action. Chapters V and VI and the previous sections in this chapter have focused on defense and security matters: military cooperation. This section briefly addresses integration within the context of nonmilitary cooperation.

The European public overwhelmingly favors integration (Table 7-1). While support in Britain is less than in the other countries, the British support for a political union has increased from 37% in 1973 to 69% in 1984; although the EEC continues to be viewed by the British as being not beneficial. The relatively low support among the British fits their characterization as Military Allies in Chapter III: those who favor military cooperation but oppose nonmilitary. This distinction of the British can be attributed to their being denied entry into the EEC until 1973, as well as to their island geography and ties with their Commonwealth. The result is that the British consider themselves to be somewhat other than "European" and are therefore less enthusiastic about European integration than others (Barzini, 1983:65).

European attitudes toward integration contrast dramatically with their views on security and defense. Broad changes and reversals were noted in regard to security issues in Chapter V, while favorable European sentiment

TABLE 7-1
ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
(percentages)

Question 1: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?"

Question 2: "Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?"

Question 3: "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

	<u>Question 1</u>		<u>Question 2</u>		<u>Question 3</u>	
	Percent "for"		Percent "speeded up/continued"		Percent "good thing"	
	1973	1984	1973	1984	1973	1984
France	68	80	76	84	61	63
W. Germany	78	80	83	81	63	57
Italy	70	85	73	87	69	72
Britain	37	69	57	74	31	38

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1986:686, 689, 690); original cited: EEC.

Note: N = 1000 (approximately) for each national sample for each year.

toward integration is increasing and approaching the level of consensus.

The relevant question, however, is: Why has there not been more progress toward realizing the goal of a politically unified Western Europe? The skillful articulation of the goal by a number of European statesmen like Jean Monnet, the historical conditioning of World War II, a series of obligatory constituent treaties and institutions, and widespread public support are apparently insufficient to overcome the specific self-interests of sovereign states and their leaders.

Theoretically, integration is predicted to result from the building of habits of cross-national cooperation through which the expectation of future benefits replaces the nationalist quest for power. This is the functionalist approach to explaining the process (Haas, 1958; Mitrany, 1966). International agencies and institutions, such as the EEC, are expected to create recognized patterns of transnational behavior by providing goods, regulations, and services that nations are unable to provide for themselves. As a result, loyalties become divided between the state and the international institutions, and as the process continues people will seek further benefits through greater cross-national cooperation ultimately ending in a politically unified community.

This process has failed to make much progress in Western Europe beyond the EEC, despite widespread public

support. The primacy of particular national interests remains. Additionally, the functionalist theory has been criticized for assuming that politics could be removed from cross-national collaboration, that learned habits of cooperation could be transferred from one sphere of activity to another, and that international institutions are better able to solve extensive economic and social problems than are nation-states (Feld, 1981:18).

Within this context, the broad public support seen in Table 7-1 can be interpreted as perhaps being symbolic and noncommittal affirmation. In other words, there is permissive consensus for a European union but a shallow commitment. There are no marches or demonstrations promoting unification, elections for the European Parliament elicit little enthusiasm, and current political leaders seem in no hurry to place this issue higher on the agenda. The public does not object to unification, but the support for it lacks any strong emotional or ideological thrust necessary to capture the attention of policy makers. This is an example of an issue area in which there is little apparent linkage between public opinion and policy.

Elite-Mass Linkage

The foreign policies of West European nations are in the hands of the political establishment, the political elite. The structural differentiation of society into

elites and nonelites is indisputable, but there are different views of the primacy of these strata. Two theories (liberal-pluralist and power-elite) offer diverging interpretations of the nature of politics and the roles of elites and masses (Dahl, 1961, 1982; Mills, 1956; Prewitt and Stone, 1973; Truman, 1951).

It is beyond the scope of this study to test the merits of the alternative theoretical views of the elite-mass relationship. Perhaps a middle position is called for: "The power-elite hypothesis and pluralism are not necessarily incompatible in very wide areas" (Prewitt and Stone, 1973:127). In this view, policy makers have a high degree of autonomy but are nonetheless constrained by the public within highly salient issue areas; the elite's perception of public expectations (anticipated demands) also influences policy making.

Analysts have reported changes in the Atlantic orientations of the European elite that seem to parallel the trends in mass opinion presented in Chapter V. According to William Schneider: "Doubts about the Western Alliance and United States leadership seem to be increasing most rapidly among European elites--precisely the groups that have been most responsible for maintaining a consensus behind the Atlantic Alliance" (1983:6). Stephen Haseler claims that "in the realm of political ideas held at elite levels the trans-Atlantic gulf is widening dramatically" (1983:2).

The amount of congruence between elite and mass attitudes is important. A high level of congruence would allow for more confident generalizations to be made about a nation's future policy orientations. Dissensus between elites and masses, on the other hand, would make such conclusions more problematic and might also indicate future political friction if policy makers remain out of step with the public on issues of high salience.

There are many ways to operationalize the concept of an elite. Donald Puchala (1984:5) distinguishes between policy elites and societal elites. In the first case, policy elites are those whose roles, offices, reputations, or expertise place them close to or within the public policy process. These are also known as the "foreign policy establishment." Societal elites are the more "accomplished" members of society, the better educated, and the well-to-do. They are managers, administrators, professionals, academics, and so on.

In his analysis of West German attitudes, Puchala (1984) subdivided the German society into the policy elites, the societal elites, and the general electorate. He found fairly high congruence between the policy elites and the general electorate, both having Atlanticist orientations (although he discerned some "superficiality" in the Atlanticist sentiment of the public similar to that observed in Chapter V). Among the societal elites, however, he observed dissensus and increasing "disaffection with

Atlanticism" (1984:13). His operationalization for societal elites was based on higher education, and in that regard his findings are the same as those discussed earlier in Chapter IV; respondents with higher education tend to have less support for military cooperation (Table 4-2).

Peter Schmidt (1984) reported on some 1980 cross-national survey data of nominees for the European Parliament. This provides an excellent sample of political elites. In regard to Europe's relations with the superpowers, these politicians prefer more independence from both (Table 7-2). This is similar to the preferences of the public seen in Table 5-25. In keeping with the national characterizations developed in Chapter III, the German politicians (as Atlanticists) display the strongest preference (40%) for more coordination with the United States, and the French leaders (as Isolationists) have the strongest preference for independence (91%).

West German political elites also display their Atlanticist sentiment when stating preferences for military security arrangements (Table 7-3). Sixty-three percent of the German sample prefer NATO over a European or accommodationist arrangement. The French leaders, again in keeping with their Isolationist character, have the lowest support for NATO (only 7%). The greatest support for accommodation is among the Italians (29%), which coincides with the Dovish Partner label attached to the Italian public in Chapter III.

TABLE 7-2

ELITE PREFERENCES ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES, 1980

(percentages)

Question: "In the future how should the European Community develop its relationship to the superpowers?"

- (1) More independence from both the superpowers than hitherto.
(2) More coordination with the USA than hitherto.
(3) More coordination with the USSR than hitherto.
-

	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
(1) More Independence From Both	91	57	83	60
(2) More Coordination With USA	5	40	17	28
(3) More Coordination With USSR	1	3	1	1
Preserve Status Quo (Vol)	3	0	0	12
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%	101%

Source: Schmidt (1984:14); original cited, Soerensen et al. (1980:354).

Note: The sample is comprised of nominees for the European Parliament. The sample size is not known.

TABLE 7-3

ELITE PREFERENCES FOR MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, 1980
(percentages)

Question: "In view of all changes in the relationship among the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union that have taken place in the last ten years, which of the following statements comes closest to your views of how Western Europe should provide for its military security?"

- (1) Continue current levels of support for NATO. (NATO Model)
- (2) Develop a European defense posture more independent of the United States. (EURO Model)
- (3) Seek to reduce the need for a strong defense through greater accommodation with the Soviet Union. (Accommodation Model)
- (4) Other.

	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
(1) NATO Model	7	63	35	42
(2) EURO Model	53	24	37	45
(3) Accommodation	24	14	29	13
(4) Other	15	0	0	0
TOTAL	99%	101%	101%	100%

Source: Schmidt (1984:16); original cited, Soerensen et al. (1980:356).

Note: The sample is comprised of nominees for the European Parliament. The sample size is not known.

A survey of European elites was commissioned by the United States Information Agency in 1981. The samples from France, West Germany, Italy, and Britain included parliamentarians, high civil servants, businessmen, journalists, and academics; political party leanings from across the full spectrum were represented, and the ages ranged from under 40 to over 70. As with most elite studies, the sample sizes were small: less than 100 in each nation.³ The composition of these samples is broader than that used by Schmidt (1984), and thus provides a look at the European elite from a different perspective.

The data in Tables 7-4 and 7-5 are drawn from the USIA survey. European elites are favorably disposed toward arms control negotiations (Table 7-4) as is the European public (Tables 5-22 and 5-23); however, there is a substantially larger proportion of the elites than the public who favor strengthening Western military forces instead of pursuing arms control. Apparently, policy makers and influentials are not as convinced as is the general public of the merits of arms control negotiations on national security.

On general foreign policy orientations, elite opinion again corresponds generally with the images of mass attitudes developed in Chapter III (Table 7-5). The Germans are the most Atlanticist, with 80% selecting Atlantic responses, and the French are independents or Isolationists, with almost 30% favoring a unilateral or independent foreign policy. The British elites favor an Atlantic outlook more

TABLE 7-4
 ELITE PREFERENCES ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 1981
 (percentages)

Question: "In your judgment, which is the better way to provide for (survey country's) national security--to begin by strengthening Western military forces, or to begin by seeking arms control negotiations?"

	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
Military Forces	44	32	20	44
Arms Control	19	16	27	23
Both Simultaneously	26	51	48	31
Not Sure	11	1	4	3
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	101%
N =	73	76	73	75

Source: International Leaders Survey 1981, USIA.

Note: The sample is comprised of parliamentarians, high civil servants, businessmen, journalists, and academicians.

TABLE 7-5

ELITE VIEWS OF FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS, 1981

(percentages)

Question: "What should the major thrust of (survey country's) external policies be in order to promote its national interest in the 1980s--should (survey country) align its policies more closely with those of the United States, develop more joint initiatives with its European allies, seek greater accommodation with the Soviet Union, pursue a neutralist policy, or what?"

	France N=73		W. Ger. N=76		Italy N=73		Britain N=75	
Work w/US, Eur, Atlantic partner- ship, etc.	53	(34)	80	(62)	59	(44)	74	(56)
Work w/European states no mention of the US	38	(25)	17	(13)	38	(28)	21	(16)
Pursue an indepen- dent or unilateral policy	29	(19)	4	(3)	12	(9)	0	(0)
Negotiate w/the Soviet Union	16	(10)	17	(13)	14	(10)	23	(17)
Other	19	(12)	12	(9)	12	(9)	14	(11)
TOTAL	155%	100%	130%	100%	135%	100%	132%	100%

Source: International Leaders Survey 1981, USIA.

Note: Sample is comprised of parliamentarians, high civil servants, businessmen, journalists, and academicians. Multiple responses were possible. The figures in parentheses are percentages of the total responses.

than the French and the Italians, but less than the West Germans.

There appears to be a reasonable amount of congruence between elite and mass attitudes in Western Europe. This brief sketch of elite opinion is inadequate to draw definitive conclusions, and the absence of precisely equivalent survey items makes most observations tentative. Nonetheless, the linkages evident in the data lend credibility to the typology developed in Chapter III and to the notion of distinct national perspectives toward the Alliance and security affairs. The existence of congruence also argues against the likelihood of political conflict along horizontal, elite-mass cleavages. Any domestic political tensions within the security arena will probably be cross-cutting, with the principal differences being along vertical cleavages, such as partisanship and ideology, which is precisely what is happening in Britain and West Germany.

Summary

This brief sketch of foreign policy patterns was obviously not meant to be exhaustive but instead suggestive. The attitudinal characteristics attributed to these nations in Chapter III appear to be evident to some extent in their postwar foreign policy directions. There also appears to be a high level of congruence between the aggregate predispositions of the mass public with the political elite. Discontinuities between attitudes and policies were observed

in regard to nonmilitary cooperation: specifically, European integration. Overwhelmingly favorable public support is not linked to further moves toward a European political union.

Political parties are the central linkage mechanism in the political processes of Western democracies. Empirical research by Russell Dalton concluded that "to a large extent, Western European parties appear successful in representing mass preferences within the top stratum of political decision makers" (1985a:294).

In Britain and West Germany the party systems are divided over foreign policy issues with the main opposition party in each case having adopted proposals that directly challenge established NATO doctrine. This reflects the attitudinal trends away from the Alliance noted in Chapter V. In France, the parties are somewhat unified in regard to the independent posture maintained by France outside of the NATO military structure, and this reflects the public's desires. In Italy, foreign policy is not yet controversial, and even the PCI has recently endorsed NATO in general terms.

An intervening variable in the linkage equation is government structure and tradition (Wallace, 1978:49,50). The French government of the Fifth Republic is almost entirely free of formal domestic constraints. The National Assembly has little influence over foreign policy because control is centralized in the hands of the President. The

British government is more formally accountable to Parliament; however, Parliament has not chosen to exert its influence very far, and there is not even a parliamentary committee for foreign affairs. The West German system is the most open allowing for extensive legislative input: primarily through the influential Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Bundestag. In Italy, the Foreign Ministry is known for its widespread nepotism, conservative orientation, and tendencies toward immobilismo, which contribute to the lack of an active foreign policy debate (Sassoon, 1978:84). These structural factors may have affected the nature and extent of the connection between the public and foreign policy decision making, because it is in Britain and West Germany--with their more accessible systems--that the highest level of public discontent is observed.

The overall picture from this discussion of linkage patterns is that there is a high degree of congruence throughout the various aspects of these societies in regard to the Alliance. The point is not that attitudes are the cause of policies or vice versa, but that an awareness of this linkage enables attitudinal generalizations to be handled with confidence and as reasonable indicators of future policy orientations. Thus, "the main concern when looking at the domestic dimension should be to demonstrate that foreign policy is not made in a vacuum . . . but rather reflects the particular values and priorities of the community from which it comes" (Hill, 1978:22).

American Attitudes: A Comparison

Trans-Atlantic harmony is influenced by the American public as well as by the European public. A ground-swell of anti-NATO sentiment in the United States would have the same, if not a greater, impact on the Alliance as would a similar occurrence in Western Europe. This section briefly addresses American mass attitudes on selected security and defense issues. The purpose is to compare American opinion with the generalizations formed thus far on European attitudes.

There are broad similarities in how the American and European publics view many foreign policy concerns (Eichenberg, 1985a; Schneider, 1985; Thies, 1986). The aversion to nuclear weapons is not found only in Europe. In a survey administered in 1982, only 28% of the American respondents thought the United States would be justified in using nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet attack on Western Europe (Thies, 1986:32); the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe is a fundamental part of NATO doctrine. Also, the nuclear freeze movement has been endorsed by many of the most influential leaders of the Democratic party. Americans, like Europeans, support United States-Soviet arms control negotiations "as a necessary element of conflict management" (Eichenberg, 1985a:22). Similarly, there is little support in the United States for increasing defense spending (Table 7-6).

TABLE 7-6
 AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE SPENDING
 (percentages)

Question: "Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut back?"

	1974	1978	1982
Expand	14	34	22
Keep the same	50	48	54
Cut back	35	18	24
TOTAL	99%	100%	100%

Source: Wittkopf (1984:23); original cited, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Note: Sample size is approximately 1500 for each year.

Americans demonstrate continuing support for the Atlantic Alliance. In both 1978 and 1982, 68% wanted to either maintain or increase the United States commitment to NATO (Table 7-7). Support for the defense of Western Europe and NATO is not controversial in American politics, despite the posturing of the Mansfield and Nunn amendments. Western Europe consistently ranks highest among those areas of the world that Americans favor sending and using troops (Table 7-8).

Below the general concept of NATO, however, there is concern within the American public about burden-sharing within the Alliance and about Western unity for policies outside of Europe. For example, a substantial portion of the American people (68%) believe that the West Europeans are not shouldering enough of the Western security burden, and that the United States is shouldering too much (Kelleher, 1984:46). Americans are also not satisfied with the level of backing the allies have given to the general foreign policy approach of the United States or to specific United States initiatives in response to events such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Polish crisis (Kelleher, 1984:40).

American foreign policy attitudes have evolved throughout this century. Debates were traditionally structured unidimensionally along an internationalist-isolationist continuum. Following the Second World War, there was

TABLE 7-7
 AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO
 (percentages)

	1974	1978	1982
Increase US commitment	4	9	9
Keep commitment what it is	50	58	58
Decrease commitment	13	9	11
Withdraw entirely	7	4	4
Not sure	26	20	18
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Source: Schneider (1985:356); original cited, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Note: Sample size is approximately 1500 for each year.

TABLE 7-8
 AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT THE USE OF U.S. TROOPS
 (percentages)

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if:

	(Percent "favor")		
	1974	1978	1982
a. N. Korea invaded S. Korea	19	25	22
b. Soviet troops invaded W. Eur.	50	62	64
c. Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia	14	21	a
d. Mainland China invaded Nationalist China	23	24	19
e. The Russians took over W. Berlin	44	56	a
f. Japan was invaded by the USSR	a	42	51
g. Arab forces invaded Israel	a	17	30
h. The Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S.	a	36	38

Source: Wittkopf (1984:23); original cited, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

[a] No data available.

Note: Sample size approximately 1500 for each year.

initially a general consensus on the internationalist and interventionist roles of the United States. In the post-Vietnam period, however, the cleavages in American opinion about the nation's appropriate role in world affairs have become very complex.

There are several contending descriptions of the new American multidimensional foreign policy belief system.⁴ Representative of these is Wittkopf and Maggiotto's (1981) characterization of American attitudes using a four-fold typology to describe respondents as Internationalists, Hardliners, Accommodationists, and Isolationists. There is evidence that similar attitudinal orientations also typify American leaders and elites (Kelleher, 1984; Wittkopf, 1983a). Wittkopf and Maggiotto's (1981) typology is derived from the joint distribution of respondents along two orthogonal factors (dimensions): militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. In both structure and content, this image of the American belief system is similar to that of the Europeans uncovered in Chapter III.

Within the current state of American foreign policy opinion, there are indicators of dilemmas similar to those faced by the European public. There is no consensus, and concerns about war and entanglements are evident. The growth of the nuclear freeze movement occurred simultaneously with the surge of nationalism and anti-Soviet hostility in 1980. The post-Vietnam malaise is overlaid with Cold

War II producing contradictory currents in American opinion. The intervention in Grenada was very popular (swift, decisive, and relatively costless), yet in a survey taken after the Grenada episode, the American people overwhelmingly (60% to 21%) rejected the notion that the United States "should help people in Nicaragua who are trying to overthrow the pro-Soviet government there" (Schneider, 1985:362).

The evidence of a breakdown in the foreign policy consensus of the American public and its leaders suggests that the management of United States policies abroad will become more difficult. President Carter's troubles with the Panama Canal Treaty and SALT II as well as Reagan's difficulties with pursuing his Central American policy (among others) illustrate the new policy making environment. In the absence of consensus, the latitude for options is reduced, and the pressures from competing centers of diverse viewpoints are more intense.

In short, American opinion is divided over international affairs and the role of the United States in the world. The multidimensional nature of American attitudes works against the reemergence of a new foreign policy consensus without a major external stimulus of some kind. What is interesting is how closely the cleavages of American attitudes resemble those of Western Europe: the multidimensional structure, the general support of NATO, the dilemmas over more specific issues, concern over nuclear weapons, and doubt about United States intervention abroad. Ironically,

"the European attitudes that have led some American analysts to question the value of the Alliance are similar in important respects to attitudes widely held by Americans" (Thies, 1986:31).

Toward Alliance Cohesion

The collective security of NATO rests at least as much on political cohesion as on strictly military capabilities. Alliance unity in the 1980s is showing signs of strain, but it has yet to come apart. There is no shortage of warnings, however, as evidenced by former Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger when he testified before Congress in June 1986, that "U.S. relations with Europe are deteriorating and that the NATO Alliance could be virtually meaningless by the end of the century" (cited in Clark, 1987:1).

The West European public plays a key role in determining the level of political cohesion within the Alliance, and the data presented in this study indicate the absence of an Atlanticist consensus in Europe as well as the existence of some attitudinal trends away from traditional Atlanticist values. Of the four attitude types identified in Chapter III only 34% of the European sample could be categorized as Atlanticists. Cross-national variations were large, as seen in Table 3-5. Chapter V showed the European public to be increasingly: anti-American, less threatened by the Soviet Union, frightened about nuclear weapons, and worried about the possibility of war. Political determinants of

attitudes were found in Chapter IV to be more influential than socioeconomic factors (a finding given substance by the political parties in Britain and West Germany).

The conclusion from Chapter VI was that changes in the international system (nuclear parity and the European recovery) and a host of political events (period effects) are the best explanations for the trends in European security attitudes. It is unlikely that the system level changes can be altered (United States nuclear superiority cannot be retrieved and Europe will probably not collapse economically). Political leaders must therefore take the public pulse more carefully and be aware of the domestic political consequences that are likely to result from various foreign policy decisions. At the same time, efforts should be made to construct Alliance, and more importantly United States, policies and initiatives designed to restore a West European Atlantic consensus.

Attempts to bolster West European public support for NATO policies face intrinsic difficulties. All military alliances contain the seeds of instability; specifically, there are the tensions induced by the fear of being abandoned in a crisis and by the fear of being entrapped in a conflict not of one's choosing. These fears are magnified within weaker powers, and they are clearly evident in the NATO Alliance. West European nations are afraid, on the one hand, that the United States may not be willing to use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe, and on the other hand,

they are afraid that the United States may resort to nuclear weapons too soon by trying to limit any nuclear exchange to Europe; they are also afraid of the spillover effect in which a superpower conflict in another part of the world may lead to war in Europe.

This security dilemma has produced a cycle of conflicting anxieties within Western Europe. A loss of confidence about the United States (triggered for example by the Korean War, Sputnik, Vietnam, or SS20s) causes the allied leaders to seek reassurances from Washington. Efforts by the United States to reaffirm its commitment to defend Europe (which are usually in the form of more troops or the latest nuclear hardware) create new tensions and fears among the European public, which are manifested in the CND, the peace movement, anti-Americanism, and recently in a polarized partisan debate in Britain and West Germany. The latest iteration of this cycle is the INF decision: a European response to the SS20s which led to the dramatic political events of the 1980s.

In addition to the difficulties created by the traditional alliance security dilemma, there have been several inconsistencies and wrongheaded decisions within American foreign policy that have exacerbated the fears and doubts among West Europeans. President Carter's flirtation with the idea of withdrawing a portion of the American forces from South Korea and his reversal of the neutron bomb decision (after allied leaders had expended much political

capital in presenting the idea to their publics) fostered doubts about the resolve and commitment of the United States. Similarly, Ronald Reagan's promises during the 1980 campaign about restoring American nuclear superiority and Secretary of State Haig's illadvised statement about nuclear warning shots created anxieties among Europeans that could have been easily avoided.

Europeans traditionally have viewed the American foreign policy establishment as amateurish and even inept. They have difficulty understanding the United States political system, with its decentralized structure and separated powers. The complicated and extensive bargaining between institutions and agencies in Washington confuses Europeans. The policy U-turns that took place on the neutron bomb, the B-1 bomber, and the MX missile are unfathomable in Europe where even between governments consistency of policy is the norm. The debate and competition in Washington over the Panama Canal Treaty and the SALT II Treaty are also unimaginable to Europeans used to the disciplined processes of a parliamentary system. This political spectacle that is constantly unfolding in Washington (the latest episode being the Iranian arms scandal) creates within the European public the sense that the United States is unpredictable at best and dangerous at worst. These images, no doubt, contributed substantially to the increased anti-Americanism observed in Chapter V.

Antinuclear feelings in Europe have been fueled by various statements and policies originating in the United States about limited nuclear war or nuclear war-fighting strategies. President Carter's PD59 that addressed counter-force nuclear targeting and war-fighting and Secretary Weinberger's statements about "prevailing" in a limited nuclear war were very unsettling to Europeans who tolerate nuclear weapons only for their deterrent value. Deterrence is enhanced little by talking about these options, which the Soviet Union must take into account anyway; but the European public is clearly not reassured by such comments, and the net effect is an increase in anti-American and antinuclear attitudes, thus further eroding Alliance cohesion.

President Reagan's messianic rhetoric has also been cause for alarm in Europe. His characterization of the USSR as the "Evil Empire" frames East-West relations as an ideological struggle to the death. This is an image greatly at odds with that held by the Europeans, who have come to view the Soviet Union as a more normal power as was seen in Chapter V. Reagan's statements about the blessings of SDI are interwoven with disparaging references to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as being immoral and unconscionable. The SDI debate began (in these terms) shortly after West European governments had just fought a terrific domestic battle over the INF deployment precisely on the merits of MAD.

What can be done, from the perspective of the United States, to restore European confidence in America and support for NATO policies? Samuel Huntington, borrowing Michael Howard's (1983) concept of "reassurance," observed that "strategy must now be explicitly directed to not one but two problems: deterrence and reassurance" (1983:125). Assuming that NATO's deterrent posture is secure at the moment--since INF, MX, and the B-1 are coming on line--the critical need is to reassure the European allies.

From the discussion of United States policies above, several suggestions within the realm of public diplomacy are obvious. First, eliminate any public references to nuclear war-fighting or limited nuclear war. Second, stress the need for military "balance" not "superiority" through the acquisition or maintenance of "defensive" systems. Third, get Soviet power and intensions into perspective and erase the "Evil Empire" imagery (allow Soviet actions to speak for themselves as in Afghanistan).

Next, stop promising utopia, as with the initial claims about SDI and the glimpse of a nuclear-free world offered by Reykjavik. There is a revolution of rising expectations among the Western public about arms control. The road from SALT I to Iceland is leading to increasingly unrealistic public expectations that are being fueled by politicians trying to outbid each other on this issue. A sense of proportion and realism must be presented by policy makers. Unfulfilled hopes of nirvana will contribute to a loss of

confidence in the arms control process and to an increase in demands for simple solutions outside the process, as with the peace movement and the nuclear freeze movement.

Also, where possible, reduce redundant or obsolete tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This should be done with much fanfare to capture the moral high ground so often surrendered to the critics. For example, 1000 warheads were withdrawn in connection with the 1979 "dual track" decision, and a decision was made in 1983 to withdraw 1400 more, leaving some 4600 tactical warheads still in Europe (Sharp, 1985b:38,39). These developments received little attention but held the potential for a considerable diplomatic coup.

These five suggestions are somewhat superficial and do not address more substantive and formidable issues. Other possibilities include clarifying the global role of the Alliance and reducing European anxiety about the spillover of Third World conflicts. These additional issues illustrate the magnitude of the agenda that must be confronted if the West European public is to be reassured and the political cohesiveness and viability of the Atlantic Alliance is to be enhanced.

Notes

¹Other domestic or internal influences on foreign policy are the following: geographic and other nonhuman characteristics of a nation; social, economic, cultural, psychological, and political processes; the media and mass communication; the character of a nation's elites: their

backgrounds, role orientations, attitudes, and solidarity; decision-making processes; organizational, institutional, and bureaucratic tendencies; and the past experiences and value orientations of a society (Rosenau, 1980:115-117). Interest in these internal influences on foreign policy must not be at the neglect of external stimuli: the behavior of other nation-states and the structure of the international system. The point is that the public is obviously only one (an important one as argued in this study) among several variables influencing the foreign policies of West European nations.

²In the parliamentary systems common to Western Europe, executive and legislative powers are fused together in the cabinet, thus providing the heads of European governments with substantially more explicit authority than that of the American president, who often must rely on persuasion and bargaining to win congressional cooperation for his initiatives. Presidential popularity, a public opinion measure taken almost daily, is critical to the American president's powers of persuasion.

³Sample size and composition of the International Leaders Survey 1981 are as follows:

	(Percentages)			
	France	W. Ger.	Italy	Britain
<u>Political</u>				
1. Parliamentarian	26	27	26	21
2. Ministry	20	17	19	16
3. Other	1	1	0	3
<u>Business</u>				
4. Corporations	10	12	12	13
5. Banking	8	8	7	8
6. Other	0	0	1	0
<u>Media</u>				
7. Print	25	22	30	25
8. TV/Radio	10	10	4	13
9. Academics	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	100%	98%	99%	99%
N =	73	76	73	75

⁴See note 3 in Chapter III.

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED IN CHAPTER III¹

1. INTLEXP (International Expectations)

Variable 0012: "It (1981) will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same?"

- (1) Peaceful year
- (4) Remain the same
- (7) Troubled year

2. The DEFPRI (Defense Priority) measure was created by combining two separate survey questions.

Variable 0016: "There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Which of these goals would you give top priority within the next ten years?"

- (1) Economic growth
- (2) Maintain strong defense forces
- (3) Giving people more say at work and in their community
- (4) More emphasis on cultural growth than the economy

Variable 0017: "And what would be your second choice?"

- (1) Economic growth
- (2) Maintain strong defense forces
- (3) Giving people more say at work and in their
community
- (4) More emphasis on cultural growth than the economy

According to their choices on these two questions, respondents were categorized into two groups. Those selecting response #2 (strong defense forces) on either question (top or second priority) were classified as giving defense a high priority, and all others were considered to have given defense a low priority. The final variable was:

- (1) Low priority for defense
- (7) High priority for defense

3. UNIEUR (Unify Europe)

Variable 0022: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? (If FOR) Are you very much for this, or only to some extent? (If AGAINST) Are you only to some extent against or very much against?"

- (1) Against - very much
- (3) Against - to some extent
- (5) For - to some extent
- (7) For - very much

4. EECMEM (European Economic Community Membership)

Variable 0023: "Generally speaking, do you think that (country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

- (1) Bad thing
- (4) Neither good nor bad
- (7) Good thing

5. NATOESS (NATO Essential)

Variable 0026: "Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?"

- (1) No longer essential (or "never was," if volunteered)
- (7) Still essential

6. NATOSPT (Support of NATO)

Variable 0027: "In your opinion, should our defense spending in support of NATO be increased, decreased, or remain at the present level?"

- (1) Decreased
- (4) Remain at the present level
- (7) increased

7. TRUSTUS (Trustworthiness of Americans)

Variable 0041: "How trustworthy are Americans?"

- (1) Not at all
- (3) Not very
- (5) Fairly
- (7) Very

8. FORPOL (Foreign Policy)

Variable 0045: "Which of the following statements comes closest to your views of how (country) should conduct its foreign policy?"

- (1) Join with the other EEC member states and with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to develop an all-European policy
- (3) Make its own foreign policy decisions independent of other nations
- (5) Join with the other EEC member states to develop a common European Community foreign policy toward the rest of the world
- (7) Join with the other EEC member states and the United States to develop a common Atlantic foreign policy

9. ECPOL (Economic Policy)²

Variable 0046: "And which of the following statements comes the closest to your view on how (country) should conduct its economic relations with the rest of the world?"

- (1) Make its own economic policy independent of other nations
- (4) Develop a common European Community policy by working closely with the other European Community states
- (7) Develop an Atlantic economic policy by working closely with other European Community states and the United States
- (7) Develop a common economic policy not only with the United States and the other European Community states but also with Japan

10. SCTYPOL (Security Policy)

Variable 0047: "Thinking now of the protection of (country) against possible attack from the outside, which of the statements listed on this card comes closest to your own view of how (country) should provide for its security in the 1980s?"

- (1) Reduce our emphasis on military defense and rely on greater accommodation with the Soviet Union
- (2) Rely on our own nation's defense forces without belonging to any military alliance
- (4) Establish an independent West European defense force under European command, but not allied with the United States

- (4) Withdraw our military forces from NATO but otherwise remain in NATO for things such as policy consultation
- (6) Establish within NATO a unified West European defense force under European command, but allied to the United States
- (7) Continue in NATO among the countries of Western Europe and the United States and Canada

Notes

¹Items are taken directly from the Eurobarometer 14 Codebook; however, the responses reflect the recoded values. Variable identity numbers from the Codebook are provided.

²The final two items, ECPOL and SCTYPOL, each contained two responses that received equal values during recoding. This was necessary because in each case the pair of responses were interpreted as not being amenable to ordinal ranking.

APPENDIX B

TESTS FOR INTERACTION FROM CHAPTER IV

Interaction exists when the strength of association between two variables varies according to the levels of a third variable (Agresti and Agresti, 1979:227). Apparent effects may be spurious. It is not useful to consider the differences in means of the levels of a categorical variable using ANOVA, if those differences vary according to the level of another categorical variable entered in the two-way analysis. In the absence of interaction, the nature of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable does not change for different levels of the control variable.

Cross-product terms are used to test for the presence of interaction. These are created by multiplying together the values for the categories of the independent variables so for each pair of variables there are several cross-products. The cross-products are then tested for significance with the F statistic just as the other variables are. The null hypothesis is that for each pair of independent variables interaction does not exist. Small F values producing large P values result in H₀ being accepted. This

means that for the specific cross-product terms being tested for each pair of the variables, interaction does not exist, and the cross-product terms can be eliminated from the model.

In Chapter IV, the multivariate analysis of the European sample began with seven independent variables. Twenty-one combinations of independent variables for two-way interaction effects (higher level interaction effects were not tested) were produced for each dependent variable. All yielded significant levels of $p < .05$ except for one. This indicates that interaction may exist. However, "large sample sizes may lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no interaction in situations where the extent of the interaction is so small as to be unimportant" (Agresti and Agresti, 1979:440). The European sample exceeded 4000 cases. Therefore, to reduce the sample size, tests were conducted again using the smaller separate samples from each country.

Table B-1 in this appendix displays all of these interaction terms for the two scales. Out of 168 combinations of independent variables, only 23 (about 14%) were significant at .05. The term recurring the most often was that of ideology/participation, which was significant four times.

Sample sizes around 1000, as was the case for these analyses, are still large and could continue to produce significant but not substantial indicators of interaction.

TABLE B-1
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF INTERACTION TERMS, BY NATION

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>
General Values	.50	.63	.02*	.24	.33	.10	.01*	.82
General Class	.25	.71	.74	.46	.04*	.01*	.41	.39
General Education	.30	.12	.86	.31	.74	.01*	.15	.23
General Ideology	.74	.22	.08	.61	.18	.25	.93	.78
General Participation	.03*	.21	.86	.93	.25	.17	.15	.46
General Party	.04*	.03*	.06	.27	.01*	.53	.76	.16
Values Class	.33	.22	.46	.54	.16	.23	.01*	.34
Values Education	.18	.22	.18	.32	.33	.41	.53	.10
Values Ideology	.22	.76	.18	.46	.53	.08	.98	.25
Values Participation	.61	.32	.97	.86	.19	.24	.06	.24
Values Party	.10	.13	.66	.69	.15	.01*	.62	.52
Class Education	.07	.38	.11	.38	.08	.07	.73	.54
Class Ideology	.97	.16	.46	.80	.20	.35	.86	.56
Class Participation	.12	.76	.45	.90	.43	.13	.03*	.11
Class Party	.03*	.01*	.75	.36	.32	.78	.52	.18
Education Ideology	.11	.55	.11	.07	.28	.41	.71	.12
Education Participation	.54	.61	.73	.09	.07	.32	.32	.03*
Education Party	.46	.43	.21	.16	.33	.55	.50	.07

Continued

TABLE B-1
CONTINUED

	<u>France</u>		<u>W. Ger.</u>		<u>Italy</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Nonmil</u>
Ideology Participation	.41	.63	.01*	.43	.05*	.02*	.03*	.77
Ideology Party	.26	.20	.01*	.04*	.67	.17	.01*	.14
Participation Party	.10	.02*	.69	.17	.79	.47	.07	.25

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

* Highlights values of .05 or less.

Note: Entries are attained significance levels derived from the F statistic in ANOVA. Results were produced by the same analysis that produced the data displayed in Table 4-9 in Chapter IV.

Mil = Military Cooperation Scale.
Nonmil = Nonmilitary Cooperation Scale.

Another test for interaction involves the direct observation of the sample means in the various cells of the cross-classification tables to determine the importance of interaction. The object is to compare the amount and direction of the differences in means for all of the pairs of means across each variable. Minor variations can be determined to be substantively unimportant despite the apparent statistical significance (Agresti and Agresti, 1979:440).

Cross-classification tables of the standard deviations from the mean were constructed for those interaction terms that were listed as significant in Table B-1. These selective terms are displayed by nation in Tables B-2 to B-5.

The effects of interaction are most apparent and substantive in those cross-classification comparisons in which participation is one of the variables. For France, in Table B-2, comparisons 1 and 6 illustrate that the variable participation has no independent effect, but rather, each category of the other variables apparently include activists who exceed the dominant view of their group. For example, in comparison 1, postwar Frenchmen tend to oppose military cooperation, and the activists appear to oppose it more than the nonactivists; but for the prewar Frenchmen, the opposite is the case, the activists are the strongest supporters of military cooperation. A similar condition exists among the parties in France. According to comparison 6, activists in the PCF oppose nonmilitary cooperation more than the

TABLE B-2

CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF
INTERACTION TERMS, FOR FRANCE

I. For the Military Cooperation Scale

1. <u>Generation</u>	<u>Participation</u>		2. <u>Generation</u>	PCF	<u>Party</u>		
	Activist	Nonact			PSF	UDF	RPR
Postwar	-.51	-.05	Postwar	-.64	-.13	.52	.39
WW II	-.22	-.07	WW II	-.61	-.29	.30	.37
Prewar	.37	.27	Prewar	-.84	.43	.50	.64

3. <u>Class</u>	PCF	<u>Party</u>		
		PSF	UDF	RPR
Working	-.49	-.18	.17	.31
New Mid	-.88	-.19	.32	.52
Bourgeois	-.52	-.35	.12	.85

II. For the Nonmilitary Cooperation Scale

4. <u>Generation</u>	PCF	<u>Party</u>			5. <u>Class</u>	PCF	<u>Party</u>		
		PSF	UDF	RPR			PSF	UDF	RPR
Postwar	-.47	-.05	.28	.47	Work	-.73	-.11	-.02	.38
WW II	-.82	-.05	.36	.10	New Mid	-.77	.04	.48	.26
Prewar	-.98	.04	.32	.08	Bourgeois	.15	.08	.18	.50

6. <u>Participation</u>	PCF	<u>Party</u>		
		PSF	UDF	RPR
Activist	-1.16	.12	.64	.45
Nonactivist	-.57	-.05	.31	.12

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980)

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the scale mean. Positive score indicates support for the scale. Results produced by ANOVA.

TABLE B-3

CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF
INTERACTION TERMS, FOR WEST GERMANY

I. For the Military Cooperation Scale

1. <u>Generation</u>	Postmat	Values		2. <u>Ideology</u>	Participation	
		Neither	Mat		Activist	Nonactivist
Postwar	-.38	-.05	.18	Left	-.1.18	-.39
WW II	-.94	-.06	.27	Center	.26	.03
Prewar	-.95	.02	.05	Right	.67	.19

3. <u>Ideology</u>	Party		
	Greens/SPD	FDP	CDU/CSU
Left	-.52	-.37	.06
Center	-.02	-.04	.27
Right	-.02	.15	.37

II. For the Nonmilitary Cooperation Scale

3. <u>Ideology</u>	Party		
	Greens/SPD	FDP	CDU/CSU
Left	-.04	-.43	-.31
Center	-.14	.09	.17
Right	-.04	.16	.12

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the scale means. Positive scores indicate support for the scale. Results produced by ANOVA.

TABLE B-4

CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF INTERACTION TERMS, FOR ITALY

I. For the Military Cooperation Scale

1. Generation	Working	Class		2. Ideology		Participation	
		New	Mid	Bourgeois	Left	Center	Right
Postwar	-.18	-.33	-.17		-.76		-.40
WW II	-.05	.02	.17		.72		.28
Prewar	-.18	.39	.03		.78		.52

II. For the Nonmilitary Cooperation Scale

3. Generation	Working	Class		4. Ideology		Participation	
		New	Mid	Bourgeois	Left	Center	Right
Postwar	-.14	-.01	.07		-.39		-.23
WW II	-.09	.09	.17		.43		.11
Prewar	-.82	.33	.11		1.01		.33

5. Generation	Primary	Education		College	6. Values	Party
		Mid	High			
Postwar	-.17	-.08	-.02	.09	PCI/PSI	DCI
WW II	-.10	.12	.40	.14	Postmat	Neither
Prewar	-.09	.59	.04	.15	Mat	Mat

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the scale mean. Positive scores indicate support for the scale. Results produced by ANOVA.

TABLE B-5

CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF INTERACTION TERMS, FOR BRITAIN

I. For the Military Cooperation Scale				II. For the Nonmilitary Cooperation Scale			
1.							
	Generation	Postmat	Mat	Class	Postmat	Values	Mat
	Postwar	-.65	.03	Working	-.26	Neither	-.02
	WW II	.07	.06	New Mid	-.35		.15
	Prewar	-.51	.31	Bourgeois	-.62		.14
3.				4.			
	Ideology	Participation		Ideology	Labour	Party	Tory
	Left	Activist	Nonact	Left	-.46	Liberal	.40
	Center	-.92	-.36	Center	-.21		.36
	Right	-.38	.02	Right	-.23		.41
		.47	.26				
5.							
	Education	Participation					
	Primary	Activist	Nonactivist				
	Middle	-.29	-.17				
	High Sch	.03	-.10				
	College	.74	.25				
		-.15	.53				

Source: Eurobarometer 14 (October 1980).

Note: Cell entries are standard deviations from the scale mean. Positive scores indicate support for the scale. Results produced by ANOVA.

nonactivists; but for the other parties, activists support it more than the nonactivists. Thus, the effect of participation varies according to the category of the other variables. This is true also of comparison 2 in Table B-3 for West Germany, comparisons 2 and 4 in Table B-4 for Italy, and comparisons 3 and 5 in Table B-5 for Britain.

This further supports the earlier refutation of hypothesis H.8 which posited an association between activism and lower support for Atlantic cooperation. That is not the case. Those groups tending to support Atlantic cooperation have their own activists who are the strongest supporters. Thus, participation effects behavior, but not attitudes.

To avoid having cells with no cases, the parties of the Left in West Germany and Italy were combined. Empty cells cause the entire computer procedure to abort, so this recoding was a technical requirement. This does not, however, appear to have altered these results in regard to interaction.

Interaction is also present to some degree with class and generation, but not to the extent as with participation. For example, in comparison 2 for France, to compare the prewar generation with the WW II generation for the different parties, the differences are as follows: for the RPR (prewar - WWII =): .27; UDF: .20; PSF: .72; but for the PCF, it is -.23. For the PCF the direction of difference changes. Exceptions of this type affecting one or a few cells within a comparison exist in most of the other

comparisons displayed in this appendix; however, the overall effects tend to be uniform.

Thus, interaction is determined to be substantial and meaningful for participation, but not for the other variables. This explains why the participation variable does not contribute at all to the multivariate model in Tables 4-8 and 4-9. Future analyses of this type should exclude this variable.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Andrew H. Ziegler, Jr., Major of Infantry, United States Army, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. His responsibilities there include being course director for the comparative politics elective and administering the Academy's Crossroads Africa program.

Prior to his present assignment, Major Ziegler served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Army. These included secretary of the general staff for the 3d Armored Division, Frankfurt, West Germany (1981-1982); mechanized infantry company commander, Gelnhausen, West Germany (1979-1981); and platoon leader, company executive officer, and assistant operations officer in an airborne infantry battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (1975-1979). Major Ziegler's military awards include the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Commendation Medal.

In August of 1987, Major Ziegler will become a student at the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following a year of studies there, he

will return to an infantry battalion in one of the Army's active divisions either in the United States or overseas.

Major Ziegler has a Bachelor of Science degree from Florida State University (1974), a Master of Arts degree from the University of Florida (1984), and he is a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Florida. He is also a graduate of the Army's Infantry Officer's basic and advanced courses as well as the airborne and ranger courses.


Major Ziegler was born in Alliance, Ohio, in 1952, and he graduated from Brandon High School in Brandon, Florida, in 1970. He currently lives in Newburgh, New York, with his wife, Kalli, and their two daughters, Rebekah and Rachel.

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
David P. Conradt, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

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
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
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Kenneth Wald
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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